The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR CLAYTON E. MCMANAWAY, JR.

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*
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INTERVIEW
Q: Today is June 29, 1993. This is an interview with Clayton E. McManaway, Jr. which is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you could start this off by giving me a feeling of where you are coming from. Could you tell me about where you were born and a bit about your background, education, etc.

McMANAWAY: I was born in Greenville, South Carolina, on March 5, 1933. I went to high school there in Greenville and to the University of South Carolina. I was a member of the Naval ROTC and spent my obligatory two years service in the Navy. In fact I was fortunate, I served one year in the Navy and one with the Marines in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Q: What was your major at university?

McMANAWAY: My major was business administration.

Q: Where were you serving in the Navy?

McMANAWAY: I served aboard an aircraft carrier in the Atlantic in a gunnery division as a line officer. Then I was a naval liaison officer with the Marines in the Pacific.

Q: In Okinawa?

McMANAWAY: In Japan and Okinawa. In fact it was the almost full year in Japan that really got me interested in international affairs and influenced me in the direction of doing something international and not domestic. This prompted me after I got out of the Navy to go to what was then called the American Institute of Foreign Trade and is now called Thunderbird, The American Graduate School of International Management, in Arizona. I went there for a year for a graduate degree.

Q: This would have been when?

McMANAWAY: I finished in January, 1959. I graduated from college in 1955, two years in the Service. I started in the middle of the school year and ended in the middle of the school year. I was intending on a career in foreign trade. I graduated during the recession of 1959 and didn't have any money and couldn't get to New York which was the major hiring place. I only had enough money to get to San Francisco. So I went to San Francisco and couldn't get a job. It was quite an experience for about two or three months. This was long enough so I didn't think it was the recession but was me. I had used up all the contacts I had. Finally I accidently got a job with an insurance company and went on to a couple of other jobs which finally got me to New York. I got a little involved in the Kennedy campaign.
Q: In 1960.

McMANAWAY: Right. I was greatly influenced by what he seemed to represent at the
time. My politics have changed since then. It was shortly after his inauguration and that
stirring inaugural speech that I received a call from the government. I had sent off the
usual barrage of letters after finishing graduate school. One of the people I wrote to was
AID [Agency for International Development]. I got several jobs later from people who
originally turned me down saying they would keep my application on file. I didn't believe
it but it turned out to be true. I got three jobs that way. This one was with AID. They had
a program to bring in some new blood in the executive field. I didn't know what that
meant, but I took it. I went down [to Washington] and stayed with the government from
then on. I started with AID and went to Cambodia.

Q: You were there from 1961-64?

McMANAWAY: I joined AID in 1961 and I was a year in Washington attending a
training program, but it was terrible. In fact there were seven of us and we revolted and
went in and complained about the program. We were a bunch of Young Turks. We all,
with possibly one exception, got out of the "executive" field, which turned out to be
administration, and went into program work, which was the substantive work for AID. So
we were there for a year. I had a terrible experience of getting out of there.

Q: I am trying to catch the spirit of the time. What was the problem?

McMANAWAY: Well, AID was being strongly affected by the Kennedy Administration.
It was being reorganized extensively and it was my first run in with government
personnel systems. I found out by accident that they were about to force assign me to
Togo without even telling me about it. So I went to Personnel and asked what I could do
about this. He said, "Well, you could turn it down." I asked how many times could you
do that. He said, "Well, about three." I said, "Well, I turn it down."

Q: Why not Togo?

McMANAWAY: It was of no interest to me. I wasn't interested in Togo. It didn't seem
like a very interesting place to be and didn't have much of a program and didn't seem like
a place to get started. My attention had been attracted to Indochina because of what was
going on.

Q: We are talking about Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam.

McMANAWAY: It seemed to me that was where the action was. I knew they were
recruiting junior people for Cambodia and I somehow got an appointment with the
mission director who was visiting on consultation. He offered me a job and I took it. This
was all outside of channels. When I went back into channels no one would act on it. The
people I was being trained with wouldn't back me up because they didn't want to fight
personnel. The personnel people who were handling African assignments called me a traitor. They were vicious. I had to write up my own memo to Personnel saying that I had been offered this job and I had accepted it and threatened to resign. Once I wrote it down, the whole system sort of collapsed and they finally gave in.

Q: It was a lesson, I take it.

McMANAWAY: It certainly was, I had never dealt with government personnel people before. Of course, AID was a terrible organization anyway, even in those days. It seems to have gotten worse and really should be done away with in my opinion. We should start over.

Anyway, I finally made it out to Cambodia in 1962.

Q: You were there until 1964.

McMANAWAY: About. I was there until Sihanouk kicked us out.

Q: What was your job when you went out there?

McMANAWAY: I was in the program office.

Q: Which means what?

McMANAWAY: In that situation I was an assistant program officer. We had a program officer and a deputy and a few other assistants. We were the OMB [Office of Management and Budget]. You had the technical bureaus, divisions, all pushing their programs. The program office put it all together and had to ultimately justify it. So the technical bureaus had to justify it to us first, so we asked all the hard questions about the programs. Then we supposedly looked at the overall policy, the development policy.

Q: What was your impression and what kind of work were we trying to do? I have always had a question about any of the AID projects because many of them depend almost on the personalities of the people there. If you happen to have a Forestry man there at the head, all of a sudden forestry is the big thing. How did you find the situation?

McMANAWAY: There was the usual sort of mixed picture. When we were kicked out, which is an interesting story in itself, we decided that surely there would be somebody going back in and we discovered as we were getting ready to leave that the files were in terrible condition. We sort of knew that anyway, but didn't realize how bad they really were. So we decided we would write a history of the AID program in Cambodia for the benefit of anyone involved in a renewal of an AID program there and for the record. We did that in Saigon for a long time and then finished it up when I went back to Washington.

We discovered in the files going back to the earliest days of AID programs projects that
we were launching at the time almost identical in education, etc. I remember being horrified to find in the files a project agreement with the government of Cambodia that was almost an exact duplicate of a program we had designed and were very proud of in the field of education just the year before. The previous program had been done years before and nothing had ever come of it.

The French had refurbished a canal system that the Khmer had built back in the 9th and 10th centuries. We went up and refurbished that and then found out that the farmers weren't using it...this showed how much we knew about the country. We finally sent an anthropologist up to the lake, which is the lake that the Mekong backs up into [the Tonle Sap]. We were trying to get the farmers to do double cropping. Well, they were already doing it using the rise and fall of the lake to do exactly what we were trying to get them to do with the irrigation. So they didn't need it.

There were dire predictions that everything would collapse when we left. The road that we had built down to the bay would be impassible, etc. None of those things happened. I didn't think much of our AID program.

Q: How did you see the political/economic situation during this 1962-64 period?

McMANAWAY: Well, Sihanouk was in firm control at that time, although he had a couple of [threats to his rule]. He had developed to an art this business of saying that he was going to resign and then everybody would beg him not to whenever he got into trouble. The incident that caused us to leave really began with some very anti-American speeches that he had made. I don't remember why he got on this kick, but we were having a good deal of trouble with him. Then Kennedy was killed and things got worse right away. Sihanouk said some things that were [out of line]. I think Averell Harriman at the UN called his statements barbaric which really set him off. We got a letter from him saying that he would not accept another dollar of aid from the United States and that he couldn't promise police protection beyond January 13 or something like that, which, of course, meant we had to get out of there. We began withdrawing quickly. I was not involved in the consultations with the ambassador or between the embassy and the State Department, but we had already taken a couple of actions that couldn't be reversed and suddenly got a cable from Harriman saying to stop everything. We got the cable, I think, on a Friday and then waited and waited and didn't hear anything more. But obviously there were second thoughts about the whole thing.

Q: You had this hold on but I take it the process was still going forward and you were getting ready to get out.

McMANAWAY: Oh, yes. We moved ahead and left on the deadline.

Q: Again looking at it at that time, how were relations between the AID mission and the embassy?

McMANAWAY: They were reasonably good. The ambassador was away. He had had
some kind of ailment and was out of the country.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

McMANAWAY: Philip Sprouse. I, of course, didn't have much direct contact with him being a very junior officer. I had more contact with the DCM [deputy chief of mission] who was a bit of a stuffed shirt. He loved to edit out all split infinitives and that sort of thing. That was his major contribution to our submissions as far as I could see. So we had a chargé at the time. We had a very strong deputy director in the AID mission, Peter Cody, who was a political appointee. You may recall they brought in about ten business tycoons about that time [as country directors] and I think they all failed. This fellow's name was Champaign, I think, and he failed also. He wasn't terribly good. But we marched ahead and left. I think the State Department was not happy with what we did. I think they felt we had jumped the gun and we might have been able to negotiate our staying which they would have preferred.

Q: What was the feeling towards Sihanouk?

McMANAWAY: We were very upset with him at the time. People were angry with him and thought he had behaved very [badly]. Kennedy was well regarded and he had just been assassinated and Sihanouk was making his ugly remarks about being happy with the whole thing. They were terrible vitriolic anti-American speeches and anti-Kennedy speeches. So nobody had any respect for him. He was a small, fat fellow with a high squeaky voice. He was called snoopy. There were a lot of rumors about the kinds of things that went on in the palace.

Q: I used to hear stories that he would go through these crash diets and all hell used to break loose.

McMANAWAY: He would go to France once a year to go on some kind of a special regime. Then there would be trouble at home and he would come flying back and be very dramatic and histrionic. There were a lot of stories about his sexual promiscuity and how he would do a lot of visiting around the countryside and nod to a girl in the audience and his goons would go get her for him. One hilarious thing that happened was Sukarno visited and stayed about a week. The day after he left the front page of the main newspaper had a marvelous photograph of these young beauties lined up at the airport all being decorated for their services to the state.

Q: Sukarno of Indonesia was notorious for the same thing.

McMANAWAY: Yes, the two of them together.

Q: Cambodia wouldn't have been big enough to handle them both.

McMANAWAY: We didn't take Sihanouk very seriously.
Q: But he is still in the action one way or another. At that time was anybody talking about what later became the Khmer Rouge?

McMANAWAY: No.

Q: Were we concerned about a spillover from Vietnam?

McMANAWAY: I don't think so at that time. There was something going on. There was one fellow, but I don't think it had anything to do with the Khmer Rouge, up around who was a rival of Sihanouk's. But there was nothing like a Pol Pot.

Q: When you left Cambodia did you go to Saigon?

McMANAWAY: Yes, for a while.

Q: This was shortly after the death of Diem in October 1963 and you had the October coup and the beginning of the revolving governments and military groups. Were you getting any feel for how the people felt about the situation.

McMANAWAY: We were very isolated there. We were tucked away in one corner of the AID mission and AID missions are pretty well isolated from what is going on at the embassy. So we were even further away from that and pretty much stuck to ourselves. We could sense that there was a good deal of frustration about what was going on and a lot of impatience with these repeated coups and demi-coups.

Q: You were there for how long?

McMANAWAY: I don't remember whether we were there for six months. We had what was then called the commodity import program going on in Cambodia when we shut it down. The commodity import program was easy to run but very complicated to shut down because you had orders all over the place and you had goods and things [in ships] on the high seas and didn't know where they were. There was no system for tracking those things. We were trying to turn ships around and it took a long time to shut the thing down and finally close out the books. I made several trips back over to Phnom Penh. I was there when the embassy was stoned which was another interesting experience.

Q: What happened at the embassy?

McMANAWAY: It was an organized demonstration which turned violent. No one was hurt, everybody was inside. I just barely made it inside before everything erupted. Some cars were turned over and burned, they threw stones through windows and things like that. There was one rickety old elevator in the embassy which was the old French kind being open except for an accordion type metal door. I had gone up to the top floor so that I could see better what was going on. Then word came for everybody to congregate on the second floor. I got in this elevator and you couldn't stop it. It came down [to the main floor] and right in front of the elevator was a window. Well, I hid there. There were three
or four Cambodian fellows outside tearing up a car and they saw me and started throwing things in an attempt to hit me. They didn't succeed but did get things into the elevator. They finally got in on the first floor but the Marines blocked up entrances and they couldn't get any further. It was over after a few hours.

Q: Then you went back to Washington?

McMANAWAY: Yes, and was assigned to the Vietnam Desk.

Q: When you say the Vietnam Desk was this State Department or AID?

McMANAWAY: It was AID.

Q: What was your impression of AID's Vietnam program looking at it from its headquarters?

McMANAWAY: My impression was that it was largely a logistics operation, moving things out to Vietnam. And it was obviously growing by leaps and bounds.

Q: This was just before we started to really get involved.

McMANAWAY: Yes. The fellow who was just above the Desk Officer, whose name was Stoneman, I think, was a good logistician, but that basically was all he understood. So I couldn't see much coherence in what we were doing. Later on, once I went out to Vietnam, I was one of the leaders that finally got us away from this awful business of winning the hearts and minds of...of this terribly naive notion that you can build a school or hospital and win the hearts and...I hate that phrase to this day because it really kept us from really realizing what was at stake there for quite a long time and I think really lost the war for us.

We finally developed the pacification program, which I became involved in, both from within AID and then later when we went through the two reorganizations when Komer came out and got the civilians organized so we could put it into the military organization. It took us a long time to turn around from this thinking and realize that what we had to do was to provide people with a stake in the society and economy and local community that they wanted to protect. A stake that was important to them, not winning their hearts and minds which was nonsense.

Q: When you say winning hearts and minds, how does one win hearts and minds in the mind-set of the 1960s when you were back in Washington?

McMANAWAY: The theory was that you gave them better seeds for their plantings, better schools, better medical services, etc. This would, without regard to what was threatening them, somehow gain you their allegiance. Instead of starting with the notion that what you have to do is develop first of all local security and then they need to have a stake politically in their local government. And they need to have an economic stake.
You do that by connecting them up with markets and with roads, etc. So, it took us a long
time, but we finally got it turned around. Actually, one of the things you will find out
later is that I think we won the war and that is why the [Viet Cong] ultimately faded
away.

Q: The mainline armies...

McMANAWAY: Turned over everything they had. But we won the guerilla war finally.
It took us a lot longer because we didn't understand it. West Point never understood it,
Abrams did.

Q: That was also helped by the Tet offensive which knocked the hell out of the Viet Cong.

McMANAWAY: Yes, decimated it.

Q: Did you volunteer to go back to CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support]?

McMANAWAY: Well, CORDS didn't exist when I went back. I was asked by a fellow
who I had a lot of respect for, Roy Wehrle, who was a real star in AID at the time. He
was a young man rising...

Q: Is he still around?

McMANAWAY: No, he years ago went back to academia out in Illinois. Everything was
inflated in Vietnam in terms of titles. The mission was huge by this time. He was the
assistant director for plans and something or other. He was number three in the mission.
He was back on consultation and asked me to come out and join his program office and
deal with local finance and currency matters, classification, etc. And I did.

Q: This was 1965?

McMANAWAY: Yes.

Q: Were you in Saigon?

McMANAWAY: Yes.

Q: What were the main things you were working on at that time?

McMANAWAY: I was working on pacification. We were torn with a lot of different
ideas about how to bring security to the countryside and how to win the hearts and minds.
One of the things we were looking at was how could you bypass the province chiefs and
get straight to the village chief with money for self-help projects, that is what we called
them then.
I set up a special fund which was jointly administered. It was financed from counterpart funds and required sign-off by the U.S. ambassador and the [South Vietnamese] Prime Minister. I designed this thing and worked it all the way through the bureaucracy and sent the letter over to the embassy to go to the ambassador. Peter Tarnoff was the ambassador's special assistant. I got a call from Peter and he said, "Did you write this?" And I said, "Yes." It was about a three page letter, I was still learning how to write. He said, "The Ambassador wanted to meet whoever wrote this and you are not to tell anybody. Don't tell Charles Mann." The ambassador was Lodge and he couldn't stand Charles Mann, who was the director. Charles Mann was an Austrian who had worked his way up from being a clerk in Paris after the war in the original aid program.

Q: That was before the original Marshall Plan, ICA [International Cooperation Agency] or something like that.

McMANAWAY: He had worked his all the way up to be a mission director. But Lodge couldn't understand him and wasn't about to acknowledge to Mann that he couldn't understand this letter. I was pretty scared. Here I was still a junior officer going over to meet the ambassador alone without telling the director. So I went over there and it was a fascinating experience. I sat in front of Lodge's desk and he said, "Who wrote this awful thing?" I said, "I did." He said, "Well, tell me what you are trying to say." And I told him. He said, "All right, you let me know if I say this wrong." He reached behind him and got his dictaphone and dictated a one page letter which was just beautiful. He said everything I had tried to say. I learned an awful lot from that few minutes. Lodge had a lot of faults but not being able to write was not one of them. Anyway, it went off.

Q: Were you getting any input from the field about your attempts to get down to the village chief?

McMANAWAY: Yes, we got some. We would have meetings with people from the field. But at that time, and one of the reasons we finally had to reorganize, we had too many people in the field, too many agencies had people in the field. Later on when we were looking at how we should reorganize, I drew up an overhead slide thing which showed all these lines going out from Saigon to the field and it was a nightmare. That was when initially the Office of Civil Operations was set up, which got all the civilian agencies together under one chain of command. And then Komer moved it into MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] and that is when it became CORDS.

Q: You were at the AID office as a fairly junior officer, what was their impression of Lodge and his direction?

McMANAWAY: There again, we were pretty well occupied with what we were doing. We thought Lodge was sort of a lazy guy, not very energetic. One had this sense of sort of a caretaker approach to things. Not a lot of initiative coming from him. But I was beginning to rise up by then. I was promoted fairly rapidly in Vietnam because they had temporary promotions which was one of the incentives to get people there. Increasingly I was asked to take on more and more responsibility and I negotiated my way up. I said,
"Well, if you are going to give me all this responsibility..." I reached the FS-01 pay grade, which in those days was as high as you could go when I was 35 or 36. I was negotiating with the Vietnamese budget office on how the local currency was to be used, the entire budget. Later, when I moved over to CORDS we succeeded in taking all that money away from AID. That was one of the reasons I was no longer very popular in AID. We took all the local currency away from AID and put it into the pacification program.

Q: What was your impression of the Vietnamese bureaucracy at this time?

McMANAWAY: You really had to push them to be responsive to the people of the countryside. You basically had Saigon and the rest of Vietnam, which is not uncommon. In terms of their competence, the Vietnamese are very competent people and very bright. I always thought they were too bright for their own good. They were complicated people. My counterpart, who wasn't really my counterpart, I was dealing over my head with this fellow at the budget office, was highly capable and knowledgeable, but had been there too long. He had been doing the same job for much too long and was quite rigid and you really had to fight with him to get any change. In fact I think he opposed this submission that I finally got through.

Q: Was part of the reason for the initiative that the feeling was that if you didn't have a proscribed procedure to get funds down to the village chief they would be sidetracked by the district and province people?

McMANAWAY: Yes, they would never get there.

Q: Did you have any feel for the role in the CIA there?

McMANAWAY: I was probably was pretty naive about it at that point in my career. I didn't know much about it. It was a huge mission and a big joke because they all drove Toyotas. Some procurement officer went out and got the low bid and bought all the same car.

Q: And they all had Hmong guards in front of their place, who were a distinctive racial type so if you saw these guards in front of a house you knew it was CIA.

McMANAWAY: I didn't know very much about what they were doing. We were working extremely long hours and didn't have time to sit around and ponder what other people were doing.

Q: What was the Office of Civil Operations?

McMANAWAY: This developed out of a meeting that took place, I believe in Hawaii, [President] Johnson had with Westmoreland. Komer had been coming out on visits and I had met him. It was decided to send Komer to Saigon. He was a very forceful man.
Q: He was known as the blowtorch or something like that.

McMANAWAY: Johnson had decided to send him out there to get the pacification program going and told Komer that he and Westmoreland was to work it out. So Komer, I think very wisely, realized that he first had to get the civilians organized, which became the Office of Civil Operations and very shortly after that it was moved in as an integral part of MACV and Komer became a deputy to Westmoreland. We worked right through the military organization. Our head was assistant chief of staff for CORDS.

Q: How did AID take this?

McMANAWAY: Badly.

Q: Were sizeable chunks of the AID organization being taken out and put into CORDS?

McMANAWAY: In Saigon they were being taken out and the chain of command was shifted so that the AID people in the field were reporting back not to the AID mission in Saigon but the Office of Civil Operation. Komer asked me to come over with it and I headed up the plans and program office. No one else wanted to do it. A lot of AID people were afraid to do this. They saw this as something...which I think in the end they were right...a lot of people in AID suffered for having served in Vietnam, which was an outrage later on, several years later. I would have, too, but I left. I think I definitely would have because all they were going to offer me was to run the Vietnamese Desk when I got back. I wasn't about to do that. I got an offer from the Defense Department and left AID.

I went over and convinced some people who had been working with me to come with me. Others didn't. Some refused, it was not a requirement. It was not a large office at the beginning, but it was the beginning of this shift of command of all these people in the field. Ultimately we had people down to the district level. When we moved into MACV we integrated everything.

Q: MACV stood for Military Assistance Command Vietnam.

McMANAWAY: We moved right in and became an integral part. The interesting thing about that was once we got inside the elephant we never lost another policy fight. We couldn't win one on the outside. We argued, for example, over how many popular forces there should be, how many regional forces there should be.

Q: These were basically small militia groups at the lower levels.

McMANAWAY: In theory and principle the popular forces were to be under the village chief's command and the regional forces under the district chief's command or in some cases province chief. These are not the full army units. And we couldn't get any attention to this from the U.S. military. The U.S. military, of course, were the ones who were negotiating with the Vietnamese on force levels and that sort of thing. So we couldn't get an increase. Once we got in, of course Tet had an influence on this, too, a lot of things
happened that year of a very positive nature. They mobilized, for one thing. I think the first time the Vietnamese mobilized was after the Tet offensive. They didn't have a government which had the political strength to do it before that.

Q: Tet was in January, 1968?

McMANAWAY: There were three offensives. There was one in February, one in May and one in August. Each one of descending violence. But once we because a part of MACV and were able to put our points forward in their system, I don't think we ever lost another policy decision.

Q: How was the coordination with the military?

McMANAWAY: Well, CORDS was a combined civil/military organization.

Q: Did you have military officers assigned to CORDS?

McMANAWAY: Yes, I had a colonel for a deputy.

Q: How did this work? Were there differences in viewpoint?

McMANAWAY: There were differences but it worked quite well. I was in charge of plans and programs and evaluations. I had a colonel under me. Our top guy who reported technically through the chief of staff to Komer was a civilian and his deputy was a brigadier general. We sort of layered it that way throughout the organization and it worked quite well.

Q: What was your impression of the reports you were getting from the field? Let's say pre-Tet. Was this part of your responsibility to get reports and get an idea of how things were happening?

McMANAWAY: It was not my responsibility but I used them, of course. We had an evaluation unit that went out. Craig Johnstone headed it up. Our impression was that there were a lot more Viet Cong out there than the military was reporting and that Westmoreland wanted to believe. But we were just as surprised by Tet as anyone else. We were not unaware of the weaknesses of the reporting system and that is why we had this evaluation unit to travel all over the country. And I traveled all over the country. And traveled even more after Tet. Before Tet we didn't have a counterpart organization on the Vietnamese side. It was only after Tet that we got them set up as a counterpart organization. Before Tet we would send out instructions to our province advisor and he would go over to the province chief who hadn't heard anything from Saigon, so it was like going up against a brick wall. After Tet when we got the counterpart organization set up, we would parallel these instructions working them out in Saigon first and then the instructions went out so that everybody got the same instructions. Then after Tet we got the first pacification annual plan which grew out of an accelerated pacification campaign that we launched in late summer or early fall that year. John Vann was very much
opposed to that plan. It was one of the few times that John and I had a big argument.

Q: What was your impression of John Vann, he being one of the major figures in our efforts in Vietnam?

McMANAWAY: John was extremely capable, a tremendous leader. His private life was somewhat spectacular also. But I was never a moral moralist, that was his business and not mine. He was driven.

Q: How was he viewed within CORDS?

McMANAWAY: He was one of the heavies. He was never in Saigon, he was always out in the field.

Q: How did Tet hit you personally? Do you have any Tet stories?

McMANAWAY: Well, I was here on leave and was called back. One story...I was getting ready to go back and I got a cable from Komer calling me back. I was sitting in home of some friends of mine in New York watching television and the news came on and there was my good friend George Jacobson leaning out the window of the embassy. Someone is trying to throw him a pistol.

Q: I recall that.

McMANAWAY: I came right out of my chair.

I jumped on a plane and flew back and got to the airport which had taken a direct hit on the building. There was no one there. It was just empty. There was no one there to unload the bags. We finally found somebody to open up the cargo area so we could get our luggage. We carried our own bags. Luckily MACV was right across the street so I was able to get over there. I was walking down the road with my bag and along comes my deputy in my car. It turned out my driver had disappeared and never showed up again. That was my entry back. It was still going on.

Q: You are back and the offensive is still active in various places, how is this affecting the CORDS program?

McMANAWAY: I think there were about 35 cities in the country which were hit or overrun. Initially we pulled in our horns but in Saigon I ended up with three jobs. We set up a recovery organization which I headed for Komer, working directly with the prime minister's office. The guy who headed that up was Colonel Que and he, after a few months, became mayor of Saigon. In fact, we made him mayor of Saigon.

Q: Was this because you felt here is somebody who can do the job?

McMANAWAY: He was a very capable guy, strong and forceful. Saigon was desperate
for leadership. He asked for me as his advisor. So I was doing the pacification planning programming job, the recovery job, and was the advisor to the mayor of Saigon.

Q: Recovery was recovery from the Tet?

McMANAWAY: Yes. One day Bob Komer called me and Bob Montesque, General Montesque, into his office and said, "There is nobody out there. The Viet Cong are not out there. What we need is a pacification offensive." "What the hell is a pacification offensive?" "Go figure it out." Pacification is defensive by its very concept. After three or four days we came up with an accelerated pacification campaign. And it worked. We targeted where we wanted to send forces in every province. It was all mapped out. John Vann objected, he thought we were overextending ourselves.

Q: Were you having more Americans go out in the field?

McMANAWAY: Well, that got them out. What we needed was something to kick both the Americans and the Vietnamese in the backside and get them moving out of the provincial capitals.

Q: I would think this would always be a problem because it was more comfortable in the capital, it was more dangerous in the countryside and there was always the paperwork which ties you down. Was this a problem trying to get people out without tying them down to bureaucratic burdens?

McMANAWAY: The bureaucratic functions weren't really that much of a concern. It was getting both Americans and Vietnamese out of the bunkers and back out into the countryside and in the process convincing them that in fact there was no one out there, and there wasn't. It was a big success and we built on that and used that as the model for the annual pacification plan which came the next year.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point? I want to put something on the tape so we will know where to start next time. I would like to ask you about the Phoenix program; your impression of Westmoreland, Abrams, Bunker and how the embassy worked; also were you getting at this point any reflections of the operation of the CIA in their work; talking about the post-Tet period.

McMANAWAY: Fine.

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Q: Today is September 14, 1993. You mentioned last time that you wanted to talk about the RD [Rural Development] Cadre program. What was that?

McMANAWAY: That was a program run originally by the CIA. It was a concept which ultimately proved ineffective. The concept was that you would take trained Vietnamese, teams trained in various specific projects and disciplines...health, education, security,
etc... and send them into VC [Viet Cong] controlled areas, into the hamlets where they would dispose of the VC and provide a form of government and then move on. The fallacy in the concept was that they did move on, didn't stay. Of course once they left the VC came back and anybody who had cooperated with them in the meantime was singled out by the VC for abuse. This was part of our learning process in Vietnam. I can recall and still work myself up into a bit of a lather over this phrase "winning the minds and hearts" of the people, which was a stupid idea. It took a long time to get away from that concept. A lot of it came out of AID and their notion of nation building.

**Q:** Wasn't this also a reflection of the Kennedy Peace Corps and very American?

McMANAWAY: It is very American. But the idea that you can go in and build a health clinic which then doesn't get stocked with supplies on a continuous basis is nonsense. It took us a long time to get away from that. It took us until 1967-68 to start getting away from that idea and getting into the idea that what we needed to do was to build a political, economic, and social structure in which the local people had a stake and wanted to protect. After Tet we were able to persuade first the U.S. military and then the South Vietnamese military, that local forces were important. We got a huge increase in the local forces which were called popular forces which were at least theoretically under the control of the local chief. So you had permanent security in these areas, not transitory. That made a big difference and was one of the major turning points. It was also a reflection of our beginning to understand the war.

**Q:** You were there during the period when people were beginning to understand this. Was it first sort of a theoretical thing, with people saying this sounds good and then trying it out, or were there hard minded people as opposed to people who were sort of warm and loving and thought this would do it? How did this work out?

McMANAWAY: You had several things going on at the same time. At the highest level you had President Johnson appointing Bob Komer as his man on pacification...we never did come up with a better name for it than that. At a meeting with Westmoreland, I think in Hawaii in 1966 or 1967, he assigned Komer to Vietnam and told Bob and Westmoreland to work out the relationship. Komer was to be in charge of pacification as a deputy to Westmoreland. Komer was a brilliant bureaucrat, in the best sense of that word. He saw right away [what to do]. What had happened prior to that is that we had a proliferation of civilian agencies in Vietnam, each with its own line of command out to people in the provinces where their people were stationed. I once drew up a briefing chart which showed all the lines out going out to the provinces from Saigon which was a nightmare. There was no coordination. The civilians were not working together. So Bob decided first to get the civilians organized and he established the Office of Civil Operations. He pulled segments out of AID, USIA [United States Information Agency] and other civilian agencies that were there, and put them all together in this outfit which we pronounced OCO. Once he had accomplished that he moved it into MACV, into the military structure, which was his goal all along. The civilians were no match for the military in terms of staffing and bureaucratic struggles for winning any policy issues until we got into MACV. One of the most miraculous things to me was that once we got into
MACV we never lost a policy fight. We were inside the elephant and able to do quite a number of revolutionary things. One of them was to get this terrific increase in popular forces. We got across various aspects like permanent security and redoing village structure through elections, etc.

Then Tet came along which was a tremendous defeat for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, although obviously not perceived that way. But it was. There were three Tet offensives, one in February, one in May and one later on, I think, in August.

We were getting away from the RD Cadre at that point and moving towards using the regional forces and restructuring the village and using the more sophisticated concept of what pacification needs to be about. Now the accelerated pacification campaign was a big success. Komer was right, the Viet Cong were not out there. We and the Vietnamese were all hunkered down and there was nobody out there. We brought security to about 3 million people in about 3 months. That led then to the first national pacification plan where we brought all of the programs together, got it written up and translated into Vietnamese, sent out and got them organized.

When I went to Harvard after Vietnam, 1971, I was going to write a book about the year of the monkey, 1968, the year of Tet, because so many firsts happened that year. The South Vietnamese were mobilized for the first time, which meant we could get more forces. We got them to organize themselves in a way that we could relate to them both in Saigon and at the CORDS level, the province level, the district level, which is as far as we went, we didn't go down to the village level in our position, so that we were no longer sending out orders to our people that were not be paralleled by the Vietnamese. We had quite good success. As I may have told you in the last interview, I am one of those who believe we won the guerilla war.

**Q: What was your impression of Westmoreland and Abrams?**

**McMANAWAY:** Westmoreland, in my view, never understood the war. We used to call him instant image, with that granite jaw appearance. He is a fine man but he never understood this war and I don't think he understands it today. Abrams understood it. If we could have had Abrams there from the beginning, the war would have turned out differently. It was fascinating watching Abrams bring his co-commanders around to support pacification. We actually got into the military plan the objective and strategy for supporting pacification under Abrams. He understood it, Westmoreland did not. I don't think Westmoreland read anything. If you didn't brief him he didn't know. Westmoreland was a logistician of some genius, I suppose, but he didn't understand the guerilla war.

**Q: How about Ellsworth Bunker, our ambassador, did you have a chance to see how he operated?**

**McMANAWAY:** He was a master, one of the finest men I have ever known. I did not have the honor of working closely daily with him. I saw him only a few times at country team meetings that I would attend for some specific purpose. He understood the war and
what was going on. I have nothing but admiration for Bunker.

_Q: What was your impression of the embassy which was very large? How did you feel it did in reporting the situation and dealing with the host government, two of the important things an embassy does?_

_McMANAWAY: Well, we were almost a separate operation. We were so big and had so much money, so many forces, and so many people in the organization...there must have been 6000 people in the CORDS section...that we didn't pay much attention to the embassy. When I first got there Arch Calhoun was political counselor and then Phil Habib came along. We would hear from Phil occasionally - he would come and brief us on what was going on. We were interested in those things but we were totally absorbed in our work in the field. Even our contacts with the Vietnamese government were separate [from the embassy]. Now Komer, of course, attended country team meetings, and Colby after him...and he worked much more closely with Bunker. The rest of us in the CORDS organization were totally absorbed in what we were doing._

_Q: It seems to me that one of the major reasons for the eventual defeat of the South Vietnamese was essentially the corruption and the narrowness of its ruling group. How were you dealing with this?_

_McMANAWAY: We had special reporting on province chiefs. We didn't get much involved in the national politics. Komer might have, but the rest of us didn't, although we had periodic meetings with President Thieu. He established a council which we attended. But, again, we talked there about the pacification program, about the war, not about national politics. But we had reporting on corrupt province chiefs and we got them changed. We had a very aggressive stance with the Vietnamese. We were right in there all the time. Komer used to call me up and tell me to go tell the prime minister who he wanted fired. We would go over with lists of province chiefs that we wanted changed and they would be changed._

_Q: I have been interviewing Terry McNamara who was up in Da Nang and he talked about the I Corp commander of the Vietnamese who had quite a reputation for his involvement in all sorts of nefarious things. Would that have been too high to get at?_

_McMANAWAY: Yes, probably too high to deal with. Although we did have a very aggressive posture with corruption. I was not one of those who believe that is the reason they lost the war. I think they lost the war because the North Vietnamese had a better army in the end and the South Vietnamese didn't have our support any more. The first invasion came in 1972 and we provided air support which enabled them to fend it off. Between 1972-75 we began cutting back funds for the South Vietnamese army. By this time I was in the Defense Department and was following it for the Secretary of Defense, Mel Laird. I was on his little group of Vietnamization program. I was seeing reports and doing analysis. The South Vietnamese army no longer had enough ammunition to train. Funds had been cut back so deeply that they were not able to allocate ammunition for training purposes. When the invasion came by the entire North Vietnamese army, they
didn't have our air support.

Q: How about the CIA? You must have been up against them quite a bit since they had their own programs going.

McMANAWAY: Basically what happened was that they pulled out of the RD Cadre program. This was somewhere around 1968-69. It was after Komer left because I remember I was in the office with Bill Colby who had taken over from Komer, when he got the call from Ted Shackley, who was the station chief, informing Bill that they were withdrawing the funding support for the RD Cadre program. They provided intelligence. They worked with South Vietnamese intelligence. But except for that one occasion, we really didn't bump into each other that often that I was aware of. They worked more with the South Vietnamese and strictly intelligence groups and we didn't have that much trouble or involvement with them.

Q: Was the Phoenix program going at that time?

McMANAWAY: The Phoenix was one of the eight or nine programs within pacification.

Q: This is the one that got a lot of publicity and all. My understanding was, and this is really from hearsay, that it was designed to root out the Viet Cong cadre and all.

McMANAWAY: It was designed to go after the Viet Cong leadership and there were several mistakes made with it in how it was described. I remember Bill Komer was called back to appear before Fulbright for a week of hearings and we brought back a whole team. I came with him and did most of the preparation for the hearings in terms of preparing the testimony, the backup and the questions and answers, etc. I sat through the whole thing but didn't say very much. At one point I realized what we were doing. We were getting a lot of tough questions about the Phoenix program and we had described the program as designed to root out the political leadership of the Viet Cong. I remember passing Bill a note saying that we had made a terrible mistake because we were sitting talking to politicians and they probably thought we were talking about legitimate politicians. We weren't, of course, we were talking about the secret command that controlled the organization of the Viet Cong.

In our terms we were very successful in those hearings because, as Bill put it, we stayed back with the trust ads, Fulbright didn't get the headlines that he wanted. However, there was one night that on national television Walter Cronkite, and I have never had any respect for him since, picked up a very sharp exchange that occurred between Senator Gore and Bill about the Phoenix program. Gore had said, "Now you are telling me that it is not an assassination program?" And Bill said, "It is not." Well, that little clip was shown on TV that night followed by a clip of some rather brutal treatment of some elderly Vietnamese gentleman...he was being given the water treatment by Vietnamese soldiers and this was described as being the Phoenix by Walter Cronkite. The analyst who looked at the film clip for us said that it was made up of about ten different incidents that they had pieced together to make up this story for Cronkite to use.
It was not an assassination program, which was the misconception of it. The only mistake we made was that we gave people quotas. That was really a mistake. I remember George Jacobson being very much opposed to that. He perceived rightly how it would seem when it got out. It was intended as a management goal, a way to measure progress. I never thought the Phoenix program worked very well. It was not designed as an assassination program. It was designed to identify, track down and get at the tax collector and the local secret command in control of the network of the Viet Cong. Not necessarily to kill them but to arrest them, to get them out of the picture. What usually happened was that you would get intelligence...this was also supposed to bring together a lot of the different intelligence...about a tax collector or a local commander who was going to be traveling from this village to that village and you would use those popular forces to lay an ambush. More often than not, and I looked at the statistics at how the people who were part of the Viet Cong cadre, the leaders, were actually killed. They were killed in combat not as a result of assassination teams or a deliberate operation aimed at them. So by the time I left in 1970, I thought we had put so many popular forces out into the countryside that we had pretty well suffocated the Viet Cong structure and the Phoenix program was no longer needed. One of my last recommendations before I left was to disband it.

Q: Then you left in 1970. When in 1970?

McMANAWAY: August.

Q: You went to Harvard for a year. What were you doing at Harvard?

McMANAWAY: It was sort of a sabbatical.

Q: You know 1970-71 at Harvard, coming out of Vietnam, how did you react to the student protests?

McMANAWAY: I didn't. I was at the Center for International Affairs which, I guess, started out as the Kissinger Seminar. I had intended to write a book about the Tet offensive, but the atmosphere was such that I dropped the idea immediately. There was no audience whatsoever that wasn't stridently opposed. I found the atmosphere at Harvard to be quite unreceptive to any objective view of Vietnam.

Q: Looking at some of our most prestigious universities they seemed to have all have made up their minds and were closed to listening.

McMANAWAY: Oh, yes, they were completely closed. The thing that upset me the most was watching the professors trying to outdo the students or to curry the favor of the students. I found it absolutely disgusting. Over and over I saw them trying to get out in front of the students in terms of their anti-Vietnam attitudes in order to curry favor with the students.

Q: Harvard was particularly bad, wasn't it?
McMANAWAY: Yes.

Q: *Yale was of the same ilk, I think.*

McMANAWAY: The spring semester before I went there, a bomb was set off at the Center for International Affairs by anti-Vietnam protestors. We didn't have anything like that when I was there.

Q: *Were you able to pursue any studies while you were there?*

McMANAWAY: The arrangement there is that you have faculty status so you don't get any credit there for any academic work you do, but you are free to audit whatever you want. They only ask that you write a paper. I decided to write a paper on how to end the Vietnam war. An amusing little side story...I wrote a paper that said that it was really useless trying to deal with the Russians on this, that we needed to deal with China and that the President should visit China in order to deal with this and then we could deal with the Soviets. You have to defend your paper and I was hooted out of the room. I brought it back down to Washington with me when I came back to work and took it to a friend of mine over at the White House and gave it to him. I got it back with a little note saying, "Very interesting." A few months later the opening to China was announced by the Nixon Administration.

Q: *When you left Harvard in 1971, what did you do?*

McMANAWAY: I had received an offer to go to the Defense Department. One of the things that had happened while I was in Vietnam was that I was put into a position of competing with AID, my parent agency at the time, for resources and we usually won. I really took over all of the local currency and got it put into the pacification program. I was not really very popular with AID and they were not offering me very much in the way of assignments. The best they could come up with was to work on the Vietnam Desk, so I said thank you very much I had had enough of that. Meanwhile I had gotten an offer to go to the Defense Department as a deputy assistant secretary in systems analysis. I said, "You have the wrong guy because you show me a mathematical formula and my eyes glaze over." They said, "Well, that is not what we want. We want you for a particular job called deputy assistant secretary for regional programs, dealing with foreign policy matters and work with the ISA."

Q: *That is the International Security Affairs, which is the foreign policy arm of the Pentagon.*

McMANAWAY: Yes, it's their State Department. So I resigned from AID and moved over to the Defense Department. That is where I met Larry Eagleburger.

Q: *Yes, Larry was running ISA.*
McMANAWAY: Not exactly, he was the deputy assistant secretary, not the assistant secretary. We worked on a number of things together. We worked on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] doing the original papers. In fact some of the stuff that we worked on MBFR in Europe they were still using ten years later.

Q: What was the view at that time from the Pentagon of MBFR? Did they look upon this as a good thing or pie in the sky?

McMANAWAY: I think it was viewed...except for the Deputy Secretary [of Defense]...we had done a lot of work on this when he came in and he announced at the meeting Larry and I had with him and some others, that there was not going to be any MBFR. He got that straight from Nixon. Well, for a while we didn't know what to do. We finally got back on track. And then he left, he didn't stay there very long, it was viewed reasonably well. It was viewed, I think, as a long shot, but worth doing. We also did a lot of work under Schlesinger, when he came in as Secretary, on the balance of forces in Europe...what it was and how capable our forces and our allies of standing up to a Russian attack. I once took materials which proved that NATO could hold that would take you two days to go over in detail and condensed it to a two-hour briefing for NATO ministers, which we gave at Camp David with Schlesinger in the chair.

Q: Was this under Nixon?

McMANAWAY: Yes. The whole purpose was to encourage the NATO allies to continue to allocate adequate resources to defense, because there was sort of a pessimistic air at the time that Russian forces had been built up so greatly that NATO couldn't hold. The work we did showed that NATO could hold.

Q: Was this without nuclear force?

McMANAWAY: Yes, using conventional means.

Q: What was the prevailing view, you were there from 1971-73, of the Soviet threat? Was it something that could happen?

McMANAWAY: Yes, I think so, it was something that could happen. I think that was tempered somewhat by the fact that the Soviets had not done anything when we bombed North Vietnam. I recall Larry Eagleburger coming back from [overseas]. He was working on the treaty that we finally signed with the Soviets about operations at sea. He went to Moscow and came back saying, "I am not sure those missiles will work."

Q: Now that we are in the post-Soviet period we wonder if we exaggerated the Soviet capabilities.

McMANAWAY: We probably did.

Q: What was your impression about working in the Pentagon? How did they see the
world? Was it a different view than seen by AID and the State Department?

McMANAWAY: Oh, yes, of course, it was a different view. You were working on much bigger policy questions than I had been before. But I was still working on Vietnamization. I wrote a paper trying to keep us out of Cambodia, which didn't succeed. I am not quite sure what you are looking for.

Q: I am just wondering whether the military saw things differently. While we would be looking for arrangements, would the military be looking and preparing for the war?

McMANAWAY: Oh, there is always that. I was opposed to the situation in Cambodia but wasn't able to prevail. The military's program of assistance to the Cambodian army was to build them another American army which would be totally out of place.

Q: I think of these pictures with these slight Cambodians in our huge American helmets and our rifles sort of staggering around.

McMANAWAY: So there is certainly a mind set there that is very hard to deal with and change. There are not many in the military like Abrams who understands these things.

Q: While you were working on the Vietnamization, which was essentially turning everything over to Vietnam, did you feel at the time that this was a viable program or were you always looking over your shoulder at Congress and realizing that our mandate had run out?

McMANAWAY: The Vietnamization program was proceeding quite well. I wrote the withdrawal memos. I never saw the finals, they were kept in great secrecy. Although I had prepared the analysis and response to Abrams’ proposals and for each withdrawal that went over to the White House from Laird. I can't remember the year, but Thieu sent a delegation to Washington seeking more aid and it was not received anywhere. They went home empty handed. I think that was when I realized the jig was up. They were going to make it on their own or they weren't going to make it, and it was highly unlikely that they were going to make it on their own, certainly if the North did what it ultimately did, come across the border with its full forces. The Congress had just cut it off. Ford went up with a supplemental and didn't get it. I saw the handwriting on the wall at that time.

Q: Were we beginning to look at a post-Vietnam period where South Vietnam would fall to the North Vietnamese and what that would mean as a military situation?

McMANAWAY: By then I had concluded that our going in there had been a mistake. I am one of those who believe we never should have gone in there. On the other hand once we were in there we should have won it and never allowed ourselves to be defeated. I don't think we understood the history of the region enough to realize [how to conduct the war]. The whole containment policy goes all the way back to the idea that communism was monolithic and the Chinese [were strong supporters of the North]. Well, the Chinese didn't want anything to do with Vietnam. The Chinese were not expanding at all at that
time. If we had done a little [research into] history we would have realized that the Vietnamese and the Chinese fought each other throughout the centuries and that Vietnam had been divided about where the DMZ was back in the 16th century or something. So there was an awful lot of history that could have been instructive had people paid attention to it. But we were fixed on the idea that we had to draw a line somewhere. Put it back into the context of Berlin and all of those things that were going on in the world. There is an apocryphal story that Kennedy was going to change our policy when he returned from Dallas. You probably heard that story.

Q: Yes.

McMANAWAY: I have no idea whether it is true or not. I was also by then quite disillusioned with the whole idea of limited warfare, which I think is an academic concept that doesn't work. I was also disillusioned with the way we had conducted ourselves, and it is still something that irritates the hell out of me when I see it still today, we still have this misconception, of proportional response. Well, that is absolute nonsense when we are fighting a war or doing anything using violence. What you want is a disproportional response. The net result of Vietnam was that we were constantly behind the curve and we were letting them dictate what was going to happen next. We read and heard reports after the bombing of Hanoi had stopped, that if we had kept it up a little bit longer they might have crumbled. European diplomats in Hanoi at the time were saying that. Of course we didn't do it. Why we fought that war the way we did [is a tragedy]. The concept of limited warfare goes back to Korea. There are some good books that I have read subsequently which say that is the beginning of this whole idea, which is an oxymoron as far as I am concerned.

Q: You left the Pentagon in 1973 and did what?

McMANAWAY: Bill Colby became Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and he was the first director to take seriously a memorandum from the President, President Nixon directing the director of the CIA to be the director of central intelligence [DCI] and to wear two hats. One, to run the CIA and the other to coordinate the rest of the government's intelligence community. So Bill set up a staff called the Intelligence Community Staff. Prior to that I think Helms decided that since many of the resources were in the Defense Department, he wasn't going to go up against Bill Laird, and probably wisely. But Bill was determined to carry out that mandate. He asked me to be on the Staff. I did and worked with Bill and others in trying to effect that coordination.

Q: How did it work out?

McMANAWAY: It worked out pretty well. We put together the first comprehensive intelligence community program budget for presentation to Congress. This was the first time it had all been put together in one document. One thing we didn't do successfully, Bill wanted to set up an evaluation system to evaluate which sources of intelligence were giving us the most value for the buck. We worked very hard on that but didn't succeed. Later, after I left, they got an executive order to back them up and it has worked quite
well. I think it has been disbanded now. We didn't have an executive order and had to do an awful lot by persuasion and sort of an after the fact approach on some things. After the executive order the Intelligence Community Staff became a more formalized part of the community.

Q: What was your impression of the various elements you had to deal with...INR of the State Department which is essentially doing political analysis; and there is Defense's National Security Agency [NSA] and CIA? Did you see a difference between these as far as timeliness and effectiveness was concerned?

McMANAWAY: Yes. The CIA as an organization is, I think, one of the most professional in the government. It is a peculiar culture, part of which stems from where it is located geographically.

Q: It is across the Potomac...

McMANAWAY: It is isolated from Washington. What I observed, I don't know what it is like now, but when I was there the Director was God. He was more important than anyone in the government. He was more important than the President. They would kill themselves for the Director. They would do anything for him. They would work night after night or whatever he wanted. The distortion in their thinking was that what he wanted was the most important thing going. I am sure they probably thought he should have been a member of the cabinet which under Carter [he was].

Q: It has come back and forth.

McMANAWAY: I think it is a big mistake.

Q: It is a big mistake, he is an advisor rather than an operator.

McMANAWAY: Now, Colby was a pretty humble guy and never took advantage of that, but they are very responsive to the Director and they are very good. They do...it has happened often enough and people commented on it how they can get a mind set in the analytical part of CIA and not see it. The 1973 war in the Middle East...

Q: This was the October War, the Yom Kippur War, between Egypt, Syria and Israel.

McMANAWAY: ...was missed by the Agency in spite of the fact that they had the war plans. This compartmentalization can be a problem. In the process of trying to set up this evaluation program I went around interviewing a lot of people. I was talking to an analyst out in NSA about his work and how we could evaluate it and he, I have forgotten what prompted him to say this, I must have asked him something about how much he produced or something, said, "Oh, I know a lot more than I write down." So there it was. God knows how much intelligence was resting in this guy's mind and never going anywhere. And there is a problem in NSA of distribution of intelligence. I have run into that. I am sure we have all run into it. Right up to the end of my career we were having problems
with NSA.

Q: NSA being the people who do the eavesdropping with radio and various electronic intelligence, etc.

McMANAWAY: They have one source that is very sensitive, and this was when I was working in counterterrorism, and they were very sensitive about it and would not send us any raw intelligence, only stuff that they had worked on themselves. They made mistakes, they were not experts. They made mistakes in names. There was a big brouhaha about this, it was never solved. I have forgotten who was there, I think it was Inman. There is a big difference in the military between strategic and tactical intelligence. It is an ongoing, never ending problem. The biggest problem with intelligence is when do you know you have it.

Q: Yes, you get an awful lot of information in but how do you sort it out.

McMANAWAY: How do you know when you have it and how do you know when you haven't got it. Of course intentions is the biggest [and most difficult] thing to get a hold of.

Q: Well, they hauled you back for the collapse of Vietnam?

McMANAWAY: Larry Eagleburger called and asked if I would come down. I had been in touch with some of the people in the State Department. I was sitting out there watching Vietnam collapse.

Q: This was 1975.

McMANAWAY: I knew there was some agitation within the State Department to get ready for the end and Kissinger was holding them off, I think, for perfectly good reasons because the announcement of a task force on Vietnam would become a self-fulfilling prophesy. But Larry, who at the time was Under Secretary for Management but really Kissinger's right hand man, called and asked if I would be willing to come down and help Dean Brown run this task force. I went in to see Bill Colby and asked what he wanted me to do. He said, "Go, that is more important than anything we are doing here."

Q: This was when in 1975?

McMANAWAY: April 17 or 18. I remember because we had about ten days before Saigon fell and nothing had been done.

Q: Was this that we didn't want to talk the untalkable?

McMANAWAY: Kissinger didn't want it getting out that we had formed a task force to plan for the end of South Vietnam as an independent country. I don't think he or anybody else knew that it was going to unravel as fast as it did.
I called Larry back and told him Bill had said it was okay. He said, "Fine, why don't you come down in the morning." And I said, "Why don't I come right now." It was in the afternoon. I went on down and met with Phil Habib, Dean Brown, who I had never met before. I knew Phil from Vietnam. We met in Larry's office and drafted a memorandum for the President establishing the task force. Phil had resisted it, too. It was his area, he had been running it. But he acquiesced and from then on was quite supportive. Larry had promised me a blank check for whatever I wanted or needed. So Dean became then Mr. Outside and I was Mr. Inside. He dealt with the Congress and the press and I ran the task force.

Q: What was the job of the task force?

McMANAWAY: First of all we had to get organized and we had 12 government agencies involved. We had to get policies together of what we were going to do if Saigon fell. I quickly decided to let the military do their own planning. We wouldn't try and meddle with that. They had done some contingency planning. Later that became a problem which I will come back to. But nothing had been done about what do we do about the Vietnamese. There was not even thinking about it except by some Young Turks like Craig Johnstone and people like that. So we had to get together and get a coordinated government policy position of what we were going to do. We started off with the Immigration and Naturalization Service under a former Marine four-star general who flatly opposed any Vietnamese coming to this country. Some of those meetings of 12 agencies were stormy. And we had to get money, we had no money. We had to go up on the Hill and get money. We found that, of all people, the great refugee [supporter] who had hounded us in Vietnam about refugees this and refugees that, Ted Kennedy, was opposed to this. He said we were going to bring all the fat cats, all the wrong people in. We got to him through the Catholic Church. Rodino was the hero.

Q: Yes, Peter Rodino of New Jersey.

McMANAWAY: He was the hero for us, he carried the weight. We kept him closely briefed. He made a remarkable speech on the floor about immigrants and being from an immigrant family which carried the day. We didn't even know how much money to ask for. As it turned out, we gave some money back. We got one of the few positive GAO reports I have ever seen for a program like this.

Q: What were you thinking in terms of number of Vietnamese?

McMANAWAY: We didn't know what to expect. I think we finally used a figure in the neighborhood of 250,000-300,000. We were also working with the embassy and MACV trying to persuade them what was going to happen.

Q: How did you find dealing with the embassy under Graham Martin?

McMANAWAY: Graham Martin. There was a steady flow of back channel messages
with Martin. Martin wanted to stay even after the outcome was clear. He wanted to stay and negotiate with the North Vietnamese. There has been some misplaced criticism, I think, of Martin about lack of planning. I think Saigon, being what it was like, if the embassy had done any detailed planning it would have gotten out. So I don't fault him for that. But they did miss it though. George Jacobson, who was working very close with Martin, stopped by at the task force after they had gotten home and said, "Well, for once you guys who were 10,000 miles away got it right." We had a hard time convincing him to start evacuating, but did finally get them started.

Q: How did you persuade them?

McMANAWAY: I don't think we did persuade them. I think events finally did that.

Q: It was so obvious from here that after Da Nang fell... 

McMANAWAY: I think they just couldn't believe it. I think it was when II Corp collapsed that the embassy finally realized the situation. I can't remember exactly. We were working night and day up in the Operations Center at the State Department. The situation there created a fascinating psychological problem and a problem from an historian's point of view as well, because there are no windows up there and you have no time reference. You didn't know if it was night or day. So you can't remember when things happen. It is very hard to remember. That whole task force was one long interrupted conversation. You just bounce from one subject to another. I would get home three or four in the morning, lay down for an hour and go back.

Q: You say it was a conversation, what were you doing?

McMANAWAY: First of all we were trying to figure out what was going on in Vietnam. We were planning for the worse case, a great exodus. We were trying to figure out how we could get out those who had worked with us, so they wouldn't be killed or tortured. We were all afraid there was going to be real bloodshed. The military would tell us that one day they could get 10,000 out and the next day they would say they could only get the Americans out. They were back and forth. We were trying to decide where to put them. We were having this fight with the INS. The Washington Action Committee had been activated and was holding meetings over at the White House. We couldn't get an answer out of them. We had given Okinawa back to the Japanese. Where were we going to put these people? And it was typhoon season. But we had no choice, we finally selected Guam and Wake Island as first places. We couldn't get an answer out of the committee. Some of these people were starting to leave on their own. We were also dealing with the airlift. We had started the airlift out of Tan San Nhut, went to Manila and then they started piling up in Manila and the Filipinos started yelling to get them out of here.

The descent on Guam was so close that we sent the admiral a cable saying to get ready because you have 25,000 people coming at you in about 24 hours. What happened was that we suddenly had a fleet out there of about 35,000, the first wave coming out of the
Delta area. I got phone calls asking what to do with this ship that is along side which is listing and full of people. I would say to get the people off. One of those ships floated all the way to Hong Kong.

We were setting up the camps and trying to decide how we were going to deal with it. The basic issues of who is going to deal with it. I said that there is only one organization capable of dealing with this many people, moving them, feeding them, and that is the military. The military has got to do it. So that was one big hurdle we had to get across. Once we got that then you have to watch the military because they will get out from under you and "boom" they are off and running again.

Then we selected the camps here and had to get them activated. We had to find civilians to run them.

Q: I imagine the governors were not very happy about this.

McMANAWAY: We had to stay in touch with the governors, congressional delegations. There were a million things to do. I virtually moved into the Operations Center.

Q: How about the CIA, they had probably the most sensitive group of people that you had to get out?

McMANAWAY: We got a lot of those out.

Q: Did they sort of operate on their own?

McMANAWAY: No, they worked with us. They got them out. There was one story...I had handpicked the beginning group. We started in one room of the Operations Center and ended up taking over the entire Operations Center before it was over. Craig Johnstone was one. Lionel Rosenblatt was another among a lot of people. Paul Hare and Frank Wisner, all these people...I called them directly and told them to get up here, there is no time to waste. And, of course, Larry backed me up on that. We broke every rule in the book when it came to getting people.

One day Craig Johnstone and Lionel Rosenblatt didn't show up. They didn't show up the second day. I said I bet I know where they are and sure enough they had gone back to Vietnam on their own. There has been a movie made out of this. They got a lot of those people you were talking about out by putting them in trunks of cars and getting them to where they were able to board a CIA plane. (this was before the final evacuation, obviously). The movie was called The Last Plane Out. I haven't seen it.

Of course, these two officers had gone against orders and Kissinger was furious. Larry was mad at first and I said, "Larry you can't discipline these guys, look at what they did." Kissinger called him in and read him the riot act and then said he was very proud of them. They both later got a award.
But it didn't end with the final evacuation. That was an awful night. We were listening in the Ops Center on an open radio to the helicopters going in. They turned back, you know, all but the lead helicopter. I have never known and never seen any explanation of it, but there was an order that came over the radio to turn back. It must have come from the North Vietnamese. And the general landed, looked up and there was nobody behind him. So they had to get everybody back out and over there. We listened to that whole thing. It was one of the saddest nights, God, it was depressing. You could cut the gloom in the Operations Center. Larry was trying to make jokes to cheer us up and get us through it. We were all there. Phil was there. Larry was there.

But it didn't end with that for us because we had all these people coming out. We were still patrolling just outside territorial waters. We had to get these camps set up. We wanted to get Vietnamese speakers, FSOs into these camps, which we were able to do. A funny story there. One of the fellows that I had sent out to Guam, who was actually military but he had worked with us in Vietnam...he had taught himself Vietnamese. I sent him out to Camp Monitor, Guam, and we had this tent city of 25,000 at one time. A year later, by the way, a typhoon hit Guam and it would have wiped out such a camp. That was one of our nightmares. This fellow was walking through one of the camps one night and two or three elderly Vietnamese asked him to come over and said, "We notice you speak Vietnamese." And he said, "Yes." They said, "Can we ask you a question?" And he said, "Of course." "Were we?" They had been out fishing and this huge aircraft carrier comes by and sweeps them up. And when he said, "You are in the United States," they said, "Oh, shit." They had no intention of leaving, they were just out fishing.

Q: What turned the INS around?

McMANAWAY: Visiting the camps. Well, first of all, the first big breakthrough we got with General Ewing was at one of the big 12 agency meetings, everybody sent two or three people so the conference room was just jammed with people. We had this flotilla of ships floating around. Finally I lost my temper with the guy and said, "What do you want us to do with these 35,000 people, let them just sink? We have to put them some where, we have to put them on Guam." He was afraid that if you put them on Guam they would be able to claim political asylum. I said, "These people know nothing about political asylum." And he finally gave in. Then he visited the camp and met some of the people. He just turned around completely. He thought we were going to bring in bad guys, and we did get a few, but by in large they were good people.

Q: When the thing really developed and all of a sudden you had tens of thousands of people coming out, how did Congress respond?

McMANAWAY: We had to keep going up and changing our estimate and they were getting pretty irritated with us. Once it was going there was no way to stop it. We set up four camps in the States. We had to have a processing system and had to set up all that. We had to do the planning of how long it was going to take, how long to keep the camps open, etc. The military was absolutely magnificent. They had these places ready. Camp Pendleton was ready with just a few hours to spare.
Q: Camp Pendleton in California.

McMANAWAY: Yes. There was Pendleton in California, Chaffee in Arkansas, one in Texas...there were four or five camps. We ended up bringing 250,000 people. There came a point when we had our own internal arguments about when was the time to stop. We were well past the point of getting people who were in political danger. It was becoming an economic thing. In fact, several years later I returned to the subject with Phil Habib when he was Under Secretary for Political Affairs. There was a sudden surge of people out of Vietnam and the White House got concerned about it and wanted to know what we should do. I wrote a long paper for Phil pointing out that these were economic refugees.

One of the interesting things that happened, the Viet Cong had planted some agitators and they were causing trouble at various camps and wanted to go back to Vietnam. We consolidated them all out in California and someone asked, “What are we going to do with all these people?” I said, "Well, let's send them back." We found a ship that was in Hawaii that was seaworthy. No one knew to whom it belonged. We found that among these 2,500 there were some seamen. So I wrote a memorandum to Phil saying, "Let's stock this ship for about a million bucks and escort it to within 12 or 3 miles, whichever the territorial limit was, and send them back." And we did. And that was the end of that. They wanted to go back, so we did it. Don't know what happened to them.

Q: Let's cut it off and pick it up next time when you were dealing with the Sinai mission.

McMANAWAY: Fine.

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Q: Today is January 20, 1994 and we continue the interview. After the Vietnam task force and dealing with the immediate repercussions of the fall of Vietnam, what happened to you then?

McMANAWAY: Larry Eagleburger talked to me about staying in the State Department. He wanted to establish another assistant secretary-level position for a resource manager, but that never happened. At one point I did a special job for Phil Habib. I think the Sinai Mission was the next thing I did. Larry asked me to take on the establishment of the Sinai Mission. Now this was right after the Yom Kippur war.

Q: The Yom Kippur war was in 1973. So by the time you finished the immediate Vietnam business, we are talking about late 1975.

McMANAWAY: What had happened there was the agreement that Kissinger had managed to negotiate for the separation of forces. Both sides [Israel and Egypt] wanted an American presence between them. I think we started this in October, November and we had to have it done with an early warning system set up between the forces in order for them to disengage. This disengagement was to take place, I think, in February. So we
had a strict deadline on us. We had other restrictions placed on us by the Congress when the money bill was passed for it. We couldn't use anybody who was actively military, they had to be retired at least a year. We couldn't use any intelligence officers and we had to use maximum involvement of private industry. This was to be set up where the Sinai Pass is. Basically there is nothing there but a water line left by the Israelis. It was just desert. So we were faced with building a small town to support the associated early warning system. And we were to do it on contract, bid. And we did it. We got it done. I was the acting director of the Sinai Mission.

Q: Were you doing it in Sinai?

McMANAWAY: No, from Washington.

Q: How did you get the contract?

McMANAWAY: Well, we sent a team out first. We put together a team of different skills that were necessary. I called on some people that I had worked with in the past and who had different skills, whether it was engineering or electronics or communications. etc. Based on their survey we put together an RFP [request for a proposal], which went out on the street. It requested industry to respond in an unusual way because there was very short time. We spent that December and Christmas working, evaluating the various bids that we got. The main bid we got was from E-Systems who had subcontracted to a construction company in San Antonio, Texas, run by a self-made man who started by laying sidewalks. It was a fascinating company. They went to him because he had a hobby of building modular buildings and had put up a hotel for some kind of fair in San Antonio using modules that were about the size of a railroad freight car. They were completely self-contained, basically a little apartment. That was the concept we bought. We then proceeded with it. They made every deadline we gave. And we made our deadline and were operational when we had to be.

Q: What were the main problems that you found?

McMANAWAY: Oh, we had a multitude of problems. We didn't think we would be able to communicate from there. This fellow that I had brought in devised a system where we bounced a signal off the side of the mountain to be able to communicate out to the Egyptian and Israeli governments. We had trouble with the size and weight of these modules. Half way through the planning one of the engineers...at that time there was only a pontoon bridge across the Suez Canal and we had planned to go in through Egypt...figured out that one of the modules would have sunk that bridge. So we had to go in through Israel.

Exactra was the name of the construction company. Boy, what a can-do outfit they were. They went out there and set up search lights to work at night and built a town, as well as laying in these sensors that reported any movement across the lines.

Q: What were the sensors and what were you trying to accomplish with them?
McMANAWAY: We were trying to assure both sides that they would be notified by a third party, and they wanted Americans to do it, of any movement towards their lines as they withdrew. The Sinai Pass is a key pass in the area, the only way through for armor in either direction. It is like a choke point. We had sensors that would sense movement and laid them out on the desert.

Q: How cooperative did you find the Egyptians and the Israelis?

McMANAWAY: Quite cooperative.

Q: On both sides?

McMANAWAY: Both sides, yes. They wanted to disengage and wanted our presence there. We also were doing overflights regularly for photography and providing them to both sides.

Q: One of the things that has come up at a later date from people who have dealt with this is that one gets the feeling that the Egyptians were sort of cloddish, and the Israelis were always probing and trying to take another inch, almost like it was a game. Did you find this at all a problem?

McMANAWAY: Not during my time because once it was up and running I turned it over to [another officer]. He ran it for the next several years. I went on to Management Operations.

Q: Was Congress pretty much behind this?

McMANAWAY: Congress was supportive except for the restrictions they put on us which made it more difficult to get the job done. We didn't have a lot of bureaucratic problems. The major problem we had was the time pressure and there industry responded, I must say, admirably, and the physical reality of what had to be done within the time constraints. The other problem was manning it and again we had to use a lot of contractors who had to be screened with background checks and all that. So there was a lot that had to be done within the short time we had to get it done. Those were the main problems. We had good support. We didn't have any major bureaucratic problems either within the executive branch or with Congress.

Q: Well, you were also drawing upon a tremendous amount of expertise which had come out of the Vietnam war weren't you?

McMANAWAY: I was.

Q: Both civilian and military. There were people basically in their prime who had been there. There is nothing like a war to hone skills.
McMANAWAY: We put together a very good team. The evaluation of the contracts was done on a highly expedited basis. We had special teams working around the clock almost.

Q: Well, it sounds as if you got the right contractor?

McMANAWAY: Yes, it was good. Unfortunately I never got to see it. I never went out there.

Q: So that lasted into 1976. Is that right?

McMANAWAY: Yes.

Q: Then you moved over to management for a while?

McMANAWAY: Director of Management Operations, which was basically the way Larry Eagleburger ran it. Larry was Under Secretary for Management and he used that position as his deputy. Whenever Larry was traveling, I was acting Under Secretary.

Q: Larry Eagleburger is an important figure within the Department of State, later being Secretary of State. From watching him in the management job and as his alter ego, how did he operate?

McMANAWAY: Larry was much more than Under Secretary of State for Management. He was still Kissinger's right hand man, even though he had moved over from that Executive Assistant job he had held previously. I would say that 60 percent of his work was still with Kissinger, writing his speeches, debating with him over policy, etc. As for management, Larry takes a very common sense approach to most things. He delegated a lot of work to his assistant secretaries. He had a pretty good, small staff there right around him. And then there was Management Operations. I did a lot of the managing. We set up a number of management instruments which managed the budget process, which I did mostly. Larry would chair most of the important meetings with the assistant secretaries and resolve any major differences. We also set up a continuous standing committee on, for example, managing the allocation of personnel positions throughout the Department and around the world. Consequently, [there] wasn't always a crisis that we had to come running in at the last minute [to settle]. It was a continuous review of the process. This also opened up management. A lot of these decisions had always been made, not really in the dark, but people weren't part of the process and didn't understand how the decisions had been arrived at. We opened that up by having the geographical bureaus and functional bureaus represented on these different management instruments that we set up.

Q: Did you ever wrestle with the problem of cutting down on representation by non-State agencies in embassies abroad, particularly the Department of Defense? The State Department is always trying to cut down but other agencies seem to expand. That is an impression I have.

McMANAWAY: Well, it is true. There was at that time a system, I can't think of its
acronym, but supposedly State was in the chair of that and ran the system. We automated it at that time. It has since been disbanded because there were so many struggles and fights over it. But the fights with other agencies for positions abroad would literally end up all the way over in the NSC at the deputies’ committee that they had in those days.

**Q:** What was the rationale to continue expansion of other agencies abroad?

McMANAWAY: Well, I guess in fairness, they saw a need from their point of view to have representation. They didn't want to take just the reporting from the Foreign Service, but wanted their own people to deal with their counterparts in the foreign government. A lot of it, too, I always thought, was that it was sexier. We ran into this in my last assignment in counterterrorism because the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] discovered the outside world.

**Q:** What was your impression of the top management level of the State Department? One of the criticism of the State Department for decades has been that there are a lot of fine people grossly mismanaged by these same fine people.

McMANAWAY: When we say “managed the State Department,” what do we mean? Are we talking about managing mainly personnel, as far as managing the State Department itself? If we are talking about managing issues in Washington vis-a-vis the other agencies who have an interest in those issues, that is a different matter entirely. I don't know which one you want to talk about.

**Q:** Let's talk about personnel first.

McMANAWAY: I always felt we never had a professional personnel manager and still don't. We have this notion, much like the military, that once you reach flag rank you can do anything. Instead of having professionally trained people in managing personnel and managing the systems, we insist on doing it with our own Foreign Service people who have no particular background in it. If you look at the string of director generals you will find some very fine people but none with any particular background in personnel management.

Then the other problem, I thought, is that we never leave the system alone long enough to figure out what was wrong with it. We tinker with it all the time. Either we, Congress, or somebody was always tinkering with it before a system was allowed to function long enough to really see whether it was working or not.

The managing of the issues was a different matter.

**Q:** Was management involved in the management of issues or not?

McMANAWAY: Not really. Larry, himself, was, because of his relationship with Kissinger. But there I always thought the State Department was weakened by not having people at the deputy assistant secretary [DAS] level in those jobs long enough to provide
the kind of continuity and building up of credibility to go up against the other agencies in town. The other agencies in town did have people who had been in those jobs five and ten years. Larry and I talked many times about what we could do to help with that. We talked about making the DAS job a five-year assignment. It never came to pass. Another thing we talked about was the lack of management experience most Foreign Service officers have. As you go up the chain you don't really get much management experience. We tried some interchanges with other agencies, but it never became a systematic thing. For example, AID people do manage programs. They are probably better managers than Foreign Service officers. Then suddenly you find yourself either a DCM or an ambassador and you are responsible for managing this whole thing and people don't have the experience.

Q: You weren't in this management job very long were you?

McMANAWAY: No.

Q: I have from 1976-77.

McMANAWAY: I was in that job until the change of administrations.

Q: That would be 1977.

McMANAWAY: Yes. And then the Democrats came in. I had not gotten my career status back at that point having come back from the civil service. So I had no claim...normally I think before and after a person leaving that job of director of Management Operations, has gotten a post, but I had no claim on that at that time. But I knew Richard Luce who came in as Under Secretary for Management from the days in Vietnam when he was working on the Hill and would make trips out to Vietnam. So I stayed on and worked for Luce for a while. We did away with the Inspector General Foreign Assistance organization. I made a major study for Dick on that and we ended up abolishing it.

Q: What was the reason for abolishing it?

McMANAWAY: It wasn't effective. The way it was set up it had two bosses, the Congress and the executive branch. The State Department fought this new arrangement of the Inspector General for a long, long time successfully, but then finally lost. But the people running the Inspector General Foreign Assistance were actually sending drafts of reports up to the Hill that the staff were to comment on before putting it into final. It was outrageous. It was just totally ineffective and a waste of resources.

Q: Was it difficult? Once something like that has its own clientele and Congress, I would think it would be very hard to get rid of it.

McMANAWAY: It was pretty hard but we managed to get it done.
Q: Transitions are always interesting to look at. The Carter Administration was coming in. From the management point of view, how did this transition work out?

McMANAWAY: The Carter people, it seemed to me, had a total lack of trust of people that were in the government. We found that if you wanted them to go in one direction you recommended the opposite because that is what they would do. They were very suspicious of the whole bureaucracy, not just the State Department. I did all the management briefing papers for the transition team. They fired so many people in the White House that they got down to the technical level and when they wanted to get agrément, there was nobody there who knew how to do it. The people they fired were steady career people who had been there for years and years with no political ax to grind at all. Another amusing thing to me was when they first came in, it was like amateur hour. Burt Lance, OMB, sent around, and somehow it got out and around, a little note saying, "Why do we have all of these personnel files in the federal government. Get rid of all these files." He had completely forgotten about social security and all these things that make it absolutely essential that you have files on people.

[This attitude] stopped very quickly, but we did see memos that had been sent to the White House and had found their way to Carter's desk and the margin area where he had written on some of these documents showed he was looking at them in incredible detail. The old story that he was managing the tennis court is absolutely true. Documents got on his desk that should never have even been sent over there because they didn't warrant the attention of the President of the United States.

They brought in another one of these management systems, zero base budgeting.

Q: This is where you start from the very beginning and figure out...

McMANAWAY: Yes, and finally like NBO and those before them, collapsed of its own weight. But those things tend to put the bureaucracy through a really agonizing amounts of time and paperwork and energy and frustration. It was after Reagan that I decided I would never vote for somebody from the state level again. They inevitably bring with them people from the state level, which is just human nature, people they know and trust who come in and just don't know the first thing about Washington. It takes them at least a year or two to learn it, at least that.

Q: We are going through that now with the Clinton Administration coming out of Arkansas.

McMANAWAY: Yes, we've going through it again.

Q: We went through it with Reagan coming out of California and Carter out of Georgia.

McMANAWAY: Actually Reagan didn't get his team together until the last two years of his second administration. He finally got together a good team that was largely a result of, I think, George Shultz. It wasn't until then that we had a team that was really smooth
and functioning in a cooperative way.

Q: Can we talk a little bit about [Richard] Moose? Moose is now the Under Secretary for Administration. The word was he went into Administration but was so poor at it that he was moved over under the Carter Administration to African Affairs, where apparently he was more in his own milieu. Did you find him administratively focused or not?

McMANAWAY: He was a bit out of his element, being more of a policy fellow. I think he was much more comfortable in the African Bureau. I never understood why he was selected for that job. He didn't have any particular background for it. I never knew for sure whether he seized an opportunity and made that move himself, or whether people perceived that he needed to be moved. I never really knew what was behind the move. I did think it was a good move for the Department and that he would do a better job in Africa. Dick is a very nice guy. He tends to go more on intuition than on anything else. Perhaps he is too nice for that job.

Q: How long were you working for him?

McMANAWAY: I would have to look back and see when I went into the Inspection Corps. Bob Sayre called me and asked if I wanted to become a senior inspector. That must have been in 1978.

Q: So you went into the Inspector Corps, what was your prime function at that time?

McMANAWAY: I was a senior inspector. Initially they were going to set up a second deputy and I even have a plaque that names me deputy of inspections, but it never happened.

I led a team to the Benelux countries and then did an inspection within the Department of what is now called FAIM [Foreign Affairs Information Management].

Q: That is Freedom of Information basically.

McMANAWAY: No, it is all the documentation of the Department, [the “how to do it” instructions for all Department functions]. While I was doing that inspection I was asked by Ben Read...believe it or not there was a big fight as to who was going to be responsible for Freedom of Information with John Thomas, Assistant Secretary for Administration, wanting to have it as his responsibility and the Bureaus saying they couldn't have anybody else doing this but us. Ben Read, who was then Under Secretary of State for Management, asked me to look into this and make a recommendation, which I did. Then they trapped me and asked me to carry out my own recommendations which is how the Center for Declassification was established. The concept was to stuff the declassified function with retirees. All the retirees that work down there, lots of them, owe me a great debt.

Q: It seems to me there is life after death in the Foreign Service.
McMANAWAY: My idea was to get people representing each particular Bureau. They have to be nominated by the Bureau or approved by the Bureau. So the Bureau is comfortable that somebody they trust is reviewing their documents. Before that time these poor desk officers had stacks of documents to review and had to do them on the weekend and were way behind schedule. It was terrible. So we centralized working within FADRC [Foreign Affairs Departmental Records Center] and is now called FAIM. We set up offices there and also took over the [declassification] review for the Historian's Office.

Q: The Foreign Relations series.

McMANAWAY: The whole Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] series. So we had two sets of offices basically. One doing day to day Freedom of Information Act requests and another doing the systematic declassification which went to the Historian's Office for publication in the Foreign Relations series. This was a successful format and continues today.

Q: What were the pressures setting this up, outside of getting the personnel to do it? There is an ongoing battle between the diplomatic historians, columnists, reporters, etc. about what documents haven't been coming out, etc.

McMANAWAY: I had a lot of trouble with the Historian's Office. I had a big fight with the fellow who was historian at the time. He left the Department and went over to the Department of the Army.

Q: Yes, he is a miliary historian. Trask was his name.

McMANAWAY: Yes, David Trask. The academicians were the biggest problem and the organizations that they had. They had mistakenly in my view...there was an advisory committee made up of these academicians who would look over the situation and issue an annual report. It was inevitably critical. It would get into the papers and there would be a big to do about not releasing anything. Of course, historians want everything right now. You can't do that with some of these things.

Q: Was it a problem of just dealing with a mass of paper or was it really a problem of declassification with people wanting things that the desks didn't want to come out?

McMANAWAY: It was both. We had a massive backlog that the Department just hadn't been able to be responsive to. So there was a lot of paper to go through, a lot to be reviewed. But we had a system where the Bureaus had to clear off on what we released, so there were checks and balances set in to prevent us from making mistakes and releasing information that shouldn't be released. This did happen, not so much with us, but with other agencies at that time. Documents would get out that shouldn't have.

Q: I was in Korea about this time and I remember something came out about something
we had said about the Koreans.

McMANAWAY: I think that was the Kim De Jung case. We almost had a break in relations because it revealed how the Korean CIA had kidnapped him out of Japan. There was a big brouhaha. That happened just before we took over. It was another little piece of good luck on timing. It sort of help to push the project ahead.

Q: Did you find that you have to be responsive to certain requests? If there was an ongoing equivalent to a scandal or something like that that you would have to...if we were concerned, say, about Korea...adjust the program so that you could spew out more papers on that?

McMANAWAY: Yes, that could be done. In principle we didn't do it. In principle it was first in, first out. It would be unfair otherwise. But in reality we could shift because we had the people.

Q: Did you find there was a difference among the Bureaus, with some letting it all hang out and others just didn't understand and didn't want to let anyone know anything?

McMANAWAY: No, not really. A more recognizable pattern of behavior was how long the person had been on the desk or in the director position; whether they were familiar with the issues and how comfortable they felt dealing with it. Those who were less familiar with the issues were more leery of letting things go. So if there were variations it would be how long the person had been dealing with the issue.

Q: Then you left there and went to the Secretariat. When was that?

McMANAWAY: I went in 1981.

Q: So this is a new administration, the Reagan Administration. If the Carter Administration was a hostile takeover, Reagan seemed to be a hostile takeover plus one.

McMANAWAY: I was sort of isolated from it although I saw what was going on. I wasn't personally involved in any of the dealing with the incoming administration. I wasn't preparing or doing any briefings. But I knew people who were involved and it was pretty rough. As I said earlier, as far as a national security team there were all sorts of stops and starts and mistakes made. Bill Clark was Deputy Secretary of State.

Q: You gave a little shrug there. He really wasn't very well informed on foreign affairs.

McMANAWAY: No, he wasn't. He never really did become well informed either.

Q: I used to have nightmares of Bill Clark waking his friend, Ronald Reagan, the President, about a crisis and the two of them discussing what we should do. In all fairness we are talking about a significant lack of depth of knowledge on any international issue between those two.
McMANAWAY: I think we almost had that when Israel invaded Lebanon. Bill Clark was over as National Security Advisor and was dealing directly with the President. He was doing things without the knowledge of the Secretary of State that I believe prolonged that war. He went through intermediaries telling the PLO not to worry. That's my understanding. I can't prove it.

Q: You moved to the Secretariat and what were you doing?

McMANAWAY: Well, Jerry Bremer was the Executive Secretary [S/S] and he had two deputies. He asked me to come up and be one of the deputies, the other one was Al Adams. Al and I sort of divided up the world and the Department bureaus. I can't remember exactly how we divided it up but I had Europe, Political/Military Affairs, Intelligence, etc. We would alternate traveling. At that time the deputy was responsible for day-to-day review of the papers going in to the Secretary and coming out from the Secretary, as well as his major lieutenants, the Deputy Secretary, the under secretaries, also. We were looking for quality control, appropriate coordination within the Department, clarity, etc. We would stop the end runs and people trying to get into the Secretary without another Bureau knowing about it. And then making sure the people got the decisions that the Secretary made.

In addition, I ran the Operations Center and the Executive Secretary's equivalent to an archives, records of all the decisions made by the Secretary of State. AndLastly, Al and I were responsible for, and we alternated trips, traveling with the Secretary. We would be responsible for all the planning, both logistic, schedule and substance, making sure he got the briefing papers he needed, the right topics were covered, etc. We worked closely with the bureaus in that connection. I was on Reagan's first trip abroad to Europe in 1982 on which was the beginnings of the fall of Al Haig. It was a nightmare.

Q: I would like to talk about that trip, but first, how was Al Haig? Here he was Secretary of State coming out of a military background and the National Security Council, how did he run the State Department? What did he want that might be different than other Secretaries before him?

McMANAWAY: Haig used the Secretariat, unlike Kissinger. What I found surprising in watching Haig operate...someone with his experience virtually run the government in the last years of Nixon and failing to form any alliances in the cabinet. Not taking the measure of people around the President before he made recommendations and moves, which got him off to a very bad start. He went in and proposed a C structure which is a model of Kissinger, etc. and did it, as I understand on inauguration day. You would think that a man of his experience and intelligence would have bided his time to make sure he had the measure of the people around the President and just how it was going to work and try to form some alliances. He went alone the whole time he was Secretary. He was a loner. Almost as though he was the one man in town who really understood what really needed to be done and how to do it. I think that didn't go down very well either.
McMANAWAY: Yes. It certainly was confidence. That particular incident was unfortunate in that he was doing the right thing. He was down in the situation room of the White House along with Weinberger and some others. Larry Speakes was on TV and they were watching him. He was making big mistakes in saying things that shouldn't have been said, particularly about what we were doing with armed forces and things like that. So Haig ran up the stairs, didn't take a minute to catch his breath or think of what he was going to say. He was so anxious to get Speakes off the air so the wrong messages weren't sent, particularly to the Soviets. So Haig was doing the right thing. But he didn't stop to catch his breath and went out there out of breath and plunged in and misspoke, which was unfortunate. It was Bill Clark and Mike Deavers.

Q: From your point of view watching Haig, were you seeing danger signals coming from the National Security Council?

McMANAWAY: Yes, but where they became much more evident was on that trip.

Q: What was the trip?

McMANAWAY: It was a nightmare trip for everybody involved because of the schedule, it was so heavy. I made a couple of advance trips with Mike Deavers and his people and I kept trying to tell them that they were over scheduling the President. Sure enough, if you remember, he fell asleep when he was talking to the Pope on worldwide TV. It was just too much. We had back to back summits. The economic summit and the NATO summit, a visit to the Pope. We were gone ten days. I think I averaged about three hours of sleep a night.

The signs of an attitude towards Haig started during the advances and planning. Where is Haig in the motorcade? I had to get him in the right place in the motorcade. I had to go to the French to get him from Paris to Versailles, in a French helicopter. I learned on one of the advance trips that Reagan was secretly planning an extra day in Paris, going in a day early for a private visit. I was having great difficulty getting adequate space for the staff out of Versailles where the economic summit was going to take place. The White House people were being very uncooperative in giving us adequate space and putting us out of touch with the Secretary. We couldn't support him the way they were setting us up. So I looked around and noticed that the White House had not reserved any hotel space in Paris. I got a hold of the embassy housing guy and we went to the Crillon and blocked two floors and I just sat back and waited. About a week after we got back to Washington I get this phone call from the White House advance team. "We have a little problem with hotel space in Paris." So I traded with them. I didn't need all of the space I had blocked so I gave them Paris space and got adequate space from them out at Versailles. That was the way I had to do it.

Q: Was this just an inexperienced White House staff throwing their weight around?
McMANAWAY: No, this was coming from the top. Not from Reagan, but in my judgment, from Bill Clark. During the trip it went from protocol questions and logistical problems into substance, foreign policy issues. Repeatedly Haig was being bypassed. He was right there in the room or in the building and Clark was going directly to the President on issues of UN votes...This was before we had a classified fax. The White House had one. I made alliances with people on the White House staff and got a hold of a letter from Reagan...in the middle of all this Israel invaded Lebanon. We were at Versailles and we brought Phil Habib down from England for a briefing and sent him on his way. Phil correctly predicted they would not stop as they said they were going to stop, and that they were going all the way to Beirut. I got a hold of this letter from Reagan to Began begging for a cease fire. The Secretary of State didn't know anything about it. He was off at a banquet or something. So I got on the phone to Jerry Bremer, who was backing us up. I say, "Jerry, this letter, it is signed. Do you know anything about it? What am I going to tell the Secretary of State?" He said, "There is no such letter like that." I say, "Jerry I am looking at the letter." He said, "I will be right back to you." He called Bud McFarland, who was then the deputy to Clark. Bud denied it. Jerry called me back and said that there is no such letter. I said, "Jerry, God damn it, I am looking at it. I can't send it to you but I will read it to you. And it is signed." And Jerry, of course, blew his stack and got back to Bud who finally admitted the letter had gone out. I had to go and show it to the Secretary of State when he got back and tell him it had already gone out. A major foreign policy issue in the midst of warfare. And it just kept on happening.

Q: Was this that Clark just didn't cotton to Haig...?

McMANAWAY: In my judgment they were just setting him up. Haig had occasionally threatened to resign and they set him up. They pushed him to the brink and when he made his move... actually it was after we got back and an NSC meeting was called on the pipeline issue.

Q: This was the natural gas pipeline from Europe to Russia which we were trying to stop and the Europeans wanted.

McMANAWAY: There was an NSC meeting on that subject and a decision was taken when Haig was up in New York. And that and everything that happened on this trip prompted him to go over and try to have a heart-to-heart talk with the President. That was when they accepted his resignation.

Q: I have one oral history talking about being in a castle in England where in the middle of the night he over heard Haig calling the President on the Israeli business.

McMANAWAY: That would have been Windsor Castle.

Q: He was really screaming at the President on the Israeli business.

McMANAWAY: I don't know about that. But I found myself wandering around about 3
or 4 in the morning in Windsor Castle looking for the Secretary of State and bumping into Deavers in his pajamas. I thought for a while it was a replay of Macbeth or something. It is really unreal because I had on the other end of the phone Eagleburger and Bremer screaming at me that the UN was about to take a vote and did the Secretary know anything about it. I had to say that I didn't know where the Secretary of State is, that I couldn't find him. "What do you mean you don't know where he is? You had God damn better find out where he is and get him to this phone."

As staff we weren't quartered in Windsor Castle, Haig and Woody Goldberg, his assistant, were. I remember at 3 or 4 in the morning, Haig and I looking at each other and Haig saying, "What the hell is going on?" I think it dawned on both of us at the same time that this was not an accident. These series of events were not accidental. This was a deliberate strategy that Clark and Deavers had decided on to get rid of Haig.

Q: Did you have any feeling that Shultz was what they wanted to come out of this? Shultz turned out to be more or less his own person.

McMANAWAY: Yes, he did. A lot of it had to do with style, chemistry, personality. These guys from California were Californians. They were easy going and Haig comes into a room and sparks would start flying and he sits down at a table in a meeting and it is all wham, bang. I thought Haig was generally on target as far as the substance and polices he wanted to pursue. Except I think he wasted a lot of energy on Cuba, but that is another matter. So this had been building for a while. I think they finally decided this was a good opportunity to really humiliate him in front of his staff. On one occasion they were at the same banquet table when Clark goes over and whispers in the President's ear and goes off and made a major foreign policy decision and doesn't even tell the Secretary of State. Doesn't even tell him, much less involve him in the discussion.

Q: Clark was probably as close to an international illiterate as you can come when he came to the job. Were these initiatives just coming out of the top of his head?

McMANAWAY: These were driven by world events that were taking place. What he was doing was seizing on the need for decisions on those issues. He would go directly to the President with them and cut out the Secretary of State. The basic plan was that you drive this man nuts and he will come in an resign.

Q: Were you getting this from the White House staff?

McMANAWAY: Not like this. We knew there was some friction. For example, they didn't like Haig's shuttle on the Falklands [issue]. They thought it was grandstanding, I think. They tried to give him a plane with no windows in it. Al Adams was on that trip. You will have to get him to tell you about it. Back and forth to London and Buenos Aires.

Q: Was it that they didn't want somebody else to get the publicity?

McMANAWAY: They probably thought that he was upstaging the President. An
anecdote about Deavers. We had Phil Habib come to Versailles and talk to the President, the Secretary, Clark and the others. My instructions were to make sure Haig got to talk to him first. Because of some actions taken by a couple of young non-professional people that Haig had brought in, that didn't work out. We had two rooms in Versailles. One had been set aside for a quiet room for conferences. I ended up with Phil and Clark and Deavers and a couple of other people in that room waiting for the President and the Secretary to come down from a conference that was up stairs. Clark is asking Phil questions and Phil is briefing Clark about what he thinks is taking place and what is going to take place. He is telling him this is war. Deavers is arranging the room for a photo op and the President comes down. Initially I was stunned by this, I couldn't believe this thinking, "God, he is a man of no substance at all." Then I got to thinking about it and realized it was his job and that is why he did it so well. He was focused on what his job was and his job was to show the world that the President was in charge and was sending Phil Habib off to deal with a terrible situation in the Middle East. So that is why he was good. My first judgment of him was basically wrong. He didn't get into substance.

Q: Were you all waiting for the shoe to drop? Were you aware of Haig's use of this threatening to resign tactic at the time?

McMANAWAY: I was not aware of that. Jerry may have been. We didn't know what was going to happen on the day it happened. In fact, I had uncharacteristically left the office up there and gone for a sandwich. I knew Haig had been over at the White House. When I came back Jerry was in there with him and they were writing the letter of resignation. I could feel the tension when I walked in. I said, "What is going on?" I was told there was going to be an announcement at 1 or 2 o'clock from the White House, and we all watched it on TV.

Q: Did you continue in the job when Shultz took over?

McMANAWAY: Yes.

Q: Was there an appreciable change in atmosphere?

McMANAWAY: A dramatic change.

Q: How?

McMANAWAY: Well, Shultz is a very calm, deliberate man who is also very thoughtful. He is very considerate. Not that Haig is inconsiderate, I didn't mean it in that way. But Shultz has a totally different style and is a different man. Haig was brimming over with energy. Not that Shultz doesn't have energy but you don't feel it. He doesn't generate tension in a room, but Haig does just by walking in a room. And I think Shultz is a much more self-confident man than Haig and much easier to work with. I think both are good men, but I like Shultz better.

Q: Did Shultz run the State Department differently, would you say?
McMANAWAY: Yes. Shultz was a better manager. Shultz had tremendous experience. On one of the trips with him we were waiting in the late early morning hours for a phone call from Washington and we started talking about different things. I had always been very impressed, all of us were, with the way Shultz came into the State Department. He arrived absolutely alone. He didn't even bring a secretary. He walked in on a Saturday, I think it was a Saturday, and there wasn't a single person with him. He accepted every one of our recommendations for executive assistant and secretaries, and just began working with everybody that was there. This night he told me that he had gone in at the top of Labor, OMB, Treasury and now the State Department and then Bechtel, a huge, huge corporation. He said that he found that you really have to gain the support and loyalty of the people in the organization. That is the way he did it. Haig just didn't think that way at all, but Shultz did.

Another thing that Haig did, that Shultz did not, was try to be Secretary of State wherever he was. So trips were particularly hard on the staff. After meetings or dinner he would come back to the hotel and get on the phone and call Washington and we would be sitting up all night long cleaning up what he had been doing. Sometimes he would tell us what he had been doing and sometimes he wouldn't and we would have to find out what was going on because we had to follow through on everything. Shultz was totally different. He would say, "I have a deputy and I am going to concentrate on this trip. It is going to have all of my attention. Washington, don't call me unless you really need me." He didn't want to be bothered unless really needed. This made a tremendous difference for us because we could focus on the substance of the trip. The assistant secretaries who traveled with him loved it because they got his full attention on the trip.

Q: Did you find a comfort level with the President's staff?

McMANAWAY: Yes, it changed right away. The preparation for trips and so on, all that changed.

Q: So this gave you sort of a benchmark to understand what had been going on before, that it wasn't the normal White House/State confrontation, there was another agenda.

McMANAWAY: Yes, that there was another agenda and that was now finished. Shultz took his time and dealt very effectively with the White House staff and the President. But we still had trouble with Clark until he left. He knew what Reagan really wanted. This was particularly true as regard to the Soviet Union. Shultz would go over and sit down with the President and go through an agenda of things that he wanted to get done and should be doing like moves we should be making vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. For example, opening a consulate in Kiev and reestablishing cultural exchange programs. And the President would agree. Then when we would try to implement, Clark would block it. I am sure he thought he understood Reagan better than anybody else. It turned out that when he came to these exchanges he didn't know what they were. He didn't even know what they were, but he didn't want to do it. He didn't understand cultural exchanges. Somewhere along in there we got somebody positioned on the NSC staff,
Jack Matlock. He was a big help to EUR [Bureau of European Affairs] in particular in explaining these things to Clark. He could explain cultural exchanges to Clark and assure him that we would not be giving in to the evil empire by implementing them.

Q: Did Shultz understand the problem with Clark?

McMANAWAY: I am sure he did.

Q: Did he try to work with Clark?

McMANAWAY: What he finally accomplished I am sure Deavers helped him with, although I am sure Shultz was capable of doing it himself. He established a rapport with the President, that was what he worked on and accomplished.

Again on the Soviet Union...I was doing a lot with John Poindexter then...

Q: He was the deputy head of the NSC at the time.

McMANAWAY: Yes, and I was dealing almost hourly with him on the phone. The Secretary was due to make a major appearance before the Congress on relations with the Soviet Union. The draft testimony was done up and sent over for clearance at the White House. The President was up at Camp David. We were getting close to the deadline and I was working with John trying to get the thing back. It came back with almost no changes. John was absolutely shocked. He said, "I don't believe this. I fully expected a major rewrite." It wasn't the hard line that Poindexter and Clark thought the President wanted, and they were wrong. They were operating on a completely different agenda.

Q: You were there for about a year and a half with Shultz. Did you have a feeling that there was sort of a battle for the President's mind as far as...particularly the Soviet Union. Was the State Department taking the line that here is a power with which we are going to have to deal with?

McMANAWAY: There was that and of course the whole issue between the Defense Department and the State Department on negotiations on nuclear weapons. The SALT Talks and big fight between Rick Burt, Richard Pearl over in Defense. All those issues were bubbling along at the same time. There was definitely a battle of the minds. I think what really saved us was the SDI.

Q: That is the Strategic Defense Initiative called Star Wars.

McMANAWAY: It came out of the blue. We had been working on a speech for the President, I have forgotten the occasion, and were at the penultimate draft...

Q: I think it was the State of the Union address. I think he made it before Congress.

McMANAWAY: Maybe. It was a major speech. We got the penultimate draft and there,
out of the blue, was just a few lines announcing this initiative. I remember Jerry Bremer coming in and saying, "Where the hell did this come from? What is it? This is not our doctrine and is against everything we have been doing for the last forty years. Where did it come from? What are we going to do?" We were all running around with our hair on fire. We found out later on that it was the President's science advisor who had persuaded the President to put this in there. Once he got that in he wouldn't let go of it. That was what broke up Reykjavik where they worked all night and almost got it, which I think would have been a terrible mistake.

*Q:* It was with Gorbachev and...

McMANAWAY: Yes, to have 3 percent reduction in warheads or missiles or something. The President wouldn't budge on Star Wars. That was one of the things that brought the Soviet Union down.

*Q:* The whole idea was to have a defense that would stop all incoming missiles.

McMANAWAY: My guess is that the Soviets themselves decided in private that this thing wasn't going to work, but if [the Americans] go full steam ahead on research on this thing they are going to get spin offs that we can't keep up with and we have to get it stopped. But I will never forget that night that the speech came over and there it was.

*Q:* One last thing before we stop this session, did you get any feel for the relationship between George Shultz and Casper Weinberger? They both came out of Bechtel and are both Californians.

McMANAWAY: I don't know about Weinberger, but Shultz can't stand him. I remember telling Secretary Shultz when he first came in that he had a weekly breakfast with Weinberger. He said, "Oh, shit, do I have to do that?" I never liked Weinberger, myself, from a far. I thought he was one of the worse Secretaries of Defense we ever had.

*Q:* He seemed to buy the complete military line, he didn't seem to be in charge. But he also seemed to want to be Secretary of State.

McMANAWAY: Oh, yes. In the early days, he got better about it, when he would take a trip, particularly to the Middle East, he was very pro-Arab, we just held our breath because we didn't know what he was going to say. But what I objected to, he wanted all his military toys, but ask him to use those things and he would pee in his pants. You couldn't move a Marine anywhere in the world without his approval and he rarely approved. I think he was one of the stubbornest men in public life. Shultz had known him in OMB and at Bechtel.

*Q:* So they certainly knew each other intimately as far as working with each other?

McMANAWAY: Yes. But clearly Shultz didn't like the man at all.
Q: Did this translate at your level to having build or repair bridges with the Department of Defense?

McMANAWAY: No, Shultz never let it get that way. He is a big man of strong character. He would not have let that happen. We built bridges anyway, but we didn't have any problem. The poison between State and Defense was this Richard Pearl and Rick Burt duel.

Q: Did you get involved in this. Richard Pearl was considered by many to be a very strict hard liner.

McMANAWAY: Well, Pearl wanted to bring down the Soviet Union and he thought that we could, and it turns out that he was right. But they had very strong differences of view. They were honestly held, it wasn't just a bureaucratic fight. Rick had a good background in political/military affairs and so did Pearl. The only way we got involve was sometimes refereeing and sometimes reviewing the papers that went up to the Secretary from Burt.

Q: This was Rick Burt?

McMANAWAY: Yes, he was a political appointee. But he had a lot of experience in writing about and studying political military affairs. So he had a good background for it.

Q: Did you get any impression while you were in the Secretariat of the relative strengths of the Bureaus?

McMANAWAY: Oh, yes.

Q: Could you give me this because I try to document this as I go along?

McMANAWAY: There weren't many light moments in that job. It was an extremely demanding job. I was in there at six in the morning and would have a six inch stack of cables to go through before the phone would start ringing. I would get home about 11 at night. I would go weeks without seeing my wife and daughter awake and that puts a lot of pressure on a marriage, I tell you. But it was one of the most exciting jobs I ever had. It was just one thing after another.

Each Bureau has a personality. EUR is sort of like Europeans with pin stripped suits and everything sort of proper. ARA [Bureau of Interamerican Affairs] is mañana, very laid back. AF [Bureau of African Affairs] is sort of insecure, although they didn't have to be when we were there. They had a strong front office. They would come up on the screen and then go away, come up on the screen and go away. There weren't that many issues. Namibia was the issue, I guess, at that time. Then EA [Bureau of East Asian Affairs] was the most convoluted. We had standard ways of sending documents out, of putting together documents for the Secretary of State. It was straight forward, but they could never follow that. They always came up with their own scheme with a memo on top of a memo, etc. It would be a very convoluted thing that they would send up. It was very
Asian, very strange. EA was probably the worse at trying to get around other Bureaus and not getting the clearances. But the Bureaus do have their own personalities.

*Q: How about the Near East?*

McMANAWAY: I am not sure how we would characterize the Near East Bureau. The peace process kept going on and on and there really wasn't anything to it but I think you got more and tended to hear it. You tended to hear from that Bureau more about process. EUR had some of that, too.

*Q: Did you find that any Bureau was better at using the system to get what they wanted?*

McMANAWAY: NEA [Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs] was good in those days. It changes depending on who is there. EUR was usually good. Those were probably the two best. Of course, Tom Enders usually got what he wanted. I remember once going into Secretary Haig...

*Q: He was head of ARA at one time.*

McMANAWAY: Right... going into Haig's office right after Enders had left. Haig had rolled over on some issue and was sitting there sort of holding his head. He said, "You know, if that guy just wasn't so God damn tall." But that intimidated a lot of people, too.

*Q: Enders was known for both intellectual arrogance and height. He made a lot of enemies but was also effective.*

McMANAWAY: Yes, he was very effective and extremely bright. He played a funny role in the Falkland thing. He was pretty much on the side of the Argentines.

*Q: We are talking about the build up to the Falklands.*

McMANAWAY: The buildup was very rapid, of course. I dropped out of it pretty quickly but I attended the first meeting in the Deputy Secretary's office on the issue. I remember that Tom didn't want to do anything, whereas everybody else thought we had to do something. We ended up supporting the UK. Tom effectively blocked any action in that meeting so we lost some time there. Finally the Secretary got involved and said we had to support the UK.

*Q: I think we probably should stop here and pick up next time with your going to Haiti.*

McMANAWAY: Okay, but let me tell you my favorite story about Shultz before we close. I think it gives an insight into the man himself. We were on the way to Moscow for Brezhnev's funeral and the Vice President was coming up from a trip he was on in Africa and joined up with us in Moscow. Secretary Shultz and Vice President Bush were going to be the first two Westerners to meet Andropov.
Q: The new president.

McMANAWAY: You can imagine the things Shultz had on his mind. As we were approaching our landing, I noticed the Secretary was looking all over the cabin for something. I said, "Excuse me Mr. Secretary, can I help you find something?" He said, "Well, I was looking for the New York Times because I am sure the ambassador hasn't seen one for a long time." That's the kind of man he was.

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Q: Today is June 3, 1994. Let's pick up with your time in the Secretariat. You mentioned you had some comments about Sadat's assassination.

McMANAWAY: What I remember so clearly about the Sadat assassination was...I was in early as usual at the Secretariat. I usually got in around 6:00 in order to get through the stack of cables before the phones started ringing. My timing may be off, but it seemed to me it was around 6:30 or 7:00 that we got the reports over television. Later we learned why that was so. The assassination took place at a public event that was being covered by television.

Q: Ambassador Atherton was sitting in the stands.

McMANAWAY: Yes. But there were a couple of lessons learned. First of all there was virtually no one in the Department. All the senior people were on their way in, they were in traffic. I couldn't reach anybody. As in every crisis that I have ever been involved in, there was lots of confusion at first as to whether or not Sadat was in fact killed. We opened up a line, of course, to the embassy and had embassy people going all over Cairo trying to find out. We had people at the hospital even trying to find out. It was several hours before we knew. In the meanwhile, the press started calling the Operations Center and we had not gotten our act together quickly enough...This is something that has stayed with me ever since. Whenever I do a crisis management plan I emphasize over and over that you have to be prepared to handle the press because if you don't you will lose control. And we lost control. The wrong people tried to answer the questions and it was clear that we didn't know what was going on. It gave that impression immediately to the press and we never overcame that all during that day even though we got the right people up there within a relatively short period of time. The damage was already done. The impression among the Washington press corps was that the State Department didn't know what was going on.

Q: What could you have done?

McMANAWAY: We should have had a plan that would have prevented just any one of the watch officers taking a call and trying to answer a question based on what they were watching on their television screen back in the Ops Center. Those calls shouldn't have been responded to that way. We should have quickly appointed some one person to deal with the press.
Q: In other words, too many people were trying to answer and it became very obvious that it was an ad hoc response.

McMANAWAY: Yes. And we were never able to overcome that. Gradually the picture cleared and we knew he was dead and why the embassy wasn't responding any better than it was and people got to work and we got the thing under control. But it was one of those things that started off badly partly due to timing, partly due to lack of planning on our part for unforeseen crises.

Q: The Secretariat is responsible for tasking all the Bureaus and all with these briefing papers whenever any of the principals go anywhere. This is a tremendous job. The papers have to be done in a certain manner and have to cover every eventuality, etc. At the time you were there, did you consider this a worthwhile exercise? Were these briefing papers used?

McMANAWAY: First of all, the role of the Secretariat depends on the Secretary. Kissinger didn't use it in the way it was intended. Haig did and Shultz did, the two Secretaries I worked for. One was a military man and the other was a manager and understood. Kissinger wanted to run things his own way and others have done it differently over the years. So it depends very much on the Secretary what he wants to do with the Secretariat. But when I was there with Jerry Bremer, who was a very strong Executive Secretary, we played a very, very robust role in the Department. One of our prime roles was to insure that papers didn't get to the Secretary that hadn't been reviewed and coordinated with the appropriate bureaus. We were a policing function in that sense. With every new Secretary you have to look at what style he wants, the kind of memo he wants, and then you gradually have to adapt to this style.

It is a tremendous burden. There are only three people at the top of that pinnacle and one of those three people have seen every paper that goes into the Secretary. We have a whole line, the Secretariat Staff [S/S-S], that reviews those papers before they get up to the Secretariat itself and many papers are kicked back. One of the things you have to watch carefully is that you don't get a director of S/S-S who is a nit picker and tends to over due it and sends papers back for ridiculous things that don't really matter.

Are the papers read? Yes, they are. Jerry Bremer had Al and me sit down and divide up the world basically, both in terms of geographical areas and functional areas. Papers from those bureaus came to us. I had political/military affairs, EUR...those papers would come to me. Then, of course, the guidance coming out from the Secretary we disseminated, which is the flip side of that. The response of the Secretary was achieved and disseminated by the Secretariat.

In those days Jerry had the deputy travel with the Secretary. Other executive secretaries have done it differently. If the Secretary was going to Europe, it was my trip from A to Z. I did all of the planning, of course, with ample support from the administrative support people. They were very good people. George Toohey... he is somebody you ought to
Q: Where is he now?

McMANAWAY: I'll have to look and see if I have an address for him. He was there for so long. Pat Kennedy is another one who would be good to interview for things that went on in the Secretariat.

I will digress for a moment, in that job, the George Toohey and Pat Kennedy jobs, the incumbents, supported everybody who came within the S [Office of the Secretary] area. That included the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, ambassadors-at-large. A particularly tough time was when a trip was being planned because we had to do logistical planning, organize the [S/S-S] teams that would go out in advance, plus the substantive papers, plus whatever issues were going on in that particular deputy's responsibilities. So those were really long days. The papers were read and used. Many of them were tasked, some of them were initiated by the bureaus. Those two Secretaries did use the Secretariat.

Q: Let's talk about your time going to Haiti as ambassador. How did that come about and how long were you there?

McMANAWAY: I arrived there in mid-December, 1983 and left on the August 1, 1986. I had learned that the State Department's recommended candidate had been turned down by the White House. [The rejection] was not in favor of a political appointee, but something else had caused that. The normal tour of the Secretariat is about two years, that is about all you can take, and that would be in around January 1983. So I went down to see Tom Enders, who was Assistant Secretary for ARA at the time, and asked him what his reaction would be if I threw my hat in the ring for it. Tom's answer was typically Tom Enders, honest and to the point. He said that he had to support his candidate from the Bureau but he would not object. So I was nominated from the Secretariat. When the committee met, which at that time was the Deputy Secretary's committee which hadn't been operating very long consisting of the Director General; Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who was Larry Eagleburger at the time; Executive Secretary, who was Jerry Bremer; Assistant Secretary concerned and others. I was selected. I was recommended to the Secretary and my name was sent over to the White House.

And then began the long wait. [The nomination] went over in March and I didn't get the appointment until November. Senator Percy, who didn't know me from Adam but was running for reelection and was chairman at the time of the Foreign Relations Committee was mad at the White House. At the same time the Republican Party of the State of Illinois had recommended a retired doctor to be ambassador to Haiti who felt that because he was a doctor he could go down and deal with Baby Doc, who was not a doctor. Percy seized this as a way to get more support out of the White House for his campaign and he held up my nomination. He had me up there once to explain to me what the situation was. That it was nothing personal, it was politics. Of course, the White House didn't feel that he had done such a grand job as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee either, so
he finally gave way. But it was very disruptive personally. My wife was working and didn't know whether to put in her resignation. She was working with the CIA. And, of course, we had to put our daughter in school and then take her out. It was a very disruptive thing from a personal point of view, but that happens to a lot of us and no one in the Congress particularly cares. It doesn't bother them in the least.

Q: Senator Percy was defeated wasn't he?

McMANAWAY: Yes, he was defeated.

Q: Before you went in December, 1983, how did you bring yourself up to speed on Haiti?

McMANAWAY: I left the Secretariat almost as soon as my nomination went in and began working both on French, refreshing my French, and getting familiar with the Haitian issues. This was an eye opener because a small country like Haiti barely comes up on the screen in the Secretariat. When you go down to the bureau you find out about all these problems that people are working on that you had no idea about. It was a very active relationship. But I had plenty of time to get on top of the issues.

Q: You hit there at a key time, but as you were going and when you arrived, what was the situation in Haiti from the perspective of the United States?

McMANAWAY: The situation was that Haiti was sort of stumbling along and had been doing so for some years. It was still the poorest country in the hemisphere and was not improving a great deal. There was only one sector of the economy that was improving and that was what we call the assembling center which was essentially American companies setting up plants to partially assemble things to be brought back to the U.S. for final production. Everybody knows the story of the baseballs, I guess. All of our baseballs, including the pro baseballs, are made in Haiti.

The problem that we faced immediately was that there was a group on the Hill, not just the Black Caucus, although some of the Black Caucus, Fauntroy in particular was active. There was also a group of staffers over on the House Foreign Relations side who were interested in Haiti and had become active. They had decided that it was time to do something about the human rights situation in Haiti and the lack of any political progress in the sense of movement towards properly elected democratic system. They wrote into the AID legislation... in fact, just as I was leaving to go down there... they wrote in language that was the toughest language I think that existed anywhere at that time. In fact, in talking to the staffers later, I think they were a little aghast at what they had done and realized they had gone a little too far, but it was already there. It called for political parties and certification by the Department of State that there was progress in these directions and human rights in order to continue the AID program. This was put into law just as I was going to Haiti and became the centerpiece the whole time I was there.

Q: Before you went out did you talk to both the staff members and their principals and say, "What do you mean by this?" There must have been implications there that there was
a good possibility that aid would be cut off. Was that acceptable?

McMANAWAY: It wasn't acceptable to the administration. The administration fought it. Something else had gotten the attention of the administration that year on the aid bill. I forget what it was, but it was bigger than Haiti and nobody notice this until it was too late. They couldn't do anything about it. It slipped through the normal give and take on the aid bill with the staffers and the Congress itself. It caught the administration by surprise. Haiti wasn't the only country that had these certifications. The general position that the administration was taking at that time was that all of these certification requirements were unconstitutional in the sense they tied the hands of the President too much. So the position that the administration was taking was that they were going to fight all of these, Haiti being among them. I didn't think that the administration was going to be successful, so I felt it was incumbent upon me to warn the government of Haiti, Duvalier and his principal ministers, that this legislation was now in effect. In the spring I was going to have to submit a recommended report that would go to the Congress. Even though the administration was not please, the report would have to be taken seriously. My initial courtesy calls turned substantive right away.

Q: Did you find the attitude there was, "Well, the administration is challenging it so let's not worry about it?"

McMANAWAY: Oh, it varied from minister to minister. Some were outraged by it, some were frightened by it, some were defensive, some were offended by the intrusion into their internal affairs. So you had a variety of reactions. It started my tour in Haiti off on a very interesting foot. Here I was basically coming in telling them they were being challenged to make political improvements or the AID program was going to be cut off. The AID program was the biggest thing in town, not a huge program but big enough to make a difference. It made a difference because other donors tended to follow our lead. Not only other countries like France, Germany, Japan, who had small programs, but it also influenced attitudes of the World Bank and IMF. They were having troubles with the IMF. So it was a serious issue in Port-au-Prince.

Q: How well were [the Haitians] informed? They were close to the United States. Did they have a good lobbyist? How well informed were they of the real workings of Washington?

McMANAWAY: That is an interesting question because there is in Haiti, or there was, a group of people who are very well educated, worldly wise, well traveled, well read and who talk as though they understand Washington and the United States, when in fact they don't. They don't really understand it. At that time the foreign minister was a very articulate and erudite gentleman by the name of Estemay, whose father had been president in the forties and we had long debates. He had probably the best grasp of how Washington worked. But even he didn't really fully understand it the way we understand it. The fellow who came to be the minister of economy was very adept at manipulating the IMF and World Bank. I used to tell him that I thought he had magic numbers. I used to kid him a lot because the numbers he used with IMF always seemed to turn out just
right. He was quite adept at that. He was French educated, I believe. Estemay had lived here as a young man in exile, as well as in Brussels but he still didn't understand. And, of course, Duvalier had left the island once when he was 18 years old about a year before his father died and left him president for life. He went to France for a two-week vacation. That was the only time he had been off the island. He did not finish college and was not a learned man. He was not dumb, but he didn't understand Washington at all.

Q: Could you describe the political and economic situation when you arrived?

McMANAWAY: There are two Haitis. There is Port-au-Prince and the rest of the country. The rest of the country is in pretty dire straits economically as it has been for years. Politically it was like being dropped into some other century. I never quite figured out which century, but not the twentieth. It was court politics, palace politics which young Jean-Claude Duvalier had become quite skillful at. After his marriage, he had stopped traveling in the country the way his father had done and the way he had done prior to that. One of the ways his father had maintained his political base and his power was through what they call a Gromet out in the countryside. In every area there were these people who dominated things and made appointments, etc. It was through connections with those these people and other methods that Francois Duvalier used, and he used everything from voodoo to you name it, to manipulate the people. He was a mad genius at this. Jean-Claude Duvalier gradually stopped doing that, staying in touch with the people in the countryside. So you had a situation where he was concentrating mainly on politics in Port-au-Prince and would deal only occasionally with problems other areas. Most of his attention was on palace politics and the manipulation of the political powers that existed in Port-au-Prince by Duvalier. He did that through appointment of his ministers and letting one particular minister accrue more and more power until he got too much and then he would cut him off and get rid of him. But no one was ever out of favor, socially or politically, because you might need them later on. You might have to bring him back five years from now. There were only so many who were capable of doing the job. You may no longer be able to get your hand in the till directly, if you were no longer a minister, but you are never out of favor socially or politically.

The mulatto class was primarily in commerce. The blacks Haitians were primarily in the military. The government became more of a mixture under Jean-Claude Duvalier than it was under his father. Francois Duvalier had run on the platform of returning power to the blacks. It was supposedly a revolutionary government and Jean-Claude maintained that the revolution was still going on. That, incidentally has a lot to do with our intervention back in 1915. I have just recently written an editorial that is going to appear in the Washington Times Monthly in July against this idea of invading Haiti. One of the things that I point out is that we went in there in 1915 and stayed for 19 years. We sent in southern Marines who were much more comfortable dealing with mulattos. Up until that time the traditional division of power was that the mulattos were good at commerce and the blacks ran the government and military and they fed off of each other. Well, our Marines were much more comfortable dealing with the mulattos so we upended the power structure and put in mulattos in charge of the puppet government. Eventually that gave rise to Francois Duvalier. So our legacy was the Duvalier regime.
Q: That is interesting because back in about 1785 we supported the blacks against the mulattos.

McMANAWAY: Jean-Claude had more of a mixture and this was a matter of some grumbling around. It was felt that he needed a better balance. Even in the controlled press at that time you could occasionally see articles about the need for more balance in the cabinet. Gradually he ended up with really only one powerful black, La Fontaine, who was minister of defense and interior at the same time.

Q: Clay, can you tell me a bit about Jean-Claude Duvalier's wife? I have the impression that she played a role in how he operated.

McMANAWAY: Very much so. The marriage was really the beginning of the end. I think history will show, the beginning of the end.

Q: Can you explain about the marriage and what had happened?

McMANAWAY: The marriage was... Let's see. He had been married about five years when I went there. I think that's right. She had lived in the United States. She was the daughter of a middle class coffee grower, merchant who turned out to be an extraordinarily greedy man once he got in the position where he could get his hands into the till and influence things, and he got into everything. He became a real irritant to just about everybody in Haiti. She was very powerful. She attended cabinet meetings. She spoke up at cabinet meetings. Jean-Claude was a somewhat passive guy. He was not a very aggressive man although I think he did maintain the final say. She had his ear and everyone knew that. There was a lot of jockeying on the part of ministers and others to win her favor. There were groups that she favored and groups she didn't favor, and that kind of thing went on quite a bit. She was quite a party girl, too. There were a lot of sort of lurid stories and rumors about their sex life and the partying that went on at the Palace which I never paid much attention to. It didn't affect me. The only time it affected me was the residence. He had a residence... A number of residences, but he had one residence which abutted our ambassador's residence. They would have New Year's eve parties. They would have commercial speakers out there that would keep you awake all night long. The power structure of this class, social structure was... Again the mulattos in commerce, some very wealthy people. I think about one percent of the population had almost all the wealth in the country. I call them the skimmers. They took and they didn't invest in Haiti. They never made any real contribution to Haiti's economic development and I made it a policy not to have much to do with them. I felt that it was not a good signal to give because they were aligned with Duvalier. It was his policies. He was in the position to give them the monopolies they had which enabled them to accumulate the wealth that they had. So they were beholden to him for that and he could change any time he wanted to. It was also his way of taking his cut and accumulating his wealth at the expense of the Haitian people. So I felt that it was not... It would have been unseemly for the American ambassador to be seen socializing with these people.
Q: I take it this would have been somewhat of a change because we just normally fell into the company of the resident elite?

MCMANAWAY: Well, I don't want to be critical of anyone in here about my predecessor, but I had been warned that this had become a problem and there had been a lot of that. So I made the decision not to do that. So we turned down a lot of opportunities to go to glamorous parties and ride on glamorous yachts and things like that. I just refused and the word got around very quickly that I was turning these invitations down and they stopped.

Q: How did you find the staff you had and what sort of contact... I mean, how did they operate within that society. I'm talking about the embassy staff.

MCMANAWAY: It took me about a year to get my country team in shape. The shape I wanted it in. My attaché position was vacant for quite a while. I had to fire my first Agency station chief, and I was able to do that... Is this the kind of thing you want?

Q: Sure. Certainly.

MCMANAWAY: Because I found out quite by accident that the Agency was trying to send somebody down even before I was confirmed. I was still in the process of being confirmed and then I found out quite by accident that they were sending [somebody] to go down there as station chief. So I put a stop to it. I called out to... Keep in mind now I had had some dealings with the intelligence community during my career. I was with Bill Colby, I was on the intelligence community staff. So I knew people at the Agency personally including the deputy at that time. I had known him before. So I got it stopped. I said: "Nobody's going down there without my interviewing him."

Q: Did you have a feeling that the person named represented a policy or is it just a generic thing that you wanted to know who was coming?

MCMANAWAY: I wanted to know. You see, it was a small political section. I had asked, to give you a sense of what I was thinking about, in view of my state of mind or what I thought might happen. I'm not claiming here any prophesy capabilities or anything like that, but I had asked the historian's office to do a study for me on where there had been change from a totalitarian government to something less than a totalitarian government without violence. They weren't able to find anything. I was looking at legislation and looking at the situation in Haiti and wondering what I might be facing down there. I was trying to get some precedents, get some ideas from history. I knew I was going to need a good station chief because it was a one man station. He had a girl Friday but he was going to be just the one guy so I wanted him to be good. I knew that the Agency had a tendency on places like Haiti to make it a retirement assignment. So I had the guy stopped and I interviewed the guy and I didn't think he was up to the job. This presented a problem because he was partly a native American Indian and part black. So we had a problem, and his girl Friday was black down there. I think to this day she probably believes that I fired him because he was a minority. But I went to John - not
John McEnroy... I went to John and I said: "John, I interviewed this fellow and I have my doubts. I'd like to have your personal opinion, your personal blessing on this fellow that he is somebody who can indeed do the job. Would you look at his file?" He did and he called me and said that he thought he could do the job. I said: "Well, I defer to your judgement, but I'm not persuaded completely and I'll give him six months." At the end of six months you know, he had not performed well. I had formed this little inner group and we met quite often to review what we were getting into. It was a real team, it was a team effort the whole time I was there. And he simply... In fact, he wasn't respected by the team. It was evident. He tried his best to brown-nose me and he would say things that would turn your stomach, about what people were saying about me I knew were not true. So after six months... I had made a deal with the bureau that I would come back up here every six months because I felt there was a tendency... You know you could get isolated down there because you didn't see traffic from other places and I felt there was a congressional element there that needed tending, that needed to be talked to and that I could do it better than anybody else here. So I struck a deal with the bureau that I'd come back every six months and work the Hill, and work with the executive branch. I came back after six months and went to the Agency and said I wanted him replaced. Having dealt with intelligence people, people in the intelligence community in the past, I sort of knew what words to use and what buttons to push. I said that I had formed this inner circle and that quite frankly he was the laughing stock. Bam, that did it. They couldn't take that. They sent down, to their credit, an excellent young man who performed superbly and thank God I had him. Once the end was in sight for Duvalier, he was invaluable, absolutely invaluable. He did a terrific job. You know, they stopped letting the ambassador choose below the DCM, and I'd chosen my own DCM. He is a man who had been a DCM in a number of places in Africa which I felt was appropriate. I had a very high regard for my first political chief and an equally high regard for my second. Leno Gutierrez was my first. He was Cuban born, raised in the States. Leno has kicked himself, he could have stayed. I said: "You can stay. You can extend." And he went on and he's kicked himself ever since because he missed the big event. He's kicked himself ever since. Leno did a superb job. We had a very, very good staff. We had a major turnover at the embassy when I went down which was really mismanagement, I felt, on the part of the Department personnel to have that big a change, a complete change over. The consul general was extraordinarily good. I ended up having a very good public affairs officer, Jeff Lite; he was superb. I handled the press through him. During all of this I didn't give any interviews, I stayed away completely from the press and kept Jeff closely informed and did everything through him, through all of this. One time I was, toward the end of it all, I was approached at the airport by a fellow from Time magazine who said: "I just wanted to tell you, by the way, [I admire the way] you handled the press. Very smart." I've had other people from the press make similar comments. I kept information flying, but they weren't getting in to see me. One time we had like three or four hundred reporters. If I'd given an interview to one, my God I'd have...

Q: I would have thought that there had been two factors going in here. One, the military attaché is extremely important because you're talking about the military being a crucial factor in the thing and there has been a long sense of closeness between their military and ours. Maybe I'm wrong on this. And the other thing, there has been a tendency of our
military to use a post like that again for retirement purposes. Did you find either of these factors...?

MCMANAWAY: My military attaché was good. He was not as strong as I would have liked. It turned out that my station chief in the end had the contact that paid off and resulted in a covert meeting with General Namphy's number two. General Namphy was still in the Palace that night dealing with Duvalier and dealing with setting up a government to take over when he left and I had a clandestine meeting with his number two where I put down our demands. The interesting thing was that they didn't understand this business of recognition, so I played that to our advantage, and they came wanting to know what would be required to receive recognition from the U.S. government. So I laid out what would be required and they did everything we asked. But that was arranged by the station chief, not the military attaché, even though it was a brigadier general that came to the residence.

Q: Did you find, say your political officer, was he able to get out and around in society?

MCMANAWAY: Oh, yes. This is a phrase that I want to keep in mind, because I did coin it. Port-au-Prince was a place of no secrets and no truth. Oh, I should mention, I had a very strong economic officer who was very good at contacts. He had an extensive network in the business world and both my political counselors did the same. Even [John Evansworth] was very active socially. When anything looked like it was about to happen or we got a whiff of something coming along, we pulled this team together and I just said: "Hit the streets, go. Be back here at five o'clock and let's compare notes." I'd be calling on people, you know. We had extensive contacts throughout Port-au-Prince. Later on in other parts of the country. When the country started going up in flames, to be dramatic about it—in fact there were demonstrations in every city except Port-au-Prince—we put people out and we got people up in Gonaïves, and we got people in Cap Haitien who were reporting in. We had some very good intelligence as to what was going on.

Q: When you arrived there, were things in a state of flux at that time, or did some things start to fall apart as far as Duvalier later on...?

MCMANAWAY: Well, in March of '83, the Pope had visited which I think is a marker, is one of several turning points. Because when he left he said: "Change must come to Haiti" in his remarks and the church became much more active. Here's another irony of Haitian history. Francois Duvalier had deliberately set out to get himself excommunicated by the church, which he did. He then renegotiated the concordat, he renegotiated this treaty with Rome, with the Vatican, in which he got the authority to name Haitian bishops and he got rid of all the French, foreign bishops. It was those bishops that turned on his son. His son was faced with a Haitian Catholic church, led by an Italian nuncio, and he and I worked very closely together. But the church became much more active, speaking out about the disparities in the society between the rich and the poor. Gradually about the Palace we had this combination of things taking place, these forces converging on Duvalier. The marriage was resented deeply by the military and by the blacks because she was as white as you are and Duvalier himself is really...
would classify as a mulatto, Jean-Claude. His father was black. There was resentment over the marriage. There was growing resentment throughout Port-au-Prince and wherever there were businessmen in Gonaïves or Cape Haitien of her father and his [greed]. It was gross, his corruption, his greed was one of the worst I've ever seen anywhere.

Q: His corruption was gross?

MCMANAWAY: Yes. It had to become an ego trip because no one needs that much money. He was bragging all the time about it, [manipulating] foreign currency and... It was outrageous. You had the church speaking out against corruption and making the public increasingly aware of the discrepancies about their way of life and the rich people. And you had the U.S. government bringing pressure to open up the political process and for human rights improvements. These things were all going on at the same time, all this mix began to really become [critical].

Q: How did you see it when you went out there? You had rather explicit congressional instructions. You understood the climate in the United States when you went out there. What did you see at the end of the road as far as where we were pushing for Haiti to go within your time?

MCMANAWAY: I decided to try to use, since I really did not have much choice. It was there, it was the law. I didn't have much faith in the administration even though Motley [Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs] was trying along with others. In fact there had been a task force set up I think to try to overturn these conditions on AID that Congress was increasingly imposing in those years. I didn't have much faith that they were going to be successful, so I said: "Let's use it, let's make use of it to see if we can bring some improvements here." Where that was going to lead I didn't know for sure. I was secretly hopeful without ever saying it to anybody that it would lead to the departure of Duvalier. I didn't have any idea that it would actually happen. The reason for that I thought it would be a good thing is that Haiti has got too many people basically. It's just a fundamental economic problem which is not going to be solved by Haitians. Now I guess they're saying seven million, when I was there six million and on the east end of the island. You got the worst in the island. Two thirds of that island is on an incline of twenty degrees or greater. The trees have been cut down, the land is washing away. It's going to take an international effort to do anything positive about Haiti's economic condition. As long as the name Duvalier was associated with Haiti I didn't think you could get that. I thought if you could get that name away out of here, then you could. And we did start it. As a matter of fact I did start it working behind the scenes, working with the World Bank, working with other donors, trying to get something headed in that direction. But I didn't know what would happen and certainly when it did happen it wasn't just our doing. What happened in the end, it got to the point where if we had a choice. If Duvalier stayed, it would mean the deaths of thousands of people, which would have driven us away from it. The position that we at the embassy took vis-a-vis Washington was: "Let's not wait. Let's not wait until we're forced to pull back. Let's pull back now. He's gone; he's finished." Mind you this was right toward the very end.
Q: Actually Duvalier left in February of '86. So we're talking about the end of '85?

MCMANAWAY: Yes, December, January. We started taking some deliberate steps which upped the ante and increased the pressure on Duvalier at a time when all the other things were beginning to come to a head. They made some really stupid mistakes which gives you an idea of their state of mind. They being the Duvaliers. They had in May of '85... Well, my first Fourth of July, I invited...

Q: July of '84?

MCMANAWAY: Of '84, I invited some of the dissidents and the government tried to get me to disinvite them and I refused, so the government boycotted my Fourth of July, and I made a speech which made me a hero on the Hill, you know, an absolute hero. They thought they were doing me in and they were making me a hero back in the Congress. So my tenure there was pretty rocky, it was full of tension a lot of the time. There are a number of different stories that I'm going to tell you. I don't know if we're going to get to them today because I had an experience there which I think is somewhat unique. I don't know if it's unique or not, but unusual certainly. But the mistakes they made in May of '85... They had this huge big party. They invited people in from Paris and all over, a big thing. They gave door prizes and one of the door prizes was a twenty thousand dollar necklace. This was on TV.

Q: This sounds a little bit like the Shah's two thousand birthday party or something in Iran just before he went down the tubes.

MCMANAWAY: Yes. The Foreign Minister's wife won the twenty thousand dollar necklace. This was all on TV and was shown all over Haiti. We couldn't believe it. We couldn't believe they could be that stupid. Later that year, in the fall of that year, they had run into foreign exchange problems again. They couldn't pay their bills and there were gas lines. There was no gas, so you had long gas lines. In the middle of that episode, she flies off to what was billed as a one or two million dollar shopping spree in Paris. Now this was in the context of bishops and priests talking every Sunday talking about this, and gradually it was coming home to people that the general disposition of the Haitians was that they were in the plight they were in because it was God's will. It was fate.

Q: They're a patient people.

MCMANAWAY: Yes. It wasn't the Duvaliers. But gradually they began to associate their situation with Duvalier. It was his fault. And then in December or so there was a shooting. Some students were killed in Gonaïves and it started downhill so fast, it took everybody's breath away. The Duvalier mystique was gone. They were no longer afraid of him and at the same time they were beginning to blame him.

Q: I don't know what the timing is, save the going downhill for later. But before that before it all blew up, what about relations? What about our aid?
MCMANAWAY: Our aid was increasing. We were able to get increases in our aid program. I got in a new AID director who had served as Deputy AID Director in Ethiopia. He saw immediately that we needed to make strategic changes in the design of the AID program which took a lot of time. I spent a lot of time on it. In other spheres things were going quite well. They did do some things. I'd have to go back and review notes and things to give you specifics and I can do that if you want me to.

Q: I would.

MCMANAWAY: They did make some moves, both on the human rights front and on the political front.

Q: You were able then to basically in all honesty make certifications that [improvements were made]?

MCMANAWAY: Yes, we were able to make certain certifications in my first year there. First year that we had to do it, we had the certification. We were criticized for it, but we felt justified in making it because there had been some movement. We also renegotiated what had been in effect when I got there and which is now such great controversy was this interdiction agreement which is an international agreement with the Haitians.

Q: You're talking about the boat people leaving and...?

MCMANAWAY: Yes. Bilateral. Which gave us and our Coast Guards the right to patrol those waters and return them. It was an agreement, with the national government. We had at that time a requirement from the Justice Department which was a part of that, a program of follow-up interviews with at least twenty-five percent of those returned and within six months after their return to make sure they were not being harassed by the government. We never found any sign of that even under the Duvaliers, any sign of harassment of these people. We negotiated a title three, PL-480 agreement which we had got them into the Caribbean basin mission which was a first for Haiti. Haiti had never been a part of the U.S. sponsored regional AID program. So there was tension and I continued to hammer away on this but we were making progress. What was about to happen though was that he was about to undertake, you know, screw the top off the bottle and couldn't get it back on. After the boycott of my Fourth of July and after... That was a fact, my office director, Rich Brown... I was just teasing him about this the other day. At one point when the Administration was still battling to get these restrictions placed on the AID program by Congress lifted, Motley sent Rich Brown down to rein me in. I was going too far too fast for this business. So I suppose I slowed down a little bit.

Q: The rationale being that if you started meeting all these requirements it would undercut the Administration's position in a broader sense?

MCMANAWAY: Yes, but it was also causing tension with the government of Haiti and I guess Tony [Motley] felt that let's don't go in that direction because we're going to get it
changed. Well, I didn't believe it, was going to happen and it didn't. But I was then approached by the most powerful member of the Cabinet who was the Minister of Defense and of the Interior and said: "We ought to meet with you and the entire Cabinet, and we'll put all the cards on the table and have an honest exchange." I said: "That's something unusual." It finally turned out that we had two dinners. One hosted by the Foreign Minister and I hosted the second at the residence. The first was at his home. Basically what they wanted to know was whether I was sent there to get rid of Duvalier, was that my agenda. This was in the fall of '84, somewhere in that area. Since I hadn't been sent there [for that], that was not our policy. What I managed to do... I had my political counselor with me at both meetings and it was quite a performance by this fellow, Lafontant. He always reminded me of one of the major figures in Haitian history, during the fight with Revolutionary France (Toussaint L'Ouverture). He always brought this fellow to mind, he was the first fellow who said: "We'll burn down Haiti before we surrender." And he said it to me. He came through during this meeting. Number one, keeping Duvalier in power was essential to these people because it was the basis of their power. This was fundamental and it wasn't going to change. But I was able to let them know that was not U.S. policy without letting up on the pressure which took some doing, but went through the two meetings. First dinner I just sort of listened, so there was still a lot of tension when we started the second one. But when I sort of, in a very carefully worded way, let them know that I wasn't there for that purpose, it was almost physical, you could see the relief. Having come from Vietnam, you know there were rumors about my being CIA and all that sort of thing and in the way I was acting and making some pretty tough demarches they really had got it in their heads that maybe I was there, maybe I had been sent there for that purpose. So we got past that and we made progress with the IMF, we made progress in a number of areas. I think one of the things that I did had a strong effect on future events was I went to them all, including Duvalier himself. I went to his key guys and said: "Look, your constitution says that Duvalier is president for life but it doesn't ban political parties. Why don't you consider having a law that governs political activity and political parties. That started [it]. They went for it. The ball started rolling and they brought in people from France to help them write the political law and it was a long story about that evolved over the next year. They did come out with a law that governed political parties and people started forming political parties. The next thing you knew, the press became much more liberal, it just started... And by December of '85 we withheld certification and informed the government we were withholding certification. In saying we weren't going to certify it we delayed it and by the time... I was in Washington at the time arguing for this policy and by the time I got down there in January the whole country was in an uproar.

Q: Whom were you arguing with who wanted to give certification? Were there forces within the State Department, Congress or anywhere else that basically didn't want to rock the boat?

MCMANAWAY: There was concern about what the impact would be. It was not that there was a big argument about it. We simply sat around and discussed as a policy issue. How do we deal with this? Do we want to send the signal now. Do we try to certify? That was another problem. Could we certify? With demonstration all over the place, some
students having been killed, it would have been very difficult to certify anyway. But we decided that it would be a good political strategy vis-a-vis the government to send that signal that we were delaying it. By somebody saying so, we were sending a signal that we did not approve the way that the government was handling the situation. Because at the time he was still sending out the military against these demonstrators. Later on that ran its course and the military really basically stopped. They refused to shoot Haitians.

Q: Were you talking to the church, the Roman Catholic church?

MCMANAWAY: Yes, through the Nuncio.

Q: How did they see things playing out? What were they after?

MCMANAWAY: Same way. They saw it exactly the same way. There had to be this change and it was leading to his departure. Or it was going to lead to his departure or a great bloodshed.

Q: Were any of you thinking how do we get this guy out? What would our role be?

MCMANAWAY: Oh, yes. We were very worried about... There is an incidence in Haitian history that was on my mind very much just before we intervened in 1915. It was the public dismemberment of the president, the crowd tore him apart literally. Sam was his name. I particularly didn't want that to happen on my watch.

Q: What did you do?

MCMANAWAY: To the extent that we decided that we would not take him out in the daytime. That we would take him out at night when people were asleep. I was worried about getting him to the airport.

Q: Before we talk about the actual getting him out there, were you sitting around a few months before telling your people: "You know, we may end up getting this guy out. Did you have a plan?"

MCMANAWAY: We had discussed and it sort of jelled very rapidly. When it started going, it went very, very rapidly. Within a matter of two or three months it was over. He lost his mystique and the demonstrations started, he'd reacted to it. He was increasing... The military was backing away from him and he was turning more and more to the Tontons Macouttes.

Q: The Tontons Macouttes. Could you explain what they were?

MCMANAWAY: Well, that was the para-military organization that was set up initially by the father, Francois Duvalier as a counter-force to the military. It was not a military organization in the sense of having battalions, etc. But they were all over the country.
Q: With the disguise of dark glasses and?

MCMANAWAY: That's in “The Comedians,” the movie. No, Jean-Claude changed that. He made them into the Volunteers for National Security and gave them a uniform. They had blue uniforms. They were thugs. Not all of them were thugs. Some of them were your cousins out in the countryside. Some people joined to survive. And that's one of the things that's so wrong right now and people don't realize it. Those people are back in control. We can knock off the military with a reinforced company but that's not the point. What do you do after that? You can back in there and you assume responsibility for Haiti's future and why on earth should we do that?

Q: Let's cut if off now, don't you think? I'm just looking at the time. Let's talk about when we pick this up the next time, about essentially what we keep referring to. How things played out as far as the overthrow of Duvalier. What we were doing, what you were doing? How we saw it, how Washington reacted? Also something I didn't ask before but that may be covered, the role of the Black Caucus within Congress, how did this play?...Not necessarily at that time but all throughout your time, was this an important factor or not? Did you have to be concerned about that equivalent to the ethnic community, the black power group? Okay?

MCMANAWAY: Okay.

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Q: Today is December 13, 1994. Clay, you heard what I said on the last interview, I think we're in Haiti. We've more or less talked up to the fall. Why don't you cover about the Black Caucus first and then let's move to how the situation played out with the overthrow of Duvalier?

MCMANAWAY: The Black Caucus played a role but in fact the individual who played the most important role was Fauntroy.

Q: What is his first name?

MCMANAWAY: Walter E. Fauntroy who is the [democratic] delegate from the District of Columbia, a non-voting member. He became very interested. And some of the staffers of the appropriations committee on the House side were very keen on Haiti. As a matter of fact I met with them repeatedly on my [trips back to Washington].

[Note: portion of tape inaudible]

[Congress] had written conditions into the AID legislation, including formation of political parties, and I think everybody felt that they had gone too far. But there it was, it was in there and as it turned out we later made very good use of that in pressuring for change in Haiti. Fauntroy visited quite often and took a very keen interest in Haiti.
**Q:** He would go see Duvalier?

MCMANAWAY: He would go see Duvalier, but not very often. He would see others. He would see a lot of the dissenters, he would see some of the opposition, he would see some of the people who would do things on the human rights side. He would see a lot of the clergy. Fauntroy is a reverend himself, a preacher. He came out of the civil rights movement and he would make speeches there, press conferences there and here. He was quite active, traveled throughout Haiti.

**Q:** Did you find him useful in sort of getting across the concern of the American political establishment or not?

MCMANAWAY: Well, he certainly complemented what the Administration would say. He was not well-liked by Haitians certainly not the Duvalierists, nor the Duvalier government, but Haitians in general do not like African-Americans I guess you would call them now. They don't like them coming down telling them how to do things because they don't see Afro-Americans as being particularly successful. After all, the Haitians in their eyes overthrew their slave masters. It's been downhill ever since, but in their eyes, they don't like black Americans to come down there and tell them what to do. The converse of that is that I think Haiti is an embarrassment to black politicians, American politicians, the Black Caucus. And it was the Black Caucus which was very instrumental in driving President Clinton into this current policy of intervention. He allowed them to make it into a domestic political issue rather an international or foreign policy issue. Even at the end though they sort of split, the Caucus did, as I understand it. They weren't unanimous about the intervention even though they had put so much pressure on it and given Aristide so much support that it became inevitable.

**Q:** We're talking now in say December 1994 where earlier in the year the United States put on tremendous pressure and actually sent troops into Haiti which are there now as we speak to restore the government of Aristide. The situation is still in flux. How did the situation play out with Duvalier. Why don't we start with how the situation was falling apart?

MCMANAWAY: We'll have to go back a bit to understand the forces that were at work. It wasn't falling apart when I went down there although the seeds had been sown already by the Pope's visit in March of 1983. I went down there in December of ’83. The Pope on his departure in his speech, his statement when he left, said change must come to Haiti. From that the catholic church became much more active. The international press was much more active in raising the consciousness of the Haitian people about the corruption in government, about the disparity between their lives and the life of Duvalier. At the same time we were putting quite a lot of pressure on Duvalier to change.

My relationship with the Duvalier government stayed correct but tense the whole time I was there to the point where I guess it was my first or second July Fourth reception I invited some of the opposition, some of the people who were pushing for human rights, some of the people who had spoken out and they asked me to disinvite one or two and I
refused. And then the government boycotted my Fourth of July reception. I went ahead with it and made my speech to no response and they made me a hero on the Hill. They didn't realize what... Then they made some very huge mistakes.

Q: Let me ask something about the role of the CIA. Was there a problem?

MCMANAWAY: No. No problem at all. We had a very good station chief. He was part of my inner group. There were four, five of us that met, worked this problem. I used all the resources I had there. He was very useful as a contact. We were approached by the Tontons Macouttes leadership. We were approached by an old-line Duvalierist who had been out of power for a long time. We were approached by everybody. They all knew it was crumbling and they were stepping forth to see what they could do with it. They wanted to work with us. I was sending messages and finally was asked directly... Let me back up a minute, it gets more complicated because somewhere along in this time period, the Prime Minister of Jamaica had in his cabinet a fellow who knew the Duvaliers personally. So he sent him over to Port au Prince and I was seeing someone over at the airport and he arrived by pure chance and he came running over to me and he said: "You're the American ambassador." I said: "Yes." And he said: "I've got to see you, I've got to see you. What's going to happen? When can I see you?" So we met clandestinely and we talked on the phone. He was there for a few days and he was helpful. I used him to send messages to Duvalier. I used every avenue that was going to Duvalier. Everybody who was seeing Duvalier and it was sort of the same thing. "You've got to go."

Q: Was the message by this time (We're talking, I guess, about late '85) "Get out!" or "You've got to make major reforms!"?

MCMANAWAY: Well, we still favored major reforms. I didn't have the green light from Washington to take it any further at that point. We did have, again fortuitously, a chief of missions conference in Miami in January. I didn't know it but the [Assistant Secretary (Elliot Abrams)] had a meeting on a [previous] Saturday of all wise men on Haiti who were in Washington, and they had come out of the meeting which said: "Don't underestimate Duvalier's staying power." I'd had a session with my team and we wrote up a memorandum of recommendations and I carried it with me. It had the endorsement of the entire country team which was a hundred and eighty degrees out from [the wise man’s advice]. And to his credit, he came around very quickly to the point of view that it was inevitable that the choice for Duvalier was, "Kill a lot of people in order to stay, or leave." If we didn't back away, you know, distance ourselves from it, we were going to be associated with that slaughter. We needed to convince him to leave because if he started slaughtering a lot of people, we'd have to move away from him anyway. To his credit he came around very quickly overnight and I got my marching orders and I was able to be much more forceful when I went back.

Q: Who came around?

MCMANAWAY: Elliot.
MCMANAWAY: The Assistant Secretary of State.

Q: Yes. Who had come down and basically he had been receiving and saying: "Well, Duvalier is going to stay in there for a long time"

MCMANAWAY: Yes. "Don't underestimate his staying power." But we met with his various lieutenants and discussed it at some length and decided we would take a more aggressive stance. We would move to distance ourselves from Duvalier even further. So I was going to go back with a much stronger hand and at that point started passing the message that I began forcing the conversation on to options. What were his options? This gentleman, Solomon, was a brave man.

Q: The Foreign Minister?

MCMANAWAY: Yes. His wife was dying of cancer at the time. He was walking through the dark corridors and he didn't know if he was going to get out of there alive. They had crazy ideas. They wanted go to the UN with this and he had to stop that; they couldn't do that. So a lot of his advice was most unwelcome. He came by one day and asked me, this was early one morning and he said: "The president wants to know what you think?"

Q: Were you at this point saying: "You know, if you want to go we'll help you get out? How was this put?"

MCMANAWAY: Very subtly but clearly enough. One of our nightmares was that Port-au-Prince would go up in flames. We were also worried about all the Americans living there, about five or six thousand Americans all over Haiti. We had hooked into a ham radio network where we could keep people informed throughout the country on what was going on. They could stay in touch. We had a round the clock task force going. Of course the schools were closed. A lot of people had left.

Q: Just giving the nuts and bolts, you really saw this as an inflammable situation in the Caribbean where things at least were near our resources. Were U.S. military forces alerted for an evacuation?

MCMANAWAY: Oh, yes. In fact we had some people from the military there. A couple of guys had been in earlier and had done their usual surveys for evacuation. They came in... The Department had sent in a satellite (TACSET) secure radio. I had one of those on my desk. In fact the Executive Secretary got upset with Elliot and me because we were doing so much of our business on TACSET. There were very few cables being sent back and forth. We were on that radio constantly, back and forth. For once, we had called it right because definitely he was going to go. I was in lunch and got [the] word.

Q: When was this?
MCMANAWAY: February 6th, 1986. I was in lunch down in a little snack bar we had at the Embassy and I got word that the Foreign Minister was on the phone and went up... I remember leaving my ham sandwich lying on my desk. He said: "Would you please come to the Palace right away?" My DCM insisted on going with me for my protection, but they wouldn't let him in the room when I went in to see Duvalier. As I arrived at the Palace immediately in front of me was the French ambassador. He preceded my car, in his car. He went in and saw Duvalier, then I went in. He made a little speech. The Foreign Minister was there. He made a little speech about what was good for the country and he was going to make this sacrifice to save lives and he wanted to leave as soon as possible. He wanted to leave that night. Could I get him a plane? Without any authorization I said yes.

Q: But you said without authorization, we were saying we'd help him get out...

MCMANAWAY: We didn't have anything arranged. We didn't have any policies, statements, any directions from Washington that said: "We will do it." I had asked for a number of things. We had put on standby some jets out of Florida to come do a fly-over if we needed - Haitians are terrified of airplanes for some reason - to fly over Port-au-Prince, not to invade or anything like that. It never even occurred to us. Our concern was getting him out alive without a real horrible massacre of him and his family. If people found out he was headed to the airport, why, [who knew what could happen]? Trying to do it in the daytime would have been foolhardy. So Washington responded. The military responded. We had a C-141. It arrived I think about two o'clock in the morning. I told them they could take two suitcases each, that was all. They wanted to take everything. I said I needed a list of what they were taking with them.

I congratulated [Duvalier] on his decision, etc. I'm leaving out a number of things. I wasn't prepared to give this much detail because we had one mishap where we thought at one point during all this activity going on, he declared a state of emergency. I was working very closely with the Nuncio at this time.

Q: The Papal Nuncio.

MCMANAWAY: The Papal Nuncio. All during this period. We had a meeting that night, on one particular night. The town was just rolling with rumors. People were calling, coming to the residence. Something's happening, something's going on. He's been captured by the military, he's in jail, this, that... It was just wild. My DCM decided he was going to go down to the Embassy and he was there alone when this broadcast came on, very early in the morning on the radio. It was a radio broadcast which said that he had left. The operations center in the State Department got wind of something going on down there and called about that time. My DCM said: "No, we've just heard on the radio that he's left." Well that was immediately send off to the White House and somehow got to...

Q: Who was the spokesman for the White House.
MCMANAWAY: They were on Air Force One and he made this announcement which of course was false. Then Duvalier... I think it actually helped in the long run. Then Shultz went on Good Morning America and we scripted him to say the right things. He knew what to say of course. By then he'd been following it. He wasn't directly engaged but he was following it. He was kept closely informed and he was asked the question whether we supported Duvalier and he said: "We support popularly elected governments." Well I was besieged with questions immediately coming from the Palace. "What does that mean?" "It means what it says." But I used that to very good effect. The Jamaican was there at the time.

Q: What was the timing of this about because we're talking about February 6, 1986?

MCMANAWAY: You know what I'd like to do. I wrote a piece for Shultz's book.

Q: Turmoil and Triumph?

MCMANAWAY: Yes. I'd like to go back and reread that piece and then we can do it maybe I don't know if we're going to do anymore of these.

Q: Sure.

MCMANAWAY: We can just hold the conversation on this at this point and I can refresh my memory and get the chronology right.

Q: Okay. While we're here why don't we... We'll insert this later on. But Duvalier left. Let's let it go at this point now here.

MCMANAWAY: Well, it was interesting. The C-141 landed. I thought it was going to wake up the entire city. It was huge.

Q: A big four-engine jet. It's one of our biggest transit planes.

MCMANAWAY: It reversed the engines when it landed. I thought it was going to wake up everybody. At one point we got word that one of the networks had the story and was going to go with it, so we got the phones cut off. We were working with the military at this point.

Q: The Haitian military?

MCMANAWAY: They got the phones cut off so that people in the States couldn't call and tell people in Haiti what was going on. We had a two-hour window. The plane could only stay on the ground for two hours. We used that entire two hours to get [Duvalier’s] entourage out there. I think the plane left at three forty-five, or something like that, that morning. We had set up liaison with him and with the military, General Namphy, but we lost track of him. Nobody was answering the phone at the Palace. All I could think of, having been in Vietnam, was [when Diem] had been killed. I was thinking: "Oh, my God,
they've taken him off somewhere and shot him. Got to find him." So I woke up the Foreign Minister about three times in that early morning hour through to three o'clock and do you know what they were doing? They were partying at the Palace, going-away party. Plus he was handing out part of his weapons to the Tontons Macouttes right up to the last minute. But they finally arrived out there. Washington decided that we should have somebody on the plane, so we put a young lady Foreign Service officer on the plane. The French were not happy about them going there, but by then they couldn't do anything about it and they took off.

Q: So then, what happened, from your perspective?

MCMANAWAY: I met, before he left, at the residence clandestinely with a Brigadier General, an envoy from Namphy. This was set up by my station chief. We went upstairs at the residence, at night, I forget what time it was. He wanted to know what it would take for us to recognize the new regime, not realizing that we don't do that anymore. So I laid it out, what they needed to do. There had to be elections, and do this, and this, and this, for a move toward democracy, establishment, honoring international treaties and all these things. General Namphy came on the television the next morning and announced all these things, they were all there. Everything I gave him was in the speech. They had formed this council to govern until there could be elections. And I began working with Namphy directly.

Q: How sincere did you find him?

MCMANAWAY: Very sincere. Secretary Shultz also came down before I left and had a long meeting with Namphy. Namphy was, I think, very sincere from the outset. I don't know what happened. I never have quite figured out what happened. Namphy was a stubborn man. I had a four-hour meeting with him. He spoke French with me. He had a slight speech impediment. I had a splitting headache, but I'd meet with him almost everyday. I could turn him. It would take time, but if he was heading off in the wrong direction I could turn him around. Then I left.

Q: You left when?

MCMANAWAY: I left August 1st, 1986.

Q: Just to give some idea how something operates, you knew what we wanted but your proposals to Namphy, were these coming from you or was there a game plan or you were just told the goals over there and you figured out how to get there?

MCMANAWAY: Yes, that's pretty much it. A lot of it... You mean after Duvalier left?

Q: After Duvalier left.

MCMANAWAY: Well, I worked with Namphy in setting up a cabinet. I talked him into putting several people there. He was going to make the military attaché here in
Washington as ambassador. I said: "You can't do that. You can't send a military officer off as ambassador, from the military. He represented almost a military regime. You don't want a civilian on your council but you can't do that. He would get exasperated. He said: "Where am I going to find anybody after twenty-eight years who is not a Duvalierist?"

And I gave him the list, talked to him on the week-end. I called him and we went over the list.

**Q:** Where did you get the list?

MCMANAWAY: We made it up from the collective wisdom in the Embassy. And he'd start reading down the list and he'd say: "No, no, he's not family, no, can't... Then finally I'd hit one and he said: "Ah, good idea, he's family, okay!" And that person became ambassador.

**Q:** When you say family...?

MCMANAWAY: He meant you know, part of the... People he could trust. That was one of his big problems, was finding people he could trust. But you want to save the rest of this heap to the next time?

**Q:** You mean the addition about the timing?

MCMANAWAY: Or anything else.

**Q:** Or we can keep on. How's your time, do you have more time?

MCMANAWAY: I have a little bit more time.

**Q:** Why don't we keep on. In the first place during this post-Duvalier period, how did you treat things like the army, the Tontons Macouttes and all that?

MCMANAWAY: Well, the Tontons Macouttes were being disarmed. One of the things we were worried about was that the way the Duvaliers had run things, they had three battalions. The chief of staff, Namphy, was really not in command of the military. He was off to one side, an administrative officer. The commanders all reported to the president directly. They didn't socialize with each other, they weren't allowed to. We didn't know whether they would work together or not. Whether they could work together. While the Tontons Macouttes was not a military organization, it was very big. It was even bigger than we thought. When they got into the Minister of the Interior and found the files, the numbers were staggering, including messengers. Over three hundred thousand men.

**Q:** Good God!

MCMANAWAY: But they were spread out. There was no organization. It was not organized like the military, except in Port-au-Prince you had the real hard core, about two
thousand. The whole military counting everybody was only about seventy-five hundred. And that's fire trucks, police, etc. So we were concerned about whether the military could hold together... Well they did. They almost had a pitched battle in Port-au-Prince, and the Tontons Macouttes backed down. Then they sort of started disappearing. Of course the people started attacking them as well, killing them where they could. Out in the countryside they just sort of melted away. One thing about the countryside, the Tontons Macouttes were probably your uncle or your cousin.

Q: Was this... I'm using the wrong term but more a social organization, you know. If you were a member of the Tontons Macouttes, were you getting a salary? How was it...?

MCMANAWAY: No, it was basically... They lived off the land, so to speak. They were powerful, they had the power to do a lot of things.

Q: Was it a mafia-type thing?

MCMANAWAY: They were open, not undercover. They were called the national volunteers or something like that. They had uniforms. But you could go into some of the most remote places in Haiti and suddenly, boom, there would be a Tontons Macouttes wanting your name and who you are and what you're doing there. Not secretly, but openly. But they were his balance of power from the military.

Q: In this post-flight period, did our military get closer to the Haitian military and started beefing it up?

MCMANAWAY: We tried. We tried like hell. Because one of the things we felt that Namphy needed to be able to do... He kept asking, kept asking, kept asking... He said: "You know I've got to do something with the army. Can't you help me get some barracks. I want a medical program for the army. But you know, I couldn't get it through Congress. That was an area I think where we let him down. We couldn't get the money for the military in appreciable amounts to give him a strong hand with the military. Our military came down to do surveys of their requirements, their needs, etc. We tried, but the Congress just would not go along.

Q: Why? Was there a feeling that the military per se...? Was this a post-Vietnam reaction, or...?

MCMANAWAY: They didn't trust. They didn't trust them. We tried to point out to them they had no training in riot control, crowd control or any of that. They didn't have any instruments like rubber bullets, they had very little tear gas, you know, for crowd control stuff. We were afraid they would misuse it. Congress was afraid they would misuse it so we had a lot of trouble getting anything through. We got some.

Q: Did you have a feeling that when Duvalier left, interest within the political apparatus back in Washington fell off. I mean, this was taken care off and now to move on to other countries?
MCMANAWAY: No, no. Not in the administration and not among the people who'd been following Haiti up on the Hill. No, it didn't. Everybody was holding their breath. I was working very hard with Namphy to... We had some back-and-forth about how long it would take to have an election. I thought five years would be a good time period. Certainly no sooner than three years. Washington was pushing very hard for eighteen months. The Administration felt that Congress wouldn't stand for any longer, and Namphy surprised me by coming out with eighteen, I think it was eighteen...

Q: Clay, the two names, I think, General Cedras and Aristide, did any of these come across your radar at this time?

MCMANAWAY: Aristide did. As I was leaving he was emerging as a very vocal liberation theology priest and one the Vatican was worried about and was trying to move him out of Haiti.

Q: Could you explain what “liberation theology” was?

MCMANAWAY: Well, it is: overthrowing a government is justified on the grounds of religion. The church was very worried about him and wanted to move him out of Haiti. They weren't able to do so. He was emerging then with some very varying speeches, or sermons I guess, I've forgotten the right term. Their Sunday morning homilies. They were firebrand stuff. He also... We didn't know then that he was a little wacky as well. He was just emerging when I left.

Q: When you left Haiti... You know, as you leave what did you think. You'd been so immersed in things what did you think when you left? Whither Haiti?

MCMANAWAY: Well, the Secretary had me in.

Q: Mr. Shultz?

MCMANAWAY: Mr. Shultz. For a chat when I got back and he said: "What are the chances?" And I said: "Fifty-fifty." I may have said less than fifty-fifty. He was a little startled, he thought... "Well, you're saying it's not going to work?" And I said: "No, no. It could but there's a long way to go." They'd never had it. They don't know what's democracy. To most Haitians democracy is license, to do what you want to do. It would include getting revenge. They have memories that go back... Things that had been done to them. It's a sad place. They can be very gracious people and they deserve better leadership than they've had since they beat the French, they and yellow fever. They defeated the French. They haven't had it. I don't know what happened to Namphy. Namphy was a drinker. I guess two months after he'd taken over he had to go take a rest. His doctor ordered him to take some rest. They were working very hard. They're not used to working those kinds of hours. They'd never had to work like that in their lives. Here they were faced with running a government. He had to take some time off, and he took a rest period. After I left I heard that he went back to the bottle. I don't know whether it's
true or not.

Q: Just for somebody who wants to get a little feel, in the short term, in the next couple of years. Basically were the election held in eighteen months?

MCMANAWAY: They did hold the elections and they were aborted. During the voting, as the voting started, there were attacks on the voting places. People were killed and the election was aborted by the military. Namphy, from what I could tell, sort of let it happen. He didn't... There were some bad guys around him. Again I'd have to refresh my memory on some of these names and I think they basically took over running things. I got the impression, I wasn't there. I wasn't really able to follow it that closely. I wasn't reading the cable traffic and certainly not to notice. But I think a lot of people saw it coming. Our embassy didn't.

Q: Who replaced you as ambassador?

MCMANAWAY: Brunson McKinley.

Q: What was his background?

MCMANAWAY: Brunson had served, I believe, mainly in Europe and had had one tour in China.

Q: I want to get a little bit how our system works. Here is a place which has just gone through a critical phase and is obviously still up there. We don't know where it's going or what's happening. Did you have much of a chance to brief him? Was there much bringing him up to speed before he arrived?

MCMANAWAY: I made myself completely available to him and did as much as I could. He was well briefed. He had been selected before the overthrow of Duvalier. He had been the seventh floor's candidate. He replaced me as Deputy Executive Secretary. We had a very short overlap there. It was the first time I'd met him. Then he was the seventh floor nominee. I think Abrams felt he had no choice but to leave him. He had been selected before the fall of Duvalier. You know the Department, how long this process takes. He was not selected with the situation in mind.

Q: Probably a good place to stop would be about here. Do you have some more time?

MCMANAWAY: Not today I'm afraid.

Q: Could you explain just how you got your next assignment then?

MCMANAWAY: I don't know if we want to get into that or not.

Q: Well what we'll do, is the next time, you'll fill in a bit the details of the day Duvalier left. And also then we'll pick up starting about your problems with Elliot Abrams and all,
about getting involved with the Nicaraguan situation and a job there which proved abortive for you. Then we'll move on to your time as (a counter terrorist?) Okay?

MCMANAWAY: Okay.

***

Q: Today is March 9, 1995. As we said last time, we got Duvalier off the ground and what happened after he left, the day after. Then we'll move on to other things.

MCMANAWAY: Did we get him off the ground? I don't recall.

Q: Maybe we didn't get him off the ground, but we were having trouble, he was partying or something like that.

MCMANAWAY: Oh yes, he was in the Palace, we couldn't find him. I woke up the Foreign Minister two or three times during the night.

Q: We can always cut this out if we've already... Don't worry about that.

MCMANAWAY: We had a liaison by then with the military. We had a colonel who was with him and supposedly performing liaison with us. When we couldn't find him I was reminded of the situation in Saigon when Diem was killed. We had to send out a major to collect him from where he was hiding in the Chinese part of town, Cholon. The major lost his head on the way back and killed him and Ngu his brother-in-law in the van on the way back. It was not intended at all and I had visions of [the same thing].

Q: You'd be known as Mr. Assassin or something. "Don't send this guy to my country!"

MCMANAWAY: The guy we sent was someone we weren't all that sure of and...

Q: This was a Haitian colonel?

MCMANAWAY: Yes. We had about a two-hour window when the military aircraft could stay and then it had to leave and we were getting very close to the end of that window when they finally showed up. The mother came out first, showed up at the airport. I had sent a team out there. We had unusual luck in the team that I had. I had as part of the military detachment there was a sergeant who was a C-141 cargo master.

Q: C-141 being the type of aircraft we had.

MCMANAWAY: And my DCM was a former Marine, Steve Doggins. And I had a Coast Guard fellow who was a pilot, and we put him in the tower at the airport to talk to the plane's pilot coming in and going out. And there was a fourth, I'm trying to think who the fourth was. We also at Washington's request put a young female officer on the plane to go with them. I wasn't terribly enthusiastic about that, but Washington thought we should
do this and we did. But finally they showed up with about fifteen minutes to spare I think, maybe a little bit more. Then they loaded up. We had limited them to two bags each. The plane took off at close to four o'clock in the morning, at three forty-five I think. It sounded like... You could hear it for miles, huge racket. Since it was taking off in the dead of night I thought surely it would wake up every Haitian in the country, but nothing happened. Then General Namphy went on TV. I had met with his envoy to me that night and he wanted to know what it would take for the U.S. to recognize the government. I laid down our standards of requirements and he spelled them all out in his speech. They were all covered in his speech: elections, he would return to civilian elected rule and meet international obligations, and all those things. They were all spelled out in his speech to the people on TV the next morning. Namphy had a call-in of the whole diplomatic corps later that day around noon and gave the usual assurances that you get in such situations. Then he met, wanted to meet separately with me, and we talked about meeting later and how we were going to proceed. From then on I met with him almost daily. It was quite a sensation driving down to the Palace that day. The crowds were in the streets waving the American flags and palm fronds as a sign of peace. That was one of the few times I flew my flags.

Q: I was going to ask you whether... On the ambassadorial car most of the time one doesn't want to fly the flag.

MCMANAWAY: A few times I did and drew the cheers everywhere all the way to the Palace. It was quite a sensation. It was a very happy day for our government. Then we went forward working with Namphy to form his cabinet. We had quite an influence on that. I may have mentioned previously some of the things that we did. We pretty well suggested his minister of the economy, his minister of finance. I dissuaded him from sending a colonel to Washington as military attaché. I said he couldn't do that, he couldn't have a military... Not an attaché, it was an ambassador. I said he couldn't do that. He said: "Well I can't find any people who aren't supporters of Duvalier, Duvalierists." So I came up with a list and he picked one out. As a matter of fact, it was a grandson or a great-grandson of a former president, Pierre Sam, and he sent him as ambassador. We proceeded on a number of fronts with regard to policies, programs, and headed toward elections over the following months.

Q: But your replacement was already on track at that point?

MCMANAWAY: Yes, he had already been nominated, decided upon anyway, at least within the State Department, he'd been decided upon which I learned when I returned on consultation shortly after.

Q: Well, how close were you, sitting down there "Why don't you pick this guy as a minister of economics and don't do the ambassador." Was this coming out of you, or were you...?

MCMANAWAY: That was coming out of me.
Q: That's what I thought. How did Washington, particularly the State Department...? Did they give you your head or was there a problem, running down there to see what was happening?

MCMANAWAY: No, they pretty much gave me my head. The one area where we had some debate was how long before they could have elections. I thought they should have more time. I was thinking if we could possibly do it, three to five years. They were pressing for elections much sooner, eighteen months which is what Namphy finally did. That was the one area of disagreement. Other than that they pretty much gave me my head. I would not call interference at all.

Q: Going back to you, this thing came to a satisfactory conclusion, at least as you, at this particular point in time, were concerned. Your successor had been put on track. It was time for you to leave. What happened?

MCMANAWAY: It wasn't until... You see, Duvalier left in early February.

Q: February '86.

MCMANAWAY: February '86. I didn't leave until August, 1st of August.

Q: So you really had quite a bit of time for what we would call nation building?

MCMANAWAY: Yes.

Q: You feel a little bit better about this than you did in Vietnam?

MCMANAWAY: Oh yes. We were encouraged by Namphy. Secretary Shultz found him to be a person that he had some confidence in. It didn't turn out that way, and I've never, never really quite understood what happened except that he didn't have a lot of stamina. He was a drinker and apparently he did go back to drinking. I think he was manipulated by some of the people around him, but I've never been able to determine exactly, what happened to Namphy, why he failed. He did. We didn't think he would. We thought he was capable. The one area of concern I had about Namphy was his extreme dislike and distrust of Haitian politicians. He would not talk to them. He wouldn't do a lot of things initially. It took a lot of long, long meetings I had with him. I'd have four-hour meetings with him. I got him to turn around on a number of things, but that's one I never did succeed, to deal with politicians. So I was worried about that.

Q: When you say you had these meetings, I mean you're the American ambassador and here is the president of a country. Was this your role? I mean turned into an advisor's role?

MCMANAWAY: Very much so. I met with him very frequently and we talked about lots of things, about how he was governing and things that needed to be done. He asked for things, he asked for one thing we failed as a government to respond to I think probably
because of concerns about congressional attitudes. He needed support for the military and
he wasn't looking for lethal weapons or things like that. He was looking for things like
barracks, places for them to live. He needed the army support. I could never persuade
Washington to come up with the funds and [equipment] that could make a difference. I
don't know whether that had anything to do with the eventual failure of Namphy or not. I
can't say. It's conceivable that he lost support of the army. He knew and he was pretty
desperate about it, that he needed to produce something for the army who in fact had
stepped in and taken over and had pulled back from following Duvalier's orders at the
end, of killing Haitians. We weren't able to deliver on that, not in any meaningful way.
But yes, I was pretty close, not close in the sense that we were dealing with each other
very frequently. These very long meetings which I always left with a splitting headache.
He had a speech impediment and it was all in French. It took a lot of perseverance and a
lot of time. But I had gained his trust and he would listen, do things that he didn't really
want to, but he did it.

Q: What happened when your term ran out there. What happened as far as your
progress, as far as your personal career went?

MCMANAWAY: Abrams had asked me to earlier... He was Assistant Secretary for the
region. He had asked me to come back and run the Nicaraguan program. At that point the
Congress was considering this hundred million dollar request and it looked like it was
about to be approved. I had reluctantly said I would consider it. Then Shultz came down
virtually the last day I was there, just before I left, he came for a visit. He was visiting
other places and he included Haiti. He met with Namphy and of course I was riding
around with him in my car, the ambassador's car and he asked about it. Well, that pretty
well... You know, you never can say no to the Secretary of State. So I went back to
Washington to go in and run this program which I found was flawed from the very
beginning. The legislation was flawed. It gave responsibility to the State Department but
gave money to the CIA and I thought it was going to be very hard to monitor, even to
know what the CIA was doing with the money. I expressed my concerns and had a lot of
questions. I made one trip down to Central America with Abrams and [a representative]
of the CIA who was quite rude, really didn't want to deal with me. One of the theories I
heard later was that it was really the CIA which didn't want me in that job. You see I had
fired a station chief. I don't know if I covered that or not.

Q: Yes, you have.

MCMANAWAY: Fired the first station chief. And I had worked in the intelligence
community, so I knew how they worked. I wrote out a number of questions for Elliot and
made some suggestions. He wanted me to run this program really without any staff.

Q: What was the program?

MCMANAWAY: Well there was this hundred million dollars given by Congress to
support the Contras.
Q: In Nicaragua?

MCMANAWAY: In Nicaragua, yes. I had a number of questions about what we were trying to do. Whether we were trying to build up the military [side] or trying to support an insurgency. There's a lot of difference, and I pointed out that I knew the difference because I'd spent five years working with an insurgency in Vietnam. Anyway, he wanted me to run this thing by myself basically out of the office of Central American Affairs. I said that wasn't possible. Just wasn't possible alone and I laid out what I would need. I'd need at least a small staff and a reporting mechanism tied in to the embassies to know at least what the agency was doing otherwise we would be blind. Next thing I knew Elliot had gone to the Secretary and had said that he didn't think I was the right person for the job. That I wanted to do it a certain way that he didn't want it done. The Secretary was not happy I'm told about that. You know, he said: "You're telling me that McManaway is not the man for the job? You're wrong. What are you going to do for McManaway?" Of course he didn't do anything. I had never really wanted the job to begin with so I wasn't terribly unhappy about it. Elliot called me in and said he thought it would be better to have someone else. Then he asked me to give him a memorandum on how I would do it, which I did, and he followed it almost to the letter, and brought in someone else to do that. [Jerry Bremer] heard that I wasn't going to do that. He had taken over the ambassador-at-large [for Anti-Terrorism Affairs] and asked me to join him and I did. So I left. My feeling was that Elliot had heeded the Agency and said... Elliot was trying very hard to have a smooth, even relationship, cooperative relationship with the Agency which I didn't think was possible. I thought you had to, shall we say, create a tension there otherwise... I know the Agency. They'll come to the table and tell you everything you want to hear and then they'll go off and do what they want to. We were going to have to have some way of checking what they were doing. So either because of the [objection from] the CIA or because he felt I wasn't with the program because I had so many questions about it, whatever the reason, he decided he didn't want me for that job. I wasn't displeased with that outcome because I didn't think we knew what we were doing and the more I got into it the more I felt that way, thought that way. So that's how I ended up back over with Jerry Bremer once again.

Q: I would like to put this in the record. From '86 to '88...

MCMANAWAY: Well, actually I didn't go over there until '87. I spent from August till the end of the year... I had minor surgery and I was out for a while. So I started sometime in early '87.

Q: Elliot Abrams was a controversial figure. Certainly he was taking much of the flack for the media and all this on Nicaraguan policy and support of the Contras. What were you getting from [his people]? You were involved in going down and talking to the embassy desk people. How was he viewed by the people working with Central America within the State Department as far as you can gather?

MCMANAWAY: As far as I can gather is that he had [their] support there. [I didn't detect any] lack of respect. He was a very bright man and quite able to take the heat. He
didn't seem to deal well with people who questioned... you know substantive questions. They were not meant to be questions of, you know, [coming from some] kind of disloyalty or anything like that. But he didn't seem to handle those sort of things very well. I didn't detect any lack of support. Quite on the contrary, he had good support from the people working with him.

Q: In Counter-terrorism from '87 to '88, what are you talking about?

MCMANAWAY: I was there from '87 to '89, when I left. So it was a little over two years.

Q: What was the bureau? What were its concerns?

MCMANAWAY: The bureau?

Q: Counter-terrorism, was that a bureau at that time?

MCMANAWAY: No. It was an ambassador-at-large reporting back to the Secretary of State. The Department had floundered for quite a few years on how to deal with this subject of counter-terrorism, where to put the organization, how to organize what. How it should be managed. It was in M [Office of the Under Secretary for Management] for a while, it reported to D [Office of the Deputy Secretary] for a while, it was back to M. It was finally decided to have an office under the Secretary. It was S/CT. That had occurred in the fall of, or slightly before Jerry went in there. Jerry went in in October 1986 and he was reporting directly to the Secretary. He was attending the Secretary's morning staff meetings, etc. He had direct access which really made a big difference. It really made a huge difference in the ability to do the job because it is a single-issue office and you went to deal with a bureau, the geographic bureau, you were dealing with people who had multiple concerns in the individual country. We were a pest. We were just trouble makers. We would go in there telling them "You've got to do this, you've got to do that." We were looking only at one issue so we couldn't go to the bathroom without getting into a bureaucratic fight. Fighting all the time, trench warfare, constantly. Particularly with the Near East bureau.

Q: I suppose some of the major threats were probably Syria and Libya, weren't they?

MCMANAWAY: Syria, Libya, Iran, and Lebanon of course where we had all the hostages. We had most of our dealings with the folks in the Near East bureau and they were pretty stormy. One of the first major issues that I can recall getting engaged in was the issue of returning our ambassador to Syria. You'll recall the terrorist who was supported by Syria. In fact he was using a Syrian passport, not a [full diplomatic] passport, they'd have something just short of a [diplomatic] passport. He was in one of those. He used a diplomatic passport to get the materials for his bombs into London trying to blow up the El-Al flight and they caught him. He was using this woman, his girlfriend. He had duped her into carrying this bomb onto the plane and the Israeli security had caught her. At that time England, the UK, broke relations with Syria and in
support we withdrew our ambassador. The bureau wanted to return him. They were very uncomfortable not having an ambassador there. We were very much opposed until... Our position was that the ANO, which was the terrorist organization Abu Nidal Organization, until they ejected him, or did something to him, and that took months to accomplish. But finally they did, finally the Syrian government kicked him out. He went to Libya and at that point our ambassador was returned to resume this wonderful dialogue we supposedly had with Assad. Of course there was no such dialogue.

_Q: It continues today._

MCMANAWAY: Anyway that was one of the major battles.

_Q: I suppose with Iran, this would have been in the hands of the CIA?_  

MCMANAWAY: One of the things that perhaps I should take a minute to explain. There had been a decision, I guess an NSC decision to give the responsibility for coordinating the United States government's counter-terrorism policies and responses to international terrorist incidents to the State Department. For domestic instances, it was the Justice Department, the FBI was the action arm of the Justice Department. The whole effort was an intensely inter-agency, one of the most intense inter-agency operations I've been involved in, and I've been involved in a number of them. We had the CIA, the FBI, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, we brought in the Justice Department later on, at the Secretary's insistence; [the Defense Department]. All of those agencies were involved daily and weekly in forming policies, or responding to incidents, or trying to track down terrorists, and of course [dealing with] the hostage situation. Also we were recovering from the setback of the Iran contra-incident. The only country which hasn't stumbled on this issue of hostages, the only two countries were Kuwait and the UK. Everyone else has stubbed their toe on that combination of dealing with terrorists over hostages, as we did during the Iran-Contra affair.

_Q: While you were there, pretty much were you all agreed about how one deals with hostage situations._

MCMANAWAY: Yes, there was a good, uniform consensus among the different agencies.

_Q: Which is essentially "Don't deal," isn't it?_  

MCMANAWAY: Don't Deal. You can talk, but don't deal. That's one thing we ran into all the time, people not really understanding what we were saying when we said we don't negotiate. What we were saying was not that you don't communicate. In some way you try to communicate, but you don't cut any deal, you're [not making] concessions. That was widely supported among all the agencies.

_Q: The Iran-Contra thing had blown up by this time?_
MCMAWAY: It was over by this time.

Q: Was this serving as a strong lesson? Don't let amateurs get in? Does this serve as a worse-case example of what happens?

MCMAWAY: Yes, but because Iran-Contra created the image we were negotiating with hostage-takers, it took a while to recover from that, dealing with other countries like France in particular, to convince them that [we really did mean it]. We didn't want them making concessions either. That was one of the things that we worked on quite well.

Q: Do you find that the NSC was duly chastened on this type of thing? Because the Iran-Contra thing had been run out of the NSC.

MCMAWAY: Yes. That was the one agency I forgot to mention was I was listing. The NSC was involved.

Q: I would assume that having received this very bloody nose, they would have been careful.

MCMAWAY: Yes, they were very careful and very supportive not doing anything like that again. One of the things we were able to do was... We snatched a terrorist and pulled it off. We had seven agencies involved. It took us months to plan it and pull it off. We lured the terrorist out of Lebanon into international waters and snatched him. We brought him back to the United States and tried him. He is in jail. One of the things we patted ourselves on the back for, we felt that we’d proven that you can do it without doing it the North way. You could do it within the system.

Q: Without doing it the Oliver North way?

MCMAWAY: Yes. You could do it within the system. You didn't have to go outside the system. We were able to pull that off without a leak.

Q: Did that seem to have made an impression on the terrorist organizations? The fact that we got somebody...?

MCMAWAY: I think so. It's hard to say. You can't get inside the [system]. It's very hard to penetrate these organizations. I would have to assume that it did. I can't say for certain.

Q: What about Libya? At this time we didn't have diplomatic relations then did we, but we had some Americans there.

MCMAWAY: There were some Americans there but you were not supposed to be traveling there, nor were you supposed to be traveling to Lebanon at that time. Libya, Qadhafi had [pulled back] by that time, because of the raid on Libya...
Q: This is a bombing raid which narrowly missed Qadhafi and...

MCMANAWAY: He pretty well kept his head down and has since then. He's worked through surrogates. Some of his people of course are now saying he's involved in the [Pan Am 103 bombing]. I have my own theory about that, but I was not there at the end of that investigation. I'd left before they had... When I was there they were on a different track. The investigation was turning in a different direction and it shifted only after I left. So I don't know, I don't have access to all--except what you see in the papers--as to how that shifted, and Libya having been involved. The changes that have been made in the State Department since that period have been really [major].

Q: Changes which result in the program losing clout?

MCMANAWAY: It loses clout within the Department, it loses within the U.S. government. It loses clout internationally. When we traveled, either Jerry or Al Adams or I traveled... Because we all had the title of ambassador but we all would be working at the level that... We'd call on ministers when we were abroad, visited foreign countries. At the [current] level, I don't believe they can do that.

Q: At the time you were there - we're talking about '87 to '89 - what was the prime motivation of these various terrorist groups or were there various ones that we were concerned with?

MCMANAWAY: You know terrorists are looking to make a political point, trying to damage U.S. interests wherever they can. Of course with television the way it is now... For example, the Kuwaiti [Airbus] highjacking took place within that time frame. We were not directly all that involved but there was one American on board. No one knew that. We only knew it because before switching and using an Egyptian passport as he caught the flight out of Bangkok, he had shown them an American passport, so we had found out that he had an American passport. He did not show it on the plane to the highjackers. So they did not know it and we were very careful not to let anybody else know it. We knew it and we were very interested and were following it. We followed it overseeing it as well as we did through the television agencies because they were right there, they had better booms, they had better equipment. They were everywhere the flight was so we literally followed it on CNN. So they get a huge audience for whatever message they want to get across. In that case they wanted seventeen colleagues released by Kuwait. They had been jailed for terrorist acts in Kuwait.

Q: There'd been attacks on the American or French and also on Kuwaiti ministries by Palestinians.

MCMANAWAY: One of the seventeen terrorists that were held was in fact the brother-in-law of one of the leaders of Hezbollah.

Q: Which is one of the Iran supported terrorist groups?
MCMANAWAY: There are several factions within Hezbollah. Hezbollah was largely responsible for a lot of the hostage taking.

*Q: How did you find support from some of the European countries and Japan during this time?*

MCMANAWAY: Japan was not a big player. I made one trip out there. They were not a big player in the counter-terrorist... Of course they have a reputation for paying off. When they have people kidnapped, they pay off. Therefore they have more people kidnapped. Usually big businessmen and the companies pay off right away. France's support varied with the administration that was in. The current interior minister was also interior minister during the latter part of the time I was there, Pasqual. He was very supportive.

*Q: He is a very hard-nosed...*

MCMANAWAY: He's an ex-cop. He is a law-enforcement guy and he is a tough bird. I don't know what the story is on this...

*Q: Right now we're having a political brouhaha over this but anyway...*

MCMANAWAY: But he was very supportive. And they were very supportive of Spain because in Spain there is a terrorist group who crossed over for safe haven into France.

*Q: Some Basque type things?*

MCMANAWAY: Basque type thing. They were very supportive in helping Spain and they got a number of the top guys and they were very helpful there. They were very supportive in the international forum which we met on account of terrorism during that time. Other times, you know, France for a long time had a policy of laissez-faire, if you like. As long as you didn't do anything on French territory, the French wouldn't do anything against the terrorists. So their policy is not consistent. It's been somewhat inconsistent. The UK was always very supportive. Italy was very supportive, Spain...

*Q: Germany?*

MCMANAWAY: Germany was pretty good. In fact the Germans picked up one of the principal terrorists involved in the highjacking of the ship "Achille Lauro." We tried to get that fellow extradited to the States but they refused. But they tried him in Germany and the FBI did a lot of work on that, provided a lot of evidence and witnesses at that trial. Greece was pretty hopeless. We tricked Greece. There was one terrorist... After we snatched this one guy whose name escapes me, maybe it will come back. Eunice was the guy's name. We got him out of Lebanon. We told him he was going on a big drug deal. He was going to make a lot of money. The Agency had the contact with him. Lured him out. How much of this can we get into I don't know. It's already been made public. They had got a hold of a yacht and had it stationed out there, in Cyprus. Of course it was manned by a CIA agent, a girl, a female of the agency in bikini, etc. They were just out
beyond the border, in international waters. Took him out there in a speedboat and once aboard he was clapped and he was arrested, then took him to a navy ship which then took him to an aircraft carrier and we put him on a plane and we flew him on back nonstop. It took about three refuelings, broke several records of flights off an aircraft carrier which I guess we'll never get into the record books, but... After we'd done that we had been tracing and following another terrorist who had been involved in the bombing of an American plane some years before in which a teenager was killed. We knew he was in Sudan and we were planning an operation. We were having a lot of trouble with the lawyers because this time we were going to go into a country and take him. We had a pretty good plan, but then we found out he was going to be traveling, and he was going through Athens. So we notified the Greek authorities that there was going to be somebody going through on false documentation. Only after the arrest did we tell them who he was. Because if we had told them before, they probably wouldn't have let him in.

Q: I served four years in Greece and we had a terrorist attack. We had a bombing of a TWA plane there and the Greeks' whole idea was: "Get him out. We just don't want to deal with this problem."

MCMANAWAY: We didn't try to get him extradited. Again they tried to... He's in jail and that was all.

Q: How did you get him out? Did the Greeks finally, using publicity?

MCMANAWAY: We didn't get him out. They tried him in there.

Q: It's easy in a way to deal with the Arab terrorist, but all of a sudden we get into a politically sensitive thing like the IRA. The IRA very obviously are terrorists of the first water, but at the same time there's still an Irish heritage. This is a Kennedy talking to a McManaway. Was there a problem, an internal political problem in dealing with the IRA?

MCMANAWAY: Not very often. You know we were supportive of the UK. It was really a UK problem. They weren't really killing any Americans. Terrorist activities that don't involve Americans, we didn't get involved in. The only problems we had were with some of the spokespersons for the IRA who wanted to come to the United States. You'd get into some bureaucratic squabbles over that. We were able to block one or two times one of the fellows who's since been let in. But that's about the only connection we [had]. We did get involved a little bit in providing intelligence of Libyan shipments of munitions and weapons and stuff to the IRA. We didn't get too much involved.

Q: By the time, when you left a new administration had come in 1989 which would have been the Bush administration and you retired at that point. Looking back on it all, one, on the counterterrorism, what was your impression of how our efforts had been at that time?

MCMANAWAY: I thought we'd done pretty well. We had improved international
support which is obviously an international problem. We had made a couple of dents in their several organizations. We had disrupted the ANO pretty badly...

Q: The ANO is...?

MCMANAWAY: Abu Nidal Organization, one of the worst of all the terrorist organizations. We had improved significantly efforts against states who had been supportive and who were supporting terrorist groups. We had improved our capabilities to track and identify them, and track them down and keep them off balance. I thought we'd done pretty good. We had very strong support from George Shultz. Bush of course had got involved in counter-terrorism when he was vice-president, so we had good support from his staff. It was really running well. We had a couple of inter-agency organizations. One was a big organization, I'd have to go back and count them. Lots of agencies involved. That group got involved in some of overt policies and activities that we did such as supporting the government of South Korea during the Olympics, the government of Canada during the Olympics in Calgary. But we didn't rely on that. The real group that really made policy and made decisions was a small group that met over at the NSC, and we had a very strict rule. There were no notes, minutes taken. It was gloves off. We said whatever we thought. One agency would tear into another and it just cleared the air. We had a rule that only one principal from any agency could attend the meeting. So we kept very small and that's where we planned the snatch of Eunice, that's where we planned a lot of different...

Q: Also by not having too many people, it kept people from posturing for their own staff and all that which is always a problem when you have a large...

MCMANAWAY: That's true. And unlike the anti-drug organization, they never had anything like that to my knowledge and they've never been able to get a really good coordination. But we had that inter-agency coordination and it was really humming. It was going on extremely well. My impression is that on the Busby...

Q: This was Morris Bushy...

MCMANAWAY: Yes, it must have worked very well because of the job they did prior to the war in the Persian Gulf on Iraq I thought was just super...

Q: Well they certainly buttoned up Iraq as far as...

MCMANAWAY: Just super job. They got, I forgot the number, I think it was two or three hundred so-called diplomats PNG all around the world. They blocked an operation in one country that I know of that would have been spectacular, and they pulled it off. They did a super job. It seems to me it's gone downhill since then, but it was going well. We'd done a good job particularly in our agency's side. We had done some very tough things. I spent nine months negotiating a treaty on what would happen if we sent... We had an inter-agency response capability which extended to the military. What would happen in any given country between the American ambassador and the Commanding
Officer of the unit that went in there. How that would work and when the Command would (shift over when it would shift back?). It took me nine months but it's probably gathering dust on some shelf somewhere now.

Q: But still this is an important thing because you had a little bit of this happen down in Sigonella, Sicily prior to your time when they'd picked up the Achille Lauro.

MCMANAWAY: Yes, a little bit of it?

Q: There was a big confrontation there, from the Italians, the Americans who snatched the highjackers, and the American authorities in Italy. That was I guess the instigation.

MCMANAWAY: We were still suffering from that with regard to our dealings with Italy all during the time I was involved. We also worked out understandings on debriefing of hostages. Who was in the lead, how to handle that? We did a lot of things. We ran a lot of exercises. If we'd ever been called on to respond I think we would have done quite well.

Q: One of things I think you really have to deal with this. Every agency if they have their choice really wants to be paramount and they run in and it all looks unplanned. We end up looking stupid because of this.

MCMANAWAY: We also end up missing opportunities and messing up situations. But it also stems from legitimate interests and concerns. For example, you always have this tension between the FBI and the CIA, because the CIA is interested in intelligence. The FBI is interested in evidence and you don't disseminate evidence, you keep that. You're going to have to use it in court. They're trained that way, they've lived that for twenty-five years. It's just ingrained in them. So sharing is just unheard of. Breaking that down, making sure that we did get evidence that we might need if we ever were going to prosecute anybody, at the same time not miss any tactical intelligence. Of course the military are interested in an entirely different thing. For example debriefing hostages, trying to figure out where they were held and how you get in there if you ever get a chance to go in and try to rescue hostages. Which way does the door open. They want to know all that stuff. They all have legitimate interests and concerns, so reconciling that is not an easy job.

Q: State of course is concerned about the sensibilities of the country where it happens...

MCMANAWAY: But also making sure that we're staying in the league and our responsibility was coordinating all this. We got a lot of that done which hadn't been done before. For one thing, the period just prior to Bremer taking over and Al Adams and I joining them had been a horrific time. There were just one incident after another. Bob Oakley was there and Parker Borg were there that previous year, that year of 1985. I've forgotten how many incidents there were. You had highjackings and... Those poor guys were just running from one crisis to another. So a lot of the stuff couldn't be... There just wasn't time. Before that, it wasn't well organized within the State Department. It wasn't put together right to do any of these things. So it was really the first chance anybody had
to tackle some of these things. I don't know what's happened to them.

Q: Well Clay, then you retired in '89? Just for the record, what did you go on to do then?

MCMANAWAY: Well I came here in the Fairfax group. I've been the Vice President of the International...

Q: Which is what? A management consulting firm?

MCMANAWAY: A management consulting firm. An international management consulting firm. We specialize in investigations of all kinds, fairly sophisticated stuff. We have a lot of former senior government officials who know how to run undercover operations, sting operations. It's all new to me but it's... Not all, but a lot of it was new to me which was fun. We also work on security matters.

Q: Okay. Well, thank you very much.

MCMANAWAY: My pleasure.

Q: Great!

End of interview