

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**HARRY I. ODELL**

*Interviewed by: Peter Moffat*  
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## INTERVIEW

*Q: This is an interview with Harry I. Odell taken by Peter Moffat on April 17, 2000. Tell us a little bit about your background.*

ODELL: As far as foreign service is concerned, I don't think I had any lifelong burning desire to be a Foreign Service officer. I don't think I knew there were such things until World War II when a fellow I knew in the Army Air Corps had a brother who was a Foreign Service officer. He used to get letters from his brother and he talked about it a bit. I subsequently met my friend's brother. That was what first attracted my attention. After World War II when I was still an undergraduate at Brown, I really had no clear vision of what I was going to do. I was quite concerned about my age, which being in my late 20s seemed to me to be enormous at that time. I had to do something in a hurry. I considered law school. I think I could have gone to law school. That seemed another three years or something after finishing up. Then when I was at Brown, one of my government professors also taught up at the Fletcher School in Medford. He wondered if I would be interested in going there. Since I hadn't made up my mind what I was going to do, I said, "Well, alright." It was just at that juncture that the written exam for the Foreign Service (This was in September 1948.) was being given, so I decided to take the written exam, which I passed. By this time, I was in graduate school at the Fletcher School, so it just came naturally that I took the oral exam the next spring and passed that.

At that time, one of the Department's endemic budget crises was upon them and we were all told, "Congratulations. You passed the exams. It will probably be 18 months before we can give you a commissioned appointment. Go find a job someplace and we'll get in touch with you." I didn't know what to do for a job and by this time, my wife and I had almost totally run out of money. What little we had, we spent going out to California and back after I finished at Fletcher.

So, I came back and had to do something, so I came down to Washington. I had a couple of names, including the brother of this fellow that I had met in the Army, Fraser Wilkins, who subsequently became ambassador to Cyprus. I saw Fraser, but, of course, he couldn't do anything for me at the time. I remember going to the old Virginia Avenue 21st Street entrance to the Department and sitting there and looking through a Department of State telephone book. Of course, security was nothing like what it is now. I just was going through it. I saw that in the Bureau of European Affairs, they had a section called "Policy Reports." I had no idea what they did up there, but I went up and introduced myself. The fellow in charge said, "Well, what we do here is, each day, we summarize cables and stuff that have come in and put a little summary memo on the assistant secretary's desk when he comes in in the morning. Then, if he wants to see the other cables, he can. Frankly, sometimes, he reads our summary and sometimes he doesn't, but that's what we do. Once a month, we do a broader summary and we do ad hoc things. But I don't need anybody in my office. Down in Far East (FE), Sharp Noddler, who is in charge down there, was telling me the other day that he needed somebody." So, I went down there and talked to Sharp. He said, "Well, these are all Civil Service positions here. This is a P2 position. For me to hire you, I'd have to certify that all these candidates that have come up from the Civil Service Commission system don't meet my standards." So, we kicked that around for a while and he finally decided that none of these people would meet his standards and he so certified and hired me. It was a different world in those days. Of course, I had done very well on the written English part of the FSO exam. So, I went to work there as a P2.

I hadn't been there for more than a couple of months when I got a phone call from Personnel saying that there was a new program. The Department of State was taking over responsibility for the government of occupied Germany. They were converting from a military government to a high commission. They were going to staff positions in Germany that had been held by military government officers with State Department people. Some of these military government officers were just going to convert from Department of Army to the State Department. Somebody had the bright idea (or what they thought was a bright idea) of "Let's get some of these fellows waiting to become Foreign Service officers and send them over there." I said, "Well, it sounds interesting, but I've just gotten started here and I like my job. My wife has just gotten pregnant and we've just finally found an apartment. I don't know." They said, "Well, what are you getting paid?" I said, "Well, \$3,000-some." They said, "We pay \$5,300 as an FSS-7." I said, "Where are you?" They said, "The Walker Johnson Building." So, I went over and was interviewed there. One point that came up was, I had been a prisoner of war in Germany during World War II - would this cause me any problems one way or the other? I said, "No," of course. That was it. Then we gathered in December, 27 of us, and stayed at the institute until March, studying German and getting lectured on mostly sociology. There was very, very little about what we might be encountering in our jobs or the all-important thing of our relationship with the American army rather than with the Germans. There was practically none of that.

Then we went to Germany and stayed for two years. This was in 1950. In November of

that year, my FSO-6 appointment came through and I got a diplomatic passport and a salary cut of \$600 a year and became a Foreign Service officer.

In Germany I was a so-called "Kreis" officer. Kreis can mean either "circle" or "district." It was sort of like counties in this country. It was at that level that we were assigned, converting from military government. By the time we got there, the real authority legally was still there, but in practice, there was very little power left. The Germans had by that time pretty much started running their own affairs up to a pretty high point. So, we had a mandate to try and help them become better democrats and so forth. There were a number of programs already in place that we were supposed to help implement, such as a schools program, community action programs, and so forth. There would be people with supposed substantive knowledge in these things at our headquarters - in Munich in my case. I was in Bavaria. Then we were supposed to implement these programs and so forth. Up to a point, we did try. We were totally dependent on the American Army for logistical support. The State Department budget had been taken over from the Army. Such things as housing was still handled by the Army Quartermaster Corps. Our vehicles were serviced by the Army. Our housing was assigned and maintained by the Army. The Army, being the Army, kind of went about its business. Although generally you didn't have any bad relations with the Army, if you wanted... I was transferred partway through my first assignment from a very remote and rural area to a more urban area in Bavaria and there happened to be an armored cavalry regiment stationed there. There, I found that a lot of my job was functioning as the civil affairs officer for the Army. We had certain functions equivalent to being a justice of the peace in this country. If there was a German who broke an occupation law or an American violated a German law, both categories came before us in the first instance as a convicting magistrate, if you will. If there was anything serious, you simply found whoever was involved, an American who had violated German law, but Americans couldn't be tried in a German court at that time; or a German who had violated our law. There was always something going on. The Army soldiers would get in trouble in one way or the other. I found that a very interesting part of the job. Again, the Department of State was not terribly helpful in 1) giving us clear guidelines as to how to function in this capacity and 2) making certain that the Army through its own channels told its people down the line who we were and what they should expect from us and how they should behave towards us. You were pretty much on your own. Some people had a lot of trouble with the Army. I didn't, partly because of my wife, who hit it off very quickly with the wife of the regimental commander there, a woman who was considerably older than my wife. They hit it off and then somehow the word trickled down through all the channels that we were fairly reasonable people. If Colonel Brown saw fit to think that we were alright, why, then everybody did. It worked out pretty well.

*Q: Who did you report to back in Washington?*

ODELL: We didn't report directly back to Washington at all. We reported through Commission headquarters in Munich. The reporting was essentially parochial domestic. We didn't do any...

*Q: Who would write your efficiency report?*

ODELL: We had a district boss who had perhaps six or eight of us under him.

*Q: He was a Department of State employee?*

ODELL: He was then, but the fellow I worked for had been a Department of the Army civilian. That was another thing. They had never seen these forms before. They didn't quite know what to say and so forth. It was a particularly interesting thing. This happens to be the 50th anniversary of that group getting together. Although we weren't officially a Foreign Service officer class, we always considered ourselves to be one. We all went to the same country, which I think was unique in the history of the Foreign Service. We have remained quite close ever since. We're having our 50th anniversary this next month here in Washington, those of us who have survived. We've kept in touch.

*Q: Who among your group achieved particular fame?*

ODELL: Talcott Seelye was in my group; Bob Dean; Spike Dubbs, who was killed in Afghanistan; Jock Dean. I think they are the ambassadors.

*Q: It's interesting how many of those names left Germany behind and went on to other...*

ODELL: I was somewhat different. My third assignment was back to Germany, first to Hamburg and then to Berlin for two years. The same thing happened to Walter Jenkins. He went out to Taipei and then came back to Germany in Berlin. Jock Dean, I think, stayed in Germany. Although Jock was in the Congo once, he spent much of his later career involved in German affairs.

*Q: Well, all good things come to an end. You had to go back to the Department?*

ODELL: No. I went to Haifa, Israel as vice consul. In my wish list, I had said "the Middle East." I had no idea I would be sent as vice consul to Haifa. It turned out to be quite an interesting assignment. I got there in 1952. That was four years after the creation of Israel. It was an interesting period to see the changes taking place administratively in Israel. Manifestly, even in that short period of time in two years, administratively, things were working better than they had when I got there. Four years after the British gave up their mandate, they were just sort of beginning to get ordinary government service and facilities under control, in addition, of course, to coping with an enormous immigration problem, a military problem, and every other kind of problem. As a consulate, particularly in a port city, a provincial city, you didn't see the big picture as much as you saw the mechanics of the thing - the mail being delivered and the garbage being collected, conventional police work and so forth. It was interesting to see that movement take place in Israel.

*Q: Who was the ambassador at that time?*

ODELL: Our first ambassador to Tel Aviv, who I think I met once, died of a heart attack and then he was replaced by Francis Russell, whom I saw more because he preferred Haifa physically to Tel Aviv and used to come up more than we wanted him to. I did see more of him.

*Q: And your consul general was who?*

ODELL: When I got there, it was a fellow named Wilbur Chase, who had been in Hamburg. He was a consular type and stayed one. Wilbur was there and then he went on extended home leave. I was in charge of the consulate the last three months or so. It was a pretty good period. Things were fairly austere. It was difficult to get things and things didn't work very well. There were constant power failures and that sort of thing. But things got better. Of course, in those days, with a diplomatic passport, you could cross the Lebanese border or the Jordanian border with no trouble at all, so we made a routine of going up periodically to Beirut and coming back with a car just absolutely bogged down with everything you can think of. It was not an unpleasant experience in Haifa. My son was born there. We found it very agreeable, although I had no idea of that assignment coming up. It was particularly interesting because... Talcott Seelye at the time was over in Amman. He knew from the word "go" that he wanted to be an Arab specialist. He and his wife and children came over to Israel twice. This was very rare of an Arabist in those days. They tended to avoid Israel like the plague. Talcott didn't. He had his strong views, which he still holds, but he came over. We visited them in Amman. Of course, Jerusalem was there in between. It was an interesting place to be. I got to know people that I still know. We traveled quite a bit. We went up to Damascus; Amman two or three times; Beirut several times (We didn't get to Cairo.); up to Cyprus, which was still British... We were there the night they were celebrating the coronation of Queen Elizabeth. Some official Americans assigned to Israel, if they were going to have children, the wife would go over to Cyprus or someplace and have this child rather than have it born in Israel. My son was born in Haifa and my wife said, "I'm not going over to Cyprus. I've been going to this doctor here and I want to stay here." When his passport was issued, the place of birth said "Haifa, Israel." He carried this with him. His passport to this day says he was born in Haifa, Israel. After he grew up, he traveled all over the place, including all through the Arab world. There was a lot of mythology connected with this.

*Q: You then returned to Germany?*

ODELL: I was first assigned to the consulate general in Munich. While I was on home leave, I got a telegram saying, "Don't go to Munich. Go to Hamburg." This always stuck in my mind. I wrote the usual letter to him saying how absolutely delighted I was that I was going to work for him and so forth. I got a letter back from him saying, "Thank you very much for your letter. I will be delighted to have you on my staff, but I can't imagine what you'll be doing because there is no vacancy here." Then it was about a week later that I got a telegram from the Department saying, "Don't go to Munich. Go to Hamburg." So, I went to Hamburg and was not terribly happy there because I was, of course, put in

the Visa Section, which was a very, very busy visa section in those days (the spring of 1955). Hamburg was a nice city and there was lots to do there and everything, but the job was just visa applicants. You would be there and again it would be filled with visa applicants and so forth. So, when the opportunity came, I was asked would I be interested in transferring to the job in Berlin. That didn't take me very long to say "Yes" to.

I went to Berlin and that was a good assignment. I was assigned to the Economic Section and was assigned specifically to Berlin. In those days (1955), it was a few years after the airlift and everything. They were still thinking of what was going to happen to Berlin. My specific job was to try and keep track of traffic in and out of Berlin and also airlift planning. They were planning in case there was another airlift - stockpile planning and so forth. They had the Kommandatura structure in Berlin at that time. Although it didn't have any real power, it still met and they had subcommittees. One of the fringe benefits I got was that I was assigned to this subcommittee dealing with these matters. I had a British colleague and a French colleague, both of whom were full-time civil servant types who stayed there since World War II. They both spoke fluent German. Our German colleague, ex-officio, in the group (Of course, the Germans were paying for the thing.) didn't speak anything except German, so they had fallen into the practice of talking entirely in German. It didn't take very long for me to realize that it wasn't going to work. I knew some German from my previous German experience. I had kept up with it a little bit in Israel, but it wasn't by any means fluent. I decided right then and there that I was going to have to work at this. It's the old story: if you're forced into a situation of using a foreign language, it begins to... After a while, I discovered one day that I was beginning to at least in that context think in German rather than in English. That was a real big fringe benefit of that job. It made life after that in Germany much more pleasant. Subsequently, much later on in subsequent posts, it was much more pleasant. That was an interesting period.

I met Chuck Johnson during that period. He was a civil servant when I first met him. He was sort of staff assistant to Eleanor Dulles, who was special assistant to the secretary for German Affairs. Eleanor used to come out to Berlin periodically. She was a GS-14 at the time, maybe a 15. She was treated with a considerable amount of deference. Chuck came out with her. I think that was the first time I met him. He was still in the Department. Subsequently, I was assigned to be her assistant and discovered that Eleanor really had some rough edges on her, no doubt about it. But basically, she was quite nice underneath it. We got along quite well. I enjoyed that because running around with Eleanor got me into meetings with people that I at my level at that point would have never been in otherwise.

Bernard Guthrie was one of our chiefs. He was a senior State Department official. At that time, the structure was complicated. The British, American, and French ambassadors in Bonn were the chiefs of mission in Berlin. Their official deputies were generals. The general's deputy, if you will, was Mr. Gussler. In practice, Gussler dealt directly with the Department of State and so forth. But that relationship with the Army in Berlin was a lot of fun. The Army put its best foot forward there. The officers seemed to have been



carefully picked. General Dasher told me at one time that he had a lot of authority when it came to officers being assigned there. If he got the word that somebody wouldn't fit in very well, he could say "No" to them. The first were sharp troops. There were lots of good parades. It was Berlin; of course, the Germans put on a good show there. Berlin was full of good things to do. It was cheap and not crowded and it wasn't full of tourists. We thoroughly enjoyed Berlin.

That was an interesting period. Willy Brandt was on his way up. at that point. Again, my wife got to meet Mrs. Brandt at some kind of function. They took the children to circuses and things like that and I got to know Willy before he became a great man. He didn't become mayor until later, but he was really on his way up. It was during that period that there were a couple of incidents. The riots took place in Poznan, Poland at that time. There was a spillover into Germany and East Berlin. Willy Brandt came to the fore. Chuck Johnson and I went down. Chuck by that time had been assigned to Berlin. He and I went down to the Rathaus, where they had a big rally and Willy got up and spoke to the crowd and calmed them down. From then on, his political star was in ascendance.

*Q: So, what happened then?*

ODELL: After Berlin, I was sent to Bonn in the Economic Section and I really knew very little about economics. I did economic studies at Harvard in 1957-1958. It was then called the Littauer Center. I subsequently became the head of the school, much to the unhappiness of Mr. Littauer's descendants. That was a good year. There wasn't much pressure on. I met some interesting people and heard some interesting lectures and stuff. But it did mark me as an economic officer. I took a couple of assignments before the Department finally agreed with me that I really wasn't that much interested in economics and wasn't all that good at it to begin with.

After that, I came down to the Department and was in the old Bureau of Economic Affairs in the Aviation Division for just a year. Then they created a new bureau, which was called CU. This was the old CU. I think there is a new one now - Cultural Affairs. But at that time (This was when USIA was quite different.) - implemented these programs abroad and the American side of these programs was handled in the Department of State. But it created this new bureau. They brought together the various exchange programs, the Fulbright Program, various cultural activities, and so forth. They were looking for a staff assistant. I was on the list of the Secretariat at that time to work up there. I got a call from the Secretariat, saying, "Would you like to work in CU?" I didn't know what that was. They said it was as staff assistant. They said, "Now you're drawing a GS-13 salary down in the Economic Bureau. This is the GS-14 slot." I said, "Yes, sure. I'll be right over." So, I went over and did that until the administration changed. Mr. Kennedy came in and a new political assistant secretary for CU was appointed. He had his own man that he wanted in that position and I was due for reassignment anyhow. (tape turned off)

*Q: With aviation and CU behind, could you tell us a little bit about the major issues and what was going on?*

ODELL: In the Aviation Division, the chief issue was that this was 1958. By that time, the aviation world had changed. After World War II, the United States and to a lesser extent Great Britain, had all the airplanes and all the know-how and all the power. Whatever we wanted was pretty much what we got. We had a conference in Bermuda which we pretty much dominated and established certain principles governing international civil aviation called the Bermuda Principles. In practice, it meant pretty much that what our CAB said went. By 1958, there were a lot of other countries coming along who had their own airlines, most of them state-owned and controlled. Ours were not, which added another complication because we dealt with them and they were private American corporations, but they had to go through the U.S. government because, in contrast to most corporate activity, civil aviation on the international level was subject to government to government agreement. The Department of State, of course, had to negotiate with the airlines and with the CAB and with the foreign government, so there was a lot of negotiation going on, much of it unofficial. But along came these other countries, most of whose airlines were state-owned or state-controlled and they wanted a piece of the pie. They were not interested in being told that the economics of a given situation should be German. Obviously, the American market was the most important market in the world and our view was (and I think it was basically sound) that to get access to the American market was very important to an airline from Argentina, in return for which they ought to be very free with landing rights for our airplanes. They shouldn't impose any restriction really on us of the number of flights we could operate. Certainly, being able to fly into our country meant a great deal more to them than for us flying to Argentina. But they didn't see it that way and they would say, "Well, Thursday, Pan American can land three times. Friday, they can land two" or something like that. We would say, "No, no. Let's leave that up to Pan Am. If they think it's worthwhile to fly six times on Thursday and eight times on Friday, they ought to be allowed to do that. That is in your benefit-" (end of tape)

Tape 1, Side B

ODELL: This was 1961 that I went to Sri Lanka. There had been a very few years before that some serious "communal disturbances," community disturbances - Tamils and Sinhalese - which had taken very unpleasant forms, but they hadn't created a national crisis that caused a great deal of trouble. In the circles in which we moved in Colombo, the educated well to do professions that we tended to know, civil servants, senior civil servants, and so forth, and the club we belonged to, the Eighty Club, which I think was probably the best club in Sri Lanka (I joined to play tennis primarily.), Tamils, Sinhalese, and Burkers were the Eurasians there mingled freely on the social level. They played tennis together and had dances together and parties together and so forth. You didn't sense much, except that marriage between those groups was very, very rare indeed.

Quite a few of the people at that level were at least nominally Christians rather than Hindu or Buddhist. The religion was a kind of blanket that covered them to some extent, but it was very rare for them to marry. I still have friends whom I haven't seen in years,

but they spend part of their time in London and the rest of the year in what's now Sri Lanka. He is a Sinhalese, a very good family, and she is a Tamil. I think they were the only couple that we knew that somehow bridged that gap. To answer your question, we didn't see much actual trouble.

*Q: Who was our ambassador at that time?*

ODELL: Frances Willis. You've heard of her. She was a career officer, of course, and she was our first minister at that time to Switzerland. Then when we raised the legation to embassy rank, she became the first ambassador. Then she was subsequently ambassador to Norway and then her sort of retirement post was Sri Lanka. That was a good thing for me.

*Q: Did you ever know her?*

ODELL: No. She's dead a number of years now. She was one of the genuine brains that I met in the Foreign Service. I met a lot of very bright people, but she was in her 60s at the time. She doesn't seem all that old to me now, but did then. She was bright and very demanding. She could have quite a ploddy demeanor that some people didn't like. But she had a great capacity for going to the heart of an issue. I found her very helpful in the sense that she could sense what you were getting at very quickly, sort of like a good editor helping somebody write something. At least with me, she could sense what it was. I was fortunate professionally in Colombo that I had been kind of bumping along and the job was not terribly exciting. Having to write about tea and all and rubber... We didn't have a great deal of interest. We had a fairly large AID mission. I never quite understood how the AID mission had gotten to be that substantial in Ceylon, but it was a big one. The first thing was, Miss Willis decided that she wanted to keep the AID mission director kind of at arm's length - for whatever reasons, I don't know. She wanted me as her economic officer to be the one that kept in touch with the AID mission and kept her informed as to what they were up to, which was not easy because they were up to all kinds of things. That was the first thing. I had to report to her on what they were doing.

This got me involved with the AID mission director Jack Bennett, who had been a fairly senior guy in the Treasury at one time. I don't know how he ended up in AID, but I think that was Jack's retirement post somehow. He and I got along fairly well. I told him, "Jack, the best thing I can do for you is, you are persuaded that your AID mission is doing good things - let me see as much of it as you possibly can. I'm not a spy, but Miss Willis is asking me questions every day." So, he arranged for me to go with all of his field officers to every damn thing they were doing, which got me all over the island. I saw all sorts of things, which was fun.

But the big thing that happened in Colombo was that Senator Hickenlooper attached an amendment to the AID appropriations bill or something. It said in substance that any foreign government that nationalizes, seizes, American property and doesn't provide adequate, prompt, and effective compensation shall not have a USAID program there. We

would suspend the AID program. Well, at that time in Brazil - I think it was one of the federal states of Brazil - was giving IT&T a very hard time. Of course, nobody wanted to suspend the AID program to Brazil. It was a big operation down there. But the Ceylonese in their wisdom decided to nationalize American Oil Company. There was no oil in the ground as far as I know, but there were two American marketing companies, STANVAC and CALTEX. They split half the market and British-Dutch Shell had the other half. Well, they decided to nationalize these marketing operations. They sold the gasoline and the diesel fuel and the kerosene and so forth on the island. They set up Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. To give the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation facilities, they nationalized all these gas stations, storage tanks, and distribution facilities. Well, they didn't provide prompt, effective, and adequate compensation. As I say, nobody really wanted to move in on the Brazilians, but here was Ceylon up there. You could do anything you wanted to with Ceylon and that wouldn't cause any particular trouble. So, we suddenly from being a fairly obscure place started getting an awful lot of attention. Boy, the oil company, figuring that this was setting a precedent, their high-powered brass from London, Amsterdam, and New York were out there all the time, coming and going. The U.S. government got very much interested, too. We were constantly being visited by people. So, just fortuitously, being the economic officer, I was it. I started dealing directly with Frances Willis and this became our prime occupation for close to two years. This was about what we did. That was very enjoyable.

It ended up, of course, by suspending the AID program, finally deciding that they hadn't provided the prompt, effective, and adequate compensation, although they kept saying they were going to and I believed that in their own way they fully intended to do this, but they were going to get around to it sometime next year or something. So, we suspended the AID program, closed the whole thing up, and sent everybody home.

*Q: What was the reaction of the Ceylonese authorities?*

ODELL: It was a very interesting reaction. I remember the day I went down with Ambassador Willis. The final word had come through that there was going to be no further reprieve and "You are hereby instructed to go down and tell the foreign minister that as of midnight or something, he is going into the gas chamber." I remember going down there and Francis saying, "Oh, dear." So, we went in and she told him and put a formal note on his desk. We sat there for a moment and he said to her, "Is there anything else?" She said, "No." He said, "Well, thank you for coming" and rang his own bell. An assistant came in and he said, "See that the ambassador's car comes around, please" and down we went. That was his reaction.

But then, the Ceylonese press picked it up. There was an official statement from the government saying how terrible this was and so forth. But I went that evening to play tennis at the Eighty Club. Here was the foreign minister's assistant there and nobody said anything. We played tennis as usual and everything went on.

Relations got a little chill; there is no doubt about that. I think I have to backtrack. I think

it was just before we did this when relations were getting kind of difficult. The prime minister was a woman, **Sirimavo Bandaranaike**, the widow of the man who had been assassinated. Just before Christmas, it didn't occur to us at the time, but the ambassador came in and said that she had been invited - not summoned, but invited - by the prime minister to come to her residence that afternoon. If the ambassador would like to, she could bring Mr. Odell with her. I said, "What is all this about?" She said, "I don't know, Harry. I think that maybe they're going to break diplomatic relations with us or something." We didn't know. Whenever it was, relations were very funny. We rarely saw the prime minister directly except on social occasions. She dealt with us through her foreign minister. We got over there to her official residence and came in. The prime minister greeted the ambassador and then nodded at me. She said, "We've been kind of quarreling with each other lately. I thought we all ought to have some Christmas cake together." So, we sat down. Some of her personal staff came in and we had tea and Christmas cake. Then we went home. That was all there was to it. We didn't discuss any business.

*Q: Was there some coup or coup effort?*

ODELL: Yes. I don't remember the exact dates. I would guess it was about a year before I left there. There had been unhappiness for some time with the government in power. Mrs. Bandaranaike had replaced her assassinated husband. I think his party thought that they would use the name Bandaranaike and that she would be a figurehead. Somewhat to their surprise, I think, she became a powerful personality in her own right, and she was very much in charge. She had a controversial nephew named Felix Bandaranaike, who was always kind of off there on the side and so forth. There was a lot of dissatisfaction among the capitalist-minded, free trade, right wing, if you will, types in Ceylon. There had been rumblings for some time. There is no doubt that the government in power had a number of pretty far left types in it. They were doing all kinds of things, many of which needed to be done - in other words, spreading the benefits that were available down to everybody on the island. They were on this Sinhalese nationalist kick, which meant attempting to have everything in Sinhala, which is understood by only a few million people in the world. Of course, educated Ceylonese, which extended pretty far down in the population, whether they were Tamil or Sinhalese, English was the common language. It was a shame, but it was impossible to break away from that. That was causing problems. Then there had been a lot of changes. They made a lot of changes in the upper structure of the army, which was not very important at that time (This was before the real civil war developed.) and the civil service and the businesspeople and so forth. So, there were constantly rumors. Something had to be done about this. A bunch of these people got together and plotted to overthrow the government. Then they realized that their plot was being talked about around town, so they all met down on a beach near Colombo one night and decided that they'd better call this thing off. Exactly what their physical plans had been, I don't know or I've forgotten. Anyhow, they all went home and, of course, the government then sent policemen around and arrested them all. They were held in prison before trial for a long, long time. Then finally a special panel was convened of judges to try them. The trial was still going on at the time I left. They were convicted and sentenced to prison, but some

years later, after a change in government and so forth, those that were in prison were amnestied. Nobody was hanged or anything. There is no doubt about it that they were conspiring to overthrow the government. There is no doubt about it that when it came down to it, the trial was probably fair enough. However, a lot of people felt that, yes, they had been bad and they had been punished and eventually they were amnestied.

*Q: Was the embassy involved or informed at any point?*

ODELL: That the coup was going to take place? I don't know. I was not sufficient high ranking in the embassy at that time to know how much we knew about it. I don't think there was any doubt in the coup planners' minds, however, that strong elements in the American embassy didn't like the government in power. Certainly, the Defense attaché made no bones about it, nor did the CIA people. Whether they were actually involved in the planning, I doubt it. I don't think they did. But at the Eighty Club, where a number of these coup plotters were members, you would have to be kind of blind not to realize that there was a considerable amount of grumbling going on, talk, this, that, and the other thing, and rumors circulating that something might go on.

Anyhow, the coup didn't succeed and the government was more firmly in power as a result. It was still in power when I left. We had in the meantime suspended our aid program and sent all the AID mission people home.

Then I was transferred to Athens in 1964. I was assigned there to the Economic Section. Athens was an interesting place, horribly overstaffed, in my opinion. We had an enormous aid program and military program there. All kinds of camp followers had drifted into this. Greece is a country of 10 million people or less. We had an enormous infrastructure of all kinds there, a great big CIA contingent. When I got there, we had a major general in charge of the JUSMAG (Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group). His three section heads were full colonels, one of them a Navy captain, in addition to which, we had our own Defense attaché establishment with a Navy captain, an Air Force colonel, and an Army colonel, all with their supporting staffs and everything. The CIA was just kind of all over the place. The head of the CIA, Jack Moore, who is now dead, when he died, the memorial service for him in the National Cathedral was just absolutely packed. He was quite prominent and a very nice guy, a very distinguished first family of Virginia gentleman. He carried this very, very easily and graciously. He was a real nice guy. I liked Jack. He had an awful lot of people working for him in Athens.

*Q: Who was your ambassador?*

ODELL: When I got there, it was a man who had been the director of AID. He Henry Labouisse, he was from Connecticut. Norbert Anschutz was the DCM. Did you ever know Norb?

*Q: I served for him.*

ODELL: He is still around. Labouisse was replaced by Phillips Talbot, who had been the assistant secretary in NEA and come out of the Asia Foundation into the Department. He was assistant secretary for NEA when I was in Ceylon. I met him then. Then he came out and replaced Labouisse.

I got to Athens in 1964, which was at the end of the really great time to be in Greece if you were an official American. Things were still cheap. Greece had been discovered by the tourists, but that was just really beginning to build up. So, it was still possible to enjoy the many things that are possible to enjoy in Greece. The dollar was still \$35 to an ounce of gold. The drachma was cheap. Things were available and servants were available. The countryside was not cluttered up. Athens, which was beginning to get cluttered up, still wasn't. If you got to downtown Athens early in the morning, you could actually see sheep being driven through the streets. It was a great place to be from the personal point of view.

There were just people all over the embassy. We had officially discontinued our economic aid mission. A great deal of my time was spent trying to tie up loose ends left over from the AID mission project.

*Q: Your title was what?*

ODELL: I was an economic officer. In the Economic Section, my boss, Bob McCoy, had been director of the last AID mission in Ceylon. He had the title also of economic counselor. They abolished the AID mission officially and he stayed on as economic counselor. I was number two to him. Then we had a commercial attaché who also reported to him over there. Then we had about four other officers in the Economic Section and also local employees. McCoy was a very sharp man. He had worked directly for Labouisse in AID. He was one of Labouisse's boys. After Labouisse left, Bob didn't rank quite so high. Of course, his perks had been taken away from him after he lost the AID mission. He no longer had a car and driver. He no longer had all these things. He wasn't terribly happy. He was a very active guy. So, he got an offer from Esso to go to work for them and he left the government to work for them as head of the Government Relations Department or something like that.

He was replaced by Frank Butler. He had come in originally under the Manpower Act proceedings. He was my boss until I left. He was a totally different guy than Bob McCoy. McCoy was very active.

I enjoyed Athens, except I got a little frustrated towards the end. There wasn't a great deal of activity. But we personally found it very pleasant there.

Of course, I was there when the Colonels' coup took place. That was another thing. That was, again, in terms of U.S. government policy... I don't know if you're familiar with the history of that. The Greek government in World War II had gone into exile in Cairo. It was headed by Prime Minister George Papandreou. When the war ended, he came back

and was reinstalled by the British as prime minister. Of course, the civil war in Greece broke out after World War II ended. They had a civil war for almost four years in Greece. Consequently, Greece got a very late start into the post-World War II recovery. We had this big military support operation there. But then various changes... Papandreou went out of power and a man named Karamanlis was in power. He had a big famous falling out with Queen Frederica. He went into exile in Paris, where he lived. He was sort of like the Bonny Prince Charlie of Greece. He was off there. Everybody talked about how wonderful it was when Karamanlis was in power. George Papandreou had a son, Andreas Papandreou, who had gone to the United States as a young lad and become an American citizen. He was briefly in the United States Navy and had studied economics. I think he taught in Minnesota, where he acquired his wife, Margaret, who had previously been married to somebody else. I think it was a bit of a scandal in the University of Minnesota faculty over that one. But Andreas went to California and became a full professor in the Economics Department at Berkeley. Apparently, his resume listed him as having been chairman of the department, which he was, except I found out that that is not quite what it means. California had a practice, I believe, of rotating the deanship or chairmanship of the department among the senior professors. In other words, if there were four, one would have it for a year or two years and then they would rotate. But he had an international reputation as an economist. He decided to go back to Greece, first to head a special economic study foundation project that had been established - I think with some American money in it - and then he went into politics and became very controversial in that capacity. Many of our people just couldn't stand him.

When I got there, he was not in office, but then he became the minister of coordination, which meant that he was the one who dealt with foreign governments in terms of any aid programs in Greece, which meant us. I met him several times. He was in my home. He was quite senior, of course, but he and his wife did come to my home. And we were in their home. He was a good looking guy. Women thought he looked very, very attractive, which he was. He spoke English beautifully. He was a little bit erratic. Greek politics were very convoluted and tangled and very difficult to put your finger on. But what happened was that there was a series of caretaker governments and then under their constitution, general elections were programmed for May of 1967. It was I thought - and most observers objectively thought - that probably the party to which Andreas and his father belonged would come back into power and that Andreas might very well become the prime minister. His father was getting pretty old at that time. It was at that point in April 1967 that this coup took place. Again, I don't think there was any doubt that the coup plotters thought that this would be something that we would be terribly upset about, but I don't believe we were involved. The day of the coup, I saw Jack Morrie at the embassy and I never saw such a shaken man in my life. He didn't really know that this was going to take place. Of course, if the CIA in a given country has any great value, this is the sort of thing they ought to be on, but they didn't. The people who pulled the coup, three colonels and a brigadier general, were pretty well unknown. It was a magnificently handled affair. What they took was the big NATO plan, that if the balloon went up and the Communist Bloc attacked NATO, Greece was a member of NATO, as was Turkey, and the plans had been laid and it was assumed that the attack would come down through



Bulgaria and so forth. The contingency plan of what would happen in Greece if that happened provided for certain people on a given list - a few thousand people - to be arrested and interned. Certain strategic points would be occupied immediately. Marshall law would be declared, etc. They simply took this plan, which was already thoroughly worked out, and applied it with a few twists - like arresting the leaders of the government and so forth. I think only one person was killed during the coup and that was a woman that was hit by a stray warning shot that had been fired.

I had been in the United States. My mother died and I went home for her funeral. I had only been back a couple of days. It was morning. I was getting ready to go to the embassy. My wife came in and said, "Malcolm Thompson is at the door." He was a Foreign Service officer in the Political Section. He lived not far from me. That was very unusual for him to come to the door at that hour of the morning. I went and Mac said, "Harry, something has happened. The phones aren't working and there are soldiers all over the place." So, I turned on the radio and all you could hear was marshall music being played. So, Mac and I decided that we would go to the assistant military attaché's house, who was also there, and see whether he knew anything. He didn't know any more than we did. We decided we would get in his car and see if we could go down to the embassy. We started encountering roadblocks and were turned away. But we finally worked our way around through back streets and go to the embassy. There was Jack Morrie, the CIA station chief, in his World War II Marine colonel uniform. He figured that it would be easier to get through in a uniform, which was true. The problem with Jack was that the uniform no longer fitted him very well. He was semi-ridiculous in appearance. Anyhow, everything had stopped. The airports were closed, as was everything else. The first two or three days, we were kept off the street. Then things sort of started moving. Our policy was totally without any direction at that point. We had no guidance from Washington except to keep our distance from these people. Well, this isn't practical in some respects. I mean, what do you do?

Things went bumping along. I wasn't privy to what was going on up at the top, but I did know that there was a lot of heat generated because among the guys that had been arrested was Papanreou. He was their prize capture. He had a lot of contacts in the United States. Lyndon Johnson subsequently said that "I'm never so tired of hearing anything as hearing about that damned economics teacher they got over there in Greece." The academic world from Galbraith and everybody all kind of rallied and started to put the heat on.

Eventually, they did let him go. He left the country and went to live in Sweden for a while. He subsequently, of course, became prime minister of Greece. His son is now the foreign minister of Greece, George (named for his grandfather).

Our life went on, but the problem was what do you do? Do you continue dealing with the civil servants and stuff that you had been dealing with? We did have programs. We had a big ongoing PL-480 supported food program. We had set up a school lunch program that reached virtually every schoolchild in Greece. It was a very good, valuable program. At that time, an awful lot of people in rural sections of Greece were very, very poor. The

kids simply didn't have the meals. What do you do? Do you continue these programs? So, we kind of bumped along.

Of course, in June of 1967, the Arab-Israeli War erupted. The Department in its wisdom decided that the Americans evacuated from the Middle East should go to Greece. You can't have umpteen thousand or whatever it was Americans coming into Greece without some contact with the local government. I don't remember the argument being made that they shouldn't come to Greece, that they should go to Germany, where there were all kinds of Army hotels and facilities. So, we in the Economic Section were instructed to go down and talk to the civil aviation authorities and we were to talk to the central bank and we were to do this and do that. The upshot of it was that contacts started being resumed. I don't think there was ever any official decision, but we just started doing it.

To talk about my personal role in this, I still retained a pretty good working knowledge of German at that time. It turned out that one of these colonels, Makarezos, had been their military attaché in Bonn and spoke pretty good German. He had become the minister of coordination. So, when Ambassador Talbot went down to see him specifically because they had discontinued the school lunch feeding program, and argued that this program, which was certainly non-political from our point of view, was a good thing, they had decided that anything that foreigners were doing was to be stopped. So, we went down and we were kicking this around for a while with an interpreter. Then I asked Makarezos directly if he spoke German. He said he did. So, we were able to communicate directly. Talbot promptly said, "Well, would you mind if Mr. Odell came back and saw you about the details of this?" So, from that point of view, my background in Germany was again useful in Greece. We never became buddies, but we were able to talk directly without an intermediary and that made things a lot simpler. I suggested to him simply that he go out himself into the country. Like so many of the Greek officers at that time, they had come from rural backgrounds. We said, "Just go out into your hometown and see this program" and he did. He agreed that we should continue it.

Otherwise, things settled down. Gradually, as revolutions do, the classic pathology, they started quarreling among themselves. The one colonel, Papadopoulos, had become the leader. He began really insisting on the perks of office. There was internal tension. But they were still in power when I left for Amman. Subsequently (I don't remember the exact dates of this.), they trouble started with the students at Athens University. Somebody got pretty heavy-handed and sent the troops into the university and the troops refused to fire on the students. It is a conscript army in Greece and most of these (It was then a very small country.) were from closely knit families. The vast majority of these soldiers were very young conscripts and were not about to start shooting students and so forth. I think that was the thing that pushed it over the edge. Karamanlis, I think, came back from Paris. Last I heard from Bob Keeley, who was there at the time as a junior political officer (He and I knew each other quite well then. Henry Tasca became the ambassador. He was quite friendly with the colonels. I never knew him.) that one of the triumvirate, I believe, has died. The others are still in prison, although it is quite a commodious prison life. No government has yet decided to amnesty them.

*Q: How would you characterize the colonels' coup and our attitude towards it?*

ODELL: I would say that we kind of drifted into more conventional relations with them. As they stayed in power, at least for a period, I think some of the more egregious aspects of it began to kind of drift away. Parliament was not in session, but troops were progressively withdrawn from things. The banks got opened and civil aviation began functioning. Things were getting along. My impression (I saw him, but never met him.) was that the brigadier general, Stephanopoulos, was just a pure, blunt soldier-type. Makarezos, a lieutenant colonel who had been military attaché in Bonn, I think was a more subtle character and was probably more intelligent. I thought he was personally an honest man. The other one, Papadopoulos, who was the leader, was shifty-eyed and he relished the perks of power. He was eventually in a palace coup of his own.

The young king's role in this was that he attempted a very feeble countercoup and then had to leave the country. Subsequently, many years later, there was a referendum in Greece and he was invited not to come back. He was a bit of a tragic figure. They used him. He was king and he stayed king until he attempted this countercoup, which had no chance whatsoever of succeeding.

He went off to Rome. The Greeks, I don't think they missed their monarchy very much. It was not of Greek origin originally.

Tape 2, Side A

The king was a squash player. Malcolm Thompson and I used to (There were squash courts at the Athens Tennis Club.) play squash. One day, we were told that we were going to have to vacate our court because His Majesty wanted to play. We said, "Well, yes, of course. We'd be glad to give way to His Majesty." Who should His Majesty show up with, but with his brother-in-law Juan Carlos of Spain. He had married Constantine's sister. She was a Greek princess. That caused a bit of a controversy because they were Greek Orthodox, of course, and Juan Carlos was Catholic. The two royals came down the corridor and we discreetly gave way to them.

He was a very attractive young man with a pretty Danish wife, of course, and so on. He didn't have a political stature. The general feeling was that he did what his mother told him to do. She was not terribly well liked. She was modern day German. She had been the German princess. Most everybody of any significance lived not far from anybody else in Athens. There were certain sections where you were supposed to live and you did.

That's about it for Greece.

I was supposed to go back to the Department. I got word (I had never heard his name before.) that Ambassador Harrison Symmes from Jordan was in town and that I was being considered to be the economic counselor in Amman and he'd like to talk to me. I said this

was new to me. I thought I was going back to the Department. I went and talked to Symmes. Actually, I was kind of intrigued with the idea of going. He dropped hints that, if things work out, I might become the DCM. He didn't say so, but that was kind of the implication. So, we went to Jordan. In due course, that did happen. Did you ever know Duncan? He was the DCM. When he left, I became the DCM.

*Q: Situate us in Jordanian history.*

ODELL: This was 1968. They had gotten into the '67 War. Apparently, they would have had been better off not fighting at all. The Israelis have always said they offered not to fight them if they didn't fight. Whether the Israelis would have occupied the West Bank and Jerusalem is another question. I don't know. But certainly the Jordanians, I believe... Hussein flew to Cairo and embraced Nasser and all that sort of stuff. Then the war promptly started. It was just a debacle as far as the Jordanians were concerned. The Israelis just ran right over them. There was some rather nasty fighting in Jerusalem itself. Fighting in cities is not an easy thing to do anyhow. I think the Jordanian army, what fighting it put up was in Jerusalem. There was some serious fighting there and a number of people on both sides were killed. The Israelis, of course, were determined to capture the old city and they did. That was in June of 1967.

I got to Jordan in September of 1968, a year later. Of course, to me, not having been assigned in Jordan before, the differences weren't immediately noticeable. But to people who had been there before the '67 War, it was an enormous difference. Apparently, life in Jordan for American diplomats before the '67 War had been extremely pleasant. You could go to Jerusalem if you wanted to. It is a fascinating place to be. We would go down to Jericho. If you had the money and the means, you went to Jericho in the chilly weather. The king had a winter palace down there. Life was quite agreeable and then this trauma hit them. They lost the West Bank. Transjordan (or Jordan proper), was largely desert. The West Bank was settled and civilized and they lost all that. So, it was quite traumatic. Of course, the refugee population had been increased enormously suddenly. The strain on the facilities in Jordan was very, very great.

When I got there as economic counselor, we had an AID mission, of course. It was smaller than the one we had had in Ceylon, but again, I don't think there was a great deal of clear focus on what the purpose of the exercise was, what they were doing. There were some good people doing some good things, but I couldn't sense any coherent picture or package. Although Harrison Symmes was nothing at all like Ambassador Willis in Ceylon, he shared her view that he should have as little as possible to do with the AID mission and that his economic counselor officer should be the one that dealt with the AID mission. So, I myself was not terribly interested in that. I tended, I must confess, to push a lot of that off a guy named Arthur (Art) Bowman, who was my number two in the Economic Section. Poor Art, I'm afraid, was the guy that I would say, "Art, you go to that AID staff meeting" and so forth. Of course, I had in mind quite clearly that I hoped I would become the DCM, which I did become.

Harrison Symmes was very attractive, a very nice guy. He had a very pretty wife, Joan. He was very much of an Arabist, but an unusual Arabist in that by that time he was beginning to get a reputation among other Arabists of drifting from the faith a little bit. He was not all that keen on Arabic rhetoric. It can get pretty intense and pretty hard to take. Of course, we were blamed for their debacle. If we did not support the Israelis, this would not have happened to Jordan. It was our fault and we ought to do something about it. Well, you can say, well, there is fundamentally a certain measure of truth to that, that if we didn't support the Israelis, they wouldn't be as successful as they were. There is no doubt about that. If we didn't give them or sell them these Phantom airplanes, they wouldn't be so dominant in the skies over Jordan. Having said all that, on a day to day basis of not being able to do anything without being lectured on that subject, it got to be a little bit weary. It got to Symmes. He also had (still has) a bit of a temper. If he is pushed very hard, he can kind of explode. He can get pretty uptight every now and then about things like this. This was a period of growing tension. The Fedayeen movement, the Arafat movement, when I first got there, as economic counselor, we lived in an apartment not terribly far with the embassy. Amman was built on hills. They say "the seven hills of Amman," called "jebels," of course. The embassy in those days, the chancery was on Jebel Luwebdeh and we lived near it. The center of gravity of the city had moved by this time over to Jebel Amman. There were deep wadis in between. It was an interesting place. Man's history in Amman goes way, way back. It was Philadelphia under the Romans and the Greeks and there are Roman artifacts all over the place. It goes back to the Stone Age. People have lived there for a long, long time. It is a very interesting place. I lived not far from the chancery.

The Fedayeen, Arafat and company, Time Magazine ran a cover article on him way, way back. Barbara, my wife, said to me, "I've seen that man." Their headquarters was just down the street. But all the while we were there, this Fedayeen presence and power was growing. Periodically, something would flare up and there would be trouble. It was usually in the refugee camps and stuff. The presence of these paramilitary groups became more and more obvious. It became more and more obvious that there were many areas of Amman and in the countryside where the legitimate government really had no effective control. It was a growing problem. It began to impact on us because it seemed that hardly a week would go by that it would not be dangerous to go here or there. The Fedayeen down in the valley periodically went right across the border into Israel to do something and the Israelis would come over and retaliate. Then, of course, the tension would increase some more.

In the meantime, of course, the so-called "war of attrition" was building up between the Egyptians and the Israelis along their border. It was a difficult period and it was unfortunate, too. Amman must have one of the nicest climates in the world. You're up just high enough. You get some nasty weather during the winter. You get heavy rains. There is very little snow, but it can get to be unpleasant. But most of the time, in the summer, you're up high enough that the heat doesn't really get to you. In six or seven months of the year, it just kind of a lovely golden glow. The Jordanian people that we encountered were quite agreeable. Jordan has always been a step removed from most of

the Arab countries in terms of western orientation. Of course, the King was very much so. We enjoyed many aspects of it, but there was always this background of trouble brewing. It just kept building up and building up, and then periodic this, that, and the other thing. Of course, it politically came to a crunch with us when Joe Sisco, who was then the assistant secretary for NEA, came out to visit the area. The Fedayeen, groups of them, in Amman decided to protest. They had big demonstrations and they burned down our cultural center and trashed things around the chancery and so forth. The police, whether they were unable to or afraid to, really did nothing to stop this. Much of the crowds were young people, students and so forth, egged on by people. You could see the Fedayeen encouraging them to do these things. They burned down our cultural center, which the USIA guy, David Strapland, was very proud of. David was really shook. They came in with burning devices, highly sophisticated ones. It takes a lot to burn books. Books don't burn very easily and they burned these books and trashed the place. Symmes was annoyed. When the foreign minister called up, I was on the extension listening in. He said how sorry he was for all this. Symmes really let him have it, that that is not good enough, that the authorities didn't stop this and this was not our fault, etc. He really let him have it. Sisco by this time was in Tel Aviv. We had made rather elaborate arrangements - I had been involved with them in the middle of the night - that Sisco was going to come over, but we would arrange with the Jordanians that they would send a helicopter down to the valley. Sisco would come down to what used to be called the Allenby Bridge and was officially now Hussein Bridge. It was nothing but a bailey bridge across a creek. Then he would be picked up and brought to Amman. The helicopter was the idea that it wasn't safe to travel by road down there because of the Fedayeen. That was the first consideration: would it be safe for him to come? We had had all these riots. This was kicked around for a while and then they burned the cultural center and everything else and Symmes had this discussion with the foreign minister. At the end of it, Symmes recommended to Sisco that he not come. He put it up to the foreign minister that "I don't see how you can guarantee the safety of this American official." The foreign minister kept saying, "Oh, he will be safe." I'm quite sure he would have, but Sisco ended up saying, "Alright, I won't come." Well, I think it was that night that Symmes called me at home and said he wanted to see me. So, I went over. He had just gotten word that the Jordanians had gone into the Department of State in Washington and asked that Mr. Symmes be transferred. I said, "Well, what are you going to do about it?" He said, "Well, I don't know what the Department is going to do about it." I said, "Well, they haven't declared you persona non grata?" He said, "No, and I made that point to the Department, but I think they'll probably go along with this."

So, they did. I always thought at the time that the Department again was a little wishy washy in this. They might have said to the Jordanians, "Well, if you don't like Mr. Symmes, say so." But they didn't. They said, "Wouldn't it be nice if you transferred him" rather than simply saying, "We're kicking him out."

I think they thought he would leave immediately. But he didn't. The first thing he said was that (This was in the June of 1970 or thereabouts.) their son was in school in the international school in Amman and they wanted him to finish the semester. If Symmes

himself left, he didn't see any reason why his wife should have to leave. So, Symmes stayed on for quite a while. I forget just how long it was until the foreign minister said to me one day, "When is he going to leave?" I said, "I don't know. He is taking his time." He said, "Why doesn't he leave?" I said, "He hasn't got his transfer orders." So, Symmes was very methodically packing up his books personally. Eventually, he did leave and I became the chargé. But his wife, Joan, stayed on until the kid finished school. She stayed on in the residence. She kept a very low profile. She stayed there and we gave her full support - a car and driver and everything else - but she stayed pretty much in the home. She did come over to our house a couple of times for dinner, but she didn't entertain except American gals. She would play bridge or something during that period. Symmes ended up becoming Tom Macalmees's deputy in Congressional Relations.

But I was the chargé and I stayed chargé until September. Then I was replaced. Then Dean Brown was named ambassador. He came. I left. Just about the day after I left was when the September shootout started, which was unfortunate professionally for me, in a way. It would have been better if I had been able to stay, but I didn't know what was going to happen. Tensions were building up and we evacuated dependents and so forth. Never again. That is a real mess. It just upsets everybody's lives. You can't imagine the number of people, the school problems, the family problems, and everything else. That happened. After Symmes left, that summer was a long, hot summer in Amman. There was constant trouble building up between the government and the Fedayeen. It was obvious that something was going to give.

The climax came when they hijacked the three airplanes. TWA, a British plane, and a Swiss plane. I think one of them went to Cairo, but the others landed on a World War II airstrip outside Amman. I think that was the crunch point. By this time, my successor, a kind of a political appointee, came in. I was anxious to leave at that point. I knew I was going and I wanted to get the hell out of there. My daughter was in college and my son had to get set in school. I was supposed to be on a promotion panel back in Washington. Time was going on and everything else. So, this guy came in. Dean Brown was up in Beirut. I left and then Dean came down and things started practically the next day. But what happened before the planes were hijacked that summer, our assistant military attaché was killed in a shootout. His house was in an area that was being contended over by factions within the Fedayeen. They came to the door to his house. I think he made a mistake probably. He was an Arab language officer in the military. He spoke just enough Arabic for them to fire through the door. I think if he had spoken English and stuff, they might not have done that. But he was killed. Then they started stealing our automobiles and everything. Things were getting very, very bad that summer. We evacuated the dependents and so forth. Finally, the king screwed his courage to the sticking point and told the army to go after the Fedayeen and their September civil war sort of broke out. It ended with the Fedayeen being driven out of Jordan at that point. Some of them crossed into Israel and begged for asylum. Once Hussein's royal troops (bedouin troops mostly) got going, they didn't need much encouragement to shoot Palestinians. They were quite happy to shoot Palestinians.

Getting back to me, I came back to the Department. By this time, my promotion panel job had been given to somebody else because the promotion panel already started. I wandered around for two or three weeks until I got the job in North African Affairs. I stayed there until 1973, I guess.

I then was assigned over to the Foreign Service Institute helping run a seminar over there until the Swiss job came up. Then I went to Switzerland.

*Q: Let's not skip by North Africa quite so quickly. You must have had some interesting issues there while you were there.*

ODELL: Yes, we did. The non-commissioned officers tried to kill the king in Morocco. Stuart Rockwell was at that party. I remember his telegram: "I have just returned from several hours of horror." I guess it was very unpleasant. When we were in Switzerland, the French ambassador, LeBelle, had been the French ambassador in Morocco and had known Rockwell and been with him on that occasion. He and Rockwell had, among other things, loaded the body of their Belgian colleague into an automobile or something. LeBelle told me a lot that I hadn't known before about that event. We had that one. They tried two or three times to kill the king. These guys tried to kill him. I think the air force tried to kill him. They executed a bunch of people after that.

We had Bourguiba of Tunisia. He was just a grand old man. David Newsom was very skeptical of the value of Bourguiba, who was the great moderate in the Arab-Israeli thing. What is moderation consisted of saying was, "Why don't those people live peacefully together? They ought to have a nice, peaceful state there with the Arabs and the Israelis settling down and living happily together." That is about what it amounted to. Newsom said, "He's been dining out on that line and isn't going to happen. It doesn't amount to anything."

Libya was very much on the list at the time of the oil interests. We had at that time over 4,000 Americans living and working in Libya. We had incidents. I remember the Libyans arrested a couple of young American evangelists for public proselytizing, which was against the law. This caused a great flap among the American evangelical community in the United States. They said we ought to do something about this. Libyan oil. Morocco because of the communications station there. Tunisia.

The Sudan was part of our territory at the time. That was an interesting part of my job. The Sudanese were making noises that they would be willing to resume full diplomatic relations with us, which they had broken at the time of the '67 Arab-Israeli War. Rogers, who was the Secretary at the time, was very anxious to have this promoted. So, Kurt Moore was our chargé in Khartoum. He was head of our interests section at the Dutch embassy, actually. I was sent out to see what was going on. Kurt arranged for me to go down to the southern part of the Sudan where the civil war, which is still going on, had been going on and had kind of come to a pause at that time. One of the ideas was that one of the conditions under which we would be willing to resume relations if they wanted to



(and what they really wanted was for us to resume an aid program, of course), was that this trouble in the south be settled peacefully. So, I went out to Khartoum. Kurt had arranged for me to go down to the south. He wanted somebody from the embassy to go along with us. So, by coincidence, a fellow named Sanderson, who had been our administrative officer in Colombo, Ceylon, while I was there, was the administrative officer in Khartoum. I knew Sandy. He was an old military type, a very common sense, practical sort of guy. So, I suggested that he be the fellow to go along. We went down and spent a couple of weeks down there. We traveled by jeep down to the Ugandan border. That was a route through which supplies might conceivably be brought in to aid people who had been dislocated by the civil war. We came back and made a number of recommendations, none of which were adopted. One of the things we said was that the best thing, if we resumed aid, we could do was build a bridge across the Nile at a place called Juba, where there was a rickety old ferry. What the CIA could do if you asked them to do it... I got back and we got in touch with the CIA. I said to them, "Would it be feasible to build a bridge there?" My god, their research staff came up with the depth of the Nile, the nature of the bottom on the Nile, the speed of the current at that point. We gave all this to the Army, whose Corps of Engineers looked at it and, given all these facts and figures, said, "Yes, we could put a bridge across there." So, we recommended this. Of course, they didn't do it, but the Dutch did. Kurt told the Dutch about this and they came up and put up a bailey bridge. The Dutch are good at building bridges. They build a lot of bridges. So, that was an interesting thing.

The next thing was, we sent an AID mission group out to Khartoum. I went along sort of as the political commissar. I met with Kurt and with the Sudanese officials and talked and talked and talked. It ended up with AID recommending that our aid, when we resumed it, be in the form of working together with the World Bank to irrigate a section of the country for cotton growing or something like that. Building the bridge was not something they wanted to do.

Libyan oil was very much the thing. It is what is known in the trade as "sweet" oil. It has a low sulfur content and is very prized for that. It is very important to the Italians, who, of course, had been in Libya. Occidental Petroleum went there and then we had Armand Hammer who was very active in Libya. The oil companies were not at all interested in fighting Qadhafi about things. Of course, in those days, Qadhafi was constantly doing things that upset people in Washington and so forth. Libya had not broken diplomatic relations with us during the Six Day War. They were about the only Arab country that had not done so. So, we still had an ambassador and so forth in Libya. Of course, we don't now.

Mauritania. Periodically, there were problems there. They wanted to make David Korn ambassador to Mauritania. He was turned down, probably because he was Jewish, although I don't know anybody who has said that.

I had a very active boss, Jim Blake. David Newsom had been ambassador in Tripoli and was very much interested. So, I wouldn't say substantively I threw much weight around in

North African Affairs. It was interesting enough, but I always felt that that job shouldn't have existed really. Those deputy jobs in those positions, come on. They had several very good, active country desk officers in North African Affairs, people like Bob Pelletreau, who subsequently became assistant secretary. There was also the man who became ambassador in Cairo. His father was CIA. (Tape turned off)

We had all these bright guys, such as Frank Wisner. Here I got a very active assistant secretary of State, a very active, bright office director who had been Newsom's DCM in Tripoli, so they worked very closely together, and all these hot potato desk officers. What is a deputy supposed to do except kind of drift around in between being beaten from the top and a pain in the ass to the guys down below? It's a lousy job. I recommended (Of course, they didn't do it.) in writing after I left there that the senior desk officer be designated as the person to be the acting director of the office if the director was on vacation or traveling or something like that, but they not have a formal deputy. Jim Blake - and I would have done the same thing if I had been Jim - wanted to know what the hell was going on. So, he would talk directly to Frank (Wisner) or to Bob Pelletreau, who had been in Amman with me, incidentally. The Foreign Service is kind of incestuous sometimes. It was a good thing, too. Jim, if there was anything particularly going on, he wanted to know and he didn't want to delay - and why should he - to work his way up through. So, I would be reduced to standing off on the side and so forth.

*Q: Were you involved at all in the Moroccan decision to recall Stuart Rockwell?*

ODELL: I knew what happened at the time. Interestingly enough, a few years ago at a Christmas party, I ran into Dick Parker. I hadn't talked to him for a long time. We were reminiscing. He said he never quite knew what had gone on with his boss, Rockwell. The king asked specifically if Robert Murphy could come out. Murphy at the time was chairman or CEO of Corning Glass Company. So, we arranged (not secretly, but quietly) for Murphy to go out. Murphy said he would be glad to go out. He knew the king. He went to Paris. I remember, Jack Kubisch, the DCM in Paris at that time had been very involved in our AID program in Ceylon. I remember getting on the phone to him and saying, "Jack, you're going to have a visitor. Just take care of him. He's unofficial, but take care of him and don't question him too much" or something like that. So, they took care of him. I forget what Murphy had to do in Paris, but he went to Paris and then he went out. When he came back, he invited Jim Blake to join him for lunch at the Metropolitan Club for a debriefing. Jim came back and I got this from Jim. In essence, what the king had said was that he didn't want a lot of trouble, but he didn't want Mr. Rockwell around the place. What was the matter with Mr. Rockwell? "Well, he intimidates me," said the king. Rockwell had a hawklike bearing and manner. "He intimidates me." I don't know whether he laughed at that point or not, but that was what Murphy said the King had said. So, arrangements were made for Rockwell to be removed. I don't know who replaced him.

*Q: Robert Neumann.*

(Tape turned off)

ODELL: Dick Parker was in Cairo when the June '67 War broke out. Of course, the first day was all confusion. These planes were coming out of Cairo, Jordan, and every place saying that the Israelis were going to be finally obliterated and driven into the sea and stuff. It wasn't until maybe the next day or so that it became evident that that wasn't happening. In fact, the contrary was beginning to happen. Cairo came in with this telegram starting off, "At the close of a busy day, we have this to report." This was Dick Parker drafting this. He went on to say what a confused situation it was. He said that the Egyptians claimed that they had shot down 165 Israeli airplanes or whatever it was they were claiming. "We suggest that the Department apply a mandasti quotient of 10 to one on these planes." I thought to myself, "Who is doing this and getting away with it?" It was Parker. He had the gift of... He and I formed a little club at one time, called SOFA (Safe Our Forest Association). I was struck by the fact that he would plead for, if somebody was too prolific in their writing, he would say, "Save our forest. You're cutting down trees to make this paper." So, I suggested to him one time that we form an SOFA and for years whenever we saw a document that struck us as being considerably longer than need be, we called each other's attention.

*Q: You moved on then to FSI.*

ODELL: Yes. That was a pleasant and not very productive period. I was helping run the Seminar over there, which had evolved... They had something originally funded called "counterinsurgency" or something like that. This had evolved over the years under a guy named Albert Humood. It was called the Executive Seminar. Actually, as it evolved under him, it had become a fairly useful thing. For three week periods, they had a group that was primarily military people who were going to go out and be military attachés. They came over and then there were supposed to be people from the Department. It was always difficult to get people from the Department assigned for such a short period of time. Inevitably, if it was a desk officer who was any good, somebody would want him back. It was always a problem getting Department representation. We had military and the CIA would always send some people. Then there were people from the Department of Agriculture. It was primarily for people who were from other agencies who were going to be assigned abroad as attachés. The leavening of this was supposed to be Foreign Service officers from the Department of State. That was the problem, of getting these people to participate in these groups. But we would line up about 20 speakers. It was an instructive thing, how readily the main people - if you said you were calling from the Department of State, they would be interested. We got some academics and had some standard ones. There was some guy from Princeton, Mari Leady, a sociology, who was standard. I got A.J. (Al) Meyer from Harvard. He was very much the Middle East guru up at Harvard. I had gotten to know him the year the Department had sent me to Harvard. He subsequently became a very, very high-paid consultant to the oil companies. I ran into him in London being chauffeured around in a fancy car once. There were people like that and Max Burner- (end of tape)

Tape 2, Side B

-this thing had evolved. It was not a bad thing at all. The Department in its way was missing an opportunity to put some of its impression on these people from other agencies and so forth. It was a struggle to get the Department to assign people there as participants in this seminar for a three week period. I don't think it was ever suggested that he come, but we'll say, somebody of the caliber of Frank Wisner to come over and just be one of the students in the group, you know, with these guys. The Department made a mistake by not seeing the way to clear to that. Anyhow, I did that from 1973-1975. After I left, the thing was abolished.

I had at that point been negotiating to become consul general in Dusseldorf. Martin Hillenbrand was the ambassador to Germany. He had been in Berlin while I was there. I think that could probably have happened eventually, but out of the clear blue sky, I got called by Joan Clark. Joan and I had had our difficulties in the past, but she called me and said that a job had come open and would I be interested in going to Switzerland as DCM? I said, "Well, what about Dusseldorf, Joan?" She said, "I don't know what's going to happen to Dusseldorf." So, I thought over this and said, "Well, maybe I'd better take this one. I did. Whether that was wise or not, probably not. I'd probably have been better off as consul general in Dusseldorf, but who could tell?"

I went to Switzerland and I was DCM to three ambassadors. The first one was Dominic, who was actually from Colorado. He replaced Gary Hart, who wanted to be President, and got in trouble with bureaus. Peter Dominic was a senator from Colorado. The Dominics are a banking family from New York. They were around a long time. Peter had moved as a young man to Colorado to dig his own fortune, which I think he had made, and then became a senator. I don't know how he came to be ambassador. Anyway, he was there very, very briefly and then I was chargé for quite an extended period of time until Matt Davis came. Then he left and then Marvin Warner came in. Marvin subsequently went to prison in Ohio, not for anything he had done as ambassador in Bern, but for violating banking rules and regulations in the state of Ohio. The federal government tried to nail him, but he slipped out of that one. The state of Ohio got him. He actually went to prison. That was an interesting experience. I was struck... Matt Davis was totally CIA gunshy. He wouldn't even have the CIA station chief and his wife to dinner in the residence. He included them in the Fourth of July reception, but that was about it. He was so afraid that anybody would think he had a CIA connection. But Dominic, who was a republican, and Warner, who was a democrat (both political appointees) - all the CIA had to do was say something and that was important. Of course, it wasn't important, but the mystique of the CIA had really come through to these guys.

*Q: Of course, there was a substantial presence of that agency in Bern.*

ODELL: Oh, yes. But actually, that was one of the more pleasant aspects. When I arrived, the station chief was a fellow named Fred Alner. He had had polio. That is another thing. He had been in Indonesia and he had polio. The guy that replaced Jack Morrie in Athens

had been in India and he had had polio. My wife always wondered whether the CIA had been experimenting on these guys. Fred had this infirmity. He was quite reactionary in his attitudes, but was very bright and a lot of fun to be with. I thoroughly enjoyed knowing Fred Alner. He is a friend of mine until right now. I liked him a lot. I think he played pretty fairly to me. This was a Stansfield Turner period. Fred would show me directives he had gotten from Stansfield, which made it pretty clear that Turner didn't want Fred getting too cozy with the State Department types. Fred would show me these things. He would say, "You understand, Harry, that officially, I'm not supposed to like you very much." Matt Davis, because of this Chile thing, was very afraid that he would be part of the CIA circle. But the other two guys... Dominic wasn't there. He was sick and left quite soon. But Warner made his mark. You hear these horror stories about political ambassadors, but the (horrible???) thing about Warner was that he was basically good looking. He danced well. He had a good singing voice. Women found him very attractive and he found women very attractive. He was rich and bright. There is no doubt about it. Warner was bright. But he was quite divorced from reality in that situation. Some of these things are kind of funny. He had to present his credentials. The Swiss are quite formal on that sort of thing. So, you had to wear morning clothes and so forth, which I didn't own, but I rented. Marvin was getting all ready for this and was quite interested and concerned. So, he asked me to come over to the residence the day before and tell him what was going on. He said, "I want you to see my clothes." If you remember the old movies with chorus boys in the background dancing and so forth, he had a very light outfit, tails, pants, and everything, but it was... He said, "What's the matter?" I said, "Well, it isn't really what you're supposed to be wearing." He said, "Well, what am I supposed to be wearing?" He said, "How the hell do I get that?" This was the day before. I said, "Well, we'll go down to the place where I got mine." So, he went down and they fitted him. It didn't fit, but they got him an outfit that he wore.

Then he was divorced and he liked girls. The CIA had a very attractive young woman working for them, so he decided that she should be his companion and he started going with her. Of course, new ambassadors immediately got on the circuit that was being played by other ambassadors and so forth. So, he took this gal with him. He went to one party, the Romanians. They didn't know that he was bringing this girl. They had to run around and find a place for her to sit and so forth. He went down to Zurich and decided that a young Australian woman who was working in the consulate general was very attractive, so he took up with her. Then he took up with a very, very attractive young Swiss woman who worked in the Consular Section of the embassy. He had these girlfriends. I'll say he had good taste in girlfriends, but it wasn't really what he should have been doing so overtly. If he wanted to do this sort of thing, for God's sake, go off someplace and do it. He's Jewish. Alright. There was a Jewish community in Switzerland, which was very old, had been there a long time. It was very well integrated but was still a Jewish community. It was very dignified, very proper. They decided this was the first Jewish-American ambassador that had ever been there (and there weren't very many Jewish ambassadors from any country, except the Israeli, I guess) and that they would have a dinner in his honor in Zurich. So, what does he do but show up with this Australian girl. I was told by a Swiss banker, Hans Beyer... I said, "What happened" and

he said, "Nothing happened. We went ahead with the dinner, toasts, the welcome, and everything else, and just pretended that this was perfectly normal. But it was very strange. People don't understand that sort of thing. It's a strange thing to do when you think about it." But the climax came that Carter was President at the time and he had a secretary named Susan Clough. Warner had gotten to know her, so he invited her to come over to Switzerland. But the occasion he chose was two big things a year in the diplomatic community. The diplomatic corps (the ambassadors and chargé) gave an annual white tie dinner in honor of the government of Switzerland. The President would be the guest of honor and other the other consuls would be there. Everybody of any importance would be there. When I was chargé, you were notified by the dean of the diplomatic corps. When I was there, that would be the Papal Nuncio, "Please pony up." There was a lot of money that had to be put up. This was done down in Belding Palace and it was a real big clambake. It cost a lot. The Papal Nuncio made a speech and the President made a little speech.

Well, then the next thing was that the government, of course, gave a much lower scale of party for the diplomatic corps. Warner decided he would invite Susan over and she would go with him to the party that the diplomatic corps gave for the government. Well, the problem was that it was made very, very clear... The rule was that it was chiefs of mission and their spouses. If you didn't have a spouse, you didn't bring anybody. That was the rule. So, one, he didn't have a spouse; two, he didn't tell anybody that he was bringing this woman. He showed up late, of course, with Susan Clough. The drill at those things was that at the Bellevue, you got there and there was a half hour of cocktail hour, if you will, where you drank champagne and milled around. Then you would all troop in and take your place. As chargé, I was way down at the table, you know. But anyhow, then the festivities would continue. I wasn't there of course, but Warner showed up at the end of the cocktail thing, just when they were just about ready to move into the dining room, with Susan. At that point, the chief of protocol realized what was going on here and he explained to Warner that there was no seat for her. So, Warner went to the foreign minister and said, "This is the President of the United States' secretary. You've got to have a place for her." The foreign minister said, "This is not my party. This is the diplomatic corps' party. I am a guest here. I can't do anything about this." So, the Papal Nuncio's assistant, a young priest, tried to explain to him that there was simply no seat for this woman at the table. So, they all went in and sat down. By this time, everybody was buzzing, I gather. Warner came in alone and people thought, "Well, he's going to go take his seat and that will be the end of it." He went up to the head table and spoke to the President of Switzerland and said that he wanted this woman seated. The President was sitting there as the guest of honor next to the Papal Nuncio said to him in effect, "Mr. Warner, I'm a guest here. This is not my party." So, he left. Boy did that cause some talk in town! That really caused some talk in town! He thought for a couple of years that I had told the press. Not one word appeared in the Swiss press, but it got into the Herald Tribune, I think, and others. The thought I had told the press, but I didn't. I ran into him two or three years later and told him I absolutely did not leak any of it to the press corps. The only thing I had done was, the next day, I had gone down to the foreign office and quietly asked if I could see the chief of protocol and asked him to tell me what had gone

on. I wanted to know. He told me.

I don't know whether Warner served out his full term or not, but he got in trouble with the banking regulatory authorities. He went to jail for a couple of years.

*Q: Were there any major issues going on at that time in Swiss-American relations, the banking?*

ODELL: Yes. The very early flurries of what in recent times became an issue, this bank secrecy question. The Swiss banks, ironically, were taking the position when I got there, that they had to have this bank secrecy. "Look how much good work we did in World War II protecting all these Jews and others from having their money confiscated by the Nazis." The big issue we had (and my name was on one of the documents) was, we were attempting to negotiate what was called officially a judicial assistance treaty in which... Shelby Cullom Davis had been involved in this. For certain types of offenses, the Swiss would agree to make available or allow banks to make available to our investigators documents necessary to prosecute somebody under quite restricted circumstances. But we had persuaded them that it would be in their own best interests to relax to some extent on the bank secrecy question. The Swiss were always double-edged. It forbade a bank or anybody working for a bank to release the information and it forbade anybody to seek the information. You could get put in jail for going around asking a banker these questions and if the banker answered the questions, he could go to jail. So, the idea was that we were pursuing people for income tax evasion. Well, income tax evasion is not a crime under Swiss law. It is an offense or something, but it is not a crime, not something you go to jail for. So, he would do that. But the idea was that if somebody was laundering money they had gotten in the drug trade or something like that, under limited circumstances, we would be allowed access.

But the question of the bank accounts of Jews and others from World War II, that came up a couple of times. The Swiss at that time took the position that they had done all the investigating necessary and there wasn't any money. I didn't believe them for one minute, nor did anybody else. There had to be more money than that. Come on! People have been putting their money in Switzerland since the French Revolution and before. These Jews and others, any sensible person with money in Europe for generations has always stashed some of it in Switzerland or someplace. So, it stood to reason that even if they weren't trying to evade the Nazis per se, there were bound to have been affluent Jews and other affluent people who had money in Swiss banks and when the great cataclysm of World War II came, that money would have been bound to have been there. I tried to tell them after I was working for them in the American-Swiss Association that this is not going to go away, fellows, this is going to come up sooner or later. Of course, it did. I think Shelby Cullom Davis thought the same way. He became president of the American-Swiss Association later on. I think he felt that they were being a little bit foolish in being quite so difficult.

You've brought me pretty close to the end of my career. I retired and took this job as

executive director of the American-Swiss association, which had been formed after World War II. During World War II, particularly in the latter part of it, American-Swiss relations got kind of nasty. Once we no longer found Switzerland useful as a neutral island in the middle of warring Europe, we began pushing them pretty hard for their relations with the Germans during the war. Some Swiss properties in the United States were seized and things were kind of unpleasant. So, a small group of Americans and Swiss who had dealt with each other for generations - they weren't quite clear how they would do this, but they formed a little group called the American-Swiss Association to sort of keep in touch with each other and through business connections to kind of keep channels open so these things didn't happen again. They had a very distinguished list of corporations and individuals who belonged, but they didn't do very much. The executive director at the time was an aging public relations fellow. He was leaving them and they were casting around for a successor. At the time, I had become quite sure by then that the Department wasn't going to make me an ambassador. I didn't know what to do at that point, whether to just sweat out my remaining time or what. I talked to some people, talked to my wife, and decided that that job would be good, so I did and worked for them for five years.

It was very hard to develop a tangible program because there wasn't anything tangible really to work with. But what we did with some success was, we tried to get prominent American political figures to visit Switzerland under very nice but very informal circumstances to get them to know some Swiss and know Switzerland a little bit better in case some problem came up. We were focusing on senators. We did get several senators to come to Switzerland. Who was that big tall senator from California who after he retired got into trouble? Well, we started with him and then word of mouth... Bradley was on the list, as was John Glenn. Who was the senator from Massachusetts who developed cancer? Brooke. And the Utah senator who went up with the astronauts. Anyhow, what we got was, these guys would come over. They would get first class travel over and back with their wife. They would spend about a week in Switzerland and to keep the Senate Ethics Committee off their back, they would give a lecture at the university or the technical institute or whatever. Then they would be guests of Switzerland and treated very nicely and assigned as their control officer, if you will, or escort officer, would be a Swiss senator. I don't know any of them who didn't thoroughly enjoy this and come back with the feeling that the Swiss are pretty good guys. It was very difficult to get it going consistently. If you've ever tried to get a U.S. senator to do something and pin him down if he in fact is going to do this... Who was the one from Oregon, not the one who got in trouble? He had been governor of Oregon? He was all set to go and at the last minute had to cancel. That put the Swiss into an awful tizzy because they had made lots of plans. He came up to New York and talked to us. We had lunches in New York. Visiting Swiss dignitaries would come and we would arrange luncheons and things like that. I did that for five years. We were living up in New York and still had a house in Glen Echo and decided that I would come back to Washington. So I left there and came back down. I worked in Freedom of Information and luckily got assigned to USIA as the only declassifier working there.



*End of interview*