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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is Wednesday November 8, 1989. This is an interview with Consul General Allen B. Moreland on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Mr. Moreland could you give us a little about of your background before you got into the Department of State?

MORELAND: I did my undergraduate work at the University of Florida, and I did some graduate work at Harvard before the war, and during the war I was in the Navy and served overseas.

Q: Where did you serve overseas?

MORELAND: In England and France. I was with the Naval Advance Port Party entering Cherbourg immediately after its liberation. Our mission was to reestablish local government and clean up the harbor which had been destroyed by Allied bombing and some demolition by the Germans when they departed the area. The last couple of years of the war I was assigned in the Navy Department Office of Island Governments in Washington. During this time I went to Georgetown Law School at night and on week ends and earned a law degree. As fate would have it, I was a Naval officer working closely with the staff of General Hilldring who was invited to become the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas and he invited me to come with him. That was my introduction to the State Department.

Q: Now you had a law degree, were you to be working mainly in the legal side of matters?

MORELAND: No, I had the law degree before I went into the State Department, however, I was assigned duties of an economic nature. I liked the State Department and I stayed. I became integrated into the Foreign Service under the Wriston program and I had better that twenty years in the Foreign Service.

Q: Now let's go back to the early days because I have it from the record that you came in about 1947. What were you doing?
MORELAND: I was a special assistant to General Hilldring for about a year and after that, by a quirk of circumstance, I was invited by Chip Bohlen to become a legislative assistant on the hill. At that time he was Counselor of the Department with newly assigned collateral responsibilities for congressional relations. So I moved from the Office of Occupied Areas to the Counselor's office and became liaison officer for the State Department with primary responsibilities for the House of Representatives.

Q: I wonder if you could describe how you operated because I think this was a very crucial time. The United States had just ended a war and all of a sudden it was dawning on us that we couldn't just walk away but we really had to get involved. It was a tremendous change for the United States to get involved and the men and women in the House of Representatives were the people who were both trying to understand this and at the same time deal with constituents at home. Could you describe what the situation was and how you worked in that business?

MORELAND: Yes and it was further complicated at this crucial time by the fact that we had a divided government, in the sense that we had the Democratic Administration and the Senate in the hands of the opposition party and success came by virtue of the strenuous efforts by the people in the upper echelons of government both in the Congress and the Administration to try to find a bipartisan way to face the future realistically. In fact at one period both the House and the Senate had Republican majorities. It was not easy because there were a lot of snags and a lot of people who disagreed with the thrust of the responsibility that had been put upon us, but reason and common sense finally prevailed. It was a glorious time to be involved in Congressional relations.

Q: Whom did you deal with primarily in Congress?

MORELAND: It was my responsibility to get to know and work closely with the House leadership, including the Speaker and the House Majority and Minority leaders. Also I was to work with the Chairman and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and other committee members where State Department legislative interest might be involved. The one exception was the Appropriations Committee, which was considered a preserve of the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. It should be remembered that this was at a time when Congressional leadership and power were vested and exercised by the Speaker and the Standing Committee Chairmen. In those days they were powerful figures. While there were subcommittees of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the time, they had limited staff assistance and authority and they reported back to full committee before going public on issues of importance.

It is interesting to note that during the development of legislation for the Marshall Plan and NATO the House Foreign Affairs Committee had exactly 3 permanent staff members, 3 secretary/legislative assistants, and at the busiest time, 3 part time consultants who commuted from Harvard three days a week. Today the Committee has at least sixty staff members.
One other thing strikes me when I reflect back on the era. Some of my best tipsters and sources of information were the members of the Press Corp accredited to the Hill. There was no automatic adversarial relationships. There was agreement on the basic objectives with the most of them.

In those days when the Congressional leadership agreed on a course of action they could deliver it most of the time. My function was to be a conduit to the substantive people in the Department rather than a "mouth-piece" for it. By that I mean when a member of Congress wanted to talk to a Senior Department officer, I would escort him to the Hill and let him discuss the matter with the Congressman in his office.

I tried to have as wide a range of contacts as possible on the House side of the Hill. At one time I knew by name and sight all 435 members. This was put to a test at the ceremony for the signing of the NATO Treaty. Initially, only members of the Senate were invited to the ceremony on the theory that the Senate must give consent to the treaty. When we pointed out the fact that this Treaty would require a lot of enabling legislation, in which the House would be involved, the White House issued a air broadcast invitation to all Members of the Congress the day before the signing in the Department of Labor Auditorium. On the day of the ceremony we reserved a bloc of seats for congressmen and I was stationed on the front steps of the building to recognize and greet them and turn them over to an usher who would seat them. There were no problems and about thirty members attended.

*Q:* *What was the outlook of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs at that time and who was heading it?*

MORELAND: When I arrived, Sol Bloom from New York was the Chairman and he of course was the kind of a man who was a party regular and whatever the administration wanted, Sol Bloom was more apt to be found supporting it than opposing it. Shortly thereafter he died and he was succeeded by Judge Key of West Virginia who was a Democrat of good standing and very much of a gentlemen and amenable to the thrust of the administration as to what the requirements of the situation were. Then the house became Republican and Doctor Eaton...

*Q:* *This was the election of '50?*

MORELAND: Yes, Dr. Eaton, of New Jersey a Republican, became Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and he also was an internationalist in the sense that he could see what the situation was. Earlier, he and Mr. Christian Herter, who was in the House at the time, organized what is generally known as the Herter Committee which involved the Congressional initiative of having Members of Congress make trips abroad so that they could see firsthand the devastation that was caused by the war and talk to the people who were the principals in the foreign countries as to what their requirements for aid and help and understanding were. This was a very useful exercise and made the job of the
Administration a lot easier because when they talked with most of the members of Congress who had to deal specifically with foreign aid and foreign policy legislation, there was a community of interests and a community of exposure to the problems.

Q: Were there any particular burrs under your saddle, any congressmen in particular that you had to deal with who were really not sold on the idea of American involvement abroad?

MORELAND: Well, there were some lesser lights in the Foreign Affairs Committee that were isolationist, but they had no really important impact. One of the most important members on the Republican side was John Vorys who was a power in that party. He was not anti-internationalist. He was a man of great integrity and great energy and while he was from Ohio, you might say "he is from Missouri" - you had to show him everything. He was thoughtful about everything and required everyone to dot I's and cross T's. and he made a significant contribution to the development of the program because his fellow Republicans had the feeling on the floor that if anything has passed John Vorys' critical eye it must be alright, and so to that extent he was a significant factor in speeding up legislation that was needed.

Q: How about some of the major issues? - the Marshall Plan, Greek-Turkish Aid...? This was not a matter of fighting opposition but of educating, now what about another period that came somewhat later, but you must have been involved somewhat and that was the McCarthy period? How did this effect the work you were doing?

MORELAND: It had a very serious effect on all of us. But McCarthy himself had very little impact on foreign aid development. As I remember it, his thrust was somewhat later. It did have a personal impact on me. When the Loyalty/Security program for the Department of State was established pursuant to the President's effort to neutralize the political damage of the McCarthy attacks, it was decided that certain benefits would accrue if the Legal Officer for the Board was a person personally known on the Hill - or at least on the House side. (Incidentally if one stays long enough in House Liaison, he will soon know a wide range of Senators. The migration from House to Senate is much more general than is realized). I was drafted.

The Department was also sensitive in the creation of the original panel for the State Department Loyalty/Security Board. General Conrad Snow, an Assistant Legal Advisor, a man of great integrity, and incidentally a registered Republican, was selected as Chairman. He and Theodore (Ted) Achilles were typical of the sensible men of integrity chosen. The years of proceedings of this Committee were marked by no witch hunting and occasional arguments with the Loyalty/Security Review Board which frequently disagreed with our findings. Most notable case was requiring the Department to take action against John Service after the Senate Board had recommended no punitive action.

Q: Now then you were doing this congressional liaison work for how long?
MORELAND: I was assigned to the National War College in the fall of 1952. So I was involved from about '47 to '52.

Q: What were you doing at the National War College?

MORELAND: I was sent as a student.

Q: ...and then was that when you were sent to Heidelberg?

MORELAND: No, I had one year in as special assistant to Fritz Nolting, who was a Special Assistant to Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs: October '54 to January of '55.

Q: And what type of work was that?

MORELAND: It was in the allocation of funds under the Marshall Plan to the various and sundry European countries, and I found that a fascinating experience too.

Q: In looking back on it did you see in the allocation of funds any particular priorities or bias that you can think of?

MORELAND: No, this was more or less related to what the appropriation were and it was a matter of allocating the flow. There were no jurisdictional disputes.

Q: Then I would like to move on to the time when you went to Heidelberg, you were a political advisor?

MORELAND: Political advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Force in Europe.

Q: What would a political advisor do? You were there from about 1954-55, to about March '57, what were the main issues you dealt with?

MORELAND: I was attached to the Embassy but stationed in Heidelberg. I was maintaining liaison with the Senior Officers in the headquarters related to matters where the U.S. Army presence and the occupation presence in the beginning impinged on the government that was being established and later attained sovereignty in Bonn. I would attend staff meetings every Monday in Bonn, I would go from Heidelberg up to Bonn and get the political coloration and the political facts as they were in Germany at the time, and, as issues arose within the headquarters command I would be able to relate them to headquarters and integrate them into staff studies, that is, proposed actions of the military. Once a month we were able to get the High Commissioner, later the Ambassador, to come down to Heidelberg and give a briefing on the political situation in Germany to all the commands in Europe. They would assemble in Heidelberg and the High Commissioners or Ambassador, as the case would be, would come down and give a briefing and answer questions and have a lunch and then he would go back.
Q: How did you find how well the military was integrating into a situation that was both political and military, was there a problem with the military mind set, or who did you see it?

MORELAND: No, there was no real complication in so far as the military adjusting to the realities of the German situation. The mind set of the Commander-in-Chiefs I dealt with were to have a reasonable attitude and policy toward the Germans and to be helpful and as long as that attitude was at the top, there was no problem with it permeating the whole command. There was one point of friction however between a Commander-in-Chief and the High Commissioner. At the time under the regulations that prevailed regarding war prisoners, those sentenced at Nuremberg were incarcerated under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner of the Allied powers. The prisoners who were incarcerated as a result of military courts were incarcerated under the general supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, US Army forces in Europe. A time eventually came when it was politically imperative that some rationalization be made of the imprisonments. It was felt that one just couldn't go along indefinitely with Germany regaining its sovereignty and having these people still in jail. It was becoming a political problem among the Allies and it was decided that some rationalization had to be made. They developed a consensus among the High Commissioners and their Governments that a system of parole should be initiated for all type of war prisoners. The Commander-in-Chief of US Army forces was adamant that there was not going to be any parole on the part of the military prisoners that they had. This was a point of friction, and as a matter of fact it was not fully overcome while I was there. Eventually it was resolved by an extension of a parole program, except for the case of Rudolf Hess who remained alone in the SPANDAU prison until his death a few years ago.

Q: Who was the High Commissioner and then the Ambassador when you were there?

MORELAND: Dr. Conant was the High Commissioner and Anthony C. (Tony) McAuliffe of "NUTS" fame was the Commander-in-Chief.

Q: Speaking of Tony McAuliffe, who had been at Bastogne, and was very famous there, Do you think some of these prisoners were there as the result of atrocities committed against American troops include including the Malmedy massacre, I suppose this was still a sore point with all the military....

MORELAND: This was still a sore point with all the military and they felt there was no way they could acquiesce in any - there was no thought of any pardon - parole.

Q: How did you work in this atmosphere?

MORELAND: ....carefully...

Q: Obviously you were attending the meetings up in Bonn and getting the debriefing of the High Commissioner in Heidelberg, you must have been getting quite a feel for how our people in the embassy and on the ground viewed this transformation of Germany
from an occupied country into a democracy, what was the atmosphere at the time, how did they look on the situation, and where it was going?

MORELAND: You mean the American personnel?

Q: The American personnel from the Ambassador on down. Did they look on this thing optimistically or dubiously?

MORELAND: Very optimistically in so far as West Germany was concerned. This was a period where there was a lot of friction with the Russians in regard to access to Berlin, but the Americans based on my observations, were most helpful. There was no resistance to the concept of Germany regaining its sovereignty and regaining its place in the world.

Q: How about the American military, was there some feeling? ...It is always difficult to set the military off on some other course, and it was a pretty good deal for them, they had control, they didn't have to worry about as many political factors as you do when you are dealing with a sovereign state.

MORELAND: The military couldn't have been happier. They were in control, as you say, they considered that some of the military people in Germany during the war were very high class people. People like General Heusinger and General Speidel were two examples of the people that they considered to be first-class soldiers and first class citizens. The late General Rommel was almost as popular with U.S. military personnel as he was with their German counterparts.

Q: So you didn't feel like you were having to drag the American Army into this changed situation?

MORELAND: No, there was no sense of that at all.

Q: To move on, you then became Consul General in Stuttgart from 1957 to 1960? Could you describe what type of work you did? What was particularly important?

MORELAND: It was the typical work of the consulate general, I mean as Consul General you have a political program, you have an economic program, you have a Consular program, then you have an administrative support system to carry it out, and a public information outfit, and we had a normal operation in the sense that Baden-Wurttemberg, which was the area to which Stuttgart belonged, was one of the economic power points within West Germany, you had a lot of economic reporting to do and it was appreciated by the department. It was also an important political base for the CDU and so we had a political program and the USIA had a very good public affairs program, and the issuing of Visas was not a complicated process there, and so those were three or four very pleasant years I spent there.

Q: How did you deal with the two major parties, the CDU and the SPD?
MORELAND: There were no problems. The individual members of the two parties treated each other like human beings; there was no significant problems. The CDU and SPD in that particular area were not mortal enemies, they had to live together. It was a rather pleasant environment.

Q: How about the KPD, the Communist party in Germany, did we have any relations with that at all?

MORELAND: There was not any of it in Stuttgart, in the Baden-Wurttemberg area. It just wasn't that important a factor at all. The Communist Party never could garner enough votes in Baden-Wurttemberg to get a second listing on the ballots. Unless a political party could draw at least 5% of the votes cast in the previous election it could not place the list of candidates on the next ballots.

Q: Did you have any individual problems that caused you any sleepless nights in Baden-Wurttemberg?

MORELAND: None at all, it was a very idyllic assignment and I enjoyed every minute of it.

Q: How about your staff, did you have a good staff?

MORELAND: Yes, and they seemed to enjoy it.

Q: Good, well then you left in 1960 and you came back and served for one or two years as an inspector?

MORELAND: A little less than two years and that was an unhappy situation in the sense that I was assigned to the inspection corp at that stage in my career. I had two teen-aged children and one daughter that was not quite teen-aged. This meant that my wife could not travel with me. I was ten months of the year away from my family. I was not very happy about it.

Q: Also, that was the time almost all the inspections were overseas, so that you didn't have time in Washington.

MORELAND: Right. In those days you would have about half the month of December off and the month of July off. You would come to Washington in January for about three weeks of briefings then you were assigned an itinerary that would get you back into Washington at the end of June. You then had another itinerary that you would take up the first of August and bring you back to Washington in the middle of December. So about ten months of the year I was away from the family. As a matter of fact, the second year I was in the Inspectors corps, I indicated that if they want me to stay in there without complaining too bitterly I wanted to inspect Canada, so that over long weekends or
holidays, I could fly back or my wife could fly up to Canada and we could be together. I got that kind of an itinerary. But during the middle of the second year I was called back to Washington because there was a crisis developing in the Security and Consular Affairs area. Ambassador Hill, Bob Hill, who had been Administrator of Security and Consular Affairs had been assigned as Ambassador to Spain. The director of the Visa office, Bob Hale, had elected to take early retirement so that he could qualify for one of those bonus, cost-of-living things that were prevalent in those days. He had to retire by a certain time to qualify for a bonus in his retirement pay. So I was called back to talk about an assignment in that area and when I got in I went to Mr. Roger Jones who was the Under-secretary for Administration at the time and I indicated while talking about the assignment that since the job of administrator was open, and given my qualifications, wouldn't it be possible for me to be the Administrator? He seemed to be amenable and he said he would check this out over the weekend and he would see on Monday.

Q: This was the administrator of the Visa office or Consular affairs?

MORELAND: At the time it was organized as the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Actually, security had been taken out and made a separate office at that time, but the name of the office was still the Bureau of Security and Consular affairs. Well, Monday, when I came back to his office, Mr. Jones indicated that Mr. Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, had indicated that he was sending over one of his assistants attorney general to be the Administrator. As a matter of fact the young man arrived that day. He was given an appointment as a special assistant to the Under-secretary for Administration pending the submission of his name to the Senate for confirmation. Well, as circumstance would have it, our foreign aid program in Congress was in need of a "conservative" Congressman advocating on the floor of the House of Representatives that some of the aid should be allocated to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had just been thrown out of the Comintern by Moscow and President Kennedy felt that it would be very useful if he could persuade Congressman Francis (Tad) Walter of the Walters-McCarran Act to make such a speech during debate on the current bill.

Q: That was Francis Walters of Pennsylvania?

MORELAND: That is correct...to make a speech indicating that Yugoslavia needed this help. Well, Mr. Walters agreed provided that Mr. Abba Schwartz would be named Administrator to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. And the President had acquiesced. So the Assistant Attorney General who had been sent over and had severed his connections at the Attorney General's office, was in a rather precarious situation. His name was James T. Devine. He ended up assigned to Geneva to work as a political officer with the U.S. Mission to the European office of the UN and other International Organizations. He was given the personal rank of minister...

Q: They were still dealing with refugees at that time weren't they? ...yes...
MORELAND: Well, this was the way the situation developed. Since I wanted to get out of the Inspector's Corp I accepted the job as Director of the Visa office.

*Q:* Well, now Abba Schwartz was an important figure in the development of Consular relations, could you describe a bit about his background and how he operated, because he was your boss, wasn't he? And why Walters was pushing him?

MORELAND: I never fully understood the closeness of the relationship between Congressman Walters and Mr. Schwartz. I know that Mr. Schwartz was a lawyer with a particular interest in refugee movements. There was talk also that Mr. Schwartz had somehow attracted the favorable attention of Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Robert Kennedy by his work in this field of activity. Of course, Mr. Walters, as Chairman of the Immigration and Nationality subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee also had interests in the refugee movement.

Further, Mr. Walters was not a fan of Frances Knight, the Director of the Passport Office. Very soon after Mr. Schwartz came aboard he became embroiled in a confrontation with her.

*Q:* Well, there was this peculiar situation where Frances Knight was according to the State Department hierarchy supposed to be subordinated to the Bureau Security and Consular Affairs but she had her own power...

MORELAND: Yes, she had her own power base and did not like to be closely supervised; she would like to have a free-rein to run her responsibility as she saw fit.

*Q:* Did you get much direction from Abba Schwartz or were you...?

MORELAND: Well let me develop this. When I arrived in the Visa Office there were many currents afloat. There was a deep division among the staff as to who would have final authority over the product of the Advisory Opinion Section of the office. In fact there was a complete lack of communication between warring factions. There was a sense that the time was ripe for the Walter-McCarran Immigration Act with its "National Origins System" to be repealed and the Act greatly modified. Mr. William Crockett, the Under Secretary for Administration, was in the process of introducing the Department to the computer age. We had no statistical compilation staff to keep up with the reporting routinely coming in from the various consular posts and the Department of Commerce was urging a waiver of Non-immigrant visas as a means of stimulating tourism in the U.S.

The Advisory Opinions Section of the Visa Office is the place where harassed consular officers request "advisory opinions." The Walter-McCarran Act was so complex and at the same time so restrictive that frequently consular officers had doubts as to whether the factual situation developed in the consular interview were sufficient to bring the applicant within the restrictions of the statute. In such cases the consular officer would refer the
matter to Washington for decision. The Washington staff was accordingly given a wide range of influence as to whether a generous or restrictive immigration policy would result. There was also a waiver factor involved in this office. The law provided for a temporary waiver of ineligibility could be made by the consular officer with the concurrence of Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) staff stationed abroad. Waivers for the more serious grounds of ineligibility had to be referred to Washington. They came to the Advisory Opinions Section for processing.

These Washington referrals frequently involved high ranking foreign nationals with more political than national security implications. These requests were sometimes referred to the highest levels in our Government for guidance or concurrence before any action was taken. The Chief of the Section was expected to use mature judgement in approving and securing INS concurrence. He was expected - if judgement warranted it - to circulate the waiver requests to the Director and to the Office Directors of the appropriate geographic area for comment or further internal clearance, before a decision would be made to approve it and seek INS concurrence or to deny it. The Chief of the Section was the late Frank Auerbach who was an authority on the Immigration and Nationality. The office was paralyzed. Something had to be done.

It was evident that the Kennedy Administration was going to move in on this issue. About this time Mr. Crockett, the Deputy Secretary of State for Administration was introducing the Department to the computer age. He was well along with the task of placing all accounting and pay roll procedures under his jurisdiction in the computer. There was left considerable computer capacity in his main frame and he was soliciting other areas to develop computer related projects. From my experience in congressional relations, I knew the voracious appetite of Congressmen for data and general information when major legislation is being considered. The sad fact was that if we were to amend the Immigration Act we would be hard pressed to supply the statistical data which would be required. Our statistical section consisted of one woman nearing retirement age who occupied a single room in which two standard office tables were pushed together on which she placed the master form for record keeping. As Consular issuance and rejection statistics were reported she had the task of laboriously inking the figures into the master sheet. Mr. Crockett was happy to send over a delegation to make a study of our statistical needs and relate the recording and reporting of them to a computer related system.

We were able to come up with a complete 10 year study of all types of visa issuance and rejections by categories by country, post and type. By the time the immigration legislation was considered every member of congress had a copy of a 40 page complete statistical study. We had very few additional requests for data during consideration of this legislation.

The members of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party for a long time had advocated a revision of the Walter-McCarran Immigration Act. One of the important reforms desired was the elimination of the National Origins System.
Q: Could you explain the national origin section?

MORELAND: The national origin proviso was that immigration quotas would be based on a percentage of the national origin of the population in the United States as of the census of 1900. At that time, the predominance of residents were from northern European countries, and very few Asians and southern Europeans.

Q: 1900 was chosen deliberately in order to get more Germans, Scandinavians, English, Irish.

MORELAND: Yes. It was a very strange thing when you look back on it. There was no quota, no system to prevent South Americans from coming in any quantity they wanted to. There was no numerical control on South American immigration at that time and we were living with it and it was a perfectly normal thing.

Q: I knew Frank Auerbach who was very Germanic, he wrote the definitive book on the McCarran-Walters Act and all consular officers, myself included had to go through his "eye of the needle." I remember him well.

MORELAND: I went through a little chicanery I guess, I promoted him but took away his responsibilities for direct control of advisory opinions. He had input but no control.

Q: Professor Emeritus...?

MORELAND: He was made a deputy to the visa director and he had general supervision but not the immediate control of the advisory opinion function. George Owen was given that and he performed beautifully. He made one error at one time but we will get to that in a few minutes. Well, that change eventually meant that I had about three days of grilling on the hill before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality which was under the direction of Senator Dodd, the father of the present Senator Dodd who was very conservative on these matters and his staff assistant Jay Saurerwine was even more conservative. I paid a healthy price for that later on. That is sort of a post script.

Q: Were you being supported by anyone or was this something you knew had to be done and you did it.

MORELAND: I knew it had to be done and I did it.

Q: Where was the opposition. Was the Senate getting things from Auerbach?

MORELAND: Yes. The Auerbach faction had a very close line to the Senate committee.

Q: Well Auerbach really drafted the McCarran-Walters Act didn't he? Or was at least intimately involved?
MORELAND: Yes, I am sure he was. Whether or not he drafted it, he was a student of it and knew all its nuances and he knew how to interpret everything so that it would carry out his idea of the intent of the legislators.

Q: I am trying to get a feel for this for the student of foreign affairs because visa policy is not a minor thing. We are what we ingest insofar as we are a nation of immigrants. This is the control valve. What was the Department, I mean you had a Secretary of State, Rusk, and you had other people underneath, this is an important thing, they obviously had their eyes on Vietnam at the time, but were you getting any particular backing or were they just saying go out and do your best?

MORELAND: No, because the conduit was through Abba Schwartz, and he was not very helpful. He had problems of his own, somewhat of his own making, but I will get to that in a minute. Early in my days at the visa office, the Department and the Department of Commerce were very much after something to speed up the visa process, so we could have more tourism in the United States with a minimum expenditure of staff time. They proposed some kind of a selective waiver of visas for non-immigrants coming in. I was called on to go down and testify before Tad Walters' Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality in the House. It became obvious that there was no way that they were going to agree to a waiver. However, they seemed to be amenable to something less than a personal appearance requirement for non-immigrant visa applicants. So I went back to the department and got the staff together and we compiled a questionnaire designed to give the kind of information that would be required for a consular officer to make an informed decision as to visa eligibility, which could be mailed in by visa applicants. But after we had completely satisfied ourselves that this document was ok, I went back down to the hill and cleared it not only with the staffs of both committees but with the interested congressmen so that there would not be any flare-up if we made some error in relation to it. Well, we came back and introduced the visa by mail concept and we devised ways and means that we could have this application form published in travel magazines in the various and sundry countries so that people who were interested in going to the United States could tear it out and send an application in along with a passport and have the visa put in and have it sent back to them. So that was really a life-saver considering the subsequent volume of...

Q: Yes, I remember (I should say on the record that I was a consular officer and I remember). Unfortunately, I was in Yugoslavia, and being a communist country this did not apply to us. How about Frank Auerbach. Was he fighting this?

MORELAND: Well, once I was able to get this approved, indeed he did not. But when I had to go down to the Dodd subcommittee a year or so later, I had to answer very specifically to the charge: I was more interested in getting people in than I was in observing the technicalities of the law or to the intent of the members who passed the Immigration and Nationality Act. They could not challenge the concept of visa by mail. That was why I had been so very careful to dot the i's and cross the t's in relation to that particular application before it was put to use in the field. One other problem that
developed at the time was that Willard Wirtz, who was the Secretary of Labor at the time, abolished the bracero program that had been working between the Americans and the Mexicans in the American Southwest for the import of temporary Mexican labor. Under the bracero program as it existed at the time, the farmers of Texas and the southwest, would certify to the agriculture representatives what temporary workers they needed at a certain time, this total requirement would be taken to the Immigration and Nationality Service and they would give it to the Mexicans, and they would recruit the needed workers and they would be hauled in to the U.S. by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. When the time was up, INS would pick them up and take them back. This was the operation of the bracero program. But there was great labor opposition to this in the areas affected. I think primarily because they couldn't be unionized. However, it was obvious that when one brings in temporary workers like this, for stoop labor in farm communities they will not have the very best of housing. On the basis that they were not given proper housing and that this was a demeaning program, they abolished the program with the stroke of a pen, which meant that if the farmers were going to get temporary labor, they would have to get someone with an immigrant visa to come over and do it. If he has an immigrant visa he would be here as a resident alien and wouldn't go back at the end of the season. Well, the waiting lists for immigrant visas in the Mexican posts within three months after this program was abolished, had developed to a point that if we had to issue all those visas with the existing personnel, we would have had about a six to ten year backlog and there was no disposition to send in new consular officers and proliferate the issuance of visas to these people who couldn't qualify for the provisions of the law that still required that one not be a charge on the public facilities or public finances of the local Community.

Something had to be done for the Mexican Consular posts in this situation. We tried to arrange some form of satisfaction of the "public charge" requirement of the law. We talked with the Labor Department and INS and came up with a compromise modus operandi. We instituted a system whereby the consular posts in Mexico would require farm workers to present a written offer of employment by a specific farmer in the U.S. This letter would then be referred to the appropriate Regional Office of the Labor Department which would confirm the existence of the farmer and the bona fides of the offer. Its certification would be returned to the consular post and the visa would be issued. Considering the size of the backlog of the applicants at all posts, it was agreed that existing IV applications would be canceled and new applications conforming to this plan would be required. All existing applicants were so notified. This got us back in business of having temporary labor coming in to do the farm labor in Texas, Southern California and Arizona and it got us out of those tremendous backlogs. As a matter of fact, we had to fight to prevent the labor certification concept that we established for non-immigrant visas from being embedded into subsequent legislation that was a revision of the 1952 Walter-McCarran Act.

Well now, to get to Mr. Schwartz. He hadn't been in his office very long before Mr. Tad Walters died, and Mr. Walters was succeeded by one Michael Feighan of Ohio who had
been number two on the committee for any number of years. His relations with Mr. Walters were anything but cordial. It is reasonable to infer that any friend of Tad Walters was not a friend of his. So Mr. Schwartz was almost persona non grata at the Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality in the House of Representatives.

Furthermore, about this time Mr. Schwartz did something that got him into trouble in the White House. One morning I received a call from a New York Times reporter asking what about this news that he had that Mr. William Gallagher, the retired head of the Communist Party of England is going to arrive at Kennedy Airport the day after tomorrow? I said I have never heard of it, I would check up on it. I called George Owen and said "George have you approved a waiver for this visit?" He said, "yes, I have." I said, "did you circulate it?" He said "No, I know I should have circulated it, but the guy is 81 years of age, he is retired, he was going to Chicago to visit his ailing sister who is just recovering from an operation, and I thought that it was an open and shut case." Well, I went immediately to Mr. Schwartz and told him that I had this call, and told him Mr. Gallagher's circumstances, and that we had not circulated the consular request for a waiver.

Q: By circulating it what do you mean?

MORELAND: Coming to the visa office director, the administrator, or the bureau that would be effected. In other words, for England, the office of Western European affairs. These principles have some say on whether or not a waiver should be granted. Anyway, I recommended that since this was a humanitarian circumstance, considering the age of this guy, and his mission here we should just play it flat, and say that he had a waiver, and that he complied with the law, and this is it, he is just going to visit his sister. Well, that didn't satisfy Mr. Schwartz. He immediately picked up his phone and had his secretary get the Consular officer in Glasgow on the phone, while I was sitting there. He ordered the Consular officer to go to Mr. Gallagher's home before he left and take away the visa. And that was done. Well, it hit the press in England and became headlines. And when it was headlines in England, it became headlines here in the U.S. The President personally ordered the visa reinstated and it was done and Mr. Gallagher made his visit. But thereafter Mr. Schwartz issued an order that all waivers for visas had to be approved by himself or his immediate staff. Furthermore, every reason that was given for the necessity for a waiver, had to be investigated by our SY, (Security division of the State Department). Well, you can imagine what that did to the operation, to say nothing of the moral of the visa office. By this move he had alienated himself from the White House, and by the arrival of Mr. Feighan, he was persona non grata at the Committee. It so happened that the revision of the National Origins System, which is the act of 1965, came about with very, very little input from the Department of State. It was handled primarily between the White House and the Attorney General's office.

Q: Astounding, because this is our major immigration act.

MORELAND: That's right.
Q: When you say the White House, whom ...

MORELAND: The General Counsel, and I have been trying to think of his name. But primarily, the responsibility was taken by an Assistant Attorney General.

Q: Were you aware that they were doing this?

MORELAND: Yes, because they would talk to me and they wouldn't talk to Schwartz. They were just keeping me informed, I didn't have too much opportunity for input. There was a Dr. O'Connor from the staff of Mike Feighan. Between the them and the staff of the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of the House, the immigration revision was brought to fruition. The Senate more or less acquiesced in it because after McCarran departed, the members of the Senate who were on the committee were willing to leave the spade work to the House. They didn't want to object to what the House had done, they could rely on them to do the "right thing."

Q: But you know in a bill as complicated as this there has to be the time when the people who are going to be administrating it in the first instance, being the visa office and the visa officers overseas can often point out "that sounds fine, but it won't work." But you weren't allowed to vet this at all?

MORELAND: No, we had very little input, the Secretary of State was brought down to testify, but that was canned and given to him. I am not aware that Schwartz ever made an appearance before the committee to answer questions as to what was needed and what the implications for administration were.

Q: I might just add here as a sidelight, I was the Chief of a consular section, a busy one, with many complicated problems from dealing with an essentially friendly communist country in Yugoslavia. I came back at one point and made what I thought would be a useful and dutiful call on Abba Schwartz, and tell him about my problems and all, and this was sort of standard operating procedure, and I was informed by his secretary that he didn't see consular officers. In other words, he cut himself off. And so as a working consular officer I wrote him off.

MORELAND: Anyway, we had very little input into the immigration and nationality act of 1965.

Q: That came about just about the time you left?

MORELAND: Well, there was one other thing, actually, before I left, I was taken out of the visa office and made a special assistant to Crockett. He was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. Here again, Mr. Crockett needed for increased utilization of the main frame computer downstairs. We conceived the idea that the lookout book - that is the basic book for the consular officer's use in determining whether or not a person is ineligible for a visa - be placed into the computer and print-outs of the books be sent to
the field for the use of the consular officers. We conceived the idea that in some of the posts where there was a tremendous volume of visa issuances, especially non-immigrant visa issuances, there should be an electronic tie-in between the posts and the central file in Washington. So that when the applicant comes in with all his information, his name could be vetted through the system instantaneously and the visa issued or denied right then and there. We decided that we would experiment with it first in Toronto, because they had a tremendous volume of visas issued there. I was assigned as Consul General to go to Toronto with primary responsibility for installing the first device. So in going to Toronto, that was one of the first orders of business - to get this mechanical device into full operation. Abba Schwartz was not objecting to it, he just divorced himself from any interest in it. It was very much of a success in Toronto.

Q: I think just to put this back into context, you had this man William Crockett who came in with ideas, and we are talking about the period of the '60's when the computer was not what we now have, this was a big machine down in the basement, and in the State Department the general feeling was well this is fine but its not for us. But the one place in the Department, two places, probably the administrative area keeping track of supplies and all but the other one was that the visa office did deal with a tremendous mass of information.

MORELAND: That is right and we were most fortunate in hitting the situation at that time.

Q: And part of it was not only did we need it, but also there was the need on the part of management to demonstrate the State Department has moved beyond the quill pen. It was sort of revolutionary, but now almost in 1990, one cannot imagine how one lived without it, but then it was men like Crockett and yourself who was forcing this into one small area of the foreign affairs apparatus.

MORELAND: That is certainly the feeling that I have, yes. After this thing was a success in Toronto I was asked by Crockett and the Western European Office Director to take time out on my home leave to lead a small delegation to key posts in Europe to lay the foundation for expanding the system to Paris, London, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Rome. I did that and subsequently this system was expanded to those points. At the same time, the posts that didn't have the volume to warrant this expense of a direct connection, we reduced the look-out book to microfiche and set up the machines so reference to the contents of the books could be speedier.

Q: Microfiche is film that can be reproduced very cheaply.

MORELAND: And it is much easier to send out because it can be put in an envelope.

Q: Before, it used to be a big book. The look-out book is the book where it is found that people who are ineligible, they appear in a book and it means that you look at them extra carefully, and you have to check with the visa office in order to issue them a visa. Well, in
you time in Toronto, you were consul general from 1966 to 1970, was this your main work in setting this up?

MORELAND: No, we had the normal programs of a large consular district. The province of Ontario was one of the most important economic cogs in the economy of Canada and the political situation there was such that it was the key to the political success of the Federal Administration. So we had a political program, an economic program, and a visa program. We didn't have as elaborate a public affairs program in Canada, as in Germany.

Q: Really wasn't necessary. Because of the spillage across the border. How did you find dealing with the officials in Ontario, were they sort of annoyed? The "Well America doesn't pay enough attention to Canada and all this?"

MORELAND: Well, I arrived in Canada in January of 1966. At that time an American could do no wrong. Members of the staff at the Consulate were very much a part of the community, very well liked, and we had very few problem except, of course, we did hear the media complain about American investment in Canada, and that American advertising was too pervasive, and that Reader's Digest and other periodicals were all were coming across the border with their advertisements. The Canadian media was particularly irritated that Canadians could go across the border to Buffalo and advertise Canadian products on the Buffalo television. These complaints were not voiced by the population at large. As the process of disturbances increased incidental to Vietnam, by the time we left at the end of '70, we had threats on our lives; we had guards around the house; and at times my wife and I wanted to go off on the weekends, police guards were automatically assigned to guard our residence because our daughter didn't go with us. It was a tremendous transformation over a period of three years.

Q: Who were doing the threats? Where were they coming from?

MORELAND: One very interesting vignette. One day the senior Canadian staff member came to me and said "I have just had a very interesting telephone conversation, with a University in Southwest Ontario. I got a call from a Dean of one of the Schools there who said, 'how well are you acquainted with the immigration people?'" This senior representative replied, "American or Canadian?" He said "Canadian." The reply was, "Well, I know them alright, but what is your problem?" He says "we have recruited a Professor from the U.S. for our staff here, but Canadian immigration won't let him in because he has three convictions. Is there any way you can intercede? Can you get the Canadians to waive his ineligibility and let him come in?" The response was "There is no way." The problem was many universities were recruiting U.S. activists, and when they came in their activism was given full vent in Canada and a lot of silly things were done due to their agitation. That is to say nothing of the activism of the students who had fled from America and were enrolled there.

Q: How did you deal with them? Did they bother you or did you bother them?
MORELAND: No not really. The front of the American Consulate General in Toronto was a favorite meeting place for all of the activists and the media. Because all one needed to do was say there was going to be a demonstration in front of the American Consulate General and full media coverage was instantaneous. It was right down town and very convenient for everybody. I never will forget one day that we had a tremendous demonstration out front. I looked out the window and heard the chant "Get Canadian banks out of Trinidad!" I mean it was a completely local issue, but they had found a formula to phone the media and say we are going to demonstrate before the American Consulate General. We had nothing to do with the substance of it, but this is what happened.

Q: This has been fascinating. Then you left Canada when?

MORELAND: In September of 1970.

Q: And then you were an inspector for a while?

MORELAND: Yes.

Q: I wanted to concentrate on your period of dealing with the visa thing, because I think this is a very important element that we are now putting on the record. Looking back on your career, what gave you the greatest satisfaction?

MORELAND: Actually the period when I was director of the visa office was one of the most creative times in my foreign service life, and it was done under the most depressing pressure and in circumstances where I got absolutely no credit for it. From the stand point of the accomplishments, I feel that the visa office assignment was one of the most creative and in many ways the most enjoyable. Of course so was the congressional relations assignment. I enjoyed that thoroughly.

Q: One final question we like to ask is, "If some young man or women came to you today and said 'Mr. Moreland, what about the foreign service as a career?' How would you reply, or how do you replay today?"

MORELAND: It is such a changed situation now that I don't know whether I would attempt to give advice. I just don't know what the traps are because it is such a changed circumstances.

Q: I fully subscribe to that, things have changed dramatically, both pluses and minuses.

MORELAND: That is right, but I never regretted my life in the foreign service... well, I don't know whether an anecdote is appropriate.

Q: Sure, let's hear it.
MORELAND: I told you that I went from the staff assistant of General Hilldring with Chip Bohlen. Before I went with Chip Bohlen, I had my law degree and I had decided that I was going to be a lawyer practicing law where I grew up, Jacksonville, Florida, I had corresponded with a friend of mine who was County Solicitor, which is an elective office which prosecutes everything short of capital offenses. Here was an opportunity to gain court room prosecution experience. I thought if I were going to practice law, it would be nice to have some court room experience for a couple of years. I wrote my friend and he offered me a job as Assistant County Solicitor. I sent my wife and children to Florida; gave up the rented house; I resigned from the State Department and the last thing I did before leaving the Department was to have lunch with Ernest Gross who was also on General Hilldring's invitation list to accompany him to the State Department, but he was at that time Legal Advisor. At lunch Ernie Gross said to me, "would you be interested in an assignment in the Department in congressional relations?" I made a fast calculation in my mind and came to the conclusion that if I'm going to be a lawyer in Florida maybe a few years of congressional experience might have more carry over value in practicing law in Florida than learning court room deportment and arguing before a jury. I said that sounds good. He said that Chip Bohlen had taken on collateral responsibility for Congressional relations and was looking for someone to work on the House side. So we go back to his office, he phones Chip, and I go over and have an interview, we hit it off and Chip wants me. I go to the Department and withdraw my resignation; I was able to get my house back...this was a rental situation and there were still war-time circumstances, so I was lucky to be able to get it back, and I phoned my wife that I would come and pick up her and the children soon. That one lunch changed my life. I got into the Departmental Service, and when Wriston came along, I was Wristonized and have had a long and very fruitful career.

Q: I thank you very much.

End of interview