The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**AMBASSADOR DWIGHT J. PORTER**

*Interviewed by: Horace G. Torbert*
*Initial interview date: November 5, 1990  
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INTERVIEW

Q: You have had a long and distinguished career, a lot of important posts and important functions after you left the Foreign Service. Would you like to start out on giving us a little review on how you became interested in the Foreign Service and the foreign affairs field in general, what is your general background?

PORTER: It is a great pleasure in being interviewed by an old Central European colleague. How does one get interested in foreign affairs and the Foreign Service? I have to start with the assumption that as a Middle Westerner, although one with a classical studies father who was a professor and school administrator and a mother extremely interested in the English language, apart from that background, I think I really got deeply interested in foreign affairs at a very good little Mid-Western college called Grinnell which had extremely competent far-sighted internationally-minded faculty. It is a school that makes one think. I certainly owe a lot towards Grinnell for getting my first understanding of foreign affairs. I was primarily interested in public service and at that point, in 1938, when I graduated, the thought of taking the Foreign Service exam was pretty remote. It was a small service and not well publicized. I was interested in the public service and encouraged by my parents, although I had several good job offers with some major firms. I was selected primarily to get into the New Deal, which at that point became a rather major ideology for kids my age by being sponsored by an outfit called the National Institute for Public Affairs, which was one of the early children of the Rockefeller Foundation. The idea being to select and recruit good candidates, both academically and in leadership to come to Washington for a year's internship with the hope and expectation that that group would ultimately stay in public service and improve public service. There were about seven or eight of those annual NIPA selections, I was in the third as I remember. There were some very prominent people who were spawned from those groups. Interestingly enough, when I was Assistant Secretary of State, in one period of time in the State Department in the '60s, we had two other NIPA interns, Harlan Cleveland and G. Griffith Johnson who was Economic Assistant Secretary and I have a feeling that there was even a fourth, but I forget who it was.
That organization, the NIPA, was the immediate factor in my coming to Washington. During that year we were exposed to all the cabinet officers and had quite a broad-gauged training program, which included some academic training as well. One of the things I can remember was an hour and a half in the Oval Office with FDR which does not happen to too many kids in that stage of life. I did part of internship as an economist, which is what I was trained as, in the Federal Reserve Board doing economic research. Then I suddenly got interested in public administration, which was sort of the hottest discipline of the moment in Washington. The effort was being made to build and maintain a highly competent Civil Service, or bureaucracy. This interest in public administration which was so dominant at the moment lead me to leave the Federal Reserve and for the second half of my internship and went to the Department of Labor, which was then under Frances Perkins, the first female secretary of all time and I spent some time working for her and the administrative operations of the Department of Labor. So although I was an economist by training, I selected to start my career in the general field of public administration.

The basis for that selection of a discipline is sort of remote in my mind right now, but at the time it seemed to be the most challenging assignment around. I found that basically I was not a research economist, I was an activist and that is one of the reasons I enjoyed ultimately getting into the Foreign Service.

Q: There were a great many exciting people around, most of them spawned by the Department of Agriculture, as I remember, what was the name of the assistant secretary?

PORTER: That was Bill Jones. I was later there when Bill Jones was there, that was after the war. At any case I got into some of the early and middle New Deal programs which really stood me in good stead, they gave me an understanding of how bureaucracies work, what is important in domestic programs. I understood our New Deal quite well, I think, which helped me a good deal in understanding what was going on in the rest of the world. I worked first with the U.S. Housing authority, which was the early slum clearance housing program. I worked briefly with Leon Kaiser, who was the chief economist, who later became a famous economist in Washington. Then I was in the administrative area, essentially in personnel work. I can remember hiring Mayor Walter Washington [later mayor of the District of Columbia] for his first government job. I hired him to be the manager of one of the slum clearance projects in Southeast Washington. His rise was perhaps faster than mine.

Then through many mutual friends - you develop quite a network of buddies, at least in those days in the public administrative system, we were all young. Most of them had come out of a few leading schools, and once you got in the orbit you found friends everywhere you went. So I was hired when the first food stamp plan was being started and I went out to San Francisco to be the first regional officer of the food stamp plan in the eleven western states, that was quite an eye opener, dealing with the state and local officials. I discovered some of the seamy side of life. Even in the first year of the food
stamp plan we had to worry more about compliance than anything else just to be sure that all the food stamps were not being drained off into improper usage.

Q: Like political war chests?

PORTER: Exactly. That was a fascinating experience and was a chance to get to know the west, which was much nearer the frontier than it is today.

Q: How long were you there?

PORTER: A full year and a half, and then I was in San Francisco when the war hit, Pearl Harbor, and we decided to do something about that. Again through mutual friends, I was called back to Washington to be on the Board of Economic Warfare as assistant personnel officer. We were building this huge organization from scratch. It was a place to meet a lot of interesting people, non-government people who had come in to do their duty in Washington, many of them dollar-a-year men, headed by a chap I had known briefly named Michael Perkins, who was one of the more illustrious New Deal minions.

Q: Did he come in from outside?

PORTER: Yes, he had been in Agriculture for awhile as a political appointee, he was a very highly regarded person. He probably would have been secretary of agriculture if his health had held up. Also amusingly enough, with Grinnell connections, I was befriended, in terms of getting to know people, by Harry Hopkins and by Chester Davis, who was War Food Administrator. Both of them were Grinnell grads. They did not have any influence on my jobs, but it was nice to know them and they could open doors to new experiences.

Then I quickly decided as my 26th birthday came up to either stay in the government, because I did have a draft exemption with my government job, or to join the service. So with two of my other National Institute of Public Affairs friends, we were living together as bachelors, we all joined the Marine Corps on the day before my 26th birthday. Otherwise I would have been too old to get into the officer candidate school. Then, that was in April of 1942, I had only been in BEW only five months, I went into the Marine Corps and survived.

I was married and then left after thirty-six hours and returned two and a half years later to find a truly different Washington. I found it was not, surprisingly enough, not easy to reestablish myself in government service. The Board of Economic Warfare was, of course, a thing of the past, and I finally was able, through a chap who had been my boss in BEW, a job with the Rural Electrification Administration in the Department of Agriculture. I was the director of administrative services. This was a fascinating agency; it was bringing power to rural America and was a first-class, well-run, well-managed operation. There again I learned a great deal; I learned a lot about statistics, about the predecessor to computers, the old IBM machines. It was quite a broadening experience; I
had to run a production control system for the programs that REA did and it was, of course, working in all the 48 states.

Q: Before we get too far, do you want to fill in one little gap. What kind of service did you have in the Marine Corps, where were you?

PORTER: I was fortunate. I went in trained as a "ninety day wonder", a second lieutenant, and came out on a ship bound for Guadalcanal in a replacement battalion and Marine second lieutenants were real cannon fodder, but I was pulled off at the last minute. The Marine Corps was building a new outfit called the First Marine Corps Amphibious Corps and they needed to develop a staff organization so just as I was on the ship ready to go to Guadalcanal I was snatched off and we went to New Caledonia where I was assigned to intelligence duties. I stayed in that organization, which later became the Third Corps, for the duration of the war. That was pretty fascinating because I got to know quite well almost all the great Marine generals and admirals. I served on a command ship with Halsey, Nimitz at various times when we were conducting operations. Then I did make five landings, although thank God I was not in the first wave. That spanned from Guadalcanal through two landings in the Solomons, one in the Marianas, one in Pelieu. Fortunately my points came up one day before I was scheduled to go to Okinawa.

I had a couple of interesting assignments doing some prelanding reconnaissance, which was not as dangerous as it sounds.

So back to the REA; I think that we covered that pretty well. I found it a fascinating experience and again got to know an awful lot about the U.S. Then again the net work reached out and said, "Why don't you come to work at the State Department? The world is changing, the State Department is expanding greatly and we need management people and economists". A friend of mine who was in Personnel in the Department of State eventually persuaded me to come over - of course I was still in the Civil Service.

I went to work as the management and budget analyst in the Department of State. Those were the days of Peurifoy and ? who were my bosses. It was a lively time in the State Department; we were much more involved in terms of change, perhaps too much, but it was a real bull situation. State was being run by George Marshall group that he had brought in. Dean Acheson had just left when I came over, I would have liked to have worked for him, although I would not have known him, I'm sure, at that point.

The State Department experience at that point only lasted less than a year. I was getting to know the organization and learning a new trade in budget work. Then I was asked to help organize and run an organization called the Displaced Persons Commission, which was created in 1948, I believe, to move out of Europe all the poor dispossessed by the war, the flotsam and jetsam who were left over. Many were Balts, Armenians, Jews, Gypsies - all the dispossessed that Hitler had collected in Germany at one time or another.

Q: Plus a lot of Volksdeutsch?
PORTER: *Volksdeutsch*, Ukrainians. The Germans were so disorganized at that time that the concept of the law of return which applies to *Volksdeutsch* now, did not then. So we got out just to America - we also tried to get them to other countries - but basically the Displaced Persons Commission got them to the United States. It is amazing how well it all worked out. They became first-rate citizens in almost all cases. That was the interesting experience too. You had a group in America that always had taken the stand of keeping the walls around America high, don't let in the outsiders, versus the Jewish groups and ethnic groups who were interested in bring them in. That is the way the law eventually came out - you had to have a sponsor and when these people came in they had to be gainfully employed so they would not be a burden on the taxpayer. We had a lot of work to do there. It was largely done by the church and other groups to get that kind of sponsorship going.

At that point I spent a great deal of time in Europe. We had to organize, and it was my job to do it primarily, several offices, Austria was one of the biggest, there were five or six in Germany, there was one in Naples. All of which were sort of adjuncts of the consular service, in a way, in providing assurances that many of these people who were brought to the United States would be under the law, not public charges.

*Q:* How much was the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] involved in this?

PORTER: Almost not at all. Later it became very much involved. The INS was the ultimate reviewer of the documents before people came in. INS would have final decision, but basically all the INS criteria were taken care of in the Displaced Persons offices. In those days, as you will remember, they were pretty complicated, one's sexual preferences, health to all sorts of things. Of course, although one would not think it was too important, there were still a lot of people who felt that the communists had all sorts of plans with these poor refugees, so they had to be carefully vetted.

*Q:* Well, that went on and got even worse.

PORTER: 1948 it was not too bad. There was a high percentage of Balts whom Hitler brought down for the labor camps. They turned out to be first rate citizens. It was funny, there were a lot of Armenians that crept in one way or another. There were fascinating people. One of those I enjoyed the most was George Martikian, who was the famous restauranteur in San Francisco whom I had brought in to improve the food in the Army. This young Armenian came into the United States at the age of ten, not speaking a word of English, got out to California with a placard hanging over his chest saying "please send me to such and such an address". He made his career in the United States and devoted all his wealth in helping stranded Armenians all over the world. He had come from Turkey at the time of the so-called genocide.
That was a very enriching experience. I was working closely with the Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, Lutheran organizations where you got to know a whole new segment of interesting people.

Q: Did you find, as I found in Salzburg, that although they did wonderful work there was in-fighting between the religious relief organizations than you could imagine?

PORTER: There was just an inbred jealousy. Everybody was afraid that someone else was getting a little more help and succor than they were. But we got the job done. I was on the executive side of the Displaced Persons Commission, but the commission was a three man commission, a Catholic, a Jew, and the famous Ugo Carossi, who was a famous Italian, I guess an atheist. He was one of the great New Deal types who had done all sorts of interesting things in Washington. We had our own little lobby mechanism that was quite helpful.

Q: I had some of it, I was a sort of a field hand in it.

PORTER: You were in Salzburg when?

Q: We had three million refugees. That ran about a year and a half or so?

PORTER: Yes, I had really done my job, the organization was running and the program was beginning to decline. I was called back to the State Department. At that point I went very briefly into the Office of Management and Budget, but I guess that I had met enough people at that point in my travels in Europe and in Washington that I was tapped to join the team which went over to Germany. This was just proceeding John McCloy's appointment. This was the team that went over to plan the transition from military government to an ultimate reestablishment of Germany as a democratic state. That team went over in 1949. We spent several months putting together a report. I did go to Austria two or three times and talked to Red Dowling about how the transition was occurring in Austria to learn something about that.

It was a fairly large group, about six or eight - half of us - were from the State Department, the others were from outside. We made our report to McCloy who was arriving in Germany. Within a few weeks he, or the State Department more specifically, asked me to go over to Germany to serve on his staff, and that is when I really first joined the Foreign Service group even though, of course, the High Commissioner in Germany was hardly the Foreign Service. It was basically staffed by career Foreign Service people.

Q: The management was, at least, Foreign Service by that time.

PORTER: Pretty largely.

Q: We had fifteen Foreign Service people to run 3,900 Americans in Vienna and I imagine that you had pretty much the same.
PORTER: Yes, except, you see at this point, the Army assumed a much more subordinate role; we were really a civilian organization. There were a lot of ex-generals, George E. Hays, whom you knew in Austria, was, of course, the deputy to McCloy. It was a wise move to keep a military man in there to keep contacts with the U.S. military.

Q: What was your job when you went there?

PORTER: When I first got there I headed the Office of Management and Budget. In actual fact pretty much stayed there all the way through the American occupation period.

Q: We had a break there - we had just gotten to the point when you moved in as the head of management and budget in Frankfurt. Was Glen Wolf the Administrative officer there?

PORTER: He was my immediate boss. He had just come from the Bureau of the Budget or wherever he had been. Glen was a dynamic, driving fellow.

Q: You have to have a fellow like that. In retrospect I think he saved us from disaster.

PORTER: He deserves a lot of credit which he hadn't got just because of some silly nonsense that happened later on. He did good job. It was a unique period, of course. We were in Frankfurt in the I.G. Farben building and John McCloy was the ideal choice for that job. He was a remarkable man and a wonderful man to work for. He had selected, by and large, a highly intelligent, interesting group, mostly from New York, to be his principals. The political work was done, of course, by the old career Foreign Service. It was a great privilege for me to get to know that crowd. John Davies was sent there during his trial and troubles [as a result of the McCarthy episode] and I grew very fond of him. He was one of the real great ones. He never showed any of his problems on the surface at all, just did his job and bravely, of course, as we all know. Sam Reber's sad departure nearly broke his heart. Sam had come back going through some agony in Washington, talking to, among others, John Foster Dulles, he had been asked to leave. He came back to Germany and he could not contain himself. He asked me to come over and we stayed up all night drinking Scotch to get to the point where he could sleep. Sam shortly thereafter left.

Jimmy Riddleberger was there; he later became my immediate boss in Austria where he was DCM. Haynes was running the industrial side, the financial side was run by a Belgium banker, who was an adopted American citizen. Whitney Debovoise was there. Bennie Buttenwieser and others. Ben Shoot, who was one of the old OSS boys, was involved in setting up the ultimate CIA apparatus. Then there was a whole host of military people, Max Taylor, whom I got to know well, a tennis partner who beat me. Max was at that point the U.S. representative in Berlin. We had a State Department element in Berlin, which was under him. Cecil Lyon was another. Al Leitner was there some ten years later in Berlin and later Munich. He was there when the inimitable Scott McLeod [head of Security for State Department in Dulles years] came over.
It was my job to contain the damage. He was after Al. Al was old Foreign Service and he could not have been any good as far as McLeod was concerned. But we managed to divert the arrow. I have really deviated in talking about people. I suppose as a youngster, I was still in my early thirties, it would be difficult to create a situation where one could meet so many fascinating people from so many walks of life as one did in that period.

Q: *It was the absolute center in those days. Germany was the number one administrative and executive problem.*

PORTER: It is fascinating how much power and authority I had in that job. McCloy would just give general directions and it was up to me and a small group working for him, Glenn and the lawyers, to create the institutions to do certain jobs and then to wipe them out as the German political structure and economy moved along and they were no longer needed.

Q: *Sometimes getting rid of them was the biggest problem.*

PORTER: It was, but McCloy would brook no nonsense on that. For instance, when the time came to get rid of the Ruhr Authority, which really was no longer needed because they finally got John Monnet's coal and steel organization going, we just got rid of the Ruhr Authority. Now there were things that were done perhaps too quickly, but once the momentum started it was much more sensible to let the Germans back in to run things. I think that the only problem where McCloy probably felt some disappointment was not being able to control cartelization as well as could have been done. But I learned to enjoy and respect McCloy immeasurably. He took life so seriously. When we had war crimes problems he would lock himself in for weeks, not being visible, lawyer that he was, he would study the individual trials to decide whether to commute their sentences or let them stand. The Germans, of course, appreciated it. The understanding that he had for them. He blocked the bombing of Rottenburg and another in Bavaria. It did not hurt that they knew he had been opposed to the Morgenthau plan which would have been one of the greatest tragedies of our post war period if it had actually been carried out. [A plan proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to turn Germany into a purely agricultural country]

Q: *You were just talking about High Commissioner McCloy.*

PORTER: That period was one of transmission from one of all out military government to restoration of diplomatic relations between sovereign states. The whole purpose of the High Commission was to achieve what was unfinished in the military government, basically creating the political structure and institutions which would lead to a long term solid democracy in Germany. To put into effect the German constitution and to make it real and effective. Also, of course, to complete the eradication of Nazism. Most of that had been accomplished in the military government. McCloy still had, as I said earlier, difficult decisions about individual cases, in which he had to decide the ultimate fate of
individual Nazis. In any case, the High Commission operated from 1949 to 1954 and we really had three goals, the democratization objective, the establishment of a viable economic structure in Germany which, of course was a Marshall Plan objective, and finally the integration of Germany into a Western European structure, which would hopefully avoid the warlike pattern of the past. I was lucky, I never understood why, but McCloy put me on the Marshall Plan committee, which voted the money that would be used for whatever purpose. At that time we had, of course, moved to Bonn, Bad Godesberg, at the urgent behest of Konrad Adenauer who wanted the capitol near his home and frankly at the behest of the British as it was in the British zone of occupation and they were very eager to have the capitol there.

Sitting on the Marshall Plan committee, we were not doing so well. The problem was consumer goods; the German labor movement after the war was very disciplined and gave up a great deal of possible advantages it could have taken in terms of its wage and other demands in order to allow the economy to recuperate and develop. But the workers would not work too well for there simply was not much to buy with the new mark. The mark at that point, when it was created, was around 4.5¢ - today when one reads the paper it is about $1.17 or thereabouts. Its pegged rate was 22¢ if I remember correctly and it got up to that rate in about a year and a half or close to that rate. We had about three months to go until our two plus billion we were allocating to Germany (which was a lot of money in those days) would essentially run out. Suddenly it all began to come together. French soap and stockings were starting to come in, mopeds [small motor bikes] which workers could buy, the shops began to get not only food but clothing and still it looked chancy. We got down to our last month and we only had two hundred million dollars left, and we said, "Well, here we go!" and we put in all the two hundred million dollars into industrial expansion, praying that everything the Marshall Plan had been doing in the rest of Europe would continue to work and consumer goods would flow in. Sure enough, by the end of the last month everything had turned around, the German worker was working his tail off, as is his wont and the Marshall Plan was a success. But it was much more chancy than people realize at this point. Of course it was only a few years later that Germans were beginning to pay us back for the Marshall Plan.

Q: Maybe keeping us afloat.

PORTER: Maybe. McCloy worked very closely with Schuman and Monnet also, particularly Monnet, of course, in trying to create European mechanisms. We put a lot of money and quiet support in getting the Germans to accept the Coal and Steel Community. We were not at all sure that their newly-created government would endorse, but surprisingly they endorsed it overwhelmingly and the German steel cartel crumbled in opposition as did the French to a degree.

The job I had, as I started to say earlier, was the creation of the dissolution of various institutions. First of all the hiring of people, mostly Germans, and towards the end of my tenure, which was several years, was firing most of the ones we hired. Most of them went to work immediately for the new German government and doing substantially the same
work they had been. It really worked beyond one's wildest dreams. The democracy is as stable as any in Europe today; the momentum that was created towards Europeanization of institutions and political structures has really carried on to this day. I suppose at this point the German constitution had allowed them to send troops to the Arabian Gulf.

Q: Somebody was too smart for that.

PORTER: I participated a little bit in the writing of the German constitution, it was primarily done by a political scientist called Pollock from the University of Michigan. He did most of it. Some of us read it and made some minor suggestions. That was when we were over on the initial survey. But that constitution has stood up awfully well. One wondered if the federalism that was built into it would last, but it has now endured through two generations and has become accepted. Of course the whole constitution structure was designed that you could not have a strong unitary structure so that it could not be taken over by a Hitler or even a Bismarck.

Q: It has held up.

PORTER: I probably never had a more challenging job in my entire life that I had as a not-quite-forty-year old in Germany. When you think of the magnitude of the task and how relatively easily and peacefully it was done. We worked ourselves out of a job, of course. Little tidbits stick out. Konrad Adenauer was making his first trip as the chief of a state to Paris. I think it was early 1953. Ben Wolf and I were really quite close to Adenauer and his staff. The famous Johnny von Herwarth [?] was a close, immediate aide de camp. I will come back to him. Adenauer was visiting Paris and of course there was no infrastructure for the fledgling German government at that moment, so we, in our munificence, provided him with an aging DC-4 and hastily painted out the U.S. Air Force markings and sent him to Paris. About the only people who sent him off were a few of us from the High Commissioner and Johnny von Herwarth. There was a little field very close to Köln which maybe the big airport of Bonn now, but then was a tiny ex-military field. That was Konrad Adenauer on his first out of country visit as Chancellor.

Johnny von Herwarth was fascinating. He was our liaison man with Adenauer. Johnny has written a book which should be a must reading for those who like reading about the old foreign service. He was a German who was at the German embassy in Moscow before the war and became intimately acquainted with Chip Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson and all of them who were there. He as written a book, a portion of which deals with that period. Johnny was in the anti-Hitler movement and never slept in the same bed twice, mostly in the Bavarian Alps. He came out to become Adenauer's trusted, number one aide. He was then the first German ambassador to England after the war. It was amusing. I was then stationed in London. When you think of what Germany is like today. He had nobody to turn to when he went to London. I helped him find a house, helped him hire people to get started. Now one would probably find the reverse to be true, not in England but in many places. How quickly the German government recovered.
I guess my remembrance of that period is so real because of these very close relations with just a handful of Germans who were recreating the country. The same was true in the economic and fiscal fields. The Marshall Plan Ministry was really more important than any other ministry. Of course those were the people who eventually went over and staffed the Ministry of Finance and Economics. That is how German bureaucracy was recreated and/or spawned after World War II.

*Q:* In many cases as American employees.

PORTER: A lot of them had been. In my budget office we had a number of German employees, some of whom rose to great prominence in the German government, one of them became minister of finance.

*Q:* He undoubtedly was one of your cashiers?

PORTER: We actually made him a budget analyst. He had a lot of responsibility, especially when we were dealing with the dissolution of some of the occupation and High Commission political institutions.

*Q:* Did you leave when McCloy left?

PORTER: I stayed on. Jim Conant, former president of Harvard, replaced him. I stayed through with him until we dissolved it altogether. I then had my choice of going to either London or Paris as administrative counselor and I choose London.

*Q:* You did not want to learn a new language at that time? Had you learned German?

PORTER: I had studied classical German in college. It was not an easy language. I could read Goethe with a dictionary, but could not order a fried egg. Later I was a long time in Austria and that is where my German improved.

*Q:* I never was in posts that spoke the same language.

PORTER: I then went to London in 1954.

*Q:* Who was the top person?

PORTER: Winthrop Aldrich. Uncle Winthrop. He had come out of Chase [Bank] at rather advanced years. Winthrop was not terribly happy with the career Foreign Service, I don't know why. There were a lot of interesting stories about that which I found interesting. Many of them never told. I suppose this might be as good a time as any as most of the principles are dead or would not care less at this point.

For some reason or other I was on the right side of Winthrop Aldrich. One of the reasons may have been that I knew Wild Bill Donovan and after I got to London Wild Bill came
to town and as we all know Wild Bill was terribly suspicious of any Foreign Service officer and had as little to do with them as possible, but in my case he seemed to like it because I had known him. I think my Marine Corps training somehow set me apart. So Wild Bill would come in and ask me to come to the hotel and he would talk to me for hours about what was going on. Wild Bill at that point was a roving ambassador living in Bangkok. There was that brief period when he was given sort of a regional responsibility out in the Far East, I guess primarily he was still doing intelligence work. But under Ike he was sort of keeping a roving watch on the whole area. He would often come to Britain, which he dearly loved. So I think maybe through the Wild Bill connection I got on the good side of Winthrop Aldrich. There was quite a bit of transition going on in the local CIA scene at that point. I had been rather deeply involved in intelligence activities in Germany because part of the process in building there was building an intelligence apparatus. So I got to know almost all the cast of characters.

Wild Bill had come over to sort of oversee or review our US-British intelligence activities. He must have set Aldrich up to this, but Aldrich was very angry at his DCM who was Walt Butterworth; Aldrich just could not get along with Walt.

Q: Walt was a bit inclined to take authority as far as it would go.

PORTER: He had had his years as financial attaché and dealt with the little old lady of Threadneedle St. and knew his England very well, and Walt was a dominating personality. My old friend, Jim Penfield, was a political officer and I suppose that some of that animosity rubbed off on Jim who would not hurt anybody. So one day Aldrich called me in, he was just steaming mad, and he said, "From now on you are going to be the only liaison in this embassy with CIA" (I never really understood this), and he said, "furthermore I don't want you to discuss this with any other officers in the embassy." All the people who wrote my efficiency ratings among other things. At that point I could see that there was nothing to do but say, "Yes, sir" and leave the room. I just decided to sweat it out. I did tell one or two of the Agency people what I had been instructed to do and told them to ignore that and to go ahead and do their business and to keep me advised and try not to have me trampled under foot. It all ultimately worked out because the ambassador must have forgotten about it. I will never forget it, it was a moving day in my experience.

England at that point was an intriguing place, we were there just after the coronation, a year after, and found already that Germany in 1954 was enjoying the comforts of life much more than the British. The slow, hard rebuilding process took a long time. Other than for some of my skullduggery that I mentioned previously, it was a basically fascinating tour. Win Brown was, of course, really deputy economic person, was the head of what was the Marshall Plan operation, it was technically over, but there were all sorts of residual activities. Linc Gordon was the economic chief and Win was his deputy.

My next job was coming back to Washington where I got involved as executive director of the Economic Bureau, which was a surprise to me, but I enjoyed it because it came both in my discipline, economics, and administration. At that point there was a deputy
under secretary for economics, which was the top economic job - Herb Prochnow, very few people remember him. He was a Chicago banker who was a very nice fellow, but more of a banker than an economist and not really understanding of international matters. He had written a successful joke book and was really a very nice man, but was not a period in the Economic Bureau when the leadership was might have been needed at that point. That was a major era of trade negotiations and development of the GATT.

Q: Was there an assistant secretary?

PORTER: There was an assistant secretary who was the famous Finn, Cavergjaro. He was a good economist, but not a leader of men, that is the best way to put it. An academic type, again a very nice person. He knew his job but again was not an administrator. So while all this was happening, Herbie Hoover Jr. showed up. He was really the reason why I was in this job. He was Under Secretary at that point. He had been running the Iranian mess, you remember when the Shah was briefly evicted and Hoover was the honcho in that whole exercise along with Kim Roosevelt. Later on Hoover was our representative on the Suez Canal negotiations after the unfortunate 1956 episode. I had gotten to know him in London and he had talked to Aldrich. The two of them had plotted to send me back as somebody to help bring the economic area out of the doldrums, or at least that is what I was told.

Herbie Jr. did not last very long after I was there. For some reason he tried to use me as he eyes and ears, he needed the ears for he was very deaf. But he did not last long, he did not like it, he was a lonely man.

Another amusing little anecdote; when he left, his last week in the service, he called me in and said, "I just have one request of you" - as an aside, he was an inveterate ham radio operator; he loved ham radios, and the only negotiations he was really interested in which reserved radio frequency bands for ham radio operators and he jealously guarded those bands against any inroads - and he said "when I go out of here I am afraid that no one will be watching the interest of the ham radio operators and I want you to be sure that in all future negotiations that their interests are protected." That is last time I ever saw Herbie. I guess that shows the nature of his trust that he thought I could do something about that; I did not think I could. But I think the hams took care of themselves.

Q: My casual encounters with him did not give me great trust in him as an under secretary of state.

PORTER: He hated the job to begin with. He had no patience with political considerations at all. He was really a classic engineer., "let's do the job and move on. To hell with what everybody else thinks!" Nobody has ever written a book about him.

Then all of a sudden they decided that something had to be done about this. They tapped Doug Dillon, who was ambassador in Paris, to come back and he took Herb Prochnow's job but they made him under secretary, that was part of the deal. Doug, the minute he got
there, the first day he sat down with me and said, "Let's plan a campaign about how I am going to get this job upgraded and get a charter so that everybody in Washington knows what the president wants me to do, etc., etc."

Doug, you know, with that soft-spoken manner of his, is very deceiving, strong and intelligent human being. He is given to some bits of temper once in a while. He held it in fairly well. He said, "Let's sit down and figure this out, and you are going to write it all up and I am going to get the President to sign it". And that is exactly what happened. We wrote him a charter that put him in charge of just about everything that operated in the financial and economic spheres of international affairs. The charter was adopted and sent around. Of course he was upgraded at that point to Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

The other thing that happened that I should explain. Herbie Hoover Jr. had violent prejudices against some of the highly valued and valuable Foreign Service officers who were in the economic area. Most of these were Wristonees, of course, as I was. [Officers integrated into the Foreign Service from the Civil Service under the Wriston Program of the early 1950s]. I was Wristonized when I was in London. There were several who were on Hoover's blacklist, people whom he wanted to get rid of, in fact people whom he had instructed me to get rid of in some cases, and I knew the value of these people - many I did not know personally. Three of the ones he wanted to get rid of all became assistant secretaries later; so I went to Loy Henderson who was the head all administration at that point, and told him what was happening. Good old Loy said, "We have just got to put these people out somewhere they cannot be reached until this all passes." That is exactly what happened. None of them were fired.

Q: Were these people like Joe Greenwald, for instance?

PORTER: No, I don't think so. John Leddy was one [Ed ?] was another. As far as I can tell, it was just a highly conservative attitude you can find in some people in the period where all of these were, he was convinced, New Deal offshoots, or pinkos. It was a classic, I would not go as far as to say McCarthyism, but it had some of the elements and reactions.

As soon as Doug Dillon came in, I did not have to tell him. He knew all of these names, and he said "I want this guy back here doing this and that guy here doing that" all of them came back in. Doug, of course, played the violin very well, and we had all the best talent around, and none of them got fired. All of which shows that you can accomplish something in the bureau if you are careful. I might have had a lot more trouble if Loy had not been around. That was a vivid moment. I did not even have to say "boo", he just did it. I am not sure that he even knew all of them personally.

Q: No, but he was interested in the structure of the service.

PORTER: These were people who were irreplaceable. They knew more than anybody you could possibly hire or promote. Of course all of them had great careers for twenty or more
years. It shows a difference, we had two different Republicans, and Dillon had a real interest in talent.

Well, that last a while, and then we had our Hungarian refugee relief. That was the end of 1956. You and I met and that was the year that I had efficiency reports written by Doug Dillon, Loy Henderson and Hoover, it was an interesting year - they all hired good writers. I think helped Charlie Whitehouse and Ted Eliot. Both of them, their first jobs were working with Dillon. Dillon had gotten them in, Charlie came from CIA, I don't know if Ted did, but Dillon had known his family. I sort of helped them break in, they were new to the trade and I was hanging around the office all the time. I think that maybe Ted actually wrote my efficiency rating for Dillon.

Q: Then after the Hungarian refugee thing you had a year of war college? Would you talk about the Hungarian business?

PORTER: Obviously the Hungarian thing hit like a ton of bricks. The Department was simply not ready, as you well know, not staffed for it. It is amazing to me how much we actually did accomplish in the 1950s with one or two people, where today you would have a whole task force, interagency this and that. This was two people. Loy called me in and using his special assistant at that point who was the same guy who originally hired me into the State Department, and of course knew all about my career and what was important then was that I had had this displaced persons experience. I did not have to start from scratch, I knew who all the voluntary agencies were and the church ones, and basically how the system worked.

Concerning the Hungarian Relief Act and permission on getting Hungarians refugees to come to this country - as you know, you were deeply involved yourself, it was a moment of great frustration when the Hungarian Revolution occurred and the U.S. was unable to respond in a way that would have allowed it to be a success. There was that six week period when many young, not all were young, but most of them were, Hungarians got out into Austria, walked over the border. I can't remember the totals anymore, but it was over 200,000. It was more than we could handle, and more than Austria could handle. So there were lots of things that could be done. We had to help Austria in various ways so that they could simply handle the logistics of the problem. We had to face up to the problem of getting refugees out after the Russians returned to Budapest and the border closed down. Of course a lot of them escaped in the few weeks before the final closure. We had well over 200,000 that had to be resettled somewhere in the world. The U.S. frustrations in not being able to help the people in Hungary were helpful to me when Loy Henderson called me in and said that he would like to have me take over the job of coordinating the whole Hungarian Relief Program. This of course meant doing something for the Hungarians who had left, not for those who tragically were left behind.

The job was to help Austria to some extent, improving facilities, feeding people, and above all to resettle them as quickly as we could, to get them out of Austria. My job really
was working on this exodus, which was handled in this case entirely by the State
Department. We did not create a Displaced Persons Commission.

**Q:** This is where General Swing [head of Immigration and Nationality Service - INS] began to get into the act?

**PORTER:** That is when the INS started really moving and tried to get people overseas. General Swing of the INS was a gruff, tough old general, was a close buddy, very close buddy of Ike's and I guess was his commanding officer at one time. He took as much control as he could of the situation. It was not all bad because in some respects he could get money that would have been harder for us, knowing how the State Department usually fares in its budgets. We began bringing them in to the U.S. as quickly as we could, as immigrants to the States. Swing was tougher, I think, than he needed to be in applying the criteria that could have been applied gently or firmly, but we did a magnificent job - I don't say that for myself - but in terms of response of the American people and the voluntary agencies in getting them in. However, we just simply could not take in enough, and after we really got the immigration movement into the States in full swing, it became quite clear that we had to nudge the rest of the world. We used food programs, like PL 480, to induce a lot of people, including the Austrians, who retained some of the Hungarians by providing surplus grain under the PL 480 program, which was designed to ease the financial burden on the countries. That was the program which I conceived and worked out. It was really quite successful. The result was that the Hungarians got placed pretty much around the world, we got quite a few in Australia that way. They all turned out to be first rate immigrants - they were young, tough, ready for democracy.

During this process Vice President Nixon decided to make a trip to Austria just before the final closure of the border. The Soviets had already come back into Budapest, but there were still people straggling back to Austria. It fell my lot and my interviewer of the moment [Ambassador Torbert] to take the vice president to Austria with a brief sojourn in Munich where he addressed the Bavarian leadership on his way home. Aside from that the trip was solely based on the concern over the Hungarian refugee relief program. There were a lot of very interesting tidbits on the trip, but I must say that with all the controversy that has attended to Mr. Nixon over the years I found him to be a really intelligent and hard working representative of the U.S. abroad.

**Q:** I agree.

**PORTER:** He would do that, which a bureaucrat loves, he would say, "What should I do now?" rather than say, "This is what I am going to do." He would take advice, listen to it, and do it well. The only time we did not control him was when he took off and went to the border on his own.

**Q:** And then announced it publicly.
PORTER: I was the last to know. Amusingly enough on the golf course the other day I bumped into one of the Secret Service guys who was with him. He went to the border with Nixon and for the first time I got a full, eye witness account of what was involved and shook hands.

Q: I think it might be worth mentioning as a footnote, how simple this trip really was compared to what happens now. We had you and me for a staff, we had exactly three friends of Nixon, one of whom was the future secretary of state and attorney general, William Rogers, Congressman Wilson from California and one other fellow. And his PR guy, I think King was his name. I was instructed not to let anybody else on that airplane unless Nixon personally approved and he did not approve of anybody else. We did not even have Secret Service on the plane, they had gone ahead as an advance party. It was incredible. It was very simple.

PORTER: That is a theme that constantly keeps reoccurring to me. How we did things with so people and managed to do them more effectively because decisions could be made fast. As I said on the subject of the Hungarian refugee matter, the Department assigned me one other man to do spade work. We were it. We did the whole thing. Of course I knew the organization well, I had just come out of the economic area, which was the one area I needed to work with for PL 480. It was literally done by two people and a borrowed secretary from Loy Henderson, and that was it. Today can you imagine? There would be fifty people, ten agencies. Fifty would hardly be enough for there would also be the command center. I simply cannot believe how effective that trip was.

For the trip, I personally went down to my bank, this shows how far we are from the way things were handled, and I got out five thousand dollars worth American Express checks to pay for the trip. I paid all the hotel bills and everything else with that.

Q: I hope that you did not have to use your own money for that?

PORTER: No, I got the State Department to authorize it. Today the advance party would be $6,000 a day. That is a theme that I just cannot get over. I will get back to that when I talk about the landing in Lebanon in 1958.

Q: Did you stay on this work long?

PORTER: As soon as the trip was over I asked Loy - towards the end of this I had gotten a rather bad infection, the only time in my life that I had been really ill, and that sort of drained me and I wanted to go to advance training. I had never had a day of training in the service of any sort, even language - I did all that on my own. I asked Loy if I could go to the War College, and he said if Doug would release me, well ok. By that time Doug did not need me any more. He had the Whitehouse and Eliot off and running, so I left to go to the War College, which was a lovely year for me, it gave me a chance to really read and reflect. One does not get a year like that very often. One does not usually have a year when you can get home at five o'clock instead of nine o'clock.
Q: And this was a time when the kids needed it.

PORTER: Yes they really did need it. That was amusingly enough the year that the young assistant history professor, Henry Kissinger, brought out *A World Restored*. I will never forget when he came and lectured us at the War College and he was still considered wet behind the ears, but his intellect shown through, from that really quite erudite book. That is not to say that I am either a disciple or total admirer, but I remember him when. Just as I remember Zbig Brzezinski when I was in Austria a couple of years later. There was the very young professor who had just come out of Moscow who stopped by the embassy. For some reason or other we got together and I enjoyed hearing him talk about the Soviet Union. He was just starting his career.

So, at the War College, Tom Wailes, of fond memory, was the State Department representative there. Amazingly that year at the War College we had two or three outside professors who were brought in, by whom I do not know, who were really hardliners, I could not call them McCarthyites, but they were about as tough hardliners as you could get on the Commie situation. Fortunately we had Tom Wailes to assure that we got a good, overall perspective. The War College year really helped me get my next assignment.

To go back to the War College for a minute, Max Taylor was Army Chief of Staff, and he sent his very best to the War College, colonels, most of whom got three or four stars before they were through. It shows you the difference between what he thought about training and what some of the others did. Half and half. About half were serious people who really wanted to have a greater knowledge of the world, and the other half, most of whom were aviators, were much more contemptuous of the thought process in foreign affairs. The Air Force was almost universally push button types. Curt Lemay was the Air Force Chief of Staff. They would simply go off the wall if you even contemplated talking to a Chinese Communist.

Q: The Air Force in those days just simply did not have the people.

PORTER: No, they did not. They got a lot of them later.

Q: I had the same impression in my class two years earlier. Where did you go on your trip?

PORTER: The Middle East. We had a fascinating trip; that is where I first began to understand that area, which of course became later on my stock in trade. I remember Baghdad, we got there in 1958 just a few weeks the revolution when Nuri Said and the king were killed [July 14, 1958]. Wally Gallman was ambassador. It is interesting to read his book, *My Days with Nuri Said*. It was not widely distributed. It is still not well known that we had come quite close to getting King Faisal, who was a cousin of King Hussein, to accepting all of the Palestinian refugees. Nuri Said, who was the strong man and who
ran the country, knew that - I did not learn most of this until later, but sensed a bit of it when I talked to some of my friends like Hermann Eilts, who was a young U.S.-CENTO representative. John Foster Dulles sponsored that organization of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The whole future of the Middle East could have been changed if somehow the Palestinian refugees had been gotten out of Lebanon and Jordan. It probably was also the king's undoing, because certainly that information must have sooner or later leaked and given the nature of the communist lead revolutionaries, this gave them an excuse to get the people behind them and start that brutal revolution.

I remember one other tidbit. We went to Tunis, that was when the French were having all their trouble with Algeria. Tunisia was already independent. We met with Lewis Jones, who was ambassador and Bob Blake was DCM. Bob was, of course, running his clandestine contact with the FLN in Algeria, which he was not supposed to tell anybody about, and didn't. I learned about it later. When I got back to the War College I predicted that Algeria would be independent by the time we got out of there and was pooh-poohed by most of the military, and of course that happened.

The other thing was that I predicted in one of my public pronunciamentos, this was after the African trip had come back and reported about how they had talked to the Belgian Congo leaders and how everything was under control and maybe that the Belgian Congo would have it independence in twenty years. I predicted that by the end of the year that it would be independent by the time we got out. At least it was a pleasure that we had one Navy type, who later became a four-star admiral, stand up at the end and say, "I was not so sure about you State Department guys, but I remember those two predictions, and I congratulate you."

Then Bob Murphy picked me up right away, Bob needed somebody to be his number one boy. Tap Bennett had been before and the other had gone to Cairo as DCM. My luck was that I got to work for Bob. A wonderful man. A delight to work for. He worked his tail off and expected us to do the same. It was never a driving situation, it was always relaxation and humor in the relationship. The only problems Bob had were his many personal ones, his wife was not well, his daughter committed suicide, it was very tragic. Bob used to lecture me. He said, "Whatever you may do in this service, don't follow my mistake, don't neglect your family."

Q: I remember Tap Bennett told me that he made a point of releasing him after a certain length of time.

PORTER: I don't have to extol Bob, everybody has written about him. It opened more doors for me as a source of political know-how about what is going on in the world, it just oozed out of him. I found it fascinating.

I forgot one thing, I should go back. When I was working for the Economic Office, Scott McLeod was then what amounted to assistant secretary for security and consular affairs and the Eisenhower White House wanted very much to have a new immigration bill, but
they did not want Scott McLeod to be involved. I can say this about Scott because he and I went to college together. He was a year ahead of me. Here was this man who was posing as the most staunch anti-communist in America who in college organized and led the peacenik meetings. I knew a lot about him, there was no way he could get to me - I knew about some of his girl friends too. So I felt emboldened when I was around him and he knew it, and he squirmed. As a matter of fact when I was in Germany as I told you he got Al Lightner and several others, for that matter. Conant did not realize how fortunate it was to assign me to be his control officer. He could not do a thing. Towards the end he started calling me the best anti-antiCommunist in the State Department.

But I was told said that General Pearson [?] in the White House wanted somebody to work on this immigration bill, but they did not want it to be known in the State Department. I was assigned for a few weeks to work over there. That is just when Sherman Adams, [Eisenhower's chief of staff, was forced to leave]. It was sad, he was not always nice, but he was not mean. In any case, General Pearson [?], his deputy, was a sweetheart. I had known an worked with his brother at REA who was a famous management expert who had taught for years at Tuck. Tuck School at Dartmouth. So that was helpful. Pearson was the one who was interested in this and I worked for him for several weeks. That is sort of an intriguing sidelight. The department decided they did not want the consular affairs people rewriting this thing, at least while Scott was there. I was not a consular expert, I had to use some of the guys down the line to give me some information. That was one reason I got to know Loy Henderson rather well.

[Interview Two]

November 15, 1990

Q: When we stopped, you had made a slight digression about the Refugee aid bill and before that you had just started to talk a little about Bob Murphy and I think it would be interesting to get big items that you remember handling or remember him handling and his technique in him handling. He was a past master in this art.

PORTER: He certainly was a towering figure in the history of the Foreign Service. A fascinating man, an extremely urban, cultured, but also very down to earth. As I remember he was the son of a Milwaukee railroad employee, blue collared employee, who lived in Wisconsin. One of his favorite stories was that as a fairly young man he was consul general in Munich - this was at the time of the first putsch by Hitler in the late Twenties and a few years later he came into power. At that point the nuncio in Munich was Pacelli, who of course later became Pius XII, and when the first putsch occurred Pacelli reported that it was just an aberration, that Germany would stay on its democratic path. I think Murphy reported differently, he felt this was the way of the future, the Nazi wave of the future. Many years later when Murphy visited the Pope in Rome they reminisced about those days and Murphy chided the Pope and the report made it clear that there was no Papal infallibility at that time. He had not acquired his infallibility until later.

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Bob Murphy had a unique place in the State Department because of his particular rapport with the military. Those were the post war days when political/military relations were very important and Bob was the epitome of that relationship. He would attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an equal and participate fully. I doubt if that is the case now for a senior Foreign Service person. On occasion it was a lot of fun for me to sit in for him on the Joint Chiefs meets when he was busy - I was his senior assistant.

Q: We did have a Foreign Service officer named Carlucci who became fairly influential in the military [as Secretary of Defense].

PORTER: Bob always was given the utmost trust by his seniors. It goes back to John Foster Dulles and Chis Herter when they were secretaries. He almost totally handled relationships with the CIA and approved or questioned on behalf of the secretary covert operations. That was also great fun to be able to sit in from time to time on what was then called the 5412 committee, which was the name of the group that passed on covert operations. Needless to say I was not making decisions but enjoying being part of the process.

One little episode stands out in my mind. You remember the Khrushchev-Eisenhower summit which was supposed to take place in Paris was called off because the [Gary] Powers episode when the U-2 was shot down. One of my tasks was to participate on behalf of the State Department to produce a cover story when things like that happened so as not to implicate the President. When this did happen just before the summit meeting I had prepared months earlier a little statement which would have been issued which would have allowed the President to beg off, that this really was not his doing. It was not stated so positively, but it was so stated that would have given the President a chance to go ahead with the summit if he so desired. That statement was duly trotted out when Powers was shot down, but interestingly enough the President would not allow it to be issued, the President took full personal responsibility and the summit was therefore canceled. Of course it may have been that he just did not want to have another summit with Khrushchev, but in any case it was intriguing that there was a lot of foresight but it was not used.

Q: There was some speculation at the time that there was domestic politics that caused this and he did not want anybody to say that he did not know what was going on.

PORTER: That may have been true. It would be hard for any president to back off and say, "It did not happen on my watch". In any case the summit was less important than domestic politics and his own sense of integrity.

Another thing that I remember from those years, we are talking about the late Fifties, was again how easy it was to get things done in the government without a full array of committees and the participation of dozens of bureaus and departments. The 1958 landing in Lebanon was a case in point where, as you know, we made the landing under the
Eisenhower doctrine, and it was very tense for a while. It was not even clear that the Christian Lebanese army would have accepted the U.S. Marine presence in Lebanon without, perhaps, some shooting. Rob McClintock, the ambassador, has of course written about this, but it still was a tense situation a week or so after the landing. Bob Murphy at that point flew over all by himself to soothe ruffled feathers and get things back to normal and get the Marines back as soon as he could. That whole landing, the State Department participation, involved about four people. Murphy, of course, but after he left I ran that from his office, Freddie Reinhardt from his office, Mac Godley was Freddie's deputy. The three of us literally were the only ones in the Department who were intimately involved in the Beirut landings. Obviously we were getting input from the regional desk people, but contrast that with what would have been the situation twenty years later. I am sure that there would have been dozens and dozens and dozens of people whirling around in committees and getting less done, perhaps than we did with four people.

Q: How was Congress handled on this occasion?

PORTER: Well, it really wasn't an issue as long as it did not turn into a shooting war. It turned out to be a great success because nobody got hurt. I think Congress would have endorsed it then much more readily than they would have in a comparable situation today. Vietnam, particularly, has intervened in the meantime. There were no major Congressional squawks. We would even only brief the Secretary about once a day on the whole deal. It really was amazing how relatively efficiently things could be handled.

Of course, when I first took over as Bob Murphy's assistant, he was Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and later on, just about the time I was ready to leave to go to my new post, Bob was elevated to Under Secretary for Political Affairs, that was the first time that a career Foreign Service officer had moved up to that kind of position, which from that point on was almost always a career assignment.

The privilege of working with him was really great. He had been deeply involved with the military in North Africa during the war all of that is a matter of record. He had an intensive dislike of de Gaulle founded during that period when he got to know him very well, and of course subsequently.

Q: He was fairly easily dislikable.

PORTER: Bob wrote a book, which was called, if I remember Diplomat Among Warriors. It was an interesting book, but diplomat that he was, he was very careful to steer clear of anything that could have been considered derogatory of any person. I begged him to write a second book, the real book, which if he did not want to publish it could be kept under wraps and perhaps published after his death or at least made available to scholars, but to the best of my knowledge he never did.

I think that Bob probably was the most interesting person with the possible exception of John McCloy with whom I worked. He was colorful, had a wonderful way with people.
He performed a special role in the Department of State too, he would constantly make himself accessible to junior officers, to desk officers who normally were not consulted in any major way. They normally got their way in through their immediate boss or something they wrote. Whenever there was a crisis or interesting political development in their country, Bob would just pick up the phone and call the desk officer, or ask me to get the desk officer in. It was also a great morale booster, and probably gave him more information on the subject than anybody else had, except the desk officer. It was also fun towards the tale end of the day, about seven o'clock, unless there was social activity, Bob and Chris Herter and John Foster Dulles would all get together for their shot of bourbon. I would break into those meetings if something hot developed. They were very mellow, interesting meetings, when they were all relaxed and set a course of action for the next day. Loy Henderson, of course, was often at those meetings too.

I left Bob at that point.

_Q: This was about May of 1959?_

PORTER: Yes, because a special opportunity arose in Vienna. Doc Matthews had, of course, been the first career inhabitant of the position of Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, he had really created the job and Bob Murphy followed him. Doc had a very fond place in his heart for that position and people who worked there and he was in need of an economic counselor at that time. He already had Tap Bennett who had the job of working for Bob Murphy before me and so Doc was filling the post with alumni of the office, it was called M at that point.

_Q: It was quite fascinating because Bob and Doc and Walter Donnelly, for example, were all sort of a Catholic mafia in a way, but they pulled in these people who were from outside, to show that there was not an exclusive coterie from the church, which some people tended to think there was._

PORTER: I never saw any of that at all. Of course it was very helpful to have the church connection and also the Vatican input. Cardinal Spellman was down a great deal in the office with me. I never did detect there was any so-called church mafia influence. After all it was pretty damned important to keep in touch. Spellman in the hierarchy would do things for Bob. I remember years later I was on a plane going to Yugoslavia, and there was old Spellman, who was then quite up in years. He was actually performing a mission for the U.S. government. He was stopping off to talk to the Croatian Catholic hierarchy. That was an important role Bob played, but as far as I remember, everyone of his assistants was a Protestant.

_Q: That was interesting that those four or five Catholic laymen were so influential._

PORTER: Actually Doc Matthews was not; he was married to a Catholic but Doc himself was a High Church Episcopalian.
PORTER: Yes, Bob was gracious to let me go. By this time the Austrian economy was on the edge, it was just getting ready to take off. When I arrived as economic counselor, I was also the last Marshall Plan chief for Austria. I think by that time all the Marshall Plan offices had closed down in all of Western Europe and only Austria remained because the Russian zone had only recently been evacuated and it was, of course, denuded by the Russians as they pulled out, they took everything with them. So the Plan kept going a little bit longer when I got there, but it was largely a matter of using counter-part funds rather than dollars. I think we ran out of dollars the first year I was there. We did have a continuing relationship with Austria in the economic field. The Austrians, I think, relied on us rather heavily, as you know, although they are a special breed and are a bit arrogant about their own capacities and potential. They chaffed a bit, I think, under the belief that we were still trying to run their economy, although we really weren't. We mainly wanted to make sure that the money was being used effectively and was not being frittered away.

There was another reason, of course, why we still were in business with counter-part funds, there was a very large counter-part package, close to half a billion dollars in schillings. But Doc Matthews, very rightly I think, refused to release the use of counter-part funds without American permission, until the Austrians cleared up certain outstanding issues. Among them was the oil claim, mainly Mobil Oil, that had been nationalized and not reimbursed, at least in most of the oil fields in Austria. The Nazis had taken them away and they had become Austrian government property after the war. Mobil had perfectly legitimate claims which were not being addressed by the Austrian government. Matthews never made it a clear *quid pro quo* so nobody could say he was blackmailing the Austrian government, but the fact was that ultimately it sunk in that until the oil claims, I think they called it the Vienna memorandum business [?], were settled there would be trouble with the counter-part funds. Finally they were settled; there were a few other little odds and ends that were settled in the process.

It is amusing that one of the things that I did at that point was to insist on holding out enough money on counter-part funds to provide a sort of endowment for the Salzburg Seminar, which probably would not have continued its existence if this was not done. Of course it has been held ever since, and the Austrian government, which originally was rather unhappy about our U.S. insistence on this, later on they changed their views completely and came up with quite a bit of money themselves. They made it into a rather fascinating place, mainly for East-West exchange.

As an aside, since I have taught there several times, I got a notice from the Salzburg Seminar that they are terribly worried about their new role in life. For so long they worked to develop a bridge between East and West and now that the bridge has become superfluous, what are they going to do? There are plenty of things for them to do, but they may have more trouble with financing.

_Q: I have been following that for a long time too._
PORTER: The Austrian experience was an extremely interesting one. I will go back a little bit. While I was economic counselor David Waynehouse, who was DCM left and Doc Matthews very kindly promoted me to DCM, so I had about five years in Austria in the two posts of economic counselor and DCM. It was an interesting period, it was shortly after the Berlin wall went up and it was much more difficult to get information about what was happening in Eastern Europe. So of course there was a great expansion of intelligence facilities in Vienna or developed from Vienna, is a better way of phrasing it.

Q: We used to figure that five percent of the national income of Austria came from the intelligence activities that were paid by both sides for the same false information. It kept the coffee houses going very well.

PORTER: There was a lot of the "Third Man" business which has remained to this day.

Q: There were so many people from East Europe there, so many expatriates with connections.

PORTER: Of course it was not only the CIA but also the embassy that was participating in this, it was called a debriefing exercise to find out what was going on in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Every time a senior Austrian would visit the Soviet Union I would be down at his desk the day after he came back to find out what the hell where Khrushchev or Brezhnev might be and report that in because there was very little contact between the Soviets and our embassy in Moscow in those days.

Doc Matthews, Murphy and Henderson were three of the first four career ambassadors in the career foreign service. I thought I was very lucky to have a substantial amount of experience working for them.

While I was in Vienna Doc Matthews decided to retire, he had reached age 65 and I was chargé for about a year after he left. That was an interesting year, it was about 1963. Then Jimmy Riddleberger came in, he was an old friend from German days, head of the political office of the High Commission and later head of the office of German affairs. I think he was the only person in the State Department who really stood up to McCarthy and McCarthy's henchmen. He showed great courage when courage was not worn on the sleeve. I, of course, always enjoyed working for him, he was delightful.

Q: Was it on your watch that the age-old coalition government disintegrated and you got Socialist government?

PORTER: It happened just after I left. Kreisky was still foreign minister when Riddleberger arrived and I guess that did signal the change. He was the first Socialist foreign minister. To show you how close the Austrian-American relationship was at that time Kreisky and I would be on the phone at least twice a week. He would keep trying to select who would be the next ambassador - American ambassador to Austria. I would
come up with names and he would raise questions, two or three he accepted, but he really wanted Jimmy Riddleberger. Jimmy was a very good ambassador, he spoke very good German but his accent was really something. We had to write his arrival speech when he first arrived in Austria as ambassador. I could hardly understand him. He had learned all his German in Berlin and that accent is so different than the rather mellifluous Austrian accent.

I stayed another year with Jimmy and then left for my next assignment.

Q: You were in Austria and you mentioned while the tape was off that you some PL 480 [grain] programs and other economic things that were going on.

PORTER: The economy was indeed taking off dramatically during my last couple of years there. Of course you had the Austrian neutrality question which made it quite clear, whether the Austrians wanted to do it or not, and I am not sure they did, that they could not join the Western market, the Russians did not want that. That took a great deal of time; the European Free Trade Association was created and the Austrians needed a lot of hand holding, but it was their first major post-war attempt to come out of the isolation, which was not necessarily their fault. They had to become a part of a large Europe and to take a role in EFTA, which consisted of European neutrals, Scandinavia, etc. which was developed apart from the Common Market. A lot of my friends who were working on Austria, on the administration of the Marshall Plan were the people who continued on as the Austrian EFTA bureaucracy which developed in Geneva. Much as we did in Germany where we trained a lot of German bureaucrats, we also trained a lot of Austrians.

Q: Also I think on the public affairs side with the press and radio and that sort of thing.

PORTER: Yes, very much so. In those days too, you could go out to the ski areas and find Marshall-plan plaques all over on lifts and gondolas and the like. If you go back today you will find all of those have been removed.

Q: They probably have been rebuilt.

PORTER: A lot were taken down when Austria decided that it was going, indeed, to stand on its own two feet. Austria was, of course, an area where the blackmarket, where the word schwartz described all sorts of economic activity where you could trade currencies, engage in illicit trade with the East, there was an awful lot of activity in enforcing U.S. trade restrictions and COCOM restrictions and the transfer of goods to the Eastern Bloc. It was quite clear that there were a lot of Austrian fortunes being made in a way that would not necessarily be approved by the U.S. government. The Austrians are not necessarily Puritan in their business life, by and large.

Q: Any more than they were in their political life, as we discovered.
PORTER: Indeed, as we discovered documentarily. I remember uncovering one juicy little scandal in Austria. We kept trade statistics. The U.S. government had, at that point, an interesting program called triangular trade where one sell, say, grain to Austria at perhaps favorable prices. The schillings that would accrue from that sale would go to buy commercial diamonds in South Africa or Turkey or wherever, most of which were used for building up strategic stockpiles in the United States, or sometimes for other purposes. We found that studying the trade statistics, the U.S. was exporting a great deal more grain to Austria than the triangular trade income would indicate. We started to look into it and found that $25 million worth of grain had gone to Austria and had been reexported to Eastern Block countries, largely Hungary, I think. There were the usual payoffs and Austrian bureaucracy had kept this thing from reaching the public eye. It was interesting that by just an analysis of the statistics we found that this thing was going on. The Austrians had actually paid for the grain, but they had got it at concession prices. The real problem was that it was being reexported to countries that were not supposed to be getting it and those countries were not getting preferential price as the Austrians were charging more.

I got a totally perspective on Austria by pressing that case. We finally got a lot of people put in jail; I am sure they got out rather quickly after we turned the other way. It was a little seamy and one could only conjecture what else was going on. In the early days one of the brightest sources of income of the recovering Austria was subterranean channel to the East. Also during that period the Refugee Program pretty much came to an end and the money we gave to Austria to feed and house and resettle, and a lot of them were resettled in Austria, many of them Hungarians from the 1956 revolution and quite few Czechs, those programs pretty much came to an end. There was one final program, it was probably the last one in Europe, which Doug Dillon was very kind to approve when he came over, and it settled about 12,000 refugees in Austria. That in a sense was the end of the refugee problem in Western Europe, with the U.S. involvement. From that point on the refugee problem began to shift to other points of the world.

Q: That pretty well winds up the Austrian part of your recollections. You returned to your bureaucratic surroundings, how did you get back to Washington?

PORTER: The Department had undergone quite a transformation, that was about the same time that Bob Murphy was elevated; the top administrator was Deputy Under Secretary for Management. The first incumbent of that job was a chap from the Bureau of the Budget who handled the international program there, Roger Jones, a distinguished public servant, but did not last very long in the State Department. Second came a lawyer from San Francisco, and finally a career FSO, Bill Crockett was put in the job. He was an administrative officer in, among other places, Rome. Underneath Bill the assistant secretary for administration at that point really had almost all the administrative activities in the Department, unlike today where the Director General heads personnel. Then the Director General was simply an advisory position. So the assistant secretary for administration had personnel, budget, and what we call operations, which overseas we
would call general services and all the other administrative activities except the Foreign Buildings Office and Security, which were separate.

George Ball called me over to Paris, he was then Under Secretary, and said that they wanted to have me back as assistant secretary for administration. It came like a bolt out the blue, but then I had been in Vienna for about five years. I think I might have blotted my copy book if I had not taken the job. So back to Washington we came. That was a big job. I think that it is handled much better where the Director General has personnel and the administration has what is left, budget and operations and so forth. Then it was almost too big a job to give to one person. I actually recommended that change when I left the job a couple of years later.

I think I was the last Kennedy nominee to a position, which required Senate approval in the State Department.

Q: When Ball left did Katzenbach come in?

PORTER: Katzenbach came in later. Ball was still there. I was there when Katzenbach did come in. He was only there two years. George was still Under Secretary and I guess I saw more of him than any other single person. It was a good time to be there, Dean Rusk was a good Secretary. There was a lot of ferment, the Kennedy administration was always looking for change, new ideas to shake up the State Department, it was too moss-backed, the fudge factory. Those were the days when Kenneth Galbraith was appointed to India and he would call on Dean Rusk as he left and tell Dean, as the Secretary of State, to do his best to keep him informed.

Q: A story I remember about Galbraith was that the White House staff got together on Christmas eve to send him a happy birthday telegram. I don't think it was ever sent, but they talked about sending it.

PORTER: The Kennedy period I was there was actually only a few months before the assassination. I had a interesting contact with President Kennedy during that period. The first job was assigned before I even got my feet planted on the ground in the Department was to take Vice President Johnson overseas on one of his several trips. I have always refused to discuss in any depth some of the incidents that occurred on those trips, they were mostly larger than life. I don't think it does any good to have these rather tawdry incidents put into the historical file of a future president of the United States. In any case this particular trip was to Scandinavia, and I think Bobby Kennedy delighted in keeping Lyndon Johnson on the road as much as possible and out of Washington. There is no secret how Bobby felt about Johnson. These constant pin pricks that LBJ was getting from Bobby were a source of unbelievable frustration to his proud and Texan - he was really a very fascinating guy. But he was sure a big pain - he was hard to be close to. We were talking earlier how easy it was to take Nixon around the world, he would do his own thing, but would also do what you asked him to because it made sense. Well, LBJ was not quite built that way. There is a question of whether it made sense or not.
Well on this particular trip to the Scandinavian countries, most statesmen would infinitely enjoy it, because of pleasant countries, good relations, lot of Scandinavian-Americans cheering on the sidelines, good for a politician, I thought, with all those Scandinavian immigrants scattered about the United States, but what LBJ really wanted to do was to visit the Soviet Union, which he had never done. Hubert Humphrey, Senator Hubert Humphrey at that point, had just come back from a visit to the Soviet Union, which had been quite interesting and gotten him quite a bit of publicity and one of the few revealing contacts the Americans had had with Khrushchev for a long time. Humphrey had gained a lot of stature and prestige out of this. I remember him coming over and briefing us in the Department and we were really quite fascinating in what he had learned, but this also made LBJ more jealous. He wanted the limelight. As we were about to take off for Scandinavia, this was in late summer, we took a helicopter from the airbase in Massachusetts to see Jack Kennedy at Hyannisport for the vice president to brief the president on the trip. He made a most earnest plea to visit the Soviet Union also on the trip. He said it would be most easy to go from Helsinki to just drop down to Leningrad, it would be easy "for me to see the Soviet Union and press the flesh" and so forth. President Kennedy artfully dodged and twisted and said such things as, "Come on, you are lucky to go to such places as Scandinavia where we do not have any problems. You ought to have a lot of fun, it takes to time prepare for a Soviet trip and there really is nothing to talk about right now, relations are not that good" and on and on in that vein, but LBJ simply did not give up, he wanted to visit Leningrad on that trip.

Q: Were you with them?

PORTER: The three of us were together. Jacqueline and the kids were around, John- John was just a little tot at that point, climbed up in my lap, pulled them off my nose and threw them on the floor and broke them. Jack Kennedy thought that was very funny. Of course I had another pair in my suitcase.

After the president had reasoned with LBJ and as LBJ got up to leave, the president said, "Well, what I will do is discuss this with Dean Rusk, I really don't think you should go there now, but if he thinks it is all right we will send you a cable to Helsinki telling you how to proceed. If he does not we will send you a cable telling you why. As the vice president was moving out with Lady Bird and his daughter, I think it was Linda, the president beckoned to me with his finger, so I stayed behind. Before you take off on that plane I want you to get in touch with Dean Rusk and tell him the situation and have him send a cable to Helsinki making sure the vice president does not go to Leningrad. He also chatted with me a bit, although he had never met me he remembered having nominated me for the job.

Q: He was fabulous in that. I remember one half hour session with him - I have never forgotten it.
PORTER: He made me feel very much at ease although I knew very well he was looking me over at that time. Well, fortunately I did not let him down. It was incredible. It took enough time, I had to run to catch up with LBJ who was mad because I had kept him waiting, he did not quite know what had happened when I stayed behind. I guess he figured we were talking about some matters of the State Department. There was no way I could get ahold of Dean Rusk, all the communications on the plane were controlled by the president and his staff, so here I was running around while everyone else was eating dinner finding a pay phone so that I could reach the Secretary of State. This was at an Air Force base in Massachusetts. I could not use the plane's communications. So I finally found a pay phone and reached the State Department. It was a weekend and he was unavailable, so I got the duty officer and gave him the whole picture, I could not hold back on anything. I practically dictated the cable on the phone and said, "You get this thing off to Helsinki, we will be there in ten hours." Sure enough, we got to Helsinki and an 'eyes only' cable from Dean Rusk to LBJ was duly delivered - I got to see it later. It seemed to mollify LBJ completely, it was archly worded and promised a trip in the future.

It was interesting in view of the subsequent relationship between President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, what LBJ said to me when he was the vice president. He said, "Porter, you are a lucky man, you work for the nicest gentleman in Washington." Meaning Dean Rusk, and that relationship endured throughout the administration.

Q: And of course Rusk was equally loyal.

PORTER: Speaking of that relationship, when we would find that the secretary and the president would speak on the phone, sometimes for an extended period every day, and nobody in the White House knew what the president was saying because he was not going to let himself be taped and it was hard - the secretary with his sense of loyalty and discretion, very often was not debriefed on discussions that were held between the two. So what to do? There was a lot of unhappiness in the Department about this, so I went to the secretary. We finally worked out a deal. He was reluctant to reveal any of it, but the deal was that a tape would be made, and his personal assistant would listen to the tape the next morning or in the evening and make whatever notes were pertinent and could be revealed that would not be of the personal relationship. Anything that the State Department needed to know - put it that way. Then the assistant would show it the next morning to Dean Rusk and Dean would authorized the release of the information, which had already been sanitized. So that is how we finally worked that out. They would have very long conversations, almost every afternoon, where Dean would bring him up to date on things and talk about personnel appointments.

The personnel situation in the State Department was in a real state of flux, one was the appointment of ambassadors and the other was the question of the whole promotion system, the Foreign Service Act and the way the Foreign Service was run. Everything was being challenged. There was the idea of wiping the slates clean and starting over, which of course is one of the great unfortunate traits of American administration. You can solve everything by just reorganizing it.
Q: Did you have a deputy for personnel?

PORTER: Yes, it was a chap who had been hired before I got there. He was one of the top guys in the Civil Service commission. There was a certain suspicion in the career Foreign Service of this chap because he was an outsider and he did not have any of the traditions of the Foreign Service or understanding of what life was like overseas. His name was Rosen. Finally, just as an aside, Rosen left and then Earl Saunders took over for a little while, and then Harvey Wellman, who had been his deputy, took over.

Congress was very anxious to take another look at the Foreign Service Act. Wayne Hayes was this inimitable congressman from southern Ohio ran the House administration committee. How did he get his hooks on the State Department?

Q: He was chairman of the House foreign affairs subcommittee, the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee. He was also the chairman of the House Administration Committee, everyone owed him something, he gave out parking spaces and the like. He controlled FBO [Federal Buildings Operation].

PORTER: He got a lot of his own people in FBI after he got rid of the incumbent he made sure that whoever got that job was totally amenable. He and Bill Crockett and others had the idea that we should really eliminate the Civil Service in the State Department and the affairs career service should be enlarged to include the senior officers of the State Department. In other words no more Civil Service except in the specialized jobs, communications and the like. The Foreign Service people would come back to Washington to operate in Washington as well. I was of two minds on that. There was the Hayes bill. It was a lot better than some of the other alternatives that were being suggested at the time to amend the Foreign Service Act, but it also, I think, would have enlarged the Service to a point where it would have been more vulnerable. Most Foreign Service officers did not join the Foreign Service to spend half or more of their time in Washington, which would have been the ultimate result. In any case we developed a legislative package; it really died a-borning. It received a lot of opposition on the Hill, and Wayne Hayes, who sponsored it vigorously, suddenly decided he did not want to have his name put on something that perhaps would not be approved. So fortunately at that point we were able to preserve the Foreign Service Act pretty much as it was and it was only several years later that legislation was finally passed into its current form.

Ambassadorial appointments were another matter. Of course that is a perennial problem in any administration. The White House grilled me before I got the job. They asked me about twenty or thirty career Foreign Service officers, what I thought of them. They gave me the names and I was supposed to respond what I thought of them and what they ought to be doing. This was done by the chap who ran appointments for Jack Kennedy, who later became our ambassador in Chile [Ralph A. Dungan]. He was an interesting fellow, a political science professor, who ultimately went back to teaching.

Q: He had a lot a strong opinions.
PORTER: Very, he had sort of a basic antagonism to the career Foreign Service. He met somebody somewhere along the line he had not liked. He was not bad, he was fair, by his lights he was fair and he was a bright guy.

Q: He approved both of us [for ambassadorial appointments] which proves he was bright. [laughter]

PORTER: It is interesting that I passed that test; my evaluation of people seemed to be close enough to his so that they could trust me. But in actual fact, we weren't in the mainstream of jobs. I, of course would keep pushing people for jobs, and we did as well in that administration and perhaps better than in others like the Reagan administration. The non-career ambassadors were of a rather high quality, but sometimes they weren't. Fortunately at that point we still had some of the non-career giants around like David Bruce and others who tilted the balance.

Q: We all knew that most of the non-career people were pretty good, with occasionally having horrible ones - usually they are the ones who are untouchable politically.

PORTER: The Kennedy administration really did not last that long and I can't really give much of an evaluation of it. Most of my time was with Johnson, whom of course I had gotten to know better because of my experience with him as vice president. On trips with Johnson it was clear that he was in one of the most frustrating periods of his life; he really was not in the mainstream as vice president and Bobby Kennedy was showing his active dislike in every way he could. The President, I think, was very good with Johnson, but he really was not being cut into anything. While we were on that particular trip one of his mainstays in Capitol Hill, Bobby Baker, whom he had raised and brought into power in the Senate, had his comeuppance. The scandal that developed skirted LBJ, but it really did disturb him a great deal. I don't think he was involved, but the fact that this was his protégé did not help. That all came out when we were on the Scandinavian trip, so I watched his immediate reaction to the Baker scandal, and it was a grim period for him. His actions on that trip reflected his general unhappiness with his lot in life.

Q: Did you become his regular escort officer then or did he take others with him?

PORTER: Just twice. Of course we were nearing the point when he took over as president. At that point everything changed, I was not involved. As vice president I had a relatively small crew, we were still operating where we could do it in one plane. Now I guess they use six.

Q: You have the advance party, the press plane.

PORTER: You have one to carry the limousine. Of course we did not take our limousine at that point, we just used presidential limousines in Scandinavia, and then in one of the other trips to Holland and Belgium. LBJ, at that moment in time, you could almost be sure anything that you would put on the schedule which you would think normally he
would be very happy to do, he would resist and question and often change. So it was just a constant effort to keep things going. He would cancel at the last minute, emotionally, I presume. These trips were not easy for an escort officer then, you really had to do everything, from writing his speeches or being sure they were written, to arranging all the current plans and all the advance plans, putting it all together. It was a hell of a job; I got about two hours sleep a night on the whole trip.

Well I, of course, suddenly had to face the assassination. The State Department had to do an awful lot about what went on. The protocol chief at that point was Angier Biddle Duke, and he was very good. He and I worked on it together. We had to set up almost everything, all the planning for the incoming guests, it was a major effort. I had only been there five or six months. Then, of course, we entered an entirely new period when things settled down a bit and that was when Katzenbach showed up as Under Secretary. Rusk stayed on, which was a blessing. There were still undercurrents of McCarthyism in Washington and there was one particular case, a chap named Otepka, who had been a senior security guy in the Department. He had been eased out - not by me - but by my predecessor, as well he should have been. He probably should have been fired for cause because he was a constant source of leaks to a chap named Jay Sourwine who was Senator Eastland's man on the Judiciary Committee. Sourwine just kept up a running anti-Communist crusade which led down all sorts of blind allies. But it was the way he made his living. I have a lot of gratitude for Dean Rusk since I was the one who - Otepka was asking for reinstatement in the Department and it would have been up to me to make that decision - so I was getting all sorts of pressure from Sourwine, which turned into innuendo, totally unfounded. Finally it got to the point where I either was going to have to take it to court or challenge it in some way. I had plenty of Senatorial friends and had no difficulty in getting their support but fortunately I went to Dean Rusk and said, "I would appreciate it if you would talk to Senator Eastland about this and get it settled. It is taking a lot of my time and ruining my reputation to a degree and is totally false." Dean called Eastland and I never heard any more from Sourwine, which I thought was a nice deft touch on Dean Rusk's part.

Q: *Eastland was not an easy guy to handle.*

PORTER: Not at all. I don't know how Dean handled it, but he did. Those were the days when there still was a lot of character assassination around town Dean himself had a few thrown at him.

In terms of what was happening in administration in State was that we really made the Senior Seminar work. There was a question of whether it was need or should be funded. I made an effort to be sure it was, and I think it has been a great success.

A rather major effort, with Bill Crockett largely behind it, although somebody must have suggested it to him, was to get rid of the inspection corps as being sort of an institution whereby the FSO whitewashed itself. The decision was almost made, and I discovered this and put up a major fight, actually I discovered it because Norwood Hazelton, who had called me and told me about it, I was not aware of it. We set up a major fight to save
the inspection corps, which was, I think, a worthwhile endeavor. Of course it now has an even broader mandate in terms of reference than it had then.

_Q: Now, of course it has an outside inspector general, a bit different._

PORTER: Most of the inspectors are still drawn from the service, as I think they should be.

_Q: Bill Crockett was kind of a fascinating guy, don't you think? He had an idea a minute and one out of five was magnificent._

PORTER: If I had major criticism it would be that he just spewed these things out and some of them were very first rate and some were really ill-considered. He hired two or three outside consultants who were, I would call, brash management types who would tend to make sweeping judgments about how the Foreign Service should be run; they did not know a thing about it, they had never been overseas, or really know what the mission of the Foreign Service was. It was sort of a constant bit of byplay to keep them under control and from doing silly things. If you could get to Bill he would usually see reason, but sometimes there were rash...

_Q: I think his intentions were always good._

PORTER: No question about that.

_Q: He did not get credit for the good things he did because of the silly things that he proposed._

PORTER: He was an intensively intelligent and hard-working man. His judgments were, of course, based on a great lack of understanding of the Foreign Service.

_Q: He had served as an administrative officer in a big post, namely Rome. Of course that was his overseas experience._

PORTER: He was in Lebanon as an administrative officer for the AID mission early on. There was something in between. He was as good as some of his successors, but I did not work directly with any of them so I can't comment.

_Q: Well, sometime in 1965 you got liberated from this world of woe. Was that something you engineered?_  

PORTER: I was ready to leave.

_Q: Probably the day after you arrived._
PORTER: I had tried to staff the place with people whom I thought would give it a good Foreign Service input so that we would not have any problems, but most of those people did not last or did not work out too well for some reason. We did get Rosen transferred to Athens as administrative officer and sort of fitted into the Foreign Service and got Personnel under Earl Sohm who was good. We went through a big budget expansion then. That was when we filled up the 8th floor, I do consider that one of my accomplishments. Ken Conger deserves all the credit for everything that is in the 8th floor, but I was able to convince to the infamous John Rooney and Wayne Hayes - in fact John was a friend, but showed it in peculiar ways. He put the money in to redo the 8th floor and that is all it took and then Ken Conger began filling it with all those priceless things. It has been a great success.

Q: He has been blackmailing every rich man in the country.

PORTER: More power to him.

Q: Then we move on.

PORTER: I was offered two or three ambassadorial posts and I really don't know why I decided to pick Lebanon. It seemed to be a particularly interesting part of the world and one that I had gotten more and more interested in after my war college experience, I had done a lot of reading and studying, but I had never served in the Middle East before. Of course I wasn't one of those 'accursed' Arabists who get some much venom and vile in the American press. But I did enjoy that experience. It was a period when Lebanon was on the slippery slope down, and it was so sad to be there and to experience it all, and to try to put your finger, and then your fist, in the dike - knowing all the time that somehow or other course of events in the Middle East and the whole political life of that part of the world was bringing Lebanon to its knees. There was not much we could do about it. Once the Palestinians got into Lebanon, right after the creation of Israel, it was a cancer that was gnawing at the basis of what was a very fragile political structure in any case. And of course that finally blew it open.

Q: Had the Christian armies started making trouble by that time?

PORTER: That was later. Of course within any of the fourteen religious groups that existed or coexisted in Lebanon at that point, there was always friction, and the clan was probably even more significant than the religious entity. And there were usually several clans - I use the term loosely - vying for ascendancy within a religious group. The family comes first, the clan comes second and the religious affiliation third, and somewhere way below that is Lebanese nationality, or nation-state feeling. Of course the Islamic side in Lebanon really disliked the Palestinians - there is really a strong dislike among the Muslims for them in that part of the world - but they had to show solidarity when the chips were down, when there was nothing else a God-fearing Muslim could do. So this tended to constantly be a major centrifugal force and pulling the religious balance apart.
Of course one can write a book about that, and many have. I think I could summarize it best by saying that the real guillotine blow to Lebanon came in 1969 - this is not publicized too much - by the signing of the Cairo Agreement. The Cairo Agreement wasn't even approved by the Lebanese president or the political structure, but it was negotiated by the commanding general, Bustani, of the Lebanese forces. He signed with Nasser and what it did in effect was to get the Lebanese security forces out of the Lebanese camps and allowed the Palestinians to operate within the areas where they lived with autonomy, as almost a state within a state. Well, once the Sureté left the camps, that was the end of it. Immediately the Lebanese lost control and the Palestinians, who were about twelve percent of the population, maybe even more, quickly got armed, and they lived a separate life of their own within the Lebanese state.

Q: Of course the Israelis felt they had to move in.

PORTER: That is what of course happened. Long before that there was a major civil war.

Q: You were there for the 1967 War?

PORTER: Yes, I was there from 1965 to 1970 and up until the Cairo Agreement it looked to me like they might be able to hold together for a while longer, but the pressures that led to that agreement would have led to something comparable within the next year or two. The Christians, of course, bitterly resisted any change at all in the structure which allowed them to have a majority in what was going on in Lebanon when they were no longer the demographic majority. That changed very dramatically. You had these poor little Shi’a farmers up in the hillside. I don't know how they survived. They grew a little tobacco and having ten or twelve kids, whereas the rich Christians were having one or two kids. The rich Sunnis were having two or three kids. The Palestinians were also having an effect on this. The Lebanese Muslims were reluctant allies, they did not like them but when the chips were down they had to support them, or at least not resist them and let them have their own way. So gradually this Palestinian cancer grew and grew and eventually destroyed the state. Whether or not this state could have endured if there had not been an Israel or perhaps if there had been no Palestinian exodus from Israel, is somewhat moot. It probably would have endured because it was doing what a state has to do, and that was providing a lot of prosperity to a lot of people and being a pleasant place to live. This was part of the reason for its prosperity, because all the oil money was going in, in one way or another. The Lebanese knew how to use it, how to bank it.

Q: This is December 3, 1990. When we left two weeks ago you had pretty well gone over the political situation in Lebanon and the influence of the various elements and the sad fall which you attributed very much to the influx of the Palestine refugees. Would you like to go on from there and talk about the types of problems the embassy faced?

PORTER: Of course Lebanon with its Christian-Muslim balance, balancing act, had a long history, going back to the crusades, of association with the West. Most Americans forget just how dominant the relationship in all the Arab world, historical and current,
with the West has been. In Lebanon that was even uniquely so, because over the centuries the Lebanese Christians had felt that they had particularly been the wards of the Europeans, primarily the French, and French culture largely dominated the Christian world of Lebanon until the creation the American University of Beirut and all of the secondary schools which went with it, which was accomplished largely by American missionaries from many of the Ivy-league universities, Princeton being the dominant one. So by the time I got there there was sort of a dichotomy between French-American cultural influences, for by that time a large body of alumni had come out of the American University and the French influence, which was perpetuated not only by very active French government cultural activities but of course by schools and language courses which the French continued. The Christians in Lebanon manipulated this dichotomy between the French and American influence; they were convinced that by playing one side against the other somehow they could achieve special influence, financial rewards, or other rewards. Of course the uncertain world of the Lebanese Christians always made them look outward, keeping a foot in the outside world. They were, of course, great emigrants, they were scattered all over the world. And although they assimilated well wherever the emigrated, they were always loyal to the family and the clan in Lebanon. Of course one of the aspects of Lebanese prosperity was the constant remittances sent back by wealthy Lebanese who seemed to do extremely well in business, banking and commerce all over the world. Lebanese were always very proud of their prowess in making money and it even shows today when so many had to leave Lebanon, just how much money they did have. It has been invested in the outside world and continued to make money for them.

This French-U.S. rivalry, enhanced by the feeling of the Lebanese that they could play on it to benefit themselves, created a lot of amusing and interesting situations in Lebanon. Every once and a while it became necessary for me to talk to the French ambassador to get things cooled off. The French government loved to play it too; they really did want dominance, in the sense of cultural dominance, in Christian Lebanon. Most Lebanese liked that; they remembered how the French had saved them in the past by force of arms, particularly in the middle of the last century when the Druze had been killing Lebanese in wholesale fashion and the French had sent in an army and reversed the fortunes of the Christians.

Our embassy in Lebanon was a regional embassy in many ways, even when I got there and the U.S. was represented in most Arab countries. We still were the regional center in terms of commercial and cultural activities. We had several regional officers who moved around the Gulf and in the smaller Arab countries performing commercial and cultural activities. After the 1967 war, when most Arab countries broke relations with America we, of course, assumed a much larger role. The embassy and intelligence activities were substantially run from the Beirut embassy. At that point we had several hundred American employees who were watching much of the Arab world. Among other countries we did not then have representation in were Syria, Egypt and Iraq and some of the peripheral countries like Sudan and Yemen.
It was an extremely busy embassy in the late 60's. Beirut stayed a pleasant place to live until 1970 when the Palestinians really asserted themselves as a state within a state and got away with it. From that point on, one hardly slept a night without hearing shooting somewhere in Beirut. I left in 1970 and even as I left things were so uncertain it took a battalion of loyal troops to get me to the airport and get me out. There was a lot of anti-American sentiment that was trying to assert itself and they feared an outburst of anti-Americanism at that airport as I left. I think that personally I gained a lot of respect from all sides in Lebanon because I tried to have a balanced position between the various religious groups and sects. It was interesting that the Sunni prime minister sent me a letter of regret after I left about the fact that the airport was almost under siege when I departed. He said, "If I had only known that I would have come down and stood with you as you departed." That was a nice vote of confidence. I think it was a surprise to the Lebanese, this spontaneous thing. At that point the street were controlled by Nasserist gangs. Nasser was the hero of the Arab world and the Shia were still very much behind the scene, even though by that time they were in the majority demographically. They were a somewhat despised so-called minority still run by old, outmoded clan leaders, none of whom today has any influence whatsoever. At that point the mullahs were very much not in the leadership role. The role of the old boys was really worthless as political leaders but they still held dominance for traditional reason.

It really was impossible in the Middle East, in the broad sense, and in Lebanon in the narrow sense, to help either side, either the Christian or the Muslims; they were both so incapable of compromise, particularly the Christians. Their inability to act in concert since each sect was full of jealousies and rivalries for leadership, particularly the Maronites. One found it almost impossible to help the Lebanese to find a rational political structure. There were a lot of Lebanese Christians who were aware of this but just were unable to do anything about it. So in many ways the Christians have sowed the seeds of their own destruction in Lebanon, which finally became particularly evident in the last few months when the Christians were fighting each other with substantial armies while the rest of Muslim Lebanon stood back to wait for them to kill each other off.

The Syrians were always very active in Lebanon. They never recognized the independence of Lebanon as a state; today they seem to be increasingly successful in their long-term objective in incorporating Lebanon. Perhaps not as part of Greater Syria, but as a satellite of Syria.

Q: One gets the impression from perhaps fiction that one reads that in that period the U.S.-Lebanese relationship was carried on to a great extent by the CIA.

PORTER: I think that in the early days that might have been true. I think when I was there it was not so. I always had close relationships with the intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA. I don't think that DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] really had much influence in the country. I decided very quickly that I did not want that to happen, that there be a problem with the intelligence agencies. I think we succeeded in working together closely, at least in general, and knew in general what they were doing. I did not
need to or want to know specifics. It seems to me that it worked out. The CIA worked very closely with me once they got to know me. We did develop the best penetration that one has ever had in the Palestinian movement and in the leadership structure in the Middle East at that time. We really knew what was going on. Tragically that was lost and finally almost totally lost when the embassy was bombed several years after I left. Most of the CIA talent that we had in the Middle East was caught in the bombing and killed. They were some of the most capable people I had known as young officers.

In the early days, long before I got there in the 1950s, the Middle East was just a great playing field for the intelligence agencies; it was too easy and they had a lot of fun and enjoyed it. There was no question about the fact that several of the Western intelligence agencies were extremely well represented among the political leadership, not just the Americans. Overall the troubles in the Middle East hung the Israeli problem and the identification of the U.S. with Israel. I tried several times to get a dialogue started between the Lebanese and the Israelis. The Lebanese were always pretty afraid to do it. The Christians had their own subterranean contacts with Israel which had developed in the 1958 fighting, or revolution, or whatever you want to call it. It came out clearly when Israel was the principal ally of the Lebanese government (read Christians) in the heavy fighting that occurred in the early and mid-70s during the Civil War, which was first with the Palestinians and then from time to time with the other Christians and with certain Muslim militia. This was the kiss of death for American influence in Lebanon. Once we got tarred with the brush of being the defenders of Israel, it was almost impossible for political leaders in Lebanon, dearly as they might want to, to openly associate themselves with American interests or American presence. That was even more true in the rest of the Arab world. But in Lebanon even the Christians had to take a stance of anti-Americanism as affected the Arab-Israeli problem.

The embassy was still quite active and quite effective when I left in 1970, but it was also manifestly clear to me at that point that Lebanon was on the slippery slope and there was not much we could do about it; that it would indeed pretty much dissolve in fighting and bloodshed. That is pretty much what happened.

I had several differences of policy view with the Department on occasion when I was there. One of the unpopular suggestions I made to the Department was that we would never really have peace in the Middle East until we get the Russians to join with us in making or establishing or enforcing the peace. I think that was true. Now things have changed so dramatically that the whole nature of the Soviet-American equation in the Middle East has changed. But certainly at that point it was clear to me that the Soviets could have effectively destroyed any efforts we made for peace. They had that much influence in the Middle East. It was not very hard to do in any case since the Israelis were manifestly not going to participate in any international conference where the Russians were present.

In the middle of my tour in Lebanon the '67 war occurred, and that resulted in a sudden and tremendous outburst of anti-Americanism. I had to make the tough decision to
evacuate almost all the dependents and all but the most essential Americans in the embassy and to urge other Americans to leave. Gradually Americans began to filter back in towards the fall, the war was in June. I had to make a decision whether or not I could go back or would ask the Department to assign me somewhere else. I had to leave Lebanon; there was a great desire on the part of Lebanon not to break relations with the U.S. but they had to show solidarity with the Arab world, which almost universally broke relations. I finally suggested to the Lebanese, and it worked out very well, that instead of breaking relations, that we follow a technique of recalling ambassadors. They recalled their ambassador first and therefore I had to be recalled, but we did not break relations as a result. We were able to keep a fairly good skeleton force of about 50-60 Americans in the embassy. My family had already gone out earlier with the general exodus of Americans from Beirut, and a few days later I went out on this recall of ambassadors ploy. I spent the summer in Washington doing my best to convince the Department that this was the great time for peace in the Middle East. The Israeli sensational victory in the '67 war and had there been a little show of magnanimity I think the Arab world would have fallen over itself suing for peace. If the Israelis had, for instance, voluntarily pulled back from the Sinai, the Canal and from all or most of the other occupied territories in exchange for peace, I think that at that point it would have been very easy to do. But it was simply impossible for any Israeli politician to make that judgement and the American government did not even ask the Israeli government to do it. Bill Rogers, Secretary of State at that point, came as close as anybody could with the Rogers Plan - that was latter in 1969. That was about the only effort that was made by the U.S. Government in the decade of the 1960s to carry peace efforts forward.

I think it was a very narrow window when Israel after its magnificent victory really could have gotten the Arabs to accept the existence of the state of Israel in a reasonable territorial framework in exchange for giving back territory. That has never been done and now it won't be short of a very drastic change in the circumstances and politics.

I had a visit from an envoy from the Lebanese president in late August to talk about the possibility of restoring full relations. I had five kids that had to go to school at that point and I sent word back to the president that if we were going to resume relations we had better pick some time in early September so I could get back and get my kids into the American Community School, which was a great institution in Beirut. It closed down during the summer while the '67 war was on. The Americans were coming back and there was a great American financial business community in Beirut that depended on that school, which took ARAMCO kids and from around the Arab world; this was before the big buildup of Americans in Saudi Arabia and schools for their children there - then there were none.

The president picked right up on that saying "we can't have the kids uneducated" and so we went back in early September. It may be unique in the annual of diplomacy that the children of the ambassador determined the date of renewal of diplomatic relations. I think that is about enough on Lebanon.
PORTER: It is interesting to know the machinery of movement. Harking back to the Lebanese firm belief that their destinies were all ordained by the Western great powers, the Lebanese presidential election was coming up. I had one Lebanese president, Charles Helou; he had just been inaugurated just before I got there. The elections were coming up and the Lebanese press was rife with the usual rumors that the Americans were buying the election, or only occasionally that the French were buying the election. The French handled the press too well for that to happen often; it was the Americans who were buying the election. This was a wonderful opportunity for the anti-Americans, particularly the Nasserist and Communist press. Beirut had about 60 newspapers, 55 at least existed to be the mouthpiece of whoever would buy them at the moment. There were a lot of people who did not like America who were buying those papers. So, I set out to do my best to assure that the U.S. would not interfere in that election, it would not take sides, or give help financially or give any type of endorsement in any manner. I thought it was particularly important that I leave just before the election so that there could be no question; it would enhance our role of hands off.

PORTER: Actually the new president who was elected was a good friend of mine. If I had had a chance to pick one he would not have been the one I would have picked, but c'est la vie. It turned out that he was not very good. Every time I would have lunch or be seen with a presidential candidate, all of whom were old friends of mine at that point, the press would pick it up and run with it, that this was a visible endorsement of X, Y or Z. I asked the Department to get me out on that particular date, but it was unfortunately delayed a little so that the election occurred just before I left so it was incumbent on me to make at least one call on the new president. He wanted to see me before he saw any other ambassador. He wanted to make damned sure that he had been endorsed by the Americans. His name was Franjieh. In the process many old friends did get annoyed at me because they did want me to endorse their particular candidate. Camille Chamoun who had been the president and evicted in 1958 when the country almost went through a catastrophe and the Marines landed to preserve law and order, was very anxious to be reelected. Of course it was, a) an impossibility and b) it would have set the country into another tailspin. Among others was Charles Malik, who was of course well-known at this stage and who always was at prayer breakfasts at the White House. I am told that Charles Malik went around later saying that he was responsible for getting me kicked out of Lebanon, simply because I had not endorsed his candidacy for the presidency. It was rather amusing, hardly broke my spirit. So that created the timing of my departure; the Department would have liked me to stay on for awhile, they had not planned on a successor, but going on six years was a long time. It did lead some credence to the story that the Americans were indulging themselves too much in interference in Lebanese affairs. While I was there the French had at least three ambassadors, so did the Brits.
Well, where to go? At that point there was not much of a choice. There weren't any Middle East posts, the new administration had really almost filled the other positions, this being in September. I had good contacts with Richard Nixon. As a matter of fact he had spent almost four days with me in Lebanon when he was out in political ostracism. During that period when he was in New York as a lawyer. He spent four days with me learning about Lebanon and the Middle East, pumping me and others about the Middle East, which certainly does reinforce my earlier views that he was a very hard working man and wanting to know what was going on.

Q: Very interested in foreign affairs.

PORTER: After that he had written me a fine letter, which amusing enough had been burned by my new secretary in 1967 when the embassy was under siege at the time of the '67 war, when all of our records were burned and we came within an ace of being invaded by an angry mob, but fortunately we weren't. You know, that is almost worth a story in itself. There was a tremendously angry mob and nobody but a handful of policemen guarding the embassy. At that time there were a couple of thousand in the mob. The army had been called.

Q: This was during the war?

PORTER: This was during the week of the '67 war, I think it was probably the second day of the war. We were being guarded by a very small, elite, police unit which had a fine cadre of policemen, and there were two jeep loads of them - and that was it. The Marines, of whom we had eight, said they wanted to 'lock and load' their weapons. It did look like we were going to be overrun. I had to make a very quick decision and said, "No" and see what the police could do and of course the troops were on their way. What really saved us was that the lieutenant of the police group was at the front door, a huge glass door, there was none of the security that embassies now have, and somebody tried to rush him. He literally picked up the man and threw him against the wall and killed him on the spot. The crowd drew back. By the time they reformed the troops arrived and saved the situation.

Q: I hope you were able to decorate the policeman.

PORTER: I tried very hard, but our penurious government would not do a thing and about all I could do was to scrape together a little from our intelligence agencies to see that at least he got a few gifts. It did occur to me that he really did not want a medal, that might have been making him a target. Tragically later on he was killed. Not for defending American interests but just defending his country. That is one of the things that has disturbed me about the Foreign Service - that it is unable to respond to something like that. I tried to get emergency funds set up when I was Assistant Secretary to do this sort of thing, but we just were not able to do it. One of the advantages of rich, political ambassadors is that they can do it out of their own pocket on some occasions. Sometimes we can make a little emergency fund in the embassy, but strictly, I suppose illegal, one would sell old tires, old batteries and one thing or another and one could develop a little
fund. One could at least send flowers to the funeral of a local employee or in this case I think I used the fund to give the lieutenant a case of whisky. But that was about all you could do. Even that was not really legal although I think everybody did it.

Q: We are getting back to your assignment which turned out to be Vienna.

PORTER: There were several opportunities but they involved going home and sweating it out. Nobody could assure me, Butz Macomber was then the head of administration and an old friend of mine, but he could not really assure me of what might happen. Then the Vienna thing popped up. This was the permanent representative to the International Atomic Agency in Vienna. It was a job that I knew quite well during the beginning of the Agency when I was in the embassy in Vienna. I had gotten to know some of the basic problems of the Agency and some of the principal characters in the States who were responsible for it.

Q: December 3, 1990. We were just getting to Vienna, do you want to pick up there? Did you go directly there from Beirut?

PORTER: Actually yes. We were so pleased at that point - things had heated up so much in Beirut and we had heard a lot of gunfire even then. I was rather anxious to get the kids in a more pacific environment for a while. The time was perfect, schools started in September and that is when we got to Vienna. For Mrs. Porter and myself, this was a very familiar environment and a school we knew very well. As a matter of fact I had raised the money to build the school in Vienna and so it was fun to come back a decade or so later to take advantage of it. Our eldest had been in the first graduating class in Vienna. The school itself had become quite an asset to Vienna as the Austrians tried to move UN agencies to Vienna. You remember, this was Kriesky's great dream to make this the second Geneva or New York. At that point he felt this was a bulwark from expansion from any side against an largely undefended Austria. We flew directly - that was the incident that a battalion of troops had to get us down to the airport.

I got there just in time for the first annual general assembly meeting of the Agency. I had to go back and be vetted by the man who was the ambassador to the IEA but who was resident in the United States but only came over for the big meeting.

Q: Was he primarily a technical man?

PORTER: It was Keith Glennan, he had just been appointed and he did not even know anything about Vienna and get his agreement to in effect being his alter ego on the scene in Vienna as he handled it in Washington. Glennan was a fascinating man whom I enjoyed working for. His history goes from everything from being a Hollywood executive to being a college president to having been the first head of NASA, he was the man who started us going to the moon. He was appointed by Eisenhower. He had a variety of experiences and knowing people. He had also been a member of the Atomic Energy Commission - very knowledgeable in this field. He was devoted to the cause of the IEA,
the effort to keep nuclear from proliferating. He was imaginative, and innovator. His health was not good. During the five plus years we stayed in this job, he was replaced at the end of the third year by a gentleman named Gerald Tape, who had also been a member of the AEC, a college administrator, a physicist of renown. So I was very fortunate to have these two knowledgeable and interesting colleagues while I was in Vienna.

My job was to learn as much as I could about nuclear power and energy economics. Fortunately I already knew a lot about it. I had been a devotee of nuclear power since the war and had studied a lot about it. As somebody who had started out to be a chemist I found it a little easier to understand the intricacies of nuclear power. I believed then and still believe today that if we are ever to have an energy policy that makes any sense it will be based on nuclear power. We will have to get over a lot of hangups before we can do that.

We settled back into Vienna very easily. The Viennese politicians and leaders whom we had known when they were younger were mostly retired or dead. But Kriesky, at that point, was the really dominating figure. We had all known Kriesky from the beginning. I actually did not have a great deal to do with the Austrian government except as a member of the IAEA, but I continued to have close relations with a lot of Austrians friends while we were there.

The job really involved a lot of diplomacy. The U.S. was the founder and the recognized leader of the International Atomic Agency and we were relied on by the staff of the agency as well as its director general, a very competent Swedish physicist, to really set the tone of the agency and set its agenda. One had all the problem that had occurred in all UN agencies of the period, the feeling that if the U.S. was going to do the leading it ought to do most of the funding, and since we were dealing with the questions of nuclear weaponry the Soviets were very much involved. The Soviets had not for a long time understood the importance to them of non-proliferation of nuclear weaponry. The Chinese for a long period before they saw the light and decided that it might not be a good idea to have a few little bombs scattered about the world. The Soviets were not so clear either in their own mind. Finally they began to understand just how unsettling and destabilizing nuclear weapons would be, and they suddenly became rather stalwart allies of the U.S. in this endeavor. The non-proliferation treaty was legal instrument which the agency enforced. During a period of very sour U.S. - Soviet relations somehow at the IAEA in Austria we found common ground and a certain amount of camaraderie. We carefully consulted with the Soviets in advance about new policy initiatives. We almost always got their sanction and overt support for initiatives which we were working out. The Soviet Ambassador to the IAEA was one of the old-line Soviets named Markatiev [?] who had a long history of being cantankerous in relationships with the Americans. I found him fascinating, he had grown up in the pre-Revolutionary days in Russia and loved to talk about it. His church had best wine and sacraments on the Moscow River. He would reminisce about life in pre-revolutionary Russia.
Q: What were the mechanics of running the IAEA, was it something like the Security Council with limited votes, or was it something like the General Assembly?

PORTER: It had a director general who executed the decisions. Theoretically there wasn't a superbody such as the Security Council; the Great Powers did not have certain rights reserved to themselves, but in fact it pretty much worked that way. Six or seven powers, all of the nuclear states except for Canada, nuclear states either in a weapons or reactors, those were the states that really led the way and everybody else was hanging around trying to get something out of it. Which is quite understandable. Large nations like India and Pakistan and some of the threshold nuclear states were very often resistant to attempts to get them to indulge in self-denial in nuclear weaponry. This was particularly in states where they were confronting an enemy in close proximity, for example in the subcontinent, India and Pakistan.

Israel was, of course, the real example. Both Israel and India, particularly Israel have the capacity for utilizing nuclear weapons. One of the fights we had for years in Vienna was to keep Israel as a member of the IAEA and there were constant attacks on Israel. The typical kind of attacks one found in New York at the UN and elsewhere. It was even more difficult there because it was an open secret that Israel had nuclear weaponry and was not allowing the inspection of its facilities, not only by the agency, but by the United States, which was contrary to the original promises which were made. So it was quite a diplomatic job each year to keep Israel in the diplomatic fold. At that point the U.S. Congress not clearly understanding the value of the IAEA, with a few exceptions. It was lashing out to the IAEA for 'its unfriendliness to Israel". That has subsided as the role of the IAEA has become more evident to the Hill. But for a long time it was treated as somewhat the step-child by the Congress. There were always members of Congress who understood it, but they were always in what, shall we say, was the small, educated minority.

Q: Did you have to do some of the lobbying of Congress on this, or was this usually handled by Glennan and others?

PORTER: Well, I did a lot. I had to come back each year for the authorization bill and appropriations bill. At that point Congress handled it differently, and it was very helpful in a way. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which was the committee of reference for the IAEA did not have to go to either of the Foreign Affairs committees. When I was confirmed for my job I was confirmed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, not by Foreign Relations. Unfortunately while I was there the Joint Committee was abolished. That was the time the IAEA sort of fell into limbo in Congress. That committee which had the knowledgeable members of Congress on it ..

Q: And the best security of any committee on the Hill.

PORTER: Indeed a good security system. Once that committee was abolished we really lost the thread of communication with Congress for a while.
Q: Who took over when it was abolished?

PORTER: Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs took over. We lost almost all of the expertise on the Hill as regards atomic energy when that happened. Of course it happened primarily because of the basic attacks on atomic energy by domestic opponents to nuclear power. The result was that the international aspects really didn't work, all the staff, for instance of the Atomic Energy Committee, which had a great staff, was just wiped out overnight. They were never picked up by the Foreign Relations people.

That was an interesting transition we had to go through. I think that we did achieve a great deal despite some of these troubles we had with the Hill. No country has developed weaponry, nuclear weaponry, through the use peaceful nuclear power. While it is also true that most countries that want to have such weapons do it by secret and dedicated facilities to the purpose, there is a great inhibiting value to the IAEA. We are seeing it right now on Iraq where the IAEA is inspecting at least the peaceful facilities in Iraq. Quite a bit of value comes out of their presence there. It is awfully difficult for the political leader of a country to go ahead and develop a weapons system when enough is know internationally about his peaceful program to make it pretty clear that somehow or other leaks are going to appear about what else is going on. Pakistan today is a case in point. The fact for years they have been talking about making a bomb and have made some progress towards it. I think that Pakistan would have gone ahead with its bomb and had it ready a long time ago if it had not been for the inhibiting presence of the IAEA and its peaceful nuclear program. It is not easy, in an uncertain world, to say that anything is a final determinant in the outcome of political affairs, but the IAEA has quite clearly paid for itself.

Q: Presumably they have some other more technical aspects? They run the inspection teams. Do they also act as a clearing house for atomic information?

PORTER: Very much so. These are safety matters, to assure safety. Ever since the awful Soviet accident in Chernobyl, the safety rule - this is subsequent to my time - has greatly increased, as it should. The Agency does not itself provide all the technical expertise that needs to be brought to bear on nuclear problems. When there is a nuclear problem the Agency will establish a team of international experts and get them over there quickly. It has now also developed a role of operating the massive relief efforts in the event of any serious accident. This is something new. Fortunately they have never been needed, but they have developed a mechanism to carry it out.

One of the things that has happened since I left Vienna is that other UN agencies have come in, in fact while I was there UNIDO was there, and now the job in Vienna runs the gamut of UN agencies, I had resisted that. I thought my time was needed in the IAEA and the other agencies were so relatively unimportant as regards political objectives that I did not want to get involved. But that has changed now, and the resident ambassador in Vienna is representing the U.S. in several agencies. He has subordinates who specialize in
each agency. His own time is probably less involved in atomic energy matters than mine was.

Q: What did you have for staff there? Did you have some real technicians?

PORTER: Yes we did. It was not a large staff. We drew from both the State Department, I had two political officers who worked with me on what I would call diplomatic initiatives, we would have to break them in and teach them about what they were doing in atomic energy matters. They would usually get a month or two briefing in the United States. The bulk of the staff was technical. We had about six or seven technical people, not all engineers or nuclear physicists, but they all came from the Atomic Energy Commission, which became the nucleus of the Department of Energy when it was created. As the AEC died out and the DOE came in the function continued. Their main job was to get help from the technical people in the States and also to recruit Americans for positions in the Agency. It was very important that American citizens have a substantial presence in the Agency. The Soviets at that point were staffing the Agency with KGB types, unfortunately. They were using it almost as much for an intelligence platform as a nuclear platform. It was easy to tell them all apart, the real nuclear types, who wanted to work closely with our people on peaceful nuclear matters, and the KGB types who were out just mouthing their lines on nuclear matters. I had the feeling that that has been gradually changing, particularly since the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviets have decided that that is something important to them and they had better put in real technical people. Obviously whatever has happened in the last year or so with the KGB would be fascinating, but I am not in a position to know.

Q: Do you have anything to say about the relations of this job or this kind of job with the embassy? You obviously did not have the same kinds of problems that they have in Paris in interfering in the economic side and in one thing and another.

PORTER: I had to walk something of a thin line for a while until it became clear to my Austrian friends that I was not going to get involved in anything internal. I got that sorted out very quickly and we had someone very sympathetic and pleasant human being in John Humes, the American ambassador at that point. He and I just hit it off fine. There were probably little, understandable, bits of friction between individual officers down the line - the perks and prerogatives - who gets the biggest house and so on. But this was almost irrelevant. The admin officer at the embassy had worked for me for years, the general services officer had been with me in Beirut so everything worked out just fine as far as I was concerned. It possibly might have been different if you had not had such a congenial person as John Humes. John was delighted to use me in some things. We needed to get additions on the school and needed to have the Austrian government put in some more money - at that point the school was a great asset to them. They could not put UN agencies in there without providing schools for the kids in English. I went to work with John's blessing to raising more money from the Austrians. I dealt with the Foreign Ministry to build another addition to the school, which was done. No frictions at all, the embassy people were delighted to have me do it, they did not have to do it.
Q: By this time did you still have kids in school?

PORTER: Yes, it was quite something to raise five kids in the Foreign Service.

Q: I found two was plenty.

PORTER: We were lucky, the Vienna school was fine and the Beirut school was superb. It was a tragedy that that great institution is gone now.

Q: Do you want to talk about your decision to retire?

PORTER: When I was assistant secretary for administration, a chap who had been very active on the Joint Committee for Nuclear Energy as a staffer back in the early days after the war, and who was close to several senators as a result, he knew Humphrey, Scoop Jackson among others, a chap named Frank Carter, had been named chief inspector for foreign affairs, or something like that, in the Department. Frank had gone to work for Westinghouse Electric shortly thereafter and got deeply involved in their nuclear program. He stayed in Washington and become the head of their Washington office. Frank had gotten to know me quite well. I was approaching sixty, I was a career minister so I did not have to worry about retiring at age sixty, but I was not amiss to looking around for something that might keep me gainfully employed for longer than age sixty-five and also that I might feather my nest financially a bit. Frank picked me out. Westinghouse wanted an international person in their large Washington office. At that point they were the number one name in nuclear power. What I had learned and the people I had met were obviously important to them. In addition, just a general understanding of trade policy and the state of the world that diplomats get to know was something they wanted to hire. So they hired me as a vice president for international government affairs for their Washington office.

At that point I had to make the decision of whether I would leave the Service or wouldn't I? I decided that was the right time to leave the Service. I probably could have gotten another post or two, but I felt this would be an enjoyable experience and would improve my financial standing. So I really had ten quite interesting years with Westinghouse after my retirement.

During that period I stayed very close to the question of nuclear non-proliferation because Congress became terribly interested in it and our nuclear exports from Westinghouse were so dependent on Congressional approval. As it turned out, during that period the Congress very short-sightedly, I think, passed legislation, which I fought consistently against and for a very long time, which destroyed the dominance of the United States in peaceful nuclear energy. This was the so-called Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which set so many conditions and terms on the export of anything that bore on nuclear power that it finally in effect just made the United States an unreliable supplier since the Congress assumed the right of deciding what could or could not be sent overseas. That is shorthand
for a very complicated piece of legislation. In fact you could not ship anything overseas that a handful of Congressmen or Senators decided to oppose. It was so easy to manipulate public opinion on this subject. So suddenly Westinghouse, which had a monopoly on the export of peaceful nuclear power gradually lost out in every potential market in the world. That was that. This essentially was the reputations that the U.S. Government applied to the agency to make it an unreliable supplier. Now the U.S. industry is essentially drying up. Since we were not making anything in the United States it was depending on nuclear export orders to keep the production line going, but that line has long since dried up. Probably if we go back to nuclear power we will have to buy from the French. The French, of course, are using a Westinghouse reactor. Basically all the reactors in France except their breeder reactor are Westinghouse technology.

Q: In your taking on of this job did you find any great problem shifting from government to private business? Was the period of adjustment difficult or did it work smoothly?

PORTER: It was not easy. Corporate structure is concerned with the "bottom line" and it was not always easy to give advice to say, in effect, this is something that you should not do. Usually if a manager wants to go in and sell something to a country and I would tell him he should not do it for the following reasons, I was the messenger bearing the bad news. It took awhile to establish a relationship where my views were generally accepted. It was always fairly easy for me to make the correct judgment, I knew the areas so well. Things like, should you sell nuclear reactors to Romania? Well, it was just obvious that you should not sell them to Romania, but there were an awful lot of salesmen who wanted to do it.

Q: One of the best reasons was you might not get paid for it.

PORTER: That they could understand. I think that is how I finally convinced them that they might get their payment in Romanian [currency?] and that is all you are going to get out of it.

I found that Westinghouse was a good employer. I enjoyed the people, it was a different milieu, there is no question about it. It is not easy to make that adjustment quickly. It was less bothersome for me because I stayed in Washington, I kept my old contacts in the Government and the diplomatic world. I think gradually I found my niche and they found my niche.

Q: What were you, about one third salesman, one third advisor, and one third lobbyist?

PORTER: That sounds pretty good. I never called myself a lobbyist, I was skirting it. I never filed as a lobbyist, I was just skirting it.

Q: What kind of access did you have to the top management of Westinghouse in Pittsburgh?
PORTER: I was with top management a lot. I could be heard, not always successfully. By and large the top management was easier than middle management.

Q: They probably had a longer view, more understanding. Do you want to say anything about your eventually second retirement?

PORTER: No.

Q: You said a while back that you wanted to talk about the Kennedy-Khrushchev visit - we are going back to 1961-62 in Vienna.

PORTER: That was intriguing. I was number three man in the embassy at that point as economic counselor. Both the Ambassador, Doc Matthews and the Minister, David Weinhouse, were away. They were each taking a month's vacation and I was chargé, my first chargé experience. Two days after they both left town I got a top secret message telling me that Kennedy and Khrushchev were planning a meeting in Vienna and I had better start making the arrangements. It was a fascinating period for a young officer. Fortunately I had had a lot of administrative background, I would have probably been the person to do it anyway if everyone had been there. But to do it on my own was fun. It really went well. Fortunately I knew all the important Austrians then. My German was now good enough so I could converse without the translators. We did one hell of a job in putting together the visit under very difficult circumstances. It was not easy to work with the Russians then. Then they were trying to seize every initiative they could to come first, to get to places first, to get their limousine before ours, that sort of thing. That seemed to be as much their objective as developing a harmonious meeting ground. In any case the Austrians were all on our side and it worked out very nicely. [name of Austrian? Oskar Palutka? ] who was my counterpart, I dearly loved the man.

It was a bellwether meeting in many ways. I won't bother with many of the details of how we set it up. In the days before Kennedy arrived, they sent his advance team which was all Irish mafia. They were very suspicious of me. I was just Foreign Service and they did not trust the Foreign Service. Everything had been done, it was all tied together beautiful, but they came on the scene and just had to dispute all the arrangements that had been made, but we had to go through all the agony and reasoning all over again.

Q: The Security boys were all over the place I suppose?

PORTER: Fortunately some of them had come in much earlier and they had been part of the team, and I think we had done all of the security pretty well. The others just had to be sure that Kennedy was not going to be in any demeaning position with Khrushchev. It was getting worse and worse; they were starting all over with the Austrians and making everybody mad. I had a very kind station chief working with me then, a fellow named Charlie Kaytek [phonetic] and he and I were good tennis partners together. Charlie saw what was developing, he did not even bother to consult with me. He found that the Mafia really loved their bottle so he proceeded to take them all out on the town so that by the
time they came up two days later, he told them "what are you getting mad at this guy for, he is a great Marine, a hero etc?" By the time they came up for air two days later it was practically time for the meeting. We had pasted everything back together again. So everybody duly arrived.

Jack Kennedy had planted that damned tree in Canada and then he went to Paris where Jackie made her great hit. In planting the tree, or in digging or lifting it or something he had terribly dislocated his back, he was in great agony. Well both Matthews and Wainhouse had come back a couple of days before the meeting, I had kept them informed of what was going on so they would be ready when they got back. They just did not have any awareness of what the problems had been.

Q: And probably not aware of what a modern presidential visit meant.

PORTER: Doc may have, he knew so many prominent people, he had been at Yalta, but not to have them land on him. He had to just move out of his house, lock, stock and barrel. The office setup was put in the top floor of the residence. Of course Jackie and the President had the bedroom. There was very little sleeping room in that residence. Everybody else slept out in a hotel. I had to second guess hotel accommodations, what the pecking order would be. So I put Rusk here and Sorensen there, Schlesinger there. The head of the Irish Mafia, who later became a friend of mine, but was very nasty at that point, did not like what he got. It was very amusing. I did not know anything about the internal White House protocol, who hated whose guts. I put Ted Sorensen rather prominently up near the top, and was told to "get Sorensen out of there, put him down on next floor". It was arranged that all those who trusted each other in the White House were together and those who didn't were not. Then he saw what I had done upstairs. I had put Dean Rusk's secretary, Mrs. Macomber, and the President's secretary in a temporary little office in a sort of sitting room upstairs and the next thing I was told was to get Rusk's secretary out of here, this is a White House place.

Q: She was suspected of being a Republican?

PORTER: Yes, Phyllis had worked for John Foster Dulles too. That was when I did not fight with him, I just did not do it. He never dared mention it again. I don't know what he was trying to do, assert himself or what?

Q: I always found that some of the assistants are much more difficult that the principals.

PORTER: Of course. I think the first thing the President would have said was, "Why isn't Dean Rusk here so I can consult with him?"

Getting back to the President's back problem. The first meeting was Khrushchev meeting Kennedy at the American residence. This was a dinner party and they continued the next day. Perhaps he came for lunch - I don't remember exactly. I was sort of getting everything organized there. The President was upstairs, it was a long flight of stairs, there
was no elevator. Kennedy was just in agony. Suddenly the Khrushchev entourage came in
the driveway. I ran upstairs to get Kennedy and he could hardly move going down the
stairs. I actually had to help him by holding his arm. Nobody else was around. I had been
designated to give him the word of the arrival, which I did. Fortunately Khrushchev did
not see him, I got him down before he arrived. Much as has been written about the
meeting, but I am not sure how much has been mentioned about the agony he had during
the meeting with Khrushchev. Having had back problems myself in the old days I can
deeply sympathize with the terrible pain he had. Maybe the pain had something to do it
when he suddenly realized what he was up against with this tough communist cookie
whom he thought he could manipulate, but he learned fast.

There were a lot of other stories of course. I learned a lot then about Presidential advance
parties which stood me well later when I took LBJ to Hyannisport, I had learned a lot
about his White House and his entourage.

Q: Have you any final words about a Foreign Service career, would you do it again, or
advise your children to do it?

PORTER: It is just such a different world. It would be hard for anyone to have a more
rewarding career than I had, people in my generation had, despite some of the problems. I
am deeply incensed at the way the Service has developed in respect to the team-mate
proposition between husband and wife which was so important in my career, and my wife
feels the same way. Today it is more a question of it is just another job, the wife has here
own job and has nothing to do with what her husband has to do in representing the United
States of America. I am sure that is not true of all women in the Foreign Service, but it
has been established as a norm not as an exception.

Q: A small part of the problem is that it is almost impossible to give the old fashioned
helpmate wife any recognition for it.

PORTER: That is very true. More time and attention should have been given to that, I
guess. She cannot even be put into the efficiency rating. I had a big fight on that one when
Wayne Hayes made me take that out. You remember we had brief period, for about two
years, when we had a confidential part of the efficiency rating, which was called the - I
don't remember. The idea was there would be a confidential evaluation of the potential of
the officer for future development. The rest of the efficiency report was on performance.
A handful of Foreign Service officer did not like it and one of them wrote Wayne Hayes
and said this was undemocratic, that people were not allowed to see what had been
written about them. It really had been a very intriguing piece of paper. In most cases a
Foreign Service officer will be very veiled in his comments about a performance of a
subordinate, understandably so in a small post where they have to live together for two
years. But there might be fundamental flaws in a person's character that would
particularly effect him as he moved into higher levels. I thought that was worthwhile
getting down in the record and we did. It only lasted two years until it was blasted out by
the House, primarily by Wayne Hayes. About the same time we were pressured, mainly from Congress, from having any reference to the wives in efficiency reports.

Q: I remember protesting that one with a cable and I was told that there was only one other ambassador in the Service whom made an objection to it.

This has been a very useful and interesting interview and I want to thank you for it.

End of interview