The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ROBERT B. OAKLEY

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INTERVIEW

Q: Bob, thanks very much for giving us your time to review your Foreign Service career. Let me start by asking you about your background and your education.

OAKLEY: I was born in Dallas, Texas, but moved to Shreveport, Louisiana where I stayed until I attended South Kent School in Connecticut. I was there for three years and enjoyed it tremendously. By happenstance, without having much information, I decided to go to Princeton. The people at South Kent had enough credibility to get me into that University, despite my apparent indifference during the admissions interview. At Princeton, I majored in history and philosophy, but I had no idea what career I wanted to pursue. The Korean war was ongoing at graduation time; I decided to volunteer for the officers' training program being offered by the Navy rather than being drafted. So in 1952, I joined the Navy; it assigned me eventually to naval intelligence and sent me to Japan, where I spent two and a half fascinating years in Yokosuka as a member of the staff of the Command of Far East forces. While in Japan, I decided that I was really interested in foreign affairs, although it was not clear to me how I might pursue that interest. I did conclude that, in light of the people I was working with, the Navy was not up to my expectations and I decided to get out of that service. I hoped that if I ever entered government service again, I would try to avoid the kind of bureaucratic problems that I had encountered. I thought that the senior levels of the Navy paid too much attention to individual desires rather than basic policy issues. On the other hand, towards the end of my tour in Japan, I worked for Captain Rufus Taylor, who headed up the intelligence staff. He later became the chief of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and later Deputy Director of CIA. I told him that had he been my boss six months earlier I probably would have decided to stay in the Navy. Unfortunately, there were not enough

Taylors in my experience and that pushed me to leave the Navy.

Not knowing what I was going to do, I talked to a number of corporations, looking for a job in their government relations departments. I was told that the positions in those small departments were primarily filled by ex-government people that the corporations had hired away from places like the State Department and CIA after they had been in those agencies for a dozen years or more. After that experience, I decided to attend graduate school and selected Tulane University, and I also decided to take the Foreign Service entrance examination which I passed. After going through all the clearances, I was asked to report for duty in the Department in July, 1957. That ended my efforts to get a master's degree.

When I started the A-100 course, it was at a time when Wristonization was in full force. The Foreign Service grades were being adjusted to cover eight grades from the six that had existed before. That meant that some people had to go back to being an FSO-8 and some of them were sent to the A-100 course. Frank Carlucci, a Princeton classmate of mine, fell in that category. Dan O'Donahue, who spent most of his career working in Asia was in this class. Quincy Lumsden, who became an Arabist, was in the class as was Alan Davis who had a career in Africa. Paul Cleveland, who had a career in Asia was there. They all became Ambassadors and had over two decades of distinguished careers. I think that every one was considering the Foreign Service as a career; no one looked at it as just a phase of life. I must say I found the course very boring. I told that to my mother who replied that perhaps that was part of the training program; she was not necessarily wrong on that score. But FSI was not a complete loss. I met my wife-to-be there, thanks to another classmate, James Briggs, who had known her at Fletcher. She was a class behind us when Jim introduced us in the glamorous facilities of Arlington Towers. We fell quickly in love. As a Foreign Service officer she had to give up her career to marry me under the regulations then in effect in the Department. I still marvel at my good fortune and her willingness to sacrifice her career.

1957 was a year when the Department had too many FSOs and not enough jobs for them. In fact, late in that year, a freeze was put on further recruitment. After finishing the A-100 course, I was assigned to French language class in Arlington where I learned little if anything. Then the Department sent me to the language school in Nice, which was superb. Being in a totally French environment 24 hours a day made all the difference. I really learned to speak French there and to speak it quite well.

For all my troubles, I was then assigned to Khartoum. I was called by phone about two hours after our graduation (every one else had an assignment, an unnerving situation) and told to leave within the next two days to go to the Sudan as a General Services Officer. I didn't know very much about Khartoum and even less about being a General Services Officer. That was my first real taste of the Foreign Service. A new position had been created, a General Services officer. That post had never had one. Now, however, the Embassy had been given the responsibility for supporting an ICA [International Cooperation Administration] assistance mission - a first in the annals of the State Department. The ICA staff had not yet arrived, but there I was in charge of general

services, not knowing anything about it.

The assignment turned out to be a very interesting one. From the career point of view, I have always maintained that you are better prepared for the Foreign Service profession in the long term if you start out in a general services or a vice-consul position than in any other first assignment. Such jobs give the opportunity to see post operations from the bottom up.

So for sixteen months, I was the GSO. I had a peculiar boss, the administrative officer, who preferred to sit in his office with the door closed. If he got any complaints about my activities, and there were a lot of them, he would scream at me. Never mind that I had absolutely no training in this function and that I had to learn everything by trial and error. The ICA assistance mission was not to exceed twenty employees; by the time the first year was over, it had reached 85 and was still growing. We had to support all of those people, and the main burden of it was mine. This included wild drives across sandy miles of desert tracks to and from the temporary airfield, an old WW II Royal Air Force base. One night, in addition to diplomatic pouches, I found an ICA family of six. No one at the post had known they were coming. It was a wild time. The Sudan had inter alia placed an embargo on all imports except essentials, to save foreign exchange; therefore there was very little available on the local market. Furniture and furnishings had been sent by Washington for twenty people; it went very quickly and we had to scramble every day to support the growing aid presence; we bought up all the furniture and office furnishings in Khartoum. The number of acceptable apartments and houses in Khartoum were soon also all taken up; I suspect we managed to triple the rents in that city in that one year period of time. So our increasing presence was very useful for Khartoum's economy. But it probably took two years before the assistance staff could mount any kind of aid program. They lived in Khartoum in large houses, air-conditioned, driving big cars, working in big offices - all of which I had managed to acquire, with the help of a few local employees and a few American staff employees, most of whom were almost as inexperienced as I was. Needless to say, this ostentatious American presence with no visible benefits for the Sudan generated a lot of criticism.

After four months, my fiancée, Phyllis Elliott, flew to Cairo where we were married. There had been no time for this earlier because of the suddenness of my assignment to Khartoum, rather than Europe or the Department which we had expected. Khartoum seemed somehow too small, so we decided on Cairo where we had friends at the Embassy. Phyllis' father gave her a one-way ticket as a wedding present.

At the same time, we had a wonderful Ambassador, James Moose, who had spent almost all of his career in the Arab world. He spoke Arabic fluently. The Sudan had just achieved its independence and was in the throes of great political excitement and great optimism for the future. The young Sudanese were returning from the best schools in the West - Oxford and Cambridge. My wife and I were practically the only young people in the Embassy. The Ambassador and Mrs. Moose apparently decided that they wanted to use us to get to know the younger Sudanese generation, who were expected to be in charge of the country in the not too distant future. So Phyllis and I were invited to many

receptions and dinners at the Ambassador's residence. Ambassador Moose made it very clear to me that he was depending on me to meet the young Sudanese returnees. So we had a great time; these young people would drop by our house and tell us that their sister was getting married that evening and that they wanted us to join them for the ceremony and the festivities. They would also ask us to go with them into the countryside. We represented to them the younger generation of Americans and we were all anxious to know each other better.

Ambassador Moose was an introvert, who understood the Arab world and the Arab mentality. He viewed the Sudan as another Arab country; he had been disappointed in his career. He compared himself to Ambassador Raymond Hare, then our ambassador to Egypt. I remember Ambassador Moose telling me that most of what you become in the Foreign Service - that is what you achieve and how high you rise - was due to three factors: what you know, who you know, and luck. He thought the "who you know" is best achieved through contacts made in Washington. Moose felt that he could have risen higher in the Service had he had more tours in Washington - he had served there only for two years out of his whole career. But I believe that he did not reach the levels to which he aspired because of his personality rather than his lack of Washington assignments. He enjoyed his overseas stints, but he felt that Hare had done better because he had spent more time in Washington and therefore knew more people who could influence his assignments. I must say that as I look back on my own career, I believe that Moose was absolutely right. An officer can be absolutely competent, but if he or she is not noticed by "movers and shakers", then it will not be reflected in assignments and promotions. If - and perhaps that is the "luck" side of the Moose doctrine - on the other hand, your work is brought to the attention of the Department's senior officials, they will see to it that you are rewarded. Phil Habib and Joe Sisco were the two senior officials who did the most for my career. But Moose did not have a flair for bringing his work to the attention of the right people; he operated by making quiet contacts.

My activities did cause some strains with the administrative officer. One day, he called me into his office and told me that I was not to see any more Sudanese and that my job was that of a General Services officer and not political officer. I told him that I was meeting those that the Ambassador wanted me to stay in touch with and that if he, the administrative officer, had any problems with this, he should take them up with the Ambassador. Needless to say, my first efficiency report was less than stellar; I got a 1 plus on a scale of 1-6 (six was the top). After sixteen months, the Department finally sent not one, but three experienced FSOs to replace me; I guess it figured it would take that many to clean up the mess I had left behind. I was transferred to the political section.

The Sudanese civil service was very good; many of the officials had received excellent training from Great Britain during the colonial years. I would say that the British Sudan Service was ranked between the British Foreign and Colonial Services. The individual Britisher who served in the Sudan would have acquired many friends and a wonderful reputation among the Sudanese, even though the Sudanese were strongly opposed to being a colony. They wanted their independence. The Sudanese, as individuals, have wonderful qualities. We made a lot of close friends, many of whom are still close to us,

even after thirty years. But they have never been able to govern themselves well; as a generalization that always has exceptions, they are not very good managers; they are too fractious for that. The North-South, Muslim-Christian/Animist split has made things much more difficult for Sudan. The civil war was going on even while we were there and it continues to this day.

We greatly enjoyed our personal relationships with various Sudanese individuals. Phyllis and I traveled widely in the country and also accompanied the Ambassador on some of his trips. We loved the country. It was an exciting tour for us; we watched the rise of a younger generation of Sudanese, full of hope and expectations. Unfortunately, the country collapsed later on several occasions and never fulfilled the aspirations of the younger generation. But in the late 1950s, it was a wonderful country in which to serve.

As I mentioned earlier, we mounted a large assistance program - roughly $100 million - which at that time was a very significant amount. The assistance agreement had to be ratified by the Sudanese Parliament; to our astonishment, we found that the British were lobbying against ratification. They didn't want us to "poach" on their territory. The British showed a lot of animosity at the policy level, even though we had a number of close personal friends among the British. In fact, they were spying on my wife and me which was very amusing. Since we had moved into a house previously occupied by a CIA officer, and I had a background in Naval Intelligence, the British could not believe I was a GSO. To them, this was a cover. Eventually, the British pressure on the Sudanese Parliament did not succeed and the agreement was ratified. The U.S. was not looked upon as the Sudan's savior, but we were regarded as an important player. We viewed the Sudan as an important country in Africa, but not a major factor in our foreign policy scheme. Egypt, to the North, was the important country and the Sudan worried about its relationship with that country. Egypt was the keystone to the Sudan's foreign policy; they were well aware that Egypt had been vexed because it couldn’t annex the Sudan. A referendum had been held in 1956 and independence had won. But Egypt viewed itself and was viewed as the "big brother", which engendered a love-hate relationship. While I was in Khartoum, the Egyptians and the Sudanese negotiated, with considerable difficulty, a treaty concerning the Nile water rights, which enabled Nasser to move ahead with the construction of the Aswan Dam. He could not have done so had he not had agreement from the Sudanese on how the Nile waters were to be divided. The close U.S. relationships with Israel were obviously well known to the Sudanese, but they were not an important factor in our relations with them at that time. It was not a big issue; the Sudan was far enough removed from the Arab-Israeli action and had enough domestic problems to be too concerned by events that were taking place far away.

Internally, the Sudanese were concerned with their economic development and the political rivalries between the UMMA Party and the National Unity Party. Not too long after my arrival, the military conducted a *coup de etat* with General Aboud becoming the President. My friends belonged to the established political parties; such as Sadiq al Mahdi - the grandson of the President of the Sudan who was in office when I arrived in Khartoum and who was the posthumous son of the first Mahdi who had defeated Gordon and freed the country for a brief period from the Ottoman and the British, who became a

very close friend. President al Mahdi was a very impressive man. One day, his grandson, Sadiq, came to me - this must have been early in 1960 - telling me that we Americans had to assist in getting rid of General Aboud. I told him that in the first place, as a matter of principal, the U.S. does not take that kind of action to interfere in internal affairs. That statement brought a wry smile to his face. I then asked him what planning he had done if Aboud were to be removed: who would take his place, what kind of government, which individuals, etc. He said he had done no planning. I said that after he had completed that task he should come back and we could perhaps talk again.

When I left the Political Section, and returned for an assignment in Washington, I was replaced by a CIA officer under Foreign Service cover. I found out very soon that my contacts with the al Mahdi family had been taken over by my replacement and the Station Chief. I was concerned not so much that my replacement had picked up some of my contacts, but that his boss, the CIA Station Chief, had done so. I thought that was inappropriate because my contacts were overt, had nothing to do with CIA interests in the Sudan, and was with individuals already friendly to the U.S.. Why get the CIA involved? Those were the days when CIA was very operational and very competitive with the Department of State. CIA operations in the Sudan led to many misfortunes for the latter.

I still vividly remember when I went back to Khartoum on a visit in March, 1967 returning from a tour in Saigon. I stayed in Khartoum for about five days renewing acquaintances. The then President, whom I had known when he was the President of the National Unity Party, received me with open arms; he and my other friends seemed very glad to see me. Strangely, the only person who would not see me was the then Prime Minister, Sadiq al Mahdi. I found out that this refusal was apparently due to the fact the Station Chief didn't want him to see me. All my Sudanese friends told me that it was the Station Chief who was running the Embassy. I asked how they knew that he was a CIA official and was told that it was an open secret. Everyone also knew about his very close contacts with the Prime Minister. My friends, who had worked diligently and consciously in getting rid of General Aboud and had supported Sadiq al Mahdi for the Prime Ministership, were very disillusioned. Many of them hoped for a return of the military because they found that he was not doing what they had expected of him; in fact, the Sudan was in bad shape. I mentioned this to the Ambassador who pointed out that I had attended a staff meeting that morning when the Station Chief and others said that all was going extremely well in the Sudan. I was staying with Cleo Noel, the DCM, who had been in the Political Section at the same time I was in 1960. I told him that my contacts were saying that the Embassy had lost touch with a lot of key Sudanese and were speculating that the Sudanese government would collapse soon and be replaced by a military dictatorship. Although my friends certainly did not support military rule, under the circumstances existing in early 1967, they thought it would be better than the civilian regime then in power. Cleo said that he was happy to hear what I had to say because he thought that he was the only one who was seeing the situation as I had described it. I had told Ambassador Weathersby the same things I had told Cleo, but it didn't have any impact. Six weeks later, Sadiq was overthrown. That was followed by the Six Day war and the U.S.-Israel relationship then became a very sensitive issue in the Sudan. Ambassador Weathersby was asked to leave and the Sudan broke diplomatic relations

with the U.S. in June, 1967. Furthermore, the Sadiq-CIA relationships became public. Sadiq's wife Sarah - whom we had earlier arranged to come to the United States with a college fellowship - went to Cleo, who was then the senior U.S. representative in Khartoum and asked that the U.S. provide assistance to get her husband out of the Sudan. She considered him in mortal danger because of his association with the U.S. government. Cleo was not in a position to help. There was absolutely no reason for the CIA to take over the contacts with the al Mahdi family to begin with. Any sensible judgement would have concluded that putting the Prime Minister on our payroll was just an invitation for trouble and totally unnecessary; he would probably follow our general policy line in any case, but by putting him on the CIA payroll we corrupted him politically and made him extremely vulnerable. In the final analysis, the al Mahdi family and the U.S. paid a harsh price which was completely unnecessary.

I saw the same phenomenon when in 1974 I traveled with Joe Sisco to Greece during the limited war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. I saw how the CIA had managed to get itself deeply involved in domestic politics there, and Ambassador Tasca was almost completely captured by the Station Chief. In the 1960s and 1970s, the CIA became over-entangled in country's domestic affairs apparently because the CIA saw it as an opportunity in its bureaucratic battles in Washington. I remember when I returned from the Sudan in 1967, I went out to the CIA headquarters to see my old friend, Rufus Taylor - my boss during my Navy service. By then, he had become the Deputy Director of the Agency. We discussed the Sudan situation; I was curious about what CIA thought it was doing in Khartoum. I told him that it made no sense for the Prime Minister to be on the Agency's payroll - it was counter-productive for the Agency and more importantly for the U.S.. Taylor said that he didn't know anything about it. He asked for the file to be brought to his office and read it while I was sitting in his office. After a while, he looked at me and said; "How did you know all this? This information is supposedly very closely held". I told him that my information had come from Sudanese; not from Americans. He was absolutely astonished.

Q: In 1960, you were assigned back to Washington. What was your job?

OAKLEY: I was assigned to the Office of UN Political Affairs in the Bureau for International Affairs (IO). I didn't have the slightest idea what I would be doing. Before leaving Khartoum, I had asked Ambassador Moose what I should do about this assignment given to me by the Department. That is when he described the personnel process which I mentioned earlier and talked about what you know, who you know and luck. He thought that Washington was a good place to develop contacts and for people to get to know me. He suggested that I take the assignment, which I did.

I worked for Bill Buffum and Joe Sisco. I enjoyed it tremendously and think I did a fairly good job. This assignment was very helpful to my future career. The Kennedy administration had just come to power and took the United Nations very seriously. Harland Cleveland became the Assistant Secretary for IO; he had direct access to the White House as well as to Secretary Rusk, and relied heavily upon Joe Sisco and Bill Buffum. The UN was viewed as a serious organization; votes in the General Assembly

were a matter of great concern to the administration, not to mention the activities of the Security Council. The UN was used as a primary vehicle for implementation of U.S. policy even internally. For example, if the State Department wanted to do something in the foreign policy area, it could sponsor a General Assembly resolution to force a policy decision. The easiest thing in a bureaucracy is to duck a decision. However, during my tour in IO, I observed that when a vote was to be taken on a GA resolution, an active bureau such as IO under the Cleveland/Sisco leadership, could significantly influence policy, as could the Department of State. If the issue were managed skillfully after a decision was taken, such decisions led to an enhanced role for the UN. The fact that there would be a vote taken in the GA was taken very seriously by the Kennedy administration. Not only would this process bring forth the U.S. position, but it would also stimulate our Foreign Service to lobby for the U.S. position in capitals around the world. That didn't mean that the U.S. automatically followed GA resolutions with which we didn't agree, but we worked hard to push through resolutions that we favored. We tried to be consistent so that our overall policies were consonant with our votes in the UN; the Kennedy administration did not ignore the UN and its resolutions as many later administrations have done. During the Bush and Clinton Administrations, the U.S., I believe, returned to the view that the UN is an important institution, although the emphasis has been on the Security Council and not so much on the GA. But in the late 1950s and 1960s, our positions in the Security Council were always subject to Soviet vetoes, so that the Kennedy administration tended to lean on the GA for support.

The major UN decision that was reached while I worked in IO dealt with the Congo - now Zaire. I became personally involved in that issue, working with the African experts in the Department. At one critical point, [G. Mennen] Soapy Williams, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, was looking for guidance on our policy in the Congo including what position we would take in the UN. The immediate question was whether troops would be used in Katanga. He was raising these questions in a large meeting at the State Department while Cleveland was at the White House having a one-on-one breakfast with the President, to get decisions on these issues. Cleveland returned to the Department with the decision that the UN could use force. Williams was so far "out of the loop" that he had no knowledge of what was going on. This reflected in part the vigor and drive that IO exhibited under Cleveland, Buffum and Sisco; they saw the UN as a way of forcing and getting support for U.S. policy positions.

We were judicious on those days in selecting which countries to lobby for support. We didn't approach every country for support on every position, but selected our targets carefully. We stressed the important countries on such issues as Chinese representation, which was an extremely important and contentious issue. I was in New York on detail during the consideration of this issue, serving as liaison with African countries. My assignment, and that of my colleagues, was to make sure that the African delegates and those from other regions actually attended the GA session while important debates on China were going on and that they understood that their instructions from their capitals were to support the U.S. position. Sometimes, we had to pull them out of the delegates' lounge or out of a bar because some of them didn't want to cast such an unpopular vote. This reluctance was even truer for the Latin American representatives than it was for the

African ones; we would approach the reluctant ones and tell them that we knew what their instructions were and that we expected them to carry them out. On occasions, we had to be very heavy handed; often their predilections were to vote against us and we had to twist arms forcefully. The State Department later devised a system of rating countries according to their UN votes, whether they were for us or for the USSR. We compared how countries voted to how we voted and the Soviets had voted on perhaps twenty-five key issues. That became a sort of score-card which was used to judge whether foreign assistance and how much might be given to a particular country. That simplistic score card was an over-emphasis on the importance of UN votes as an indicator of a foreign country's support of us.

I worked with Virginia Hartley, who had been with our delegation at San Francisco when the UN charter was approved, and had been in IO ever since. Unfortunately, today we don't have such institutional memories or people with such considerable UN experience. That becomes a problem when the delegation changes every two or three years. But in the early 1960s, we had a few people who had been around for a long time and they were absolutely invaluable. Unfortunately, their advice was not always heeded and that often ended us up with problems. I remember Virginia Hartley arguing against one of Cleveland's wishes to push for the ouster of the Soviet Union from the UN. The International Court of Justice ruled that the Soviets had to pay their share of the peace-keeping operations even though they were supposed to be voluntary contributions.

Of course today, the situation is reversed. The Russians are current on their UN contributions and we are the ones that are very delinquent. If we had paid attention to Hartley, we would not now be embarrassed by the precedent set in the 1960s. It was a real boon to have "old hands" available.

In IO, Buffum played the "institutional memory" role. He had all the facts and history. Joe Sisco was the operator; he could smell out a developing policy issue before anyone else. So he would have a thoughtful, detailed memo on Cleveland's desk concerning the handling of the upcoming issue before anyone else knew that it was even coming up. When that issue would come to a crisis point and when the Secretary would turn for advice, there was Cleveland, with memo in hand, suggesting what actions should be taken. Of course, that memo always proposed the involvement of the UN in one way or another. Ironically, one of Joe's first acts when he became Assistant Secretary for NEA, was to minimize the involvement of the UN in the Middle East. One of the reasons, I think, that he moved from IO to NEA was because he had squeezed all the bureaucratic leverage he could out of the UN, at least as far as Middle East affairs were concerned.

Joe Sisco was a superb Washington operator - one, if not the best, that I have ever seen. Cleveland took full advantage of Joe's capabilities, even though he had a direct connection with President Kennedy. He understood the value of the UN as an institution and its value to him and IO in proposing solutions to a variety of policy issues. Sisco was also smart enough to recruit some of the best talent in town. He spent many, many hours looking through personnel folders, looking just for the right person for any vacancy that might be occurring in his office. He invariably recruited good staff, which would be

responsive to his demands for papers when he sensed a policy issue arising. So he and his staff were always ready to be players in the policy development process. Joe's efforts made Cleveland and all of IO look good. Joe's keen antenna was a hall-mark of his actions; he was always ready whether he was in IO or NEA or the Undersecretary for Political Affairs under Kissinger. He always had high quality analysis and recommendations ready whenever his bosses wanted them.

Harland Cleveland gave Sisco full support. I think I have already given the best illustration of this Cleveland/Sisco strategy; while "Soapy" Williams thought he was in charge of African policy, in fact, the most important issue of the day - the Congo - was handled by IO. The desk officers in AF [African Affairs] would prepare all the texts of messages and speeches, get them typed, but the name of the "drafting" and "approving" officer were left blank. When these documents were brought to the Office of UN Political Affairs, we would add an IO name as "drafting" officer and Cleveland or Sisco as "approving". This was the only way that the AF officers could get anything sensible out of their own Bureau.

The Congo became the first major battleground between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Africa. It was therefore viewed by all as a major Cold War issue. The U.S. was able to get its way by pushing the UN to enter the conflict and support what today might be termed the "moderate leadership" of the Congo; that also meant the removal of [Patrice] Lumumba, whom we viewed as a Soviet and Chinese puppet, a challenge and a threat to the U.S.. We did not see him as the nationalist leader as he liked to portray himself. With our help, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold and Under Secretary General Ralph Bunche did intervene: they took the kind of action that many would have liked to see today in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. But I think nations have come to understand that interventions of the kind that the UN undertook in the Congo can be very tricky politically and militarily, and must be handled with great skill. Today, the nations are again shying away from those actions because of disappointments and difficulties in Somalia, Bosnia and Cambodia. In any case, The Congo became stable - more or less. Mobutu began to emerge from behind the scene; no one realized at the time what kind of leader he would become. One of his main assets was always that he has been a staunch anti-communist, but with the end of the Cold War, it was no longer enough.
Tshombe, on the other hand, was not one of our favorite leaders. We did not share the view of the Belgian government which was driven by its commercial interests. We were trying to be both anti-colonialist and anti-communist; that meant that we had to look for other leaders besides Tshombe, such as Adoula, a young man when his country became independent who suddenly emerged as the President of the Congo in 1962-63. There is a wonderful story connected with that event that has been mentioned before that I would like to repeat. Frank Carlucci had befriended young Adoula in 1959-60 when he was a member of the Parliament. In 1963 Frank was one of the desk officers for The Congo. Adoula came to visit the U.S. after the defeat of Lumumba. That was considered a great triumph because he was viewed as very pro-American, who had brought stability to his country while driving the communists out at the same time. So we had a perfect situation which met both our anti-colonial and anti-communists predilections. Adoula was given a State Dinner at the White House during which he looked around the room and then

turned to President Kennedy, who was sitting next to him and asked: "Where is Frank Carlucci?" That inquiry eventually reached Secretary Rusk's ear who summoned Carlucci from the Blair House where he was keeping company with the more junior members of the Congolese delegation. Carlucci was given the seat between Kennedy and Adoula so that he could serve as the interpreter for the rest of the evening. That was the beginning of Carlucci's meteoric rise! Frank turned out to be a good friend of our new hero, the Congolese President, whom he had known when he was only a Congolese Senator.

I should mention that at this time, the UN had a very good staff. Brian Urquhart and Ralph Bunche were in charge of the political side of the UN and they were very careful about their staff recruitment. Dag Hammarskjold was the Secretary General, who was succeeded by U Thant, who wasn't quite as able as his predecessor, although I think did a quite acceptable job. The staffing gradually began to deteriorate later. But in my time, the UN Secretariat was well staffed. That was due in part to the general world acceptance that the UN was an important instrument for world order; that meant that almost every country sent some of its best diplomatic talent to staff its missions in NY. We certainly were well represented by such people as Adlai Stevenson.

Q: You left the IO in 1963 and were assigned to the Ivory Coast. How did that assignment come about?

OAKLEY: It was the system that sent me to the Ivory Coast. I did not ask for the assignment. Joe Sisco had asked me to stay with him for a third year which I was happy to do. Then it was time for me to move on and personnel knew that I was a French language officer. An opening became available as Economic officer in Abidjan and off I went. My wife, two children - ages 1 and 2 - and I all moved to the Ivory Coast.

The 1963-65 period was a fascinating one in the Ivory Coast because it found itself right in the middle of the Cold War. It was surrounded by Socialists close to the west and China: Sekou Toure in Guinea, Modibu Keita in Mali and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana - all left-leaning leaders, very actively supported by both the Chinese and the Soviets. These neighbors plus their communist backers were engaged in subverting the Ivory Coast government through propaganda and other activities because that country was perceived as the Western capitalistic bastion in West Africa. James Wine from Kentucky was our ambassador in Abidjan. He was a political appointee who had been a Kennedy campaign worker - he was a tremendous help to Kennedy in building bridges to the Protestant vote; he was close to Averell Harriman. Phyllis and I made a lot of good friends in the Ivory Coast and enjoyed our social life there immensely. The beach was great! Professionally, it changed my expectations. This assignment enabled me to clearly notice and begin to understand the inter-relationship between political and economic affairs. It was clear that economic development had a major direct impact on political growth.

The U.S. faced a critical decision soon after I arrived in Ivory Coast. The international coffee cartel was strong; it held to a rigid quota system. The U.S. was the world's largest consumer of coffee and Brazil was the major producer, but the Ivory Coast was

increasing its coffee production. In 1964, the Ivory Coat had a bumper crop, the world's second or third producer, just as prices were reaching a peak level. President Houphouet-Boigny had been a coffee grower himself and had risen the political ladder based on his success as a coffee grower and his ability as an organizer of other coffee planters. He started his political career as an opponent of the French, although in later years, he became France's best friend in Africa. He was in the forefront before 1960 of the drive to gain autonomy but not independence for the Ivory Coast. When he became a leader of his country, Houphouet never forgot his roots and the support that the small coffee grower had always given him. These people owned only ten acres or less, but there were hundreds of thousands of them, making them a powerful political force. The Ivory Coast government therefore always set a very high producer price for coffee and cocoa, bringing cash to the countryside, further empowering that sector politically.

The crisis in 1963-64 arose when the Ivory Coast production greatly exceeded its quota as set by the International Coffee Producers Association. This presented the government with a major dilemma: high production and prices and a low sales quota. If it would have to purchase all that coffee and cocoa for local storage, unable to sell it in world markets, the government's budget deficit would fall out of sight. That would have a devastating effect on the economy. The Department of State in Washington did not see any answer to the Ivory Coast's dilemma despite our cables and reports.

I became greatly concerned by the consequences of this confluence of events and the Ambassador came to see the problem, as well. He understood the importance of maintaining a stable Ivory Coast in light of the ambitions of its neighbors. He and I worked on a letter that he sent to his friend, Harriman, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Harriman took the letter to the White House and was able to arrange for a one-time loan waiver of the Ivory Coast coffee import quota, allowing it to sell that extra coffee. That one action made a major difference in the Ivory Coast's long-term economic and political future; it was able to export its coffee and dollars came flowing into its economy; it was a real boon because, as I said, prices were at their peak at this time. The cash went into the countryside and not into the bank accounts of a few rich, well placed people - bureaucrats and businessmen - as so often happens. Tens of thousands of people came from Guinea, Mali and Ghana to seek work in the Ivory Coast, either on plantations or on the docks where imports were coming in, or on the roads that were being built, or as labor on the coffee and cocoa farms. The proceeds from exports plus economic assistance from France and the U.S. gave the Ivory Coast an opportunity to engage in serious economic development. That made the 1963-65 period an illustration of a single U.S. decision having a major long lasting effect on the future of another country. It became a key decision for the political configuration of West Africa of the strength between West and East, as well. As the Ivory Coast became economically stronger, the pressures from its neighbors collapsed. Their citizens, having worked in the Ivory Coast, understood the advantages of a free market economy compared to the system that their leaders were trying to sell to them. Within ten years, the Communist leaders of Mali, Guinea and Ghana were all overthrown, and the idea of socialism totally discredited. The loss of Soviet influence was equally evident.

I should also note that the presence of a well-connected political ambassador was very useful in this series of events. Although Wine had not been one of the major players in the campaign, he did have important political contacts in Washington who helped him to carry the day. I don't think that a professional ambassador, good as he may have been, could have managed to have the coffee quota issue raised in the White House because all he would have had to depend on would have been the regular communication channels of the Department. We in Abidjan had tried those channels which were entirely unresponsive. It took Wine's personal letter to Harriman to get the appropriate and necessary Washington action. The State bureaucracy never did fully understand the political import of providing relief to the Ivory Coast in the context of its rivalry with its three communist neighbors. Furthermore, the bureaucracy did not know how to obtain a quota increase which required a Presidential waiver.

I should note that while Wine was working his personal channels, the U.S. assistance agency was working on establishing an Ivory Coast Development Bank. That was a very welcome step by the Ivory Coast because it saw it as a very useful institution to encourage foreign investment which would accelerate its economic development. But we, in establishing this bank, paid very little attention to the average Ivory Coast citizen, nor did the Ivory Coast government try to do that, even the representatives of its own business community. Sekou Toure in Guinea insisted that the investments all be indigenous - not foreign. By taking this "politically correct" line, I think he destroyed Guinea's economy. Houphouet went in the opposite direction pushing for maximum economic development in the shortest possible time relying upon foreign investment. But in doing so, he paid scant attention to the development of his own people and did not try to engage them further in economic development. That led Ambassador Wine and me to the conclusion that the new bank should have a loan capacity for local small business people; it was to provide capital resources as well as human resources - accountants, etc. - to assist in the establishment and development of the small business sector of the Ivory Coast. I can't say that my AID assistance colleagues were very happy with this concept; they insisted that they had already reached agreement of the bank with the Ivory Coast government. We pointed out to them that they had forgotten to talk to the Embassy about their program before talking to the host government. Finally, Wine had to tell the assistance agency that if it insisted in pursuing its program without our modification, he would have to appear before Congress and express his serious reservations. That changed the program quickly and a small business component was added to the development bank. A few years later, I read that the Ivory Coast was pointing to this new program for the small business man as a model that all of Africa should emulate. Once again, this was an illustration of the power a political appointee can have to push through the ideas of the staff if he or she is willing to use leverage and take a few risks. Wine was not a special ambassador, but he did have a good deal of common sense and was willing to stick his neck out.

The French felt that the Ivory Coast was their province; that caused many tensions between us. We took a more liberal approach, particularly in economic development which by its very nature was bound to make the new country more and more independent of France. So we always had a struggle with the French. It was just one more area of

continuing French-U.S. tensions that have always existed and are still with us today. I had many contacts with French representatives in Abidjan, but clearly we were going in different directions. I remember that we had serious differences on how to handle the Congo. By now, Tshombe had become Prime Minister. The Ivory Coast was instrumental in providing him support. Tshombe came to a meeting of the West African countries which was being held in Abidjan, thanks to the efforts of the Belgian ambassador. That ambassador had a reputation which had preceded him to Abidjan. He came from a very wealthy, aristocratic Belgian family. He was a great lover of African women - literally speaking. His wife did not come to the post with him giving him opportunities to gather intelligence in a very undiplomatic fashion. He was very successful at that having more "inside" information than all other ambassadors. He also had better access to the President - through his liaisons - than the French Ambassador, who was always very frustrated by that situation. One day, I went to see the Belgian Ambassador to discuss something about the Congo. Before our discussion started, he was on the telephone, but he threw me some photographs which he said I might be interested in seeing. They were pictures of him and some of his "ladies"; I must say that he had exquisite taste in women.

At one point, I remember the Italian Ambassador who lived right next door - by this time I had been promoted to be the Political Counselor and therefore was living in better quarters - invited Phyllis and me to dinner. The evening was going along very smoothly until we were all invited into the dining room. All of a sudden, a great chill came over the party of 14-16 people; conversation stopped. The Italians and the Belgians had refused to accept the French Ambassador as the automatic Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, even though the Ivory Coast had agreed to that as part of their independence agreement. The Italian Ambassador had placed his Belgian counterpart in the place of honor - to the right of the hostess. The French Ambassador was supposed to be seated on the hostess' left. But the French Ambassador, always alert to such slights, had sneaked into the dining room before the guests had entered and had switched the name cards so that he would be seated to the right of the hostess. He then entered the dining room first and sat where he had put his name card. Almost all of the guest of course guessed what had happened and then no one spoke another word to the French Ambassador for the rest of the evening. That gives you some of the flavor of the diplomatic community of Abidjan in the 1963-65 period.

The French had always exacted a deal from the Ivory Coast which required that 50% of all tracked vehicles imported into the Ivory Coast would be bought from France. Some French businessmen, who were involved in logging and construction, signed a petition to the French Ambassador saying that they didn't want French equipment because it was inferior to other manufacturers. They wanted the quota removed so that they could procure from Caterpillar. The U.S. assistance agency was providing approximately $15 million for purchase of heavy equipment for highway construction. The lowest bidder was another American bulldozer manufacturer. But the Ivory Coast government refused to accept the bid; it wanted Caterpillar equipment because it felt that it was of higher quality and had lower maintenance costs. The assistance mission pointed out that the other bidder was the lowest, but the Ivory Coast government insisted that over a ten year period, the Caterpillar would prove to be a better purchase. Our assistance people

eventually went along with the Ivory Coast which was just as well because the lowest bidder went out of business the following year.

I should say a word about what American interests in the Ivory Coast were, as we saw them in Abidjan. We understood that it was not our role to replace the French, but to serve as a supplement to them and in some cases to serve as a prodder in a effort to get them to change some of their policies. We were in the Ivory Coast to fill in some of the niches that the French were leaving, such as, for example, assistance to small businessmen, that I have referred to before. The French were not very supportive of our efforts because they were concerned that such assistance might have a negative impact on the large French monopoly corporations that were operating in the Ivory Coast. But essentially, we were in the Ivory Coast to supplement French efforts and thereby provide support to efforts that we believed would be beneficial to everyone in the long run. That was our general policy.

Occasionally, we would try to support the Ivory Coast on a major economic problem, as we did in the coffee quota issue that I described earlier. We also bolstered the government in its contest with its pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese neighbors. In the period we were discussing we were fortunate that Houphouet-Boigny was a very good President. We wished that he would have spent a few more resources developing the country's human capital, but in general we found him very helpful. He insisted on rigor in economic development - i.e. no corruption was allowed, the funds went into a development budget and not towards supporting a lavish life style for himself or other high ranking officials. He did have a large palace, but at that point, it was not an issue. There were some indications that this stable situation might change. For example, the planning for Yamoussoukro - the future grandiose capital of the country - was beginning. But it in 1963-65, this was not seen as a major threat to a very rigorous and disciplined economic development program that the Ivory Coast was pursuing. There is no question that Houphouet was not a "democrat"; he was authoritarian and somewhat paranoid. In the African tradition, the country had only a single party and the President did not tolerate much dissent within that party. There were "elections" but they were pretty well pre-ordained. Houphouet really concentrated on economic development, giving no attention to political growth. His economic policies enabled him to build a solid base in the Ivory Coast, but after 1970, the rigor of the economic development system became frayed and corruption began to take its toll. The economy of the country began to collapse because the controls over expenditures collapsed and the Ivory Coast lapsed into an economic malaise that occurs too often in "Third World" countries.

Unlike its operations in the Sudan, the CIA station in the Ivory Coast played a very positive role. Its focus was primarily on events in Mali, Guinea and Ghana and its intelligence collection efforts were very helpful. While I was in the Ivory Coast, Jack Matlock arrived in Ghana, assigned as the political officer to our Embassy in Accra. Matlock was even then a Soviet expert and later became our Ambassador in Moscow. Jack looked at Nkrumah and his cohorts through the eyes of a Soviet specialist. His analysis was that what he saw was not "African socialism", but rather essentially a Soviet sponsored communist clique that had captured Nkrumah. His reports were well

considered and convincing. William Mahoney, our Ambassador in Accra, also a political appointee, fully supported Matlock; between the two of them, they made a sufficiently strong case that brought a complete reversal of U.S. attitude toward Nkrumah and Ghana.

Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman visited Accra on a couple of occasions in an effort to bypass the clique around Nkrumah and talk to him directly, but he failed. So the U.S. concluded that Nkrumah was not worthy of our support and we used our influence with the World Bank and other donors to cut Ghana off from any economic assistance. That termination of assistance in addition to the already poor performance of the Ghanian economy, stemming from the nationalization of their major export productions - coffee and cocoa - led to the collapse of the Nkrumah regime. That event was also helped by the good performance of the Ivory Coast which was so evident to all Ghanaians who worked in or visited that country. I found this change in U.S. policy very interesting because it was based on new insights into a local African situation that a Foreign Service officer, trained in analysis of the Soviet system, brought to his assignment.
The Soviets and the Chinese tried to bring their influence to bear in the Ivory Coast as well, but they were not successful. On one occasion, a group of communist rebels were intercepted as they were trying to infiltrate from Mali. CIA sent one of its agents to assist in the interrogation of the captured. These infiltrators had originally come from the Ivory Coast, but had left the country for one reason or another. They had been brought together in Mali, from where they were sent to the Soviet Union and China for training in propaganda and armed subversion. Then they had been brought back to Mali to infiltrate the Ivory Coast. When they entered the Ivory Coast, they brought their classroom note books with them, which made for a rich intelligence collection for the CIA. The Station then assisted the Ivory Coast in preparing a "white" paper about the perfidies of the communist powers which was widely circulated in West Africa. This is how the CIA operated with its host. The Station Chief was Robert Whittenhill.

Q: In 1965, you were assigned to Saigon. How were you so lucky?

OAKLEY: It was totally unexpected. In the first place, I was a French language officer. Secondly, Cleo Noel was the Personnel Officer responsible for staffing of Far East posts. We had talked in 1964 and he asked me whether I was looking for something different outside of Africa. In fact, I was getting a little tired of African Affairs, having spent a lot of time on its issues. Cleo suggested that I look to Vietnam where he felt there were some very interesting jobs. This was just at the beginning of our major involvement in that country. So I consulted Phyllis and she was willing to go. That was supposed to take the Oakley family to Saigon.

However, between the time the assignment was made and my departure, the security situation in Saigon changed dramatically. Families were no longer allowed to accompany official personnel. Phyllis was greatly displeased by this turn of events, but we finally agreed that the best thing for her and the children would be to for them to go to Shreveport, LA, where I had grown up and where I had a lot of friends. But it was a strange place for her. Those two years of separation - the first in our married life - were not particularly enjoyable for her or me. But we were sufficiently impressed by the fact

that our soldiers were actually risking their lives in Vietnam and could not see any way around the moral dilemma that my refusal to go to Saigon would have created. I would not be subjected to physical danger unlike our soldiers; they too were separated from their families and we didn't see how I could now seek another assignment with a clear conscience. We weren't happy with the prospect of separation, but felt that it was part of a Foreign Service career commitment. Fortunately for all of us, my best friend from childhood, Stanton Dossett, and his wife and children lived across the street from Phyllis and Tom and Mary. They probably saved Phyllis' family and my marriage.

When I arrived in Saigon, I became one of Phil Habib's "boys" - a member of a 26 man Political Section. That was an experience! I was first assigned to work with John Burke on internal political affairs; we were part of the Embassy's Political Section under Phil Habib. Someone should write up the history of that section; it was absolutely extraordinary. Dave Lambertson, Dick Teare, John Negroponte, Paul Hare, Bill Marsh, Tom Corcoran, Bob Miller, John Burke, Freeman Matthews, Richard Smyser, and Ken Quinn were all members of the section at the time; most of them rose to be ambassadors. They were outstanding in their knowledge of Vietnam, SE Asia, and Asia generally, and also innovative, intellectually curious and excellent at interpersonal relations. Dick Holbrooke and Frank Wisner were working as special assistants to Ambassadors Lodge and Porter, but were really part of Phil's group. The section included a special section of language officers who reported on activities in the provinces; they went out in the countryside for 2-3 weeks at a time to get first-hand views of the situation and then came back to write up their reports. These collected reports provided the most accurate information of activities and trends in the countryside. Too bad they were largely ignored at the policy level in Washington. In fact, worse than ignored, they were denounced by agencies other than State that found them too pessimistic. Eventually, the U.S. Pacific Command and the Pentagon succeeded in having the provincial reports stopped and the section disbanded on the spurious grounds that the reporting was too subjective. They were replaced with a new, objective measure of the situation in the countryside, which came to be called the Hamlet Evaluation Program. Everyone recalls that it measured the provinces as over 95 percent secure and stable just before the Tet Offensive.

Our living conditions in those days were very good. We lived in a compound of five houses; Habib, naturally, occupied the one in the middle and his acolytes lived around him. The security situation was well in hand and didn't have any fears for our security even though we were not heavily guarded. The Ambassador was Henry Cabot Lodge - his second tour. The Deputy Ambassador was Bill Porter - in addition to his DCM duties, he was also the head of CORDS (a program to try to stabilize the provinces with assistance). I found my assignment fascinating - very exciting. My work was on internal Vietnamese political affairs. I got to Saigon shortly after the old Embassy had been blown up and left just before the new one suffered the same fate. Fortunately, the old building had been repaired by the time I arrived.

As I said, I worked on matters relating to the political situation in Saigon. I was supposed to try to understand and analyze South Vietnamese politics. Before my arrival, there was a period of “rolling coups.” - that is one government after another. My job also included

working with the U.S. military to try to understand the political role of the Vietnamese military. They had a tremendous amount of political information but did not understand it. I remember one day going to MACV - the U.S. military headquarters - to see a couple of generals. I needed some information about some Vietnamese officers which I thought they might have. They met my inquiries with the answer: “But they are involved in military affairs; they have nothing to do with politics. We can't answer your questions and give you any information.“ I was pretty sure that the Americans knew, but were not prepared to provide it to me. I think it was clear to many of us that the American military was quite aware of the political activities of their Vietnamese counterparts, but were not ready to share their knowledge with the Embassy.
My dealings with the U.S. military were primarily because I was assigned as head of a committee dealing with the Montagnards (tribal people living in the highlands who worked with the U.S.). The committee had on it representatives from the military, CIA and AID. The purpose of the committee was to coordinate all the programs and activities that the U.S. government carried on in support of the Montagnards. That brought me into contact with the U.S. military; tangentially, I had contacts with the military on other issues as well. We worked very diligently on this coordinating committee because we found out that - unconsciously - our Special Forces and the CIA had picked up where the French had left off, treating the Montagnards as a special group, providing assistance and protection far more generously than that received by other indigenous groups; in fact, we protected the Montagnards against the South Vietnamese government. One day, we attended a graduation ceremony at the Montegnard training center, a group trained by the U.S. was ready to go into the field. It was a big event with lots of fanfare and pomp - wives were invited to attend. Ambassador Lodge was there for the U.S..

At one moment during the day, we noticed all of a sudden a lot of scurrying around; people bringing messages to Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky. It turned out that a number of Montagnard units had rebelled; they had pillaged a number of South Vietnam towns and had then retreated into the countryside. These units happened to be crack units that we had trained to fight the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. They had rebelled against their South Vietnamese leadership. When members of one of these units returned to town, they were arrested and put in jail along with a U.S. Army major who was with the Montagnards. The major had been assigned as an advisor to these units and in an act of loyalty decided to go to jail with “his” men to try to protect them from any retribution that the Vietnamese might have wished to mete out. He was upset that the Montagnards had been arrested. Our relationship with the Montagnards had reached the point at which we not only treated them better than other indigenous groups; we in fact sheltered them, just as the French had done.

The events of that day made me become aware of what was going on generally. I recognized that we had fallen into the same mental trap as the French had and that instead of trying to bring about a *rapprochement* between the Vietnamese government and the Montagnards, we were continuing the policy of separation. We failed to realize that one day we would leave Vietnam and that made it imperative that the Montagnards and the Vietnamese be able to live together. So I took the issue up with Ambassador Lodge and the Embassy leadership. That brought the development of a new U.S. stand vis-a-vis the

Montagnards and the establishment of the coordinating committee I chaired. As I suggested, our policy of treating the Montagnards differently from the Vietnamese just developed unconsciously and before we were aware of it, we were following the policies of the French. We did then make the conscious decision to bring the Vietnamese and Montagnards closer together, enabling us to abandon the role of intermediary which we - the U.S. military and the CIA - had unconsciously assumed. These two American agencies had trained the Montagnards, as they were supposed to do, but in the process had become so close to them that they became the protectors thereby perpetuating the French policy of separation. The Montagnards of course did not object to having this special status; they had become accustomed to their role during the French rule of Vietnam. In fact, they really didn't like the Vietnamese; so this separation suited them.

The internal political situation in Saigon was always full of intrigue. We didn't know as much about what was going on as we should have. That was the main reason that we were continually surprised by a new coup, which as I mentioned had happened frequently in the period preceding my assignment to Saigon. While I was there, Ambassador Lodge received orders from the White House to transform Vietnam into a democracy. Those instructions were passed on to Phil Habib and the Political Section. This seemed highly unrealistic but President Johnson insisted. I worked on that effort, which was an interesting experience. Phil and I along with a professor of political science from Penn State started a joint project with the South Vietnamese government. Our first objective was to write a draft constitution. That was followed by the election of a constituent assembly to ratify the document so as to make it the supreme law of the land. After that, there were presidential elections.

The Embassy trio - Habib, the professor and me - set to work and ended with a Vietnamese version of the U.S. Constitution. It had three separate power centers: the executive, the legislature and a judiciary. The president was to be elected by the Vietnamese voters. When we had finished with our draft, we sent it over to the Constituent Assembly which fiddled around with it. But the “fine tuning” did not change the essence of our draft. I must say that from the outset we did not think that a constitution based on Western principles was likely to work in an Eastern culture. The question for us was not would the new constitution be in effect while the U.S. was present in Vietnam, but what would happen after we left? The concepts underlying the document were alien to the Vietnamese and we did not give them a very great chance of becoming permanent. We did it because we were instructed to do so.

We then got the word from Washington that the presidential candidates would be General Thieu and Air Marshal Ky. This was somewhat contrary to our hopes. We had hoped that a fine civilian, Mr. Huang, would step up and become a candidate. But Washington felt that we could not afford to take any chances; i.e. we had to stick with those we knew. A new candidate would be unpredictable and Washington didn’t want to take any risks. It was satisfied with the *status quo* and didn't want to rock the boat. We proceeded with elections and a new Constituent Assembly and President were elected. General Thieu was elected President.

I have been asked whether the approach we took to political reform in Vietnam bore any similarity to what General MacArthur did in Japan. We did not really review that experience primarily because the situations were so different. We occupied Japan and we were completely in charge of all governmental functions for a period after WW II. MacArthur had many experts on his staff who could not only develop appropriate legislative approaches, but could also over a period of time correct any processes that seemed ineffective. We in Vietnam, never did quite figure out what our role was. We were not an occupying power; we were allies, but how far did that allow us to interfere with domestic affairs? Were we the "big brothers" with all the responsibilities that that term often connotes? We were in fact ambivalent about our role and the South Vietnamese were not any clearer about this question than we were. I think that in the absence of a clear understanding of our role, the Vietnamese leaders manipulated us to a great extent; we did not ever manage to understand or lead them. Of course, the Vietnamese had had a lot more practice at manipulating Westerners - starting with their former colonial masters. But we created a situation which was neither fish or fowl. We left ourselves open to charges by Vietcong and their Hanoi masters that we were acting just like the French had during their colonial rule. It wasn't true because we never managed to achieve that level of influence because we wanted the Vietnamese to maintain a certain amount of sovereignty. So it was a strange situation. The Vietnamese played the "game" because it was obviously to their advantage; they adopted some of the outward attributes of democracy knowing full well that the full concept would never be acceptable to them. Of course, our role in selecting presidential candidates was hardly a model of democracy; the Vietnamese learned that lesson fast. In fact, once the South Vietnamese army leaders made their choice of winner known, that was it; he was elected. We all knew that Thieu was going to win.

Although I am not a cultural anthropologist, it was quite clear to everyone that often we and the Vietnamese talked past each other. For example, I remember the day when several mid-grade Vietnamese Army officers came to see Frank Wisner and myself. Frank at the time was working for Bill Porter. The officers asked us whether we realized what General Westmoreland was about to do. He was going to remove all Vietnamese troops from the front lines; they would be exclusively devoted to the pacification efforts. The front would be manned entirely by American and South Korean troops. These officers pointed out that regardless of our opinion of individual Vietnamese units, such a move on the part of Westmoreland would have a devastating effect on all Vietnamese troops. Their morale and self-image would be completely destroyed; the Americans were in fact saying that the Vietnamese were not good enough to fight their own war, fight for their own country. My answer was that they obviously had misunderstood the import of Westmoreland's concept; he and we felt that pacification was extremely important. Their comment was something along the lines: "For us and our men, it is the garbage detail!" One of the officer pointed out that he had been a regimental commander in an airborne division; he was then the chief of staff to Minister of Defense Co - who by the way was a complete crook. He said that the airborne men had a tremendous amount of pride; he thought that the airborne troops were still very good. There were other units that were mediocre and some that were poor, but he was sure that if Westmoreland followed though on his plans, all the South Vietnamese troops would end up being poor. There

wouldn't be any left to fight. Frank Wisner and I understood the Vietnamese anxieties and agreed with them. We got Habib to support us. He got Ambassador Lodge to see Westmoreland and held a long meeting with him. At the end, Westmoreland said: “I am in charge of military operations in Vietnam. This is a military issue. I have the support of all of the Vietnamese command. End of conversation!” He did not have sufficient feel for Vietnamese “face saving” needs. Of course, later Westmoreland was replaced by General Abrams to “Vietnamize” the conflict, to bring the South Vietnamese army back into the war. That was too late because by that time there were no effective Vietnamese fighting forces left. Westmoreland's move destroyed the morale of the Vietnamese troops so that Abrams had nothing to work with when he arrived.

This story also illustrates the American command structure in Saigon. On “military” matters, the CINC [Commander-in-Chief] called the shots. The issue of what units would fight where was perceived to be a “military matter.” Habib was frustrated by the situation. We understood that there were very few matters, if any, which were strictly “military.” He and others like myself tried to interject ourselves when we thought that larger political objectives were at stake. We did our job as best we could, recognizing the limitations dictated by the situation. It is true that we managed to force some decisions to the Washington level and that would end the local debate. I should note that episodes such as the one I described seem to have been overlooked by McNamara in his book on Vietnam. I have mentioned CIA. I should note that the relationships between the Political Section and the Station were quite good, although we did not always agree with what they did. On a minor scale, I think they may have been undertaking actions which were not known to Ambassador Lodge, but this was not a major problem. There was one specific problem that we had. As I mentioned earlier, we received word from the White House that either Thieu or Ky would be South Vietnam’s next President. The choice of the winner was to be left to the Vietnamese military command. CIA sources maintained that Ky was going to be the winner and so reported to Washington. We in the Political Section maintained that it would be Thieu. John Negroponte was by this time working with me on internal Vietnamese political affairs. We were certain it would be Thieu because he was much more Vietnamese; Ky appeared to be much more western. I had left Saigon by the time the final choice was made, but John told me later that the last report from the CIA - still predicting Ky - was filed just at the time that Ambassador Lodge was called to a meeting with the military command at which he was told that its candidate would be Thieu. CIA had had a very close relationship with Ky for a long time; so they had a bias in his favor which undoubtedly colored their reporting.

When I left in 1967, I was not optimistic about Vietnam's future. I could not predict the outcome of that struggle, but I was less than sanguine about the possibility of a free South Vietnam - much less a democratic one. I remember one day attending a Westmoreland briefing as the representative of the Embassy. He was talking about building a large military complex in the Delta which would have cost millions and millions. At one moment, he looked at me - as if I were representing the enemy - and said: “If you think this is a waste of money, you are wrong! We will still be using this facility ten years from now.“ It was at that moment that I recognized that we had no strategy which would permit us to leave Vietnam under less than panic circumstances. It was inconceivable that

any one could seriously believe that we would still have a major presence in Vietnam in ten years. I had a sinking feeling at that moment; the lack of an exit strategy did not bode well for the success of our efforts in Vietnam. Our military command at least and others as well did not have the slightest idea how to bring our involvement in Vietnam to a conclusion. That was a disturbing thought since I was certain that the American public would not support our involvement in Vietnam for anything close to another ten years. I am not sure that it took a rocket scientist to figure that out; I was only a mid-level political officer, but I knew that Westmoreland's statement lacked credibility.

Joe Alsop came to Saigon at one time. Many of my bosses were in Manila for a high level conference with LBJ. Alsop maintained that a major victory was just around the corner and that we would be leaving South Vietnam in triumph in six months' time. He and I had a very strong argument about that. I told him that I thought he had lost his mind. I may have expressed my doubts a little more vigorously than others, but I don't remember any great feeling of optimism in the Embassy about Vietnam's future. But we had not yet reached the point at which "exit strategies" were not only acceptable, but as is the case today, mandatory. There are some who will maintain that our effort to bring democracy to South Vietnam was in fact an "exit strategy." If we had been successful and if the concept would have won the "minds and hearts" of the Vietnamese, then perhaps those analysts would have been right. But in fact, beyond writing a new constitution, I don't remember any other efforts made by the U.S. to bring democracy to Vietnam. CORDS may have been thought to have been an effort along those lines, if you believe that bringing better administration is fundamental to democratic development by winning the loyalty of the population and reducing corruption. But I don't think the basic goal of CORDS was to bring democracy to Vietnam; it was designed to bring support to our friends in the government in Saigon. We did have democratization as a political goal, but our implementation efforts were very shallow and superficial. I suppose the Vietnamese themselves could have taken greater advantage of the opportunities for democratization that we would have supported, but when we write the constitution and dictate who should be the candidates for the highest office in the land, it is a little hard to fault the Vietnamese for not taking democratization a little more seriously. Our policy of democracy was not an "exit strategy"; I think it was a cynical move dictated primarily by U.S. domestic politics.

I might mention a couple of other efforts in which I was personally involved. We tried to establish a youth committee for younger Vietnamese - student leaders, recent graduates. I was personally interested in this project because it related to my interests in trying to do something about the city of Saigon. I spent a lot of time working with the Mayor and other city officials on the subjects related to the administration of Saigon. CORDS and AID focused on the rural areas and other cities besides Saigon. I thought that our target was somewhat misdirected because the real action was in Saigon where the politics was focused, where most of the people were. I thought it imperative that assistance be provided to Saigon because in addition to the problems it had under the French, it was being overwhelmed by a flow of refugees from the countryside. So I managed to get some assistance directed to improving the administration of the city, its public transportation, infrastructure, etc. AID helped us to get some projects going, even though

its principal target was still the countryside.

I found a project headed by Charlie Sweet, an AID advisor, to be one of the most intriguing efforts. Together with Frank Wisner and Sweet we were able to get the Vietnamese themselves to establish self-help programs in the Saigon's outlying districts - 6, 7 and 8 - which were filled with refugees. Some of the former student leaders, who had led demonstrations against their government while at university, found a challenge in helping to bring some order to the chaotic situation in those districts. It was a satisfying experience for those young men and women. We worked with them to improve the infrastructure and housing conditions by trucking building materials to these young people in the middle of the night so our help would not be visible. At our request, Lodge issued an order that no Americans were to enter those districts without the explicit approval of his office. That insured that the effort would be seen as entirely Vietnamese. The young people managed to get the refugees to provide the "sweat" labor; they put up the housing. SEABEES would go in at night to lay the concrete slabs - the young people and the refugees didn't have enough skills to do that, but the Vietnamese built the rest of the houses. So it could be and was said that this was a Vietnamese self-help project, which I think was a very important symbol.

In fact, these self help measures assisted the inhabitants to take the political process into their own hands. In those three district, they held elections and voted for their own municipal officials. That did make the rest of the city officials very uneasy because the representatives of those three districts were not corruptible at all. As I said, most of them were student leaders who were not interested in "feathering their own nests." That made the others very nervous. They began to wonder what the Americans and the students were doing in these three districts. These new political development came to a crunch when the Tet offensive took place; it was that part of the city that we destroyed to get the Vietcong out of Saigon. That was most unfortunate. It put an end to what was an inspiring, growing project.

I just mention one incident which I believe is instructive for anyone trying to understand our role in Vietnam. On one occasion, a team from the Pentagon and CINCPAC came out. Habib was gone. I was the senior officer in the Political Section at the time. They presented a plan which would have changed the nature and methodology being used by the Provincial Reporting Section of our Office. Negroponte, Teare, Lambertson were part of that staff. Ken Quinn was a member of that section - he just went out as our Ambassador to Cambodia. All the members of that section spoke Vietnamese or Khmer. They would go into the countryside for 18-19 days and then return to Saigon to write their report which would take approximately a week and a half and then they would head back into the field. They gathered information about conditions and programs from whomever would talk to them - Vietnamese, Americans, civilians, military. Their reports provided us and Washington with a composite picture of the situation in particular provinces. It was not long before some of the other agencies staffs - CIA, military, army civilians, AID - began to mumble resentment about these reports. That was because the reports from our provincial reporting staff did not square with the usually optimistic and up-beat tones of the reports that the representatives of these other agencies were

submitting to Saigon and Washington. So this Pentagon-CINCPAC team wanted to change our reporting system - they considered the reports to be "faulty." The team complained that our reports were "subjective"; they insisted that only "objective" measures be used to measure what progress we were making in the countryside. So I asked what the team suggested as "objective" criteria that might be used. The answer was a classic; I was told by the team that the war was progressing much more favorably for our side than our Embassy officers were reporting. They had looked at certain statistics such as the number of local officials killed or wounded; that number had dropped from the previous year and therefore they concluded, and thought that I would conclude, that the war was obviously going our way. I think the team was somewhat startled when we told them that the reason for that "improvement" was because the local officials had all moved back into safe military bases; there were in fact very few local officials left in the countryside. Their "cause and effect" analysis was completely mistaken; we just had to laugh. Unfortunately, these kinds of analyses led to the end of the Embassy provincial reporting and to the quantified "hamlet evaluation" program which was intended to prove how well pacification was working. It showed 96% success just prior to Tet. False premises lead to false conclusions!

In general I found the younger generation - the student leaders for example - much more progressive than the power structure. I was greatly impressed by the young people. They lived in those districts among the refugees. Initially, they viewed us as the "enemy"; when they saw that we were also interested in their agenda and were willing to give them support, their whole attitude towards us changed. Sweet worked with them constantly; there were some NGOs [non-governmental organizations] out there as well, but we tried to stay in the background as much as we could. We had no U.S. military involved nor any senior people from the U.S. civilian agencies. The emphasis was Vietnamese management and it worked. Perhaps even more importantly, the people who lived in those districts became strong supporters and vocal fans of the students, in part because the students withstood considerable pressure and intimidation from City Hall and other power centers. I suspect that we might find similar circumstances if in a large U.S. city run by a political machine all of a sudden finds wards declaring their independence and distancing themselves from City Hall.

There was no question that corruption ran rampant in the government. I remember one time Bob Komer coming out to Saigon; he gave us a briefing of Washington's views of the situation. During his presentation, he insisted that we should get rid of the corruption. I and some others asked him whether he wanted to get rid of the whole Vietnamese government? That upset him. But we kept insisting that Washington face reality; it had to understand and accept that most of the Vietnamese leadership was extremely corrupt. They were pocketing a lot of money. We named the Minister of Defense and others as illustrations. Washington knew that the Vietnam leadership and much of the bureaucracy was corrupt. But what to do about it was another question. Our only solution - inadequate at best - was to run our own programs as honestly as we could and to target areas that were likely to be less corrupt or quite clean like the three districts in Saigon I mentioned earlier.

Corruption is very hard to ferret out. If we are occupying a country, such as Japan, then it is possible to have control of the process. But where we are “advisors” at best, as we were in Vietnam, the best we could do is observe, preach and try to protect our own programs from the insidiousness of corruption. In Vietnam, we were trying to prop up a leadership and a process that was not able to gather sufficient popular support on its own; and therefore failed.

Occasionally I had an opportunity to discuss the Vietnam situation with American journalists. I had to use my own best judgement in those discussion; I was not under any censorship, but I certainly was not giving a prediction of gloom and doom. There was no “party” line, but I tried to stay as positive as I could. I think Habib certainly agreed with my assessment of the situation.

During my tour in Saigon, the Buddhists were a very important element in the political process. They were very much opposed to American involvement. At one point there was a civil war in Hue and Da Nang; some Vietnamese army units actually revolted against the central government; they were led by some Buddhists. So we had to keep a wary eyes on the Buddhist monks. I find it interesting today to recollect this religious involvement because it comes as a great shock to the American public when it is mentioned that a major religion and its leaders - Islam - are involved in a political process. That is nothing new to those of us who watched the Buddhist monks leading political actions in Vietnam. Of course, we also used the Catholic Church in Poland to put pressure on the Soviets to leave that country. The use of religion for political purposes has a centuries long history - e.g. the Crusades - , but somehow or other many Americans found the Buddhist involvement novel and unacceptable. Much of this is discussed in Don Oberdorfer's excellent book on the Tet offensive and its effects. He and I - we are good friends - have discussed that issue on more than one occasion.

I must say that my Saigon tour was an extremely busy one. It was fun; I enjoyed it, despite the family separation. I spent a lot of time in the office and going around Saigon to talk to people. For a change of pace, John Negroponte and I spent a lot of time playing badminton; it was a healthier form of release than bar hopping or finding female companionship. Sometimes, we would find two other officers and play tennis. Most Embassy officers, including Ambassador Lodge, belonged to *Cercle Sportive de Saigon* - a Vietnamese club that we could join. That is where we played because the Embassy had no facilities of its own. Of course the Vietnamese used the club and some of them used to petition Ambassador Lodge with one favor or another or provide some advice to him.

There were a number of lessons that I learned from my Vietnam experience. In the first place, I found out first hand how complicated situations could be. Secondly, I learned that the U.S. had to be very careful about its involvement in matters outside this country; it is far easier to become involved than to disengage. As I mentioned earlier, we had no exit strategy in Vietnam and therefore suffered frequently from the law of unintended consequences. That lesson was an important one when later I was confronted with the Somalia situation; I knew by then that all the facets of U.S. involvement had to be drawn together - political, economic, humanitarian and military. When I got to Mogadishu, in

fact, I put three very good political officers together with some AID folks - from the disaster relief program - and started a mini-CORDS program. I would send them around to certain locations in Somalia to work with the military teams and NGOs that were already stationed there in an effort to pull all activities together towards some common objectives. I think that was a very useful management technique.

I also learned in Vietnam - and later in other situations - to not mislead one's friends. It was better to be above board - even if it was bad news - than to take a position which later would obviously be seen as not honest. I think we did that in some respects in Vietnam. We led some people down “a garden path” - not necessarily deliberately or with malice of forethought - but some of our analyses were obviously too optimistic. I had some qualms about that approach, and I tried never to repeat what I consider to be a major mistake.

I learned another lesson too, as illustrated by the following anecdote. I used to talk to a Vietnamese journalist because he often had information that he could not print.. On one occasion, he finally turned to me and said: “You know, you Americans look on us as if we were just a basket of crabs. You don't really care what the crabs are doing in that basket as long as they don't escape or as long as someone is not stealing the basket away from you.” I thought then that he had that right. It was exactly the way we viewed South Vietnam. These were “our” crabs; they could do whatever they wanted in that basket as long as we held on to the basket. It was obvious to the journalist and to others, I suspect, that our motives were often quite selfish even when disguised in very noble terms.

There is no question in my mind that my tour in Vietnam stood me in good stead for some of my later assignments. I look back on it frequently. For example, during my first week in Somalia, I sat down with the Marine generals and discussed the lessons of that “police action” and our unhappy experience in Lebanon to make sure that we tried as best we could do avoid the mistakes made during those U.S. actions.

Vietnam was interesting. The only problem was that between the time I decided to go to Vietnam and the time that I actually went, the Department had changed its policy and was barring dependents from going with their sponsors. So that made it tough on my wife Phyllis. We were separated for twenty months during which I came back to the States once - on Lodge’s plane. Lodge had been unable to convince the Department to authorize Embassy officers to travel back to the U.S. to see their families. It was alright to see the families somewhere overseas, but not in the U.S.. Other agencies however authorized their officers to fly back to the States for family visits. That was a major discrepancy in the personnel policies of different agencies of the U.S. government and not helpful to the morale of State employees. Finally, on one occasion, Lodge had to return to Washington to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; he was going to tell them how well things were going in Vietnam. While in Washington, he went into Bill Crockett's office - who was then the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. Lodge told him that he would not leave that office until the travel regulations were changed. It is wonderful how quickly an immutable regulation can be revised! But for me, by that time it was too late. So except for that one time, I did not see Phyllis for twenty months.

Q: Your next assignment was to Paris. Was that an assignment that you sought?
OAKLEY: Paris was not a post that I had requested. I guess it came as a reward for my tour in Saigon.

My job in Paris was in the Political section of the Embassy, reporting on African and Middle East affairs. I had some experience in Africa and some interest in the Middle East; in fact this became my first working relationship with Middle East issues - a subject that I would follow for much of my career. Chip Bohlen was my first Ambassador; he was followed by Sarge Shriver. The first was the most senior career officer; the second an extraordinary political personage. The same thing happen to me again after Paris when I served with the U.S. Mission to the UN where my first ambassador was Charlie Yost who was followed by George Bush. The chance to work for such special people was personally a very enriching experience. My first DCM in Paris was Chris Chapman who was followed by Bob Blake. The Political Counselors were Dick Funkhouser and Bob Anderson.

Let me make a few comments about the stylistic differences between Bohlen and Shriver. The first was an obvious super-diplomat; he was unparalleled in his ability to work with de Gaulle - to the degree that any U.S. official could work with the General. But he handled his ambassadorial duties in the formal way that he had learned in his career. On the other hand, Shriver was just superb in his P.R. efforts. I just recently talked to Shriver; he told me that Bohlen had predicted that there was little he could accomplish in Paris. I told him that had he come a year earlier, that probably would have been true. He arrived just at the time that France was beginning to open up, thanks to the quasi-revolution of 1968, after which France's relations with the rest of the world changed dramatically for a time. The French began to look outwards and finally forced de Gaulle out of office. He knew that it was time for him to leave the reins to others. Shriver had a unique style; he went to the Left Bank to observe the anti-de Gaulle student riots - before he had even presented his credentials. It was that uprising that forced a change in French attitudes and in fact was the beginning of de Gaulle's demise and, as I told Shriver, it opened the door for an American ambassador to play a more important role in France. He agreed with that assessment.

In fact, Shriver acted as if he were the U.S. ambassador to a third world country. He went down into the pits with the coal miners; he visited the vineyards to talk to the growers; he would talk to the shop-keepers. He had many of the ordinary French people to Thanksgiving dinner. The Embassy was a real live place during Shriver's tour. Shriver set up a “youth committee” to sort of parallel the Embassy's structure. Ted McNamara, Frances Cook and I were part of this “youth” movement. On one occasion, during the transformation of French attitudes and in the middle of the student-inspired strikes and agitation, he had the President of Yale - Kingman Brewster - who was visiting, as the guest of honor at one of his typical *soirees*. The custom was that the guests would mingle briefly before dinner, eat the repast and then have a long, long discussion about issues of interest to his guests. For this particular dinner, he had also invited the Minister of Education, the President of the Sorbonne University as well as some of the radical

professors and representatives of the student movement. It was a very lively evening, I can assure you! These kinds of events occurred frequently; on occasion, he would have as many as four events at the Residence in one day - a breakfast, a lunch, a tea, and a dinner - all very lively. On another occasion, he got Wilbur Cohen, the Secretary of HEW, to come to Paris for one of these dinner sessions. Shriver would monitor the movements of all leading Americans; if they were in Europe, he would insist that they come to Paris where he would put them to work, allowing the French to express their views to our leaders and vice-versa.

For one Thanksgiving dinner, he invited movie stars, sports stars, coal miners, farmers, shop keepers - a real mixture of French society as well as the bourgeoisie such as the Rothschilds. Shriver had an extraordinary effervescence that somehow enabled him to bring together disparate elements of French society for lively, but civil, discourse. Of course, his style created an extra workload for us in the Embassy staff, but it was fun and we did not resent it. It was also an extra workload for Phyllis and some of the other wives; she was not a member of the Foreign Service at that time; nevertheless she became part of the Shriver entourage and she enjoyed the experience.

On the other hand; Sarge had some weaknesses. He was not a skilled diplomat; he insisted on speaking French which was atrocious. After the first time he had a meeting alone with the Foreign Minister, we got an anguished call from the Quai - the Foreign Ministry. John Dean - he was handling Far Eastern affairs in the Embassy - and I rushed over. We were told that it appeared that we had changed our entire foreign policy on Vietnam, Biafra and the Middle East. So we sat down with our French counterparts and reviewed the conversation that Shriver had with the Foreign Minister. The review obviously called for major revisions in the “memorandum of conversation” which the French note-taker had drafted. That established a pattern; after each of his conversations with the Foreign Minister, we would sit down with our French counterparts and clear up any misunderstandings that Shriver may have left behind because of his unfamiliarity with the French language. As far as I know, he never knew what we had done!

Shriver was much more accessible than Bohlen was. His door was always wide open - to anyone. He just had a different style and was helped immensely by the change in French attitudes. I remember the Foreign Service inspectors coming to Paris when Bob Blake was the DCM and saying: “Isn't it bad enough to have an 'unusual' ambassador; is it necessary to have an 'unusual' DCM as well?” Blake had a personality similar to Shriver's; he was an extrovert, glad-handing his way through crowds; not terribly well organized but very smart. They were a real combination!

Bob Anderson, who was my boss for a while, had a lot of French friends. He let his officers do pretty much what they wanted; I could set my own priorities and reporting targets. That was a problem for me because I had to set my own priorities. With all the issues that were pending in the Middle East and Africa, I had to be quite selective; I could not possibly give full coverage to all. I was in contact with the Quai all the time, with other embassies, with the staff of the Ministry of Cooperation. One of our very good friends was the *Chef de Cabinet* to Foccart; he was a very important source because it

was Foccart who in effect ran France's African policy. He was a young man who attended my first meeting with Foccart and thereafter our families became very close. This fellow was very open with me. One day, he called me and told me that Foccart was sending the Minister of Cooperation to Brazzaville. That puzzled me, but then I was told that the French government did not like the way things were going in the Congo. They were concerned that the government was too close to the communists. About six weeks after the Minister's visit, there was a coup in the Congo which brought in a new government. A few days later, my friend called to let me know that Foccart was sending the Minister for Cooperation to Bamako, Mali. I asked: “Just like he did to Brazzaville?” I was told that the French regarded the Mali situation as even worse than the Congo had been. In this case, it took only three weeks after the visit for the Mali government to be overthrown.

Sometime later, I asked my French friend about Bokassa, the horrible Prime Minister of the Central African Republic. I noted that I thought that Bokassa was a real threat and a terrible leader. I was then told that if we could find someone better in the CAR, the French would be glad to review the situation; they had not been able to find a better leader. I think these events and conversations were quite revealing about French African policies. They could and did manipulate the leadership in their former colonies.

I had a similar experience with the chief of the Middle East division in the Quai. Right after his inauguration in 1969, Nixon made his first Presidential trip to Europe. He came to Paris. The Quai official had not been very communicative, but when the visit was announced he came to me, under instructions, and said: “We are now going to try to work with the U.S. in the Middle East because we also are very concerned about Soviet penetration of the area”. So he gave me a complete run down on the briefing paper that the Quai had sent to de Gaulle for his discussions with Nixon. I was made privy to all of the details of French views and policies. I was able to get that information to Kissinger and Nixon's staff before their arrival in Paris. They were very interested and that French initiative led to four-power talks - U.S., France, Great Britain and the USSR - that were subsequently convened on the Middle East. It was a fascinating process because the French shifted their policy 180 degrees; instead of working against us, as they had been, they decided to try and work with us. They had come to the conclusion that the situation in the Middle East had so deteriorated by 1969 that cooperation was by far the better policy. They hoped that Nixon would be a willing partner and in fact, for a while, we did work together on Middle East issues. The four power talks did get started in Paris; I think Dick Funkhouser was our principal representative, but I went with him to all the meetings. His counterparts in the other three embassies were their countries' spokesmen. We were trying to foster and support the UN sponsored efforts led by Ambassador Jarring which were supposed to lead to a peaceful resolution of the complicated Middle East issues. There were parallel talks being held in New York, but that was no problem; the coordination was very good and we never got our signals mixed up. Our Paris group worked on some details. Paris was agreed upon as the location for the talks because the French had been the originators of the idea of four power talks. It was a de Gaulle initiative. Eventually, the talks collapsed because we and the French just had great difficulties working together on anything, particularly something as sensitive as the Middle East. Kissinger's approach, as the NSC Advisor, was to work quite independently

of the bureaucracy. Eventually, the talks collapsed; I won't say they were deliberatively sabotaged by us, but the NSC did not give it much support. Furthermore, the Israelis did not like the formula very much; they were left out of the talks.

At the beginning, I thought that those talks might actually produce some positive actions and coordinated policies. I did not find that the French and the USSR sided against us and the British, as was expected by some; I would say that in a majority of the questions, the French sided with their western allies. That gave me some hopes that the four power talks could have some successes. But like the Rogers' plan and other State Department initiatives, the four power talks in the final analysis went nowhere. Of course, in early 1969, none of us knew much if anything about Kissinger and his *modus operandi*. But we learned! One day, my friend at the Quai asked me to come over and he let me see a reporting telegram from the French Ambassador in Washington concerning a conversation he had had with Kissinger. After reading it, I wrote an “Official-Informal” letter to Joe Sisco then the Assistant Secretary for NEA, reporting what I had read. He was very grateful for that information because he said that this was the first time he had really found out what the details of Kissinger's Middle East policy were.

I mentioned Nixon's visit. I was involved to some degree with the arrangements. The President made a point of meeting with non-governmental officials - union leaders, youth leaders, political opposition. He tossed all these disparate elements together which was a good approach. In Paris, he just listened for about two hours, trying to get a sense of what the French “public” thought was going on. I found it a fascinating session and an interesting approach to getting a “feel for the country.” I arranged that meeting. But I also remember from that trip how difficult Ehrlichman and Haldeman were. They advanced the President’s visit. They demanded an extraordinary amount of detailed planning, making the visit seem more like a movie script than a spontaneous visit. We would have to chart the room that the President was going to enter and then describe - step by step - exactly how he would proceed to his seat. We would go over every inch of the event time and time again; it was an agonizing experience for the Embassy. Everyone charged with responsibility for a particular event had to draw these elaborate and very detailed plans.

I think in general my personal relationships with the French was quite good. As I said, after a while, several of the officials became quite open with me and we became good friends with a number of them. It made for very good collaboration. It takes the French a little while to extend trust to a foreigner, but once having done so, I found them quite easy to work with. I think we worked well together on Middle East and African matters. The existence of jobs in the Embassy concerned with regional affairs was very useful, particularly in the areas that I covered where France played a leading role. In many African countries they had the predominant role; in others they had important roles. It was in our interest to have officers stationed in Paris concerned with African, Middle East and Far Eastern affairs; the U.S. learned a lot about what was going on in those areas from the French - not only about what was going on, but also about what the French were going to do. Furthermore, African chiefs of state were coming to and going from Paris constantly; after I had become acquainted with their embassies, I also had an opportunity to meet with chiefs of state. That gave us one more point of contact with important

African persons - of course, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, we did care about Africa!

During my tour in Paris, the French were playing also a significant role in the Middle East and that made our liaison job in the Embassy a significant link in the process. Now the French have largely withdrawn from the Middle East, more or less, but at the time we are discussing, they were a significant player. I think our regional jobs were important not only because of France's roles in the areas, but also because it gave us an additional avenue for access to regional leaders who would visit Paris - that was true for African leaders, as I have mentioned, and Middle East leaders as well. It gave us another source of information of their perspectives on what was going on in their countries and regions. Since I also maintained contacts with the representatives of the African and Middle East countries in Paris, that was an additional source of information for us. Their ambassadors were considered among their top officials because France was an important country and the African and Middle East states used to send the best talent to represent them in France. These were very useful avenues for information collection and the expression of U.S. views on various issues. Since the U.S. had multiple channels to these leaders, there was always the theoretical risk of "mixed messages", but I never encountered such a situation. My main problem was essentially time; I didn't know what priority Washington gave to all of my contacts and work-load; I had to set my own priorities. I had more to do than I had time.

I earlier mentioned the student uprisings. I also mentioned that I had the "youth" portfolio in the Embassy; i.e. I was supposed to cover the comings and goings of the French younger generation. The student rebellion started in a courtyard of the Sorbonne University when two groups of students began to fight each other. The riot police then entered the University grounds trying to bring calm. Thereupon, all of the students turned on the police. That began to spill out of the University grounds unto the surrounding streets. More police came; more students came. That melee was joined by union rank and file members who joined the students. That brought police reinforcements from outside of Paris. The confrontation continued to escalate over a period of days. At one stage, de Gaulle left the country to meet with his generals in Germany; he was totally confused and didn't know what actions to take. When he returned, he found a situation totally out of control. I and others in the Embassy used to go to the Left Bank to observe the action with our own eyes. Much of my information on events came from my friend in Foccart's office; he kept me abreast of developments. Foccart soon brought his friends together - most of them having been veterans of de Gaulle's resistance forces. They organized counter moves, led by Foccart and the Minister of the Interior. After about three weeks of total chaos, they marshaled their forces for a big march down the Champs-Elysées. This turned the tide.

It was interesting to us in the Embassy to watch this rebellion spread - from the Sorbonne to Paris to other French cities and then nation-wide strikes. Union leaders were opposed to the participation of their members in the general strike. It was not like the general strike of a couple of months' ago which was led by union leaders; in 1968, it was the membership that led the general strike. They held huge parades, led by standard bearers waiving huge red and black flags. Interestingly enough, the Communist Party leadership

also did not support the strikes, but it was forced into support by its rank and file members. The union membership was in essence showing its dismay with ten years of authoritarian de Gaulle rule. They decided to act like "Frenchmen" and stand up for their own rights. So they did!
The change of direction in the Communist Party leadership was crucial to the outcome of the uprising. When that leadership decided to throw its lot with the rebels, it scared the hell out of the middle and upper French classes. The Communist made the uprising appear as its own; that allowed the government to capitalize on the fears of the majority of the French people.

From my point of view - i.e. as the "Youth" officer of the Embassy - , I found it most interesting to watch every major French professional sector - lawyers, doctors, professors, architects, etc - going through a similar process: the young professionals were in revolt against the leadership provided by the older generation. They viewed that leadership as authoritarian and rigid; they viewed the "professional" system as antediluvian - since its origins really stemmed back to the time of the French monarchy. So the revolution was not only in the streets, but throughout French society. All of the foundations of society were shaken; the younger generation was not willing to abide by the authoritarian regime that had been imposed on it by their elders - with de Gaulle being only a symbol of what in fact was a prevailing authoritarian process in all French institutions. The students, with whom we talked, expressed their hope that the American educational system could be exported to France. As always, these uprising had internal contradictions; on the one hand, we and the Soviets were being vilified because in the streets we were perceived as France's principal foreign "enemies"; on the other hand, the students wished for an educational system modeled after ours. Shriver played that for all it was worth; he was always ready to talk to the students about U.S. society and culture. He drew on his experiences in the Peace Corps; he reached out to the French youth and was a real asset for the U.S. image. The riots made no difference to Shriver's approach of trying to get American leadership together with French citizens; he just reveled in his efforts to bring the two communities together, whether through social events or just exchanges on the streets.

Another interesting aspect of the rebellion was the reaction of some of the senior French leaders, like Cabinet members. Although it was their generation and their institutions that were under attack, some of them were quite proud of their children who were rioting in the streets, building barricades and throwing bricks at the cops. They took great pride in their children who were behaving in the "typical" French manner - as history tells us. They thought it was wonderful! My friend in Foccart's office told me that the Prime Minister was making a big mistake when he decided to crack down on the students, including not permitting some of the leaders back into the country. My friend's advice to Foccart was to keep repressive measures to a minimum, in part because he felt that the Prime Minister's tactics were leading to further deterioration of the situation, not an improvement. But his advice was ignored.

The Embassy did not take any special security precautions because the students and the workers were not targeting the Embassy. Of course, life was hardly normal; there was no

gasoline, trains were not running, mail was not being delivered, no schools were open; very little of customary life remained the same. Phyllis finally said: “I think the strike will be broken soon because the women are becoming increasingly unhappy. They are shut in their apartments with the children. The men are having a great time occupying the factories; the women are going to start very soon taking the kids to the factories and dumping them on their husbands. That will bring the strike to a halt!” In fact, I think these domestic tensions did help end the strike. At the beginning of the revolution and for the following two weeks, people were very excited; they could join their friends in the streets and vent their frustrations without consequences. I have never seen a population so elated and on a “high”. There was real comraderie; people were picking up hitchhikers, people were talking to each other - a real feeling of community, such as one might see in Washington in a snowstorm in one of our neighborhoods. It was very un-French - they usually do not speak to strangers or join in communal activities. But after that initial feeling of freedom, the consequences of service stoppages began to fray people’s nerves. They began to wonder where and when it would all end. In light of recent events here in Washington, one can say that the French close their governments from below, we from above.

Let me expand a little on my role as the Embassy's “Youth” officer. Sarge asked in essence that a “Youth Committee” be established which would reach out to the younger Frenchmen - young Parliamentary deputies, student leaders, the young French leaders in all walks of life. At one time, he organized a tour of the U.S. for twelve of them, with transportation paid by some of his American friends - not the government. Fritz Stern came to Paris to pick up the crew and take them to and through the U.S.. The group consisted primarily of young professors and younger government officials who espoused anti-U.S. views, although they knew very little about us. We picked them very carefully. These were people who during the revolt had played key roles. Once this group got to the U.S., USIA picked them up and developed a program for them. The general concept was to expose these younger leaders to the U.S. so that they could talk somewhat more authoritatively about the U.S.. After they returned,, they were included in the *soirees* at the Residence as were many other younger French leaders. We would also include them in events in our apartments. Frances Cook and Ted McNamara, who were members of our “Youth Committee” were very active. I think I chaired the group, but it was an effort that depended on the work of all of us. Some of our more senior colleagues called it the “counter-embassy” because we used to cut across the standard lines of authority - sometime bypassing the Political and Economic Counselors. We used to quote the Ambassador as our authority which I am sure didn't make the seniors feel any better.

We met with the students continually in informal “bull” sessions. We were all about the same age. I don't believe I ever gave a formal speech, but we were in contact with those students all the time. It was great fun - for all of us, I believe. It was good for our morale; it added excitement to our work, even though it was in addition to our regular duties, which as I mentioned earlier, in my case certainly, was already more than I could handle. Unfortunately, I had left by the time the twelve younger leaders returned from their tour of the U.S., but I am sure that my Embassy colleagues stayed in touch with them.

I use this example of the younger leaders' travel to the U.S. as an illustration of Shriver's *modus operandi*. I thought it was marvelous. Had he been in France before the 1968 uprising, his approach would not have worked. At one time, we managed to get a hold of a report written by one of the provincial *prefects* to the Minister of Interior asking for guidance on how to handle the American Ambassador on his visits. He said that, if it were not the American Ambassador, he would have arrested him for subversive activities! The French were mystified by this very unconventional American envoy; neither they or the Embassy had ever worked with or for such an ambassador. I think the Shriver approach - which was replicated by others in other countries - was a real worthwhile effort. I wished it could have continued. It was atypical, but very effective. It was not the customary “stuffed shirt” approach that the Department, ambassadors and embassy staffs usually take. It requires an unusual leader who will infuse “his troops” with his or her enthusiasm for the unconventional. I thought Sarge's performance in Paris was exceptional and well worthwhile. He had the right perception of what moves a country.

I had some knowledge of the Vietnam talks that were being conducted in Paris while I was there because many of my Saigon friends participated in them. Holbrooke was there, Negroponte was there, Habib was there. We had all worked together in Saigon. I did not know about Kissinger's involvement in these talks. At my farewell party, Habib confessed that while Phyllis and I were on leave on the Riviera and he was using our apartment, he conducted the first secret talks with the North Vietnamese there. John Negroponte was both the interpreter and the food caterer - he had to get it so that the negotiators could eat in our apartment - so that the meetings might be less exposed to public observance. That explained some of the residue that we found when we returned from the Riviera which had been a mystery to us; we didn't know where all the left-overs had come from. So at my farewell - which took place six months after those negotiations had been held in our apartment - Phil explained what had happened. Of course, we knew that Harriman was in town and we knew that some discussions with the North Vietnamese were being held. The fact that negotiations had begun was also helpful to the Embassy because it improved the atmosphere in Paris for the conduct of U.S.-French bilateral issues. Just the fact that we were talking to the Vietnamese removed a French psychological block in the way they looked at the U.S.. I think they were pleased that we were talking to the Vietnamese and doing so in Paris. I think the initiation of these talks helped change the French attitude toward the U.S.; they viewed us thereafter in an entirely different light.

The change in French leadership - from de Gaulle to Pompidou - did not make that much of a difference because both men had basically the same view; their styles were different, but not their objectives or policies. Pompidou was elected because the French revolted against de Gaulle's authoritarianism, but I don't believe that basic French policy changed much because of the change of presidents. I was there when the change took place, but I think the new French attitude towards the U.S. preceded the change in presidents. Before the actual occurrence, I think that most people understood that de Gaulle was finished; his views were no longer dominant after the revolution of May 1968. I think that even de Gaulle knew that his days were numbered. He expected the referendum to be a vote on

his style of government as did the people and they rejected it. It was an elegant way for de Gaulle to leave; I think he felt that he would lose the referendum, and when he did, it was a graceful and democratic way to leave the presidency. I heard that his staff was already packing their stuff in their offices even before the results of the referendum were announced. I suspect that de Gaulle was willing to give the referendum a chance, but I doubt that he had much confidence in winning support. He considered the French people ungrateful for his past services to his country, but I suspect that he was quite fatalistic at the end - "If they are not with me, what can I can do?"

As a summary of my tour in Paris, I think I should say that my first year was terribly dull. I was just working on Africa, not the Middle East. There was very little action. But then the Department for budgetary reasons had to cut back on staff. The separate Middle East position was abolished and I inherited that portfolio. Then the action began. Nixon was inaugurated in 1969 and that started a cooperative effort between us and the French on the Middle East, as I described earlier. Shriver didn't leave Paris until March, 1970. The riots started in May 1968. All of these events made the last years of my tour very lively. I had fun in Paris. So did the family.

Q: Then, in 1970, Ambassador Charlie Yost asked you to join him in New York as a member of the UN delegation. How did that come about?

OAKLEY: Yost was looking for someone to handle the Middle East portfolio on his delegation. I had some knowledge of the area from my tour in Paris, especially my participation of the Four Powers talks in Paris. Through that participation, I must have come to the attention of the UN delegation, which led to Yost's offer, which I gladly accepted. I had not known Yost before.

In New York, I worked for Bill Buffum more than anyone else. The UN work centered around meetings; there were many of them, particularly with the Egyptian and Israeli delegations. I could learn a lot about what was going on from these meetings. Amr Mousa, a young Egyptian diplomat, about my age - perhaps even a little younger - was a member of the Egyptian delegation; he is now the Foreign Minister and very influential. I remember working with Rita Houser who was a member of our delegation, serving on the Legal Committee of the General Assembly. She was and still is a remarkable person. With a little help from me - but mostly on her own - she wrote a speech about the Geneva Convention and its relevance to the Occupied Territories. It was the first time the U.S. had made that linkage - to the great distress of the Israelis and the leaders of the Jewish community in New York. Rita stuck to her guns. She became a great friend of Arafat and counseled him prior to the Oslo process and since. That was a personal relationship that has survived for many years.

But the meetings went on all the time in connection with official UN committee meetings and for other reasons. In most instances, we and Washington were working very much in parallel. I knew Roy Atherton quite well - from my Paris days when he would come through town. I knew Hal Saunders from college days when we were classmates and good friends. Joe Sisco, I had worked for in the Office of UN Political Affairs - 1960-63.

Joe in fact was really the link in my assignments. So I knew the leading players on the Middle East in Washington quite well. In fact, I participated in some of the Middle East talks that Joe conducted with Soviet Ambassador Dobyrnin. Those Two Power talks were being conducted simultaneously with the Four Power talks which were being conducted in New York, having moved there from Paris.

The Two Power talks probably started in 1970. Kissinger had not yet established total control over U.S. foreign policy; he showed some reluctance to become involved in the Middle East early in his stewardship. Eventually, as he noted in his memoirs, he established his own channels to conduct the Middle East peace process independent of State's activities. Later on, he was able to say that the Department had screwed things up because the cease fire agreement had been negotiated, which was violated by the Egyptians.

The major objective of the Four Power talks held in New York was to agree on the details for the framework established by UN Resolution 242. There were a lot of details that the four countries had to agree to on withdrawal - from where, to where, etc. Some of the Four Power agreements in NY were later encompassed in the Rogers' Plan, after the Four Power talks had been abandoned for all practical purposes.

As I said, while these Four Power talks were on going, Sisco held his private discussions with Dobyrnin and his deputy, Yuli Vorontsov, who is now the Russian Ambassador to the U.S.. Out of that came the 1970 cease fire agreement. But, as I said earlier, the Egyptians subsequently violated it - with the support of the Soviets—by placing SAM missiles along the Suez Canal. The Israelis found out about that deployment and that brought all the discussions about peace to a screeching halt. As I also mentioned earlier, this Egyptian move was used by Kissinger against the State Department; he accused the Department of "allowing" the Egyptians to break the cease fire agreement.

I thought at the time that the Four Power talks could have been useful. But they became less and less important as agreement became harder and harder to achieve. We were limited on our side by the Israelis and the Soviets did not show enough flexibility. There weren't enough incentives for all sides to make the necessary compromises. The U.S. government wasn't willing to make the extra effort which would have required the imposition of some limitations on Israel. This was an outcome that might have been foreseen before the start of the talks, but it was not clear to me at least that the talks could not be conclusive. The Two Power talks were a little more specific. They were not about frameworks, but more concrete issues; in general, they were intended to enable the two super-powers to reach a better understanding of each other's positions. Those talks did lead to some agreement, but, as the Soviet Mission to the UN's Political Counselor told me when I showed him photographs of the SAM sites, there were times when the Soviet diplomats also did not know what was going on in the military sphere. The Soviet military had something going with the Egyptians and probably were not about to have it scuttled. The Politburo probably decided to work on two tracks, with neither necessarily knowing what was going on the other. I did have the feeling that Dobyrnin was interested in achieving some concrete results from his talks with Sisco, although the authority on

that is really Joe Sisco.

I said earlier that the UN delegation and Washington worked well together. I did have one personal disconnect and that was related to the 1971 Pakistani problem. Over a period of time, it became clear to me that the U.S. was tilting towards Pakistan and protecting it. Of course, I knew nothing at the time about Kissinger's use of Pakistan for our opening to China. We did not, for example, criticize Pakistan for its atrocious behavior in East Pakistan, where thousands of people were killed and millions of refugees were forced to flee. In New York, we worked out a plan with Brian Urquhart, the UN Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to have the ICRC (International Commission for Refugees) working in East Pakistan and the UNHCR (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) working in India with the East Pakistani refugees, along with many NGOs, to flood East Pakistan with relief workers in the hopes of stemming the violence being perpetrated on the population by the Pakistani military government. We hoped to stabilize the political situation.

Our hopes came to naught because Sadruddin Khan, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, wanted to have part of the action. He called a meeting in Geneva and told the delegates that a humanitarian peace keeping operation would be mounted - a phrase so much in vogue today. Both the Indians and the Pakistanis turned down the suggestion in a hurry. They would not support a peace keeping effort; they would have agreed on a humanitarian support program. But with some encouragement from the U.S. delegation, Urquhart convinced the Secretary General, U Thant, to send a letter to the five Permanent members of the Security Council, which in effect said that the East Pakistan situation was very likely to become a serious threat to international peace and security and he invited the five Powers to join him in taking some action to stem the deteriorating situation. We got word from Washington - from Kissinger - that under no circumstances would the U.S. join U Thant in his proposal. We were told that the U.S. would not put any pressure on our Pakistani friends and that we would therefore not participate in any action. Later that year, in December, Kissinger criticized the UN for "doing nothing" about the East Pakistan situation. I had no idea why Washington had put the damper on our efforts to do something about Pakistani atrocities; I was mystified and none of my colleagues in the Department could clarify Washington's policy on this issue before we learned of the U.S.-Pakistan-China connection.

I thought that the UN was a moderately useful institution. It was not terribly effective, but it was moderately useful for political purposes - not operational. It provided a good forum for multilateral and some bilateral discussions among and between countries. At the time, peace keeping was not a major activity; in fact, besides the development assistance programs, the UN did not conduct many activities at that time. But there were many political discussions among representatives of various countries. Of course, these talks, such as the Four Power ones, could have been held in another venue, but the UN was a convenient site.

On the Middle East *per se*, the US, as I said, was trying to move on the implementation of U.S. Resolution 242. The UN, through the good offices of Ambassador Jarring, had

not had much success, forcing the U.S. to become more and more active. As UN began to fade out of the picture, a vacuum was created into which we stepped. Despite Kissinger's misgivings, we pushed the Rogers' Plan which was met by a cold Israeli reaction. From that we went to the failed cease fire in 1970; then to a period of detente, during which we and the Soviets agreed just to put a lid on the Middle East. Eventually that lid blew off because Sadat could not take it anymore; he found a situation of "no peace, no war" intolerable; we didn't take his warnings seriously enough because he did go to war.

I think I had some impact on our UN activities. Even though I was only a middle grade officer, I think people listened to my ideas, both on Middle East issues and others - both in New York and in Washington. Urquhart and I were very good friends and we worked together very closely. The Washington backstopping was quite good; there was no perceivable friction between the Bureau for International Organizations (IO) and the Bureau for Near East Affairs (NEA). I do remember, with some amusement, that when Joe Sisco was the IO Assistant Secretary, he would always latch on to Middle East issues under the guise that these issues were being discussed in UN context. But when he became the Assistant Secretary for NEA, all of a sudden the UN had nothing to do with the Middle East; the issues were all regional and therefore under the purview of the regional bureau - a classic example of "where you sit, determines where you stand." I think Joe understood that even better when one day he went to the Department in a snowstorm on a snowplow and his picture appeared on the front page of the "Washington Post" the next morning. Being responsible for the Middle East made him a front page item, but only Joe could pull off going to work on a snowplow!

I thought my tour at the UN very worthwhile. I got to know George Bush there; he had an "open door" policy - although I had excellent access to Yost as well - and somewhat like Shriver, liked new ideas and approaches. I think the nature of the our delegation changed when Bush took charge. In fact, I think there were some similarities in the change from Bohlen to Shriver in Paris and from Yost to Bush in New York. The U.S. delegation at the UN became a much livelier place; I think it took on greater importance in the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. Although quite different personalities, both Shriver and Bush were "political animals" with considerable clout in Washington. Both were more open and more lively than their professional predecessors. The Delegation worked well under Yost. It was well organized, but Bush brought to it a new life.

Bush spent some time on Middle East issues, but it was not during this period the priority that it became later. I have always been an activist and undoubtedly I would have liked to see a greater U.S. engagement in the region. I am not sure that I fully understood at the time the dynamics of the political situation in the area; I don't think I predicted catastrophe unless the U.S. became more involved. Everyone was still under influence of the 1967 events when the Arabs were beaten so badly; I don't think in the late 1960s or early 1970s anyone was predicting a resumption of hostilities. As a matter of fact, the record I think will show that the Israelis themselves in 1973 refused to believe that Sadat would mount an attack, they believed that the Egyptians were conducting "military exercises." We did notice the Soviets and the Egyptians making some minor moves along

the Canal, but that was not considered a threat and therefore not very effective. I don't think anyone in this period was concerned about renewal of hostilities. We were more concerned about Soviet penetration of the Arab world.

Q: After your tour at the UN, you were assigned in 1971 to Beirut as the Political Counselor. How did that assignment come about?

OAKLEY: It was a lucky assignment. Beirut at the time was calm and as I think most observers will vouch, it was a very lovely city with great places to eat, swim, and enjoy life. I don't think the Oakleys ever found a better place. Bill Buffum, for whom I worked in NY, became our Ambassador to Lebanon and he asked that I join his staff. I remember the advice I received from my first ambassador, Jimmy Moose; he said: “What will become of you in your Foreign Service career will be determined by the time it is all over in equal proportions by three factors: what you know, who you know, and luck!” In the case of Beirut, it was that someone whom I knew had some appreciation for my abilities - or potential - and asked me to become the Embassy’s Political Counselor.

I knew very little about the Lebanon situation before the assignment was made. I didn't have much briefing either; as usual it was ”hurry up and get there” - as all my assignments have been. I have always envied those who had time for language and area training. As I said, Buffum was the Ambassador; Bob Houghton was the DCM. Bob was the “Arabist;” neither Buffum or I were.

In the early 1970s, we were not interested so much in Lebanon. We still viewed Lebanon as a side show in the Middle East. There was some U.S. interest in Lebanese commercial opportunities because at this time, Lebanon was the cross-roads for Middle East commercial traffic. After the 1973 war, with the major spike in oil prices, we began to deal directly with the Persian Gulf states and other countries that until then had been reluctant to deal directly with the U.S. because of the Arab-Israel conflict. So until then, Lebanon was the center of our economic relations with Arab states. Egyptian, Saudi, Jordanian, Kuwaiti entrepreneurs and commercial people like bankers used to come to Beirut to transact business. By the time I left, the reduction in the importance of Lebanon as a commercial center was really beginning, in part as I said because of the opening of the Arab world to the U.S. which included the infusion of sizeable investments. Then came the Lebanese civil war, which certainly reduced and practically eliminated that country from commercial activities. But in the early 1970s, our main interests in Lebanon were still commerce.

This U.S. focus probably led to some feeling in the Embassy that it was being somewhat neglected by Washington. But both Buffum and I recognized that it was hard for us - in a post considered not central to U.S. foreign policy - to have our views taken very seriously by senior officials in Washington. I always had an aversion to claiming that my post was the center of the universe; so did Buffum. So we accepted our lot and didn't mount any campaign for “greater recognition.”

Beneath the surface calm, there were many rivalries in Lebanon. There was some

terrorism, primarily conducted by one group of Palestinians or another. They used Lebanon as their home base; more specifically, the refugee camps were the breeding grounds both for recruitment and for base of operations. Organizations like the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigades, the Armenian terrorist groups in addition to the Palestinian groups used the camps as "home base." There were tensions between the Palestinians and the Lebanese government, which at the time was dominated by the Maronite Christians. There were tensions between the Maronites and the Lebanese Sunni and the Shiites - the Muslims groups. The Sunnis had some influence at the time; the Shiites practically none. These tensions were evident in the early 1970s although they had not yet exploded in open combat. The Maronites opposed strongly all Palestinian activities within Lebanon; they would have preferred to have the Palestinians leave the country. The Sunnis on the other hand defended the Palestinians. The division of political power [between Christians and Muslims] was based on a census that had taken place decades earlier, which was obviously outdated, but was accepted by all parties as politically expedient. As I said, the tensions were beneath the surface.

My wife and I had been in Beirut about two weeks when we were invited for dinner at his house by a Maronite deputy, who lived about half way up the mountain which separated Beirut from Alay. The deputy's son and daughter - both in their 20s - joined us for dinner and we had a wonderful evening. We spoke French, had French wine, French food. The son had graduated from a law school in Paris; the daughter was a graduate of a French medical school. After dinner, former President Chamoun joined us along with some of his militiamen - all dressed in their "tiger" suits. They sat down and had a great time reminiscing about the events of the previous year; they had used this house to plan and conduct an ambush of a Palestinian funeral courtege that was winding its way back to Beirut from the Bekaa Valley. A few hundred yards from this house was an S curve in the mountainous road, which forced traffic to come almost to a full stop to navigate the road. The Maronites at the dinner bragged how they had killed thirty Palestinians and had wounded forty of them; they thought it had been a great evening's work. I was flabbergasted; on the way home, I commented to Phyllis that I could not comprehend how civilized our hosts had been and yet at the same time could relish their participation in a human slaughter. I had a hard time comprehending this dichotomy in their personality. At the time, as I have said, open internal hostilities amongst Lebanese had not yet broken out, but that evening was a real lesson for me about what was going on beneath the apparent calm political atmosphere in Lebanon. I was also convinced that the Chamoun appearance, which caught me entirely by surprise, was obviously staged for my benefit as was the after dinner conversation. This bizarre episode left an impression; no doubt about that. I wondered what kind of a strange world Lebanon really was - from a civilized French atmosphere one minute to the middle ages the next!

This Lebanese chameleon quality repeated itself several times during our tour. One faction or another was always trying to impress us with their power. In the story I just related, not only was I meant to understand the Maronite power, but obviously I was also to be impressed by the deputy's relationship to Chamoun. All of us Americans at the Embassy were courted by the various Lebanese factions and individuals. The U.S. was viewed as a mighty power and the Christians, at least, as well as some Sunnis who were

part of the establishment hoped - and some probably really believed - that we would protect them. The French were similarly viewed as protectors of the *status quo*. Of course, we were also viewed as the "issuers of visas" - a commodity in great demand.

We were always being solicited by one group or another to intercede on its behalf. I remember that on one occasion, the Station Chief and I sat down to discuss the political situation. We agreed that the U.S. would be very wise not to have any direct linkages to any of the political groups. CIA, based on the Station Chief's recommendations, directed that direct, covert relationships with certain Christian groups, which had been in existence for years and years, be terminated. The Phalange was the group that had had the closest relationship to the CIA. I thought that the Agency had taken the right action because we had come to the conclusion that - given the widespread foreign involvement in Lebanon political affairs - including the Egyptians, the Israelis, the Saudis, the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Iranians and others - the more we became involved with one group or another the less influence we would have overall because other powers would more than match our own efforts, thereby starting a race for influence that we could probably not win. Therefore, it became clear to us that the wiser course was for the U.S. to keep its distance from all groups and appear to be more of a neutral observer and not so much an active participant in Lebanese politics.

I might just describe an incident at this stage which illustrates my point. One of the owners of a large English-language newspaper invited the Oakleys to have dinner with him. Phyllis and I had a great conversation with him. At one stage, he began to complain how the U.S. was corrupting the freedom of the Lebanese press by funneling assistance to one or another of his competitors. I explained to him, as emphatically as I could, that history notwithstanding, I could categorically assure him that at that time neither the CIA nor any other part of the U.S. government was providing any funds or assistance to any Lebanese newspapers. The next morning, I got a note from him suggesting that since we were not supporting any of his rivals, would we consider putting some money into his newspaper!

There were a lot of myths about the U.S. in Lebanon at the time. That had been historically true and was true for many years after I left. We had no hopes of killing the rumors and the misperceptions, but we hoped that we might change the realities. The Station Chief was instrumental in this effort. When one of his people was transferred, the replacement never picked up his predecessor's links to certain Lebanese individuals. It was easier for the Political Section because we had never had any operational role and therefore under the new U.S. policy did not have to change our behavior. Tom Carolan was my deputy; he was a wonderful "Arabist". He was very useful; he finally managed to restore the Arab language training program in Beirut. He was also instrumental in restoring a program of Arab specialists in the Foreign Service when he joined the Office of Personnel after his tour in Lebanon.

Despite the surface calm, we were always concerned about the political stability of Lebanon. The problems in Lebanon revolved around four factors: religion, personalities, outside meddling of other governments in support of specific factions and ambitions for

power. These four factors played off against each other. It was an obvious cauldron waiting to boil over. There was always some unease because there were many small clashes and frictions between groups - even within the Muslim and Christian communities. In 1972, there was a major confrontation between the PLO and the Lebanese government, which could have reached the level of intensity that occurred in 1970 when the King of Jordan had to order his army out against the PLO there. The seeds of Lebanese confrontation started in the South where the PLO had increasingly assumed the functions of a sovereign power. They had their own road blocks; they chased the Lebanese army and police out of the area. Finally two good friends of mine - the Army's Assistant Chief for Intelligence and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations - persuaded the Army Chief who in turn persuaded the President of Lebanon to allow them to conduct a raid on the PLO headquarters, which was then located in the refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila - located between downtown Beirut and the international airport. The President stewed over the recommendation for a long time; he finally approved. The Lebanese army began its sweep at noon of the appointed day. By six that afternoon, they had gone through about 2/3 of the camps, inflicting about a dozen Palestinian casualties while suffering three or four army losses. The army, composed of members of many Lebanese communities - Shiites, Sunnis, Druse, Maronites - held together admirably. The soldiers fought side by side as a single unit. There was no unrest whatsoever in the rest of Lebanon; in fact, most people were relieved that the government was finally taking a strong stand against the PLO. President Franjieh was approached that afternoon by all Arab ambassadors who complained bitterly about the army's actions. By seven that evening, he lost his nerve and recalled his troops from the camps. Included among the ambassadors was the Syrian, but in the early 1970s Syria did not have the sway over Lebanon that it subsequently mustered.

In June 1972 - a month after this raid - the Political Section managed to get a hold of a PLO "after-action" report. It admitted that the raid had almost been totally successful in destroying the PLO chain of command because it had all been centralized in Sabra-Shatila. The conclusion of this report was that the PLO headquarters would have to spread out into other camps and neighborhoods, especially the poor ones in Beirut which were mostly filled by the Shiites and some Sunnis. The arm caches were to be disbursed in many neighborhoods. The PLO was to open small offices in many neighborhoods to recruit and decentralize their operations. This same report also concluded that the PLO needed to obtain greater support from the Syrians, who had not raised a finger during the recent confrontation. It was also stated that the PLO had to be much more vigilant about the Lebanese army because the raid might occur again.

The President's decision also had an impact on the Christian communities. The more aggressive, such as the Phalange, came to the conclusion that the government then in power did not have sufficient backbone and the army was too weak to impose its will. The conclusion reached was that the Christian community would have to look to its own resources to protect its interests; that meant that Christian officers and men had to be pulled out of the army and assigned to the Christian militias. The inconclusive raid on Sabra-Shatila therefore became one of the key points in the unraveling of the Lebanese country; the splintering really began after that. I therefore consider summer of 1972 to

have been the time when Lebanon really began to fall apart as a nation.

The U.S. refused to provide any significant military assistance to the Lebanese army. We provided some small arms and equipment, but it was nothing like the support we gave the Jordanian army in 1970. The Lebanese wanted the same treatment; we never did reply to their request. So military assistance became a major issue in our relations with Lebanon. I think we should have provided some arms and equipment - limited, but more than we were willing to do. I looked at the issue as a political one and felt that greater assistance was required to shore up the Lebanese army against the PLO, and to shore up President Franjieh. But at that stage Washington was preoccupied with other issues; furthermore, probably the other Arab governments would have objected to an increased assistance program to the Lebanese army to use against Palestinians. So Washington's decision was not to get involved.

I mentioned Sabra-Shatila. I visited them as well as other refugee camps. I never saw any hostile reaction by the people living there. But it was obvious that these camps were and would increasingly be the breeding ground for major problems. They were obviously over-crowded and suffering from the lack of infrastructure and employment. But having served in Africa, I probably did not have as strong a reaction than others might have had. But the contrast between the camps and the rest of the Beirut was noticeable. Of course, the camps tended to be in poor neighborhoods, which made the contrast not quite as stark. The presence of refugee camps, the poor neighborhoods, the glitter of certain parts of Beirut just accented the wide gaps in the socio-economic conditions of the various elements of Lebanese society. Everybody understood that these wide discrepancies - particularly the refugee camps - would sooner or later be the kindling points for a major conflagration.

The only major assistance agency was UNRWA - a UN refugee assistance program. But in general, the Lebanese government was not interested in using its own funds or as a matter of fact having any other government or institution using their resources to alleviate the poverty in the camps. A lot of the refugees had been chased out of Jordan into Lebanon in 1970; they had crossed into Jordan from the West bank after the 1967 war. But in the early 1970s, the world’s major powers had other fish to fry; they had not become fully aware of the ticking time bomb that was Lebanon. Alarm about terrorism had not yet reached the level when it could have provoked the major powers into action. There was a hijacking of aircraft and smaller terrorist actions, but the scope of terrorist activity had not yet reached the crisis point it would later.

Some of the terrorism came from Iraqi and Syrian agents fighting each other in the streets of Beirut. In the early 1970s, both Iraq and Syria vied for influence in Lebanon and especially about who would be the leader of the Baath Party. The two countries tried to resolve that issue by fighting in Lebanon; that was true for many Arab disputes - they were settled in the streets of Beirut. For example, the Iraqis and the Iranians were fighting for control of the Shiite population. Lebanon's wealth and influence made it an attractive target for foreign manipulations. I pointed out to one of my Lebanese friends one day that almost every Arab country was trying to have some influence in one or another of

Lebanon's political parties. Each Arab country also seemed to have a stake in one or another of Lebanon’s newspapers. These Arab countries were smuggling arms and money into Lebanon. I wondered whether my friend was not concerned about this foreign interference. He said: “No, not in the least. It is great for trade. You don't understand our history. We have always had an 'open door' policy which permitted all sorts of different groups into Lebanon. We calculate that these groups cancel each other out - and that no single one will be the most powerful and influential. In the process, we get rich!” It was a very benign view of the world which I suspect the Lebanese may have later regretted.

I had an interesting commercial experience. One of the major Lebanese banks, which collapsed, was owned in part by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). In fact, CCC was the bank’s biggest stockholder, followed by the government of Lebanon. The bank had a well-deserved reputation for being less than above board; so when it collapsed, no great harm was done, except that the U.S. was left holding the bag. Donald Nixon's son - the President's nephew - came to Beirut with an entourage which included an American wheeler-dealer. They wanted to buy the bank. There was a difference of opinion in the Embassy. There was a group, primarily the economic-commercial officers who wanted to let the deal go through. Buffum and I had great reservations; we didn't like the “smell” of it. We knew that the bank had been corrupt and that the man accompanying Nixon's nephew also did not have a savory reputation. We were trying to clean up the bank so that it could pay its debts to the legitimate customers. We weren't sure that the American buyers had the same concerns. So we plotted to have the Agricultural Attache, who represented the CCC, and the government of Lebanon postpone the offer. The bank's board met every month. After the first meeting after the offer was tendered, the Ambassador was approached by the Legal Attaché [the FBI representative] who had a message from Mitchell, the Attorney General. The message requested that the board at its next meeting give more favorable consideration to the Nixon offer. There was also a call from Haldeman's office in the White House, making the same request. But we decided to stick to the “no action” scenario.

It was not much later that “Watergate” hit the headlines. We sent back an “innocent” cable to the Department saying that we had heard from Mitchell and Haldeman, via their intermediaries. We said that our policy was to treat the Nixon offer as we would that proffered by any American businessman. We then added that if the Department wished to have the matter treated differently, it should issue appropriate instructions to us. It was obvious that our message seemed to have hit a sore spot because we heard a lot of squawking and noise; we understood that the Attorney General's office denied that Mitchell had ever been involved. We had created a huge flap in Washington. We heard no more about the matter.

We had no contact with Israeli agents in Lebanon. One night, some Israeli commandos landed on the beaches of Beirut, found their way into town, killed three prominent PLO leaders and blew up an apartment building in the center of the city. They were never caught. We were accused of having facilitated their departure because it was popularly believed that when they retreated, they entered the Embassy compound and used a tunnel that led to the sea, where a submarine was waiting to pick them up. Otherwise, I don't

think the Israelis were a factor in Lebanon in the early 1970s.

Before concluding this discussion of my tour in Lebanon, I would like to make a personal observation about which I feel very strongly. Having watched the U.S. in various places around the world - Vietnam, Sudan etc - I observed that the U.S. periodically made commitments to individuals and groups; then when these people got in trouble, we did not stand behind our commitments. I strongly believe that this was and is very poor policy. I drew a personal lesson from this observation which influenced me for the rest of my diplomatic career; I swore that as long as I had anything to do with policy development, I would never fall into that error. I made a special effort in subsequent assignments not to mislead others about support they might expect. That is why I worked with the Station Chief to bring our activities in Lebanon back to where I thought they should be; i.e. neutrality. Before I left Beirut in 1974, I made a point of calling on people like Chamoun, Gemayel, and other Lebanese leaders to say my farewells. I had known most of them as personal friends. In my farewell call, I told each that I hoped that they were not under a mistaken belief that the U.S. would send its military forces into Lebanon to help one faction or another. I predicted that such event would never occur. I opined that neither the French or the British would intervene militarily. I suggested to each of the leaders that they behave in the future with this cautionary note in mind. I added that I thought that Lebanon had a good future, even though after the 1973 war, there had been a lot of changes in the Middle East and in Lebanon. I was referring to the fact that Syria was stronger than it had been, that Saudi Arabia was opening its country to foreign investment, but I thought that nevertheless that if Lebanon could stabilize its internal political tensions, it could balance the interests of the Syrians, the Saudis and the Egyptians in such a way that it would work to Lebanon's importance. But if the Lebanese continued to maintain that they were the bastion of Western civilization, that would be a huge mistake which would not sit well with their Arab neighbors. Then I repeated my prediction that if Lebanon was counting on U.S. military support in the event of an Arab attack, that would just compound their error in judgement. Most of my interlocutors didn’t believe me; they were sure that the U.S. would come to Lebanon’s aid. I repeated my prediction that we would not - and as history shows, we didn't.

Before closing my comments on my Beirut assignment, I should mention that one of my jobs there was liaison with the PLO - not directly with Arafat, but with some of his lieutenants - particularly with a Palestinian professor at the American University. I acted on Washington instructions. At one point, the professor and I were the intermediaries in the exchange of papers between Kissinger and Arafat. The papers were “non-papers”; that is to say, they had no identifying marks. There was no heading nor a signature. But they were messages that we and the professor exchanged in Beirut. This was later revealed by a PLO defector who joined the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine using this exchange as one of the reasons he left the PLO because it allegedly showed to him that Arafat was too close to the US. I think in the period we were discussing, I was only one channel to the PLO. Undoubtedly we ran some intelligence operations, but I think I was the only official channel to the PLO. When my operation became public, Kissinger was furious and was blaming me, but I pointed out that I could not be held responsible for PLO defectors who leaked information given to them by Arafat.

Q: Then in 1974, you were transferred to Washington to take on the job as the senior staffer on the Middle East on the Department's Policy Planning staff [S/P].

OAKLEY: I had not sought the S/P assignment; I knew it was time for me to have a Washington assignment and I was satisfied with the S/P offer particularly since I would be working on Middle East issues. I knew the issues and most of the Washington players, like Sisco, Atherton and Saunders. I stayed in the Policy Planning Staff for about six months, which actually started with an assignment of six weeks in Geneva where the U.S. and USSR were co-chairing the talks on the Middle East. We kept stringing the Soviets along promising more meetings in Geneva - while Kissinger was conducting his "shuttle diplomacy" first with Egypt and then with Syria. One of the goals of the "shuttle diplomacy" was to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East. The Geneva "talks" were essentially a sop to the Soviets who kept complaining that they were being left out of Middle East affairs, although nominally they co-chair of a group that was established to bring some settlement to the area. In order to make it appear that the U.S. had some interest in keeping Geneva going, I was sent there from Beirut as sort of an advance man - somewhat as a decoy to make the Soviets feel that we were interested in some cooperative action with them. I was pretty sure that no meetings would be held in Geneva, but my job was to make it appear that I was busily engaged in preparations for those meetings. In fact, I sat around for most of the six weeks doing little while appearing to be very busy. There would be occasional meetings with the Soviets, just to keep up the pretense, but no serious business was ever transacted. For those six weeks, I was the lone U.S. representative to the Middle East talks to be held in Geneva.

After actually reporting to the Department, I participated soon after my arrival in a Palestinian Working Group which was the first U.S. government effort to study that group in depth. The working group had on it people like Hal Saunders who had worked on the Middle East for some time and academics and other outside experts like Joe Johnson. I don't think we came to any revolutionary conclusions, but several of Israel's friends were somewhat upset by our report.

Most of my work consisted of participating with others as a support group for Kissinger as his Middle East policy evolved. Bill Quandt was with Hal Saunders in the NSC, but was phasing out. They and Roy Atherton, the Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA, Joe Sisco, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and I acted as a think-tank on Middle East policy and fed ideas to Kissinger. We were planning for a disengagement agreement for Jordan; that had top priority in our policy. That agreement never came to fruition as Kissinger explains in his "Memoirs" because it was just politically too difficult, even though we had promised it to the King of Jordan. Eventually, we began to focus on a second disengagement agreement for Egypt. All of these efforts are covered in some detail in Quandt's and Saunders' writings.

Q: I believe that during your S/P tour, you became involved in the Cyprus crisis. Can you tell us about that?

OAKLEY: Because of my work for the Policy Planning Staff, I found myself collaborating with Joe Sisco once again. As I have said earlier, I had worked for Joe when he was the Director for UN Political Affairs and then later when I was at the UN. It just so happened, that in 1974, Cyprus was a hot issue. Responsibility for that country as well as Greece and Turkey had just been transferred from NEA to EUR. EUR, as the new boy on the block, didn't know how to handle the crisis. In the area, there were many signs pointing to the possibility of a real war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. EUR was lost and Sisco stepped in to manage U.S. policy. He asked me to join his crisis management team. I said that I had my hands full with Middle East problems. Joe, in his inimitable fashion said: "I know you, Bob, and I can work with you. Let's go!"

So we started on a trip to the region - Joe and I and several people from EUR and IO. Bill Buffum had by this time returned from Lebanon and was the Assistant Secretary of IO; he and Joe had worked closely together before and would do so again on the Cyprus problem. We were trying to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey. I am happy to say that we were successful. The trip was very interesting. It was plain that the Greek military junta was being very tough; the Turks were on the verge of moving. Our first stop was Athens where we argued that the Greeks should make some concessions to the Turks. Those few days in Athens were unforgettable. First we were briefed by the Embassy, including the CIA. The latter had said previously that they had assurances from Dimitrios Ioannidis, the power behind the Junta, that the Greeks would not take any action against Makarios on Cyprus - there had been earlier some concern on our part that the Greeks would take some action against the Archbishop. After having those assurances, the U.S. relaxed until we found one morning that in fact the Greeks had taken action precipitating the crisis. So when we arrived in Athens, the CIA was already shaken. It was also clear that Ambassador Tasca was very much under the influence of the Station Chief. He didn't have a DCM - he had in effect eliminated the position. He told us that the U.S. had to intervene by bringing the Sixth Fleet into that part of the Mediterranean, as we had done in an earlier Cyprus crisis. If we did not bring our military power to bear, Tasca predicted that the Greeks would attack Turkey. Sisco and I looked at him unbelievingly; it was clear to us that regardless of Ioannidis braggadocio, he was not stupid enough to attack the powerful Turkey directly. Tasca would not change his tune and insisted the Sixth Fleet be brought off shore; that was the Station's line and Tasca had bought it lock, stock and barrel. There was no way the U.S. would do that.

We kept trying and trying to see the real leaders of the Junta; our first conversations were only with the nominal government leaders. After many tries, we were finally escorted through a large crowd of security people into the principal government building in downtown Athens. That building was guarded not only by uniformed personnel, but cops and security people in civilian clothing. We were taken to the basement of the building. There we began to talk again with the nominal leadership. After about half an hour, Ioannidis walked in - as I said, he was the real power behind the Junta. He said that the Greeks would not make anymore concessions; they had gone as far as they would.

So we went to Ankara, essentially with empty bags having come to the conclusions that a) the Greeks were immobilized, thereby inviting a Turkish attack on Cyprus and b) the

Greeks were not about to attack Turkey - despite CIA's and Tasca's predictions. But we went to Ankara anyway to see whether we could talk the Turks from taking action. We didn't have much hope of swaying the Turks, but we had to try to avert war. Paul Hare was with us in charge of our public affairs. On one morning, at 3 a.m. we were sitting in Prime Minister [Bulent] Ecevit's office, when he came in saying: “I have just been to our National Security Council meeting where we agreed that we have no choice except to go to the assistance of our brothers on Cyprus. Our ships will land on the Cyprus beaches in three hours." He looked at Hare and said: “I remember your father was involved in a prior similar situation. At that time, the U.S. assured us that it would take care of the interests of the Turkish minority on Cyprus if we refrained from military action. There was a second situation when the same promise was made. In both cases, you did nothing. Now the situation for our people on Cyprus is even worse; so this time we will go our way, not yours!” After that, there was nothing more we could do; so we rushed to the airport and took off just before the airport was closed to all civilian traffic.

We went back to Athens. After the military debacle on Cyprus - the Greeks having been pushed around by the Turkish army - we found Admiral Arapakis - the Chief of the Navy and a member of the Junta - who was willing to sign a cease-fire agreement that we had worked out. We believed that the Turks would also sign. In fact, the Admiral was the only member of the Junta who could still be found; the rest had disappeared. We later found out that the Junta had planned to bring back Karamanlis, a popular Greek leader who at the time was exiled in Paris. The Junta was going to bring him back and have him sign the cease fire agreement. After having signed that humiliating piece of paper, the Junta was going to try to defame Karamanlis and make a comeback.

But we did not want to wait for too long; we insisted that some Greek leader sign the cease fire right then and there. We waited for three days to find a Greek leader who could sign the cease fire. It just happened that one of the Embassy's local employees was a nephew of Admiral Arapakis. He took us to his uncle's house in the middle of the night; the Admiral agreed to sign, but only after he had talked to Kissinger. We called the Department and the duty officer was finally able to track the Secretary down - he was having dinner with his wife and Winston and Betty Lord at the Empress Restaurant. Kissinger, in his usual fashion, got on the phone and said: “Sisco, what the hell do you want?” Joe told him that he had to talk to the Admiral; Henry objected; he wanted to return to his fine Chinese dinner. Finally grudgingly, Kissinger agreed to talk to the Admiral who then also agreed to sign the cease fire agreement - the Greeks were ready to stop hostilities.

I mentioned that it took us three days to find the Admiral. When we arrived in Athens on a Friday afternoon, Ambassador Tasca announced that he was having house guests and therefore he could not invite Joe to the Residence, as he had on the previous visit. So Sisco slept in Tasca's office; I slept in the DCM's office for the week-end.

On Monday morning, the Administrative Officer decided that he had to talk to Joe about some internal Embassy problem. That led me to suggest that we had been in Athens too long. I said that since we had just gotten the Admiral’s agreement we had better leave

before the Embassy decided that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs was there to sort out all sorts of minor details. I should note that we didn't see Tasca for the whole week-end; he entertained his guests, while Joe and his delegation ran around Athens looking for any member of the Junta to stop the war.

Then it was time to tackle the Turks again. But they wouldn't give clearance to our plane. They knew why we were coming back to Ankara and they weren't really willing to stop their military advances quite yet. They were moving forward, but had not gone as far on the island as their schedule had called for. Sisco called Ambassador Macomber from the Athens airport. He told the Ambassador to see the Foreign Minister immediately and to have the Defense Attaché see the Chief of Staff with the message that we were not going to tolerate anymore stalling. Joe said that we were taking off immediately for Turkey; we would be in Turkish airspace in an hour. If the Turks wanted to shoot down the personal representative of the President of the United States, they could do so. Otherwise he would land in Ankara. Our pilots were extremely nervous; they wanted to know what they were to do once we had gotten near Turkish airspace without clearance. Sisco told them that if we had not received clearance to land by that time, we would circle.

About five minutes before we were to leave Greek airspace, we got our clearance. Not only that, but once we got into Turkish airspace, the Turks provided us with fighter escorts to lead us in to Ankara. After landing we had to find Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit. Macomber's repeated calls were not being answered. Sisco finally remembered that he had a friend in the Turkish government from his days at the UN. The Turkish friend at the time was an Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the Foreign Office. Sisco told me to go upstairs with him to try to find his friend. Downstairs, there was a large group of Embassy officer sitting around a circle debating what we should do next - that was Macomber's decision making process. Sisco became frustrated with this approach. He beckoned me to step outside the room and to get his friend on the phone. I was a member of S/P; I had not worked on Turkey and didn't have the slightest idea who the officials were. Anyway, I put a call in to the Under Secretary. I told him that I had to have a call back within thirty minutes confirming that Sisco had an appointment with the Prime Minister. Otherwise, Sisco would leave and return to the U.S. and tell everyone that the Turkish Prime Minister would not receive the personal representative of the President of the US. Within twenty minutes, the Under Secretary called; he told me to tell Joe that he had arranged a meeting with the Foreign Minister. I objected and said that Joe didn't want to see the Foreign Minister; he wanted to see the Prime Minister; no one less would do. Nevertheless, the Under Secretary insisted that Joe come to the Foreign Minister's office at 8:15 a.m. I asked whether this ploy would work; Joe's Turkish friend expressed the hope that it would work.

So we showed up at the Foreign Minister's office at the appointed hour. And the Prime Minister showed up, coming in by a side door. He didn't want to be seen meeting with Joe. In any case, the Turks finally agreed to sign the cease fire agreement, but only after Sisco threatened to cease all assistance and withdraw all support from Turkey. I should mention that Sisco had had the foresight to call Kissinger the previous day to review what he would say; he was certain that the Turks would monitor the conversation and therefore

know that on the next day, Sisco would not be bluffing. There was something else at work then and again later on. Ecevit had been a [student] Professor Kissinger at Harvard. Kissinger had a predisposition to believe that any of his students would automatically do his bidding. He was certain that Ecevit would not cause any problems because of this professor-student relationship. Of course, it didn't quite work out that way, at least initially. But the Prime Minister knew that Sisco had Kissinger's approval to a complete cut off of assistance and that finally convinced them to sign the cease fire agreement.

As we were flying home, Sisco commented that in light of our experiences in Athens, we had to find a DCM - whether Tasca liked it or not. That would then have in place someone who could act as Chargé after Tasca's removal. When Joe returned to Washington, he sent a note to Kissinger about Tasca's political naivete as well as his behavior. Joe was outraged by what he found in Athens; he had not been advised by how bad the situation there had been. When Kissinger agreed to get Tasca out, the Department found Monty Stearns in the backwoods of Maine, where he was vacationing. Monty was shipped out within two days as the unrequested DCM; a week later Tasca was recalled.

I traveled twice more on the Cyprus issue. The first time I went with Buffum to meet the British, the Turks and Greeks to work on a proposal which had been essentially drafted by the Turks. It established a series of "Cantons" in Cyprus intended to settle the dispute on the ground, going beyond the cease fire. It would have ratified the situation that existed at the time the cease fire was signed and turn the situation into a permanent settlement. We worked on this document laboriously and tabled the draft. We returned to Washington when the Greeks refused to accept the draft.

The second time I went to the area with Art Hartman, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; we were a delegation of two. It was in August, 1974. Before we left, we were instructed by Kissinger who told us that "some things may happen in Washington while you are gone." He never said or hinted what that was. But he said that we were to tell each and every foreign official we saw that regardless of what might be happening in Washington or what they may be perceiving as happening in Washington, the U.S. would react very strongly to any provocation or interference with our goals - he said that he meant the Soviets especially, but the same U.S. policy would apply to any foreign power. Neither Art or I had any idea to what Kissinger might be referring.

Our first stop was Cyprus where we met Ambassador Roger Davies and talked with Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader and other Cypriots. This was just a couple of days before Ambassador Davies was assassinated. Clerides told us that as Greek Cypriot, he understood what was happening in Athens, where the Foreign Minister was totally under the sway of Archbishop Makarios, who at the time was in exile in London; they did not want a Cyprus agreement. Prime Minister Karamanlis was too weak to obtain the Greek Parliament's approval without Makarios' blessing and the support of the Communist Party. Clerides predicted that the Greeks would not accept the proposal on the table at the time. In Ankara, it became clear to us that the Turks were reaching the limit of their patience; they were increasingly bellicose. As Clerides had predicted, Karamanlis was not willing to accept the proposal which would have established a cantonal arrangement.

We met the British Foreign Secretary in Geneva; he said he had an intelligence report that predicted that in five days, the Turkish forces would move beyond the cease fire line in an effort to capture all of the territory on the island that they originally had intended to take. That report rang true in light of the mood we had sensed in Ankara. The Foreign Secretary suggested that the British move a squadron of [F-4] “Phantom” aircraft to Cyprus in an effort to deter the Turks from further aggression. He wanted U.S. approval. So we sent a cable to Kissinger; the answer was that our intelligence community had no such information and therefore Washington did not find the British report credible. Back we went by cable suggesting that we believed the British report to be plausible and that the U.S. should support the British. Time passed and we could not get a reply, despite Art's pleadings. He called [Larry] Eagleburger and told him that something had to be done. Larry told him that he didn't understand what was going in Washington; i.e. Kissinger's total preoccupation with Watergate and the President's position. Sure enough, on the day predicted by the British, the Turks moved - which said something about our intelligence and about the chaos in Washington in August, 1974. While in Geneva, we watched Nixon's resignation and his departure from the White House. That made the trip especially memorable. We then also understood better why we had such a hard time getting any meaningful responses from Washington, and what Kissinger had meant when he talked to us before our departure.

I must say that this experience left me personally very pessimistic about Cyprus. To this day, I do not see a solution that would be acceptable to all parties. I noticed that Dick Holbrooke said last week that he was going to make one last effort to settle the dispute. I think that even suggesting that he would take a crack at it might be a mistake; there is very little hope of any success. As far as I am concerned, that is a “no win” issue. I think we may well be posturing on Cyprus, as I was doing in Geneva, as I described earlier. We seem to be generating a lot of activity without any serious thought about accomplishing much except to maintain a posture of activism. I hope that we will not be fooled into thinking that we can have much influence on the Cyprus dispute; I don't think we can produce a settlement, at least in the foreseeable future. The main risk is that U.S. representatives who do get involved come to believe that they might have an effect; that only brings on greater frustration without any accomplishments.

Q: Soon after that you joined the National Security Council. How did that happen?

OAKLEY: One day, in September, I believe, Win Lord, then the head of S/P called me into his office and told me that he and Kissinger had had dinner the night before and the Secretary had decided upon the transfer. Hal Saunders had left the NSC to join the Department as Roy Atherton's - the Assistant Secretary for NEA - deputy for the Middle East peace process. Kissinger had been unable to find a qualified replacement for Hal and therefore had decided that I should move from S/P to the NSC. I was happy to make the switch. This was the period when Kissinger was both Secretary of State and the NSC Advisor. Brent Scowcroft was the Deputy NSC Advisor - he became the Advisor when Kissinger decided to become the Secretary of State exclusively.

My first experience in the NSC was a real revelation. I found that the CIA Middle East

“experts” who would not give me the time of day when I was in S/P, were deluging me with attention and information as soon as I moved to the NSC. They were very eager to help. I asked them where they had been while I was in S/P. I pointed out to them that the U.S. “Middle East” team remained the same; we might be in somewhat different positions, but Sisco, Atherton, Saunders and I were still the main parts of the team. It is true that my transfer out of S/P did reduce that Office's involvement in Middle East affairs, but the basic team was left intact. My role may have changed to some degree, but I was as much of the team while in S/P as I was in the NSC. The same people traveled with Kissinger on his “shuttles” and were part of his diplomacy planning team. Where these individuals might have been shown on an organization chart was really immaterial; the Middle East “team” consisted of a small group who would have been members of it regardless of their assignment. Kissinger undoubtedly felt comfortable with the four or five members of the “team” and couldn't really care less where they were formally assigned.

My first “shuttle” trip was really memorable; I almost got fired and almost got Sisco fired. It was a great start! It took place in 1974. I was eager to make my mark and had not fully comprehended the extent of Kissinger's sensitivities. On our flight out, Kissinger came back - as he rarely did - to the working area of the aircraft. I made a remark - just to show the NSC Advisor how smart I was - about something that Sisco had told us in confidence about the negotiations. Kissinger exploded; Joe had to go to the forward compartment and almost on bended knees ask for forgiveness. He probably told Kissinger that I had overheard him when he was dictating a telegram which recorded what he had been told in confidence. Sisco no doubt said that he was very sorry indeed for this “breach” and that he had not told me or anyone else what Henry had said in confidence. Then Joe came back to the rear of the plane and proceeded to just take my hide off. I then understood the game that Kissinger and his cohorts had played for a long time. Henry undoubtedly understood that mid-level officers like myself needed to have certain information, but he did not want to know that that information had been passed on from his very small inner circle and certainly did not want it to go further. But the bottom line really was that Kissinger did not want the information to go beyond the “need to know” line, and was ferocious in enforcing secrecy.
As I mentioned before, I had actually run into this strange system before when I was in Paris being briefed by the French in detail about a conversation that Ambassador Lucet had had with Kissinger regarding the Middle East. I had reported this intelligence to Sisco who was very grateful because, as he said, that was the first time he had found out in detail what our Middle East policy was, as seen by the White House. There was the Under Secretary of State relying on a report from Paris on U.S. Middle East policy because the National Security Advisor never shared that information with State Department officials. Hal Saunders performed superbly when he was at the NSC in very discreetly passing information on a selected basis to the appropriate officers in the Department even though he was under strict orders not to. But it was a game that I was not aware of at first; I blabbed something that I officially should not have known and that created a volcanic explosion. It was a lesson that I did not forget! I have no doubt that Kissinger knew that his strict instructions were being violated; he understood that the machinery of government could not operate without some of confidential information

being passed on to the officials responsible for policy implementation, but Kissinger just did not want to know that his “confidences” were being violated. It was a game that we all played. It was fairly effective because it met Kissinger's real goals; i.e. that the information not go beyond the minimum number of officials who needed to know. As long as we knew that we had information that theoretically we should not have had, you can rest assured that we made sure that it didn't go beyond us.

I learned a lot of things from Kissinger - and Scowcroft later - which were quite valuable. On that first “shuttle” I recognized the value of the Kissinger process, which I think Hal Saunders was instrumental in creating. As I suspect he has described in his oral history, before we left for a “shuttle” trip, we would prepare briefing books - as the bureaucracy would do for a principal for any foreign visit. The novel aspects of the process was that as we moved from one stage to the next - from one meeting or one capital - the briefing books would be updated with revisions based on the last conversation(s) and other new information with a new “action check-list” developed to remind Kissinger what we hoped would be accomplished at his next stop or meeting. These revisions were made in time for the next flight, giving Kissinger an always up-to-date action check list. The flights were usually short, although I remember one "shuttle” that took us through Russia, South Asia, Iran and Saudi Arabia before landing in Israel and doing the Middle East countries. But that was an exception; usually we flew within a very circumscribed area in short hops.

We would arrive usually in the morning; meet with various people or groups during the whole day followed by a dinner or some other social event, after which we, the staff, had to draft a report of the day's activities for Washington, an update of the action check list and whatever else might be necessary to conduct the following day's business. When Kissinger would wake up at 7 a.m. and ask for his briefing books, he would find a completely updated version, and the draft telegrams and report ready for his approval and despatch, as well as incoming cables and intelligence reports. Then the daily routine would start all over again: the flight, the meetings, the social event, the reports and the updating. It was obviously very tiring, but the process forced us to think anew every day about where we were going in light of the most recent events. We were busy with the routine, but it in itself forced us to pause for some thinking, much of which we did on the plane between landings. Most of the planning of course took place before Kissinger and his team left Washington, but the process forced us to update our views as well as the papers.

Let me give an illustration of “thinking while flying.” On one unexpected trip in 1974 back to the Middle East - following the Rabat Summit which took all responsibility for Palestine from Jordan and gave it to the PLO after we had assured the Israelis this wouldn't occur - we flew from Moscow to Kabul, where we talked to the Afghan government, then on to Islamabad to talk to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to New Delhi to talk to Prime Minister Ghandi, who had just authorized the explosion of a nuclear device. Then on to Dacca to talk to the new President of Bangladesh, Mujibur Rahman. Then on to Teheran and Saudi Arabia for the Shah and the King. Kissinger was then scheduled to go to Rome to represent the U.S. at the world's first food conference.

Bob Hormats, who was the NSC economic expert, was on the plane with us. He suggested that we should try to marry U.S. farm technology with Middle East oil money to see whether that combination might not alleviate world famine of the kind that we had seen in Bangladesh. Bangladesh in 1974 was one of the most miserable places on earth; this was soon after the war of secession and poverty was rampant - thousands of people lying in the streets dying of hunger and poverty. So Hormats and some of us put together a proposal while flying which eventually ended up becoming the International Fund for Agricultural Development. The costs were shared between the oil rich countries who provided the financial resources and the U.S. and other Western countries which supplied the technical knowledge. This Fund is still going today, but the idea was born on a “shuttle” flight because all of us saw the need for it and because we were in a struggle with the French for leadership of the North-South relations. The French were telling the “Third World” that it was that world's principal supporter among the developed countries and suggested that these countries work with France primarily. That French position did not endear it to the U.S. and we wanted to take some initiatives which would prove otherwise. So we came up with a practical proposal which would be very helpful to the “Third World.” Kissinger discussed the proposal with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the Shah of Iran asking them to provide the necessary financial resources in a partnership with President Ford. He wanted the three countries to table the proposal together at the food conference in Rome. Both the King and the Shah leapt at the opportunity to be partners with the US; they readily promised to provide the money. They saw that this was a “win-win” proposal for everybody. All the other countries were astonished when Kissinger unveiled the proposal in Rome, particularly when the package came so complete.

This was an illustration of “thinking on the fly”, but the process in Washington was incredibly difficult because it forced State, Treasury and Agriculture to develop a brand new policy and find some resources. But it was done despite all those ponderous bureaucracies. It was interesting to watch Kissinger operate in such situations. Many of his speeches had considerable “meat” in them, and they were never given without him being sure that he could deliver on any promises that he may have made publicly. He would never have tabled his proposal in Rome unless he was 100% sure that he had commitments from Washington for resources, as well as from the Shah and King Faisal. He used his NSC position and his relationship to the President to get other agencies of the government to agree on a brand new proposal in a short period of time - a week! Within that time, he had a new speech to give in Rome, a genuine helpful proposal which had the support of the President of the US, the Shah of Iran and the King of Saudi Arabia. No mean feat!

I have been asked for my views of Kissinger's policy development style. I think his process was a good one for him and the US. However, I was not one of Kissinger's slavish admirers. After a meeting in Austria with Mubarak, one of us in the delegation mused that the greatest foreign policy asset then available to the U.S. was Henry Kissinger's mind and the greatest liability was his ego. So the foreign policy process established by Kissinger was a good one while he ran it; I am not sure that in the hands of others it would have served the U.S. as well. Kissinger was extraordinary. Those

professionals like Sisco, Atherton and Saunders, who were in a constant dialogue with Kissinger - unlike me who essentially only saw him on the airplane - occasionally saw the real Kissinger. He rarely exposed his mind to others; there was not much dialogue with him. He would speak to you and on occasion he would even listen to someone, but rarely would there be a real dialogue. On rare occasions, I witnessed some "give and take" and those were some of the most fascinating experiences in my life. It was a wonder to watch Kissinger's mind at work; he could literally be thinking about three different problems simultaneously, even though they might have been in three different parts of the world. At the same time, he would be thinking about history and the long term future. He had an extraordinary mind; I have never met anyone who could think like Henry Kissinger. So the foreign policy process of the 1970s was to serve Kissinger; as I said, it probably would not have suited anyone else. Neither Shultz nor Baker could operate in the same way, but it worked for Kissinger. So I had no problem with the Kissinger system because he was able to stay on top of all the major issues.

It is interesting to note that both Kissinger and Baker wanted complete control of the foreign policy apparatus and process. Both were quite secretive; they played their hands very close to the chest. But Kissinger could handle considerably more problems - both in numbers and in scope - simultaneously than Baker; the latter tended to pick and choose the most important and leave others unattended. Kissinger had a rare capacity to cover the waterfront; he also was willing to involve his assistant secretaries more in the process than was Baker. Of course he arguably had the best set of professional Foreign Service officers as assistant secretaries; that helped immeasurably. He was not willing to share information and his views with anyone below an assistant secretary, but that was a far wider collaboration than Baker who only talked to his immediate entourage on the Seventh Floor - except under most unusual circumstances. So although Kissinger and Baker seemed to operate in a similar fashion - very tight control of the mechanism run by the Secretary and his immediate staff - their operations were considerably different, stemming primarily from their very different characteristics and personalities.

I earlier mentioned that I learned some things from Brent Scowcroft. One important lesson was to be thorough. Scowcroft was very meticulous and thorough. Kissinger also had that trait, but he did not manage it as smoothly as Brent did; Kissinger was much more abrupt. There is a story about Kissinger, which might be apocryphal, when he was a Harvard professor. One of his students had written two drafts of his PhD dissertation which had been sent back for further work. When he submitted the third draft, it was returned with the notation: "Is this the best you can do?" So after revising it yet again the student stormed into Kissinger's office, protesting that the dissertation had been rewritten three times and that he thought no one could do any better. Kissinger looked at him for a while and then said: "Fine. Now I will read it!" Sometimes I felt like the student must have, but Kissinger's pursuit of excellence was unremitting. He forced me and others to think clearly, to write concisely, to make arguments clear and logical. He certainly brought me to a level of achievement that I did not think I could reach.

Kissinger did bring out the best in people, but did it in a very nasty way. Vince Lombardi had a similar approach when he coached football teams. A good coach can inspire his

team without being mean; some even use kindness. It is a function of a coach's personality.

Back to Brent for a minute. He was not, as some people mistakenly thought, merely a toady to Henry Kissinger. He had a mind of his own, which he used on occasions to contradict Kissinger. He was very disciplined, very loyal. In my own case, he saved me on one occasion from some dire consequences. One day in 1976 I got a telephone call from Bob Houghton in State Personnel who wanted to know why I had not reported to the Senior Seminar. I told him that I had been assigned to the NSC and was staying there. He thought differently. His assignment sheet showed me assigned to the Senior Seminar. I told him that that was news to me. I couldn't figure out what had happened. So I went to see Scowcroft. I reminded him that in a recent conversation he had led me to believe that he wanted me to stay at the NSC through the end of 1976 - an election year. I told him that I had agreed to stay, but I also thought that Kissinger might be furious with me - that was the only reason that I could see why I might have been assigned to the Senior Seminar. I told Brent that I would wait for him to tell me where I should report; he would undoubtedly find out about my reassignment in the near future. I also told him I would be a good soldier and go wherever he told me. I would have been glad to go to the Senior Seminar and I would have been happy to stay in the NSC.

I found out later what the story was. Kissinger had promised Sadat at a dinner in 1976 when the King Tut exhibit opened in Washington at the National Gallery that the PLO could open an office in Washington, in accordance with Sadat's request. This was still in the period when the U.S. was not supposed to be conducting any dialogue with the PLO. But Henry used Dean Brown - a retired ambassador - as an intermediary. Dean arranged for things, but he never let it be known that he was working on Kissinger's behalf. So the PLO was allowed to open an office in Washington. Six weeks after that office opened, Israeli Ambassador Dinitz lunched with Kissinger. After the lunch, Kissinger sent word out that the PLO office was to be closed. He asked Roy Atherton to call Dean Brown and convey a message to the PLO - only Dean knew where they could be found. Dean was followed by INS people to the apartment where the PLO people were staying. As he left the apartment house, Dean noticed some official looking men walking towards him. They passed each other and later Dean found out to his great surprise and chagrin that the INS people had given notice to the PLO people that they were to leave the U.S. immediately. Dean and I discussed these events at a party hosted by Charlie Yost which took place the next day. We commented that everyone was apoplectic over this turn of events. I noted in the presence of the Egyptian Ambassador that what his President was able to get at dinner, the Israelis were able to undo at lunch. My comment was included in a report that the Egyptian Ambassador sent to Cairo the next day, which somehow made its way to Kissinger. There were some other remarks in that report which were quite unflattering and were attributed to me when in fact most were made by Dean. It took six weeks to turn Kissinger around; he felt that I had been very disrespectful of the Secretary of State. Furthermore, one day Jeanne Davis, Executive Secretary of the NSC, came to me and told me that I could continue to work at the NSC. The whole six weeks were taken up by negotiations between Larry Eagleburger, Kissinger's Under Secretary for Management, and Scowcroft about my future. In retrospect, I find that whole episode amusing, but I

can assure you that at the time, I did not see any humorous aspect. This was a good example of Scowcroft's character.

I might just continue with some comments about our relationship with the PLO during the 1974-77 period. Kissinger and I had entirely different views on how to deal with the PLO. He believed that they could never become participants in the peace process; he thought that they would always play the "spoiler" role. My view was that regardless of the PLO leadership and policies, no Arab state would ever agree to any kind of settlement with Israel without PLO approval or at least acquiescence. After all, the PLO was the organization - the only one - that represented the Palestinian people. I felt therefore it could not be ignored and would have to become involved eventually in the peace process, even if the leadership and its policies might have to change. Kissinger felt that if we were tough enough, we could bypass the PLO and still obtain Arab states' approval of negotiated agreements with Israel. This was a continual debate and difference between Kissinger and some of us.

But Henry didn't close the door completely. There was one point in the 1975 Sinai II talks when the Israelis tried to close the door completely by demanding that there be absolutely no U.S. contacts with the PLO. Kissinger reformulated that by saying that there would be no "negotiations" with the PLO, leaving himself some "wiggle" room. But basically he felt that the PLO would not be a "player". He and I disagreed on that view. He always called me "the PLO representative", particularly after I chaired the administration's "PLO working group." I want to make it clear that I was not promoting Arafat nor the PLO policies which at the time were not helpful to the peace process, but I did believe that the PLO had so much political impact on Arab states as the essentially lone representatives of the Palestinian people that ways had to be found to get the PLO engaged in the peace process. I was not sure that the PLO would play, but I was certain that we had to try to get them involved. Without them, I thought there was little chance of success for peace in the Middle East. I wanted the U.S. to talk to the Palestinians and to Arab governments on certain PLO policies which clearly seemed to be impediments to the peace process. The PLO had to understand that unless some of their policies were changed, they could not be "players", but if some changes were made, then the atmosphere might change and it might be included in the peace process. That was the purpose of the "non-messages" that were exchanged between Arafat and Kissinger in Rabat in 1974, with me and Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian Professor and AUB [American University of Beirut] as the messenger. They provided some hope and incentive to the PLO to be more cooperative. In the late 1970s, it was clear to me that the PLO would have to change its policies, and perhaps even its leadership, but that as an organization representing the hopes and aspiration of the Palestinian people, it had to be brought into the process.

In my conversation with PLO members, I could not detect any concrete signs of policy changes, but I was never ready to assume that the situation was hopeless. At one stage, I actually was discouraged by the Israeli Political Counselor, who invited me to lunch about two weeks after I had started my NSC assignment. He said that it was too bad that I could not stay in the NSC much longer; when I questioned this comment, he told me that since I was in contact with the PLO and that was unacceptable to the Israelis.

This suspicion apparently stemmed from my Beirut days; the Israeli were fully aware of my contacts with the PLO then because every year I would travel to Tel Aviv to brief my colleagues in the Embassy on my activities with the PLO representative. I also briefed, in general terms, officials of the Israeli Foreign Office; we discussed the general substance of my dialogue with the PLO representatives - I did that on my own initiative because I thought it was the proper thing to do; I was not under Washington instructions to give those briefings, but I did it certainly with its knowledge. I didn't tell them of the Arafat-Kissinger exchanges but I did tell the Israelis that I was having discussions with the PLO. Never once, did they indicate then that they objected to my conversations. They never tried to use me as an intermediary; they had enough contacts of their own. It was only when I got to the NSC that they pulled this history out.

At the lunch, I told the Israeli diplomat that I had not had any contacts with PLO representatives since Arafat had gone to the UN (in 1974). In any case, I said that even if I had had contacts, I didn't understand why that was of such great concern to the Israeli government. After all, the great majority of the mayors of West Bank cities and towns were members of the PLO and they were in constant contact with Israeli officials including Cabinet members. I found the Israeli position somewhat contradictory in light of their own practices. In any event, I stayed in the NSC, but I learned a further lesson about Israeli “games”; I believe that they did try to have me reassigned from the NSC, but it didn't work especially since their charges were just not true.

My contacts with the PLO did resume to some extent during my NSC tour, particularly after Sadat talked Kissinger into permitting the PLO to open an office in Washington. I didn't have regular meetings with PLO people in the U.S. but I did see them from time to time. When it was closed, my contacts diminished. It was almost totally terminated after the second disengagement agreement when we signed an understanding with Israel that there would be no US-PLO “negotiations.” As I said, that was a reformulation of a “no contact” phrase, but the U.S. decided that at least for a time, we would agree to a strict "spirit" of the Israeli formulation. Kissinger emphasized the role of Egypt; he did not believe, as I said earlier, that the PLO had any role in the peace process. My successor in Beirut discontinued contacts with the PLO, although one of the CIA agents in Beirut did pick up contact with another PLO representative. So a contact was maintained, but in a more clandestine way. Unfortunately, that CIA officer was killed when the Embassy was bombed; the PLO representative was later assassinated by the Israelis. He was married to a Lebanese woman, a former Miss Universe. The contacts with the PLO in Tunis did not start until much later.

While at the NSC, I did have meetings with foreign Embassy officials stationed in Washington. I always briefed State officials on these meetings, most often with “Memcoms.” This later became, in general, a questionable practice; it was a sensitive subject to State when an NSC staffer held meetings with embassy officials. The extent of State's acceptance of this practice depended on each Secretary of State; some disliked it more than others. Shultz had different views on this practice. At one time, he was apoplectic. Then he calmed down somewhat. But the practice I think was always

somewhat suspect from State’s point of view.

Let me talk a little more about the peace process. I think everyone worked very hard and effectively and I include our embassies overseas in that comment. I was particularly impressed by the support we received from the CIA. Sam Hoskinson, who had just moved into a new position of Middle East National Intelligence Officer, did a marvelous job of marshaling our intelligence resources to support Kissinger's negotiations. The intelligence community built a replica of the Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai for the 1975 negotiations - ”Sinai II.” That was a full scale model, very precise, which helped us to figure out what each side really wanted, and where the different lines really were. We have taken the same approach recently in Bosnia, although the job now is a lot easier in light of all the satellite and computer capacities that we have. But in 1975, a model had to be built so that we could see precisely what each side would have to do to bring about a viable agreement. For example, the Israelis had agreed to abandon territory which the Egyptians believed included the passes, but there was a lot of flim-flam going on. The Israeli maps on closer examination showed that they would not surrender the passes. So we had a precise topographical model built which clearly showed that the passes would not be abandoned by the Israelis; in fact, the lines on their maps would have left them right in the middle of the passes.

We had a similar experience with the oil fields in the Sinai. Kissinger, Sisco and Saunders went to Aswan in the middle of the negotiations in the fall of 1975. The Israelis had promised direct Egyptian access to the oil fields in Abu Rudeis. The proposal was to build two parallel roads - one Egyptian and one Israeli. Roy and I were looking at maps prepared by the CIA. We noticed that at high tide, the Egyptian road would be underwater. We didn't think that that would be acceptable. So when Kissinger and the rest returned, we showed him the maps and our conclusions. He went “up the wall” as he was known to do from time to time. But he played his cards very skillfully. He waited until he had Rabin and Allon - the two key Israeli Cabinet officers - together; he pulled out the map and asked: ”What are you guys doing? Is this some kind of Florida land deal? I know that we Jews in the U.S. pull deals like this, but I didn’t expect you Israelis to do anything like that!” I think it was clear that the three Cabinet officers didn't realize what they had suggested. The Israeli map had been drawn up by their army. They excused themselves and went into the next room with the Chief of Staff. There ensued a major argument. When they returned they explained shame-facedly that there wasn't enough space to build two roads - the cliffs came right up to the edge of the Red Sea. There was room for only one road. Eventually all agreed that that one road would be used by each side on alternate days. That was how that unique part of the agreement developed! It was very interesting; it was only by sheer accident that Roy and I happened to look at the Israeli maps which had only very faint lines representing the proposed roads - drawn on them. I do believe that in this case, the Israeli civilian leadership had been sabotaged by its military. I don't know what would have happened if the roads had been built and then the Egyptians discovered that theirs was under water for much of the time. At a minimum, it would have been embarrassing for all concerned.

CIA's model became very useful in determining precisely what each side had to do to

reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. It was this kind of support from the Agency which was so instrumental to the success of Kissinger's efforts. Another matter was also indispensable. In 1970, we discovered that the Soviets and the Egyptians had placed missiles along the Suez Canal-contrary to the “stand still” cease fire agreement. That produced a major problem. I guess in 1976 we again discovered that additional sites had been built, contrary to the agreement in Sinai II. Sadat denied it. On our next trip to the region, we brought big maps along with aerial photography of missile sites in the Soviet Union as well as pictures of the holes in the Sinai, which were intended for missile launchers, but at the time were still empty. Sadat insisted that what our photos showed were underground hospital sites. So we showed him the Soviet sites with missiles which were unmistakably similar to the Sinai holes, same angles, same size, same everything. Only the missiles were missing. Kissinger told Sadat that he wanted to congratulate the Egyptians for their parsimonious approach to construction of their underground hospitals; they obviously had just taken the Soviet blueprints for the building of a missile site and had used them - unchanged - for the construction of underground hospitals! It must be so much cheaper. Two days later, we noted from aerial photography that the missile sites holes were being filled by bull-dozers; they disappeared. I think that was a neat feat!

My tasks in the development of the Sinai II agreement focused on the arrangements that subsequently became the Sinai Support Mission. I worried about the relationship between the UN efforts and our own on the demilitarization and disarmament of certain areas of the Sinai. I worked a lot on that. It was because of that assignment that Atherton and I discovered that the Egyptian road would be under water, as I have described earlier. Of course, the staff worked very collegially on all aspects of the Sinai II agreement; I happened to do much of the work on the issues I have mentioned, although there was never any official specific assignment of responsibilities among the team members. Various staff members just undertook certain analyses as the need arose without any specific assignments being made. For example, when the Israelis suggested that the U.S. take responsibility for the policing of the demilitarized zone in the Sinai, we refused. The Israelis didn't want the UN to have any role on that particular issue - a theme that would be raised again at Camp David later on which finally agreed on a multi-lateral police force which has no UN role in it at all. For Sinai II, we finally agreed - to satisfy the Israelis without eliminating the UN entirely - to have U.S. protection around the two surveillance sites - one which the Israelis already had and the other that was constructed for the Egyptians. We accepted the responsibility for providing immediate security for those two sites, but beyond that tight perimeter, was the demilitarized zone which became the responsibility of the UN. That was a compromise to satisfy the Israeli demand for “no UN” participation and our own policy which was to keep the UN involved in the Sinai - which we thought would be helpful - as well as the Egyptian desire for some UN presence in the Sinai.

I believe that the peace process worked well. Kissinger prepared the ground very carefully. He always had some specific objective in mind as he “shuttled.” He was very focused on each trip on achieving some concrete results, but he was not fixated by the process; he would not let matters drag on and on unresolved - as we seem to be currently doing on the Israeli-Syria agreement. We are now spending a lot of time working with Syria and Israel with not much to show for our efforts. The “shuttle” was Kissinger's tool

for conducting the peace process; it is not one that everyone can use successfully. It requires very careful preparation; it has to be clear on its major goals and they must be signaled clearly in advance. It also requires continual attention and pressure - as evidenced when Kissinger felt “deceived” by the Israelis, as I have described earlier. He took firm action. When an agreement between Syria and Israel was needed in early 1974, he stayed in the Middle East until he got some results. Kissinger was always clear on his game plan and never hid his goals from his negotiating partners - although not necessarily how he intended to achieve those goals. And most of the time, he was successful. So the “shuttle” was a diplomatic tool that Kissinger used effectively; it has no intrinsic value and therefore is not necessarily a good tool for other policy makers. It happen to fit the Middle East situation in the mid-1970s. “Shuttle” diplomacy needs the right people and the right circumstances.

On the negative side, it should be noted that obviously, the Jordanians got short-changed; they had been promised a disengagement agreement with Israel, but we didn't have the will or influence to bring it about. President Ford at that stage did not have sufficient confidence in his own foreign policy competence and probably did not have sufficient political support in the U.S. to tackle that problem because it was just not an issue for King Hussein, but would have required some accommodation on the part of the PLO. As we found out in 1974 at the Rabat Summit, Arab public opinion did not view Hussein as the representative of the Palestinians; that was, in their eyes, the role of the PLO. With the need for some sort of PLO acquiescence and the certain Israeli hostility to such a thing, it probably would have been a mistake for us to try to arrange for some kind of agreement of Israel-Jordan., even though the King had been promised by Kissinger and Nixon that we would try to work out something for Jordan and Israel after the Egypt disengagement agreement. Syria had worked out one and we had promised Hussein that he would be next. Syria got one because the oil rich Arab states - mostly the Gulf ones - insisted on that.

I found the Syria process an interesting one. I was still in Beirut when that was worked out. In 1973, Kissinger announced from the White House that since the disengagement agreement with Egypt had been signed, the Arab oil embargo against the U.S. would then be lifted. But nothing happened. Sadat, in his memoirs, had said that once his agreement with Israel was signed, he would go around the Middle East and ask the Gulf states to lift the embargo. He recognized that the lifting of the embargo was his responsibility. But he got nowhere. We couldn't figure out why he had hit a brick wall. Then the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria came to Washington and told Kissinger that before the embargo could be completely lifted, the Syrians also needed a disengagement agreement giving back to Syria some land lost in the 1967 war as had been done for Egypt. That led to the thirty day shuttle which Kissinger could not abandon since the oil embargo depended on it. King Faisal had told Nixon that he would give us the benefit of the doubt and lift the embargo on the assumption that an Syria-Israel disengagement agreement would be signed. That put Kissinger in a “must complete” mode because had not some kind of Syria-Israel arrangement not been achieved, the oil embargo might have been resumed. Kissinger performed brilliantly, but it was under severe pressure; he had to stay in the area until that agreement was reached. That doesn't

come out very clearly in his memoirs, but I remember that distinctly - the Saudi put a gun to our head, gave us some time, but threatened us with the resumption of the embargo if no agreement was reached. Nixon made it a priority and Kissinger delivered. As I said, I watched this shuttle from Beirut; it was grueling, but absolutely essential to our national security, as well as to getting the price of gasoline in the U.S. down.

I mention this historical episode because it was the first time that we understood the importance of Syria in Arab priorities. I think before that and even later administrations have underestimated the importance of Syria. During the Reagan administration, its first Middle East peace initiative omitted Syria. It floundered. Jimmy Carter originally overlooked Syria and therefore got nowhere. Syria plays a more central role than people have understood. Kissinger later admitted that he had underestimated the importance of Syria. Thereafter, whenever he went to the Middle East, even if it was not for negotiations, he stopped in Damascus. I do believe that now Syria may not be as important as it had been twenty years ago But in 1973, the Saudis made it eminently clear that Syria was very important to them; they had to be protected from both Iran and Syria. They were concerned by the threat that Syria posed not only militarily, but through terrorist sponsorship and political subversion. After Sadat’s failure to have the embargo raised, Kissinger came to understand the importance of Syria in the Middle East; it was a lesson that his successor either didn't learn or only learned after having encountered failure.

Assad is hard to deal with. He seems sort of isolated and one doesn't see Syria's influence overtly. It is beneath the surface and therefore requires a very careful examination of the Middle East terrain to notice it. Baker understood Syria's importance almost immediately, primarily because Dennis Ross understood it. Baker never made the mistake of underestimating Syria.

I might just make some comments about Kissinger and Israel. His relationship was obviously quite intimate, but I don't think he behaved any differently in Jerusalem than he did in Cairo. For example, during the Sinai II negotiations, something very interesting happened. Kissinger was the one who in early 1975 recommended that the U.S. undertake a fundamental reassessment of its Middle East policy because he felt that he and our new President, Gerald Ford, had been deceived by Israel. They had promised to give up the Sinai oil fields and passes during one of Israeli Foreign Minister Allon's meetings held in Washington in January of that year. Kissinger then made a commitment to Sadat that the oil fields and the passes would be returned to Egypt. But when Kissinger visited the area in March, the Israelis said that they would surrender one or the other, but not both. The Israelis would not move from that position, despite Allon's promise. Sadat refused to accept the new Israeli position since he had been promised otherwise. He insisted on having both the passes and the oil fields returned. So Kissinger recommended that we distance ourselves from the Israelis and the U.S. in fact suspended relationships with them - down to refusing the Israeli Defense Attaché access to the Pentagon. The Israelis became very upset because they had not completed their military modernization program to overcome their 1973 losses. Congress was trying to limit the excesses of the Nixon administration, to block Nixon’s and Kissinger’s propensity to pass out assistance here

and there according to their whims - sometimes well in advance of Congressional authorization. It tightened security and military assistance by, for example, denying the administration's ability to draw down resources in advance of an approved appropriation bill. I doubt anyone thought that this general provision would have, among its first "casualties", assistance to Israel - otherwise this provision might never have been enacted. But in 1975, this requirement really put a stop to assistance to Israel, who were desperate to finish the rebuilding of their military, but were stymied by this new Congressional restriction.

So we had both the slow-down of military assistance and the Kissinger-ordered reassessment. The problems were exacerbated by the problems caused by a new 1975 Foreign Assistance Act which in a transition year, included authorization for fifteen months - the beginning of the government's fiscal year shifted from July 1 to October 1. All these factors really put a squeeze on the Israelis, accentuated by Ford and Scowcroft, acting without Kissinger's agreement - and to his annoyance.

When the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act first came to the President for approval, Ford vetoed it. It contained some provisions which he felt encroached on his prerogatives as President, such as requiring action by Congress in advance of any military assistance project, beyond the statutory allocation of funds for each recipient country. Also that legislation included $500 million for military assistance for the Middle East to cover the extra fiscal quarter, but almost all of it was reserved for assistance to Israel. Ford felt this was unfair, especially since Israel had misled him on the Sinai process. That veto was based essentially on the recommendation of Scowcroft and the White House staff. I happened to be the note taker at a subsequent Oval Office meeting chaired by the President and attended by Senators Humphrey and Javits and Kissinger and Scowcroft. Humphrey wanted to know why Ford had vetoed the bill; he had checked with Kissinger while the legislation was being discussed in a Senate-House conference committee and Henry had indicated agreement with the draft legislation. Ford turned to Humphrey and said: "Hubert, you don't seem to understand; I am the President." Kissinger turned purple; he looked at me as if I were responsible for this fiasco - perhaps to some degree I was, but it was Scowcroft who made the decision to recommend a veto. In any event, the delay in passage of the legislation forced the Israelis to take up the administration's cudgel; they were so desperate for additional military equipment that they went and lobbied Humphrey and Javits to change the bill to ease its restrictive terms and to allow more assistance to be provided to Arab states and other foreign aid recipients.

One day, early in the morning, Congressman Otto Passman, the chairman of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations sub-committee entered Scowcroft's office. He stayed all day; by the end of the day, they had agreed on a combined 1975-76 foreign assistance appropriations bill. That bypassed all the financial restriction placed on the administration by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was a very efficient way to solve at least part of the problem for the Israelis.

I mention this episode because it was illustrative of how tough Kissinger could be on the Israelis. There was another incident that makes the same point. After the reassessment

and the resolution of the assistance problems, the Israelis came to Washington in the summer of 1975 and indicated a willingness to resume negotiations - they were anxious for the assistance to flow again. As usual, they came with a draft "Memorandum of Understanding" which they wanted to negotiate. The draft included demands which we were supposed to agree to in exchange for the resumption of negotiations. Kissinger authorized Sisco to negotiate with the Israelis; that took about six weeks. Finally the "Memorandum" was agreed upon - still in draft. In September, after the negotiations had gone beyond "the point of no return", it became clear to Kissinger that the Israelis wanted to conclude the Sinai II agreement. For example the Israeli government was using arguments in the Knesset for completing the agreement which we had used earlier to try to convince it to conclude the agreement but which it had rejected - i.e. why it should give up both the oil fields and the passes. The Israeli government was in fact adopting our arguments and using them as their own in the Knesset debates. At that stage, Kissinger thought that he could then negotiate an Egypt-Israel agreement; he believed that a mutually acceptable compromise could be reached that would cover the oil fields, the passes, the demilitarized zones, the intelligence stations - one for Israel and one for Egypt. We were in Jerusalem when the last hurdle was to be jumped, namely the Israeli "Memorandum of Understanding." That was the one that Sisco had negotiated and which included the provision about "negotiations" with the PLO that I discussed earlier. But when Kissinger focused on it, he noticed a number of provisions which he found unacceptable because he felt that Congress would balk at what appeared to him to be derogations of some Constitutional authorities of the President. He thought therefore that the "Memorandum" as it stood was totally unacceptable. Someone on the Israeli side reminded Kissinger that he had not too much earlier already approved the draft. He raised his eyebrows; he said: "I approved it? Does anyone see my name or initials on it?. I only see Sisco's initials!" He was told that Sisco had said that he, Kissinger, had approved it. "Did anyone here ever hear me say it was ok?", Kissinger wanted to know. And of course, none of us had. Even Sisco said that Kissinger had not approved it. The latter denied ever having seen the draft before and certainly had never approved it. It was hilarious!

Then Kissinger began to take parts of the draft "MOU" [Memorandum of Understanding] and cross them out. He realized that the process had gone too far for anyone to back out; he understood he could afford to be quite cavalier about the memorandum. We were astonished and aghast; we didn't understand what Kissinger was up to. We had assumed that the U.S. would be stuck with the memorandum that Sisco had negotiated; we understood that it was far too restrictive; it would really reduce our negotiating flexibility, but we assumed there was no way out. We all were certain Kissinger had told Sisco exactly what to do. This was one time that Kissinger really surprised us; I certainly was and I believe that all of the other members of the team were also. The way he handled Sisco was absolutely brilliant; he in fact, left Joe holding the bag. Joe was with us on this trip and I am sure he was flabbergasted, although he had watched Kissinger take this approach with others; I am not sure that he ever expected it to happen to him! What made the whole sequence of events even more surprising was that a number of us had been telling Kissinger that the draft memorandum was far too restrictive, but he didn't seem to have been listening to us. But when the right time came - i.e. when the Israelis could not

back out of an agreement— he forced them to modify the “Memorandum of Understanding” to much better suit the U.S. and give us greater flexibility in managing the peace process.

I think Kissinger treated Sadat and Rabin in about the same way. He was different with Golda Maier. But with both Rabin and Sadat, he would spend hours explaining the political situation, the psychological context, the personalities of the leaders in Egypt to Rabin and vice versa to Sadat. I found those *tours de force* very impressive. Rabin and Sadat wouldn't talk to each other; they had terrible misconceptions about each other. He spent a lot of time explaining first to Sadat and then to Rabin or vice-versa, what was doable in light of the domestic problems that each faced. He played the role of a mentor; he would try to convey a sense of reality to each side on what the other side was facing. It was an impressive performance.

Kissinger had “pen pals” in other Arab capitals. During every negotiation, he would periodically send reports to certain Arab leaders. In fact, my first assignment was to draft messages to the “usuals” - Algeria, Syria, Jordan, etc. - bringing them up to date on the Israeli-Egyptian agreement negotiations. He was very careful about keeping Arab leaders informed. My first draft message to the "pen pals" was in the usual State Department form; i.e. a circular telegram to all of our ambassadors in the pertinent countries. I was severely chastised by Kissinger because he told me that that was what he had done in the beginning as well. But then he found out that his "pen pals" were checking with each other; when they found out that they had all gotten the same message, they felt upset. So he never sent circular reports again. He insisted that the first and last paragraphs be different for each country. The rest could be the same in substance, but with perhaps some different words. I learned then a lesson that I never forgot. When I worked in the NSC the second time, I made sure that each message looked different from any other, even if it were for such things as National Days. The first paragraph always included a personal note from the President of the U.S. to the recipient head of state or something special about that particular individual and that country. After that, the text could deal with more general issues, but that first paragraph was key to making the whole message personal and therefore more likely to be read and absorbed by the recipient. The final paragraph would then refer to a specific issue, again singular to the relationship between the U.S. and the recipient. I found that we could do this even with National Day messages. If we hadn't done it that way, we would have lost a lot of good opportunities because a “standard” message just would not get the same attention as one which seemed to be so personal. This process took more time than the standard message would have, but it also had a much greater impact when personalized.

Before leaving the peace process, I might just mention what we did in preparation for each trip. We first reviewed all of the outstanding issues that were to be discussed and wrote up background papers on each. Then we would collect biographic data on all of the people that Kissinger would meet. These papers would serve as the backbone of a large briefing book. Then we would identify the options available to us on each of the issues. Usually, these papers were prepared by Hal Saunders, myself and our staffs. This was a pattern that I found Hal had established when I joined the Policy Planning Staff; it was

continued essentially in the same mode throughout the Kissinger years. By 1974, the process was a lot smoother because the separation between the Secretary of State and the NSC Advisor had been essentially obliterated. No longer was the NSC staff forbidden to share information with the State Department, as had been true in Hal Saunders' days. That system of compartmentalization changed after the 1973 war during which Kissinger discovered that the Foreign Service could be very helpful to him and did not “leak" to the press.

During 1976 - an election year - the “shuttles” were suspended. We did continue to work - at long distance - on improving the Middle East situation. We concentrated on seeing what could be done on Syria-Israel and Jordan-Israel relations; those had essentially been neglected in the peace process to date. President Ford was keenly aware of this factor, which I found very interesting. He thought that Syria and Jordan had been “jilted” somehow and wanted them to get some special attention. But because of the elections, we could not really continue to be so heavily engaged at the top in the peace process. Most of the work in 1976 was done by the NEA Bureau and the NSC staff.

The President did decide to let Syria Airways and Jordanian Airways fly to the United States. In this case, he over-ruled the CAB which for commercial reason wanted to restrict access to U.S. airports. Ford took that action primarily because he did not feel that either Syria or Jordan had been treated as well as Egypt and Israel in the peace process. It was his way to try to maintain good relations with Damascus and Amman and perhaps even improve them. The Jordanians used this approval to extend their fleet; with the assistance of the UAE, they bought two new Boeing 747's and started a Jordan-U.S. air service. The Syrians never did fly - for ideological reasons.

I think we got good support from our embassies in the region during the “shuttles”. I think they were probably not very happy with the Kissinger style of diplomacy. They didn't have as much input into the process as they undoubtedly would have liked. The “shuttle” work was done almost all by Kissinger and his entourage; there wasn’t much time to consult embassies. But they gave us all the support we required, even if they felt a little left out.

I should make one other point about the ”shuttle” which I found fascinating. The press corps that traveled with Kissinger was very aggressive, particularly in Cairo where I think they might even be described as obstreperous. For some reason, they felt free to take liberties with Sadat. It was also fairly aggressive in Israel, less so in Jordan. There was one place where it was very meek - never asking a question out of turn, responding only when called upon - it was Saudi Arabia. King Faisal had such a majestic presence that the American press corps was cowed! I will never forget that; it was fascinating to watch.

The press did not bother us too much on the “shuttle.” It knew that we would not say much. Kissinger would frequently hold press “tutorials” as well as informal conferences on the plane; it was all on background attributed to “a high ranking official." But the press learned early on that the staff would not be very responsive and therefore never really got in our way.

During these “shuttles”, I, of course, met a number of very interesting personalities. In no particular order, let me start with Rabin. There was a foreign leader who understood Americans very well. Even then, he took a collegial approach in his decision making. He and Perez and Allon - the main Israeli negotiators—-had the final say, and worked off the same sheet of music.

Sadat obviously was a man prepared to take some political risks. On the other hand, he wanted assurances from us that his willingness to take such risks would have some visible results. He was bright, inquisitive, personable. One outstanding feature of his leadership was his almost instinctive reaction to members of Congress; it didn’t take him long to understand that they had to be cultivated; he did that superbly.

Assad was obviously the sole man in charge in Damascus. I was impressed, as was Kissinger, by Assad's breath of knowledge. At one time in 1974, when we were talking about a variety of issues unrelated to the peace process, Assad proceeded to deliver an analysis of what he thought was going on in South Vietnam. He was very accurate in his description of domestic politics in that country. Kissinger was quite surprised. They also talked about the situation in the Gulf, in Somalia and other parts of the world. Assad not only had obviously detailed knowledge of situations in many parts of the world, but his analytical skills were remarkable; he understood what was going on in many places outside the Middle East. He knew much more of the world than some people have given him credit for. As I said, there was never any doubt in our mind that Assad was very much in charge of Syria and had always been so. I think as long as he lives, that will always be the situation. He was quite ill for several months and perhaps then some power was shared, but he recovered and is again the sole master of his country.

We saw King Hussein several times. He was very hospitable. He seemed frequently disappointed in the U.S. because he never got as much as he was led to believe or perhaps expected - i.e. interim agreement with Israel, military equipment, etc. Hussein seemed to me always to be expecting more than he ever got.

Before leaving the Middle East, I might just comment on our general objectives in the area. One goal clearly was to reduce Soviet influence there. I have already discussed some of the tactics that Kissinger used to achieve this goal. He made it quite clear that the U.S. could deliver material and political support to both the Arabs and the Israelis - something the Soviets could not. That made the U.S. indispensable in the Middle East. I had to smile when I recently read that Christopher had been kept waiting by Assad who was seeing the Russian Foreign Minister. On one of the Syrian “shuttles”, Kissinger and Assad were at the Damascus airport discussing some matters. Assad deliberatively kept the conversation going because he knew that Gromyko was circling overhead waiting for landing clearance which was not to be given until Kissinger had taken off. That was Assad’s way of signaling who was important to him at that time. As I said, one of our top national priorities was to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East - it was true in the 1970s until the end of the 1980s. At the time, I thought it was the right policy because I had no reason to dispute the U.S. assessment of Soviet expansionist desires. I did have

some qualms about the extent of our efforts; I thought it was a little overdone. Sometimes, that overriding objective pushed us into positions in the Middle East that we might not have needed to be in. But in general, I had no argument with our major policy thrust.

There was a considerable change in direction during the Carter administration. Carter's whole approach was much more open; he made an effort to cooperate with the Soviets not only in the Middle East, but globally. Kissinger had given the Soviets a role in the Middle East - in form, but not in substance. I think Carter's approach was useful; it permitted further progress in the peace process leading eventually to Camp David. I believe that Carter was prepared to allow the Soviets greater influence on Middle East affairs, but for one reason or another, it never really occurred. I don't believe that Carter's change of emphasis on the role of the Soviets in the final analysis had much long term impact on the peace process because the U.S. was and is still the principal player in the area. The Carter administration did develop some initiatives soon after taking office which were not successful.

During my first tour in the NSC, we had other matters on our plate besides the Middle East. For example, the government in Kabul was very close to Moscow. We felt that it was trying to subvert Pakistan and maybe even trying to annex parts of Pakistan - Baluchistan, and the Frontier provinces. These territories were almost like the Wild West. No central government had much authority in these provinces; they ran themselves as they saw fit. The Soviets were working hand in glove with the Afghan government against the Pakistanis, who were considered our friends and allies even at that time. Kissinger began to work with the Shah and Bhutto; we discussed these issues on some of our 1974 and 1975 trips that took us, as I mentioned earlier, to Teheran and Islamabad. The Iranians offered material help; we used diplomacy and the Pakistani pressured Afghan President Daoud through recruited Afghans who conducted guerrilla warfare against his government. That was in part a payback for what the Afghanis were doing in some of the Pakistani provinces. Later, in 1976, we continued these discussions with the leaders of Iran and Pakistan via messages through our ambassadors there; the question was how Iran and Pakistan working together could effect a change of Afghan foreign policy away from the Soviet Union and towards us and our allies. We did stop to talk to Daoud in Kabul, in 1976, and began to turn him around and away from Moscow and towards Iran, Pakistan and us. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan became normal in 1977-78. The Afghan-Soviet efforts to subvert Pakistan stopped. As we later discovered, we succeeded all too well. The Shah's efforts and assistance worked so well that the Afghan Communist Party, with the help of the Soviets, felt compelled to overthrow Daoud. That led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So our successful efforts to change Afghan foreign policy resulted in a coup and a Soviet invasion! Daoud's turning away from Moscow and from the Afghan Communist Party and his establishment of good ties with Pakistan and Iran and the U.S. gave cause for great anxiety in Moscow.

The Soviets then decided that Daoud had to be removed. It is not entirely clear to me even today how much of an active role the Soviets played in the coup against Daoud. But it is quite clear that their distaste for events in Kabul initiated a chain of events that

eventually brought the Soviet Army into Afghanistan. This is an illustration of "unintended consequences." Kissinger wanted to move Afghanistan out of the Soviet orbit; he certainly succeeded in his goal, but with longer range consequences that were not anticipated. We probably were too active in Afghanistan; we didn't understand adequately the Afghan domestic political reverberation of using Pakistan to reach our goals. As I said, both Afghan Communist parties became very suspicious of Pakistan's involvement and mounted a coup to overthrow Daoud. When the Communists ran into trouble in governing Afghanistan, the Soviets had to come in to help them. That took place during the Carter administration, but I think can be directly tied to Kissinger's efforts to eliminate or at least greatly diminish the Soviet influence in Afghanistan.

In the period 1974-1977, the relationship between Pakistan and India was not bad. After the Simla agreement in 1972, the situation calmed down and a period of relative stability ensued. There was not a great deal of animosity or tension between the two countries. This calm actually covered all of South Asia - as in "calm after the storm." I don't believe that we could say that the U.S. had a definitive "tilt" towards Pakistan. India had beaten up Pakistan quite badly in 1971 and enabled East Pakistan to secede. We were still very friendly with the Pakistanis, but since they had lost half of their country only a couple of years earlier, they were not very confident or strong. That made their concerns for Afghan subversion even more acute; they had some suspicion that the Indians were in league with the Afghans, but there was never any hard evidence of that. As I said, relations between Pakistan and India in this three year period were relatively tranquil. The provinces bordering India and Kashmir were quiet; the troubles were all in the north and north-west. I think our South Asia policy at the time was correct. I had no trouble with it.

I might just mention one incident that occurred in Lahore in 1976. Kissinger, as usual, was in the process of delivering some brilliant after-dinner comments. He began them, as he often did, by denigrating his staff, telling one and all that he had made up his remarks because had he left that task to the staff it would have made a mess of it. This often public abuse of the staff - even if perceived as "humor" - was not greatly appreciated by the staff. But that was his style. In fact, on this particular occasion, he had been unhappy with the several drafts that had been provided to him. He wanted an extraordinary speech because he knew that Bhutto was a superb after-dinner speaker and of course Kissinger did not want to be outshone. In any case. I thought that Kissinger's remarks were brilliant. Then Bhutto spoke, was even more brilliant and won the speech contest without a doubt. I was sitting at a table with a Pakistani diplomat; I told him that we would certainly be in for a lecture because although we had worked on Kissinger's comments for three weeks - and Kissinger had himself spent time on them - it was obvious to me that Bhutto made the better speech that night. The diplomat then told me that they had been working on Bhutto's speech for three months; he knew that because he had been part of the speech writing team. Small world! As I expected, Kissinger was apoplectic after the dinner. He gave us hell for not having produced a better text; he agreed that Bhutto was the cleverer orator that night.

We spent considerable time in the 1974-77 period working on India and Pakistan issues

even though there was relative calm between the two countries. By 1974, the countries in South East Asia had pretty well decided they could manage affairs quite well by themselves. There was an agreement - implicit at least - on the part of the Soviets, Chinese and ourselves that we would refrain from involvement in the area. That worked out quite well. There were some questions about non-proliferation, but in general we and the other major powers were content to let matters on the sub-continent move without outside interference. Between 1971 and 1989 the situation in South Asia was relatively stable and quite acceptable to us.

Let me briefly turn to Lebanon, my old stomping grounds. While I was working at the NSC, Ambassador Meloy was assassinated in Beirut. I knew Frank fairly well; I briefed him several times before he went out on his assignment. So his murder was personally shocking. I was also somewhat incredulous that we had allowed that to happen. Where was his security both by the Embassy staff and the Lebanese government troops? No one was surprised by the unrest and civil war in Lebanon; I think all observers saw it coming. I don't think we could have prevented it; the best we could do was to work with the Syrians in an effort to contain the violence. The Syrians at the time supported the Maronites and other Christian factions against the PLO. We didn't have any great interest in becoming the peace maker in Lebanon; I don't think we could have anyway, without a massive intervention effort that no one was really interested in making.

I mentioned military assistance earlier during our discussion of Israel. Part of the responsibility of an NSC staffer was to review the assistance budget submission of the Department and AID. The NSC staff had a division which focused entirely on assistance, but all of us with regional responsibilities participated as well. For example, we advised Scowcroft that we thought that the 1975-76 assistance allocation as proposed by the Department was totally out of whack. As I mentioned earlier, the fifth quarter's resources were to be devoted almost entirely to Israel; there were no funds for assistance to Arab states. That was just illogical and very poor policy. That was the issue on which Scowcroft held a position opposed to Kissinger's - much to the surprise of the latter.

I think we used military assistance in the same way the Soviets did - as a tool of diplomacy to bring governments closer to us. In some cases, it served as a deterrent against aggression against the recipient country. It also promoted cooperation between military establishments and sent a political message as well. So we did use military assistance for political purposes as well as for strengthening the recipient military establishments. There were instances in which I was concerned by the proliferation of weapons in certain countries - i.e. Lebanon. That was not due to any military assistance, but just to the wide availability of affordable weapons that all factions acquired. I expressed my concern to the Lebanese, but they didn't share my worries; they were content to let the weapons flow. We on the NSC staff were concerned about the quantity and quality of arms made available to Iran. This again was not primarily an assistance issue since the Iranians bought the weapons with their own resources, but nevertheless we did have questions about the amount and level of sophistication of the Shah's apparent appetite for weapons. We discussed this issue with Scowcroft, but ours was a minority view. We thought that we might be giving Iran too much and too sophisticated. But

Kissinger had set the policy and that was the end of any debate.

There were some Arab countries, like Jordan, that felt they deserved a greater share of the military assistance pie. But in fact, we had some concern about the levels that we were already providing to countries like Egypt - both on military and economic assistance. We took a major role in Egypt, giving us a very high profile. We on the staff thought that there was a possibility that such visibility might come to haunt us someday. In Egypt, we had some doubts about its absorptive capacity and our high level of assistance gave us an expanded role in Egyptian affairs which made us a prominent target for dissatisfaction.

In regard to arms to and in South Asia, we commissioned the CIA to undertake a study of the Pakistan-India military balance which was updated quarterly. That was an excellent study which proved quite useful in discussion with Congress in support of our military assistance budgetary requests. I do believe that areas which have some balance in their military capabilities tend to have stability; a preponderance of military power in the hands of one party is often an invitation for mischief by the other. The aggressor needs to know that he will have to pay a price for his policies.

All the senior NSC staff members had contacts with foreign diplomats. That was not an issue between us and the State Department. We did not try to make policy behind anyone's back. In the Middle East area, our relationships with NEA could not have been better. Despite some comments to the contrary, I did not find NEA to have a pro-Arab “tilt”. I think that almost all contacts were initiated by the foreign diplomats. It was the embassies that contacted us just in hopes of finding what was going on, perhaps on matters that they had not discussed with the Department or checking on what they had been told by the Department. Our coordination with NEA was so close that these contacts with foreign diplomats did not create any problems.

There is of course a difference in perception of situations when you sit in the NSC as contrasted to the State Department. The view from the NSC is much broader. You also get a much better understanding in the NSC of how different policies relate to each other not only within a region, but also between regions. Sometimes an NSC staffer might not have all the details, but I have also found that knowing a lot of details may hamper policy development rather than help it. The view from 1600 Pennsylvania is entirely different than it is from Foggy Bottom.

Before finishing the discussion of my 1974-77 tour in the NSC, I might just comment on another Kissinger innovation: the Annual Reports. I think they were very useful not only as tools to explain our policies to the public, but they also provided guidance to the Executive departments. They have now fallen out of favor, except at the Pentagon which still does country and regional analysis. But I thought the Annual Reports were useful. During my stint at the NSC Peter Rodman was the chief editor. The first draft would usually come from the NSC staff. We would send it to the departments for comment. We would then amend the first drafts and send them on to Rodman. Even after Kissinger became Secretary of State and Scowcroft was the NSC Advisor, those Reports were useful policy tools. After Kissinger became Secretary, he had the regional bureaus

prepare their own reports; the NSC Reports continued to be published. In some situations, the drafting of the Reports raised some issues which had not been discussed before - or at least adequately. That was another benefit of the Reports.

Q: In 1977, you were assigned to the Bureau of East Asian Affairs. How did that come about?

OAKLEY: Dick Holbrooke, the new Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, was looking for a new staff for the Bureau. He was not too pleased with what he had inherited. I had known Dick in Saigon and later in Paris, where he was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Vietnam peace talks. We were good friends and I guess Dick thought I could help him. I told him that I was not an Asian expert. He said that he was not looking for an expert, he wanted someone who could work with him well. In fact, Dick pulled together a top notch staff. He had Bill Gleysteen as his senior deputy who handled northeast Asia - Japan, Korea and China. He hired Erland Heginbotham to be his deputy for economic affairs - a superb officer. I handled southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Dick also changed almost all of the office directors. He was criticized for all those personnel moves, as he was later when he became Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. What he did was to put in place officers who gave him a very high quality product. He himself was absolutely frenetic, but very effective as long as his deputies kept him in touch with the rest of the Department and the real world - and vice-versa. Dick was constantly in motion, often on the Seventh Floor in Vance's office - not in Christopher's. He would be often at the White House, in Congress, with Bob Strauss - the Special Trade Representative, with Mike Blumenthal - the Secretary of the Treasury. Dick was constantly pushing to have an impact on policy; that was his forte because he is able to see the broader picture. He was not afraid to take a position, but he always tried to see how that particular issue fitted into a much larger framework. He wanted to be a major player in the painting of the broad policy canvas.

He expected his deputies to handle the day-to-day routine matters and to keep him informed about events in the Far East. He wanted to make sure that he and his staff were in full sync, but he gave his deputies wide latitude for action. In my view, Dick had sound judgement. He was not as prolific in throwing out new ideas as Shriver, for example, had been in Paris. But Dick had plenty of ideas and most of them were quite sound. He would pursue them systematically; he was not the kind who had an idea today and tomorrow would be off in a different direction. When he had a thought, he pursued it diligently. He would listen to the thoughts of his deputies and his staff.

I was responsible for ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries, Indochina, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific islands. These latter three areas were transferred to Evelyn Colbert when she joined FE as another deputy to Dick. In 1977, ASEAN was pretty much defunct. Dick thought that we should try to reactive and rejuvenate that organization as a means to invigorate and improve our relationships with the non-communist countries of southeast Asia; I fully agreed with that concept. With the end of the Vietnam war, we had left the impression that we had no further interest in that

part of the world, leaving these non-communist countries to believe that they had to fend for themselves. We concluded that we could not establish closer rapport with those countries through any kind of security arrangements because the Congress and the American body politic would not have supported any further U.S. security initiative in southeast Asia; most likely, those countries were also not prepared to have any security ties to the U.S. since they felt that we had let them down. So we decided to focus on economic issues, realizing that advances on that front would also be beneficial to the political relationships among the ASEAN countries and between them and the US. Dick had the brilliant idea of getting Japan to be a co-sponsor of an effort to rejuvenate the ASEAN organization - to give those countries greater vitality and to bring them closer to the US. Phil Habib, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, was very skeptical; he didn't believe that ASEAN would ever develop into an effective organization - after all, we had tried that approach in the past without any success. Dick Holbrooke would not be deterred; he went directly to the Japanese Embassy in Washington and submitted his idea. When the Japanese Prime Minister came on a visit to see President Carter in the Spring of 1977, he made the proposal that Japan and the U.S. work together to reactivate ASEAN. Carter thought it was a wonderful idea; so Dick's thought came to be U.S. policy through a White House directive that the "Japanese Prime Minister's idea" be given full consideration. Habib, who knew Holbrooke well, probably had a pretty good idea where the "Japanese idea" stemmed from. He was still skeptical.

In fact, Dick's idea turned out to be very valuable. To me it became another illustration of Dick's steadfastness and his willingness to pursue goals even over a long period of time. We started to work with the ASEAN countries in 1977 by suggesting that they begin to develop a common view on tariffs. There had been a lot of discussions about commodity prices and "most favored nations" status. We asked those countries to develop common positions on all of these various economic issues. They were considering allocating various industries to each country; we did not believe that to be a sound economic rationale. But we did believe that some progress might be made on commodity prices and tariffs if ASEAN could take a common position on those issues. That idea led to frequent discussions between ASEAN, Japan and the U.S. in late 1970s. These efforts led to joint investments and other economic endeavors. In the process, the ASEAN countries decided to have annual meetings; they invited the U.S. and Japan to have their Foreign Ministers attend the first one as observers. That started a "dialogue" which took place after the official ASEAN session was concluded. Later, Australia and New Zealand were added as observers, followed by Canada and the European Union. More recently, China and the Soviet Union have been invited and finally, Vietnam has actually joined ASEAN. We now have the ironic situation where an organization - ASEAN - originally established as a bulwark against Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union - embraces all of its former adversaries and meets with them regularly every year. This is particularly notable since our withdrawal from Vietnam left a power vacuum in the region for several years. ASEAN now talks regularly about economic problems, but common security issues are not neglected. One of the early consequences of this rejuvenation was that Malaysia and Singapore abandoned their support for Muslim dissidents in the Phillippines. There has been a marked decrease of frictions among the ASEAN states; they became much more allied and understanding of each other.

It has to be recognized that the ASEAN countries had only geographical proximity to tie them together. Culturally, they are quite disparate. They all had very active ethnic Chinese minorities, who were major players in the business communities. The ASEAN countries were also quite concerned about their communist neighbors. Otherwise, they were quite disparate, had many suspicions and divisions accompanied at times by low level subversive activities against each other. I think they decided to pull together after the U.S. defeat in Vietnam because they began to realize how dangerous division was; they were afraid of the Vietnamese, the Soviets and the Chinese. In the 1970s, the Chinese were actively supporting communist parties in each of the ASEAN countries; these organizations were engaged in all sorts of subversive activities. That made the ASEAN countries quite concerned about their security. The governments in power had been identified with the US; we really left them in a lurch when we withdrew militarily from the region. Our withdrawal, accompanied by their perception of our disinterest in the regions, left the ASEAN countries in a quandary - what would they do now to defend themselves. The Japan-U.S. proposal to revitalize ASEAN came as a very welcome proposal not only to begin to address the security concerns, but also to increase Japanese investment and assistance for their countries. They undoubtedly also hoped for greater U.S. investment, if not assistance. They saw ASEAN as a means to raise their economic standards. As time went along, they realized that they were making economic progress as a group - probably more than they would have done if they had been working independently. They found that their leverage on such economic issues as commodity prices was much greater as a group than it would have been as individual countries. In fact, the results of the various meetings on economic issues were helpful to all of them because they were all producers of tropical products; they soon recognized the power of block voting as contrasted to individual country votes.

We had to be low key in our participation. The effort to revitalize ASEAN was intended to foster the influence of the southeast nations, not for the U.S. to tell them what to do. As I said, most of the countries did very well with their economic development; the Phillippines were the outstanding exception - it did not do as well as the others. It had great internal problems with Marcos as President. It has now just begun to revive with its economic growth beginning to match those of the other ASEAN countries. The other countries did very well in their economic development; they realized the importance of the private sector and encouraged investments.

I attended all of the ASEAN Ministerial meetings while working in EA. Secretary Vance and Holbrooke attended as well. They were fascinating. The attendees would get up and sing and dance; they were very relaxed and increasingly confident of the viability of their alliance. For example when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in late 1978, ASEAN was strong enough and cohesive enough that the Thais were able to stand the shock. The Thai government did not collapse; it did not change its foreign policy direction and try to win favor with the Vietnamese. On the other hand, they were sensible enough not to get involved in combat against the Vietnamese.

Also the economic success of ASEAN was visible to all. Thailand, for example, in the

early to mid 1970s had a lot of internal problems - a lot of students left the campuses to join the communists and other anti-government groups in the jungles. By the late 1970s, the Thai economic policies had so improved the standard of living and its pacification program had been so successful that a lot of the students left their hide-outs and returned to the universities. They didn't like the jungle living and found that living in cities and towns had greatly improved. At the same time, the Chinese dropped their support of the communist parties in all of the ASEAN countries. They began to cooperate as much as they could with the governments. That made a large difference; the steam went out of the subversion. The Chinese realized that they would not in the long run win with subversion of the ASEAN governments and would lose any possibility of economic relationships with those countries. I think that the change in Chinese policy is further evidence of the wisdom of the revitalization of ASEAN and of the U.S. pursuit of that goal. I think that the U.S. role in this ASEAN effort was probably not fully recognized or appreciated outside the State Department. Southeast Asia was not high on the President's foreign policy agenda.

We did have a small but intense bureaucratic battle with PM - Les Gelb - and the NSC on the question of the neutrality of the Indian Ocean. The Australian Ambassador called to our attention discussions that the U.S. had on going with the Soviets. He thought, from his point of view that something was amiss. That caused Holbrooke to look into what was going on. He was finally able to get PM and the NSC to share with him what the conversations with the USSR had been all about. We found out to our horror that the total preoccupation of the U.S. government in these talks had been with the northeast quadrant of the Indian Ocean - around the Persian Gulf. In the process we had neglected the interests of our allies in the rest of the Indian Ocean. The map that Gelb, as the U.S. representative to the US-USSR discussions, had tentatively agreed on included our bases in Australia - both intelligence and military, ports and airfields - which meant that they would have been included in the demilitarized areas of the Indian Ocean. We would have had to close those facilities. EA had no knowledge of what the NSC was doing; the talks were very closely held and only Gelb really knew what was going on. The Soviets were close to having pulled a fast one, but fortunately the Australian Ambassador was alert enough to warn us of what was going on. I think the NSC and Gelb just didn't pay enough attention to the map and the details as it concerned those areas which were not seen as being of principal importance to them at the time. The U.S. team working with the Soviets just didn’t have any clue about our assets in Australia and their importance to our national security. They were preoccupied with the Gulf. The intelligence station in Australia at the time was the only facility that could pick up satellite signals without their being detected and read by anyone else.

One of my main preoccupations was the ASEAN refugee problem. We took the lead and worked with former Senator Dick Clark, the Special Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. Dick Holbrooke recognized the importance of this issue and told me to go to work on it. I worked with some very good people. The major part of the problem stemmed from the large numbers of refugees who had fled and were fleeing Vietnam and other parts of Indochina after our withdrawal. Many of these people had associated with us during the war; there were also many ethnic Chinese. They came out in droves, starting as I said,

after our withdrawal from Vietnam and reaching a crescendo in 1977-78. Our bureau took the initiative in trying to organize a world-wide response; the U.S. agreed to take more, but we also put a lot of pressure on Western Europe, Canada, Australia to resettle more of these refugees in their countries. We also pressured the ASEAN countries to establish holding camps where the refugees could seek temporary shelter while permanent settlement places were being found. There was initial ASEAN reluctance, but eventually the southeast countries cooperated. In 1977, during my first trip to Thailand and Malaysia, I personally stopped officials who were trying to shove the boats back out to sea. They didn't want to provide even temporary shelter because, they said, they were culturally different from the refugees. They were concerned that the refugees would become permanent settlers. At the time, we didn't have a policy on this problem, but soon thereafter we developed a world-wide policy working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Our efforts were primarily humanitarian; we believed that we owed these Vietnamese refugees some assistance because of our involvement in the war. The Carter administration had a keen social conscience, as did Dick Holbrooke. There were very few if any political benefits because the ASEAN countries and some of the others went along with our policy very reluctantly. They did not find providing refuge a natural part of their culture. I think in the final analysis our refugee policy was wiser than we had anticipated because over the long run it has helped Canada and Australia - changed their total approach to immigration. Australia now considers itself to be an Asian country; in 1977 it looked at itself as a bastion of Western Europe in Asia and was strongly opposed to any immigration. Our policy has increased tolerance in the area; it has made these countries feel better about themselves. It has probably also assisted the improvement of relationships between Vietnam and its neighbors in the long run.

I found the whole refugee process very interesting. I remember flying from Bangkok to Geneva in 1977 for the first UNHCR meeting on Vietnamese refugees. There we started the pledge process - how many refugees each country would take for permanent resettlement. Those pledges in turn convinced the southeast Asian countries that the risks of providing temporary settlement were not nearly as great as they feared. The Geneva meeting was also the beginning of a major involvement by the non-governmental organizations (NGO). They really began to be involved in refugee work and have grown in importance in this work ever since. It was assistance that surprised and delighted us; we had not expected much help from that quarter. It was one of the beneficial aspects of a policy process which had a goal, but no assurance of success. When we started out, we did not know how the potential permanent settlement countries would react, nor how the southeast Asia countries would respond nor where else we could seek assistance nor how the American public would react. We learned a lot during this process.

Domestically, it took us first about three months to get Justice Department cooperation for permanent resettlement; then we had to convince Congress to increase the number of Vietnamese refugees that we could allow to immigrate. The vital element in our fight was a TV program which portrayed the life that a boat-full of people were enduring because no country was willing to let them land. Comparisons were made with the Holocaust in Germany and other humanitarian tragedies. Holbrooke and I had prepared all the necessary documents which would allow an increase in U.S. refugee quotas, but we held

them until there was a well publicized “boat” case. After that TV show, we submitted our request and doubled the quota. We did the same thing a couple more times in the next fifteen months, deliberately waiting for each new revelation on TV which stirred the conscience of the country; we would then submit a new request for an additional quota increase. We would usually get approval for another increase in a week!

The refugee program was one aspect of the human rights issue. We had many others in "my" part of the world. Along with southeast Asia, I was also responsible for military assistance, human rights and other functional responsibilities for the whole Bureau. In the human rights area, I worked very closely with Patt Derian. In fact, I was the first person she asked to be her deputy when she was appointed as the Department’s Human Rights Coordinator. I didn’t know her, but she heard about me from someone. We had a long conversation about her aspirations and goals in the Department and I told her: “Patt, this isn't going to work. The U.S. can not run the world! I think you have to lower your sights and not be so aggressive.” She said she had heard the same excuses from people in Mississippi. I pointed out that the U.S. government could use the 82 Airborne Division to enforce civil rights in the U.S., but could not do so to enforce human rights overseas. After that conversation, I decided that Patt's approach would not work very well and so accepted the offer to work for Holbrooke a few weeks later. But I did end up spending a lot of time on human rights issues.

We in EA did have one advantage over other Bureaus when it came to human rights issues. It had been Dick Holbrooke who had written candidate Carter's speeches on human rights during the campaign. So he had considerable credibility when it came to the issue. He may not have been as outspoken a crusader as Patt Derian, but within the administration, Holbrooke was known as a devotee of a strong U.S. position on human rights. So Dick's reputation was considerable help to us in fighting off some of the more extreme positions taken by Patt. We argued for a much more gradual approach in forcing the pace of human rights in EA countries. We also had a difference of view with Patt on how the U.S. meshed the human rights policy with other goals that we were trying to reach in our relationships with various countries. The U.S. has many interests: security, economic, human rights, etc. The best current illustration is China where the Clinton administration is trying to balance all of our various interests. During my time, there were countries like Korea and Phillippines where it was important that all of our concerns be built into our relationships. The HR [Human Rights] Bureau felt that human rights should always have the predominant role in our relationships with other countries and the U.S. should always be very aggressive in pushing the HR agenda with countries like Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand. It is true that many of the FE countries had very bad human rights records; there was no argument on that. But we did have major debates about how fast the U.S. insisted on progress and how human rights concerns meshed with our other policy objectives.

HR had the right to pass judgement on any proposed U.S. economic assistance proposals and on arms sales proposals to all countries in the world as well as loans from any of the international financial institutions. So Patt Derian had considerable sway over some of the diplomatic tools available to us; economic and military assistance were institutionally

tied to human rights. Once a month Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary, would chair a meeting that would review all of the requests for assistance on arms transfers proposed by the regional bureaus, with HR sitting in judgement on the human rights situation in each proposed recipient. I used to represent EA at these meetings. We would go through the agenda country by country, reviewing all loans from international institutions, U.S. arms sales and economic assistance and other actions subject to human rights considerations. The bureau would make its argument, HR would agree or disagree and at the end, Christopher would render judgement. It was a fascinating process. By the end of the Carter administration, human rights groups gave our Bureau the signal honor of determining that we had been the Bureau that had more successfully resisted their wishes than any regional bureau in the Department. They considered that ARA [American Republic Affairs] and AF went along easily with the human rights advocates, but EA had held too fast to its view that making human rights the sole concern of U.S. policy would seriously damage our position in Asia without achieving any meaningful progress on human rights.

We were more cautious on our approach to human rights than HR would have wanted us to be and we believe it was the correct policy. For example, Holbrooke, Gleysteen and I worked out a policy for Indonesia which we considered far sounder than what HR was pushing. President Suharto sent the head of his military intelligence, General Murdani, to Washington in the summer of 1977 to ask us for two squadrons of F-5 aircraft. They had been promised to Indonesia by President Ford. I met the General and listened to his pitch. I then said to him that I understood his concerns, but that the Carter administration placed considerable more emphasis upon human rights than had any predecessor administration and that security goals were no longer the exclusive U.S. objective. I told him that under the new guidance, I wasn't sure how we would deal with his request. We talked a while and then the General said that governments had to keep their promises, even if made by the previous people. I told him that I agreed with him in principle, but that now we had a different President and administration. I added that I remembered that his President had not too much earlier said that he was about to release the 35,000 ethnic Chinese who had been arrested in 1965. They had been in jail for 12 years. The General looked at me and began to smile. He said: “Of course, you are not linking the sale of the F-5's to the release of the prisoners!” I answered: “Of course not! I was just making the same point that you had made. Presidents have to keep their promises! My next visitor as a matter of fact is the Operations Director of the International Committee of the Red Cross. As you know, they have a large role to play in the whole area of prisoners. Perhaps we can work something out with him.”

Not long after that, the ICRC was invited by the Indonesians to visit the prisoners and ideas were exchanged about the “right” conditions under which the prisoners could be released. After that we sent a memorandum to Secretary Vance recommending the sale of the two F-5 squadrons to Indonesia. I took it to Derian's office; she rejected our recommendation as being totally unacceptable; she viewed it as an immoral swap of fighter aircraft for people. I pointed out to her that the ethnic Chinese had been in jail for twelve years and that if we didn't do something, they would die in jail - was that human rights? She said that she would not be a party to this “travesty”; she suggested that her

name be taken off the memorandum so she would not be recorded as for or against. That we did and sent it to the Secretary who approved it. A year later, the release of these prisoners was touted as one of the administration's great human rights achievements. That was fine with us because we had accomplished both of our objectives: national security and human rights. I think the Indonesian case was a good illustration of how, given the right people and a sensible approach, human rights objectives could be reached without damage to our other very important national security objectives. I am a firm believer in the validity of human rights being a central concern of U.S. policy. I have been both surprised and pleased by how it has taken root and is now a continual concern of all administrations in the U.S. and also by most other countries around the world. At the moment, we may be pushing it too hard and are suffering some backlash because we are perceived by some countries as being sanctimonious, trying to impose our own values on other cultures - suggesting thereby that our values are "better" than those of others. We are also being perceived by some as hypocritical because some see trends in our own society which could be criticized as violations of human rights - economic deprivation, racial biases, social discrimination. Those people suggest that perhaps their approaches are better "human rights" than we practice and suggest that we should perhaps pay more attention to our domestic deficiencies than theirs. But I think the impetus that Carter and Derian gave the human rights agenda has served us well. The Reagan administration used it against some of the communist regimes around the globe in contrast to the Carter administration that focused primarily on pro-western authoritarian regimes. The Reagan approach may have been a cynical use of the agenda, but it nevertheless firmly embodied human rights as a basic tenant of U.S. foreign policy.

I believe that in general Derian had a positive impact. As I suggested, I think that in certain instances, she pushed her agenda too far. I don't believe that AF and ARA showed enough gumption in resisting her more far out approaches; they allowed human rights to dominate U.S. relations with their countries perhaps to the detriment of other U.S. objectives - something we were determined not to do. But, as I said, we were in a better position bureaucratically than other bureaus because we had Holbrooke as the Assistant Secretary who had human rights credentials of his own and was very active and skillful in pushing our more modulated, balanced agenda. When Derian took a trip through southeast Asia, Singapore's Foreign Minister kicked her out of his office. I happened to be in Singapore at the same time on other business; so I heard plenty about that!

Let me talk a little about our policy towards Indochina during the 1977-79 period. President Carter clearly wanted to normalize diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Within his first couple of months in office, he appointed a high level delegation, headed by Mike Mansfield and including Marion Edelman (from "Save the Children Fund"), Congressmen Sunny Montgomery (a Veterans leader), and James Woodcock (the head of the AFL-CIO), to go to Vietnam. They obviously held out an olive branch; what they got in return was a rejection - "We will never have relationships with the U.S. until you heal the wounds of war" - e.g. reparations. The Vietnamese insisted that Nixon had promised them a lot of assistance which had never been delivered (that promise was clearly in writing and we never disputed the Vietnamese claim), but pointed out their violations of the overall agreement which included this provision. Nevertheless, negotiations were

started - these events have been covered well in articles and books. Our focus was on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The negotiations dragged on for a long time. Holbrooke and I along with other people like Fred Brown (Director of the Office of Indochina Affairs), Ken Quinn (Dick's special assistant and now our Ambassador to Cambodia), Liz Verville (from the Legal Counsel's Office), were the U.S. team. The Vietnamese kept insisting that "we had to heal the wounds of war" - i.e we had to pay reparations. That was not in the cards. We told them that there was absolutely no chance that our Congress would appropriate one penny to compensate our "enemy" - in a war that we lost. But we found that the American "friends" of Vietnam, who had given the North counsel during the war, were still advising them now and were advising the Vietnamese to hold out for reparations - they thought that eventually Congress would change its mind. We did our best to try to dissuade the Vietnamese on this point; we told them flatly that the advice they were getting was plain wrong. Nixon was no longer in power and furthermore, they had breached their part of the agreement and therefore any claims that they might have made would not have swayed the Congress.

Finally, during the Summer of 1978, we began to receive hints that the Vietnamese position was about to change. There were some interesting nuances in some statements they were making on POWS, but officially their line never wavered.

We began a series of talks with Nguyen Co Thach, the Deputy Foreign Minister, starting in September when he attended the UN General Assembly annual meeting. They kept "dancing around", but would never officially drop their demands for reparations which we had clearly told them was a "non-starter". We did suggest that in the normal course of events, they would be eligible for foreign aid, like any less-developed country, once we had established formal diplomatic relations. They understood that we could not promise later assistance in advance, but were describing other situations that might be precedents.

While these negotiations with the Vietnamese were going on, we were also involved in secret negotiations with the Chinese, aimed at establishing normal diplomatic relations with that country. This was all happening in the summer and fall of 1978 - a year for Congressional elections. As [Zbigniew] Brzezinski and Mike Oksenberg [of the NSC] have made clear in their writings, there was some reluctance at the NSC to proceed with normalization with Vietnam under any circumstances because they were concerned that it would interfere with the normalization of relations with China. But as far as Dick and I knew, establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam was still high on the President's agenda - I think we had heard from Vance that Carter still wanted to proceed - as long as there were no reparations involved. Our guidelines included the stipulation that even if the Vietnamese dropped their insistence on reparations, no formal ties would be announced until after the November elections. Our conversations with Congress indicated that there would be some unhappiness among some members, but that on the whole we would have Congressional support - after the elections. Lester Wolfe, the Chairman of the East Asia Sub-Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was advising us to proceed, but very carefully.

In a meeting with Holbrooke and Oksenberg in New York the first week of October,

Thach finally dropped his demand for reparation and said Vietnam was ready for diplomatic relations without preconditions. However, those words of caution left us with some “dead” time between the meeting in September and early November. So Holbrooke decided to set up some working groups to discuss the modalities of opening an embassy in Hanoi. The Australians had accepted a situation in which their Ambassador lived in one hotel room and next door, in another room, were his offices. We did not find that acceptable. We wanted to have our old consular building back; furthermore, we wanted permission to send in teams to refurbish it, to install our own communication system and to bring a normal staff for an embassy operation. So there were many details to be discussed. That had to be done, but it was also a means to stall until after the Congressional elections. Our position became that until all the details had been agreed to, we could not proceed with an actual agreement on establishing relations.

Evelyn Colbert and Patt Barnett, our principal southeast Asia experts in INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], spent an hour or two every week with EA during this September-November period analyzing Vietnamese activities at the time. They pointed out that the Vietnamese were massing troops on the Cambodia border; that a new pro-Vietnam “front” organization had been established in Cambodia; that the Vietnamese had just signed a treaty on “Peace and Friendship” with the Soviets; that a large number of “boat” people had just been pushed out to sea. They were very disturbed by these events. The INR analysts were predicting a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Dick Holbrooke had just returned from a trip to the southeast Asia region during which he explained to all countries what we were discussing with Vietnam. He promised to continue consultations with them on our normalization process and promised that we would move very carefully. None of the southeast Asia countries objected to our plans. They were all somewhat nervous, but on balance, agreed that establishment of normal diplomatic relations was probably in the best interest of the area. They were not at that stage ready to give us public support, but we didn't really seek it.
However, we immediately recognized that a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, followed by U.S. recognition of Vietnam, would destroy our relations with ASEAN, not to mention the serious uproar that would emanate from the U.S. public. The Chinese would also certainly find the two actions unacceptable. Dick instructed me to go to New York to talk to the Vietnamese and to tell them that no further progress could be made on normalization until we had satisfactory answers to three questions: a) what is the significance of the treaty with the USSR?; b) why are so many people being pushed out to seas?; and c) why are there Vietnamese troops being massed on the Cambodia borders? I discussed these three issues with the head of the Vietnamese working group. He denied that any of these three actions had any significance. I finally took him to a corner and told him that Vietnam had been at war for about forty years - Japanese, French, Americans. It was time that his country had some peace. But I added that Vietnam's present course would suggest that it might be in for another ten years of war. His answer was: “We are deathly afraid of the Chinese! The Chinese are massing on our northern borders; they are strengthening their position in Cambodia.” I suggested that there might be other ways to deal with Vietnam's concerns. For example, I suggested that the UN might be asked to establish a “peace-keeping” force on Vietnam's borders; I told the Vietnamese delegate that there were many other options to Vietnam's present course. He insisted that the

present course was the only one in which the Vietnamese had any confidence, "the only way we know how" - the old leadership in Hanoi, having fought the Japanese, the French and the Americans only knew the “way of the sword.” That was the most poignant moment of my diplomatic career. We could clearly see what would happen and all the detrimental effects of the Vietnamese policy, but were unable to convince the Vietnamese that there were alternatives to their forty years of fighting. They would invade Cambodia because they were afraid of the Chinese. And that is exactly what happened.

The Vietnamese were “inscrutable orientals.” They were very careful in what they said - hard to pin down. Of course, we had dealt with Vietnamese over many decades and had never been very successful in dealing with them.

I saw my Vietnamese interlocutor again about six months ago. He came to the National Defense University. He again discussed the Vietnamese fear of the Chinese. The Vietnamese felt at the time - and they were not wrong - that the Chinese were in cahoots with the Khmer Rouge and were ready to use their Cambodian allies to infiltrate Vietnam. At the same time, the Chinese were massing troops on the northern Vietnam border and were therefore threatening that country from two directions. The Vietnamese saw a preemptive strike into Cambodia as their sole means of defense against China. So indeed they had a rationale for their decision. I didn’t question their rationale; I just was suggesting other possible avenues for defense. But war was the only approach that the Vietnamese knew and that is the course they chose. So when they invaded Cambodia, that ended our dialogue with Vietnam completely. Our stance didn't come as any surprise; I had forewarned them of the consequences of their action when I went to meet with them in New York.

I must say - as a personal footnote - that I thought Carter's desire to normalize relations with Vietnam and sending a high-level delegation right away may have been premature. I was surprised that Carter took this bold initiative right at the beginning of his term. I had served in Vietnam and therefore I have some personal feelings about that country. Even though I thought the initiative might have been somewhat premature, it didn't trouble me deeply, as undoubtedly recognition would have many Americans. I was not sure that in 1978 the American public was ready for recognition; the POW-MIA issue was still almost completely unresolved. I worked on that and I found it fascinating. Carter had the courage to take the missing Americans off the rolls. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, he declared them “dead.” That policy was reversed by Reagan when he took office, prolonging our public agony over the issue for another fifteen years, after it had almost been ended by Carter.

As I said earlier, I believe that if Cambodia had not been invaded and if we had been able to meet all of our needs for recognition of Vietnam, we would have done so even though there would probably have been a uproar in the US. I believed that any uproar could have been overcome and that Congress in the final analysis would have approved recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relationships with Vietnam. In 1978, the conservative wing of our body politic was still in disarray after the end of the Vietnam war, Watergate and the Carter victory. So the sector of our society which would have been most vocal

against Vietnam recognition was not at full strength.

In retrospect, I must say that our recognition of Vietnam could well have derailed our negotiations with the Chinese. Brzezinski might have been right in 1977-78. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam may have been too much for the Chinese to swallow. It might have spurred them on to improve their relations with us; on the other hand, it could just as well have upset them to the extent of terminating their secret negotiations with us. I don't know them well enough to know what their reaction might have been, but as I said, in retrospect, it could have been that Brzezinski was right in 1977-78. I have wondered what might have happened if in the Spring of 1978, the Vietnamese had dropped their precondition. We probably would have recognized them in the Summer - this would have been before our negotiations with China had really picked up speed and before the Vietnamese were getting ready for the Cambodia invasion. What might have happened in Indochina and with China if we had recognized Vietnam in the summer of 1978 makes for very interesting speculation, especially if the Vietnamese had then invaded Cambodia.

I mentioned earlier that ANZUS [Australia and New Zealand were] was my responsibility for about two years until Dick hired Evelyn Colbert to take charge of that part of FE. During the time I had oversight for the area, we had very good relations with both Australia and New Zealand. We were working on the series of agreements in the South Pacific which eventually led to Micronesia's independence. That was also a Holbrooke initiative which was finally brought to a satisfactory resolution. Dick quite rightly felt that there was really no further strategic reason for the U.S. to maintain the territorial status of those islands. It made eminent sense in political terms to give Micronesia its independence. Our main problem in the 1977-78 period was that we had too many lawyers working on the drafts - representing all sides. Peter Rosenblatt was Micronesia's chief negotiator at the time. His lawyers - all American - were advising him on how to hold out for a better deal; they were giving us fits.

As I said earlier, I had only served in Vietnam. The ASEAN countries were all new to me. I found Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia flourishing. Thailand's image in the U.S. was that of a disaster area - the effects of the war, an alleged “economic basket case”. That was certainly not my impression. During my first visit, the first American aircraft carrier visited Thailand since 1973. Many Thai ladies flocked to Pata to meet the ship. I went to Chiang Mai to look at the narcotics situation and found that the town was filled with Thai tourists who had come from Bangkok for the week-end. They were eating rock lobsters from Pata. That suggested to me that the Thai economy might not be in as desperate shape as some of the experts were stating. The economic strength of the country might not have shown up in the GNP statistics - or other econometric measures - but in looking at every day life it was evident that the country had a lot more economic vitality than it was being credited [with].

I think that my Thai experience was replicated in other southeast Asia countries. I went to Malaysia and was surprised by their successes in developing their natural resources - rubber, palm oil, etc. It was a systematic, sophisticated development program which

boded well for that country's economic future. Singapore was already known for its "economic miracle." I believe that its compactness had much to do with its economic success. They also had Lee Kwan Yew, who although quite a political authoritarian, gave the country good leadership which led to remarkable economic growth, driven in large part by a free market orientation.

The Philippines was a challenge. The most recent base negotiations, undertaken during the Ford administration, had failed to reach agreement. We had major human rights problems - Aquino was in prison, real political opposition was not allowed, etc. The country was in dire economic straits. On the other hand, we had a long history of close relationships with the Philippines going back for decades and after the war strengthened by our need for military bases. They had been vital during the Vietnam war and we could not after that debacle afford to give up our military position in the Far East. In addition, there were many Filipinos in the U.S. who constituted an important political constituency. Dick tried to balance these interests and did it well. We made some adjustments in our base negotiation strategy; we deliberately let the Pentagon assume the lead in the negotiations. By agreement with them, we put the negotiations in the hands of Admiral Mickey Wisner, who was CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific Command] at the time. Ambassador Dick Murphy in Manila, was instructed to play a supporting role as part of our negotiating team. We thought that a military-to-military negotiation was more likely to bear fruit. We also agreed that the entire draft treaty would be negotiated in the Philippines and sent to Washington for approval only after all the commas and periods had been agreed upon in Manila. We didn't want to have lawyers and others picking the draft to pieces back here in Washington - unlike the Micronesia negotiations. We got the Pentagon to agree to that arrangement. At the same time, using a trip that Vice President Mondale was making to Manila, Dick and Mondale convinced Marcos that he should also turn the Philippine negotiating team over to his military. That infuriated Marcos' cabinet and many Philippine politicians - some were apoplectic. But in fact, it had been the Philippine politicians who had been the problem - always grasping for more "goodies" - power, perks, cuts, etc. That had been a problem that Phil Habib, our chief negotiator, had not been able to overcome. By changing the negotiating teams, we managed to reach agreement.

For example, one of the issues under contention had been who had authority over the waters in Subic Bay. Our military had insisted that we had to have jurisdiction over the whole area - unlike the State Department which believed that an authority limited to only certain functions would have been acceptable. When our military took charge of the negotiations, they did a complete turn around. All of a sudden, the Pentagon found jurisdiction over just some specified activities in the Subic Bay waters quite acceptable. It was willing to accept the general thesis that Subic Bay waters were under Philippine sovereignty as long as there was agreement on a list of functions over which the U.S. had total control. That compromise was certainly acceptable to the Philippines. That move by the Pentagon was key to reaching agreement. I found the psychological change in our military fascinating to watch as they moved from just being members of a delegation to the spearhead.

As soon as the negotiations started, the House and Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees had to be briefed. We did that regularly every month during the negotiations which took about a year. These briefings came at our initiative; we in State took the lead, but the briefing teams were a joint DOS-DOD effort. I think the Members and staff were somewhat taken aback by our volunteering to give these briefings - it doesn't happen often in Legislative-Executive branch relations. We told them that we just wanted to make sure they were up to date on the negotiations. Then Dick enlisted the assistance of Senator Inouye - of Hawaii - who had very close ties to Marcos and was also the chairman of the appropriations sub-committee. As the negotiators appeared to be reaching agreement, Marcos was still holding out for more than we were willing to give. The Senator went to Manila at Dick's suggestion and told Marcos that he could increase the FMS (foreign military sales) level for the Philippines by $5 million to improve the effectiveness of Philippines' defense, but that was the limit of U.S. largesse. He also told Marcos that the longer he held out, the more difficult it would be to obtain congressional approval of any assistance - time was not on Marcos' side. Inouye strongly recommended that Marcos seal the deal right away, if he wanted an agreement at all. That did it; Marcos gave his approval and the final agreement was reached. So the strategy of keeping Congress informed throughout the negotiations and Inouye's personal involvement made congressional approval very easy; we had no problem with the legislative branch. I think the whole process was very skillfully managed. Brzezinski had some reservations, but the Inouye-Vance combination was very helpful in overcoming NSC reluctance and obtaining Carter's final approval of the base agreement. We had to overcome not only Marcos' ever-present appetite for U.S. money, but also the political problems we had with the Philippines. In fact, their military was very useful in that respect because they were much more willing to go along with some of our political demands than the Filipino politicians. The Filipino military establishments' number one priority was a close relationship with their American counterparts; their second goal was additional military equipment. The other matters that had been so important to the politicians did not come close to the other two objectives. That factor in fact was vital to bringing the agreement to fruition in a hurry.

The bases were obviously our number one priority in the Philippines. Reaching our goal was certainly complicated by Marcos' poor record on human rights. Dick managed to balance these two problems; for example, whenever he was in the Philippines, he would visit Aquino in prison. That made our position on human rights quite visible, but did not do so in a way that might have ruptured our relations with the Philippines and the possibility of reaching a bases agreement. We did make the point that we considered Aquino's treatment important and that in general we were not happy with Marcos' human rights record. From Marcos' point of view, the issue was just how much U.S. interference he could accept. We also pressured the Philippines to open a refugee holding camp. It was a tough fight, but we finally succeeded. There was some question of compensation, which we finally negotiated to the Filipinos' satisfaction.

By 1978, it was quite clear that Marcos' support was waning. We didn't necessarily believe that his days were numbered, but we were not at all pleased with his conduct of Philippine affairs. It was obvious that his popularity had slipped considerably. It was

evident to me and other observers that the Philippines had more internal conflicts than any other ASEAN country - followed by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and then Singapore. Of the five, certainly the Phillippines and Indonesia were lagging economically; neither country had yet "taken off." All U.S. investments in Indonesian oil development had stopped because Treasury and IRS were interpreting the tax laws in a way that might make oil revenues taxable in both Indonesia and the US. The U.S. oil companies were unable to obtain a ruling which would assist them in determining what the fiscal consequences of the Treasury and IRS rulings might be. Treasury in fact was saying that the oil companies should proceed with their development and then the U.S. government would tell them what their tax liabilities would be. That naturally discouraged any further U.S. investment in oil development in Indonesia. This situation lasted for about two years. Finally Dick was able to convince Mondale, before he left on his Southeast Asia trip, that he had to have a more satisfactory U.S. position from Treasury on tax liabilities than was available at the time. For taking that stand, Mondale was criticized for "having sold out to the oil interests." But he did get the necessary clarification which then in turn translated into the return of U.S. oil companies to the Indonesian oil fields. That was another example of how useful the Mondale trip was.

I mentioned Erland Heginbotham earlier. He was a superb economist. For example, in cooperation with the combined American Chambers of Commerce in Asia, he directed a study of the economic competition that U.S. companies were facing in Southeast Asia from Japan and the Europeans. It was clear from that study that our inadequate penetration of that market was having a negative effect on our trade balance and our investment position. We operated under such legislation as the Anti-trust Act and the Corrupt Practices Act which were tying the hands of our companies, forcing them to operate with handicaps which our competitors did not have. Unfortunately, the study, despite its clear conclusions and documentation, did not have the impact necessary to change the competitive environment, but it was a brilliant study nevertheless. If people had responded to it, we would be much further along - in the business area - in Southeast Asia than we are.

One day, Holbrooke and I were attending a meeting of the Economic Policy Council, chaired by [Treasury] Secretary Blumenthal. Deputy Secretary Christopher was the senior State official present. By the time the meeting was over, Bob Strauss, then STR [Senior Trade Representative], had gotten approval to be the lead official in the U.S. government on all aspects of our economic relations with Japan. Dick was very upset by this decision. We left that meeting and headed for the White House's south lawn to await the arrival of Prime Minister "Piggy" Muldoon of New Zealand. While waiting for the helicopter, Dick took Mondale and Vance aside to explain to them what had happened at the Economic Policy Council. He told them that putting Strauss in charge was just impossible. I had to go off with Muldoon, but I caught up with Dick the next morning in his office. While I was there, the phone rang; it was Bob Strauss. Dick picked it up and listened to Strauss screaming at him for about five minutes. Finally, after he calmed down, Strauss said that Dick had been the only one in that room who had been smart enough to catch what had happened and to see its consequences and the only guy in the room smart enough to get the decision reversed. He then asked Dick what would happen next. Dick said: "Bob, I am all in favor of you being the man out in front on Japanese

economic questions. But I can not turn all of the policy making responsibilities over to you. I suggest that you be the front man, but that Erland Heginbotham be your chief staff man." Strauss accepted the proposal on the spot. That solution made everybody happy. That was a good illustration of Holbrooke *modus operandi*: very political, very active; he produced results that were vital to moving our policy objectives forward - sometimes irritating a wide variety of people.

My three years in EA were more than busy; I was hopping every moment. When [Bill] Gleysteen went to Korea as ambassador, I became the senior deputy in the Bureau. That added work, as the following anecdote will illustrate. When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, the Chinese moved some troops south to “teach the Vietnamese a lesson” - this was around the beginning of 1979. The negotiations with China were just about to come to fruition allowing the establishment of diplomatic relations. All of these events coming to head at about the same time demanded that Holbrooke stay in Washington, leaving me to chair a Chiefs of Mission conference in Bangkok. It had been scheduled for that time to coincide with a visit that a delegation from the Senate Armed Services Committee was to make to Thailand and other EA posts. That delegation was headed by Senator Nunn and had on it also Senators Glenn, Cohen and Hart. We persuaded Lester Wolfe to come to Bangkok at the same time. Our meeting was to last three days: on Thursday, we were to take up security matters, on Friday trade and other commercial matters, and Saturday was reserved for a round up session with the Members of Congress. During that last session, I remember Hart saying to Erland that “big business was bad politics. You ivory tower diplomats don't understand.” That brought a strong reaction from Woodcock and [Mike] Mansfield who told Hart that he didn't understand either politics or the Asian economics. They both said that they, as non-career ambassadors, strongly supported what the career ambassadors had said. They added that as a matter of fact, they would even go further and told the Senators that unless they gave greater support to U.S. investments in and trade with Asia, unemployment in the U.S. would rise while the Asian economies would boom. That would be a political disaster for the US. It was a fascinating debate among seasoned politicians with one side reluctant to take any steps that might appear big business - as being poor politics - and the other, strongly supported by the professional diplomats, just jumping down their throats. The fact that Mansfield and Woodcock sided with us was a real morale booster.

Subsequently, we followed up with those four senators to help us with the problems raised by Carter's campaign statement that he would withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. Carter subsequently drew a time table for this withdrawal; then most people came to realize that such action would be a large mistake - some sooner than others. The Senate Armed Forces Committee issued a statement saying that the withdrawal would be a huge mistake. Vance and Holbrooke met with them before those Senators were scheduled to meet with the President on this issue and convinced them to really press Carter so that he might understand the problems that his policy might engender. They then told the President that they understood that a major policy review was underway in the Executive Branch; they promised to make no further critical public statements pending the conclusion of that review. In fact, the policy review had been completed, but we managed to keep that fact secret by having various parts of it done in different parts of the

Executive Branch. None of the parts reached any recommendations, but the conclusions were self-evident. All the different parts were assembled in a closed area of the Pentagon and delivered to the President just before he took off for a trip to Northeast Asia. So he read the complete report while flying to Korea. On that trip, he came to the conclusion that troop withdrawal was not a wise move - not only from the report, but also from what everyone told him in Korea and Japan. This was another example of Holbrooke's ability to work closely with Congress and use members to good advantage.

I might just add as a footnote my recollections of Carter's efforts to contact North Korea while he was in Seoul. Don Oberdorfer's book has a full chapter on that episode, so I won't repeat all the details. When the Carter delegation left Washington, we didn't know that he would be making a specific proposal, although the idea of trying to initiate some contacts with North Korea had been discussed in Washington. In Seoul, Carter proposed a tripartite meeting that would have included the two Koreas and the U.S. Oberdorfer describes the various activities surrounding the troop withdrawal issue as sort of a conspiracy by the bureaucracy and the Legislative Branch to try to get Carter to change his mind. I think the Carter initiative was very much more a public relations ploy than a serious proposal which would elicit a North Korean response. But Carter wanted to do something and much to our surprise, the South Koreans went along. Once they had approved, then the question became one of mechanics. Although I was not the responsible deputy for Northeast Asia, I was with the Carter party as sort of a supernumerary. I was at the Embassy in Seoul while everyone else was at the State dinner hosted by President Park Chung Hee. The U.S. proposal had to be sent to North Korea via Indonesia - one of the very few countries that had diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington. Among countries which might have served as intermediaries or potential site for such tripartite meeting was India - which didn't please us very much - and Indonesia, which was acceptable. The challenge was to get the invitation delivered to North Korea quickly because Carter wanted to hold a press conference in 48 hours after getting Park's approval to announce the initiative. So I was one of the first to see a cable from Ambassador Masters - our man in Djakarta - saying that he had not been able to contact the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who was busy at an ASEAN meeting and would not talk to Masters. There was no way that Masters could talk to Suharto without seeing the Foreign Minister first. So Masters concluded that we were stymied. I didn't accept that conclusion and called the CIA Station Chief in Seoul and asked him to send a message to his colleague in Djakarta to have him go see General Murdani - the head of Indonesian Military Intelligence - whom I have mentioned earlier. I wanted our problem explained to the General to see whether he could not get our proposal to Suharto. Four hours later, we received a response through CIA channels that Suharto was delivering the proposal to the North Korean ambassador in Djakarta. Eventually, we heard that North Korea was not interested; that didn't come as any great surprise to me and my colleagues; we always viewed it primarily as a public relations ploy. What Carter thought, I don't know, but all the professionals were in agreement that the proposal wouldn't fly. I must say that my relations with Masters and the Indonesian Foreign Minister were never the same after this episode!

I always worried that Dick might become a victim of his relationships with members of

Congress, but he managed them very well. Almost every week - early in a day - he would have two or three members in his office, before they went to their offices on the Hill [Capitol Hill]. He served juice and coffee and a discussion. He made a point during these meetings of never lobbying them on a specific issue; he used these sessions primarily as briefing opportunities. One day, Senator Stone (D-Florida) said that it was the third time he had been in the EA Bureau for “breakfast” and that he had twice attended Dick’s staff meetings. He noted that he was just a member of the East Asian sub-committee of the SFR [Senate Foreign Relations Committee], but that he was the chairman of the Near East sub-committee and yet had never been invited by the NEA the Bureau to anything. So after Stone made that remark, I called Hal Saunders, the NEA Assistant Secretary and reported Stone's comments. Hal said that the Bureau of Congressional Relations (H) did not like such “extra curricular” contacts. My answer was: “Who cares?” Dick didn’t care much about bureaucratic sensibilities; he wanted to have direct relationships with members of Congress. He saw H as a barrier and not a bridge and was not helpful to him and his policy objectives. Dick's political instincts were exceptional as we have recently seen in the Bosnia situation.

My tour in EA was fascinating and exciting. Fast moving, very difficult. Dick Holbrooke was certainly not easy to work with. But the three years were rewarding. I learned a lot, particularly from watching Holbrooke operate. But I could never act in the same way. Our styles are very different. His style was very effective and very unusual for a professional diplomat. It is one that might be found more often in people raised in politics. I used as many of Holbrooke’s techniques in subsequent assignments, but I did not have the facility he had because I just don't operate the way Dick does. The three years with Dick re-enforced a valuable lesson: have as many contacts as you can in as many places you can and use them and don't be limited by the confines of the so called “system” - which frequently doesn’t work, as we all know.

Q: Then in 1979, you were appointed as our Ambassador to Zaire. How did that come about?

OAKLEY: After consultation with Phyllis, we had agreed that we had been in Washington long enough and that the time had come to return to the field. As a Foreign Service officer, five years in Washington was long enough. Holbrooke, as usual, was very clever. When I told him that I wanted a field assignment, he said he would take it under advisement; he said he understood my rationale, but that he hated to see me leave his staff. Some days later, he called me into his office and said that the only Embassy that was available for someone like me was Zaire. I immediately told him I would accept - perhaps somewhat to his surprise. I hadn't been in Africa for several years, but I knew enough about Zaire to realize that it would not be a dull assignment. We had plenty of problems there and in the neighboring countries.

Our Embassy in Kinshasa was substantial. We had a medium size AID mission. We had a big Peace Corps operation - which of course was not officially part of the Embassy - we had a Defense Attaché Office, which fortunately had a good airplane that became my main means of transportation around the country since there were very few roads. We

had a Defense Representative Office to handle military assistance. We had a large CIA station. So it was a fair size Embassy. I think the staff was good, particularly the three political and two economic officers. The DCMs, first Alan Davis and then Ted McNamara, were excellent. Jennifer Ward, the chief of the Political Section, was great. John Heimann, the head of the Economic Section, was superb. Wendy Chamberlain was an excellent political officer. So I was blessed with some top notch talent.

I think the staff worked very well together. There was some friction - there were a few who didn't think we were being sufficiently aggressive on human rights and were anxious for the Embassy to have closer relationships with opposition leaders. That was partly a generation gap and partly an experience gap. My advice to the staff was not to get too close to opposition leaders, but one of my political officers did engage in very close contact with a member of the opposition only to find out that his conversations had been taped. That was brought to my attention by Mobutu's security chief. I managed to explain it away, but I did have a long chat with that officer. After that I think he had a better appreciation of my warnings about contacts with the opposition. I didn't think we helped the opposition at all by making them targets of Mobutu's secret police. We had to be much more circumspect about our contacts with the opposition. After that incident, I think the staff understood and became much more careful - the younger officers learned to temper their enthusiasm and idealism with reality and experience and thereby became better officers.

The first problem in Zaire, of course, was Mobutu. He had been in power for fourteen years. We had put him there in an effort to get a pro-western leader for Zaire who could stabilize the political situation. Mobutu certainly did that - by assuming all powers unto himself, as did many African leaders. He was very clever in handling the domestic political situation; no one could unseat him and almost no one could budge him on his *modus operandi*, which was hardly benevolent and certainly didn't incorporate Carter's views on human rights.

Mobutu had a tremendous amount of charisma, human magnetism, charm. He was also a brilliant schemer and plotter. There were several Washington "experts" who in 1979, didn't think Mobutu would last very much longer. When I had an opportunity to survey the situation on the ground, I came to the conclusion that there was no chance of Mobutu leaving - certainly not in the short or even medium term. He was able to take the measure of his opposition, he manipulated them, brought people into his government so that they would have an opportunity to "eat from the trough"; then he dismissed them and brought in another set to alleviate their hunger pains. He lived lavishly and flamboyantly. I found him not very convivial and not pleasant to deal with. For example, during my whole three year tour, though we had a substantial assistance program - mostly economic but also some military - Mobutu always complained about the level of resources we were providing. He insisted that what we were giving Zaire did not match what the USSR was providing Ethiopia, Angola or other satraps in Africa. Not once do I remember Mobutu making any comments or showing any interest in the benefits that our assistance was providing his country. He was neither grateful or interested; he just wanted more. He was much more concerned with the aid levels that he was getting in comparison to other

African regimes.

I mentioned that Zairean government ministers came and went, according to Mobutu's whims. But he did have a close coterie around himself - some of whom amazingly enough are still with him. It was a very small group of advisors, mostly from his own tribe and his home town. He managed the country as a chief would rule his tribe; that was hardly appropriate and Zaire was not managed well. For example, the social services - education, public health, etc. - for the interior of the country were provided almost exclusively by missionaries or Peace Corps volunteers, of which there were many. The Catholic Church, run by Belgians, had a large network. There were a number of American Protestant missionaries in Zaire. Hospitals and clinics in the interior always suffered from a lack of medicines; often there was no fuel for generators - if the facility even had a generator. The schools lacked supplies. These deficiencies seemed to be almost miraculously overcome when Mobutu came to visit; for about two weeks before the visit and for a week after, there were no shortages. Then the shortages would start again. That was Mobutu's governing style. He himself amassed large amounts of money and was very lavish in dispensing largesse to his friends and followers. No major decisions ever were taken without his approval.

It was clear in 1979 that Zaire's economy was in decline. The price of copper on the world market had fallen; the price of transportation had risen. Other minerals also suffered from declining prices. So it became uneconomic to ship some of the ore out of Zaire - the purchase price was below the transportation cost. Copper made a little money still, but the transportation costs - barge, truck, ship, railroad - were very high. Except for beat up barges, the transportation system within Zaire was almost non-existent. There was a sea-level railroad that had run across from Angola to Mozambique, designed to provide quick, cheap transport for mineral ores during the colonial days. But that line was cut during the Angolan insurrection in the 1960s. So it was very slow and expensive to move minerals from the mines to the markets. And the ore prices kept dropping.

There were large public buildings in Kinshasa, but they were never maintained. The U.S. had contributed to Zaire's infrastructure. We had financed an electric transmission line from the hydro-electric dam in Inga - right outside of Kinshasa - to the copper mines in Shaba - about 1,000 kilometers through the center of the country. It had to be direct current [d.c.] transmission to get enough power from generator to consumption and became the longest transmission line in the world, requiring some very modern and new technology because it needed lots of alternators - each of which was about the size a football field with ceilings 100 feet high. They were all covered with a smooth metal - zinc, perhaps. And the electricity would arc back and forth across the alternator. The same was true at the receiving end when the d.c had to be converted into a.c. [alternative current] Morris-Knudsen built the line, with the Swedes building the machinery. We worked hard to get the line completed - it had been under construction for a number of years. But with the fall in copper prices and the rise in transportation costs, there was not a great demand for the electric flash smelters that were supposed to be erected so they were not built. The line could not be tapped, even when it ran through a village of 1 million inhabitants. The electricity went right overhead and could not be used by this city

which had to continue to use the few small generators that it had. It would have required some very high tech devices to turn the d.c. power into a.c. and would have cost around $15 million. No one had that kind of money, so the poor villagers watched all this power go by them, without being able to use it - in fact, it was hardly used at all.

Corruption was endemic; it was huge. In the 1970s, Mobutu had nationalized - expropriated - a large number of Belgian and Portuguese commercial enterprises - firms and factories. They were turned over without any compensation to the former owners to Mobutu's friends and family. He got a cut from those operations. Eventually, most of these enterprises went broke, but not before they had enriched Mobutu's coffers. He also diverted funds generated from the sale of native natural resources - diamonds, copper, cobalt, coffee, cocoa, rubber, etc. The sale of these resources were all controlled by state marketing operations. Mobutu and his entourage got a cut from those revenues. In one particular situation, we thought we had plugged tightly all possibilities for bribery and diversion of moneys. We had a World Bank team in the Gecomines office - that was the state corporation that handled the mining and sale of copper and cobalt, the principal export resource and greatest revenue source for Zaire. The IMF had a team in the Central Bank. We thought with all that expert manpower, we could reduce if not eliminate the diversion of revenues. We soon discovered, through some very good work by CIA and our commercial people and our Embassy in Brussels, that the Zaireans were falsifying shipping documents. These documents showed only half of the actual shipments of cobalt - which was the most expensive resource. All Zairean official documents showed far fewer shipments than were actually taking place - they did not match the loading documents that were prepared at the port by the shippers themselves which we obtained. The actual amounts being shipped were twice the amounts shown on official Zairean documents. Then we discovered that the Belgian bank - Societe Generale - that was handling most of the Zairean foreign exchange had worked out a deal with Mobutu and his cronies which in effect did not credit the Zairean Central Bank with all the revenues generated by the sale of the resources. That prevented the IMF from monitoring the use of funds in the Central Bank; the Belgian bank held the balance in Brussels in the personal accounts of Mobutu and his cronies. He did share some of these illegal profits with his Belgian buddies, so that everyone, except the Zairean people benefitted. The Belgian foreign minister was one of the directors of the Belgian bank. I once asked the Belgian Ambassador in Kinshasa about that situation. He told me that in Belgium there was no such thing as “conflict of interest;” having the Foreign Minister sit as a member of a Board of Directors of a bank involved in foreign transactions was perfectly normal.

I don't know whether Jackie Onassis' friend Maurice Tempelsman was involved in corruption, but he had extensive business interests in Zaire. He was an important American business man. One of his two principal employees in Zaire was the former CIA Station Chief, Larry Devlin, who helped a lot when Mobutu was put in power in 1965. The other, John Cerages, had been the Embassy's Defense Attaché at that time. I will never forget the first evening we were in Kinshasa. We were invited for dinner at the house of a senior Embassy officer. These two men were there and I had to listen to them telling me how delighted they were that I had arrived; everything was set and my life would be very easy because, as had been the case in the past, whenever the American

Ambassador had any difficulties, he would come to them and they would work out satisfactory arrangements with Mobutu. After their intercession, as had been true in the past, then I could go to Mobutu confident that I would get the appropriate response because they had paved the way. I listen to this "educational program" for about an hour - which for me was probably a record for restraint and patience. Finally, I told them I would not operate as they suggested my predecessors had done. In fact, I had heard that their description of the process had been true when Sheldon Vance had been Ambassador from a good friend, Bob Whittinghill, who had been Vance's Station Chief in Kinshasa several years earlier, but I told the two Americans that the system would not work that way on my watch. In Vance's case, when the "advance spade work," done by Whittinghill, indicated a negative answer, the DCM would be sent to the Foreign Minister with whatever request the U.S. had. If the response were likely to be positive, then Vance would go see Mobutu. But in any case, I told Devlin and Gerages that I thought their proposal was a very bad idea because Mobutu was bound to be confused between requests made by two private Americans and requests made by the U.S. government.

Sometime later, I asked the Station Chief to come to my office. I told him that I wanted him to understand one thing: regardless of past practices, he was not to see Mobutu alone or to see him at all without my prior approval. He noted that in the past, there had been no limitations on his relationships with Mobutu; that had been true for his predecessors as well. I insisted that we start a new way of dealing with Mobutu. He said that he would refer the matter to his headquarters. What the Station Chief did not know was that I had worked out this new arrangement with Frank Carlucci, the Deputy Director of CIA, before leaving Washington. So much to the Station Chief's surprise, he got an order from CIA headquarters that he was to follow my instructions. Since then there was an agreement that the Ambassador had that authority at all posts. This is just one illustration of the sometime free-wheeling operations conducted by CIA overseas. Mort Abramowitz had similar experience in Thailand with his Station Chief. I call these places the "flagship stations" where the CIA was accustomed to dealing directly with Presidents or Prime Ministers without Ambassadorial involvement and sometimes even knowledge. The head of state assumes logically that CIA is the authoritative channel of communications with the U.S. government; I was not going to buy that and got it changed in Zaire.

I had some vague hopes that Zaire's economy might improve. That is why we worked very closely with the IMF and the World Bank, both on the macroeconomics and on development projects. We used to collude with these international bodies; we would review the economic situation together and try to agree on a course of action. Then we would agree on which one of us would take the initiative. Sometimes we would volunteer - after all I was already in so much hot water with Mobutu that another fight didn't make that much difference. Sometimes the international institutions would take the lead. So we tried to work together both on the development of an economic strategy and the necessary implementations. We spent a lot of time trying to improve our own bilateral projects as did the Bank on theirs. We both aimed to make our projects much more labor intensive trying to move [away] from large schemes which after completion would have required skilled manpower that Zaire did not have. There were few very educated people left in

Zaire; those who had education, had fled and would not return. We started again to emphasize projects which involved the local populations, similar to the projects that were undertaken in the Belgian colonial era. That made more sense than the grandiose schemes that Mobutu and his entourage thought should be undertaken. As I said, we worked very hard on redirecting the aid program, but there was too much inertia in the Zairean government - it was too weak and didn't care enough and the “boss” - Mobutu - couldn't have cared less.

To illustrate the point I am trying to make, let me tell you one story. In 1981, Zaire had a very good Minister of Agriculture, Kamitatu. He had been politically active before independence. He was a charmer and schemer, but cared a lot for Zaire. Together with him, we developed a new agricultural project which was to benefit each province. Each would receive ten trucks - Japanese and Italian - provided by those countries - 100 from the Japan and fifty from Italy. We provided seed, other governments donated tools. We were very careful to guard these supplies as best we could. We had Peace Corps volunteers and other Americans drive the trucks and materials from the port. It did take us quite a while to get all the ducks in a row since there were so many governments involved, working primarily through their ambassadors in Kinshasa.

The night before this caravan of trucks was supposed to leave the city and fan out to all the provinces, all the vehicles were stolen, apparently in accordance with instructions from cabinet ministers and leading politicians. That made it impossible to launch the project. I was enraged; I personally drove around town and looked for the trucks. I found most of them, sitting in the yards of various high officials. My pleas for the return of the trucks got me nowhere. The Prime Minister was no help; the Minister of Agriculture was helpless because in part his colleagues had taken the trucks to undercut him - he was being too successful. I finally wrote Mobutu a letter, venting my outrage and telling him that the action of his cabinet and other close advisers was totally unacceptable. I told him what I knew had happened and expressed my disbelief that anything like this might happen. A few hours later I received a call from Mobutu's intelligence chief, telling me that the President was very upset. I said that made two of us. He asked me why I had put the story in writing, I told him that was the only way I had found to communicate with the President. The intelligence chief said to me that, "Letters leave traces." I noted that, "The disappearance of trucks into the yards of cabinet members does too" and hung up. I will tell you later the consequences of this episode, but I just wanted to relate it at this point as an illustration of some of the problems we were facing in Zaire.

I must say that my Washington briefings had been quite good. I was not surprised by anything I found in Zaire. I was told that we were trying to pursue a variety of interests in Zaire simultaneously, which required considerable agility. We were trying to promote economic reform; we were trying to promote at least a degree of political reform - we were not pushing for a democratic state, but we did want to reduce the human rights abuses and increase political participation by the Zairean people. There were some in the U.S. - the Human Rights Bureau and some NGOs - who were frustrated that we did not push harder for a democratic state. They wanted a more aggressive stance, but I thought they were going too far, too fast because we had other interests that also had to be

protected. I didn't see anyway in which Mobutu would become truly democratic - nor did we have the power to force a change in leadership even in the unlikely event that we might have found a true democrat in Zaire.

For example, we had to worry about corruption even in our own assistance programs. We found that rice provided under PL 480 was being diverted; that meant we had to stop the program when the Zairean officials would not heed our warnings. The cessation of the program upset some of the American rice growers as well as Mobutu and some of the other culprits. But in Zaire, we had to watch everything; if it wasn't nailed down, it would be stolen.

We were also interested in fostering American business. We had some oil companies operating in Zaire as well as some who were conducting explorations. We also had obvious “Cold War” interests; we did not want Zaire to be subverted or infiltrated or attacked from some socialist neighbor like Zambia or Angola. And this was the time when the civil war in Angola was raging with the U.S. backing Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for Total Independence (UNITA) - a pro-west faction - against the government supported by the Cubans and the Soviets. That war had started right after Portugal had given Angola its independence in 1974. Then there was Mozambique, Zimbabwe and other African states that were not pro-west. This vision of Zaire as a bastion of a pro-western state amidst a sea of Soviet supported states was not changed much when Reagan succeeded Carter. Both administrations viewed this part of Africa through the prism of the Cold War. There was probably a greater emphasis on human rights during the Carter administration, although we continued to raise the issue with Mobutu even during the Reagan administration - to Mobutu's considerable surprise and discomfort. As we had done in the Carter administration, we tried to balance our policy so that we could try to reach our multi-faceted objectives.

We used Zaire as a support base for our activities in support of Savimbi. I was not directly involved in those operations, although I did meet Savimbi a couple of times to convey messages to him from the President or the State Department. But my involvement was rather limited - not nearly as much as it was to be later in our Afghan operations.

I was generally supportive of our policies in Zaire. I was not idealistic enough to believe that we could transform Zaire into a democracy. I was realistic enough to understand that there were limitations on our power and influence. Moreover, even if those limitations had not existed, we should have imposed limitations on ourselves. It was not our job to go around overthrowing African chiefs of state just because we didn't like their policies. But I thought we could ameliorate some of Mobutu's extreme tendencies and we worked hard on that. We did make some progress; we did get some prisoners released; we obtained permission for the ICRC to inspect the prisons. The progress was moderate, but at least it was progress.

The same was true on economic reform, although later Mobutu welshed on his promises. At one point, he decided that he had enough of the IMF meddling into his affairs, monitoring the Central Bank on how assistance was being used. He also didn't like the

World Bank overseeing the activities of the mining companies. Mobutu warned both institutions that their days in Zaire were numbered. Much to his astonishment, we fought back. All of this happen towards the end of the Carter administration. Soon after Reagan's election, Mobutu hinted that he would like to be invited to Washington - he would not go while Carter was in the White House, but after 1981, he felt "his Republican friends" were in power and that he would like to visit them. He was quite shocked when Lannon Walker and I accompanied [Vernon] "Dick" Walters - our Ambassador to the UN at the time - to a meeting he was having with Mobutu in Paris. Walters had always had a very close personal relationship with Mobutu. Walters at this meeting delivered a letter from Reagan which said that the U.S. would be glad to have Mobutu visit Washington, but only after Zaire got back into the good graces of the IMF and the World Bank. There were also some other stipulations, mainly in the area of economic reform. Mobutu, after reading the letter, burst into a rage and said that he would never visit the U.S. again. His advisors faces turned grey in horror. Walters, very adroitly, rose and said that he guessed that was the end of the meeting since there was nothing else to talk about. Mobutu, courteous as always, also rose and escorted Walters to the door, saying that perhaps he and Dick should have a private chat. So the two went into a separate room where I was told Mobutu burst into tears because he was upset. He claimed he was so shocked, that in his mind, Reagan acted just like Carter. He asked Walters what he should do. Dick told him to calm down and to consider the President's letter at greater length; it was important not to reach any hasty decisions. He told Mobutu that Reagan's letter was really in his and Zaire's best interests. Walters and Mobutu had had a long relationship; they were both very flamboyant, raconteurs, schemers; so they got along well.

About three weeks later, Mobutu decided that he could accept Reagan's conditions. I think that initially he was really upset by Reagan's letter. He had a number of American Republican friends and I am sure he genuinely felt that he would be treated "better" by Reagan than he had by Carter. He also understood that Reagan was much more a Cold War "hawk"; he viewed Carter as being obsessed by human rights and thought that the new Republican administration would be more favorable to him in the Cold War context. For Mobutu, human rights policy just seemed to be supportive of anti-Mobutu revolutionaries. He saw Reagan's election as a return to the Nixon period when Zaire was viewed as part of U.S.' strategic policy against the Soviets.

There is an anecdote that I would like to recount that illustrates Mobutu's and Zairean views of U.S. Presidents. We hosted an election night party in 1980 at a Kinshasa hotel. We took a secret straw poll among the guests - and there were lots, including the Foreign Minister. As you will recall, it was a close election and Reagan won by a slim margin. I went to bed about 3 a.m. only to be awakened about three hours later by a phone call from someone from Mobutu's entourage telling me that the President of Zaire wished to host a celebration breakfast in honor of the new U.S. President. I was to be at the palace in twenty minutes. I immediately got up - in somewhat less than a happy frame of mind. But I got to the palace on time and was a guest at a wonderful breakfast. Mobutu went on at great length on how much better his relationship with the U.S. was going to be now that pesky Carter was gone. He added that all Zaireans favored Reagan. I told him that his view was very interesting because it was quite inconsistent with the straw poll that we

had taken the night before at our election party - in fact, 90% of the votes had been cast for Carter. Mobutu scowled and said: “If I had them in the stadium for five minutes, they would change their minds!” I laughed and said that he was probably right. The Foreign Minister, who also attended the breakfast, looked considerably out of sorts. But I think that breakfast was a good clue about Mobutu's expectations - which is undoubtedly one of the reasons he reacted so strongly when he received Reagan's letter as delivered by Walters.

I think that Mobutu framed his view of Republican administrations from his experiences during the Nixon period. He also was in touch with American lobbyists who were on his payroll and were quite conservative as were the American businessmen he came in touch with. There were a few who came to Kinshasa and saw Mobutu privately, but that was a rare occasion.

This trucks episode and the Walters' meeting, both of which I have described earlier, really irritated Mobutu no end. By 1982, Mobutu's irritation at me and the U.S. was such that he issued instructions that he didn't want anyone to talk to me. He actually sent his intelligence chief to Washington to talk to Casey - the CIA Director - to have me recalled. That was an illustration of Mobutu's views on how the U.S. government was run. Fortunately, Carlucci, although by this time he had become the Deputy Secretary of Defense, knew about my clashes with Mobutu; he talked to [Casper] Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, Casey and [Secretary of State Al] Haig and told them that Oakley was just doing what he was instructed to do. He told them that I was a seasoned diplomat and certainly not the first ambassador that Mobutu had tried to throw out (he had been successful with Mac Godley and Dean Hinton a few years earlier - both were recalled for carrying out their instructions). Carlucci said that the U.S. could not afford to have Mobutu try to get every ambassador who does his job recalled. The upshot of this Mobutu effort was that Dick Walters came back to Kinshasa to tell Mobutu that I would not be recalled. Once again, I was told that Mobutu burst into tears and asked: “Do I have to keep him forever?” Walters said: “No, but he is not leaving now!”

We did manage to keep our assistance and Peace Corps programs going - but barely. At one point, Mobutu asked that the Peace Corps program be terminated because he was convinced that volunteers had been providing information to Congressmen Solarz and Volpe. This information was being used in Congressional hearings. Both legislators were very critical of Mobutu and Zaire and wanted our assistance programs terminated. We saved the Peace Corps program through the fortuitous visit of Jeane Kirkpatrick, then our Ambassador to the UN, along with Elizabeth Dole and Ursula Meese. They were on an official tour of Africa and stopped in Kinshasa. It was a very useful trip in general and for us especially. Mobutu fell all over Kirkpatrick and vice-versa, because she saw Mobutu as the personification of a pro-western autocrat - as opposed to a Soviet sponsored dictator - and this was the gist of an article she had written which Reagan liked. She and Mobutu got along very well and he convinced Kirkpatrick that I was really part of the Carter human rights cabal and therefore not only wrong, but also not to be trusted. However, I managed to convince Kirkpatrick that it was neither in Mobutu's or in the U.S.’ interest to have him close the Peace Corps program. She managed to get Mobutu to

change his mind.

Later, when I returned to the NSC, I discovered a letter that Kirkpatrick had written to President Reagan after her trip to Africa recommending that I be recalled. But since that had already been decided, as I have described earlier, through Carlucci's intervention, nothing was done about her recommendation.

I thought that it was in our interest to maintain both a modest economic assistance program and the Peace Corps. The latter had a good program. I have recently been asked how I managed an embassy. I said that I felt it important that all elements of an embassy work together, but that that was sometimes easier said than done. I mentioned that in Zaire I would bring the AID director and the Peace Corps Director together in my office. We would meet each week, at least once. It took me six months before the two would communicate with each other outside this weekly meeting; each was going off in his own direction. Ultimately, we managed to get four Peace Corps volunteers in one town to work on some local fish ponds with technical support from AID. The number of ponds increased in two years from 200 to 5,000. That provided the town with new business and a food supply. It is possible to accomplish something when all pull in the same direction. The Peace Corps worked in Zaire with the local population, which was exactly what needed to be done, but they needed some technical support.

I think Mobutu resented the efforts of the volunteers because in some respect they made him look bad, in the same way the missionaries made the government look bad because they also worked with the local populations. But Mobutu's unhappiness could not be a guiding principle for us. I did try to make sure that the volunteers kept within acceptable political boundaries - no fiery speeches about dictatorship. They had a very good training center in East Zaire for all of French speaking Africa. I think the Peace Corps training was tough; it emphasized the need for the volunteers not to be too radical, too idealistic, not to worry about the political situation they found, but to focus on their jobs. About thirty percent of the volunteers were weeded out during this training - they were primarily those who might have been psychologically weak - unable to stand the strains and pressure they would have to endure. One of the objectives of the vigorous training program was to identify early and weed out those who might not be able to meet the challenges; that was a very big plus. But the Peace Corps had a lot of synergy. When we got them to work with AID and the missionaries, they were very effective; they provided low level medical assistance, farming assistance, some English training, etc., as well as fish ponds. It was a great program in Zaire, as far as I was concerned.

Zaire was the focus of considerable Congressional interest in the 1979-1982 period - almost all of it negative. While I was there, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, who had been imprisoned earlier and released, and then had become the Foreign Minister before becoming the Prime Minister, left Zaire suddenly with his wife and family and all of his earthly belongings. He flew to Brussels because he was afraid that Mobutu was planning to imprison him again, or worse. He just picked up and left, leaving a furious Mobutu who could not understand how someone like that could leave his country unimpeded with family and furniture. His intelligence services were shaken up. So Nguza became

Mobutu's enemy number one. [Representative] Solarz held several hearings during which Nguza attacked the regime, building pressure on Mobutu. I think he was being subsidized by some smaller Belgian businessmen who had been barred from doing business in Zaire. They hoped that through Nguza, they could overthrow Mobutu and reestablish themselves as the premier businessmen in Kinshasa. However, after three years, Nguza found that his subsidies had dried up because he was obviously not meeting his supporters' aspirations. It became clear to his financiers that he would not be able to dislodge Mobutu. After the third year, he came crawling back to Zaire to beg for a job. Mobutu appointed Nguza as his Ambassador to Washington, forcing him to become Zaire's spokesman and defender in Congress, including Solarz and Volpe. He then had to explain that Mobutu was a good President and had to reverse his previous positions. That was the way Mobutu worked.

We had some visitors while I was in Zaire, including a couple of Congressional delegations. There were two special missions that I remember especially. The first delegation came very privately led by Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Defense Minister, in 1981. Mobutu was having trouble with his palace guard, which was primarily staffed by his fellow tribesmen - handpicked. He found that personal items were disappearing in the palace - one of his leopard skin caps, his cane, etc. That upset him greatly because he was afraid that these were signs of a plot being planned - witchcraft or assassination. He asked us whether we could provide him some bodyguards and whether we would train his bodyguards - all to be done by the CIA. I said “No.” Our Station Chief may have thought it might provide him an opportunity to infiltrate the palace, but for many reasons, I didn't think that we wanted to be seen as that close to Mobutu. Washington agreed; it was not the U.S. government’s business to do things like that.

I learned later that the Israelis, on the other hand, having heard of Mobutu’s interests, despatched Sharon to see Mobutu. Sharon told Mobutu that the Israelis were prepared to train his bodyguard - they knew how to do that well. He also added that Mobutu should never have turned to the U.S. in the first place, because even if we had agreed, we had been shown to be ineffective. After all, our closest allies in Africa, Presidents Sadat and Tolbert of Egypt and Liberia, had just been assassinated. That showed that we did not know how to protect our friends. The Israelis were prepared to provide trainers and in addition, Israel would make an effort to change U.S. views of Zaire by primarily initiating a lobbying effort in Congress. They also promised to see whether it would be possible to increase private investment in Zaire. In return, all the Israelis wanted was for Zaire to be the first black African state to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. And that is exactly what happened. Mobutu thought it was a good deal; he resumed diplomatic relations with Israel, who provided trainers for his palace guard.

The Israeli Prime Minister wrote a memorandum to President Reagan suggesting that the U.S. should do more for Zaire. The White House did have conversations with Solarz and Volpe, who refused to budge. A few months later, an American business delegation, headed by the CEO of K-Mart came. We learned about it by accident; Washington had not been advised. It had all been arranged through the Israelis. I did go to the airport to meet the delegation and brought them back to the Embassy in my car. During the trip into

town, I asked the CEO of K-Mart whether he would like to have an Embassy briefing. He readily agreed. So we gave him a quick one; at the end I asked whether the American businessmen planned to invest in Zaire. He looked at me and said: "Are you crazy? We are not fools! But the Israeli Prime Minister asked us to visit Zaire to indicate interest; so we came." So as far as the U.S. was concerned, nothing changed because the Israelis picked up Zaire's cudgels. It is true that Israel and Zaire resumed diplomatic relations and that Mobutu got trainers for his palace guard, but that was all. I think this story tells you something about the way the Israelis and Mobutu operated; I found it very interesting.

The three most influential countries in Zaire were the French, the Belgians and ourselves. I had very good relations with both the French and Belgian ambassadors; we were very polite with each other. We worked with the French to deliver military material to Chad when it was under pressure from Libya, using the Zairean army as sort of a "fig leaf." We flew the material into Zaire in our transports; the French, who had a military presence in Chad, made sure that our deliveries were not stolen. We followed the same practice when these supplies were re-shipped to Chad using our planes and the French soldiers to guard the shipments. It took a while to work out all the details; most of the work was done in Kinshasa, but it was a successful operation. I think there were many skeptics who were surprised that France and the U.S. could cooperate so well in the middle of French Africa.

It was somewhat surprising how well we did get along with the French who after all were our main competitors. They were suspicious of us because they viewed us as potential replacements for them in Africa. They also were competitors with the Belgians for the mineral resources of Zaire. The Belgians already had a good foothold in the mines, but there were several American and French companies who also wanted a piece of the action. The commercial rivalry did not interfere with the good working relationships the three ambassadors had in Kinshasa. The diplomatic community included Tunisian, Egyptians, Canadians, Chinese. The latter were represented by an ambassador who later headed the Chinese population program until he died of a heart attack. The Canadian Ambassador, Raymond Chretien, is now his country's emissary to Washington. The Belgian Ambassador was a wonderful man - educated in the U.S.; he was the one whom I mentioned before who explained the Belgian views on "conflict of interest" to me.

Of course, there were always ups and downs driven by Mobutu's relations with each country. When his relations with us and the Belgians soured, he would make an extra effort to have good relations with the French. If his relations with the France deteriorated, then his relations with Belgium would improve; it was a constant see-saw. He didn't want to have both countries angry at him at the same time. The only area where we found cooperation difficult was in the bilateral assistance area. I mentioned how well we worked with the IMF and the World Bank. Cooperation with the Belgians was a little more difficult because they had so many special interests. Their Ambassador was very frustrated, but we finally agreed that the Belgian situation was somewhat analogous to what we had seen with the U.S. particularly between the two wars in Central America - the "Banana Republics" - and the Caribbean when the American corporations were calling the shots - not the State Department or the ambassadors. He told me that there was very little he could do about certain Belgian policies because they were being set by the

business community and not the Foreign Ministry.

I didn't have to do a lot of table pounding when it came to Zaire’s vote in the UN because it tended to vote with the West.

We had a lot of American Protestant missionaries in Zaire. There were many Belgian Catholic missionaries. I spent a lot of time traveling around the country and I made it a point to talk to them as often as I could. I encouraged them and worked with them. As I said, the Peace Corps worked closely with them. They did not put much pressure on me on the question of human rights. They were devoted to the welfare of their congregations.

I was always a church goer. Soon after our arrival in Kinshasa, my wife and I decided that we would attend a Zairean Protestant church. The music was wonderful; we liked the pastor, Dr. Kimbawa. We did not realize that we had entered into a very politically sensitive area. It turned out that Mobutu, some years earlier, had decided that in order to counter the Catholics, who were led by a cardinal who disapproved of him, he would create a protestant "archbishop". The Cardinal - who was still there in 1979 and is still there today was regarded as Mobutu's most feared critic, although the Pope limited him in his involvement in active politics - a limitation still imposed today making the Cardinal less of a player than he might otherwise have been. Both the Zairean and Belgian Catholic leadership were very critical of Mobutu - his life style, the corruption, etc. The Church was an independent force in Zaire, as it is in most countries - the chief of state and the government have no sway over the Catholic Church and its leadership. To counter the power of the Catholic Church, Mobutu decided to get behind a Protestant block of churches. He named someone to head all of the Protestant churches in Zaire. That didn’t go over very well with the Protestants. So Mobutu decided on a different approach; he focused on getting a new pastor for the church I was attending. One Sunday, he sent one of his functionaries to the church to announce the name of the new pastor he had chosen. The church committee didn't accept that; that was not the way their pastors had ever been chosen and they were not going to be a party to a new system. That put me square in the middle of a confrontation between the church and Mobutu. I decided that I would not withdraw as a congregant, but stick with my fellow parishioners. I became a real *cause celebre.* After a while, Mobutu's people approached the church’s landlord; they made a deal and the church was padlocked. So every Sunday, we would pray in the courtyard of the church. After a few more weeks of that, the gates to the land on which the church stood, were closed. So people prayed outside the gates, alongside the road. It just so happened that on the Sunday after, I did not attend services. But Mobutu sent some of his goons to the gates and they began to beat up people, including another white parishioner whom they undoubtedly mistook for me. Then everybody got together and took up a collection - enough to construct a new church. We all prayed in the skeleton of the new church on Christmas eve; the next morning, before dawn, bulldozers showed up and flattened the church. After that, we joined a Catholic church, which welcomed us as members of its congregation.

I think in some respects, my presence at that Protestant church may have contributed to its demise. I have no doubt that some people whispered into Mobutu's ear that the U.S.

was using the church to plot against him. It was a very tough decision for me whether to leave that Protestant congregation, but in the end I decided to stick with it. I think perhaps had I left the church earlier, the second church building might not have been destroyed. But I decided that I was not going to be driven out by some goons in the exercise of my religious traditions and beliefs. After all, all I was doing was worshiping; I certainly was not involved in any political activity or plot against Mobutu.

On another note, I found it very interesting to watch Catholic services, during which priests walked in the aisles wearing leopard skins and ostrich plumes. The services were tailored to use native music. It is a whole different experience which I found riveting. It is the organized church that gives people any hope for the future of Zaire and many other African states. I found the same syndrome in some Islamic countries; when people are in such poverty-stricken situation, they must find something to believe in. As was true in the European Dark Ages, that something is the Church - regardless of denomination. We used to have contacts with the Cardinal. He was a good analyst of the Zairean political situation. As in many other situation, the Church had a good feel for the sentiments of the people, but the Cardinal was very careful in his public pronouncements. In Zaire, it was the Cardinal who organized a political convention some years ago. But as I mentioned earlier, he was under severe guidance from the Vatican. We still see him when he comes to the US, which is about every six months or so. So we are quite aware now as we were then of the political winds in Zaire and the restrictions under which the Cardinal operated. It should be remembered that Mobutu married his mistress the night before the Pope paid a visit to Zaire - he didn’t want to meet the Pope without having married his mistress - he didn’t want to be in “sin”. The Cardinal, who had to officiate at the ceremony was not a happy man, but had no choice with the Pope arriving the next day. It was quite an event attended by one million people. I have never seen such a huge crowd.

In conclusion, I think it would almost have been impossible for any American ambassador to avoid Mobutu's wrath during the 1979-82 period. There were economic issues, human rights issues. In addition to my decisions to cut off his CIA channel, I was not going to be someone that Mobutu could just roll over. So the bad feeling that he had for me was not precipitated by any one event; it came from a series of decision that we made on a variety of subjects. He was particularly upset - and with some justification blamed me - for demanding specific actions on his part before he would receive his invitation to visit President Reagan. He expected a more favorable welcome and decided to blame me for making demands on him. It is true that Lannon Walker and I worked out this strategy, but it is also true that it was approved by the senior officials of our government.

When I left Zaire in 1982, I did not expect Mobutu to fall anytime soon. So I am not surprised that here in late 1996, he is still around. I have an axiom: an African chief of state who comes to power - regardless how he came to power - if he can come through his first three years in office unscathed, he can then rule indefinitely so long as he pays careful attention to his security forces. If he can last the first three years, that means he has learned all the political hot buttons of the local scene and is able to manipulate the various power centers - military, tribal, etc. After that, his only danger comes from his

security/military forces. He must maintain their allegiance; pay very careful attention to them; stroke them, etc. It doesn't have to be all of the armed forces; in Zaire, for example, Mobutu only had to pay attention to his palace guards and the intelligence services. He had to make sure that the rest of the military never gained enough strength to be a potential destabilizing force; it was the palace guards that had to have all the military equipment. He had in one way or another to insure his control over his palace guard and the intelligence services. As I said my axiom is that any African leader that lasts for three years will be able to manipulate the political forces in his country. I first developed that thought when serving in the Ivory Coast; I think the axiom was true then as it is today - witness Eyadema in Togo who has been in power as long as Mobutu. They were both Army sergeants who engineered in the assassination of a chief of state and took power. I must say that assassinations are rare in Africa and I don't think that is the way Mobutu will end his rule.

I personally left Zaire laughing because the night before my departure, Mobutu sent one of his minions to tell me that the President wanted to give me the "Order of the Leopard" the next day. It was the country's highest honor. I opined that this gesture seemed very odd since in the last six months every Zairean had been instructed not to talk to me - and only the head of the Central Bank disobeyed orders and talked to me. I said that I guessed that Mobutu thought that in bestowing me this honor, I would be in a good frame of mind and thereby refrain from expressing any negative comments about him. I did accept the "Order" but I could barely contain my laughter. I promised to give it to Dick Walters who had never received one, but I haven't done that yet. When I left, I didn't have much hope for Zaire's future. Mobutu, in a tactic many other leaders have used, kept repeating: "If you think I am bad, just wait till you see my successors. Just remember how bad it was before I became President." It was true that in 1963, the country was in midst of a ruinous civil war, anarchy, chaos. He did provide stability. I don't think Mobutu is very different from many tyrants; he didn't like to have [potential] successors or strong vice-presidents or prime ministers. Any strong political leader is competition and a possible source for instability. Mobutu has always been very skillful in making sure that no competitor would become viable; he would get rid of anyone who might have any aspirations. I earlier discussed the Minister of Agriculture; not only was he sabotaged by his colleagues, but eventually Mobutu shipped him out of the country as Ambassador to Japan. Most Zairean embassies do not get paid; they usually have to live off the sale of visas or other documents to survive - that is true in the U.S. even today. But the Minister outwitted his government; when he got to Tokyo, he sold the Embassy, rented it back and lived off the proceeds from that sale - putting the revenues into his own personal bank account.

I think Zaire today is still a huge mess, but we really don't care that much. Mobutu has found a way to make some impact by using the Burundi-Rwanda conflict very cleverly. He insists that he is the only person who can bring peace to these two countries; of course, he is not trying to resolve the issues; he is in fact deliberately exacerbating the situation. I think the White House was considering sending Tony Lake to see Mobutu to seek his intervention in the Burundi-Rwanda conflict; I think Mobutu would pluck him naked in no time. Mobutu is very clever; there are some American emissaries who even

think he walks on water.

I found my last six months in Zaire very difficult since no senior government official would talk to me. But we kept plugging away using staff members to carry messages. I did not give any indication that I was disturbed by Mobutu’s edict. I did not change our operations. During this period I found out that the Station Chief had talked to Mobutu without my permission. I immediately cabled Washington reporting this violation of my instructions. Fortunately, soon thereafter, in a normal change of personnel we got a new Station Chief, who was a great improvement. He was the one who tipped me off that the Zairean intelligence chief was being despatched to Washington to try to get me recalled. The last six months were frustrating and I understood that we could not make much progress in Zaire under those circumstances, but there were larger principles involved, such as not allowing the U.S. to bow to this dictator. I finally left in early summer of 1982, only about four months shy of a three year anniversary.

When I left Zaire, I was not at all sure what my next assignment would be. I returned to Washington without an onward assignment. The White House and the State Department had stood by me, but they were not at all happy with what had transpired in Kinshasa. Jeane Kirkpatrick, as I indicated earlier, had suggested my transfer and she did have some influence. So while not giving in to Mobutu about my recall, I was not Washington's favorite ambassador.

Q: But in 1982, you were assigned to Somalia.

OAKLEY: That is right. That job came suddenly shortly after I returned from Zaire and Chet Crocker and Frank Wisner thought that that would be a good assignment for me. They must have thought that my experiences in Zaire would be good reparation for Mogadishu. And that is where I went.

The White House went along with that - it would not have sent me to a good European post, but Somalia must have seemed acceptable to them. They probably considered that I had been in some very tough spots before and therefore should be able to do a good job in Somalia. As a matter of fact, I think it probably worked well; it was like moving from the major leagues - Mobutu - to a AAA minor league club - Siad Barre - or from Zaire to Somalia.

In fact, there were some similarities. Both countries were run by dictators - former Army men - who really didn't give a damn about their people and were solely interested in their personal aggrandizement - power and money. They both used the Cold War to obtain U.S. support. Somalia, like Zaire, was viewed by the U.S. through the prism of the Cold War.

I knew almost nothing about Somalia when I went there. No one in Washington knew much about that country. Somehow both we and the Soviets had conned ourselves into believing that the Horn of Africa was of great strategic importance. I think that after a few years, both countries recognized the folly of their conventional wisdom. But in 1982,

we still viewed that part of the world as being strategically vital to U.S. national security interests. We had established several large military bases to protect the Indian Ocean and the Middle East - Brzezinki's "Arc of Crisis". We built some; we tried to rehab some, like the old Soviet base in Berbera. In fact, we traded allies with the Soviets. They had been the predominant force in Somalia, providing large amounts of economic and military assistance. Their generals were advising the Somalis in their war with Ethiopia. We on the other hand were Ethiopia's major supporter. Then, almost overnight, the same Soviet generals were advising Ethiopia on how to defeat Somalia's offensive deep into the Ogaden, and Soviet planes were flying in Cuban troops and heavy weapons to help Ethiopia. The Somali offensive was totally destroyed. The Soviets were kicked out of Somalia, but became dominant in Ethiopia. The U.S. started assisting Somalia.

Personally, I had no reason at the time to challenge the conventional wisdom about the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. I wasn't a fiery supporter of the thesis, but I didn't oppose it either. By 1982, Reg Bartholomew had secured base rights for us at Berbera, which the Soviets had occupied. During my tour, that base was renovated - both the port and the airbase. We held some maneuvers there - amphibious landings. It soon became evident that CENTCOM [The Pentagon's Central Command] would not be using the base very much because improved airlift capability made it unnecessary. The U.S. Air Force could fly directly from Egypt into the Gulf without needing to land in Berbera. But at the time we secured the base rights, we didn't know that we would have so extended the reach of our aircraft. By the time I got to Somalia, it was pretty clear that neither the airfield nor the port would be used very much.

Despite the concern of some American military officers, I didn't see much evidence of Soviet efforts to interdict shipping in the Gulf of Aden or the Red Sea. Nevertheless, Somalia became part of the Cold War strategy - the same syndrome that applied to Zaire. In retrospect, by 1986, it was obvious to me that both we and the Soviets had been mistaken about the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. In 1987, we held a meeting with the Soviets to discuss regional issues in Geneva. Dick Murphy, then Assistant Secretary for NEA, Chet Crocker, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and I were there. We talked to the Soviet Middle East and Africa experts about the Horn and we all agreed at our level that from that point on, both the U.S. and the USSR should not regard the Horn of Africa as an area of strategic importance, and that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had spent a lot of time and effort in that part of the world with very few, if any, benefits. It took a while for this to sink in at the policy level, if it ever did.

We did manage in the 1982-84 period to avoid paying a political price for the use of the bases. Siad Barre kept trying to involve us more deeply in Somali affairs - i.e. support for his regime - , but we resisted his offers to use Berbera as the advance headquarters for CENTCOM. We were not about to give him greater support, which would have been the clearly implicit quid pro quo for use of Berbera as CENTCOM headquarters. I will tell you later about my struggles with Siad Barre on economic issues - somewhat comparable to my debates with Mobutu. We did provide some modest military assistance, primarily to give Somalia some defense against the raids that were being mounted from the Ogaden in Ethiopia. Those raids were a threat and conducted by Somali rebels and Ethiopian

military, with Soviet support. We used that assistance also in an effort to move the Somali Army in the right political direction - e.g. economic reforms and human rights. Hersi Morgan, Siad Barre's son-in-law - later known as the "butcher of Hargeysa" - was someone I worked with. But we did not pay a political price to Siad Barre for the bases. That became quite clear when I returned to Somalia in 1992; the Somalis did not hold the U.S. responsible for the Barre regime, and was aware of my sharp disputes with Siad Barre about misbehavior of some of his guards.

By the time I arrived in Somalia, our relationship with Ethiopia had soured because of President Mengistu's deplorable human rights record. That opened the way for the Soviets to shift their support from small Somalia to a larger and more strategically located Ethiopia. So they changed sides and then we did by becoming Somalia's patron. I remember talking to some Somali generals who told me that during the war in Ogaden they could monitor Ethiopian broadcasts and hear the voices of the same Soviet advisors who only a few weeks earlier had been advising them, the Somalis.

By 1982, our military and economic assistance programs in Somalia were growing. The Embassy staff was still small - about one-third of that in Zaire. By the time I left, the Embassy probably doubled in size. The growth - almost all of it for assistance programs - was not a management problem. It worked reasonably well. If we had any major problems it was with American personnel hired on contract; they were independent of our direct control. Some were under the general supervision of the Embassy's Defense Representative's Office, which grew considerably during my tour, others were working for AID. So both the staffs working on military and economic assistance grew. From a management point of view, what I did find when I arrived in Mogadishu was a large cleavage among the various elements of the Embassy. The economic assistance and military assistance teams hardly ever talked to each other. By the time I finished my tour, I was pleased by the close working relationships that our economic assistance, our military assistance and the State Department components of the Embassy had established. One of my management objectives as a chief of mission has always been to ensure that the various U.S. programs and elements are mutually reinforcing. If we use all of our tools toward common goals, we get much more leverage, particularly from people like Mobutu and Siad Barre. We also avoid having one agency played off against another. The quality of the staff improved during my tour. The Department found me a good political officer - Len Scensey and John Hirsch were excellent DCMs. Unlike Zaire, which was an attractive assignment for African experts, Somalia was not.

As I suggested, Somalia increasingly was viewed at that time as a "front line" state in the Cold War. Our military insisted that because many of our military aircraft could not fly without refueling into the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, it needed a base in Somalia. The same view was held by the Navy; it had to have a port. Somehow, Somalia became critical to our support first of the Shah and then after he was overthrown, our support for the Gulf and Afghanistan. The case was made that unless we could provide adequate military force, the Gulf oil supplies were in jeopardy. I accepted these premises when I went to Somalia, although I was not totally convinced by the arguments made by our military.

I had not forgotten that Mobutu at one stage had offered us a base at Kamina - a large air base originally built by the Belgians which was later used frequently to support Savimbi and UNITA in Angola. When I asked him why he thought that might be of interest to us, he said that it would be important for NATO operations. I told him that I didn't think that NATO really needed a base in the middle of Zaire. It was clear to me that Mobutu's offer had nothing to do with NATO; it was just a further effort on his part to squeeze additional support out of us. When he noticed my skepticism, he said that perhaps the base could be used as a staging area for operations in the Indian Ocean. That didn't make much sense to me either; why would we want to stop in the middle of Zaire on the way to Somalia or Kenya or Djibouti when we could ship the material directly by sea? At that stage, he became quite angry and told me that I obviously knew nothing about military strategy.

The same syndrome reappeared in Somalia. Siad Barre wanted us to open an advance headquarters of CENTCOM, which had just been created shortly before I went to Somalia. I kept saying that it was not needed. Siad Barre's motives were the same as Mobutu's: to tie the U.S. to him. Siad Barre insisted that he could provide all the headquarter's needs; I told him that we didn't need to move it out of Florida. In addition to the unnecessary expense that would be involved, I was not that comfortable with our total strategy and I thought it was not at all desirable for us to put more of our eggs in Siad Barre's basket. Siad Barre's sole interest in us was as a way of keeping himself in power and fending off his domestic enemies as well as the Ethiopians. They were a constant problem in the Ogaden - the Ethiopia-Somalia border area. Not only were the Ethiopians - with Soviet support - a threat to Somalia from that region, but a number of anti-Siad Barre Somali factions operated from the Ogaden. Those factions, supported by the Ethiopians, were constantly trying to infiltrate Somalia in an effort to overthrow Siad Barre. He had not forgotten that the Ethiopians, assisted by Cubans, had beaten the Somalis badly a few years earlier. At that time Brzezinski had wanted us to intervene, but Carter refused to do so. I think some of Siad Barre's fears were overblown; I did not believe that there would be any major Ethiopian invasion. But there were occasional Ethiopian Army small scale raids, although the soldiers were disguised as guerrillas. The Somali military was not particularly effective; its command structure was lacking. Morgan, who had attended the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, was much more adept at pulling disparate elements of the Somali military together on the Ethiopian borders than any of the officers trained by the Soviets. Later on, his small war-lord force was much better disciplined and trained than the others.

On one occasion, CENTCOM had a team in northern Somalia looking for areas for amphibious landings - under operation "Bright Star (an annual U.S.-Egypt joint military exercise)." The team had landed on the Berbera airstrip in a C-130. The field was overflown by two planes, which the team reported were Soviet MiGs. All the U.S. military scrambled. It turned out that the planes were actually U.S. F-14s from an aircraft carrier, flying photo recon over the beaches. Of course, we had never been informed that this would happen. The Somalis tried to fire their SAM missiles, but they never launched. They blew up on their launching pads. But our people on the ground were sure that the two planes were Soviet fighters which had taken off from some Ethiopian airfield. There

was a lot of tension and misunderstanding in Somalia, fueled by the Cold War.

We did provide some limited military assistance to Somalia. The material was primarily APCs [armored personnel carriers] and TOW missiles (anti tank weapons). We also provided assistance to help the Somalis get their Soviet equipment operating again. But we never provided major systems - aircraft, artillery, etc. We did fly P-23s out of Berbera for Indian Ocean Gulf surveillance purposes. I think what we provided was a good use of resources. It discouraged the Ethiopians - and their Cuban and Soviet supporters. It didn't bring a complete halt to the skirmishes on the Ethiopian-Somalia border, but I think it may have prevented the outbreak of any large-scale conflicts. The Somalis used our equipment well; it was not too sophisticated for that country's military forces. We did not provide any offensive capability, beyond some old Italian tanks which looked very good on the parade ground, but could never have made it to the front. In fact, we had to bring in a special team of Army mechanics to work on them enough to get them to and through the national day parade. Not everyone [in our government] agreed to giving tanks to the Somalis, but they were in such a state, that they hardly fitted the description of military hardware.

What we did provide satisfied our military requirements because we obtained rights to use of military facilities in Somalia - which was limited by the rigor of living in Somalia and a base for our long-range aircraft. We were not interested in establishing a large U.S. military presence. In the final analysis, the Navy barely ever used Berbera; it found that Djibouti and Mombasa [in Kenya] were much more useful because our sailors could actually take shore leave in those ports; there was no point in going ashore in Berbera.

On economic assistance, I think we had some good programs. We worked hard on rural areas, trying to improve agriculture, animal husbandry and water supplies. We had some very good contractors working in those projects. As I said earlier, one of my principal goals was to pull everyone together. I chaired a meeting at the American Club where the Embassy staff showed considerable resistance to having contractors use the Club. I think they would have objected also to a U.S. military presence, but that they knew was beyond their scope. The staff didn't understand why the contractors, who were being paid "so much money," needed to have access to the Club. My answer was very simple: "They are Americans." We took three votes on the question of Club membership. The first two votes were negative on permitting contractors to join; I explained my rationale to the membership again. On the third vote, by a very slim majority, the membership agreed to let contractors join the Club. Eventually the contractors went to work and built the Club an Olympic-size swimming pool. By that time, all American businessmen were allowed to join. They provided the pipe and cement and funds for other work; the contractors supplied the labor and pretty soon we had this large pool. I thought that was a real plus. Even those members who had been opposed to allowing non-official Americans to join the Club were pleased and began to see the advantage of working together.

I think we did have an impact on Somalia's economic scene. Significant changes were made in economic policies which unfortunately were reversed when Siad Barre became so suspicious over the marked increase in the wealth of the northern clans, as I will

mention. When Siad Barre reversed himself, that was the beginning of Somalia's long decline; Siad Barre's repressive measures started the civil war. Until that reversal, I was satisfied that progress was being made on the economic front. In the period 1982-84, Somalia was heading in the right direction. But it was only a couple of years later that Siad Barre changed course.

Human rights were another matter. I think the best we were able to do was to prevent them from getting any worse, although this situation also deteriorated severely in the late 1980s. I think we need to accept that "human rights" was not a phrase that was easily understood by the Somalis. It didn't fit into their clan culture. I think it is also true that in the 1982-84 period, the phrase was not as much a part of the international culture as it has become in more recent years. I have found it interesting to watch the ever increasing importance of "human rights." There are still some nations that take issue with us on the imposition of an international standard of "human rights", but there is certainly considerable more awareness in the international community of that standard now than there used to be.

1984-86 Coordinator for Counter-terrorism S/CT

My view of counter-terrorism was that it was one of a varying number of issues that we had with different countries and a number of varying interests that the U.S. needed to pursue. I felt that it was important to examine all the issues and interests in order to maintain some perspective on the terrorist threat. Some people would be critical of my not being sufficiently dedicated to counter-terrorism, not being single-minded in putting this issue above all others. My answer was that I used to hear the same song from Patt Derian on human rights when I was in the East Asia Bureau. I felt strongly that issues like that had to be viewed in a broader perspective and could not be tackled absent consideration of a whole panoply of matters. I applied the same general approach to talking to the Europeans about terrorism. It was important that we be very careful and certain about our goal when we knocked on the European door. I didn't think we could or would make much progress unless our facts undeniably pointed to a specific perpetrator, whether be an individual, a group or a country. (Our efforts to get them to apply sanctions to Likud [the conservative Israeli political party] was a case in point.) We could not deal with generalities; speculation would not do, even if based on fragmentary information. Our case had to be solid and well documented because I understood that the Europeans had their own interests which could only be set aside by a complete and well marshaled set of facts. Once we had obtained hard information, then I thought we could get the results we desired. The Europeans had a more legalistic approach to counter-terrorism than we had; furthermore, they had important commercial relations with the countries that were suspected of providing support to terrorism. They also tend to consider themselves as more seasoned with cooler heads, unlike the U.S. which was viewed as that hot-headed and impetuous cowboy going after the "bad" guys. They were more skeptical about the cause and effect of terrorism than we were and also viewed our information about the extent of terrorism with some suspicion. Finally, the Europeans were highly skeptical about the effectiveness of sanctions, if we reached that stage. So the gap between us and the Europeans on counter-terrorism was pretty wide.

Our tools to counter terrorism were our military capabilities, economic sanctions, intelligence and law enforcement, which I consider to be the principal tools. Everyone had his or her own views about the effectiveness of sanctions. I believe that one should use sanctions - infrequently - after having obtained agreement from those countries that might have an effect on the target country. Unless all countries that have significant commercial relationships with the target country are on board, the sanction regime will not likely be very effective. The sanctions should have an immediate impact; that requires a careful targeting. I have never thought that broad scale sanctions were very effective because they tend to generate a lot of popular support for the existing regime within the target country - and sometimes even support for that regime from outside its country. What is required is a tightly targeted sanction which has an immediate impact. Also, the longer the sanctions remain in place the less useful they are because the regime and the people learn to live with them. Those sanctions may be inconvenient, but they will not be sufficient to alter the regime's policies.

In my opinion, we have not marshaled the resources of the international banking system enough, although we and the British have done it more than others. That system is useful both in tracking what is going on and in stopping it. But there is a lot more that can be done which would have a devastating effect on the target country. This would require intervention in international financial flows which cannot be done lightly - it is a very sensitive political and financial issue which I think has barred the international community from using it very much.
I mentioned earlier that I thought that intelligence and law enforcement were the main counter-terrorism tools available to governments. By that, I mean tracking of terrorist groups and individuals to determine their patterns of operation, unearthing lines of command and control, and obtaining intelligence that will assist in the prevention of a terrorist action - which we did on a number of occasions. We were able to penetrate terrorist ranks. In fact, in Spain, on one occasion, we even set off a bomb inside a U.S. installation, but in a place where it would be harmless, to protect our source. She planted the bomb and I assume thereafter still remained a *bone fide* member of terrorist cell but no Americans were killed. There were a good number of instances of that kind; if you are very patient and if you play your cards right, you can track down terrorists for years - such as those who traveled to Europe from Lebanon thinking that they were in clear who were then captured. We caught a couple of the perpetrators of TWA 747 hijacking that way; they were captured in Germany and extradited to the U.S. when they thought they had beat our vigil. So if you are very patient, you can identify terrorists, follow them and when they land in an accessible place, you can arrest them.

We used to have arguments within the executive branch between those who advocated assassinations - even if illegal - or kidnaping. One of my more interesting experience was being involved in an argument with State and Justice on one side and CIA and the NSC on the other concerning the desirability and feasibility of kidnaping a certain "Mughniyah," one of the chief Hezbollah terrorists, responsible for blowing up the Marine barracks in Beirut. The CIA believed him to be in Paris. I heard about this proposal from one of my friends in the FBI. I immediately went to see Secretary Shultz,

just before he went to see Attorney General Meese. I argued against the action and while I was briefing the Secretary, he got a call from Bud McFarlane of the NSC. Bud said that the President had approved Director of Central Intelligence Casey's recommendation to kidnap Mughniyah off the streets of Paris. That started a three day running battle in the SITROOM [White House Situation Room] with Justice, FBI and myself saying "No," the NSC staff and CIA saying "Yes". We wanted to have President Reagan send a message to President Mitterrand saying that we know that the Lebanese terrorist was in Paris - in a specific place - charging that he was responsible for the death of our Marines as well as some Frenchmen. We wanted to tell the French that in light of Mughniyah's track record, we were sure that the French would arrest him. Others maintained that the French could not be trusted on a matter of this kind and that we were the only ones who could apply due justice. We asked what the U.S. would do with him in our courts once we had kidnaped him to the U.S. Even more importantly, we made the case that our action would destroy any hopes of further French cooperation in all law enforcement efforts - terrorism, narcotics, etc. That latter point was the one that Justice felt particularly strong about; it had a lot of relationships with its French counterparts on all sorts of all criminal activities which it didn't wish to jeopardize. We in State also were opposed to such strong arm action; it would have damaged diplomatic relationship; we believed that the French should be given an opportunity to play a role.

Then Mughniyah reportedly disappeared - he could never be firmly located. In fact, we could not be sure that he had ever been in Paris. Two weeks later, we received another CIA report sighting him in Paris. We reported that to the French. The following week, the French happened to have a delegation in Washington to discuss counter-terrorism. One of the members took me aside and told me that the information we had provided on Mughniyah was very interesting. The French had followed up and raided the hotel room in which we told them he was supposed to be. They found a 50 year old Spaniard tourist where a 25 year old Lebanese terrorist was supposed to be. He was very surprised. So neither we or the French found the Lebanese terrorist. This incident is an illustration of a larger point: how far can the U.S. go in capturing terrorists in foreign countries? My view is that you may be able to get rid of one terrorist, but he will be replaced quickly by another member of the cell. I think the Israelis have found that out. Not only will the loss be marginal, but it may have the effect of agitating the terrorists even more and almost invites retaliation. If you can capture or eliminate the whole cell, that may be quite useful, but to eliminate one member will not be very useful. And if that elimination was done in a way that might have been embarrassing to an allied country, it would have a negative effect on the whole counter-terrorism effort because it would substantially reduce future opportunities for cooperation in law enforcement. We are dealing with sovereign countries who consider themselves competent to handle law enforcement within their own borders. I think we have to be very careful when we look at our options in countering terrorism in another country. I prefer building up cooperation with other countries, rather than the U.S. playing a "lone wolf" game. There may be some exceptions, such as the Libya raid, which we had to do because the Libyans had targeted Americans; in that case, we retaliated and then showed the Europeans why we had taken unilateral action. When they saw the evidence, the Europeans were taken aback and abashed and were more cooperative after that.

I think it is very difficult to combat terrorism with more of what others would see as terrorism. I don't think there would be much support in this country for such a policy; it would be morally, ethically, politically unacceptable to the American public for its government to engage in such distasteful activities. There were some people in the administration that supported consideration of such activities; there was a lot of pressure after the Beirut Marine barracks attack for the U.S. to become pro-active. The question was why we did not attack the known terrorists in West Beirut or why we should wait until they tried to cross the line into East Beirut to take further action against us before we took action against them. That is of course what happened; the terrorists did cross into East Beirut in 1985 and blew up our new Embassy. In a meeting at the White House when we decided to support the creation of a Lebanese counter-terrorist team run by their military intelligence organization, Claire George of the CIA and I - both of us having served in Beirut - said that we must have some very careful checks on the Lebanese plans before the U.S. provided any direct assistance. We wanted to be sure that the Lebanese team was properly trained and disciplined; we certainly did not want another "loose cannon" roaming the streets of Beirut. In fact, this team was checked three times by our experts and three times it was found wanting. We did have a Presidential finding to support the team; I testified on behalf of the finding before the Intelligence Committees with George. When the Imam who was the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shiites was almost blown up, we found that the Lebanese intelligence team had been the culprit, using resources that they had managed to scrape up from somewhere, perhaps Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, we had in fact never given a cent of assistance to the team because it had not passed the test. We were ready to provide assistance had the Lebanese passed inspection, but they could not meet our standards. George and I were concerned that a Lebanese hit squad, without proper training and control, could do more damage than good and in fact, I think we were proven correct. After the attempt on the Imam, there was big exposé in the Washington Post charging the U.S. both with responsibility for that attack - which required us to explain to Congress what had really happened. That episode is an illustration of another broad point - before the U.S. gets involved in any counter-terrorist operations, it must be very careful that the activity is tightly controlled; otherwise it may end up with unintended consequences which damage all.

After two years in the job, I came to the conclusion that there was clear Communist involvement in terrorism. There were a number of different terrorist organizations, some of which were supported by various Communist organizations, but not necessarily controlled by them. It was certain that there was not one single operations center in Moscow which pulled the strings all over the world, contrary to what author Claire Sterling and perhaps [CIA director] Casey thought. But we were able to find that Abu Nidal and other Palestinian terrorist organizations not only had offices in several Eastern European capitals, but also own and operated commercial enterprises, which were very profitable. They also had operational cells in many places in the world. I remember having a lengthy discussion with one of the senior officials of the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior; he was responsible for liaison with terrorist organizations. He had spent considerable time with Carlos the Jackal, Abu Nidal, and others - including Croatian terrorists. At one stage I suggested to him that they were playing with fire. The

Yugoslavs may have found it in the short run convenient to give asylum to these terrorists, but I wondered how they could be certain that the terrorists would not turn around and bite the hand that fed them. I told the Yugoslav that the French were in the same situation. They also knew that they had Arab terrorists in their country; the French were convinced that they were safe from any terrorist action on their soil as long as they extended asylum. But the French found that the terrorists would leave and then mount operations and return to safety in France. The French found that to be quite embarrassing. About a month after this conversation, Yugoslav-based Arab terrorists, under instruction from Abu Nidal, mounted an operation at two Italian airports - Rome and another. They blew up bombs in these facilities at great loss of life, expense and embarrassment to Italian authorities. At that point, the Yugoslavs felt they had enough and kicked out all of the terrorists they were sheltering. In any case, it was clear that the terrorists had a lot of Communist support but in most cases, the terrorist operations were not controlled by Moscow.

I have been asked whether after two years as counter-terrorist coordinator, I reached any conclusions about the causes of terrorism. There are all sorts. There are people who feel they have suffered personal injustices - either to themselves or their families. Then there are those who belong to a group - religious, ethnic, national - which feels it has been punished unjustly. There were some cases of ideologues, particularly religious ones. When you mix religion with politics and add some personal grievance, you get a very explosive combination. As I will discuss later, the Afghan Mujahideen are a perfect illustration of this volatile mix. Essentially, there are three different kinds of terrorist groups: 1) those that wish to make a statement to show their unhappiness; 2) those who want to exact vengeance; and 3) those that desire to actually bring about a change in policies - e.g. “If we blow up enough Americans, maybe the U.S. will get out of Lebanon” - which is exactly what we did after the Marine barracks were blown up. The shock of that event was so great that we changed policy and declared Lebanon no longer of vital importance to the U.S. The French were similarly “convinced” to withdraw from Algeria.

Economic deprivation can also be a cause of terrorism. People feel aggrieved for a number of reasons. Recently, there was a very good article in the New York Times which made the point that the U.S. is so rich, so big, so powerful that we stand out alone in the world, thereby attracting all sorts of animosities. Given the high tech nature of the world - for which we are to some degree responsible - some of that animosity will inevitably be visited upon us. Here again, I think that Clinton so far has done a better job than Reagan because the U.S. is not in a state of near panic. In the middle 1980s the U.S. was terribly anxious - placing dump trucks around the State Department, etc. I argued at the time that we should not be so agitated and anxious because I thought that was just what the terrorists were seeking. They knew that they had our number by our reaction. When Jimmy Carter sat in the Rose Garden, the Iranians knew that they had won. Some terrorists are primarily interested in intimidating the U.S.; when they see that they can do so, they are incited to mount more terrorist activities. So I was very impressed when I attended the Olympics in Atlanta in 1996 by the calm demeanor that the people there were exhibiting. They - the athletes, the citizens, the spectators - were not going to let the

bomb explosion and the continuing threat spoil their good time. They just had a better time than ever.

There was always pressure to get things done, to take action. For example, I was one who argued against sending our special forces into South Beirut in an attempt to rescue American hostages. I thought it was an ill conceived idea because no one could be sure precisely where the hostages were being held and secondly, even if we knew before the expedition where they were, the probabilities would be very high that they would have been moved by the time the troops actually landed. I also wondered how easy it would be to get out of Beirut without an unacceptable level of losses. This idea was proposed on several occasions and I was among those who opposed it. So pressure for some action is always present.

Despite his interest in terrorism, I usually did not have direct access to Secretary Shultz. [Under Secretary for Management] Ron Spiers and [Under Secretary for Political Affairs] Mike Armacost carried the main burden of dealing with the Secretary. I worked primarily with Nick Platt, the Department's Executive Secretary, and Mike. I saw the Secretary mostly in group meetings. For a while, he used to have a small morning meeting every morning at 8:30 on terrorism with Mike and Ron and myself to review the situation - the same way Secretary Christopher now reviews the Bosnia situation. Occasionally, I would meet one-on-one with the Secretary, but that was a rare instance. After about six months, the terrorist situation calmed down and the Secretary discontinued his morning meetings. I used to see Deputy Secretary Whitehead occasionally, but terrorism was primarily Shultz' concern. Whitehead was the senior official who initially blocked a reorganization plan to put State’s counterterrorism policy under the Diplomatic Security Bureau. He was the one who convinced the Secretary to reverse himself.

Let me say a few words about Ollie North, who was my point of contact in the NSC. I got to know him pretty well. He was fascinating, exasperating, exhausting to work with. He could do more than any other six people could do. He had incredible energy, imagination, initiative, charisma; he was unequaled in his ability to get people to do things his way. Ollie was an exceptional officer. But, as I said to him several times, he needed to be assisted by people with more seasoning and experience who could keep things on track. Sometimes, he would pay heed to my comments; sometimes he would not. He was a hyper-activist; he always wanted to project U.S. power against terrorism. He would support fighting terrorists with terrorists. Unilaterally, he tried to activate a group in southern Lebanon, using DEA connections - State and CIA would have no part of this scheme. So he tried to work on his own with the Israelis to establish those counter-terrorist group, which would use terrorist methods.

Ollie was always urging more military action. He wanted more strikes against Qadhafi. He wanted to capture terrorists in south Lebanon and Beirut. Ollie was a strong proponent for all sorts of counter-terrorist actions. I opposed the use of force to rescue the hostages in Beirut. Military contingency plans were developed by the Pentagon. These plans were then circulated to a group of people from all interested agencies, including myself. The formal inter-agency counter-terrorist group did not officially get involved in

these plans, but of course many members of the group, in their departmental roles, were involved. In addition to the formal inter-agency steering group, we also had an inter-agency Operation Support Group which met weekly to discuss highly sensitive operational matters. That group included the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs from DoD, the Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the chief of CIA's counter-terrorism branch, an FBI official, the NSC counter-terrorism officer and myself. In this meeting, we used to kick around a number of ideas, many coming from Ollie North, most of which were dismissed. For example, I already mentioned North's idea of a special counter-terrorist force - which this Operations Support group would not endorse, so he went out and tried to create one on his own. There were many very sensitive issues discussed in this group. I thought in general the members of the group were very good - imaginative yet solid. When Ollie and his boss, [John] Poindexter, would listen, this group did come up with very sensible, pro-active suggestions to deal with terrorism - not enough to stop the activity in total, but certainly to slow it down and diminish it. Just as useful, was this group's willingness to say “No” to a number of propositions. As has been discussed frequently, when the NSC did not think that the bureaucracy was giving it enough support, it would frequently go at it alone - not only on counter-terrorism, but in many different areas. Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary for ARA, was by far a more enthusiastic supporter of Contra assistance than I was about dealing with Iran. Whatever he and Ollie did to support the Contras was done outside of established channels - partly to avoid established policies. Ollie would frequently come to see me after he had met with Alan Fiers and Abrams; this allowed me to pick up information about the Contra support operation that would not have reached me through the bureaucracy. I became aware of the flow of money and military equipment to the Contras; so, although in bits and pieces, I had a pretty good idea what was going on under what is now known as the Contra-Iran operation.

As time went on, it became obvious that Ollie was withholding more and more information. At one point - in March 1986 - he came to me and said that Poindexter had decided that I had not been sufficiently sympathetic and cooperative and therefore had instructed North to cut me out of the loop. That was personally very helpful because I was able to say that thereafter I knew nothing about Iran-Contra. Before March, I had known something about that operation - not in detail, but I did have a general idea. On June 30, 1986, I wrote a memorandum to the Secretary informing him about what I knew about Iran-Contra. I sent the memo because I was quite concerned; we at levels lower than the Secretary thought the operation had ceased, only to find out that we were wrong. We accepted that the supporters of the operation genuinely thought that they were serving the President’s best interests; furthermore they were under the impression that they could keep the operation secret. However, I was convinced the Administration was headed toward serious trouble.

What actually provoked the memo was a visit by a British Foreign Office official and Mrs. Thatcher's National Security Advisor. They came to Washington to discuss what we were doing with respect to Iran. They wanted to know whether we had changed our policy; they had heard that we were engaged is making some deals with the Iranians - supplying weapons in exchange for release of hostages. The British position was that it

had supported us fully: by allowing us, for example, to use their bases for the bombing raid on Libya - three British citizens had been executed in Lebanon in retaliation and revenge in an operation financed by Qadhafi. The British were upset by the rumors - they had stuck their necks out to support us and felt let down by what appeared to be a change in our and terrorist Iran policy - our rhetoric and our actions did not seem to be in sync. After the departure of the British delegation, I wrote the memorandum.

I don't know whether he ever read my memo - only the Secretary and probably Charlie Hill and Nick Platt [his executive assistant] would know. It never came back to me and I assume that he read it, but since I didn’t get an answer, I can't be sure. At the time, I concluded that Secretary Shultz was probably upset by the memorandum - I should have known better than to write a memorandum on such a sensitive subject with which the Secretary was probably familiar. I concluded that he knew and was unable to stop the operation and that it would continue to the end. That analysis led me to the conclusion that it was time for me to get out of counter-terrorism. Among other reasons I was upset that the British delegation, which I mentioned earlier, had left Washington without being told the truth. They told me what they had heard from Poindexter; when I heard that, I knew that they had been lied to.

As far as Iran-Contra was concerned, even though the NSC was not sharing any information with me, I knew something about what was going on from my friends in CIA and the Pentagon - they had more information on this matter than I did. From that, I deduced that the operation was still on-going - not stopped as we had thought. It was not under control and it was clear to me that it would not stop. I also thought that the matter would become public - sooner than later - because if the British had picked up information, so would others. What I did not know at the time was that the British had been bugging Ollie North's meetings with the Iranians which took place in London. So they had good information and obviously knew enough to know that Poindexter had not told them the whole truth. I made this point to the Secretary. My memorandum saved my reputation - and probably career - because it was part of the official file and available to the staff of the Congressional Iran-Contra Investigation Committee.

In any case, I felt most uncomfortable about continuing to work in counter-terrorism when one part of the U.S. government was engaged in an activity to which I strenuously objected. Iran-Contra was in flat contradiction to our expressed policies towards Iran and terrorists. I didn’t think it was proper nor did I think the operation would be successful. I don't think there had been an adequate analysis made of the potential consequences of action. For example, a letter was written by Reagan to the King of Saudi Arabia, flatly denying that we were providing any arms to Iran. That was not appropriate; we were jeopardizing relationships with friends and allies and at the same time, violating our own policies. Both consequences were huge mistakes and I thought, as I said to the Secretary, that the whole operation would backfire in the near future, then becoming a major domestic as well as international issue. As reflected in Weinberger’s book, someone in the NSC - probably Poindexter - called Bill Odum - the head of NSA - and instructed him to shut off the distribution of intercepts concerning Iran to Defense and State. According to Weinberger, when Odum told him that the White House had issued instructions; the

Secretary of Defense said that “Houses don't talk”, and told Odum he wanted the name of the official who had issued the order. He further told the NSA chief that since his budget depended on the Pentagon - i.e. the Secretary of Defense - (the NSA budget being part of the defense budget) unless the order had come from the President personally, he was to resume the distribution - which is what NSA did. Armacost and I suggested to Secretary Shultz that he might want to have the State distribution resumed; he said “No.” So we continued to operate in the dark, but Rich Armitage, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, viewed the operation as I did; he kept me advised about information that I didn't have. That helped me piece together about what was taking place, but we had no influence on North's operation since we had been deliberately cut out. When the British delegation arrived I managed to put the last pieces in place and then I understood the enormity of what was going on. I knew that no good would come of it.

I wanted out, which led me to the Carnegie Foundation where I worked as a Fellow. As I said, I opposed the Iran-Contra operation. I could have joined a public protest, as some had done when they disagreed with their government's policies. I decided not to do that; I made my views known and then went to Carnegie with the intention of retiring from the Foreign Service, but it never went that far. The Secretary agreed to make my tour as Director of Counter-terrorism a two year tour; that made my departure appear to be part of a normal rotation. In theory, it was an open-ended tour, but by making it a two year assignment it enabled me to go to Carnegie. I was just fed up and I didn't want to be a party to the covert operations that North was running. Iran-Contra blew up about two months after I left the Department, as I assumed it would.

I should mention two episodes, one of which was very funny, which occurred while I was at Carnegie. I appeared on McNeill-Lehrer PBS television show for a discussion about what might be done to get the hostages back specifically and terrorism in general. There were three of us on the panel. My colleagues were focusing on Syria as the major sponsor of terrorism and the government responsible for the hostages. I maintained that Iran should really be in the spotlight, and not just Syria. I thought that on the program I had indirectly, but clearly, drawn a road map of what was actually going on. When I got home, I got a call from Poindexter who told me what a wonderful job I had done in defending the administration. It occurred to me that I must have been too opaque because that certainly was not my intention and I didn't think I had done so by referring to Iran as the address for action on hostage release; it was obvious that Poindexter had not understood what I had said.

The other story, which is perhaps more interesting, occurred the day after Iran-Contra broke. I went to the Hill on my own initiative to have a long talk with Senator Nunn [Democrat, Georgia and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee]. I briefed him on what I knew about Iran-Contra - the background, the rationale, the problems, etc. I predicted that the operation would turn out to be deeply embarrassing not only to the Reagan administration, but to the U.S. as a country. I suggested that if anyone really cared, a Congressional commission should be established to investigate the whole operation - before rumors and innuendos would bar a serious discussion of the operation, the process and lessons learned or before a brust of anger caused Congress to take rash

action against the President which the coultry could ill afford. That is what I think helped lead to the Tower Commission, which Senator Nunn immediately began to advocate.
I didn't talk to Ollie about Iran-Contra after I left for Carnegie. The closest we came to having a conversation was at a small dinner in September 1986 which I hosted for Anirem Neer, the Israeli counter-terrorist adviser to Perez, in a Georgetown restaurant. The Israeli official was later blown up in Mexico. The Norths were there as were Phyllis and I. Then we talked a little about Iran-Contra. Perez, the Labor Party leader, saw that the Likud Party had orginally had its businessmen handle the arms transfers from Israel to Iran. That really put them in the driver's seat; not only did the Likud get the money, but it also endeared itself to the White House. So Perez appointed Neer to pull the transactions into official channels - away from the Likud. So Neer became North's Israeli contact and the two of them apparently initiated a number of actions - unbeknown to me. The trip to Tehran which Neer and North both went on fell into this category. By cooperating with North, Perez won some Brownie points with the White House and forced the Likud out of the picture. So in Israel, Iran-Contra turned out to be in part a political battle for White House support and for revenues from arms sales.

There was another aspect of the Israeli connection that was interesting. Shultz, working through his Executive Assistant, Charlie Hill, set up a channel through Benjamin Netanyahu, then the Israeli Ambassador to the UN, to Shamir, the Israeli Prime Minister - cutting out embassies and the Foreign Ministry. Under the coalition government then in power, Labor had the Foreign Ministry, but the Shultz-Shamir channel cut it out. That is the way Lukud operated and the way Netanyahu still operates.

Q: In 1987, you reported to the NSC. How did that assignment come about?

OAKLEY: Frank Carlucci and I have always been good friends and Frank had followed my career. We had talked about the mess at the NSC, exemplified by Iran-Contra. He called me one day and said that he had been asked to take the National Security Advisor job and that Colin Powell would be his deputy. He asked whether I would be interested in being his Middle East man. I told him that I was seriously considering retirement and that I had already served on the NSC staff. He said that he had not volunteered for the NSC job and that he took it when President Reagan called because he was a good soldier and there was a lot to do. He added that I knew both the NSC and the Middle East well and that I could be of great help to him in straightening that staff out. (I had been in that same job about ten years earlier when I worked for Brent Scowcroft in the Ford administration.) I agreed to take the Middle East-South Asia Directorate again.

I found considerable difference between the NSC staff of the 1970s and that of the 1980s. Going back to the NSC brought back some memories. As I was leaving at the end of the Ford administration, along with everyone else, I noted that the new Carter team, headed by Brzezinski, decided to change the entire NSC system, not just the players. The process of decision making, moving papers, ensuring that all views of Departments and Agencies were fairly represented to the President which was in existence at the end of 1976 had been set up by Kissinger with the help of a wonderful person, Jean Davis - who also had helped to set up the State and Treasury Secretariats years earlier. Dick Kennedy was the

Executive Secretary of the NSC. We begged him and anyone else who would listen not to get rid of the system because a) it was very complicated and b) it had served previous Presidents well. But the Carter team and Zbig had decided that the system had been responsible for the bad policy. We argued that in fact the occasional short-circuiting of the system by Kissinger might have resulted in some bad decisions but the system was probably as good as could be designed. Our argument did not prevail.

The result was that there was no system worthy of being called that during the Carter regime and for the first six years of the Reagan administration. It was more ad hoc than systematic. Dick Allen and his successors did not change what they had inherited from Zbig. The consequences of an inadequate system became evident as Iran-Contra was exposed. During the McFarlane-Poindexter period almost everyone on the staff was going his or her own way with little supervision and often with no regard for other agencies. There was no real national security system in terms of evaluating policy options and coordinating Executive Branch actions. After Don Fortier died, Poindexter had essentially a flat structure, with approximately 30 staffers all reporting to him. That meant that essentially each staffer operated independently with little supervision; it was not only Ollie North who exercised that freedom, but I think almost the whole NSC staff did.

So the first thing that Carlucci and Powell set out to do was to set up a system. They were both personally well organized; furthermore, Frank had a lot of experience with the military system and of course Powell had grown up in that system. They called Jean Davis back to help them. They found that all sorts of papers and recommendations were going to the President, without proper vetting and screening. Many bypassed the NSC Advisor. So Carlucci and Powell took control of the paper flow and instituted a very orderly system of procedures, similar to the one that I had worked with ten years earlier.

Furthermore, Carlucci and Powell changed the structure of the NSC to a much more hierarchal one. They had, I believe, six senior directors, each of whom had a staff rather than a flat structure. So controls were put in place to govern the actions of the NSC staff. For example, there had been five different offices working on Afghanistan during the Poindexter regime - diplomacy, public information, covert action, humanitarian action, etc; they were all combined into one under my supervision. There were other illustrations of organizational tightening that Carlucci and Powell undertook. Dennis Ross was nominally handling the Middle East, but he had no responsibility for Afghanistan nor was he involved or informed on the wheeling and dealing with Iran which so disrupted our policy toward the Gulf and upset Saudi Arabia. After he found out what had been going on, he was happy that he didn't know, but it was a poor way to run a show. Thanks to the efforts of Carlucci and Powell, Dennis was persuaded to stay with the NSC even though he became my Deputy rather than remaining as senior director. Bill Burns stayed on to handle the Gulf and North Africa. Shirin Tabir Kelly stayed on to handle South Asia. She had been operating pretty much on her own, but she willingly stayed on in the more disciplined organization. I think the new system and organization worked quite well, reinforcing the personal leadership qualities of Carlucci and Powell. Because it was so similar to what he had been accustomed ten years earlier, Scowcroft took it over lock,

stock and barrel when he started to work as the NSC Advisor for President Bush.

Carlucci and Powell not only changed the NSC system, but also hired a lot of "new blood." They managed to get rid of all the North legacies; they closed the Office of Politico-Military Affairs where he had worked and which had cut out other NSC officers. They got rid of all the people involved in intelligence work - the principal conduits to the CIA - even though some of the analysts there may not have been involved in the North operations. Carlucci and Powell felt in the offices directly involved a 100% turn over was required in light of the events of the previous two years. They did the same thing for the Latin America Office. They wanted to make sure that there was no appearance of carry-over of the improprieties. Essentially, the NSC under Carlucci and Powell began with a clean slate. They brought in a lot of experienced senior people they had known personally - e.g. Ambassador Hank Cohen for Africa. The NSC in 1987 was staffed with top notch people. We worked quite collegially, both within the NSC and with other agencies. There was a little friction at the beginning because George Shultz wanted to be the top man in national security affairs after Casey - his chief nemesis - was gone. Shultz wanted to call all the shots, but Carlucci is not the kind of person to be run over by anyone. It wasn't too long before Shultz realized that he could work well with Frank, and advance his agenda, not have it hijacked. That revelation came during some of the disarmament discussions with the Soviets when the Secretary realized how helpful a good NSC advisor could be. A very collegial approach developed; State wasn't running everything but was kept fully informed and had their views fully heard. Shultz and the Department lived with that quite happily. At my level, relationships were very good. Occasionally, I would be reprimanded for having seen a foreign ambassador, but it soon became clear that the NSC was not an operational organization, and there were no secret policies at the NSC. The fears that had been prevalent under the Poindexter regime soon faded from bureaucratic memory.
I did see foreign ambassadors from time to time as did others on the NSC staff which raised some suspicion in the State bureaucracy. But we did not operate like Kissinger; our meetings were simply for a direct exchange of views. After the bureaucracy began to have confidence that the NSC staff was not trying to undermine it, meetings with foreign officials became routine - as long as we fully shared any information that we might have picked up. Dick Murphy, the Assistant Secretary for NEA, and I never had any problems.

The NSC Near East division became what it had been ten years earlier. It covered North Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf and South Asia. Our workload was much heavier than it had been in 1974-77. But if you don't take too much operational responsibility, it can be handled, particularly if you have a good staff - with which I was blessed. All of the three officers who worked for me were excellent.

As far as the Middle East was concerned, Camp David had happened in the interim. So the area was considerably different from the one I had left. There remained several problems unresolved such as Israel's relationships with Syria and Jordan. The Palestinians and Lebanon needed a lot of attention. When I started in 1987, the peace process had stalled in the aftermath of the Lebanon debacle.

The President did not place the so-called Middle East peace process high on his agenda. He paid some attention to it, but only as situations required. Shultz and Dick Murphy paid attention to the peace process in 1987-88 and tried to move it along together with Perez and Shamir, but they were not very successful.

When I started in the NSC, Iran and Iraq were at war and the Gulf was in an uproar. Ships to and from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were being attacked, and these countries and others (e.g. Abu Dhabi, Oman, Bahrain) felt seriously threatened. This was a different aspect of the Middle East. My first question was: “Where have we been?” The dangers to shipping - including American bottoms - in Gulf was increasing. Kuwait and other GCC [the Gulf Cooperation Council] countries had asked the U.S. for assistance. We had not answered. They then went to the USSR for help; there they got a positive response. Our apparent disinterest in this issue together with the revelation that we had provided Iran some very sophisticated military equipment covertly - e.g HAWK [anti-air] and TOW [anti-tank] missiles - made a very strong impression on the GCC states. They came to the conclusion that we were dealing with their enemy behind their backs and seemed very disinterested in helping them in a very tense situation - Iranian artillery could be heard in a major attack upon Iraq as the Organization of Islamic States Summit was taking place in Kuwait in January 1987. Iraq was at that time seen as a friend, a bulwark against the threat from Iran.

The NSC staff reviewed our position in the Gulf; we talked to people in State and DOD [Defense] and all agreed that it was time for the U.S. to respond positively to the assistance requests from the GCC to protect shipping in the Gulf. We were not too concerned about the Iran-Iraq war spreading throughout the region. We were concerned about the potential political impact of a victory by one side or the other. In early 1987, the Iranians had much the upper hand. We considered the possibility that they might cut the road from Basra to Baghdad which could have had a profound effect throughout the region. The administration was willing to help Iraq - within limits. We set up a very orderly process to determine what assistance we might offer Iraq and under what circumstances. We analyzed that issue very carefully - openly with State, DoD, CIA and other agencies, not covertly as had been done before by the NSC staff. The bureaucracy in general agreed that some assistance was desirable. For example, Iraq asked that the Jordanians come to their help with some very sophisticated U.S. counter-battery radar to be used to find the location of SCUD missiles which were being fired from Iran. We turned that request down because even if under Jordanian control we were reluctant to have such sophisticated equipment in Iraq. We were willing to allow less sophisticated U.S. radar equipment into Iraq under Jordanian control, but not the highly sophisticated radar. That is an illustration of the scrutiny we gave each request.
There were questions about extending CCC [agriculture export loan] credits to Iraq. That was also carefully reviewed, unlike previous instances were decision were made without proper screening by appropriate agencies. I thought that our actions vis-a-vis Iraq were handled thoroughly and well. There was of course a lot of inter-agency discussion, but I think we forged a consensus on most issues. Where decisions had to be made to overrule an agency, that process went smoothly because the agency felt that it had gotten a full hearing of its views. I fully supported the consensus decisions of this inter-agency

mechanism.

I thought we were right in trying to support the UN in its mediation efforts. I also believed that helping Iraq maintain its independence and territorial integrity was an appropriate course. The cutting in half of Iraq would not have been in our interest since our main goal was the independence of the Gulf states; they would have been quite concerned had we allowed Iraq to be carved up - particularly coming after what had become public about U.S. arms sales to Iran. All of this of course happened before we found out that the Iraqis were working on developing and producing a nuclear device. The problems that faced the U.S. later on had not yet arisen; so our cautious support for a whole Iraq was perfectly defensible in the 1987-88 period. If the problems were around, they were latent and not yet on our scope.

In 1988, the vast accumulation of modern military equipment that Iraq had been buying - primarily from France and the USSR - and the training that had been provided to the Republican Guards, all came together. We found that Iraq had developed a considerably increased military capability. It began to plan very systematically for a counter-attack on the Iranians. That attack turned out to be spectacularly successful. We were aware of the increased Iraqi capability through intelligence collection. For example, we had photographs of Iraqi troops practicing for an attack on the Faw Peninsula well before it took place. That turned out to be a decisive battle. The practice took place on an area the size of about four football fields; you could see in the photographs the replica of the terrain features that the Iraqis would face on the Faw Peninsula. Later, we were accused by the Iranians of having joined with the Iraqis in that attack in retaliation for Iranian missile and mine attacks on our ships in the Gulf. But all we did in retaliation was to knock out some Iranian oil platforms which were being used for military reconnaissance and as bases for missile boats. I think the Iranians actually believed that we were acting in concert with Iraq, but in fact the two military actions just happen to coincide in time; there was no Iraq-U.S. collusion.

We did not do anything to discourage the Iraqis in their pursuit of military means against Iran. I found it interesting to watch the battle for Al Faw. Through various means one could see that the Iraqis had unleashed a major artillery and bomb barrage; suddenly the major, sophisticated, centralized Iran control and command system totally ceased to function. That surprised us because the Iranians had built heavily fortified bunkers which handled all the communications on the Peninsula. Suddenly, those communications ceased. A few days later, one of our Attaches was allowed to visit the Peninsula. When he entered the communications bunker, he found dozens of empty syringes on the floor. That suggested to us that the Iraqis had used chemical weapons as part of their total barrage, focusing the chemicals on key installations. The syringes were standard practice for soldiers who had been gassed. There was no shell or bomb damage, but the installation had stopped operations in minutes. That told us that Iraq had the capacity to use chemical weapons; so we were not that surprised when they used them against the Kurds some time later. We noted that Iraq used this capability in a very sophisticated military way; the chemical was not widely dispersed, but concentrated on key enemy installations.

The other event which engaged our attention was the unfortunate shooting down of the Iranian airbus. That got a lot of attention. The Iranians came to the conclusion that the attack must have been deliberate; after all the U.S. had all of this very sophisticated equipment on brand-new Aegis-class cruisers that was supposed to be able to distinguish civilian aircraft from military and identify all aircraft in the area. They thought we were sending a very strong signal that we wanted the Iranians to stop fighting with Iraq. What might we do next? Bomb Tehran? Of course, they misread us, but I am not sure that they ever accepted the accidental nature of that event.

It was clear to me that at the time, Iran was a real threat to the stability of the region. The Iranian power as shown by its war with Iraq, together with the games we had played with that country in recent years, and the Soviet willingness to help the Gulf states made for a very incendiary situation that we were afraid could seriously destabilize the area. Soviet involvement was a real threat. I was concerned by their offer of military assistance to the Gulf states. As I said, it followed the GCC request to us in the early Fall of 1986 to which we had never responded, and came at the same time that North's operation with Iran became public. Soviet offers muddied the waters. I felt that in light of all that was going on in the region, we had to send a political signal - i.e. providing more assistance to the Gulf countries, and providing protection to Gulf shipping. Furthermore, maintaining a free flow of Gulf oil was certainly in our national interest going back to the Nixon and Carter Administrations. All of these factors made it essential that we respond positively and rapidly to the GCC. The NSC took the lead, with the active support of Assistant Secretary of Defense Rich Armitage. We first planned how we might assist the Gulf states and then we had to sell the Congress on our approach. There we met considerable skepticism, but eventually we managed to reduce the resistance to the point that allowed Reagan to approve a strong Weinberger-Carlucci-Powell (with the acquiescence of Shultz) recommendation to secure shipping in the Gulf.

The pre-existing situation was not favorable to our interests. I think that through North's operations, we added significantly to Iranian military capabilities - certainly to their anti-aircraft and anti-armor capacity. In addition, I think that the intelligence we passed to them was also of considerable help. To what degree our assistance helped them in their war with Iraq is hard to say, but the facts were that we had provided a lot of military equipment and intelligence and that the Iranians did enjoy considerable success on the field of battle - even though their military advantage over Iraq was only temporary. It may also have been that our assistance emboldened Iran in some ways; I am sure that they felt that our assistance was a political signal of some kind.

Therefore, when we began to protect the shipping in the Gulf, the Iranians saw it as a reversal of U.S. policy. The more active we were, the more they were convinced that we had changed policy course and were treating them as the enemy. Of course, there was no change of formal U.S. policy, but I can understand why they felt that way since they had been receiving encouragement from the National Security Advisor and his staff.

As far as Afghanistan went in this period, we had there one of our most serious

confrontations with the Soviets. Angola, Cambodia, Central America and Afghanistan were the potential flash points in the late 1980s. I think Afghanistan may have been at the head of the list because the Soviet troops had actually invaded that country; they were embattled there fighting the Mujahideen Freedom Fighters, whom we were supporting. The chain of events in Afghanistan started long before I reported to the NSC. Originally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978 was perceived as being linked to the fall of the Shah, but I don't think any of us in 1987 saw a connection between that event and Soviet involvement in the Gulf. Casey was dead by then and no one else had stepped up to take his place as the "interpreter of the Soviet global conspiracy."

In that connection, I should mention that starting approximately in 1987, the pressures to use military means to combat terrorism slackened considerable. I attributed this change to Casey's departure as well that of McFarlane, Poindexter and North. They had a view of the world that most others did not share and they were also conspiratorially minded.

I spent a lot of time on Afghanistan. I visited that country in February, 1987 with Mike Armacost, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. We wanted to see what was going on. We met with President Zia of Pakistan and others.
As far as Indian and Pakistan were concerned, the relationship between the two was fairly calm in the 1986-88 period. It was true that in late 1986 or early 1987, the Indians and the Pakistanis had become involved in the Indian military exercises called "Operation Brass Tacks" which could have turned into a major conflagration or at least a serious confrontation. Each started a series of maneuvers, which did not end when they were supposed to. In fact, both sides began to buildup infantry and armor along their border. Finally President Zia and [Prime Minister] Rajiv Gandhi managed to diffuse the tensions by agreeing to meet at the border and watch a cricket match together. That stopped the maneuvers on both sides, which was a wise move. We helped that process a little by providing intelligence to both sides which showed that the more alarmist reports from their own intelligence services were exaggerated. When one of those alarmist reports was made and there was increased concern we would get our intelligence apparatus to check it out and usually found that the situation was not nearly as dire as originally described. We would not divulge precisely what the actual situation was, but we would deny that their reports were accurate. I think that helped to reduce the tensions.

In the 1987-88 period, Lebanon was still in the midst of its civil war. They had reached some preliminary accords, but they were not yet in effect. I must say that at that time, I did not have much optimism about those accords or any others having much effect. I worried about Lebanon primarily as the breeding ground for terrorists. The memory of Lebanon as the country from which our hostages were taken was still fresh in our minds. When I went to work at the NSC, four had been released - in exchange for considerable amounts of weaponry for Iran. In January 1987, four more hostages were taken in Lebanon - making a net gain of zero for the policy of working with the imaginary "moderates" in Iran. Reagan's initial reaction was to try to contact the Iranians once again to see whether they could help us in the release of the latest victims. Both Carlucci and Powell raised objections. They insisted that the last exchange of hostages-for-arms really didn't work and predicted catastrophe at home as well as in the region if we were to try it

again. Fortunately, the President dropped the idea. I think this was a clear illustration of the benefits the government derives from having top notch officials, confident and experienced, who are willing to stand up to a President and tell him when he is wrong. When such courageous individuals take a strong stand, most Presidents - Reagan among them - will listen. A couple of years earlier, under a similar situation, the Presidential advisors gave him wrong advice, or Reagan hadn't listened, or they caved in to his gut instincts without taking the time to explain the risks involved. They were not up to the task of providing sound judgement in a way that was meaningful to Reagan. As good military men, I suspect that the former advisors just saluted and said that if that was what the President wanted, he would get it.

We saw the same syndrome played out when Howard Baker became the [President's] Chief of Staff. It was a welcomed change from the previous approach which was essentially to accommodate the President regardless of potential consequences. Other Presidents also had staffs that did not provide adequate advise. But Don Regan, Poindexter and McFarlane did not have adequate experience - particularly civilian - nor were they sufficiently self-confident to be useful advisors to President Reagan; they could not stop him when he went off into some of his "intuitive" directions.

I was satisfied that we had adequate time to devote to the major problems of the area under my jurisdiction. That was principally because I had two excellent assistants, as I mentioned earlier - Kelly, Ross, Burns. I don't think we neglected any major issue. We of course were not responsible for policy implementation; that was the responsibility of the departments and agencies. We were primarily concerned that there be sufficient coordination and cooperation among the agencies. In some ways, I regret that South Asia has been divorced from the rest of NEA; I think it may have diminished the importance of the sub-continent in the eyes of high level officials. Bill Burns, who succeeded me in the NSC NEA job, recently confirmed that view; he feels that South Asia gets less high level attention in the Department now that it is in a separate bureau, rather than enhancing it which was the principal reason for the organizational change. I don't think that I or the NSC as a whole would have been more active during my NSC tour on South Asia issues if they had been raised by a separate bureau in the Department. As I said, I believe we adequately covered all the issues in the NEA area in the 1987-88 period.

I did not spend as much time on the Israel-Arab peace process as I had done during my first stint in the NSC. That was not too surprising because that peace process, given its length, does ebb and flow. It should not be a continuous preoccupation of the American government at all times. What was new during the 1987-88 period was the emergence of the [Palestinian] "Intafada." I remember that very vividly because Yitzhak Rabin, then the Israeli Secretary of Defense, was in Washington when it first broke out. Colin Powell, Dennis Ross and I met with him for a long time in the Situation Room. We asked him how he intended to proceed; he informed us that he had given orders that the uprising was to be crushed in two weeks' time. We doubted that could be done and said so. We obviously differed on the strength of the Palestinian movement and suggested to Rabin that he better review his policy when he returned to Jerusalem. By the time I left the NSC, the principal problem in the peace process were the Palestinians; Syria and Israel,

Jordan and Israel relationships were stable - there would be occasional flare ups, but no prolonged period of tensions. The pursuit of peace in the Middle East is always a desirable goal, but it is not always possible to pursue it with serious results. As long as the situation was stable, we couldn't be terribly worried even if we were not making any progress or making a major effort. I think the U.S. can help make progress from time to time - as we did during my prior service in the NSC which followed the progress that Kissinger achieved right after the 1973 war. This led directly to Camp David and its permanent peace between Egypt and Israel, but even then there were periods of no movement. So there are occasions when major progress can be achieved; it just can't be done all the time. There are times, as in 1987-88, when stability is enough; chasing new agreements may not be useful and furthermore they require an extraordinary effort on the part of an administration which has many other, more immediate problems to confront. Shultz had already been burned by the Syrians for their activities in Lebanon, but even had that not happened, I don't think the Secretary would have felt it wise to take 21 trips to Damascus and spend innumerable hours working on a problem that was not flaring up. Some people get the "Middle East" bug; others don't - regardless of circumstances on the ground. Some Secretaries of State have been preoccupied with the Middle East, whether or not the time was opportune. Baker inherited something that was moving and was able to give it a big push - the Infatada needed to be addressed and he did so, with the impetus of the Gulf War. He then tried to move on to Syria-Israel; which didn't succeed. He did establish some rapport with Syrians which helped reduce tensions, but did not result in an agreement. He used the Gulf War very adroitly to mount support for the Madrid Conference which gave a new impetus to the peace process - something new had happened in the region which spurred participants to new efforts. Of course, the most important question is what is done with a new start in the peace process: can you move ahead or will the parties retreat to their old habits and policies?

I believe that if a situation is quiet, there is no reason why a President or a Secretary of State need to devote much time to it. I think that on occasions, they have tended to be too involved even when it was clear that either there was no prospect for progress or there was no indication of any trouble bubbling up. There may be times of course that domestic political pressure requires at least some outward sign of Presidential involvement, but that was not the case for the Middle East peace process in the 1987-88 period. I don't think the political pressure in any case usually comes in a way that necessarily requires Presidential action. In the case of the Middle East again, there was a lot of concern for the Intifada activities, but there was no outcry from the body politic to "do something." Toward the end of my tour and as we approached the Presidential elections of 1978, Shultz began to take more interest in the Intifada and what lay behind it. The Palestinians sent an emissary to Washington whom I met with as well as Dennis Ross. Shultz indicated interest because the Palestinians were making some sensible proposals - which never got very far. But at least, we started a dialogue with the Palestinians which later on - thanks to courageous recommendations by Shultz and Powell - turned into a limited recognition of the PLO, allowing its representatives to attend international conferences - a new advance.

I did not intend to suggest in my earlier comments that the elections alone had spurred

Shultz to show interest in the Intifada; on the contrary, this would not have been perceived as a “smart” political move. I must say that in my two years at the NSC, we had relatively little pressure from U.S. domestic constituencies. We had some problems with arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Arab states, but we had no major debates on the peace process.

There was certainly considerable outcry in the U.S. to do something about the Soviet invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan. There were some heated discussions within the administration about what course the U.S. should follow. Ronald Reagan personally felt very strongly about this issue. I think there may have been some disconnect between the President and the State Department on this matter, particularly when it came to the so-called “Geneva Accords.” Mr. Cordobez, who was the UN Secretary General's negotiator on Middle East talks and a leading figure in US-USSR talks on the issue, and the Soviet leadership both had a rude awakening in December, 1987. At that time Gorbachev came to Washington for a Summit Meeting. During one of their sessions, Ronald Reagan told the Soviet Premier that the U.S. would continue to support the Mujahideen until the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan and their man in Kabul President Najibullah had been replaced. This came as a great shock. After his return to Moscow, [Eduard] Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, sent a message to Shultz pointing out that Reagan's comments seemed quite inconsistent with the U.S. position as posited by him and by Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost during the negotiations on the “Geneva Accords,” upon which Cordobez had been working. He pointed out that in those conversations, the emphasis had been on the cessation of arms supply from Pakistan to the Mujahideen. The reply, to Minister Shevardnadze which was approved by the President, the Secretary of State and the NSC, suggested that the Soviets had not understood the U.S. position. We reiterated that if the Soviets were to stop the provision of arms to the Afghan regime, then we would try to stop the supply of weapons to our friends in Afghanistan. This position was called "negative symmetry."

I think this episode illustrates the communication gaps between the State Department and the Soviets and between the State Department and the White House. The formula of “negative symmetry” - ”we stop when you stop” - which we finally developed was the best we could do under the circumstances. After all, the “Geneva Accords” negotiations had been going on for many months; in fact, a very detailed draft agreement had been developed to which we had agreed. The only issues that were unresolved were the time limit to be imposed on arms deliveries by both sides and the length of the Soviet withdrawal period. The agreement was very clear on the question of arms supply from Pakistan: when the agreement was signed, such deliveries would stop. That position had been approved at the working level by the State Department and the NSC staff in 1985, was changed by President Reagan's remarks, the first time he had addressed this issue personally. We in Washington had to scramble for some new language which took some effort because both Reagan and Powell were on the West Coast at the time.

John Negroponte and I drafted the new U.S. position - ”Negative Symmetry.” During the January-March period, during the pre-Summit negotiations that took place alternatively in Washington and Moscow, the Soviets kept rejecting the new formula. Finally, in

March, the logjam was broken by an agreement which allowed both sides to continue their arms supply programs, or "Positive Symmetry". The new formulation was acceptable although he and all of us would have preferred a cessation of arms supply. General Powell remarked that had the Soviets accepted "Negative Symmetry" he was not sure that Reagan would have accepted it, because he was absolutely committed to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He would have been very reluctant to cut off arms for the Mujahideen - our "friends," even with the USSR doing the same. The State Department, on the other hand, approached the negotiations in its historical fashion - get an agreement if at all possible. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz was committed to establishing a good, long-term working relationship with the Soviets. Unfortunately, President Reagan's very strong views on Soviet involvement in Afghanistan had obviously not been given sufficient weight at lower levels. There were some situations which did not attract Presidential attention; Afghanistan was not in that category. Reagan cared deeply about getting the Soviets out. Shultz' policy was not on the same wave length with the President, although I don't think the Secretary ever checked it with him - the appropriate occasion never having risen. In fact, I don't think our NSC predecessors had spent much time on the subject. Prior to 1987, Afghanistan was not really a hot issue - there was never an expectation that we could convince the Soviets to withdraw. It was only during the Summit that Gorbachev dropped serious hints that he was considering withdrawal; he was testing the waters to see whether he could get U.S. agreement to a process that would make withdrawal acceptable to the Soviets.

The Soviets had expected all along that we would cease our arms deliveries through Pakistan. I think they were probably not diverted from that view by anything our negotiators might have said. Had our team contacted the White House through Shultz it might have taken a firmer position on arms deliveries and might have diverted the Soviets from their anticipations. So there was a communication gap between the State Department and the White House which in turn probably mislead the Soviets to believe that our policy was to stop arms deliveries as soon as they left Afghanistan. It was only after the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting that the Soviets - and our negotiators as well - understood that the President was firm in his position that our "friends" would be supplied even after Soviet withdrawal. That is when we had to scramble to come up with the new policy of "Negative Symmetry." The change of U.S. attitude on arm supplies was an interesting exercise. The Department had a few anxious moments and were not at all pleased by developments. It went back to the files and pulled out a 1985 cable, which had been approved by [Don] Fortier of the NSC, which approved much of the text of the agreement. The NSC response was that in 1985, the whole question of negotiating a treaty was pretty much hypothetical because as I said earlier no one believed that the Soviets had any intentions of withdrawing from Afghanistan. Had the Department been thorough, it would have checked again with the NSC and the President when the negotiations were apparently becoming serious.

In 1987, we wanted to be sure that the Pakistanis would be willing to continue to allow their territory to be a transhipment point for arms to the Mujahideen. Most of the arms came from the CIA and the Pentagon, but had to travel through Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. We had to make sure that after Soviet withdrawal, the Pakistanis would

continue to allow us to use their territory. In fact, the Pakistanis were to be the signatory to the agreement along with the Afghans; we and the Soviets were essentially only the guarantors. The Pakistani Prime Minister called Shultz and told him that he was prepared to sign the agreement. We suggested that President Zia of Pakistan call Reagan, which he did. Zia was the single power in Pakistan: the Prime Minister was largely powerless and also appeared to be more eager for an accord than Zia. Thereafter, Reagan sent Carlucci, by now the Secretary of Defense, to visit Pakistan to talk to Zia face-to-face. He wanted to make absolutely sure that there would no misunderstanding particularly on the question of our continued arms supplied to the Mujahideen - even though the Pakistan-Afghanistan agreement included a clause that would have put an end to such supplies. Zia decided that he would sign the agreement anyway - it was going to help him politically at home. When asked how he would handle the arms supply question, Zia said that he would just lie; after all, he had lied to the Soviets for ten years - a few more wouldn't make much difference. He pointed out that in Islamic culture, there was no prohibition against lying to one's enemies. Frank's cable, reporting on that conversation with Zia, had a footnote which said in effect that the Pakistanis had been lying to the Soviets about Afghanistan in the same way they had lied to us about their nuclear program!

I believe that the Reagan position on arms supply was a carry-over from the long standing position that the President, always fully supported by his CIA chief Casey, had always taken on Soviet issues: fight them everywhere at all times while ultimately ready for an understanding. In the Afghan situation, I think that policy was correct; the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Communism and the Cold War. The psychological impact on the Soviet Red Army of their defeat in Afghanistan was far greater than the impact of our retreat from Vietnam. I think in this particular case, Reagan's position was far better than the Department's - assuming that the overall policy of forcing Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as part of the termination of the "evil empire" was the correct objective. Dobrynin's view, as contained in his memoirs, was bitter about the American position because instead of helping the Soviets in their transition away from a communist dictatorship it actually destroyed them. As I said, I certainly agreed with Reagan on his general stance against communism. Although I might not have pursued the issue as hard and as far as the Reagan administration did in Central America and the Caribbean, I felt that a hard line was fully justified in Afghanistan because there was a clear case of invasion by the Red Army - not surrogates.

Q: Then in 1988, you were appointed as Ambassador to Pakistan. How did that come about?

OAKLEY: On August 17, 1988, a Pakistani plane carrying among others U.S. Ambassador Arnold Raphel and President Zia crashed, killing all aboard. We immediately held an emergency meeting to decide how best to handle the situation. That was chaired by General Powell. One of the conclusions was that an immediate replacement for Arnie Raphel should be nominated and sent at once to insure that there be no perceived gap which might be interpreted as a weakening of U.S. support for Pakistan. It was important that there be continuity in our activities in Pakistan, to insure

that assistance to the Mujahideen continued, that the Indo-Pakistan relationship did not deteriorate and that internal stability in Pakistan be maintained. Zia had been the sole leader for ten years; he was now gone and we were concerned about what might happen to Pakistan internally.

Some of Arnie's friends - the Armacosts, the Abramowitzs, the Oakleys and Dick Holbrooke - went to the Palm Restaurant that evening in a tribute to him. While there, I got a call from Secretary Shultz from the Republican National Convention in New Orleans. He told me that he was leading the U.S. delegation to Zia's funeral leaving the following day; he wanted me to be on his plane with two suitcases. I was not coming back because he and the President had decided that I would be the next U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. I said OK - it was a significant challenge, but did create some family problems. When I returned to the table and told the assembled group what I had just been told, Phyllis asked what that meant for her - she was Shultz's spokesperson at the time. I told her I didn't know; she would have to ask the Secretary. The next day she announced to the press that I had been appointed as Ambassador to Pakistan. The whole 24 hours were bizarre because neither Phyllis or I had any idea what fate would bring. We were apart for six months until Secretary Shultz completed his tour and Phyllis remained as his spokesperson. It was not the first time that Phyllis and I had been separated, but I certainly did not relish the prospect.

I certainly understood the need to replace Arnie as quickly as possible, since Zia's death had created new conditions on the ground that might have been quite deleterious. We had a big stake in Pakistan, both because of Afghanistan and because Zia had promised to hold elections, which we wanted to take place very badly. I was also a known quantity to the Pakistanis, having visited there on a number of occasions. They knew me from my NSC tours; they knew me from my days as Counter-terrorism Coordinator; they knew me from other previous assignments. During my second NSC tour, my brief covered Afghanistan, which had given me the opportunity to visit Pakistan with Mike Armacost. Therefore they knew that I had considerable familiarity with US-Pakistani issues. I think they must have been reassured by my appointment.
So I left for Pakistan in August and never came back, even for my confirmation hearings. I was given a recess appointment, which was processed while I was in flight. So by the time we landed, I was the official emissary of the President of the United States. Agrement had been received from the Pakistani government, all in the space of 24 hours. All I had to do when I arrived was to present my credential, which I did a day later. Because the way my appointment was made, I did not have the opportunity, as had my predecessors, to study Pakistan from an academic point of view, nor to learn Urdu.

I found a high degree of uncertainty and anxiety in Pakistan. No one knew who the perpetrators of the plane crash had been. The remaining leadership was convinced that it was part of a plot which would claim more victims in the forthcoming days. The fear was of course of destabilizing the country. I was instructed to try a) to calm the Pakistani leadership down; b) to insure that the arms supplies to Afghanistan would continue to flow; c) to make sure that the planned elections would take place; and d) that there be no rise in tensions in the Pakistan-India relations.

I worked on those issues on the Secretary's plane on the way to Pakistan. The CINC of CENTCOM was on the plane; Mike Armacost was there as well and of course Shultz. That was a key core group which reached a consensus on a game plan. We sent warnings to everyone - the Soviets, the Indians, etc - to stay away from Pakistan. We did not feel that the plane crash was part of a general plot, but we had to be sure that no other country would try to take advantage of the power vacuum created by Zia's demise. We told the Pakistanis that we had sent these warnings.

We tasked the intelligence community to pay special attention to any information it might receive about threats to Pakistan. We told the Pakistanis that we had done that and that we would inform them of any significant intelligence that we might pick up. We despatched a top flight Air Force investigation team to the crash site, along with some State officials. I was able to negotiate an agreement with the Chief of the Pakistani Air Force and the President which allowed our crash team to merge with theirs so that we had a single investigative team. They agreed after I assured them that no reports would be submitted to Washington until after the entire investigation had been completed - so that no separate reports would be filed, which they weren't. Such agreement was just as much in our interest because we also were concerned about "leaks", particularly of partial results. We too wanted the whole investigation completed before any reports were filed.

I had no idea of course what had caused the airplane crash. It took me about four days after the arrival of the investigating team - about a week after the accident - that I began to lean towards the accident theory. The team indicated that it could find no evidence - either inside or outside the plane - of any explosion. It of course could not be certain, but sabotage or ground fire did not seem to be the cause. That of course was the opposite of what most observers had believed; initially, most of the speculation was on a missile or a bomb. But the team never found any evidence of that. The team reviewed all the records maintained by the Air Force and Lockheed on C-130s; they found about 20 cases in which the plane porpoised through the air before hitting the ground, as the one that Arnie and Zia were flying on had done. In most of the other cases, the planes had not crashed, but it was entirely possible that this one had done so because it was lower. In most of the earlier cases, the planes were sufficiently high that the pilots were able to recover and land safely. Our team attributed the crash of the Pakistani plane to a) the inexperience of the Pakistani pilots with C-130s and b) the low level at which the plane was flying before its crash. In the previous cases, the fault seemed to lie with the hydraulic system; we believed that that was also the cause of the crash of the Pakistani plane. I was satisfied that the team had conducted a thorough investigation and that the crash was the result of mechanical failure. Until the report came in, I did not feel obliged to lean towards one theory or another. Our intelligence - which is not always infallible - had not picked up any indicators of a plot or any subversive activity by either the Soviets or the Indians or any of the known Pakistani enemies of Zia. Although we couldn't be sure, there was no unusual activity outside of Pakistan which might have suggested a foreign plot.
Of course, it was easier for we Americans to be more dispassionate about the event than the Pakistanis. They were very nervous; they were certain that some outside power was behind the plane crash. But they too began to wonder when no foreign action was

forthcoming; then they turned to theories of Pakistani sabotage - by the Army or some political opposition. At one point, some Pakistanis even blamed the CIA - a convenient whipping boy. But none of the theories seemed very convincing and there certainly was no sign of any follow-up activity which might have taken advantage of Zia's demise. Tom Clancy, in one his books, attributed the crash to a laser beam emanating from a satellite under the management of some Soviet controllers in Central Asia.

After the team had reached its conclusions, I had long conversations with the President of Pakistan and the Chief of the Pakistani Air Force. I told both that I could foresee what might happen. Under most circumstances, Americans tend to look at accidents rather mechanistically, and the accident had not involved our President. However, we could nevertheless understand how they might feel. Our evidence was of course not 100% conclusive, but our best guess was that the accident was due to mechanical failure. If the Pakistanis however felt that the cause was something else, the final report should so state. And in fact, that is what the final report showed six weeks later; the Pakistanis maintained that although no definitive proof was available they felt that the accident was the result of a plot by person or persons unknown. The Americans said that we believed that mechanical failure had been the cause.
I think you have to remember that South Asia is conspiracy-theory oriented - even more than we are about who killed JFK. It was hard for them to accept the accident theory, particularly since we had no hard evidence to support our findings. I thought therefore that the split conclusion in the final report was the best possible outcome; neither side could definitively prove its conclusion and therefore both sides were satisfied. Eventually, the issue died away.

I should comment a little about the Embassy staff. It was in a state of shock after Arnie's untimely death. It was a great staff: Beth Jones was the DCM - she had been handpicked by Arnie and had been at post for only about two weeks. Most of the staff were Foreign Service couples. For example, the Political Counselor's wife was the deputy chief of the Economic Section. The Economic Counselor's wife was the Budget Officer. Beth Jones' husband was the deputy PAO. I think that kind of staffing is a plus; it assuredly was in Pakistan in the late 1980s.

We all went to work trying to stabilize morale; everybody rallied around and responded in admirable fashion. I did not detect any resentment of my appointment, although I was not comfortable with the circumstances. Arnie Raphel was an extremely capable and popular diplomat; he was an expert and understood South Asia; he knew the language. The Embassy was his. He had picked the leadership personally. It was not an easy situation for the new fellow on the block to move into. But the staff responded as professionals should and pretty soon, we all developed a close bondage and a tight relationship. I welcomed that and it made my tour an enjoyable one.

I think the staff was satisfied after the investigation that Arnie's death was due to an accident. Fortunately, we were too busy to develop a "bunker"mentality. All of us had too much to do in trying to work with the Pakistanis to assure continuity and stability. The Embassy felt that it was functioning well under severe pressures and it received good

support and commendations from Washington, which helped morale considerably. I kept the DCM that Arnie had chosen; it was one of my better decisions. She was invaluable and stayed in Pakistan an extra year after my departure so that the two top Embassy jobs wouldn't be turned over in the same year. In fact, I made no changes in the staff, except those demanded by the usual rotation policy.

I did add one position - courtesy of the CIA. Arnie was the only long-time South Asia specialist in the Embassy. During my first consultation in Washington - after having been in Pakistan for about two months - I tried in vain to get from the Department a political officer who really knew South Asia. I had never served in South Asia and I felt we needed more expertise on the staff. Beth Jones was also not an South Asia expert. Apparently the Department did not have an available officer. Of course, Arnie had not needed an South Asia expert because he was the preeminent one in the Service. Ed Abingdon, our Political Counselor, was an excellent officer, but was not a South Asia expert; none of the other political officers were either. Interestingly enough, this was a period during which we also had a shortage of Arabists. These ebbs and flows in personnel occur from time to time. So I asked the Agency whether it would be willing to lend me such an officer; it readily agreed. I got a real crackerjack who worked in my Political Section giving us a depth of knowledge of South Asia affairs that we had been lacking. He was very, very good.

Bill Clark, our Ambassador in New Delhi, was not a South Asia expert either. But he had people on his staff who had a sufficient depth of knowledge of the area. His DCM and Political Counselor had considerable South Asia experience. Bill and I were old friends and the first thing we decided to work together on was "peace" between our two Embassies. Before us, the two institutions had been as much at each others throats as had the Indians and Pakistanis. We were determined that was not going to continue. We agreed on a program of visits between ourselves and our two staffs. Furthermore, since Pakistan was under the military purview of CENTCOM and India was under PACOM [Pacific Command], we agreed that when those CINCs visited, they would visit both countries; that turned out to be very helpful.

Pakistan was preoccupied with Afghanistan, supporting the Mujahideen, and of course the Indians had to take the opposite stance - they supported the Soviets as they did on many issues. But relative calm was maintained between India and Pakistan until the Kashmir Intifada broke out in December, 1989. Then the situation deteriorated very rapidly. The Kashmiris revolted, very much like the Palestinians - and essentially for the same reason: no one outside was paying any attention to their grievances. They felt unrepresented politically because Kashmir was governed by a puppet government, installed by the government in New Delhi after grievously rigged elections in which very few participated, and brutally authoritative. So they began violent protests to call attention to their plight.

By December 1989, the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Pakistanis took much of the credit, since they had supported the Mujahideen. They became sufficiently confident that it started to aid and abet the rebellion, which had been essentially a totally

domestic spontaneous event. The Pakistanis erroneously had come to the conclusion that their intervention in Afghanistan could be replicated in Kashmir and that the Indians could be driven from that land. In 1965, they had infiltrated some Pakistani army personnel, loosely disguised as Kashmiris; that incursion had blown up in their face because that was the cause of a war that they lost. After that Pakistan was dismembered in 1971 and by the late 1980s they were still determined to get revenge. They still wanted Kashmir - which had not been an issue between Pakistan and India since 1965. In 1989 and even today the Pakistanis maintain that Kashmir is the overriding issue between India and itself - without a settlement of that issue there can be no peace on the sub-Continent. But they forget that it was not an issue between 1965 - the end of the war - and 1990 - the year of the Kashmir uprising. But in 1990, some Pakistanis concluded that by waiving the flag of Islam in Kashmir - as they had done in Afghanistan - they could generate enough ferment to force the Indians to withdraw from Kashmir. So they set up an operation which was analogous to what they had done in Afghanistan - with the major exception that we were an integral part of the Afghan operation, but they did everything they could to keep us out of the Kashmir operation. In Kashmir, they set up local religious parties which provided support to the rebels - so that they could not be accused of providing direct support. They assisted in the creation of new political-military movements - in opposition to the regime - which were supported fervently by Islamic fundamentalists. The Indians responded by increasing pressure on Pakistan as well as reinforcing their military in Kashmir. These forces threatened to attack and wipe out some of the Kashmiri training camps, which were located in North Pakistan. The tension began to build.
Bill Clark and I reviewed the situation and came to the conclusion that we might be seeing a repeat of the 1987 maneuvers - the famous “Brass-tack” exercise, unless we somehow managed to diffuse the tensions. A military confrontation, with both sides ready to spring, like we had in 1987, could have been an exceedingly unfortunate outcome. Rajiv Gandhi had been replaced by Singh as Prime Minister; he was very weak. Bhutto in Pakistan did not have the stature to control the army. So Bill and I feared that by the Fall of 1990 tensions could build up to a level that might cause armed conflict. Therefore we urged that some action be taken by the U.S. in the spring. We recommended that the U.S. initiate a concerted effort with the Soviets, Chinese, Japanese and the EU countries to have each of those governments bring some pressure on Pakistan and India - in their own way and on their time. We wanted Pakistan and India to know that other countries would not get involved in what all considered to be an unimportant side-show which was not worth armed conflict. The concerted efforts of all the major powers began to have considerable influence on the sub-Continent, so that by the time Bob Gates, the Director of CIA, visited in May, 1990, the tensions had already begun to abate. Both sides used his visit well by using it as an excuse to back off - which they had already decided to do prior to his visit. So Gates’ trip was very useful as a cover for both Pakistan and India and to insure that the tensions stayed in abeyance.

As I said, the Pakistanis and the Indians largely ignored Kashmir for fifteen years before 1990. The Indians were not overly upset by what Pakistani involvement there was in Kashmir during this period. Bill and I checked the records as best we could and found that, despite nine or ten high level meetings between Pakistani and Indian officials during 1989, Kashmir was never raised by either side. Punjab was always mentioned - with India

accusing Pakistan of supporting Sikh terrorists - but Kashmir never. But then in December 1989 the Kashmiris themselves started an uprising. Then the Pakistanis became actively involved; they had always carried a resentment deep in their psyche that they had been wronged by partition. That bitterness had been dormant, but the actions of the Kashmiris reawakened those feelings. The Pakistanis felt that they could not ignore events right across their borders. Then it became a very hot domestic political issue - both in Pakistan and in India. In Pakistan, during the 1970s and 1980s, the military dictatorship did not feel a need to respond to public demands. So Zia down-played Kashmir; since there was no political opposition, he could afford to ignore it. But once an elected government took office in Pakistan, Kashmir became a political football - somewhat analogous to McCarthyism and the communist threat or the "loss" of China. Political leaders in Pakistan could not be seen as "soft" on India - as Indian leaders could not be perceived as being "soft" on Pakistan. This phenomenon accentuated the political dispute between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto with recriminations tossed at the one in power about being "soft" on Kashmir. Since Sharif and Bhutto alternated as Prime Minister, one was always accusing the other of that "crime." That makes settlement of the issue very hard to achieve as long as it is a hot domestic political matter. The Pakistanis, under the political circumstances of the 1990s, as well as the Indians, can not break that cycle of recriminations. If politics in both countries stabilized, then it might be possible to achieve some resolution of the Kashmir issue - if it were not used as domestic political football. Under present circumstances, the issue may heat up again some day - it is a festering problem on both sides.

The Punjab issue, on the other hand, has been reasonably settled. Kashmir could also be settled if the Indians would permit greater political participation by the inhabitants of the region and greater economic development for that land. If those matters were resolved to the satisfaction of the Kashmiris, then the Pakistanis would have a much harder time keeping the pot boiling. But I don't see the situation moving in that direction; unfortunately, I think both sides are hardening their positions once again and in a couple of years, we may have another crisis. At this time, there are popularly elected governments in both India and Pakistan, who are trying to manage the problem. At the same time, Kashmir itself seems to be calm and the tensions between Kashmir and India seem to be at their lowest level in some years.

Let me turn for a minute to Pakistani economic development. The Indians, having abandoned their socialist economic theory to a large extent, are making good progress. The Pakistanis have not kept up because 1) India has always been far ahead of Pakistan in the level of education and training of its people; 2) India has a much larger middle class and a larger pool of skilled labor - evolved since independence. Pakistan in much of the country is still largely feudal; literacy is far from universal - for women it is about 33%. The educational institutions in Pakistan are far less competent than the Indian ones - both in terms of quantity and quality. As far as I am concerned, education is vital to economic development as we can see from the experiences of the Asian "tigers" - Korea, Taiwan, Singapore - all of which devoted major resources to their education programs. The importance of education is accentuated by the technological requirements of today's world.

Right from the beginning of her stewardship, we talked to Bhutto about the deficiencies in the Pakistan educational system. She was very interested in education. It just happened that our government had been considering a very large AID-supported education program. Implementation had not yet begun. One of the first matters I asked her after she became Prime Minister was to whom we might talk about educational programs. She gave us the names of her two top aides in this field. We had on our drawing board a program to enhance elementary education in Pakistan. I wanted to get her staff and ours together to work out a joint program. She readily agreed and our respective people developed a new program to overhaul primary and secondary education in Pakistan. It began and was moving along very well until we had to stop all assistance due to the Pressler amendment requirements.

We used Peace Corps volunteers and contract personnel working in the schools of the rural areas of Pakistan. Many new schools opened; many teachers were retrained. I had high hopes that this program would really modernize Pakistan's secondary educational system. The Pakistanis were enthusiastic about it. But then we had to stop our assistance. The Pakistanis stopped their program as well because they did not have sufficient resources or interest to continue it. We never were able to change the cultural environment in which Pakistan education takes place; they still, beyond the educators, did not understand the importance of education in today's world for economic development and the society's long range blossoming. I don't fully understand their mentality, but it is clear that education is still not adequately rewarded in Pakistan. Furthermore, the military uses up so many resources that there is little left for any other purposes. The lessons that the Indians or the Southeast Asians have learned have not yet crossed the border.

Taxation was another major economic issue. There were very few Pakistanis who paid taxes-primarily the government employees. No one else paid taxes. Rich landlords - the landed aristocracy - pay no taxes because traditionally agriculture has been exempted from taxation. These landlords are represented in the national legislature by such a large block of votes that it is virtually impossible to change the tax laws. Some small progress appeared on the horizon because Mrs. Bhutto was interested in privatization; she tried to move forward with a program, but ran into opposition from labor groups which were always a major constituency of the Pakistani People's Party. When Sharif took power in 1990, he really moved ahead on the privatization program; actually at that time, Pakistan was moving faster in that direction than India. When India talked about such a program, it referred to a sale of 5-10% of state owned corporations; Pakistan talked about 50% and more. Sharif's program was beginning to move while I was still there and that was very encouraging. State corporations were being sold and they were rationalizing the production, making the enterprises viable economic entities. I found that process very interesting. For example, one of our major assistance programs attempted to assist Pakistan's huge water and power monopoly (WAPDA). It ran all the power sources - dams, generation facilities - as well as the power and water distribution systems in the country. Our program had been in effect for many years and had been one of our most important ones. We used it not only to improve the quality and quantity of the service, but also as leverage to try to convince the government to privatize it. We never got very

far on the second issue until we stopped all U.S. assistance because of the Pressler amendment. The Pakistanis found that the revenue from the sale of power was not enough to continue to subsidize the government corporation. That forced the government to start to sell off parts of the corporation, using much of the spade work that we had done in the past decade.

A lot of other privatization has taken place, in part because with the demise of our assistance program the government no longer had the resources to subsidize these state-owned entities. That is really ironical. While we were providing assistance, we did not have sufficient leverage to bring about changes in economic policies in Pakistan. But as soon as our assistance ceased, those changes were forced on the government which used our plans to bring them about.

I might just talk a little about that period during which our assistance program was terminated. When Bob Gates visited in May 1990, we had just satisfied ourselves that Pakistan had resumed high level enriched uranium production as well as the manufacturing of components for nuclear devices. Those programs had been halted in early 1989, as result of explicit and implicit agreements reached between us and Pakistan. The Pressler amendment required the cessation of assistance if a country had a nuclear device - or all components which could be quickly assembled to make a device. That provision had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1984 after Pakistan had breached the limitations imposed by the Symington amendment on nuclear proliferation. With the acquiescence of the administration, Congress passed the Pressler amendment which made the limits of acceptable nuclear development in countries receiving U.S. assistance much clearer and more definitive. Any country exceeding those limits would lose all U.S. economic and military assistance - with no Presidential waiver authority. That is probably the only law that explicitly denies the President a waiver authority.

At the same time, as a carrot, Congress authorized a major increase in assistance to Pakistan - up to about $ 600 million per annum. With PL 480 and some other programs - e.g EX-IM [Export-Import Bank], OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation - the total annual U.S. assistance to Pakistan would have been close to $1 billion. So the pot was sweetened considerably. The amendment required the President to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device or all the components thereof.

In the Fall, 1988, the Administration had said that we were not sure that Pakistan was in compliance with the requirements of the Pressler amendment - there was a major dispute on this question within the administration. The Administration's intelligence did not fully confirm that Pakistan had exceeded the limits set by Pressler. ACDA thought that it had crossed the line. CIA wasn't certain. President Reagan decided to give the Pakistanis the benefit of the doubt. We did insist that free elections be held and that the winner be allowed to take office. The certification, required by the Pressler amendment, was delayed until December - after the Pakistani election. Assistance was suspended from October 1 to December. The predominant view in the administration was that certification could not be provided until after the election, which we hoped would be free and from which the winner would be allowed to take office. The majority of Congress did

not object to this procedure, although there were some of course who thought that the Pressler amendment should be enforced immediately. Among that latter group was Senator [John] Glenn [Democrat, Ohio], who told Armacost and me that he thought that the Pakistanis had exceeded the limits and therefore he would vote against any further assistance to that country. But he did say that he would not lobby other members to support his position because he recognized that it would probably be a mistake to cut off the assistance - both in terms of sustaining the war in Afghanistan and of non-proliferation. He thought that the cutting off of assistance might in fact encourage the Pakistanis to accelerate their nuclear development program.

Both Reagan and Bush - outgoing and incoming Presidents - wrote letters to the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan, which I personally delivered to the addressees and I also gave copies to General Beg, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Both letters said in effect that the Pakistanis should cease and desist completely from any further work on their nuclear device. General Beg visited the U.S. in January or February, 1989. He talked to General Powell - the outgoing NSC Advisor - and General Scowcroft - the incoming NSC Advisor - and others. He concluded that Pakistan's best interests would be served by imposing a freeze on its nuclear program. That would allow the large flow of U.S. military assistance to continue, as well as economic assistance. I think also the Pakistan military did not see any imminent danger from India in early 1989; that took off pressure for any immediate nuclear device development program. Finally, Pakistan needed us because the war in Afghanistan was still on-going. The Pakistanis froze their nuclear development program allowing Mrs. Bhutto during her summer, 1989 visit to the U.S. to announce to the U.S. Congress that uranium enrichment was down to 5%. Our intelligence confirmed her statement. That made everyone happy.

By early 1990, Indo-Pakistan tensions rose again because of Kashmir. The war in Afghanistan was well under Mujahideen control. General Beg, with the acquiescence of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, decided to reactive the nuclear program - doing precisely what we had asked him just a few months earlier not to do. By May, we knew for sure that the program had resumed. When Bob Gates [Deputy NSC Advisor] arrived, we took the opportunity to raise the issue with the President when the three of us met privately. We told him that we knew that Pakistan had done exactly what it had been told not to do. We said the same thing to the Prime Minister and General Beg. We told all of them that they had to stop. Nothing happened. In the spring and summer, I met with all three of the Pakistani principals at least once a month, separately. I reiterated again and again that we knew what was going on and we knew that no steps were being taken to cease and desist.

I emphasized that unless the nuclear program was frozen again, all aid would be cut off on October 1. I was open about what we knew. I expanded my circle of interlocutors beyond the “Big Three”. I tried to enlist the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, other military men, two or three other politicians. I warned all of them. I told the Chief Air Marshall that the U.S. would be unable to deliver his new F-16s. No one would believe me - because despite all our past threats, we had always found some way to keep the assistance flowing. No one would do - or could do - anything. Some would deny - unconvincingly so - that Pakistan had a nuclear development program. Each would suggest that I see

someone else. But I kept repeating my message - over and over again. I told the Pakistanis that George Bush was not Ronald Reagan. Bush would be much more careful about adhering to Congressional requirements. He was much more straight forward. I advised the Pakistanis to read our domestic situation very carefully and not to be misled by history. I also noted that the Cold War and the Afghanistan War had ended and that therefore Pakistan's strategic importance was not the same as it had been just a couple of years earlier.

Pakistan had in 1990 a good many senior and mid-career military officers who had been trained in the US. We had an ever improving military-to-military relationship. A few officers, like Beg and his immediate entourage were caught by nationalistic fervor. He looked toward other Islamic countries, like Iran, as potential allies. That was unusual in Pakistan where Islamic fundamentalism was practiced by a small minority. But Beg and his people came up with a wonderful theory that if the U.S. attacked Iraq after the Kuwait invasion, Iran would join with Iraq and the two of them would take care of the U.S. One December 1990 evening, at midnight, Beg's intelligence chief called me to invite me to come to Beg's house. That was the first time he had spoken to me since the invocation of the Pressler amendment. He obviously wanted to impart some thoughts to me but didn't want anyone to know that he had talked to me. What he told me - and what he wanted me to report to Washington - was that if the U.S. used force against Iraq, the Iranians would attack us. I told him I disagreed strongly with his analysis, but he was convinced of his views. He had even devised a strategic theory - which we later managed to acquire - which postulated that the U.S. would incur large losses in the Gulf and would thereafter retreat from the area - as we had done in Lebanon many years earlier after the Marine barracks was blown up. Beg predicted that all of the countries with which we had amicable relations - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc. - would be totally discredited, leaving a leadership vacuum in the Islam world, which would be filled by Iran and Pakistan. But I hasten to add that this totally skewed perception of the world was shared only by Beg and a small group around him. The rest of the military, especially those trained in the US, knew better. Beg became Chief of Staff only because most of the senior Pakistani generals were killed aboard Zia's plane. Beg was in a unique situation, which unfortunately is becoming more common, as fewer and fewer officers are U.S. trained - none since 1989. It is one of the consequences of cutting off our ties to the Pakistani military.

But I got nowhere in the summer and fall of 1989 with my warnings of the aid cut-off. The tensions with India had increased - the Pakistanis always accused us of letting them down whenever there was a confrontation with India. Furthermore, the President of Pakistan, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army had had a falling out. The Chief of Staff was trying to get rid of the Prime Minister. The two of them were not on speaking terms. Any decision on the nuclear program required the approval of the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff. That required communication between them. In the original decision to resume the program, the President and the Chief of Staff had agreed and Bhutto had gone along because she was afraid that she would be deposed if she had not. Eventually, that is what happened anyway.

I was “allowed” to interrupt my home leave in mid-September to return to Pakistan with another letter from President Bush to the Pakistani President, announcing that our assistance program would be terminated on October 1st because the Pakistanis had not terminated their nuclear development program. I had volunteered to deliver the letter since I preferred to perform that chore myself rather than burdening the Chargé or anyone else. For the rest of 1989 and most of 1990, I had to live with this new impediment to U.S.-Pakistan relations. The delivery of that letter was a unique experience in my life. It was a very uncomfortable experience which I did not perform with any great relish. I gave it to the President; I told him that I had talked to him about this eventuality for months. He was shocked and most upset because he, like most of the Pakistani leadership, never expected the U.S. to take such drastic action. Then we began to discuss actions that might enable Bush to reverse his decision. I told the President that I couldn't of course make any promises and that any proposed course of action would require the approval of both the Executive and Legislative Branches of our government. After I delivered the letter and spent three or four days in Islamabad, I returned home to finish my home leave. The Pakistani government did not release the letter so that the press and the public were really unaware of our decision until October 1 when our assistance programs were stopped entirely. In fact, as I remember it, the first public announcement of our action was made by some Congressmen - the supporters of non-proliferation.

Then the Foreign Minister, Yacub Khan, - a wonderful man - talked to Secretary Baker at the UN in October, 1990. Since I was still on home leave, I participated in that meeting. The two had frank discussion during which Khan outlined the actions that Pakistan could take - i.e. re-freeze the program. But the Pakistan government would not agree to destroy what it had already built. That was not acceptable.

My conclusion, after living through this most difficult time, was that the Pakistanis badly miscalculated the situation in Washington. They believed that they could resume their program without retribution. Furthermore, I think that they really believed that another conflict with India was a distinct possibility - in the near future. It is true that the Indians were responding strongly to Pakistani provocations - and that must be noted. The Indians were reacting to Pakistani provocations and even though Pakistan was concerned by possible Indian actions, they would have been in retaliation to Pakistani actions in Kashmir. So the Pakistanis could hardly be considered innocent; Indian reactions were in response to provocations.

In March, 1990 the Chief of Army Staff went to Tehran. He and I always had good relations. Upon his return, much to my amazement, he told me that he had returned “very reassured.” In puzzlement, I asked “Reassured by what?" He said that he had been afraid that Pakistan would have been in trouble had war broken out over Kashmir. But in Tehran, he heard the Iranians promise Pakistan their full support and that made him feel more confident. With Iran's support, he was sure he would win a war against India. I looked at him dumbfounded. He repeated that Pakistan would win. I asked whether that meant that his forces would occupy all of India - a very large country. That query upset him. I then asked which Iranian had been his host. It had been the head of the

Revolutionary Guards. I asked him whether he had seen his counterpart in the regular army. He said “No.” - General Beg wouldn't see him, which I found very interesting because I had heard from the Chief of the Pakistani Air Force that when he went to Tehran two months earlier, he had met his counterpart, from the regular Air Force - not the Revolutionary Guard Air Force - had had a very good meeting with him and had established good relations with the Iranian Air Force. In that case, the Pakistani Chief Air Marshall wanted nothing to do with the Pakistani Revolutionary Guard Air Force. The head of the regular Air Force had asked the Pakistani what he might able to do to reestablish some US-Iran military contacts so that the Iranians would not be forced to go to Moscow for their military equipment - a move that the Iranian general said would be a last resort, but one that he might have to take if he could not open a channel to the US. That came to naught but it was an interesting look into Iranian attitudes. Beg dealt only with the head of the Revolutionary Guards.

When General Schwarzkopf CINC of the Central Command visited Islamabad in April 1990, he brought with him the head of his intelligence unit. He told Beg that he had been advised of my conversation with him after his Tehran trip. Schwarzkopf said that he didn't know what the Iranians would or would not do for Pakistan in the event of a war with India, but he had brought his assistant chief of staff for intelligence to brief the Pakistanis on Iranian capabilities. Beg said he didn't want that briefing; he couldn't trust what the U.S. military would say. He was convinced that Iran would assist Pakistan and together, the two would take care of India.

Right from the beginning of my tour, one of the techniques I used to improve US-Pakistan relations - in part by reassuring the Pakistanis that their nascent democratic political process could continue without concern of outside interference - was to increase military-to-military cooperation. We accelerated the delivery of end items that were in the pipeline - like self-propelled howitzers, helicopters, naval vessels, etc. Under normal procurement practices, much of this equipment might have taken as much as three years for delivery. We managed to get it delivered immediately. Our Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force paid extended visits to Pakistan in 1989. The Pakistani Navy Chief of Staff spent a prolonged period in the U.S. General Yeosock, who later commanded U.S. ground troops in Desert Storm, came to observe Pakistani military exercises and gave some advice. More Pakistani officers went to the U.S. for training. So we worked very hard to establish a close military-to-military relationship and I think it was a very successful program. Prior to this time, the close relationship had only existed between the Air Forces; by the late 1980s, we had done the same thing for the Armies and the Navies. That program became one of the serious negative consequences of Pressler; it had to be completely halted on 10/1/90 when the President could no longer certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device or components.

The aftermath of aid suspension was very uncomfortable for all of us in Pakistan. The Pakistanis did not seem to understand why “the U.S. had deserted” them. They pointed out that they had provided invaluable assistance to us in Afghanistan; they would not believe that it was sheer coincidence that the invocation of Pressler and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan happened at about the same time. They linked the two

events and accused us of terminating relationships once their assistance in Afghanistan was no longer required. It was almost impossible to dissuade people from this point of view, even those to whom I had been talking for months warning them of the potential risks Pakistan was running by resuming its nuclear program. Most Pakistanis did not understand why we had not forgiven them this time, as we had in the past; they linked this to the Afghanistan developments. I think those Pakistanis who had a good understanding of their country's nuclear development program, had little comprehension of the potential difficulties the pursuit of that program held for US-Pakistan relations. As I said, in the summer, I did my best to enlarge the circle of influential policy makers to try to impress the dangers upon as wide an audience as I could quietly reach. My hope was to explain that the consequences of Pakistani policies would be very serious and detrimental and to try to bring some pressure on the President, the Prime Minister and the Army Chief of Staff. It didn't work.

We tried to get our point of view across as actively as we could after October 1. We didn't rush out to brief the press, but we did talk to as many Pakistanis as we could. Ultimately, just before my departure, I held a large press conference and gave a long interview to a newspaper editor - Mrs Maleeha Lodhi, now the Pakistan Ambassador to the US. I met fifteen or twenty editors in Lahore in the week preceding my departure. I went to great lengths to explain why the U.S. had terminated assistance. I made the point that Pakistan deliberately had passed the limits of U.S. laws; it had been fully and repeatedly warned; the U.S. should not be condemned for Pakistan's actions and the resulting consequences. I added that part of the problem was that Pakistan's nuclear activities were so sensitive that only a handful of officials were aware of the full extent. The leadership knew what might happen - I had told them often enough; so they knew the possible risks and had chosen to ignore them. In a better democracy than Pakistan had, if the National Assembly and the media had been more aware and involved, the outcome might have been different. But since the information was so tightly controlled, there was no check on the few policy makers, and only inadequate discussions of both the nuclear program and the potential deleterious consequences. I suggested that the Pakistanis had considerable work ahead for them to insure that such catastrophic policies could not be carried on in the future. The politicians, the media and the people had to acquire more information and more influence to prevent episodes of the kind that we were going through. My emphasis was on the need for Pakistan's democracy to grow beyond just the popular elections which they were already holding.

I don't think that the Pakistani Embassy in Washington was in the loop. I am not sure that it sent warning signals. If any one did, it would have been the Ambassador, but I suspect that he was not involved. Only the Foreign Minster had knowledge of the nuclear program, and that was only because he had been one of Zia's confidants - otherwise, he too would have been in the dark. There were no conversations that I am aware of in Washington with the Embassy comparable to my missionary work in Islamabad. Frankly, much of what I did in Pakistan in the summer of 1989 was on my own initiative. The issue was so sensitive - in terms of how we collected the information - that most people just didn't want to deal with it. I was frank with the Pakistanis about what we knew - never how we knew. No one told me to stop talking to the Pakistani leadership; so I

continued, even though I suspect that some people in Washington were not totally comfortable with my program. In addition to my own efforts, of course there was Presidential letters, letters from the Secretary of State, a visit by Bob Gates, etc.

But I think the Pakistanis were determined to proceed with their nuclear development program. General Beg was a unique person with a unique vision of the future and he was the “project leader.” The President was a disciple of Zia. The Prime Minister, as I mentioned earlier, was concerned about the backlash that any opposition from her might create. Furthermore, there was considerable Pakistani pride involved. They had manufactured a device, even over the opposition of the rest of the world. Their position was bolstered by the fact that the Indians had a device; they could not understand why the world would allow India to have it and not Pakistan, which they felt, was in mortal danger from India.

I have always wondered that if we had signed a defense treaty with Pakistan, which would have been operative in case of an Indian aggression, whether the outcome might have been different. I have no way of proving that, but I think it might have changed Pakistan's direction. From a Pakistan perspective, it would have seemed totally irrational to give up a nuclear capability in light of the perceived Indian threat, their lack of a U.S. security guarantee and in light of U.S.-Soviet antagonisms and Soviet support for India. For Pakistan to have done what we wanted it to do would have been comparable to France giving up their own *force de frappe* [French: strike force] - which it would never have done, even when under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. We never accepted the Pakistan position, in part because the administration was constrained by the Pressler amendment.

I should say a couple of words about [Benazir] Bhutto. I found her very much influenced by her father. She tended to emulate her father's political approach. She was inexperienced, authoritarian - as he had been insecure - although she would undoubtedly deny it. Her male dominated world was bound to have an effect, which she tried to repress. She was also very vengeful - she always referred to actual or perceived damage had been done to her, her family, her father, her followers. She used that as a rationale for taking action against her enemies. That was also her excuse for such activities as corruption - ”my enemies practiced it; why shouldn't I?” There was a change in her position when the general charge of corruption - which I was able to discuss with her - was replaced by specific allegations about her husband. When that happened, it was the end of our dialogue on corruption. She then began to deny the existence of corruption. Before the specific charges, we at least had discussions about corruption; they were not satisfactory because they just led to a lot of rationalizations, but at least there was a dialogue. I always told Bhutto that without even looking at the moral issue, the political reality of corruption was that at some stage, it would backfire on her; the people would hold her accountable and take their retribution. But as I said, when the issue became her husband, then there was total denial about the existence of corruption. And that stance continues, even today.

She was fiercely defensive about her husband. She was terribly in love with him; she could never deny him anything. And he took and takes advantage of that.

We talked about many things, both at her initiative and mine. She felt very close to the U.S., particularly her friends in Congress and people like Peter Galbraith. I had not known her before, and I was not nearly as close as Peter and some members of Congress were. She felt that the U.S. was her protector; she certainly gave people the impression that that was the case. One of my moments of enlightenment - which showed that I had not listened to my better judgement - came during one of the times she was having a very bad time with Nawaz Sharif, the Chief Minster of the Punjab and the leader of the opposition. She asked me to take a message to him, which in essence was a message offering reconciliation. She said that she was prepared to meet him more than half way; she wanted to end the squabbling between them for the benefit of the country. I first asked Mrs. Bhutto whether she really wanted that message delivered. She said "Yes." I then asked whether I really was the right messenger. Her response was that there was no one else that she and Sharif both trusted. I suggested that many people around her didn't want to see a rapprochement between her and Sharif. She said she knew that, but nevertheless she wanted to proceed.

I then made the same comment about Sharif's entourage. She said that she knew that there were many around him who opposed rapprochement, which was one more reason for her decision to ask me to act as intermediary. She then repeated her request for my involvement. I had serious doubts about this as an appropriate role for a U.S. ambassador. But Bhutto kept asking. Finally, I came to the conclusion that since our official policy was to assist the duly elected government of Pakistan to succeed, Bhutto's request fell into that framework. It was a rationalization. In fact, I made a serious mistake which got me much too deeply involved in the internal affairs of another nation.

I told her that I didn't know whether her hopes for a rapprochement could ever be realized. She had a lot of opposition to her goal within her own political family. But I said I would deliver the message, which I did. About a week later, I met her again. Then she told me that she had decided that Sharif had to go and that she had sent someone to the Punjab to finish him off politically by ousting him as Chief Minister. I was flabbergasted. How could anyone send a message of reconciliation to a person one week and the next week try to eliminate him? But that was Bhutto! Unfortunately that unpredictability was part of her modus operandi; this event was not an exception.

I was told of a cable from Ambassador [Tom] Simons [U.S. ambassador to Pakistan from 1995 to 1998] reporting on a conversation he had with the present President, Sardar Leghari, in which the latter remarked that he had to get rid of Prime Minister Bhutto (for the second time). I had to laugh because it sounded very much like the conversation I had with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1990; he had made exactly the same comments about Bhutto as his successor had - authoritarian, wilful, corrupt, unbending, unwilling to listen to advice, stubborn. Bhutto seems to get worse and worse; she is not growing. That is unfortunate.

Let me make some more comments about Afghanistan. As the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, I was very much involved in both policy and operational issues. Our operation

was run by my Station Chief. I didn't know everything that was going on. But I knew enough to be comfortable and to be able to make a contribution. I didn't always agree with some of our actions, but I realized that that debate over policy would have to take place in Washington. Decisions about actions were made in Washington, not in the field.

One disagreement I had was with the State Department's general stance which was to seek compromise with the Soviets rather than pursue our efforts in Afghanistan with full vigor. CIA on the other hand, under the "Casey doctrine," wanted to push the Soviets very hard. That difference of objectives caused some very interesting debates in Washington. I had told Armacost, before leaving for Pakistan, that my views of what U.S. actions should be might be different than those previously espoused by Arnie Raphel. I said that in light of my NSC experience I might not agree with State-only ideas; I thought that a better inter-agency process had to be instituted so that when I received instructions under the signature of Secretary Shultz, I could be confident that behind them stood a unified U.S. government. There had been enough confusion already among various agencies about U.S. policy in Afghanistan. As the senior U.S. official in Pakistan, I would have to tell all agency representatives in Islamabad what our policy was and expect all of them to follow it. That was the approach I followed. I had two or three telephone calls from State officials, asking me to put an end to something CIA was doing or to get the CIA to do something else. My answer was always: "Send me a cable with instructions, showing inter-agency clearance." I didn't mind instructing the Station Chief to do something or to desist from doing something, but I certainly could not do it without knowing that the issue had been discussed and resolved in Washington first. The questions were primarily about strategy and policy; that is a matter for Washington to decide.

On the other hand, I had a very strong feeling that we were quite correct on our Afghanistan policy - i.e. support of the all Mujahideen leaders to make sure that they fought the Soviets and not each other. That view was not universally accepted. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, for example, was reluctant to provide support to some of the more radical leaders; I thought that as long as the war was being prosecuted, all leaders should receive support. I was concerned that unless they were all supported, the ones that were left out might attack their Mujahideen colleagues rather than the Soviets. In fact, after the end of the war, that is exactly what happened.

Once the war was over, it was my view that both we and the Pakistanis should drastically reduce our assistance to the real radicals. We didn't need them any longer. With the war over, it was time to work for a compromise among the Mujahideen and a more moderate policy. But the CIA couldn't or wouldn't get its Pakistani partners in line; so we continued to support some of the radicals. None of us really foresaw the major consequence that took place later - the Afghan terrorists who spread throughout the Moslem world and contributed to blowing up the World Trade Tower in New York.

The present situation in Afghanistan - fighting between the Taliban and other segments of the anti-Soviet coalition - was partly foreseen. We recognized that it would be very difficult to find an accommodation among the various factions. During the last 18 months

in Pakistan, I spent a lot of time trying to get the Afghan factions to reach some political deal. By early 1990, they were skirmishing with each other; that is, heavy fighting, as occurred later, had not yet broken out. But it was not possible to get a consensus partly because the radicals, who were only too glad to fight on our side against the Soviets, would not agree with our goals after the war. They were major actors in Afghanistan who continued to receive support even after the Soviets had withdrawn. In that respect, I thought CIA was wrong. But it was never quite clear to me whether the Agency was unwilling or unable to convince the Pakistanis to suspend aid to the radicals.

I had another problem with the Agency. I could not get it to report on the narcotics traffic in Afghanistan. The Department in Washington could not get the Agency to work on this problem. I think this was because the liaison relationship that the Station had with the Pakistani intelligence services. Everyone knew that narcotics were being grown and exported from Afghanistan. I kept asking the Station to obtain information on this traffic from its sources inside Afghanistan. They denied that they had any sources capable of doing so. They could not deny that they had sources, since we were getting information on weapons and other matters. I never did get a satisfactory answer to my inquiries. I even raised the matter with Bill Webster, the head of the CIA. Never got a satisfactory answer. Nothing ever happened. The same people who were fighting the Soviets were also profiting from the narcotics trade. I suspect that the Pakistani intelligence services may have been involved and that CIA was not going to rock their relationships over this issue.

These were the major issues on which I and CIA differed. But overall, I was quite satisfied with the support I was receiving from the Station. I had enough information to work with. One of my functions was to assure coordination between the overt, public AID assistance programs for Afghanistan - over $200 million per annum - and the covert, secret CIA programs. I had to make sure that the two didn’t stumble across each other. I had to know who was assisting whom, what were the secure areas which were out of bounds for overt assistance, etc. I was the only one in the mission who could perform that function - the AID Director wasn't cleared and the Station Chief was uncomfortable having too much information about the overt assistance program. So I would sit down with each and insure that there would be no overlap. I think it worked quite well, in part because we had an excellent AID Director for Afghanistan, Larry Crandall.

In general, for most of my tour, we viewed Pakistan as an important ally. During my tour, its importance to us changed somewhat. In early 1990, Bob Kimmitt, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, came to Pakistan as part of a tour he was taking throughout the region. He did a superb job explaining to the Pakistanis that our priorities were changing in light of changing nature of the Cold War and US-USSR relations. He emphasized that the U.S. would be placing an increasing emphasis on human rights, non-proliferation, narcotics, democracy, regional stability and economic development. He gave the Pakistanis high marks on all of those issues - but this was before the India-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir and the resumption of the nuclear program. He said that we wanted to work with Pakistan to rebuild Afghanistan. He praised the Pakistani leadership for its initiative in democracy and even said a couple of nice things about Pakistani

efforts in the narcotics area, although they had a long way to go before we could be satisfied. On non-proliferation, at the time, Pakistan had frozen its nuclear development program and had agreed to bring their uranium enrichment program to a level below weapons grade. As long as the Pakistanis focused on these issues of importance to us, Kimmitt predicted that our relationships would continue close. So we were relatively satisfied with Pakistan efforts in all areas of concern to us. Kimmitt urged them to continue on their path because if we found them changing their position in any of the areas, then there would be troublesome times in our relationships.

What Kimmitt was doing was drawing a road-map for Pakistan which would enable us to continue close relationships with that country even as the Cold War was coming to a close. It was a masterful performance. At that time, the Pakistanis seemed to accept Kimmitt's perspective; they understood what was happening and what they would have to do to maintain a close relationship with us. But by three months later - May 1990 - we discovered that they were changing their program by engaging in just those activities which we had warned them would be unacceptable and had discontinued efforts which we encouraged.

I think that the Pakistani military really were concerned about a potential clash with India over Kashmir. At the same time, they were not as concerned about us as they should have been. It is true that we had turned a “blind eye” to their nuclear program in the past. Furthermore, I believe that in light of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the military concluded that our assistance was not as important as it had been.

I mentioned the insertion of Islamic fundamentalism into Kashmir, partly as a rallying point for the Kashmiri fighters. In general, I view Islamic fundamentalism as a country-by-country phenomenon with considerable networking throughout the Muslim world. This networking was facilitated considerably by the Afghan war. I saw that development analogous to the Spanish Civil War, when the Communist and Socialist parties throughout the world sent volunteers to Spain; that was a boost for Communist-Socialist networking and the Comintern - [Communist International] - which unlike the Muslim world, in fact became the central guide for Communist world-wide activities. Much of the Islamic networking centers on exchange of information; there is also some exchange of personnel. I have never seen any evidence of a central coordinating mechanism. In some cases, the fundamentalist aggression was perpetuated by individuals; in some cases, by small groups; in other cases it was larger groups. But a lot of the fighting happened inadvertently when Islamic radicals - activists, fanatics - congregated in Afghanistan because they all wanted to be part of the *jihad* to get the Soviets out of that country. The influx of all of these fighters into Afghanistan just happened spontaneously; we didn't plan it, the Pakistanis didn't plan it - it just happened. It is true that the Iranians and the Saudis were busy recruiting and arguing about which country was doing the most to rid Afghanistan of Soviets. But there was no over-all plan. Much of the Afghanistan activity was based on pure fervor which spread throughout the Muslim world. That Islamic drive continued even after the Soviet withdrawal in part because the religious drive did not calm down and in part because the region was filled with young men who had been involved in some heady activities and knew nothing besides fighting. Some were pure

soldiers of fortune who knew nothing except how to fire a weapon and how to use explosives. Some were also religious fanatics which gave them an impetus and incentives.

I think that the use of religion to achieve political objectives is hardly a new phenomenon in world history. It is certainly not restricted to the Muslim world. In a milder version, we find it now in the U.S. with the Christian Coalition which Ronald Reagan exploited so adroitly. The Catholic Church in Poland was an indispensable supporter of Solidarity against the Soviets. We can go back to the Crusades as another illustration of religion being used for political purposes.

I might just say a few words about Pakistan-China relations. This was not an issue of great concern to us in the period 1987-1990 because the Pakistani nuclear program had not passed the point of no return. Nor had China provided any missiles by then. So we did not have a major problem during my tour. Chinese assistance had been a problem during an earlier period when they provided Pakistan assistance in the nuclear technology and design areas. And of course, the relationship became a problem later in the 1990s, but it was not such when I was there.

On the other hand, the Pakistan-Iranian relationship was of great interest. Since the public disclosure of Iran-Contra, our contacts with Iranians were severely limited. The Pakistanis were helpful in providing us with their insights into Iranian affairs. I think they were good observers and for a while we used them actively. We used them as a conduit to the Iranians - in addition to the Swiss, the official channel - the Japanese and the Germans. The Bush administration eventually made the correct decision and limited the contacts with Iran to a single channel. The Iranians were very clever in their use of multiple channels; they confused us and kept us off balance. But during my tour, we did use the Pakistanis as one channel to Iran, primarily using the very capable Foreign Minister, Yacub Khan. I have already mentioned my conversations with the Pakistani military about their dialogue with their Iranian counterparts. That was part of our efforts to look into Iran.

I should not close my discussion of my tour as Ambassador to Pakistan without mentioning Mrs. Bhutto's firing in August, 1990. When Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Senator [Claiborne] Pell [Democrat, Rhode Island], came to visit Pakistan in August 1989, he sensed a shift in Pakistani politics. Pell had been a friend and strong defender of Bhutto, Sr. He had done his best to get Zulfikar Bhutto out of prison, or at least to save him from execution. In 1989, he told me that he didn’t like what he was sensing in Pakistan; he wanted to talk to Mrs. Bhutto. So we called on her, together with Peter Galbraith - who, as I indicated earlier, was a close friend of Mrs. Bhutto. I was not sure what Pell would say in this meeting and neither was Galbraith. Bhutto was accompanied by her mother and three close advisors. She began to explain her vision of the Pakistan of the future. After an hour or so, Pell congratulated her on her presentation, but noted that it would take a long time to reach her goals. He said he hoped that Bhutto would be in power as long as Queen Victoria had ruled, but he thought that the way she was using her office she would not last as Prime Minister through the end of 1989. That

came as a total shock; she had just arrived at the pinnacle of her power. He told her that compromise and consensus building were the key essences of a democratic process - not authoritarianism. Bhutto was completely stunned, knowing that the comments were coming from a friend.

But she did not change her behavior. By August, 1990, the entire country was fed up by her. The President had had enough, as well as a lot of her own people. The President, under heavy pressure from the Army, used his constitutional powers to remove her from office. I was surprised by the tactics, not by the fact. And now it has happened again, in precisely the same circumstances. As I noted earlier, when I heard about Ambassador Simons' report on Bhutto's latest demise, it occurred to me that I could have written the exact same report 16 years earlier. She was categorized by the President as authoritarian, wilful, stubborn, corrupt. Neither father or daughter seem to learn from experience.

Q: Then in 1991, you decided that the time had come for you to retire.

OAKLEY: That is right. Ten years as a Career Minister is the limit in the Foreign Service. I might have been able to stick around, but I thought it was time to find other challenges. I worked for a year for Sam Lewis, the President of the Institute for Peace. That was fun.

One the day before Thanksgiving 1992, the phone rang. It was my old boss, General Powell. He asked me to go to Somalia because the U.S. was preparing to launch a large military operation and the administration wanted someone who could represent the President together with a Marine General, Lt General Johnston. Powell told me that CENTCOM was going to provide military support for an international relief operation, UNITAF. He said that I had had good relationship with that command while I was in Pakistan. I also knew Somalia from my previous assignment as Ambassador there. He said that he knew me and had confidence in me and hoped that I would take the job. I told him to talk to Phyllis first (she was the senior deputy in INR at the time). I reminded him that the last time he drafted me - to go to Pakistan - it caused a few family problems. He asked: “Do I have to talk to her again?” I said: “Indeed you do! As a matter of fact, she is walking through the door right now.” So I put Phyllis on the phone. She said: “Colin, you can have him indefinitely with one proviso: our son is getting married in San Francisco on the first of January. He has to be there for the wedding.” Powell agreed. So off I went.

The first thing I did was to talk to Frank Wisner, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I wanted to get some feel for the situation. I had had nothing to do with Somalia since I had left Mogadishu in 1984. We agreed that I should attend a UN conference on humanitarian efforts in Somalia to be held in Addis Ababa the following Monday. That that would be the best place for me to catch up quickly on what was going on inside the country. I got on a plane and flew to Addis. When I left, no one in Washington knew exactly when the military operations would commence. But in Addis, it struck me that if I tried to return to Washington, the Marines might well launch their attack and I would be out of country. That didn't seem to make much sense; so I decided to head for Mogadishu directly from Addis. I wanted to prepare the Somali leaders and others who would be

affected for the military operation.

We had a task force in the Department headed by Frank Wisner to support our efforts in Somalia. Brandon Grove was the Executive Director, with David Shinn serving as deputy. The task force was set up in the best State tradition: when you have a problem, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs sets up a task force. It did take care of the inter-agency coordination problems and I found it very useful in that role. The Pentagon, AID, State and the NSC were represented on it. I think the Somalia task force did quite well and was very useful.

That task force was abolished when Admiral John Howe went out to become the Special Representative for Secretary Boutros Ghali in March 1995 because Somalia had become a UN responsibility. When I returned from Mogadishu, I found that the Somali desk officer was the only officer in State working full time on Somalia, yet we had 5,000 U.S. troops there. I went to George Moose, the Assistant Secretary for Africa, and said that Somalia needed more attention. There was no inter-agency coordinating mechanism. I thought that the absence of that mechanism had contributed to the difficulties we were having in Somalia. I told him that I knew the task force had been abolished, but I noted that so many things were happening in Somalia that at least David Shinn should be assigned to work on Somalia full time, in addition to the desk officer. The Department needed more senior personnel; otherwise, it was bound to drop a few balls. Fortunately, the Department put David to work on Somalia; later he became the Office Director for East Africa. The Department had totally abandoned all special attention to Somalia, returning responsibility for a very active period of diplomacy to one lonely desk officer - relatively junior at that. As I understood it and said earlier, once the Somalia problem became a UN responsibility, the U.S. lost interest since it was no longer in charge. Also Administrations had changed and in the absence of any crisis, the Department moved on to other matters. The fact that we still had 5,000 military men and women in Somalia did not seem to have attracted much State Department attention. There ensued an abysmal lack of coordination among Washington agencies.

So in October 1993 when called back to work on Somalia again, by President Clinton, I recommended that a task force be set up by Peter Tarnoff, Wisner's successor, comparable to the one that had existed in 1991. But the powers in the Department decided that they didn't want to do that. I was asked whether I would take on the assignment as Coordinator - pulling the various elements of the bureaucracy together. I said that I would not be the coordinator; that was an on-going responsibility which the administration had to learn how to do on an on-going basis. The new appointees had to learn how to coordinate the activities of the various departments and agencies. I insisted that I was just a short-term fix; that the longer run problems had to be faced by the new officials in charge. I thought that a task force under the State Department’s Under Secretary was a tried and true method, but there could be other mechanisms. It helped that Frank Wisner was by this time over in the Pentagon. He and Tarnoff and Dick Clarke of the NSC discussed the matter and eventually they devised a coordinating mechanism, called the Executive Committee, which reported to the Deputies Committee - a part of the NSC system. That Executive Committee was co-chaired by Dick Clarke and Jim

Dobbins, who was brought back from RAND; he was well known for his ability to manage processes and to get things done. He didn't mind telling people what to do and making sure it was done - something that the State Department had seemingly forgotten how to do. Both Clarke and Dobbins were a little abrasive, but they were good managers with a proven track record. They started to task people on a daily basis and followed up to see what action had been taken. This was entirely different from the situation that had existed only a few weeks before. It worked.

The same system was carried over when the Haiti problem arose, with Clarke and Dobbins remaining as co-chairmen. The Executive Committee concept was different than the task force operation under Brandon Grove. The task force was a State Department operation; the Executive Committee was a joint State-NSC mechanism. In addition to the Ex-Comm, there was a Special Representative for Haiti located in the Department with a small staff similar to my role for Clinton on Somalia. In neither the Somalia case or the Haiti one, were the geographic bureaus the primary actors, although still important cogs. Also the Under Secretary for Political Affairs was not as directly involved as had been Frank Wisner. In other words, what was established in 1993 was substantially different from previous coordinating mechanisms. I won't judge which system was the most effective, but the Executive Committee concept together with the Special Representative did diminish to some extent the authority of the State Department, particularly the regional bureaus. In the NSC, a comparable situation arose because Clarke [who was senior NSC director for terrorism, crime, and counternarcotics] took over from Jennifer Ward, the senior NSC director for Africa. She was not a major player on Somalia. The same held true for Haiti.

When the Bosnia situation needed attention, this process was not used. [Dick] Holbrooke [then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs] and his counterpart in the NSC would not allow the establishment of an Executive Committee or a Special Representative. They viewed Bosnia as a problem for the regional bureau and approached it in that manner - in a much more traditional State manner. I think Holbrooke and his NSC counterpart ran into some difficulties because EUR - and all regional bureaus - had lost crisis management capabilities. So if a regional bureau is to exercise its responsibilities, it must be staffed with some people who know how to manage crises - as well as knowledge of the substance of an issue. My view is that the Bosnia operation suffered and continues to suffer from the lack of coordination. I am a firm believer that some kind of inter-agency mechanism is necessary when the U.S. government is faced with a crisis overseas. The nature of the mechanism is not nearly as important as the goal of insuring participation of all the players in the government.

Q: I don't want to go over ground that you have covered so well in the book "Somalia and Operation Restore Hope" which you wrote with John Hirsch. There are however a couple of issues which I would like to cover a little more. While you were in Somalia, did you have a sense of personal danger? I would also like to have your views about the efficacy and the politics of having U.S. troops under U.S. command.

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OAKLEY: Let me also suggest that anyone interested in the history of this period that

they read Brandon Grove's article in the Foreign Service Journal as well.

In answer to your question, I did not have a sense of personal danger. There were people who worried about my safety, but I was not among them. I had two security officers. The only time I felt afraid was on February 27 or 28 when Aideed sponsored some major demonstrations in Mogadishu. He felt that we had deliberately planned to allow his arch enemy, General Morgan, to enter the city of Kismayu. The demonstrators congregated around our compound and then I felt some anxiety. I debated whether to move to the military compound. I consulted General Johnston about that. I told him that I was most reluctant to move because to do so would have given Aideed a psychological boost. I told the General that I preferred to have our troops pay close attention to our compound while I told Aideed that he would be held personally responsible if anything happened to me. Johnston agreed and Aideed paid attention. I didn't have any trouble. In fact the Somalis were very careful about getting near our compound. They usually stayed as far away as possible; especially after two of Aideed's guards were shot dead by U.S. Marine sharpshooters late at night when they inadvertently wandered near the compound.

As for your second question, the first comment I would make is that there was a myth articulated by many, which was allowed to be expressed without challenge by the administration because it didn't want to deny it and thereby accept responsibility. That myth was that the U.S. combat troops who took casualties were under UN command. In fact, they never were. Republicans kept the myth alive because they thought it was a great political debating point with which they could attack Clinton. Their theme, often repeated, was that President Clinton had put U.S. troops under the command of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General of the UN. Therefore, he was responsible for their death. They knew better since there had been open Congressional hearings on the issue. But it turned out to be a good issue because their allegations were not set straight. For two years, I kept urging my friends in the NSC to have the administration acknowledge publicly that U.S. troops had always been under U.S. operational control and command in Somalia. The White House refused to make that statement, even though it was factually correct. I assume that the administration did not want to admit that since the troops were under U.S. control, their death was the responsibility of the U.S. commanders or to the Commander in Chief and not the UN. I heard President Clinton acknowledge in private to the Congressional leadership, on October 7, 1995 that the troops were under U.S. command and that we had made a terrible mistake leading to the death of some of them. He said that we had learned from that experience and that steps had been taken to avoid repetition. The Congressional leaders were impressed by this candid admission; they decided to let the March 31 deadline for troop removal from Somalia stand rather than reducing it to December 1 as Senator Byrd wanted.

There were public hearings both by the House and the Senate Armed Services Committees. The commanders of the two U.S. components, Generals Montgomery and Garrison, appeared and testified that the troops were under their command. The chain of command went from General Hoar, CINC CENTCOM, to General Montgomery who wore two hats: a) UN deputy commander and b) Commander U.S. forces, Somalia. The two-hatted arrangement was the source of some confusion. From Montgomery, as

Commander, U.S. forces, Somalia the chain went to the U.S. combat troops. There were some U.S. logistic forces in Somalia under the UN command; they were totally out of danger.

There was a second contingent of U.S. combat troops who arrived in late August. That was the DELTA Force, Task Force Ranger - the one that got into serious trouble on October 3 and 4 - with 18 deaths and 78 wounded. That contingent was under the command of General Garrison from Ft. Bragg. They reported independently - i.e. not through Montgomery - to General Hoar. So we had two independent combat forces in Somalia, both reporting to CENTCOM - one directly and the other through General Montgomery. It is important to note that neither was under UN command. The early October operations were kept secret from the UN which was the principal reason that the UN forces could not lend a hand when the U.S. troops ran into trouble. We were so concerned about potential leaks about our plans that we kept the UN entirely in the dark, unable to give assistance when it was really needed. So the October operations were entirely a U.S. operation, but no public mention of this was made for a long time. As I said, the Republicans were perfectly happy to foster the myth because they saw it as helpful politically. That myth became especially virulent after October 3 and 4.

Finally, the last debates that Clinton and Dole held in 1996, the President finally admitted that U.S. forces were always under U.S. command. I thought this statement should have come much earlier. If the President or Ambassador Albright were not willing to make it, then the question should have been referred to General Powell, who would have set the record straight.

I might just say a few words of the role of the media in Somalia. When the media - much of it was “first string;” e.g. Ted Koppel, Christiane Amanpour, etc. - first arrived I asked Brandon Grove what I was supposed to do. He talked to Frank Wisner who checked with the White House. The orders were that I was to cooperate as much as possible with media, including appearances on as many programs as possible. The administration wanted as much coverage as possible because the pictures that came back to the U.S. helped sell the administration's Somali program. Then I wanted to know if there was a particular line to follow. I was told to say anything I wanted; the White House and the Department felt comfortable that I would say the right things. General Johnston asked the same questions through his channels and got the same answers.

So he and I would appear frequently, sometimes on the same day and on the same program. My staff was also very good in providing background information to the media. We were quite open and fully cooperative as were our U.S. military counterparts. I believe that this strategy paid off. The American people were not surprised by events in Somalia; we warned them about the dangers out there and told them what we were trying to achieve. I think they supported us. I relearned one lesson which was taught by the Tet offensive in Vietnam: a country can lose a war as easily in the media, or easier, than on the battlefield. If you make one major mistake with the media, you will pay because it will eventually reflect a diminution of support from the American public. Therefore, I learned that in a situation like Somalia, the administration must develop in advance a

media strategy as well as a military and political one. There also has to be a public information [program] for the indigenous population - what the military calls PSYOPS [psychological operations]. A good local information strategy can be very helpful; I think it worked well for us in Somalia. We worked very hard on the media, both U.S. and local. That was a major part of our task. It paid off. My political officer met every day with the military specialists, in Psychological operations and together they decided upon the messages for our Somali-language newspaper and radio station.

It was clear that the media had a major impact on turning U.S. policy around. Until August 1992, the U.S. had been the leading opponent in the Security Council to any active UN role in Somalia. But when the pictures appearing in the U.S. media of the starving children and of the miserable living conditions began to penetrate the American consciousness, the political heat was turned up. I think they moved the conscience of the President. He was always concerned by humanitarian suffering; and with the support of the American people he decided that the U.S. should take a much more active role. Congress was in full support, even though the final decision to intervene in Somalia was made while Congress was out of session. By early 1993, it was clear that Congress supported a more active U.S. role in Somalia. The question of U.S. humanitarian assistance is a matter that needs very careful consideration. In Bosnia, we actively encouraged the UN to provide humanitarian protection although we were not willing to be a participant in the UN Force (UNPROFOR). The mission shifted from humanitarian to political without anyone noticing it. That slippery road eventually led to serious trouble, requiring U.S. intervention. The Security Council, led by the US, had given the UN Force objectives which it did not [have] the forces to achieve. The Bosnia operation cost the UN considerable support in the US.

In Somalia, I have mentioned that the UN was blamed for the deaths of the 18 American soldiers. The Somalia effort also started as a limited humanitarian operation - as President Bush wanted - but was enlarged considerably by the Clinton administration. It became a different kettle of fish, a political operation, without sufficient understanding of the political ramification of an expanded, more intrusive effort. Pretty soon, there was the inevitable backlash from the Somalis, led by Aideed and we paid a heavy price. So one has to be careful before one undertakes humanitarian efforts. Any administration must understand the linkage between humanitarian and political and military activities. All factors must be taken into account before any operation, benign as it may appear, is started. I think that before undertaking a humanitarian rescue, it must be admitted that the effort will not solve the root causes of the misery, unless we are willing to put up very large military and financial and civilian assistance resources over a long period of time. I think that that would be very debatable. Somalia was a very good lesson.

When the decision was made to assist Haiti, the administration carefully studied two previous operations: Panama and Somalia. They learned from the mistakes in both places as well as from the successes. In Somalia, one success came because I preceded the troops and was able to talk to the local leadership before the arrival and was able to convince them that they didn't really want to resist us. As I said before, it was not planned that way, but it fortunately happened in that sequence. They might have offered

resistance had I not been there; they were very nervous and afraid and may have reacted without thought. I teased Colin Powell after he and Jimmy Carter and Senator Nunn visited Haiti. He said he had just done what he had learned from my Somalia efforts. I laughed and said that I did in Somalia exactly what he wanted me to do.

In both Somalia and Haiti, we had overwhelming force. That discouraged any local adventurism. We had the right mixture of political presence and strategy and military presence and strategy. That worked well. I have already mentioned the PSYOPS in Somalia. That was a success, as it was later in Haiti.
We managed to limit our operation in Somalia. There were some that wanted us to get involved in disarming the local population and in other political activities. We resisted because we were anxious to avoid trouble if we could.

We kept all of countries in the coalition with us for the duration of our operation in Somalia. That was an accomplishment. There were no political splits nor any friction on the ground. In the UNOSOM II period, that took place later, some schisms did appear. Then the Italians, well publicized, and the French, less publicized, took the position that they had never agreed to fight Aideed or other Somalis and refused to obey the orders of the UN commander. We didn't have any problems like that because we conducted good political liaison and consultations. Among the military, the cooperation was very good. There was a Marine major or colonel attached to each of the national units and they had liaison officers at our headquarters. I went around to see each of them frequently, as did our political officers. That kept everyone on the same page. Also, President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney maintained liaison at the political level with troop contributors.

As I said, we did limit our objectives. We were not interested in running the country. We considered that, but well remembered Vietnam and did not want a repeat of that situation with Americans behind each official in their government. We were also careful not to get involved in the Somali civil war, having learned from our bitter experiences in Lebanon. There, the U.S. came to be seen as a party to the civil war, and the result was the bombing of the Marine barracks. So Somalia already represented a “lessons learned” scenario. Now a lot of people say that we didn't solve the fundamental problems of Somalia. My answer is always that that was not our goal. And I think we were absolutely correct in making our engagement In Somalia highly limited. I don't think we have the knowledge or the sustained will to solve other nations' basic problems. We are having difficulty in Haiti despite our massive effort, but we are very careful to let Haitians make as many decisions as possible. We have come to understand the limits of our power. Even if the Haitians are doing things differently from what we might have done, we are letting them do things for themselves. Haiti had a governmental structure; we just helped bring it back to life. Somalis had none. But I suggest that Haiti is an exception to our preferred *modus operandi*. Haiti is so little and we are so big; Haiti is so close and therefore perhaps greater involvement in that country's affairs than we would have preferred is acceptable. There is some progress in Haiti; it is slowly improving, although far from great.

In Cambodia, and other key governments, we realized we were in over our heads. The U.S. didn't have the will nor did the international community to pour in the necessary resources. The country was a long way away. So we all agreed in effect to hold elections and withdraw rather than take on the Khmer Rouge. I think that was the right decision. The situation in Cambodia is not great, but it is better than it used to be and that is enough for me. We should never be in the middle of a situation such as Cambodia; we don't know enough and we can't sustain the necessary degree of involvement.

I think that had we understood the limits of our power, the Clinton Administration Somalia plan might have gone better. But the U.S. was already started in Somalia, in a period when "nation building" was in vogue. Transforming authoritarian states into democracies was high on the Clinton agenda. All of our goals were well intentioned; we were very idealistic. The days of the UN had arrived; multilateralism was in and the world was going to be saved. I think what happened in Somalia was that for some reason, the Secretary General of the UN thought that the U.S. would continue to be in charge. We had set up a UN operation - through the Security Council - but many UN officials believed that the U.S. would continue to run things - in the name of the UN. The U.S. military on the other hand, was anxious to leave Somalia. The military decisions to draw down reached under President Bush were never challenged, much less countermanded by the Clinton administration. So U.S. forces were considerably drawn down. The Clinton team tried to get other countries to fill the military gap, but was not successful. The numbers were smaller; the troops of our allies came slowly and without the military capability that the departed U.S. troops had had. And they certainly did not have the same psychological edge with the Somalis. The UN - the Secretary General in particular - didn't really understand what was happening; i.e. that the U.S. was no longer in charge and didn't want to be. The U.S. certainly didn't think we were in charge. People in the Pentagon will tell you that they saw what was happening on the ground in Somalia, but they also realized that no one in uniform wanted to return to that country to take charge. On the political level, the Security Council was approving a larger and larger role for the UN - more intrusive and broader mandates - , but no one took the time to see whether the military resources were available to carry out the new mandates. There was a huge discrepancy between tasks and resources. Neither the Secretary General or the Security Council examined this discrepancy. The SC kept authorizing more and more tasks, but no one ever came up with the necessary military resources.

I think that, subconsciously at least, every one was relying on Uncle Sam, which had successfully carried out its mandate until the UN took over. When that happened, the U.S. military decided that it was no longer in charge or responsible. It was a situation where the UN thought we were in charge and we thought the UN was in charge. John Howe got caught in the middle. He was a distinguished retired U.S. admiral, a former director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, a former deputy NSC Advisor, who had been nominated by President Clinton and appointed as the UN Special Representative by Boutros-Ghali. He viewed Howe as his man to make sure that the U.S. did what he thought the U.S. should do. Most other observers also viewed Howe as wearing two hats: a) the UN one and b) as an informal "eyes and ears" of the U.S. administration. In fact, Howe did talk to the NSC every day - he talked more to the NSC

than he did to the UN headquarters. The policy in Somalia as expressed by the White House and the UN Secretary General was the same: an assertive, very active UN role in Somalia. All of this was happening at the beginning of the Clinton administration, when "gays in the military" was the hot subject. There was almost a complete breakdown between the political civilian and military leadership in the Pentagon.
So we had a disconnect between the UN and the U.S. and a disconnect between the American civilian and military leadership, as well as between the Bush administration people and the Clinton people. That was obviously a recipe for catastrophe. We did not repeat that mistake in Haiti; there the UN resolution which established a U.S. force also provided for a follow-up UN force. Five months before the UN force was to assume the peace-keeping role in Haiti, a 60-man planning group was sent to Haiti to insure a smooth transition. And that was done barely one month after our troops had landed. So in Haiti we did it right - we learned from Somalia.

I might just end my comments on Somalia with a general observation about a recent evolution of U.S. foreign policy, as represented by our interventions in Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. Unconsciously, I think we moved into new phase of U.S. foreign policy. I think that in some cases, we have over-extended ourselves. In certain instances, we may have been too harsh on the UN. On the other hand, we and the UN have learned some lessons - some the hard way through failures. On occasions, we and the UN have been overly ambitious but I do believe that there is more unrest in the world since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War had a peculiarly artificial stabilizing effect on the world. With the U.S. leading the charge for democracy, that has stirred up popular desires in foreign countries. At the same time, governments have been weakened by international cooperation, modern communications, NGOs, multinational corporations, etc. All of these factors - the end of the Cold War, the desire for greater individual freedom, the weakening of central governments - have converged. Ethnicity and religions become more important; they have become political tools. We are confronted with new challenges and are seeking new means to maintain international order, within states, not so much between states.

It is not the first time that we have faced this problem - witness the establishment of the Congress of Vienna, League of Nations and the UN. There are a lot of people who have been and are searching for the magic formula to maintain world order - the "alchemists." I don't think a magic formula for conflict resolution and maintenance of world order will ever be found. No piece of software or anything else will ever take care of all the problems. There are many organizations and individuals who believe they have the answer. I doubt it. But every one is looking for solutions and, consciously or unconsciously, a much higher priority has been given to trying to deal with this major problem of disorder within states - half humanitarian, half political. We will never deal with all threats to stability nor will we be successful in every instance, but I see nothing wrong with trying. There are some military colleagues who consider our involvement in Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia as very dangerous because they see those situations as distractions from the principal goal of preparing to deal with a major conflict. Of course, they can not point with any certainty to a potential major conflict, but they assume that there will be one some day. I don't think there is a flash point on the horizon - unless we

really mess up our China policy or the North Korean situation. In any case, if there is such a situation, our military will have enough time to get its readiness back by pulling its resources out of peace-keeping operations and devoting them to preparing for a major conflict. The quadrennial defense review will deal with that issue; I'll be interested to see how it is resolved.

I think whether we like or not, the U.S. and the rest of the world have and will have to pay more attention to humanitarian problems. We are developing better criteria which will define more sharply what we will engage in and what we will stay out of and how deeply and for what length of time. We may have some criteria already, but they have been unconscious and too vague. Nor have they been articulated. But we must get involved in some humanitarian situations - it is part of our tradition. The rest of the world has come to the same conclusion. I have attended a number of meetings in the last two years with representatives of our allies and friends; I find that the military of these countries are eager to be involved in humanitarian operations. They like it. They think it makes sense as a military mission. They want to be careful, but they recognize that it validates the necessity for a military. It also gives them a task, which is not always easy to come by when there is no war. And it gives them credit.

In addition, when the UN can afford it, it pays the less developed countries for the use of their military. That eases their budgetary requirements. We gain an advantage because it increases the military-to-military relationships. We sometimes train their troops and other countries like that. All of that gives us contacts that might be useful in a combat situation or a future peace-keeping operation. The reaction of foreign military leaders towards peace keeping and humanitarian assistance has been much more positive than ours. We are still arguing about whether participation is a positive. The Marines are enthusiastic; they fight forest fires, they assist local police forces in case of riots, as in LA; they help the border patrol on the Mexican borders. So peace keeping is not a major leap for the Marines. They helped the Kurds; they went to Somalia; they went to Haiti. They like it.

Some Army officers are afraid that if they get involved in small operations, they will not be ready for a big one, should it ever come along. My comment to the Army has always been that it will be involved in small operations, whether it likes it or not, because the Commander in Chief will periodically order them to do so. So they might as well prepare for that certainty. But some of the Army officers would prefer to fight the inevitable because they really don't want to participate and perhaps if they squawk enough, they believe that perhaps they won't be dragged into these operations as often as they might have. So within the U.S. military there is a division of views. In addition to the strategic question, there is of course the budgetary one because if the military decides to take on peace keeping willingly, then allocations might have to be adjusted by reducing resources devoted to heavy armor and increasing those going to light infantry forces or combat engineers or civil affairs or special forces - all essential for a low intensity operations.

As I said earlier, we learned lessons in Vietnam and in Central America during the Cold War period. Those were lessons that are applicable to the operations we are conducting today. In both situations, our strategy and tactics were dictated by a mixture of political

and military goals - unlike a major war which is essentially overwhelming military at least at the beginning.

I think we are in a transition period in foreign policy in terms of recognizing what our role in the world should be. I don’t think we will develop an over-arching strategy, which some of our great theorists keep pushing - nostalgically. Our goal will be as always to protect U.S. interests, which means essentially protecting security and economic relationships that we have built up in the last fifty years. The military is a part of maintaining this web. Secretary of Defense Perry's idea of preventive defense is a good one. I also believe that as long as we don't face a major opponent - such as the Soviet Union used to be - that we will continue to move from one crisis to another. Historically, in the last ten years, public opinion, sometimes led by the White House, has pressed administrations to be involved in peace keeping and humanitarian assistance efforts - sometimes quite unexpectedly. Some administrations have taken the position that they would not get involved only to be forced to do so by the force of public opinion. And the world expects U.S. leadership and involvement.

End of interview