The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project
Labor Series

BRUCE H. MILLEN

Interviewed by: James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle
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INTERVIEW

Shea: My name is Jim Shea. Today is November 15, 1993. Don Kienzle and I are at the new National Foreign Affairs Training Center in Arlington, Virginia, conducting an interview for the Labor Diplomacy Oral History Program. Today we are interviewing my old friend and colleague Bruce Millen, who among other things served as Labor Attaché in Rome, Oslo, New Delhi, and Ankara. Bruce, do you want to tell us something about your background, how you got interested in labor, and how you came into the Foreign Service?

MILLEN: I first became interested in trade unionism when I was in university. I came from a rather conservative, Republican background both in terms of family and in terms of community, so this was a kind of a departure that all at once I should get interested in labor issues.

Kienzle: Where did you grow up?

MILLEN: I was brought up for the first ten years of my life in Appleton, Wisconsin. My family then moved to Oak Park, Illinois, after my father lost his business in the depression. Later I went to Northwestern [University] for my undergraduate studies. At one of these colloquiums where a guest speaker came in, I exhibited an interest in following the trade union movement. He said, "If you don't come out of a plant, forget it!" Incidentally I had a similar experience when I exhibited an interest in going into the Foreign Service. That particular speaker said, "If you don't have private money, forget it." Those were the first two jobs I had after I came out of the military. That's the background. I came into [the Foreign Service] partly because I was in political trouble in the unions. I thought I was going to get fired because of internecine warfare between George Boldanzi and Emil Rieve over the Presidency of the Textile Workers Union; I tried to stay neutral, but it did not work.

Shea: Was this the Textile Workers Union?

MILLEN: No, the CIO Southern Organizational Committee which often tied into TWU projects. It was interesting how I got my job with the CIO. I read in Newsweek that the CIO was establishing a Southern Organizing Committee. I was living in New Orleans at the time and about to be discharged from the military. So I sent a night letter to a man named Van Bittner, who was mentioned in the article. He was from the Steel Workers Union and had a long record with the Miners Union with CIO President Murray. At any rate, he wrote back immediately, "Go see Fred Pieper, the CIO Director at 544 Camp Street, New Orleans." I walked in and Fred hired me. I was still in [military] uniform.

Kienzle: Was this in 1945?

MILLEN: Early 1946. I was still in uniform. He didn't ask for any references or anything. He just hired me. He said, "When you get out of uniform, come in." He put me on the Political Action Committee payroll.

Shea: I didn't catch the name. Who was this fellow?

MILLEN: Fred Pieper. He was out of the Automobile Workers Union. He came out of the Homer Martin group, so he was not in great repute himself with the existing leadership. They had put him down there [in New Orleans] partly to exile him. From my point of view, he was a remarkable person.

Kienzle: Could you explain for future students who the Homer Martin people were?

MILLEN: Homer Martin was the first President of the United Automobile Workers before it even became the CIO. He came out of a preacher's background, and he was a great speech maker [but] not much of a union leader. He eventually ended up as a captive of the industry, so there was a great struggle within the UAW when they finally got rid of him. That battle and its repercussions went on for years. It turned out that Fred organized a lot of people during the war years, and he was really one of the most capable people I ever met in the trade union movement.

Kienzle: Was he part of the Textile Workers Union?

MILLEN: No, he was Regional Director for the CIO.

Kienzle: What were your duties then for the CIO?

MILLEN: Well, at that time they turned me into a Political Action Representative, so I raised money and tried to keep track of political action and so forth. I was in one Congressional campaign. We were maneuvered by the state textile group into backing a candidate. The group got on this fellow's bandwagon very early on and shoved him through, and all at once we had a candidate, who we really didn't know very well. It was laughable and yet I got a lot of experience out of it. Our man lost as we thought he would, but we thought that we might force a run off with F. Edward Hebert, who was beginning to accumulate seniority, and jiggle the results a little bit more to our satisfaction. As it turned out, our candidate got roughly 5,000 votes, but that wasn't enough to affect the primary.

Then the CIO wanted to transfer me to the Chicago Political Action Committee, but they said, "After the elections in November [1946], we are not sure you will have a job." So I went to Fred and told him about this. He said, "Well, hell, I didn't put you on their payroll to have you go to Chicago. I put you on their payroll for you to get a little experience. I'll put you on our payroll now." So I stayed in Louisiana, then later was transferred to South Carolina, then to Alabama briefly, and finally to Virginia. Soon after I applied to the Foreign Service-I was recruited through Jim Taylor and Bureau of International Affairs over in the Department of Labor-my recall to the Army popped up on the horizon. I had an anxious two months until it was all sorted out, and I was sworn in as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer in June 1951.

Kienzle: Well, let's back up just a minute. You were busy in organizing activities in the Southern states?

MILLEN: Yes, after Fred put me on the organizing staff, then I worked as an organizer, although I was doing lobbying along with Fred in 1948 in the Louisiana state legislature.

Kienzle: So your application for the Foreign Service was submitted in about 1949?

MILLEN: It was submitted sometime in the late 1950.

Kienzle: How long were you an organizer?

MILLEN: For about five years. The same day that my security clearance for the State Department came through, I got my orders to report back to the Army.

Kienzle: This would have been in what year?

MILLEN: This would have been in early 1951. It was during the Korean War. I had a nervous several weeks [not knowing] whether I was going into the Foreign Service or back into the military. There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing at that time. I was in Radford, Virginia, working on a Hercules Powder Plant campaign, so I was coming back and forth to Washington pretty often and some of the people in the CIO staff, [in particular] Walter Harris, formerly of the Mine Workers, were trying with the military to get me out; even Anna Rosenberg said that she would help if necessary. She didn't like to interfere with individual Army units, but if it was absolutely necessary she said she would take up [my case]. As it turned out Jim Taylor from the Labor Department out-foxed the bureaucracy. Taylor had State write me a letter saying that when I reported for duty at the Department of State, I would be offered the job of Assistant Labor Attaché in Rome and then he had the Secretary of Labor, I think, write a letter to the Third Army saying, "He's going to fight Togliatti single-handedly." The Army released me.

Kienzle: Would you identify Anna Rosenberg for us?

MILLEN: She was Assistant Secretary for Manpower for the Army. She was a very bright, liberal social activist and powerful person in both Democratic circles and in military circles. Jim Taylor was at the Labor Department in the Bureau of International Labor Affairs.

Shea: Let's go back just a little bit. Did Mike Ross and the people in the [CIO] International Department put your name forward?

MILLEN: No. I more or less just walked in off the street. A friend of mine, who was a reporter for the Christian Science Monitor, told me about the availability of these jobs. So I just walked into Jim Taylor's office, and they were immediately interested. Of course I

had to have Mike Ross' approval and Phil Delaney's approval from the AFL side. So that was it.

Kienzle: Did you have any trouble getting AFL support given your CIO background?

MILLEN: In those days Mike and Phil had a working relationship [and I could expect approval] unless I came in with warts all over my head or something. Early on in my briefing over at the Department of State, I began to realize the factions that were developing over labor policy in Italy. They were all trying to enlist my support, and I being a neophyte was trying to fight them off. I knew nothing about Italy, foreign labor or anything else. So I certainly wasn't going to join a cabal at that stage of the game. On the other hand I learned that there were existing cabals.

Kienzle: Could you describe the briefing process that went on in 1951?

MILLEN: I really can't in any detail. I saw this and that fellow: Dan Horowitz, Irwin Tobin, the fellow from Latin America who finally got in trouble with the McCarthy.

Shea: John Fishburn?

MILLEN: Yes, [John] Fishburn. All those people. Some of them took me a little higher in their organizations, but to me it was a brand new experience and I was reeling from [both] the confusion that existed within me and the excitement of this type of assignment.

Kienzle: How long was the briefing process?

MILLEN: Well, it went on for a long time, because, as I remember, I got to Washington and I was sworn in on June 29th and through some failure of the appropriations bill, all travel was suspended. So here I was sitting over in a room on 16th Street all ready to go and I had to wait an extra four or five weeks before I could get in motion. I arrived in Rome on August 15th or something on that order, right in the middle of *ferro agosto*, where you wondered where all the people had gone. I must say, however, the delay did give me a period in which to assay the factional battles being fought with State.

Kienzle: Do you want to go into the factions that were there?

MILLEN: Well, it really boiled down to the pro-UIL (*Unione Italiana del Lavoro* or Italian Union of Labor Unions) and the pro-CISL (*Confederazione Italiana Syndacati Lavoratori* or Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions) [factions], the former being a mildly Social Democratic-Republican mixture and CISL being a Christian Democratic [group]. Of course at that early stage I didn't realize how thin the veil was over CISL with regard to its professed apolitical, aconfessional image. It was anything but.

Kienzle: How would your characterize it?

MILLEN: In reality CISL was almost totally dominated by the Christian Democratic Party. The only ones who didn't know that were the Americans, I guess. I remember going into a barber shop in La Spezia. I had gone upstairs to the CISL office and [nobody was there]. It was around lunch time, so I went downstairs and got a haircut in the barber shop. I told them I was looking for the CISL. "Oh, Sindicato de preti." was his response. (The syndicate of priests.) The Italians knew this game and it was only the Americans, particularly the American trade union leaders, who came over and were so firm in their beliefs that this was an apolitical, aconfessional union.

Shea: Did you get any language training in the United States?

MILLEN: No, in those days we didn't get paid [for language training]. Those bills were not paid. I started the first week I was in Rome at Berlitz, and studied for the first six to eight months. Then along about that time [the Department of State] brought in language subsidies.

Kienzle: You had no Italian before you went over to Italy?

MILLEN: No. In fact one of my fears was, as we came down and landed on a Saturday night, I said to myself, "What am I doing here? I know not one word of the language." Italy was a strange new world, both bureaucratically on my side of the fence and in terms of the Italian culture and systems and so forth. I was petrified, absolutely petrified. [On my arrival] I was greeted by a fellow who had been called in from his vacation to come and meet me at the airport. He was in not too cheery a disposition, but he did get us into town, and the next day being a Sunday, some guy from the Administrative Office called up and said, "Is this Bruce Millen?" And I said, "Yes." He said, "Thank you," and hung up.

Kienzle: Who was your boss there, the Labor Attaché?

MILLEN: Colonel Lane. *We all called him "the colonel" because of his military background. He had earlier had experience with the Fifth Army, much of which was over in Trieste. Then right after the war he moved into the Embassy in Rome. I guess he had been a colonel in "intelligence," and this operation going that was interesting. I had been there two days, I think, and was writing about some little thing out of the paper to send back as a form of a dispatch-It would have been my first dispatch. Those are high moments, you know.- and I was told by Tom's principal assistant, "You can report anything as long as it is favorable to CISL."*

Kienzle: There was a slight *bias?*

MILLEN: That was my welcome.

Shea: Can you recall who the assistant was?

MILLEN: It was Jim Toughill. He came out of the I.U.E. He was a charming rascal.

Kienzle: Was he an American?

MILLEN: Yes. So that was my first instruction. Then I had been there not more than a week when I was called over by either the Political Counselor or Tommy Thompson, who would have been Deputy Chief of Mission. I don't know [which for sure]. Anyway, talk came up about my background and I told them what I had been doing, and he said, "Oh! We were told that you were out of public relations in the union movement." Here again, the atmosphere already had this sense of mystery and conspiracy, and I had only been there a week. But life settled down, and I enjoyed myself.

Kienzle: How would you characterize our policy toward the trade union movements?

MILLEN: In a way [our policy was] juvenile.

Kienzle: In terms of promoting CISL at the expense of other non-Communist but legitimate unions?

MILLEN: In a way. It wasn't that everything we did was wrong. We were pumping a lot of covert money in and certainly at one stage of the game back, in 1948, that was important. As I have noticed these things over the years in different countries, we just don't know how stop anything. That which has a very legitimate starting point usually just continues on and on and on and *builds* and more and more people get a vested interest in it and there is no way to stop it. To gain perspective, one must realize our support for CISL was only indirectly a trade union issue. The U.S. commitment to CISL by the U.S. Government and the American trade union alike was, more accurately, support for the Christian Democratic Party as the chosen agent against Communism in general and the USSR in particular. The Communist CGIL, being so powerful and with its ties to Socialism (no matter how confused at times) or variants thereof, became a major field of battle.

Many labor attachés and others doing related work in the international labor field thought that building solid, independent trade unions in and by itself contributed to building democratic institutions. In Italy, we reverted to the pre-World War II pattern of building a religious political movement and a union movement controlled by, or guided by, the Church. This was a chancy gamble given the extent of anti-monarchical and anti-clerical opinion in Italy. The policy worked in 1948 fortunately because of the fear of Communism in the general public-even among those who normally would never vote Christian Democratic. But, in the long haul, it was a self-defeating policy.

On the labor side with the break away of the CISL group (helped in great measure by U.S. assistance) its leaders and the U.S. sources, public and private, declared the new labor confederation to be apolitical and a confessional. Few Italians believed that claim. The moderate Saragat Socialists under Saragat set up their own union, the UIL; the

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions accepted the UIL membership. The U. S. persisted in its sole support for CISL as the representative of the Italian workers. In effect, we denied trade union and political legitimacy to a substantial part of the Italian electorate. Instead of working to build a multi-faceted, genuine anti-Communist trade union force which could contribute to complementing other democratic institutions, we returned to an old agenda.

Kienzle: How were we assisting CISL?

MILLEN: Oh, we were paying an awful lot of money out. I don't know [exactly how much but] the Italians used to tell me to the tenth of a lira how much we were paying out. Tom Lane's English counterpart, the British Labor Counselor, would have lunch with me and say, "And what about this 620 million lire?"-or whatever the amount was in those days. He had specific figures and I knew nothing about amounts or anything like that. There were lots of indications that money was being passed. There were certain safes that I couldn't use and things of that nature. There was plenty of evidence that CISL was pretty much in our keep. The amusing thing was that all we did was pick up the tab for what the Christian Democratic Party would have had to pick up if we hadn't been there. The rationale-and I think it could be justified at one time-was that if we paid CISL that made the unions more independent of the party. But I never saw any evidence that CISL had that much control over anything very important. Of course, Lane had influence in the selection of ministers of labor and that sort of stuff, but it created such an unreal situation that over the long run it probably made it much more difficult for CISL to become an independent force from either the party or us.

But as I said, I had fun. Lane dreamed up this idea that we would use [our] bargaining power when we issued large contracts or loans. We would use political criteria and I spent a lot of my time out on the road checking the political situation in various plants there. How much [union representation came from] CGIL (*Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* or the Italian General Federation of Labor) or CISL or UIL or MSI (*Movimento Socialista Italiana*, the neo-fascist labor movement).

Kienzle: These were assistance loans to private firms?

MILLEN: Yes, or they were contacts.

Shea: Was this the forerunner of the off-shore procurement policy?

MILLEN: Yes, this was part and parcel of off-shore procurement, combined with MSA loans, etc. In fact I remember one day-I was not invited until very late-some admiral from the United States came over with his flock to discuss the procurement of 75 to 90 million dollars worth of ships, and I talked about using these contracts as a political instrument. There must have been 50 to 75 people there. Looking back it was funny because the admiral just looked at me and said, "Very interesting, young man. We're here to buy ships." He could not have cared less about the political complexion.

Kienzle: Were there cases where contracts were denied to organizations that had unions other than CISL?

MILLEN: Well, it gave us a basis for bargaining. I think for a while we had some impact. We didn't say to fire anybody, or at least I didn't. Some others did. But you could say, "Well, it is our understanding that the Communists"-We called them "shop stewards" which was not exactly a precise term but a short hand method for their representatives on the *Commissioni Interni*, the Internal Commission.-"are reportedly running free, while the CISL members are tied to their machines." So we could make pitches to give them at least equality of treatment: "Either tighten up on one force or let the other force loose" and things of that nature. I think for a while we had some short run influence, but I began to suspect later on that what CISL and all the unions were really saying was, "Well, look, if it is the difference between getting a contract or not getting a contract, we'll give you ten of our Commissiones Interni members," and all could agree to that kind of a division. Jobs were jobs. Possibly we induced management to be more circumspect.

Kienzle: Were we in effect influencing management to give preferential treatment to CISL?

MILLEN: Yes, this is what we hoped to do. But it all broke down and was very discouraging. I ran into one straight three million dollar loan from the Mutual Security Administration, which we now call AID, for a plant up in the Alto Adige, right outside of Bolzano. That was one of the plants that Mussolini had put there to get some Italian presence up in the Austrian part of Italy, and it was staffed 99 percent with Italians. Mussolini moved Italians up there to take those jobs. Well, the problem there, at least from my point of view, was that the management was supporting neo-fascists, so I blocked the loan and got in serious difficulty with our Deputy Chief of the Economic Aid Mission. I also got a lecture from either the Deputy Chief of Mission or the head of the Political Section. I pointed out, "If we are not here to support democratic rights, what good is all our anti-Communism going to do us? You are going to lose." Well, he was much disgruntled by my [comments].

Kienzle: There was no effort at all to eliminate fascists from positions of power?

MILLEN: The management there was actually giving active support to the fascist unions. So I held up that [loan] but at some personal cost. I was informed the loan was approved after my transfer.

Kienzle: This would have been around 1952?

MILLEN: This would have been 1953 or something on that order. My attitude didn't leave a satisfactory taste in the mouths of our people who called me in.

The one person I know about who was fired because of our efforts provided a great deal of (from my point of view) national adverse publicity to our Mission and provided to the cynic in me a piece of high comedy. A plant superintendent in Florence, an avowed Communist famous for his behavior during World War II, credited with bringing his optical plant back into production quickly after the war, was identified as one who "must go." All this in a city with a saintly Christian Socialist mayor who supported the plant manager.

A high level delegation from the U.S. Mission trouped over to Florence to insure action. It worked. Dozens of papers in Florence and Rome headlined the "discharge." The plant manager was released, transferred to headquarters in Belgium with a big title, made a member of the Board of Directors and provided with a much larger income. Peace was restored and the Embassy was satisfied. Fortunately, I was too junior to accompany our warriors, and for that matter, never knew what propelled us to take this action. For a change, I kept my comments to myself. It was a purely Italian solution and apparently satisfactory to all concerned.

One final story under this category took place one night in Minister Tasca's office. A director of one of Italy's myriad of state owned enterprises sought support for a loan or contract. After listening to the U.S. plea for more sympathetic treatment of the CISL, the director stated bluntly that it was not a difficult problem. He would direct the discharge of 3,000 Communist workers. I coughed and yammered and finally succeeded in getting our Minister out of the room. I pointed out to him that the United States Government could not absorb this type of publicity as the story was bound to become public-in fact the plant director would be the first to claim he was "following U.S. orders." We came back into the room and explained we were not demanding discharges, simply equal treatment of CGIL leaders and CISL activists on the work floor. The three of us parted soon thereafter, convinced we had done something important, nebulous as that might be.

In general one might say the entire effort of political-economic coercion to be of sound and fury. It might have stiffened a few backs on the side of management, but suffered diminishing returns as the Italians learned how to manipulate the system.

Kienzle: How did the Labor Attaché Tom Lane react [to your blocking the MSA loan to the plant in Alto Adige]?

MILLEN: Tom seldom said anything to me. He boasted of his never leaving "fingerprints," i.e. his signature on any matter. And that was certainly true in all of his relationships with me. He stayed out of this one publicly as he did on any issue involving me or any of the issues I raised. On economic issues or decisions I took, I did pretty much what I wanted.

Shea: Who was the ambassador at that time?

MILLEN: When I got there, we had one of the real old-timers. I can't remember his name. He went from there to France. Then we got the sugar king, [Ellsworth] Bunker. He was a delightful guy, savvy and a decent type of person. He was not ideological in the sense others were, a pragmatist one would say. You could talk to him and reason with him. In later years, when I would meet him on the street or when he was Ambassador to India-I visited him there.-I always enjoyed talking to him.

And then in about 1954 we had Clare Boothe Luce come in. I didn't have much contact with her. I was led to believe that she, by mere chance, saved my neck on an investigation of me. I was the subject of an apparently informal inquiry within the Embassy about me, and the best that I could make out of it was that I was being charged with being an irresponsible radical.

Kienzle: Who raised the charges?

MILLEN: I don't know. A year later I was later told by the Political Counselor that he had not been there long when a serious person in the Embassy had laid letters in front of him pertaining to me which he signed. He said the he had no reason to doubt that this fellow and others and didn't understand what was going on. He said to me, "I signed the papers and sent them to Washington." I was later told by the fellow who kept the records on this investigation [at the Embassy] that it went on for two months. I never knew anything about it until it was all over.

Kienzle: What were the specifics of the charges?

MILLEN: I have told you as much as he told me. My friend got semi-drunk one night after both of our wives had returned to the United States, and we had been invited over to dinner at somebody's house. Afterwards he came back to my place and we talked and drank and drank and talked. This whole story came out. It is just absolutely fascinating. This guy was a personal friend. He was a garrulous old boy from Tennessee, and I am sure it would have been hard for him to sit on this information, so he just told me. I was absolutely flabbergasted at the whole thing. Finally it was just dropped. I don't think it ever reached any conclusion. As he told the story, Ambassador Luce came through while they were deliberating one day and said, "Is this [discussion] still [about] the Millen problem?" They said, "Yes." And she said, "Why don't we forget about it," and that was the end of it!

Kienzle: So Ambassador Luce closed the case?

MILLEN: Unwittingly she closed the case. I think that she had begun to lose faith in Tom Lane.

Kienzle: What sort of labor background did Tom Lane have?

MILLEN: Tom was member of the Brick Masons' Local Number One in Washington, D.C. I could never figure out whether he ever actually laid brick or not. I suspect that he did in his youth. He became a lawyer, which always dumbfounded me because he was "illiterate" in both English and Italian. What a show he could put on!

Kienzle: He must have been a good "contact person"?

MILLEN: Well, look, anybody who is delivering that much money is a good contact person. You don't have to look for friends. I heard him once. I had written a despatch of some sort, and he called [into his office] Louisa San Severino, a marvelous research person, [who worked at the Embassy]. She was both a Contessa and a Professoresa. She was an interesting and nice person. She did research for us and translation of articles. I happened to be in the outside office one day and Tom was saying to her, "What do you think of that?" There was a pause. I guess my name was attached to this question, because I stood stock still. She looked at it and said, "Well, you know, I turn material over to Mr. Millen and then he does with it what he wants. I don't assume direct responsibility for that interpretation, but if you want to know whether I agree with that, yes, I do."

Shea: Bruce, at that time you got around Rome. Did you meet any of the officials of the CGIL.

MILLEN: No. There was pretty much a non-contact policy, and they weren't available. I used to go to all their rallies. I would go to some of their inside rallies when DeVittorio was speaking in a theater, and they never objected. But when an architect-sculptor. . . I have forgotten his name now, but the man who did the figure in front of Solidarity House in Detroit. . . He was a architect. He did public housing. He was an advisor to Walter [Reuther] and so forth. [In any case], among other things he did a statue that he cast in a little town just outside of Florence, and I got an invitation for the unveiling. "Oh, God, no! You can't go there!" was the cry. "They have a Communist mayor." Well, I said, "So what? The mayor probably won't show up anyway." Well, he didn't show up. I did go. Nobody could really dream up a reason why I shouldn't go.

Shea: What were your impressions of Giuseppe DeVittorio?

MILLEN: Well, from reading and seeing him at meetings and so forth, he was a very commanding guy and had a true presence on the platform. He looked like a big peasant from my recollection.

Shea: As I recall he was a peasant, I think, from Puglia.

MILLEN: Yes, something of that sort.

Kienzle: This was the head of the CGIL?

MILLEN: Yes

Shea: As I understand it, he was from the Farm Workers Union.

MILLEN: He may have been. I have forgotten all that. But that CGIL staff had good economists. They really were for the most part first rate. I remember once that the CGIL put out a five year economic plan for Italy, which was a good plan, worthy of serious consideration. I wouldn't want to buy the whole thing. At any rate I went to a reception from the *Confindustria*, which is the industrial association, and I asked one of their chief economists what he thought of the plan. He said, "Well, it's not bad." [I asked], "Does the *Confindustria* ever put out any such documents?" He replied with a grin, "Our job is to create a response to the CGIL plan.

Kienzle: Were your contacts almost exclusively with the CISL?

MILLEN: And the UIL. I had a lot of contacts with the UIL. That was part of the problem that I had there. I got into trouble with Irving Brown and Jay [Lovestone] and the Colonel [Tom Lane] and the Embassy and the CIA and the AFL, because I was being friendly to the UIL and occasionally I would get them a trip to the United States, or some other favor. It was the contacts which really troubled "our crowd." At one point I got both groups at the senior working level to agree on worker housing legislation.

Kienzle: The UIL was the Socialist trade union?

MILLEN: The UIL was Social Democratic along with a Republican current. And because the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) accepted them for membership, my activities were tolerated, even though not always appreciated.

Shea: Who headed up the UIL?

MILLEN: Italo Viglianesi-later to be Minister of Transport as the Christian Democrats weakened and had to look for allies.

Kienzle: Why did you get in trouble [for your contacts with UIL]?

MILLEN: Because they were not part of CISL. And then of course there was always the suggestion that the UIL were really laced with crypto-Communists and so forth. It was that they were out of step with what we wanted them to do, which was namely become one unified opposition to the CGIL. When we engineered the separation of CISL from the CGIL, we didn't realize that we were setting in force traditional Mediterranean cultural-political instincts to have multiparty operations. Once you broke a big piece off of CGIL, it was inevitable that smaller pieces were going to come off and try to maintain their own identity and their own political force. Given the AFL's strong plea for unitary unionism, i.e. no dual unionism, it was only natural from our point of view to say, "Well, you can't have two [labor movements]. You've got to have one." That just went counter to the entire European tradition. The general European mode of operation led to coalition

governments as well as trade unions, leaving the door open to Communist domination. It lead to muddied politics, not clear-cut results as exemplified by the American model. All of this is true, of course. We just never realized we could not pull it off.

Kienzle: Who in the Embassy supported your contacts with the UIL?

MILLEN: To my knowledge, no one on the political side of the Mission. The economic division and many on what we now call the AID Mission, including the Minister, were quite comfortable with my activities. One or two from the CIA seemed quite comfortable and cooperative.

The UIL contacts came about naturally. I didn't break my neck to do it. And there were people, who were not my superiors and so forth, who were quite happy to see material coming out [of the contacts]. Many people on the economic side of the Embassy felt there was a smell of craziness about the work of the labor section. And a good many of the Consular officers were very realistic in their appraisal of Embassy policies.

Kienzle: Did Tom Lane oppose the contacts?

MILLEN: Yes, but he couldn't say, "You can't do it." because the ICFTU recognized the UIL and because they were afraid of possible repercussions. They just thought that I shouldn't. I wasn't trying to be an obstructionist or anything. I just thought it came naturally, and I certainly was not in opposition to the CISL. I just thought that if you can't have one organization fighting the Commies, then you had better make use of what tools you have and that was it. UIL, standing alone, could never have been a match for the CGIL. It would have always been an adjunct to the CISL, never a substitute.

Shea: Pastore headed up the. . .

MILLEN: Yes, Guilio Pastore was head of CISL. I kind of liked him. He was a short, squat, little fellow. But he never commanded the respect of a DeVittorio, nor could he shape Christian Democratic policy.

Shea: Do you recall his origin?

MILLEN: No. That has faded into the past. He was always interested in the development of the south. I can't remember whether that came from part of his origins or whether he just felt that in order to develop Italy had to do something in the south. He was no dummy. He was a respectable guy. Bruno Storti was his deputy and later became [head of CISL]. Bruno was motion picture star handsome. Didn't you think that?

Shea: Yes, that's right.

MILLEN: I understand third hand that by 1967 or 1968 Storti had pretty much had it up to the throat with American interference, . . . -- because actually we were still monkeying around there -- and there was a move for unity among the trade unions.

Shea: And they were engaged in joint collective bargaining.

MILLEN: I understand that the AFL-CIO was doing its best to try to block that and were putting up a fair amount of money to stop it.

Kienzle: To stop the unity?

MILLEN: Yes.

Kienzle: Because they were afraid of Communists and Socialists?

MILLEN: Oh, I suppose so, although I really was amused [sometime] along about 1970 [when] I was reading the AFL-CIO News and there was a picture of the UIL General Convention up in Torino and by God there must have been five presidents of AFL-CIO [member unions] in that picture. I thought,"How things have changed!"

Shea: Five Executive Council members?

MILLEN: Yes, and then of course we had Harry Goldberg there in residence as part of the Lovestone operation.

Shea: Didn't they have the trade union training school down in Anzio?

MILLEN: CISL had one up just outside of Florence in the hills.

Shea: Jazali?

MILLEN: I am not sure.

Kienzle: Do you want to describe Harry Goldberg's operations.

MILLEN: Well, it was too veiled. He floated around. Occasionally he and his wife would invite my wife and me to lunch, and then, as I understand it, he would frequently go back to CISL and talk about my "Communist connections."

Kienzle: What was his official position there?

MILLEN: He was just a representative of the Free Trade Union Committee. I believe that probably would have been his title. He was a likeable and bright guy.

Shea: And an accomplished musician.

MILLEN: Yes, a very fine musician. I don't know whether he may still be living, but he was in very bad health.

Shea: He passed away a few years ago.

MILLEN: Did he?

Kienzle: Why did he report back on your activities?

MILLEN: Because they were very unhappy with my contacts and the things I was doing. I never considered these things to be all that important, but they became magnified in the minds of some observers.

Kienzle: Was there any sense that there was a need to keep track of other factions in the trade union movement besides CISL, even if we did not influence them?

MILLEN: They certainly wanted information about the UIL, and they certainly wanted to keep track of me. We had one fellow in the office who was openly from the [Central Intelligence] Agency. He was a nice fellow. He made no bones about his connection. We worked together and traded information back and forth. Then another fellow was assigned, and interestingly enough my first alert came from [our local] Italian employees in the Mission. "Be careful of this new guy coming in. He is out looking after you." These employees were from the Mutual Security Agency. How they knew it I don't know, but that was the first warning I got; later I danced with the wife of a CIA employee and she said, "Bruce, be careful. This guy is here primarily just to watch you."

Kienzle: Do you think that her husband put up to saying that?

MILLEN: No, I don't think so. I was a good friend of her husband's. No, I don't think he put her up to it. I don't think he would have trusted her with that kind of information. Then, interestingly enough, when I was getting ready to leave, the agency wanted to fill my job too. That was when I worked something out with Henry Tasca, who was Deputy Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission, and I think also Minister of Economic Affairs in the Embassy, but I am not quite sure of that.

Shea: Yes, as I recall, he was.

MILLEN: Well, at any rate, I went to Henry and said, "Hey, Henry, I understand that 'they' are trying to put somebody in my job." He was startled and said, "How can we stop it?" I said, "They apparently haven't selected anybody yet. There's nobody ready to come right in. Maybe you can fill the job on an 'acting basis' right away." So he called Ted Long down [to Rome] from Genoa, and Ted took the job [at the Embassy] and stayed in it.

Kienzle: How did the Agency go about filling those spots at that time?

MILLEN: Well, I don't know. The one that I told you about that I had been alerted to. . . I can't imagine him being very effective in any sense of the word. I heard indirectly that he was not a deep or a great agent. I guess that they selected him on the basis that he had an Italian name and spoke some Italian. He was responsible for vetting some of my reports- in fact stopped one. He succeeded in getting new cars for three CISL officers in central Italy. That type of thing.

Shea: Bruce, going back to [the subject of] the CGIL, when you went to some of these CGIL rallies, would Togliatti, [head of the Italian Communist Party], put in an appearance?

MILLEN: No, I never was at a meeting where Togliatti spoke. I think that was part of their game too. They didn't want to juxtapose these two forces.

Kienzle: They made a distinction between the party and the union?

MILLEN: Yes, I think they were trying to, but nobody was fooled by it. It was for public relations purposes.

Shea: As I recall, from its very beginning, the CGIL always had a Socialist Assistant Secretary General.

MILLEN: Yes, the Nenni Socialist Party made common force with the Communists and was also in the CGIL as the main socialist party. They were rewarded with second-level jobs.

Shea: This would have been Nenni?

MILLEN: This would have been Nenni's people. I have forgotten the names of the CGIL people, but [Nenni's people] had the important spots in the CGIL and probably from time to time had considerable influence. There was no question that the Communists controlled the operation.

Well, we have talked so much about this covert phase and I don't want to leave the impression that that's all which occupied me. It took up only about ten percent of my time, but because I was right in the middle of it, it loomed as a very important part of the picture. I think we did some good things: that school in Fiesole and some of those things.

Kienzle: Did you have other duties besides labor?

MILLEN: Indirectly, yes. I worked with the Economic Aid Mission closely. I sat on their loan committee, and I think I had some influence there, partly because of the political information that I had about individual plants where loans were being directed. I got involved to some extent in the cooperative situation. There again, Tom Lane had a certain

instinct for what was important in a political sense. He said one day, "You know, we don't know much about the Italian cooperative movement. Why don't you look into it." So I wrote a very extensive report on it. Of course, it was almost a mirror image of the trade union situation, but to my knowledge nobody had ever touched on the subject before. The Communist Cooperative Movement was strong, healthy and so forth, and organized much like the CGIL. I did work with the productivity committee, as well as general economic work.

Shea: It was particularly strong in the Emilia Romagna.

MILLEN: Yes, there farm cooperatives and everything were very [strong]. The other parties had matching organizations, which were about as effective as [their counterparts] in the trade union field. Bang! This report hit Washington and within a month we had a special group out on co-ops.

Kienzle: Did we support co-ops?

MILLEN: Just to figure out what we could do and how we could strengthen them, as far as I know, but in Italy, who knows?. Interestingly enough San Severino, the Professoresa, was a consultant to the Christian Democratic Cooperative Movement. She was a professor at Pisa. She would go up there two or three times a year "to take examinations." What she meant was to give exams. I have no knowledge she ever met a class, but that would be part and parcel of an Italian university. You know, they don't have enough seats to seat all their students if they came to class. It is not like an American university set up. You are pretty much on your own. You are an independent scholar and that is one reason why to this day relatively few people get university degrees.

Shea: Yes, I can attest to that because I was a student at the University of Perugia for a while. Bruce, do you remember when Abe Kramer was there?

MILLEN: Oh, yes. This is an interesting story. For three years I was not permitted to go to Torino, Pisa, or Trieste, because those were Tom's private bailiwicks.

Kienzle: Any particular reason for that?

MILLEN: Well, in Pisa he had set up a dual dock union, which was really run-I may be oversimplifying here-out of the prefect's office. They selected the people who would load and unload American ships. That was one of the major debarkation points for both our troops and supplies going into Austria. So in a security sense it was very important.

Shea: That was at Livorno?

MILLEN: Yes. So Tom Lane had established this separate section of the Dock Workers which was pretty much a CISL operation with the prefect running the show. I guess that was considered to be too delicate for me to go into it. For the first two or three years, I

was just not permitted to go. So Tom went up there one day and the newspapers mentioned that he was up in Livorno/Pisa. He was a public figure. I am not quite sure what the problem was but among other things, the leadership needed more money. I think that's what it was. So he went up there. He never told us or anybody about what went on. Well, Kramer was in town at that time, and Irving Brown was in the Flora Hotel. So the same guys who met with Tom on Tuesday met with Irving Brown on Thursday. They told Brown that they didn't get much from Lane and so forth, so Brown upped the ante. Kramer was at the Brown meeting and told me about it.

Kienzle: How did he do that? What was the mechanism?

MILLEN: Keeping matters and finances straight in so far as activities of the CIA and their surrogates [are concerned] is beyond my ken [capacity]. I don't know what the mechanism was, but obviously he and Lane were in great competition.

Shea: Kramer, as I recall, was brought down from Germany.

MILLEN: Well, he went into Trieste, because that was a special flash point. There was a lot of labor activity in the port, even though it was a declining port.

One final anecdote about the Italian scene, and then let's move on. I tell this simply to demonstrate CGIL-CP methods and tactics versus those of CISL. Probably in 1954 or 1955, CGIL ran a most impressive and economically devastating farm strike in Ferrara, north of Bologna. Day after day, newspapers in Rome of all political persuasions carried front page stories. It was fast becoming an important political issue with the Socialists and the Communists playing the story for everything possible. The economic issues have long been lost to my memory.

I went to Ferrara for three days to see developments first hand and spent most of two days with two fine CISL representatives who were overwhelmed by events-and frankly they were more than a little frightened in as much as they had to flee from the rear as the CGIL supporters broke in the front. Farmers were afraid to go out to milk their cows; animals were being shipped out of the province; cattle were going un fed. The CGIL mounted demonstrations led by pregnant women.

Initially the police had bicycles for transport while the strikers used motor-scooters. Jeeps were brought in for the police, but the strikers ripped up the loose planking which formed the road service for many of the small streams. I felt the isolation of the CISL forces and was stunned when, in thanking me for my visit and attention [one of them] said, "Tell some of the CISL leaders we need help. Some of our people from CISL should visit us."

The dispute was resolved a few days later under terms virtually identical to a set of recommendations I made to Minister Tasca upon my return. Cause and effect? Who knows?

So that's it. Why don't we move on to another country? Suffice it to say that Lane gave no consideration to economic issues or the work of economic development. I did not even consult with him on issues in this area.

Kienzle: Okay. Well, how long were you in Italy?

MILLEN: Three and a half years.

Kienzle: So you were there until about 1954?

MILLEN: I left in about October 1954.

Kienzle: Where did you go from there?

MILLEN: Then I went to Norway. It was such a contrast!

Kienzle: How would you characterize the differences?

MILLEN: Well, one of my old friends who worked with me in Rome, but was [actually] stationed in Paris, was the Mutual Security Administration's chief guy in Norway. This was a small operation with about five people involved at that time. We were talking and I wanted to get something done, and he said, "Bruce, you are not in Italy. You can go from point A to point B with no problem at all. You don't have to go through points C and D to get to point B."

Kienzle: So you were able to free-wheel a good deal more?

MILLEN: Well, first of all, 90 percent of the anti-Communist stuff we could leave to the Norwegian Labor Party. I did a few little things that they asked me to do, or I thought might be worthwhile in that direction, but it was a pretty straight-forward kind of thing. They wanted some special information, or if they wanted something taken care of that I could do, we would do it. They once asked me to visit one of the Communist strong points up in northern Norway.

Kienzle: "They" being the Labor Party?

MILLEN: Yes, the Labor Party and Haakon [Lie]. He asked me to go up there. He said, "You know, those idiots are up there blaming Americans for everything, and they have never ever seen one. Would you go up there and show them what an American is?" So I went up there, and they had a seminar or some sort of a training session going on. So I spent two or three days with them and I found it very enjoyable. They would come up to my room later and argue politics and drink my scotch.

Kienzle: The Communists?

MILLEN: Well, the whole group. They weren't all Communists. They would fight over issues in my hotel room. Other than showing the flag, my role was just to be a kind of an interlocutor so to speak.

It was interesting. One of the things [I found]-and this was true in Italy as well as in Norway and in fact all the countries I was in-was that one of your chief sources of information and one of the areas where you could introduce ideas and so forth was through academic circles. And in Norway, in contrast to Italy, the employers invited my participation in their events and listened to me and talked frankly about issues and so forth. In Italy that never took place. Some of the individual staff economists in Italy were interesting and useful, but the officers would never deign to sit down and talk to somebody in my position, while in Norway everything was reduced in scale because it is a small country. But it was also a highly democratic country. I used Bob Flemming as my entry point to the Norsk Arbeidsgiver Forening (Norwegian Employers Federation) or NAF. [To Jim Shea] Remember Bob Flemming?

Shea: Oh, yes

MILLEN: Anyway he was later President of the University of Michigan, but at that time he was at [the University of] Illinois. He was a lawyer and arbitrator and mediator. I used his visit as a point of entre with the employers, and they were delighted to see me and maintain contact with me. I put out a little bulletin in Norway called "Labor News in America." We did it by offset press. I was talking with the Director of the Employers Association once, and he said, "Bruce, I am not trying to impose censorship, but you know that right now the issue of the forty hour week is before Parliament. Could you stay away from that subject?" He said, "You don't know what that paper does? You put something in that paper and we've got a demand within twenty days from some place in this country for contract conditions you have in the United States." He said this with absolute good humor. "You must know that the 40 hour week in the United States was, in part, a job creation effort; here we have less than two percent unemployment. The 40 hour week will come. Give us some time."

The difference between Italy and Norway is illustrated by the relationship I had with the Norwegian Employers' Federation. It was marked by almost complete openness as the prior exchange illustrated. The Deputy Director once told me that one of the proudest moments in his life took place when he was a regional director in Stravanger. It seems that his union counterparts and his group had worked several days on negotiating a series of amendments to a contract and the pressures had been intense. When the issues had finally been resolved, the chief union negotiator said, "I must make this next train. Would you put this series of agreements in final form and see that they are distributed to my members and yours so there are no further delays." The director told me, "I was humbled and honored at such trust being placed in my hands."

Finally, I should say, based on my Italian experience, I was somewhat wary about approaching the NAF (Norwegian Employers Federation). Finally, my reservations were

overcome by the chief economist for the trade union federation, who told me I must avail myself of the opportunity. He said, "They have excellent people and far more resources than we. You would be doing yourself a disservice by neglecting the group." How right he was!

Kienzle: What kind of work week did they have in Norway at that point?

MILLEN: I think they had a forty-four hour work week. They started right after World War II with a forty-eight hour week, and they had gotten it down to a forty-four and the unions wanted to go to forty. The employers knew that eventually they would go to forty. It was simply a question of when, one year or three.

Kienzle: Eliminating Saturday morning work?

MILLEN: Yes.

Shea: Who was our ambassador [to Norway] then?

MILLEN: Coren Strong, who was a great socialite and had quite a bit of money. He was a very decent guy. Once he got accustomed to the fact that I didn't wear horns, we got along very well. In fact he used to boast to some people that he had personally selected me.

Kienzle: What kind of professional background did he have?

MILLEN: Really it was hard to tell. The thing that gave him most satisfaction was his Army time. I have forgotten what kind of a unit he worked with. He inherited his money. He was an orphan, and he was brought into the Eastman Kodak clan, I think, and that was the source of his money. His wife was a martinet but smart. Oh, gosh, she was smart, and she cracked the whip. She told the ladies, "The Ambassador wants a tight ship here." But he was a sweet fellow and it was always fun to be around him.

Shea: How did he regard the Socialists?

MILLEN: He seemed to be above that. The Socialists didn't bother him. I remember once I convinced him to give a party on Labor Day for the Executive Council of the Norwegian Trade Union Confederation, which had about 55 or 60 members. They met quarterly, and were to meet prior to Labor Day. I convinced him to throw a party. We got the invitations up, and we invited the wives although we knew that not many of them would be there. We sent out the invitations three weeks in advance, so they would get the invitations at their homes, because that gilt-edged invitation is good coffee time talk in these small towns up above the Arctic Circle. So then the only issue was that there was still one Communist member of the Executive Council. What were we going to do with him? And I said, "Let's invite him. We'll get brownie points from the Norwegians and he won't come." And he didn't. It was a good party, and the Ambassador was quite happy about it.

It is the members of the Foreign Service who sometimes give you problems. The last day I was at the Embassy-The next day I was to pack up and the day after that sail-I was sitting behind a screen in an empty office and filling out some papers, and the personnel officer came in to interview a prospective Norwegian for a job. The whole thrust of the interview was to try to elicit whether that [applicant] was a member of the Labor Party, and it was quite clear that he wouldn't be hired [if he was]. You would think that by some process of osmosis people would become civilized. This [personnel officer] was displaying all the God-damned prejudices and nuttiness of big organizations. They left [the room] before I did, and they never knew that I was there. Later I said to the [personnel officer], "You know, if that guy were to repeat the questions from the interview you were giving him, we would be in real trouble around here. Our friendly relations with the Labor Party could break down on the issue of our trying to keep Labor Party people off our [Embassy] payroll."

Kienzle: What kind of position was he being recruited for?

MILLEN: Oh, I don't know. Just a routine job.

Kienzle: Was he to work for the Political Section?

MILLEN: No, no, no.

Shea: Was the ambassador aware of this?

MILLEN: No, these were individual employees responding to the unstated objectives of their bosses, which just goes to show you the pervasive atmosphere in institutional life.

Shea: How was the Political Counselor?

MILLEN: We had two while I was there. Stratton Anderson was in charge of the two person Political Section. By way of comparison the Political Research Office-the Agency-had four people. The Deputy Chief of Mission was Hayden Raynor for most of the period. Hayden Raynor was a nice fellow. He was not a world-breaker or anything like that but competent and truly cooperative after he took my measure.

Shea: Did he clear off on your dispatches?

MILLEN: I was in the Economic Section which was a friendlier place, where, for the most part, my supervisors were most helpful. The first thing I wrote at Embassy Oslo was slapped back at me. It was a report on the first strike in 25 years held by the Norwegian Labor Movement.

Kienzle: 25 years!

MILLEN: Well, at least since the prewar [period]. This was 1955, and I had not been in the country two months before the Transport Workers Union struck Esso. [Earlier] I spent two years of my life trying to organize an Esso refinery. [The Norwegian Transport Workers Union] had Esso organized to the point where Esso apologized to the union because it kept white collar workers on the payroll who were not striking.

Kienzle: Esso in general was anti-union.

MILLEN: Well, in the United States Esso had company unions. Legally you can't say that they were company unions, but for all intents and purposes when I was working with them they were just that. So I wrote the report, and I had among other things a report written by the Employers Association that I was working from, but I didn't include it in my report. I just extracted parts. I couldn't read even "beginning" Norwegian at that time, so anything I got had to be translated. I took a few hundred words out of that report and included them here and there in the report that I wrote, and it came back to me. The Political Counselor had given it to the Deputy Chief of Mission saying, "He is biased." There upon I had the whole fucking report translated, and I just said, "In regard to the report to which somebody took exception, I submit this internal report from the Employers Association." That was the last I ever heard of it. My report went to wherever it was supposed to go, and nobody ever raised the question of biased reporting again.

Kienzle: In what sense did they think you were biased?

MILLEN: Well, I guess they thought that I was too pro-union and anti-Esso.

Shea: Was the Norwegian labor movement highly organized?

MILLEN: Oh, yes. It was not as high as Sweden, but it was over 50 percent.

Shea: Do you recall the Secretary General of the Norwegian [Trade Union Federation].

MILLEN: Konrad Nordahl. He was a very interesting personality. He was a former member, I think, of the Communist Party, and the Norwegian Party had been a member of the Second and One-Half International for a short period. He couldn't get a passport for the United States, because of that connection. In any event the only way he could come to the United States was on diplomatic credentials as a delegate to the United Nations and so forth. [After] I had been there a couple of years, I went to him and said, "Konrad, would you like to go to the United States legally sometime." He said, "I'd love it." He didn't say it [quite] that way because his mode of expression was more formal. So I started the process of getting an exception to the Attorney General's list or whatever it was called.

Shea: The Attorney General's waiver list.

MILLEN: Of course about half way through this [waiver process for Nordahl] I got request after request for more information about him from different [people] and I

thought to myself, "Boy, if this doesn't go through, I'm in real trouble." Anyway it took about three months and finally [the waiver was granted]. I went over that afternoon and said to Konrad, "You are as pure as driven snow, Konrad." He grinned. He was a tough guy. I think he was one of the strongest men I have ever met. His demeanor frightened people.

Kienzle: Physically or emotionally?

MILLEN: In his capacity to control events. He ruled that place with an iron hand. Some of his assistant officers, or assistant "foreman" as they are called, used to come to me to take messages to him, because they would say, "He gets along with you, and you are a foreigner, and he won't get mad, so would you sound him out about this? And if he doesn't react too badly, I'll take it back on my own."

Kienzle: What were his policy priorities that they felt so hesitant to deal with him on directly?

MILLEN: First of all, he was a tightwad; he didn't want any money spent; secondly, on matters of collective bargaining and legislative strategy. I don't know what it is like now, but [at that time] they had an extremely centralized bargaining process. [The leaders] had to approve every contract, and they could end a strike or they could start a strike. They could call the whole movement out if they wanted to. If the metal workers had a strike, after two weeks strike support funds automatically came from Denmark and Sweden, as part of any agreement [made back] in the 1910's. So it was very highly centralized.

Shea: Were there many figures from the resistance movement in the trade movement?

MILLEN: Yes, I knew quite a few of them. There was an amusing story. I don't know whether you want it on tape or not

Kienzle: Go right ahead.

MILLEN: It has nothing to do with what we are taking about, but one of my friends at 31 [years of age] was Assistant Director of the Bank of Norway-a former German prisoner. The problem was that he tried to run the country from that position. He tried to tell the Finance Minister [what to do] and so forth, so he finally got bounced out but later became what they called a junior cabinet minister. He was minister for prices and wages. He was an entertaining fellow. His brother was my closest friend, but I knew Gunnar pretty well.

After I had been overseas someplace, I went back [to Norway] for a visit. I used to try to take two or three days vacation in Norway on the way home. This was one of those occasions and a friend of mine set up a dinner for me at his house. His wife was part Indonesian [and served] good Indonesian food. Gunnar was among the guests and along about 10 o'clock, he said he had a cabinet meeting in the morning and he should be alert and so forth. I knew that Gunnar was not going to his hotel room, so we made a date for

lunch the next day at one o'clock. Well, Gunnar was late; Norwegians are never late. So he came in about 15 minutes late and apologized. He said, "I had to return to my room and change my linen." That's the way he talked. So he said, "You know I sat in the back of the room with my dark beard and so forth."

I said, "Gunnar, I didn't know that the Norwegian Cabinet gave any concern about the sinful activities of its members." He said, "Normally they don't, but the entire quota for the entire cabinet is being used up by the Minister of Agriculture at this time." So then I said, "Oh, that explains the hurried visit of the Minister of Agriculture a couple months ago to the United States over for a weekend." He came because his girlfriend was a U.N. delegate. Gunnar didn't know that, so we traded [information].

Kienzle: Did you have much contact with the government ministers for labor or other related subjects?

MILLEN: Interestingly enough, the Labor Minister in Norway doesn't have a great deal to do with labor. [The ministry] used to be the Ministry for Communal Affairs and Labor. They ran a job placement [service] and things like that, but the ministry does not have much to do with labor policy. The Ministry of Commerce had more to do with labor, because so much of the Norwegian economy was based on exports, and it was always interested in getting wage settlements. And the trade unions were too. This is the interesting thing. When they went into negotiations this was one thing that they can do with the centralized bargaining. They could get a reading from the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce, and set their demands in such a way that they would have the least impact on wage costs and so forth. But every once in a while they would find themselves in a position where they would have to say, "Look, we've had too long a stand still. We can't claim to be representative of our members if we don't get something out of these negotiations."

I was once asked to sit in on the meeting between the Labor Party and the trade unions on hammering out wage policy, and I turned it down. I said, "I don't think that I want to be seen there. I don't think you want me to be seen there." Then whoever asked me said, "Yes, maybe you're right."

Kienzle: Did they have a purpose in inviting you?

MILLEN: No, they just said, "Well, we want you to know what goes on around here."

Kienzle: It would be interesting to be a mouse in such a meeting.

MILLEN: Yes. Well, Murray Weisz once visited Norway at the time of the Labor Party convention. And there was a surprise. [Usually] these things are so well organized in Norway that you don't get surprises, but some guy proposed a resolution from the floor [restricting] the use of nuclear weapons, which was [quickly] passed. I couldn't believe my ears. I thought, "Well, my Norwegian isn't that good. I missed it. No, nothing of that

significance could go through that quickly without any discussion." Murray and I immediately went over to the Labor Party office after that meeting and listened as top party and government officials discussed [the resolution]. "How the hell are we going to handle this thing." It was for real. One person suggested, "Well, why don't we just leave it out of the minutes?"

Kienzle: Was this a "nuclear free zone" type of proposal?

MILLEN: Yes. And of course that idea was batted down right away. "You can't do that. First of all, we would get caught. . . " For a minute almost a hysteria took over. It was a bizarre moment.

But on another occasion, a trade union convention, I helped to write the resolution on [use of] nuclear power. I sat with the party guy who was responsible for preparing it, and we worked it out. It was more his than mine, but I contributed to it.

Kienzle: Was it for *the use of nuclear power?*

MILLEN: Well, yes. It was [really for] the status quo. There was opposition from the floor on it, but Konrad Nordahl was tough in the way he handled this issue. At that very moment when he was on the floor making it clear that there was going to be no deviation from the established policy, my chair broke and I collapsed. I was so embarrassed, and of course I had in the back of my mind, "Jesus Christ, I helped to write this thing." [Laughter]

Shea: What about foreign visitors? Especially for the AFL-CIO?

MILLEN: We had our fair share. Irving [Brown from the AFL-CIO office in Paris] came there. I was fairly helpful to him on that occasion. I think he began to realize for the first time that I was a human being.

Kienzle: Did he work at all through you on this visit?

MILLEN: No, except at the edges.

Kienzle: Or did he arrange everything privately or through the trade unions?

MILLEN: Yes. He would set it up and I would find out through the papers when he was coming. He wasn't very active up in Norway. After all, there wasn't much for him to do. The Norwegian Labor Party had reduced the Communist vote from ten percent to less than three percent. The Labor Party [controlled] all of the presses for the Communist Party press and so forth through loans. They provided it unpaid for years because they thought it would be bad public relations if they yanked the presses away from the Communist Party. People might think that the Labor Party was undemocratic. So there

was not a great deal for Irving to do about Norway itself. He had his own contacts built up over the years.

Now, I remember once the cooperative movement people came to me and said that they were in a bind because a delegate from the Soviet Union and a delegate from China were coming to their convention, and they had no indication that anybody was coming from the United States. So I wired, and we got somebody there. I had hardly sent the wire sent and I received an answer that a guy out of Minnesota would be there.

Kienzle: Did you advise Washington that they might be Communist delegations there?

MILLEN: I told them. I said that the cooperative movement [had invited the Soviet and Chinese delegates] and I assume that the [Central Intelligence] Agency sent this guy [from Minnesota]. He was an outstanding fellow. That was kind of a harmless little thing; in fact it was handy at that time.

You know, we talk about the [Central Intelligence] Agency. Sometimes they do a lot of things that we are grateful for.

Shea: The Norwegians were always very active in the international trade secretariats.

MILLEN: Oh, yes. Historically this was a longstanding thing. Before the Second World War they did it too. Once I stopped in Belgium just before an ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions] convention, and of course I went to see the American delegation at the Metropol [Hotel] and a couple of other snazzy hotels. I went to visit the Norwegian delegation, and there was Konrad Nordahl and his boys in hotel which at best was second class.

Kienzle: I don't think Irving [Brown] went second class anywhere!

MILLEN: Oh, no, not Irving. But I'm talking about all the officers and top staff of the Norwegian labor movement. Nordahl really was parsimonious.

Kienzle: How long were you in Norway?

MILLEN: I was there just about three and a half years. I left in June 1958 because I was selected that year to go to university [training]. Incidentally after Ambassador Strong left, we had Frances. . .,who was the first woman ambassador that we ever had. She went to Switzerland. A very fine person. It bothers me not to remember her last name. She was excellent and most supportive of my efforts.

Shea: She went to Oslo?

MILLEN: Yes, she went to Oslo after Ambassador Strong, and was there a couple of years. She was very supportive of me personally. In fact, she called me in when she

arrived and said, "I did something that I very seldom do, but I have to let you know that I did it." She said, "When Hayden, the Deputy Chief of Mission, was in Paris, as I was preparing to go home and come back here, he told me that he thought you were being moved out, and he thought that you should stay. So I asked the Department to retain you here. I did it without asking you and I apologize for that." She was always very helpful to me.

Kienzle: So she extended you from a two year to a three year tour?

MILLEN: Well, as it turned out, she didn't want me to go when I left at the end of three years or three and a half years. I saw this opportunity [for university study]. She said, "But I'll request that it be picked up when you do leave here." I said, "You know this bureaucracy. You can never count on them to come through, and I now have the opportunity." She was a little pissed off but she got over it. Well, I used to drop in and see her at the United Nations occasionally, and she would take me to lunch. She was a first class woman. I later saw her in Ceylon when I was doing research for the Brookings [Institution]. Did you know that I spent a year or so at Bookings? But first, a final note on Norway.

Before dropping the subject of Norway, it seems appropriate to mention the covert side. This is particularly true in view of what I said about the Italian situation. In Norway many covert operations were started as a result of war time activities. The stories told me by the head of the maritime union and his activities in American ports were fascinating. Others had ties to the OSS In 1956 or 1957 one friend told me Foreign Minister Lange warned people to be careful in their dealings with American friends-that times were changing. By the mid-1950s the situation was contained and the Communists have been driven out of most spots of importance. They had one member on the L.O. [Norwegian Trade Union Federation] National Council (Representskap) and a few members in the Parliament, the Storting, and some influence in specific local unions. The Labor Party occasionally found their votes on domestic issues in the Parliament useful and on foreign policy matters made use of non-Labor Party support. My main role was acting as a sounding board on issues, foreign and domestic.

I was responsive within the Embassy to a fairly large number of requests for specific information directed to me through the DCM which obviously originated from the Agency. I had a social relationship with one couple which was open and above board. He pumped me for information as I did him, e.g. his fake association with the Newspaper Guild provided by the union. But there was nothing untoward, except on one occasion, when he used as an explanation for breaking security on a matter most embarrassing to me by the use of the standard ploy, "We were working for a higher goal." On another occasion he jarred me with his threat to the future career of one of our political officers, because, as he so delicately phrased it, ". . . we keep the books." Stories of this nature were rife throughout the Department of State, but I had reason to recall it ten years later when somewhat the same language was directed at me via a third party close to the Agency.

From the above, it is clear that the situation in Norway was a far cry from that of Italy. A cadre of strong, disciplined leaders from the unions and the Norwegian Labor Party did most of the job on their own. Many had had a dalliance with the Communists and rejected it as being a variance with the Norwegian "will for democracy," which suffused most of the Norwegian political left. This made for an ideal situation for me as Labor Attaché. I had immediate access wherever I went. The General Secretary of the Labor Party once, when asked if he wanted to talk to our Ambassador on some subject, replied, "When I want to speak to your ambassador, you will represent me. The Russian Ambassador once complained to the General Secretary about the attention I received and a lesser level embassy type spoke to reporters about how frequently my name and picture appeared in the Labor Party and trade union press. One can understand why I found this assignment so rewarding.

MILLEN: Now to Brookings. I did a book for them, The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries.

Kienzle: That was after your tour in Norway?

MILLEN: That was after my tour at [the University of] Wisconsin. I finished at Wisconsin in 1958 and was assigned to the Department [of State]. In the summer of 1961 I went to the Brookings [Institution]. A lot of people said. "You shouldn't do that! You are outside the promotion chain, particularly after having been away just a year [earlier]." By that time I was having reservations about the Department of State anyway.

Kienzle: Was your year at the University of Wisconsin in labor studies?

MILLEN: Yes.

Kienzle: In the famous school there?

MILLEN: No, that school was for mainly trade union people. No, I was in the Graduate School of Economics. That was a good year too and it was very useful to me. It was absolutely essential . . . (End of Side B, tape One)

The experience a Brookings was so fine, because I really had the feeling that Brookings was a collegial body, and everyone treated me as though I were a member of the staff. I would attend staff meetings. I would sit in on all the meetings that involved their internal workings, and if they had a visitor from Italy, for example, they would invite me to sit in on it and so forth.

Kienzle: Could you describe the project which you undertook there?

MILLEN: Well, it was started by Ben Stephansky, and of course he was going to base it on Latin America. He and Phil Kaiser. Phil was teaching at that time at American University.

Kienzle: Along with Murray Weisz?

MILLEN: Well, Murray was teaching there too, and I had also been there a little bit. Ben had hardly started [the project] when he [was nominated to be] an ambassador. Both he and Phil [were nominated] after the election of John F. Kennedy. Ben really hadn't done much [on the project], so they suggested that I do it and Brookings agreed to change venue to underdeveloped countries, India, the Near East, Africa, and so forth. Without that year at the University of Wisconsin, I could never have done the work at Brookings.

Kienzle: What years were those?

MILLEN: Well, the Wisconsin years were the academic year 1958-1959, and then the Bookings years were the summer of 1961 to the fall of 1962. [I wrote] a short book. I did all the research and the whole process of [writing] the book by May of 1963. The book was in print and in my hand [by then].

Kienzle: What is the title of the book?

MILLEN: The Political Role of Labor in Developing Countries.

Kienzle: And the Publisher?

MILLEN: Brookings. Like so many books written at that time about economic development, it was overly optimistic. Once you start the game [of economic development], there was a kind of an automatic process.

Kienzle: The Rostow approach?

MILLEN: Yes, that's right. I remember that [Rostow's book] was one of the books I read just after I finished the project, and it sustained me in this kind of rosy glow of things, but I don't think I was unusual among people writing in those days. [However], I did identify the problems of tribalism and the problems of development as opposed to wages and so forth.

Kienzle: Did you make field trips to the area?

MILLEN: Yes, I spent seven weeks in Africa and Ceylon. The Rockefeller Foundation gave Brookings $10,000 in support of the project. The way it was set up the Ford Foundation gave a permanent grant to Brookings. My office rent, supplies, and administrative expenses came out of the Ford Foundation grant to Brookings. My travel and a part time research assistant, etc., came out of the Rockefeller money. They even had

enough money to take about $400 or $500 and apply it toward the printing costs. That's how far $10,000 could take you then.

Kienzle: After Brookings, what did you do?

MILLEN: Then I went to India.

Kienzle: At some point you worked in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State]?

MILLEN: That was between Wisconsin and Brookings.

Kienzle: Do you want to describe your duties as the Labor Advisor?

MILLEN: In NEA, I sometimes thought maybe I was the conscience of the organization. I did my best. I helped the Peace Corps get into the region, because I convinced everybody that I should sign off on all outgoing telegrams unless they involved a policy matter. This meant that about nine-tenths of all the bureaucratic chit-chat could go through without having to be cleared by all the [country desks]. In various ways I tried to make life easier for them. One of the higher ups wanted me to come to work for [the Peace Corps] . I said, "Look, I like the Peace Corps, but I don't like it as a 24 hour [a day] matter. It's going to be great for the Americans who go over. I'm not sure what the long term impact is going to be abroad, but I think it is a marvelous experience for those who participate. But that's not my life." I also warned my special contact about infiltration which lead to meetings between Director Shriver and Allen Dulles.

Kienzle: Any other notable things occur in the labor field during that time?

MILLEN: Yes.

Shea: Did you get a chance to visit many of the countries in the region?

MILLEN: Oh, yes. Greece, Israel, Egypt, Aden, Ceylon. . . There was one big blow-up, which the State Department had so much difficulty understanding, and that was when Paul Hall. . .

Shea: The Seafarers Union.

MILLEN: The Seafarers Union. Paul Hall called some sort of a job action. I have forgotten what it was [all about]. I guess he wanted to pull his crews off the ships in the [Suez] Canal, and the Arab League responded with a boycott of all American ships. It caused a big flurry, and before I even knew this had happened, the desk officers, the one for Egypt in particular, called the National Labor Relations Board to see how this law could be called null and void or whatever. So by the time I heard about it they had already muddied the waters, but it was obvious that the NLRB had nothing to do with it. Tensions

between the Egyptians and the Seafarers' Union got awfully high. The Egyptian Labor Attaché, who was a really nice guy, was sitting on my doorstep, and finally Arthur Goldberg, who by this time was Counsel for the Steelworkers, got involved. Goldberg stepped in and there was a controversy over that because one key document that he was responsible for turning out dropped a key sentence, and the accusation was made that he was really a crook at heart. Anyway, it finally settled down and I wrote a big report on [the incident], which surprisingly enough was fairly well accepted-after the fact..

Not long after that I went to Egypt and met with the Egyptian trade union people about it. I don't think that I convinced them a bit of anything, but there was some high comedy. I remember that I went to see the Egyptian Ambassador in his office one morning, and his point to me was: "In my country, they should all be put in jail." [Laughter] Here was a guy who was educated in France and spent most of his life in Western countries including ours. His response was: "They should all be in jail." I also saw Paul Hall about it. This was the only time I ever had any contacts with him.

Shea: This was when Nasser was in power?

MILLEN: No, this was after Nasser. This would have been 1961. But I did meet Paul Hall in the process, and that was interesting. He was a really flamboyant personality and I would say, at times almost lovable. Part of the problem was that Paul Hall was married to a Jewish woman, and that didn't help the matter. [Anyway, he] said, "For Christ sake, I just acted like a trade union leader. They were fucking my guys up and I responded like any trade union would."

Kienzle: What were they doing? Were they stopping ships in the Canal in some way?

MILLEN: I think they were messing them up when they went ashore. There were a lot of personal attacks and so forth. It's all dim in my memory now.

Kienzle: Were there other highlights of the NEA tour that you recall?

MILLEN: Oh, just the little petty stuff. Actually there were some friendly people there. Some of the people on the India desk were really great: Wes Adams. He was a very liberal guy. And [there were] others. Well, the things that happened. . . Again in a big bureaucracy. Bob Senser was just coming in, and the Department wanted to send him to India. Well, at that time he had a black wife, and somebody up in personnel passed the word that he would be totally unacceptable in India, because Indians would not accept [someone of] color.

Kienzle: Was that true?

MILLEN: Well, some of the Indians were sensitive to the issue, yes, but not to the extent that you couldn't send somebody there. At any rate, I went down to the desk, and I think almost universally Bernie Horgan, Wes Adams-There were about six guys working on the

Indian Desk at that time-and they asked, "Who passed out that kind of information?' They said, "Sure, maybe down south there might be a little bit of a problem, but are we in the business of sending people out there to please the prejudices of a few Indians?" So again, somebody up high thinks that he's got wisdom and you get this kind of a response. Well, as it turned out, Bob Senser went some place else. I've forgotten [where]. But these are some examples of the interesting things that happen in a bureaucracy.

Looking back on the NEA experience really revealed some of the weaknesses of the Labor Attaché Program. The Paul Hall issue, for example, bordered on turning into an incendiary affair and yet my Bureau made very little use of the Labor Advisor, me, and I was kept away from the policy decisions. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO, Arthur Goldberg, etc. made not a single contact with the one person within NEA who might have been able to help the unions extract themselves from a very sticky situation.

I recognized from the outset that NEA, because of the political nature of their client states, the Israel issue, etc. represented a difficult area within which to work, and my fears were realized quite soon. Despite the high quality of many members of the staff, and even the desire of some of them to be helpful, the Labor Advisor had little leverage. Doing day-to-day chores were easy, but trouble arose whenever I raised issues outside of the immediate and most narrow definition of my function. For example, through happenstance I became friendly with a Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Department of Interior and uncovered a program designed to foster the development of water desalinization in arid countries. Efforts to raise discussion of the program with NEA were frowned upon within my immediate office and I came close to being reprimanded.

Another instance: A brief memorandum to the NEA Assistant Secretary pointing out a weakness in a speech by the Secretary of State, which appeared in the publication *Vital Speeches* gained me an invitation to spend an hour with the Assistant Secretary but earned me only demerits from my supervisor.

A report to another NEA Assistant Secretary (after returning from a trip to Iran) about the activities of SAVAK (Iranian Intelligence) which was battling with the Iranian Department of Labor for control over trade union activities was met with instructions to my boss that he did not want such reporting, that after all "I helped establish SAVAK." Later I was to discover that on a subsequent field trip to the general area the Assistant Secretary in question had instructed all missions to supervise all of my contacts. Fortunately, most of the missions chose to ignore the instruction.

One last comment and then we will move to another subject, the posting to India. On two or three occasions the NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary told me of an upcoming meeting with Agency people to discuss labor issues. He apologized sincerely and said he would like to have me present, but the Agency had a rule never to meet when a Labor Advisor was present because they might reveal names of certain U.S. trade union leaders with whom they had dealings. On one occasion I laughed and told him that, if he wished, I could return in a few moments with the names of at least 20 trade union leaders or

employees in the Washington area with whom the Agency had regular contact. He looked chagrined and that was the end of that. I have often wondered whether on not Labor Advisors from other Bureaus were subject to the same restrictions.

Kienzle: When did you go to India?

MILLEN: I went to India in the fall of 1962. But you probably don't know that I had been slated to go to Brussels after Brookings. That bubble burst about three weeks later when Assistant Secretary George Weaver from ILAB at the Department of Labor told me that

"16th Street" (AFL-CIO) had blocked the Belgium assignment. I was not surprised-understanding the political winds at play in this situation-but I was disappointed.

Kienzle: This was after your tour at Brookings?

MILLEN: Yes, after Brookings. [Before leaving Washington] there was a two or three month period when I was doing a few things in the Department. I got to India in October of 1962 and stayed until late April or early May of 1965. India was not really my cup of tea. On the other hand, I am sure glad that I worked in a country such as India or one like it, so I could really get an understanding of the dynamics of the situation. It was fascinating.

Kienzle: How would you characterize India at that point in history?

MILLEN: Well, in a way, it was sad. The political structure was under great stress, partly as a result of the fact that Nehru was coming to the end of his life and had obviously lost a lot of his vigor and a lot of his capacity to control events in India, to the extent that anybody can. He had lost a good deal of that, and I had the impression that the corruption level was rising. While corruption is endemic in all developing countries, I had the feeling that it was on the rise, and part of it was [due to] Nehru's increasing age. He was a remarkable person to watch. [When you looked into his eyes, you almost felt that you were looking into a person's soul. And the day he was buried, everything ,of course, closed down except for the events surrounding the funeral, and it was not inappropriate that earthquake tremors went through Delhi on that day. It was almost in keeping with the event. Something cataclysmic had happened, at least in the life of India, that this man, who was a brave and highly intelligent man, and, I think, for the most part a good man, [had died].

Kienzle: Was there any institutionalized corruption in the Congress Party?

MILLEN: Oh, yes. The Congress Party was just kind of a place for boodle and payoffs, but it is hard to separate out that which is endemic to countries with this level of poverty and this level of diversity and challenge. The first time I went to India, I was on a study trip for the Department of State. I came back and I opened [my trip report] with the sentence, "In the functioning anarchy called India. . . " And it wasn't until two or three

days before I left [India], as I was going through the files, that I found Ambassador Bunker's commentary on my report. He fairly well accepted most of what was in the report, but he said, "I have trouble coming to grips with Millen's opening statement on functioning anarchy."

Shea: It is like what somebody said about the Austrian-Hungarian Empire prior to the First World War. It has a policy of calculated negligence.

Kienzle: Was Ambassador Bowles there?

MILLEN: Ambassador Galbraith was there when I arrived. He gave speeches and was a public figure, but he didn't pay much attention to the running of the embassy. He wrote some very fine essays in the form of cables that were very interesting and deserved to be published, but he was a "stand apart" guy [with] that big ego; nothing mattered [to him] but what he was doing. Once in a while you would feel that he missed the lecture class, so he would call a staff meeting, and after a couple of administrative comments had been made, one of them always being that there had been so many security violations in the last month, Galbraith would pick up the burden and give us these sometimes rather interesting little essays or commentaries. His writing style was fluid and so forth. I got the impression that he must work on his writing very hard, because when he spoke he would use a word, then pull it back and insert another word, and sometimes [do this] even a second or third time. He was very careful with each word, and he seemed [to be] almost listening [to himself]. When I would pick up something that he had written, [I thought] "God, he must spend an awful lot of time editing." His speaking style was just so different from his writing style. Not that the words didn't come out fine, but he searched for the appropriate words. It was an interesting experience. Of course, we were kind of amused when the Chinese attacked India in early 1963; he obviously had so much fun marshaling military support and going out to meet the planes that our military sent over. He also got a great deal of pleasure out of bare-knuckling Krishna Menon. He set it up with Nehru where he didn't have to do business with Krishna Menon during that period.

Kienzle: Krishna Menon was the Foreign Minister during that period?

MILLEN: No. Defense Minister. When Galbraith left, everybody [in the Embassy] was looking forward to a change, because morale was not exactly high, and everybody was saying that it's got to be better [under the new ambassador]. Of course, Bowles came in and nothing much changed.

Kienzle: How would you characterize the labor movement at that time, INTUC, and the Communist Party movement and H.M.S.?

MILLEN: Obviously the Communist Party's labor movement, the All India Trade Union Confederation or AITUC, was a superior group and much better organized. I used to make rough comparisons with the Italian situation. You had the Communist movement, the Congress Party federation INTUC (The Indian National Trade Union Congress), the

feisty H.M.S., which was a mildly socialist movement, and the revolutionary socialists plus a plethora of independent unions. Once I put Victor Reuther up to posing a question to the head of the revolutionary socialist trade union movement, who was a very interesting personality. In India, you could cross all these lines. So Victor, who was traveling through the country, asked -- I can't recall the name. -- the leader of the revolutionary socialist union what was so different between H.M.S. and his union that would make it impossible for them to merge. He was very polite to Victor and said, "Well, look, I need these guys from the Communists. Do you think I would be a member of the state parliament, if I worked with H.M.S? You're crazy. I can't do business with H.M.S."

Kienzle: Rampant opportunism.

MILLEN: Not from his point of view. Jatin Chakravarti-that was his name. I remember it now-was effective in trade union affairs because of his political position; he knew it; and I wanted Victor to understand it .

Oh, God. I got into a little bit of trouble over two people I sent on leader grants [even though] I didn't have much influence over the leader grants. Dave Burgess, one of my predecessors, had negotiated an agreement with the Ministry of Labor, which put almost the entire authority [for the selection of grantees] in the hands of the unions. And we were getting some real bad ones! So I went to the Ministry of Labor and I complained. I said, "I know that you don't personally pick these people, but I wish you could convey to the unions that they have got to pay more attention to the quality of people that they are sending." Then I went to each of the unions and I made my little spiel. One of them said, "What the hell! We don't know what else to do with this guy. He's worked hard." I said, "Well, that's fine from your point of view, but you have to look at the quality factors. You just can't send dummies." In the meantime, we sent one fellow from Kerala, who was a Christian, a big dark fellow, who when he left for the United States was in the middle of a word war that involved some anti-American sentiments. The politics of Kerala are particularly volatile. It is a heavily Communist area and comparatively speaking a highly educated group. So he went, and the Consul General in Madras didn't complain to me, but he complained to Bowles about this kind of a guy going. Then earlier this revolutionary socialist fellow Chakravarti went. He was one of my favorite people. He had been nominated [earlier] and I came along during the processing [of his grant]. There were objections to his going, and I said in a somewhat flip way, "Well, Christ, he has been to Moscow, Prague, London, and China. Why don't we continue his education?" So he went.

Well, both those cases [worked out successfully]. The fellow from Kerala came in after his trip pleased as punch. He would like to go back again and take his wife. He said, "Before I went I thought that American women were loose [and had] poor morals, and that you had an immoral society. I talked to a lot of parents and I talked to some grandparents, and I realized that you are just different. It's not loose morals. It's a different structure than we have." I thought that was quite an accomplishment for six weeks in the United States. And the revolutionary socialist came into my office not long after he

returned and said, "Hey! I turned down an opportunity to demonstrate in front of your consulate in Calcutta a few weeks ago." I said, "Well, what about that!" He said, "You know that trip to the United States? [That visit] proved that all of the things that I have been accusing America of in the last ten years are wrong. Unfortunately, I wrote this to a friend of mine and he's got the letter and he's threatening to release it." So I thought that [his change in outlook] was quite an [accomplishment]. I told him, "Look, the price of admission to the United States is not that you never demonstrate in front of our consulate again." He said, "No, I understand that. But I just didn't feel like it." He used to like to come up to my room. He would never drink in public, but he would come up to my room and he liked scotch in moderation.

Kienzle: How influential were the union leaders in the political process?

MILLEN: The process was so muddy and so gigantic it was hard to tell. But when one measures pay scales and the decisions coming out of the Wage Board structure, one must say that they did rather well. When George Fernandez shut down the city of Bombay under a process called a "bund" or general strike two years in a row, reluctantly followed by the Communists, the unions got changes in the state cost-of-living index. The unions had great influence in the banking system and on the docks. They could often pose a threat to public order at time which gave them intermittent power, but not in the daily running of government.

Kienzle: Excuse me, could you define "bund"?

MILLEN: It is like the German word Bund, but it is an active word. It is not a noun. It's an action. It's a general strike. Well, Bombay unions following Fernandez lead that twice. Once, for example, one of their main complaints was that the so-called cost of living index as reflected by their state government figures was inaccurate and that the workers were getting cheated. Well, as a result of this particular direct action, the government set up a committee and they concluded that the index was inaccurate; in fact the government admitted that certain items put in that budget in 1936 had never been changed and the products were no longer on the market.

The [Indians] set up of wage boards, which are an anathema to us. To me they made very good sense. The only way you could ever get some kind of a wage structure was to have a reasonably impartial group study the whole history and more or less lay out the benefits to be paid. Over a period of time the textile industry [developed] a pretty decent wage structure, which could never have been attained through direct collective bargaining. Not those levels. They also had, I think, a wage board for the iron industry. These wage boards were very influential economically, and they came about primarily through trade union actions, for the most part [through] politics. Here again what's politics and what's trade unionism? It's hard to separate them. I think the trade unions had an influence but not on the order of what we would see in a European structure, where you could trace where the trade unions said this and the government said this and you can watch the process go on. Everything [in India] was too oblique and all the lines were dotted and so

forth, so it was very difficult to apply any standards of measurement. But yes, the trade unions did have influence, a considerable amount of influence. For example, in the United States, during my days working with CIO, we could never organize the EXXON workers. In Bombay EXXON refineries were organized. Now they weren't organized in the tight compact form that we would have it, but by God, they had influence in that plant.

Once I found an American pharmaceutical manufacture, I think it was Pfizer, which, when I talked to the manager about the fact that the unions in the industry were communist dominated, said yes, he knew that and they were worried about it. And I got him to pretty well agree that if I could get [a non-Communist] union-I was thinking about using H.M.S., because it had a fair amount of strength in that industry-and if we could get a couple of breaks from the employers' side, H.M.S. might be able to break the lock that the Communists had. And this guy said, "I would be willing to take some strikes on it." This was totally foreign to most American employers, because they won't take a strike for an ideological reason. Unfortunately I couldn't put the H.M.S. thing together, so it never did work out.

Unions did have considerable strength in the banking industry.

Kienzle: What about the influence of INTUC given its special relationship with the Congress Party?

MILLEN: Well, INTUC was represented, [for example] over in the Bombay textile industry, and of course in its home location in Ahmedabad in Gandhi's union. That was a local which Gandhi personally organized. Now these organizations had considerable influence, but it was hard to measure the impact and hard to trace the connecting points.

Shea: What about unions organized along religious lines?

MILLEN: That was beginning to develop strongly when I left. The Janata Party and the Hindu revival groups were just forming into influential political elements. They may have been organized at the plant level long before, but you first began to see evidence of them or hear discussions them about the time I left in 1965.

Shea: Do you recall a trade union leader by the name of George Fernandez?

MILLEN: George was famous, and George was fun.

Kienzle: Could you identify George Fernandez?

MILLEN: He was a Goan by origin and started out to be a seminary student. I am not quite sure how he made the connection with trade unionism, but he did in the Bombay area. He ended up having a large proportion of the taxi cab drivers and a lot of others [in his union]. His was an independent union. He was building strength. He was putting fight

into the government. During the Chinese invasion period, the government put him in jail for about three months, because it said he had connections with the Chinese Communists. When I told the Consul General I would like to see George in jail, the Consul General damn near shit.

Kienzle: Who was the Consul General?

MILLEN: I forget. Once Phil Bradley from USIS and I set up a one day conference. We didn't have any money. We couldn't even offer lunch or anything. We did get hotel space for the meeting. I invited industrialists, academic people, the trade unions, and so forth. In the morning we talked about collective bargaining and tariffs, in the afternoon about politics. No records were kept. It was just absolutely fascinating. That was the kind of activities that were fun to do in this job. The problem was that I never wrote up my notes and sent them in to boast about what we did. It was just like opening the flood gates. Everybody had something to offer. Ideas were brought up and knocked down, but there was no rancor to speak of between employers and unions.

Kienzle: I think the Indians like a rigorous discussion.

MILLEN: Well, they do. They are great talkers.

Shea: George Fernandez was from Ga.

MILLEN: He was very important in throwing up these twenty-four hour stoppages everywhere, which were organized and had an impact. He once had a meeting, which I attended together with my British counterpart. We got there early, and, of course, the honored guests were invited to sit on the platform, but [in India the organizers] frequently do not have any chairs, and you are put on cushions. The floor is padded and you have cushions behind your back. For someone not accustomed to spending a couple hours [like that] it's pretty hard. Generally one way you told the difference between an H.M.S. meeting and an INTUC meeting was that at an H.M.S. meeting most of the participants came with a Western shirt and pants on. [At an INTUC meeting] many of the Indians came in a dhotis; there were no chairs; and they squatted. They are trained to do that and could spend hours in that position. This was kind of a fundamental [difference] in the behavior patterns of the two groups.

So George invited me to a meeting. I don't remember what the event was. One of the H.M.S. people gave a speech. He was a good guy. I basically liked him, but his speech had an attack against Americans, because we weren't solidly enough behind India in a little war that was taking place up north along the Pakistani boarder. So he used that as a takeoff point to attack the Americans. We were being pro-Pakistani, etc. I read his written speech, which was three or four pages long. When my British friend Gordon came up-I have forgotten his last name-I said, "We're not sitting up here. Let's sit in the audience." He didn't know why I said that. I said, "I'll tell you why when we go downstairs." Of course they weren't attacking Great Britain, I just took it upon myself. I said, "I don't mind

sitting here. I don't care if he wants to attack us, but I am not going to sit on that God-damned platform as if I am agreeing with him. If I sit up there, I'll ask permission to speak." So we went down and sat in the audience. Later I had a cup of coffee with George. He said, "Bruce, I have never seen you angry before." I said, "I wasn't really angry. I just didn't feel I wanted to sit on a platform while you guys were attacking us. After all, there are about eight shiploads of American grain out in your harbor right now, and there was no mention made of that. George said, "Yes, I noticed you weren't smiling today."

Shea: What about the coal miners in India. I always had the impression that they were highly organized.

MILLEN: They are pretty well organized. I once went to one of their national conventions, which was held outside under tents and so forth. It was so hot that they delayed the opening until after 5:30 at night. For Indians to call [a delay] it has to be really hot. This was an INTUC meeting and there were about 2,000 delegates.

Shea: What about wages and hours and working conditions in the mining industry?

MILLEN: Oh, I would hesitate to say. It's not easy to make a comparison in the first place. They had their wage boards over the years.

Kienzle: Was there a problem with child labor?

MILLEN: Oh, there always has been. You just see it all over the place. You look around the construction sites and there were kids. Maybe they were not even getting paid, but they were helping their mothers. Women do a lot of the burdensome work on the construction sites there. One of the most impressive things that I ever saw was [when] I was with Victor Reuther on his tour there. We were down in Hyderabad, which is south. We took a trip about 40 miles by jeep to where they were putting in the tallest and widest mortar dam in the world. They would start with these great big rocks that looked like granite. Everybody in the area was breaking these rocks up into little [pieces] for road beds and so forth. People were all over the place: men, women, and little children just chipping away. That was a major source of employment. There must have been 30,000 people just working on rock chipping. They were up to the 200 or 300 foot level when we were there. They were walking on bamboo ramps which go up and down, and men were carrying rocks which must have weighed 300 or 400 pounds hanging from bamboo sticks carried on the shoulders of four to six people. The women carried mud and cement. (End of Side A, Tape Two) There wasn't a machine in use for the first 250 feet. Then they had cranes up at the 250 foot level. Everything came up by hand. It was most impressive. It just staggered me.

Shea: Almost like building a pyramid.

MILLEN: Yes, on that order. I remember we used to get pictures during the Second World War of building airfields in China, and you saw those flanks of people out there. Well, this was the same kind of a picture, except they were going up the side of what was damned near a mountain. Now they did not have authority to put sluices in to make that a power plant. This was to be for irrigation and flood control. But they were putting the sluices in anyway on the assumption that in short order somebody would say, "By God, why aren't we developing power here?" So that gave them a little bit of a head start on that project.

India was a fascinating place, but one of the things that made [my tour there] unpleasant was the atmosphere in the Embassy. For reasons I am not quite sure of, I ran into troubles there almost from the day I landed. And, of course, I wasn't a perfect citizen. I sometimes reacted. I never did see a so-called efficiency report from there, except that I did get a special letter saying that the problems with me even extended into the distaff side of the house, because I had not praised my assistant's wife sufficiently. That was the only solid comment that I ever saw about my days in India.

Shea: What about Ambassador Bowles in all this?

MILLEN: Well, Bowles was a charmer! But he had never left the New Deal behind him. I can see how he would be a terrific advertising executive. He had a real flair.

Shea: I got to know him quite well, because he was not only the Governor of Connecticut but he was also the Congressman from my home area. He was a charmer all right.

MILLEN: He was a real charmer. But I heard him once ball out three consuls general for reporting honestly. He was just furious with them. They were giving very good reports but you had to report according to Bowles, if you wanted to get along with him. He was beyond his prime. He had Parkinson's disease. He died just recently, but he lived a long time and [I don't know] how he kept up the active life he did. He was a hard working guy. I have been at his place when we had small groups and he would almost push people out of the door, because as he said, "I am so tired I have to go to bed."

His main problem was that he so loved the Indians that he just didn't want to ever say anything bad about them. I was present one night and he was saying how soft the Americans were to send our kids to special schools. His kids would go to the Indian schools. Of course, I knew the school that they would go to. They would go to the Modern School for high level civil servants. He went on about the superiority of these Indian schools and how soft we were, and my former wife, not noted for diplomatic skills, said, "Mr. Ambassador, I couldn't agree with you less." [Laughter]

Kienzle: Did the Ambassador laugh too?

MILLEN: No, he didn't laugh. But what he probably did not recognize was the snobbishness of a large part of the Indian school system for the elites, nor the fact that any

seat taken up by one of us reduced the total for Indians. Furthermore, Indian schools followed the British model. .

Kienzle: Well, shall we stop here and resume at some later time?

MILLEN: Yes. I think so. (End of Part I of the Interview)

Kienzle: Today is November 22, 1993, and Jim Shea and I resuming our interview with Bruce Millen. Bruce, do you want to begin by giving the statement that you have prepared?

MILLEN: This isn't really a prepared statement, but I would like to go back and add to the comments which I made previously about Italy. First of all, I just want to say that given the circumstances, [Tom Lane], the Labor Attaché in Rome, had great influence. He had influence in the Italian Government and with his particular section of trade union activity, but he was considered to be a powerful man in the country, and he was a powerful person in the Embassy. As far as I could see, his power went unquestioned until near the end of my stay there. As the Assistant Labor Attaché, I, on the other hand, had to carve out my own little world, which was mainly in the economic affairs operations of both the Embassy and the Mutual Security Agency, and I found warm acceptance there. The leadership of both the aid mission and the Embassy economic officers were most helpful and supportive, and they used me frequently. People like Vince Barnett, who when I first went there headed the economic aid operation, was one of the most brilliant and effective leaders I've ever served under. His deputy Leland Barrow was almost in the same category. And Howard Cotton, who was Agricultural Attaché, was most supportive. They all understood what was going on on the political side, so they tried to help me and they tried to be supportive of me, and they made life livable for me. And despite all the problems that I had, I was a person of some substance on this.

Now, the bizarre circumstances that I discussed earlier were there and were palpable. There wasn't a day that went by when there wasn't some manifestation of this attempt to keep a cover on covert operations or to keep the truth from me or from the reporting system and so forth, but I did improve the reporting out of the Embassy. I self-censored myself, and there were only two or three occasions when I [experienced] interference with my reporting. That was partly because I had a pretty good sense of what I could get through and what I couldn't. So many of the labor attachés worry about whether they are effective. I was very effective on the economic side of the operation, and I enjoyed myself.

Just to show how bizarre this thing was, a friend of mine, who was a Fulbright Scholar, was seen with Colonel Lane down in Naples at a meeting. The colonel left, and a fellow came up [to my friend] and said, "Tell the colonel to give me 50,000 a month more." thinking that he was associated with Lane. "The cost of living is going up. I need 50,000 a month more." So that is the kind of thing we ran into.

The real danger of what was taking place in Rome had to do with feeding a myth which we came to believe. We then distorted political reporting.

Kienzle: The myth being?

MILLEN: The myth being that when we were discussing the CISL we were dealing with a non-confessional, apolitical trade union movement. Nobody else in Italy believed that. Only

Americans believed that. This showed up in our reporting, and it was a disastrous position for an Embassy to find itself in. And the [disaster] came to reality when De Gasperi and the Christian Democratic Party lost considerable influence in the election of 1954.(?) That, I think, is the lesson to be learned from this Italian experience and something that has applicability throughout the Foreign Service.

Kienzle: In short, that our covert activities should not distort the objectivity of our reporting?

MILLEN: That's right. [Covert activities] distort. They make us analyze problems incorrectly. Here there was such unanimity because you had not only Lane, the Labor Attaché, but you had the AFL and the Embassy and the CIA all working in the same direction and therefore nobody was looking at the situation very honestly or with any sense of reality.

So that's about all I have to say. I think it is an important ending to my earlier statement.

Shea: Just one question. You're saying that there was never any question about the ties between the Christian Democratic Party and the CISL?

MILLEN: No [question]. I know that we started out with the idea that we could develop a labor force independent of the Christian Democratic Party, but we never could, and I never saw any indication from any of the CISL leaders, high or low, that they had any meaningful independence from the party. All we did was save the party money for financing the union. We financed it instead. I had no quarrel with the objectives of what they were trying to do, but a little subtlety and a little willingness to put these people on their own would have been a big improvement.

Shea: Just one other question. Would you say the same thing about the socialists and the UIL?

MILLEN: Well, I got UIL involved in a few small but legitimate programs through the economic aid mission. I put together with the housing chief a housing bill with low interest rates, and I brought CISL and UIL together. I left and I don't know whatever happened to that piece of legislation, but we at least had them on the surface working together. Occasionally I would get UIL people trips to the United States, but this was all

petty-ante stuff. I'm not saying that UIL was a perfect instrument either. They had their means of financing, which by our standards were highly irregular and so forth. So we are not dealing in absolutes here. We are simply dealing with being honest to our own selves and our ability to analyze accurately. I improved it by my presence because I eliminated some of the brazen falsehoods that had been going out.

Kienzle: Did the AFL accept your activities with the UIL at all?

MILLEN: Well, the AFL didn't like them, and certainly Irving [Brown] and Jay [Lovestone] didn't. But the individual AFL leaders, who came over, were decent for the most part. In fact one of the friendliest fellows that ever came down the pike was Tom Murphy from the Bricklayers Union. The ICFTU had recognized the UIL, so the AFL couldn't absolutely say you can't do any of these things, and the things that I did were just small stuff. They helped the UIL a little bit and gave it a little legitimacy, and I don't think they harmed the other program. The idea was not to bring these organizations into greater conflict. It was just to "live and let live." They both had something to offer to our joint effort against the Communists.

Kienzle: Is there anything else that you would like to add on your assignments in either Oslo or New Delhi?

MILLEN: Well, I can't quite recall what I said about India. I may have said this. India was an interesting experience. I'm glad I was there. It was hard. I was not accepted not by the Embassy, but I was accepted by the Indians. I had good rapport with many academicians, many British, American and Indian business people, and a good share of the trade union movement. I felt like I made a contribution there, but I had an internal conflict in the Embassy which made life hard for me. I got to the point where I was watching my back a good deal of the time, and that was unfortunate. Looking back, I am not in the mood to discuss who struck whom first. Personally, I did feel I did a great deal of creative work in cooperation with AID, but it all ended on this note as expressed by one colleague, "We are afraid to be seen talking to you."

Kienzle: I think we left off last time at the end of your tour in India. Do you want to talk about your subsequent assignment in Turkey?

MILLEN: Yes. I went to Turkey and I was initially assigned as Executive Assistant to the Secretary General of CENTO . Given the kind of unfortunate circumstance I had in India, that [assignment] was to get me back in the shadows where I could hide for a while.

Shea: Could you specify what CENTO was?

MILLEN: The Central Treaty Organization, which was the successor organization to the Baghdad Pact, which was the northern tier. CENTO didn't have much substantive value. It may have had a little public relations value with the Turks and the Iranians and the Pakistanis.

That was a strange year. During the summer months the organization had [a work schedule] of 27 and a half hours a week and we didn't know what to do with 27 hours of it. So when the [Department] created a spot in the Embassy for a Labor Attaché , and I had recommended this myself about seven or eight years earlier, there was a little bit of a "to do" about it. An objection was raised to my being made the Labor Attaché, which, I guess, came out of the AFL-CIO. I never heard much about it. I guess the Department [of State] must have just beaten back the challenge on budgetary impact alone.

That was an interesting assignment. Turkey was one of the few where you had the genesis of American-style unionism abroad. The AFL had spent a lot of time there in the early 1950s, and there was almost a business-type unionism.

Kienzle: Who was your predecessor?

MILLEN: Well, there was none. I was the first Labor Attaché there. Turkey came closer to business-style unionism than any place I have ever seen in the world. And it was effective. Turkey had a Republican Party which was moderately left of center. The party names have all changed in Turkey, but in the 1960s the Demirel Party was the dominant force, and it showed. Its political alliances were not hidden or anything like that. The two forces got along pretty well inside the trade union movement, and while I was there, we paid all their bills through the AID Mission. We even built their [union headquarters], which was one of the better pieces of architecture in Ankara. Everything was pretty much out in the open. True ideological political unionism did not really start until roughly 1967. Subsequently the entire picture has changed and I have not been able to follow events.

Kienzle: This was Turk-is?

MILLEN: Turk-is was the major federation and it functioned pretty well, but as I said, we financed almost all of its activities. This was well known. There was nothing covert about it. The only criticism I would have made of that operation was that we weren't preparing them for the day when we would cut them loose, and they weren't making any effort to be cut loose either. I'm afraid that I frightened Einer Edwards and his crew over on the AID side of [the Embassy], because I got started looking around at the funding of [the trade union movement] and they thought I was there to wipe [the funding] out. I wasn't. I simply thought that we must make preparations sooner or later, hopefully sooner, to let the [Turks] become self-financing. As the head of the Restaurant Employees and Waiters Union told me, "We haven't paid our dues. We usually wait until right before the convention and then we pay our per capita, so we can get our delegates, but we see no need to pay in as long as you are there." [Laughter]

Kienzle: How many members were there in the trade union movement?

MILLEN: Oh, I can't recall, but it was a strong movement, and they had a piece of [labor] legislation you would not believe. They didn't have an election but a union got bargaining

rights by sort of a finger in the wind and a sense of the effort, and they were recognized. When this happened, everybody in that plant except the plant manager was a member of the union. The first contract was always taken up with the plant executives being bargained out of representation in the union, and of course all sorts of little goodies came up like increases in pay or [as for an example] in one factory they had to provide soap or soap powder and so forth, which was expensive in Turkey. If you weren't a member of the union, you paid 1.25 times the union dues. In other words you increased the union dues for the guys who paid an "agency fee." Now I am not sure whether that legislation has all gone down the drain, but it was fascinating that in Turkey, which was regarded as a third world country, they had these concepts. In fact one Ministry of Labor official told me one time, "We're thinking of increasing that [agency fee] to 1.50.

Shea: And there were no direct ties at all with the political parties?

MILLEN: There were no common institutions through which they [interacted]. No, they were just aligned and they used their influence for one party or another. There were no institutional arrangements as there are in Scandinavia and so forth, where the roles are laid out. It's just that some of your influence [as a union leader] comes from being part of the government party and [the government] throws favors to you which increases your influence with the workers or in the organization or whatever the case might be. While I was there, there was no real conflict between the two major political wings [of the trade union movement]. And then you had a truly radical labor organization-DISC. Whether it was Communist or not I'm not quite sure. I am sure parts of it were. DISC was led by Turkler and the Metal Workers Federation in it, and Turkler's union came as close to being like the U.A.W. as any union in the underdeveloped world. That was a operation the likes of which are hard to find. You would go into their office and you would see that the printing press was always going, and they all had classes; they had indoctrination; they had everything going all the time in that union. I am trying to think what that union was called, but it was the star performer of that left wing group. The metal workers were the core of it. Turkler was later assassinated. I admired Turkler. I never sat down and talked philosophy with him or what his true political thoughts were or anything, but he certainly was far to the left of anything that Turk-is ever developed.

Kienzle: Did Turkey have a cooperative movement to go with the labor movement, say as you would find in Scandinavia?

MILLEN: I can't recall. And then there was another wonderful guy who was a leader, the chief editor of the Republican Party newspaper in Istanbul, Ipekci. He was one of the few people in Turkey with whom I felt comfortable sitting [down] on a veranda and talking. You know, in calm terms. I wasn't up in arms about Vietnam, but I certainly had a lot of questions about it. He was one I could trust when talking [confidentially]. He was later assassinated too.

Kienzle: Were the Turks really interested in the Vietnam issue at that time or was that something that we were trying to push?

MILLEN: It wasn't a big issue with them, not the way it was in India. And, of course, you had that strong military cult in Istanbul, which gave almost automatic support to anything called "Anti-Communism." I don't remember seeing much in the press, and you certainly didn't see it expressed in trade union affairs.

Kienzle: Would you describe the collective bargaining that went on as free and unfettered?

MILLEN: Well, it was aggressive. There were strikes. Every once in a while a party figure would step in to increase the leverage of one side or the other, because Demirel's party was of course basically a conservative party. So there were these conservative pressures on the trade union movement not to go too far, but it was a rough and ready kind of a situation. You might think of the Western frontier in America, which in many respects it [resembled].

Kienzle: Were the trade unions basically independent of government and free to bargain collectively?

MILLEN: It is hard to say. It was more like ward heeling politics on a local, regional, and national scale. Non-structured give and take, rewards and punishment.

Kienzle: I believe that in the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a problem, and the ICFTU looked pretty carefully at the relationship between the government and Turk-is.

MILLEN: Well, in the late 1960s nobody walked in lock step. This isn't to say that they didn't get a message from this minister or that minister saying knock it off and so forth, but it wasn't that obvious and I thought Turk-is was very aggressive given the framework within which it existed.

I enjoyed myself there but one of the reasons I had the feeling I wanted to get out of the Foreign Service was that I had so much difficulty with the Turkish language. I had too much time when I was in CENTO. I took double language lessons, but I really didn't make much progress at all.

Kienzle: Well, Turkish is not one of the easier languages to learn.

MILLEN: I know, but I was 45 or so, and it just didn't work out right. I was also going through a divorce and I had just been ranked in the bottom five percent of my class from India. I was looking for a new job. I had a rough time.

Shea: How long were you there, Bruce?

MILLEN: In Turkey just two years. Almost exactly one year in CENTO and one year as Labor Attaché.

Shea: Who was your Ambassador?

MILLEN: First, it was Ray Hare, and then later Pete Hart. He came from a small town banking family. He was kind of a nice guy.

Shea: How were the employers? Were they neanderthals?

MILLEN: Not all of them. There was a progressive [element]. For example, there was one group that I used to meet occasionally. I made the initial contact through the man who ran the biggest glass factory, which produced fine glasses and art work and so forth. There were some progressive people there but they didn't know much about unionism. I remember the first time that I went there as a visitor. I had lunch with them and I spent maybe three and a half hours in the restaurant just "bullshitting" so to speak. They enjoyed it, but it was hard working through an interpreter. That's what got me down in Turkey. [At the same time Turkey had] some of the most interesting sight-seeing and so forth. That whole Mediterranean area there is just gorgeous! I had only one chance to go out to the east, and I was sick and I couldn't go.

Shea: Isn't it Izmir where they have the old Roman ruins?

MILLEN: Yes, they had Efes near Hadrian's wall out there, half way between Adana and Izmir.

Kienzle: After Turkey you joined the Department of Labor?

MILLEN: Yes, then I went with the Department of Labor.

Kienzle: Do you want to describe the transition and how you got your job there?

MILLEN: Well, of course I had been recruited originally through the Department of Labor and worked with their people in various capacities at the International Labor Organization. I knew a lot of people in ILAB, guys like Leo Wertz, who was Assistant Secretary for Administration, and Phil Arnow, who at this time was head of the Policy Evaluation Staff. So I had entree. It just took a bit of time. On one occasion I paid my own way back and met with Under Secretary Jim Reynolds. There were two jobs open. One I really didn't think I was qualified for; that was in the equal opportunity field. That job went to Jim Jones, who held it for about two years and then left to be on the faculty of the University of Wisconsin Law School. He was a very bright fellow. The other job was in Labor Relations Management Services, and Bea Burgoon eventually got the job. My entry on the scene forced Reynolds to fill those two jobs that had been vacant for a long time. I didn't get either one of them. I could see that putting Burgoon in a high, super-grade job took care of the women's end, and she was a highly competent woman. And putting Jim, who is black, into that other one satisfied some other needs in the

Department. So I had no complaint. I was just amused that those jobs might have remained empty for a long time had I not come back and seen Reynolds.

Kienzle: What job did you finally get at the Department of Labor?

MILLEN: I then went into what we just called the Office of Policy Planning . That office gets a different name with every new president. When I left the Department in 1981 it was the Assistant Secretary for Policy Evaluation and Research (ASPER), but in essence it was the policy planning office. I headed a small unit there on wages and labor relations. I was there for 13 years, from 1967 to 1981. The last year I got out of ASPER and I was the Special Assistant to Dean Clowes, who took over the Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). I had known Dean [earlier]. Dean was out of the Steelworkers. I used to organize with him and his father used to be my boss. Later I had been in Italy with him, where he was part of the Productivity Division.

Shea: Were you able to get back to Italy?

MILLEN: I have only been back two or three times. I used to go back to Norway fairly frequently, but now I haven't been back to Norway since 1978 and I haven't been back to Italy since 1983.

Shea: Back on Turkey, Bruce, it is always regarded as one of the most progressive Moslem countries. Would you care to comment on the status of women there?

MILLEN: Well, first of all, the Turks were always easier to deal with on the Israeli issue. They did not have an embassy when I went there, but they did have a representative and they did a lot of business with Israel. Israeli contractors worked there and so forth. They kept these low level relationships. So it was not a rough situation, but they didn't want to irritate the Iranians and all the other Arab countries. On a lot of other issues, they didn't want to irritate us, so they frequently were at least understanding of what we wanted to do and went along with us. When I was there you had the first signs of their being a little resentful of our influence. Nothing rough, but we were conscious of the fact, and I can understand that. My God! Around Ankara [we had a] number of our troops and our hospital and our school and all that sort of stuff. Then in Izmir we had a [large contingent] of navy as well as air force. It was inevitable that sooner or later you were going to get some outcries, but basically I didn't think that we were faced with a difficult situation there. I enjoyed those few Turks [I knew but because of my short residence there and because my language limitations I didn't get to know many of them very well.

in Turkey I didn't have much trouble, except once I had a fight with the head of Turk-is at a lunch given by the Ambassador. Afterwards the Ambassador called me over to his office and told me he didn't like it. I said that I was trying to make a point with [the head of Turk-is]. He wasn't going to push me around. Well, there were no further outbreaks of hostility by the Ambassador, and he never held that against me. Generally the Embassy let me go about my work and accepted what I tried to do. I did only small scale things except

for reporting and trying to find out what the hell was going on. We had a very fine Deputy Chief of Mission named Martin, who was very easy to work with and very understanding of problems and I came to have some appreciation for him.

Of course the way the Department of State evaluated people doing our type of work is strange. I tried to get close enough to the radical trade union movement to get information and maybe [conduct] a little bit of cross chat, which I could do with Turkler. But attempts to do it [were sometimes problematic]. In Izmir I had a long interview with a fellow, who was secretary or whatever, and he wrote an article attacking me and the Americans. Well, I was, of course, a little ashamed of that, or at least a little disappointed, that I hadn't been able to pull this off quietly. The Deputy Chief of Mission put that in my efficiency report as something that I should be commended for, [i.e.], that I had come under attack by left-wingers. I didn't argue. . . (End of Side B, Tape II)

Kienzle: Okay, we are back on the record.

MILLEN: Well, the Labor Attaché Program has always had to fight for its legitimacy, and from what I hear when we listen to [the current Special Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator International Labor Affairs] Tony Freeman, it hasn't changed one whit, except that you have fewer people. I think that's just part of the fact that the labor function just doesn't have a natural niche in an institution like the Department of State. Now I found [the Labor Attaché Program] much looser, less structured and more liberal-and I am not saying that in a political sense necessarily-and easier to function in during the 1950s than I did in the 1960s. The old [Foreign Service] structure was asserting itself [in the 1960s]. All the new breath that came in with the Second World War was probably crystallizing, so you were getting a more bureaucratic style.

Kienzle: Would you attribute that to the fact that there were more political appointees in the Labor Attaché Program early on in the 1950s, and that the leadership became more career oriented later on?

MILLEN: That may account for it. It used to always be fun -- I don't know if you ever noticed it -- watching your British colleagues. There was more bizarre and aberrant behavior amongst the British, because they all wore the proper ties. They didn't have to kowtow to the ambassador or his upper group. They had gone to the [same] schools. So you had, I thought, frequently a bunch of freer spirits on the British side of the fence than you did on ours. I don't know if that's a generalization that holds up or not, but that was my feeling from time to time.

During the most intense part of the Cold War period, I think we [in the Labor Attaché Program] were tolerated to one extent or another, as, for example, in Rome when everything was keyed to the anti-Communist image. You had greater tolerance of our activities because we were expected in some way or another to be at the forefront of the anti-Communist struggle. I think that just about the time that Nixon and Kissinger got into détente the labor function fell apart almost instantaneously. I don't know whether that

was a coincidence or not, but I had that feeling. Certainly we were moderately useful to some mission chiefs during that period, but I am sure -- and I think you're seeing it now -- that if there are budget cuts and any staff cutting at all, the labor attachés will frequently be the first on the list to go. I just think that this is in the nature of the State Department, which has never found that perfect type of a labor attaché to do a certain specific thing and never will.

Kienzle: Do you see a role for the labor attaché in working with the AFL-CIO institutes in say democracy building?

MILLEN: Well, there always is a conflict. There are different viewpoints as to what is required. A young lady in [the Bureau of] Intelligence and Research commented to me not long ago, "Oh, the AFL-CIO is just making things dreadful in. . . " I think she was talking about things in Russia or Eastern Europe. She said, "Their viewpoints are so wrong." Well, I didn't want to get into a discussion on it. First of all, I don't know what the AFL-CIO is doing in Eastern Europe, so I was in no position to discuss much. But I think government obviously has a different outlook than the trade unions have on what is to be done. Once you get beyond the simple business of anti-Communism, when you get into the business of building democracy, these disparate viewpoints make themselves even more felt. Certainly that was my experience in Italy and other places, where just being anti-Communist wasn't enough for [Irving] Brown [and company]. You had to be super anti-Communist. So you have that kind of a conflict between labor attachés [and the AFL-CIO representatives] if they are trying to work together, or dovetail their work. You can't work as a team with them, because that would certainly undermine their entire position of independence, and I think quite rightly so. There might be an identity of interests in the long term, but how to get there is always going to be an area of division, and I suppose that this is one reason that the AFL-CIO has paid much less attention to the Labor Attaché Program in recent years. In 1980 we got [then Secretary of State] Muskie to focus in on trying to stimulate [AFL-CIO] interest in the Department and work more closely with George Meany's operation or at least to attract their attention and support, but that, of course, fell apart with the election [of 1980]. Whether anything would have [otherwise] come of it or not, I don't know. Muskie wanted to do it, and the people at the Labor Department were trying to put together some ideas on it, I know. But the fact of the matter is that even after fifty years the labor function has never been institutionalized, and I don't think you're going to do.

Kienzle: I think that [S/IL] Tony Freeman has a group once again reexamining the role of the labor attaché and where it fits in and trying to advise [on the future of the Labor Attaché Program].

Shea: But Bruce is absolutely right. Right now the Department has asked for a 14 percent cut in personnel. All the missions are coming in and the first job they want to eliminate [is usually the labor attaché position]. That's what Tony and Jack Muth told me a couple weeks ago. They are faced with this terrific personnel cut due to the budget. Right away as soon as the missions get the inquiry, the first one [cut is the labor attaché]. Then of

course the word is out that in [the State Department's personnel] program of up or out the labor attachés don't make it. I have addressed a few of these groups [in the labor attaché training program at the Foreign Service Institute] and the young people tell me that they want one or maybe two labor assignments and then want to go on and be political officers.

MILLEN: Well, you have the case of that very energetic man, Dan Turnquist. He wanted to be a labor attaché in the worst way, but nobody would promote him. He went for years without a promotion. And he thought maybe he would have to leave the labor group, but finally I guess he did get a promotion.

Shea: He's done very well.

MILLEN: And Lennie Sandman went for years without a promotion. Of course he had some sickness and so forth, which may have been a partial explanation. For my part I fared unusually well as far as promotions and special assignments were concerned, but obviously my string was running out.

Shea: Well, I went for a good many years [without a promotion].

Kienzle: Bruce, are there any other comments you would like to make before we conclude?

MILLEN: No, I don't think so.

Kienzle: If not, I want to thank you on behalf of the Labor Diplomacy Oral History Project for allowing us to do this interview, and Jim, thank you for participating.

Shea: Once again, it has been a pleasure, Don.

End of interview