Background
- Born in Michigan; Raised in Missouri
- University of Missouri; Georgetown University
- US Army
- Entered the Foreign Service in 1957

State Department; Post Management Officer, NEA 1957-1959

Thessaloniki, Greece; Consular Officer 1959-1961
- Environment
- Visa problems
- Macedonia
- Bulgaria
- George Polk
- Military influence

Port Said, Egypt (UAR); Consular Officer 1961-1963
- Environment

Cairo, Egypt (UAR) – Temporary Duty (E and E Plan) 1961
- Nasser’ “Victory” Parade
- UAR breakup
- Suez Canal operations

University of California, Berkeley; Economic Studies 1963-1964

Pretoria, South Africa; Economic Officer 1964-1967
- Nelson Mandela jailed
- Environment
- Apartheid issue
- Bureau of State Security
- Economy
Ethnic communities
Ian Smith
Afrikaners
Military embargo
Relations

State Department, FSI: Turkish language studies 1967-1968

Izmir, Turkey; Political Officer 1968-1971
Environment
Anti-US demonstrations
Leftists
NATO
Drugs problem
US Military
Agriculture
Government
Kurds
Cyprus
Greek junta

Istanbul, Turkey; Consul General 1971-1973
Soviets
Environment
Turkish First Army
US fleet visits

Kabul, Afghanistan; Economic Counselor 1973-1975
USAID Mission
Environment
Soviet influence
Society
US commercial interests
Prince Daoud
Fundamentalism

State Department; Office of Commercial Affairs (EB) 1975-1979
Executive Diplomats Seminar
Foreign Trade and Investment
Policy and Priorities
Saudi development plan
Trade function to Commerce
Dept. of Commerce organization
Foreign Commercial Service
State Department; Personnel Economic officer Counselor 1979-1980
Placement and advancement
Economic training

Athens, Greece; Economic Counselor 1980-1984
“Plus ca change”
Economy
Common Market
Papandreou
Independent policy
Cypriot investment
US assistance programs
Terrorist groups
Greek military
Government
PASOK
Relations

State Department; Board of Examiners 1984-1985
Examination process

Istanbul, Turkey; Consul General 1985-1988
Turgut Ozal
Economy
Environment
Social life
Nevi Shalom Synagogue bombing
Fundamentalism
Elections
US military
Northern Cyprus
Denktash
NATO
Turkish-Greek relations
Jews
Iranians

Retirement 1988

Post Retirement 1988-
Executive Director, Turkish-US Business Council

INTERVIEW
Q: Today is July 7th 1998. This is an interview with William E. Rau on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I’m Charles Stuart Kennedy.

All right. Can we start? When and where were you born, and can you tell me a little bit about your family?

RAU: Yes. I was born outside of Detroit in Highland Park, Michigan, but my family left there when I was only a year old and we moved to St. Louis, Missouri, where I grew up and went to the University of Missouri, married a girl from the university town of Columbia. Let’s see, my father was a baker, and my mother’s been a housewife all along. She’s still alive; my father’s died. In fact, he died in Istanbul. I have one brother in Lexington, Kentucky, or outside of Lexington - Paris, Kentucky. He worked for Shell Oil for a number of years. And that’s about it.

Q: What moved you from Detroit to - where did you go?

RAU: To St. Louis.

Q: St Louis?

RAU: My father. This was during the depression, and he had the possibility of a job.

Q: So basically you grew up in St. Louis.

RAU: Yes.

Q: Can you tell me a little about growing up in St. Louis. This was during what, the ‘30s?

RAU: During the ‘30s. We lived in south St. Louis for quite a while, and then during the war we moved out to the suburbs, to Rock Hill and Webster Groves, that area, suburbs of St. Louis, where I went to high school. I played one year of professional baseball. I was on the high school team that won the state championship, and I thought I had eyes toward being a professional baseball player, so I signed a contract with the Yankees. At that time, they had class D leagues, so I went in a class D league. And after one summer there, I realized that there wasn’t very much further I was going to go, and I saw a lot of people around me who were older and were just bumming around in the minor leagues, so-

Q: What did you play?

RAU: Well, I started out as a first baseman, but then I had trouble hitting the curve balls, and they made me a pitcher. And I did fairly well that one year, but I realized that I didn’t have what it took to go all the way to the top. So I came back to St. Louis, got a job working for Sunnen Products Company, which was in crankshaft grinders and that sort of thing. My mother had worked there. And then some man, the neighbor of my grandfather
- I think he was on the board at the University of Missouri - convinced me that I ought to go and get an education. So I applied for and was accepted by the State University of Missouri. I went there originally on a Baseball scholarship, and I was also an amateur musician and I ended up having my own band in college, etc.

Q: Let’s go back to the high school to begin with. What sort of things interested you other than obviously baseball while you were in high school?

RAU: Girls.

Q: This is the normal upbringing for a good male Foreign Service officer, sports and girls.

RAU: That’s right. I always had an interest, as one of my sons does, in geography. I was interested and curious as to what was going on. I didn’t read the newspapers thoroughly, but I certainly followed what was going on during the war and after, post-war, but it wasn’t really that I started blossoming on this subject until I went to the university. There, as happens in a lot of cases, I had one professor, when I was a sophomore I guess it was (I was taking an arts course basically), who had been either with or assigned to the League of Nations after the First World War, Chesney Hill, and he made an impression on me. He taught a course on foreign relations that I took, and we had some chats after that, and he said, “Why don’t you think about the Foreign Service?” I didn’t know anything about the Foreign Service at that time, and I started looking into it. I went ahead and finished my ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] obligation - I was in an ROTC program there - so when I finished my university work I had two years of army duty in front of me. In the meantime, I had been interested in the Foreign Service and taking the exam, but I didn’t take it before I went in the army. So I did two years of active duty.

Q: Where did you do your active duty?

RAU: Well that’s another interesting story. I was in a forward observer unit. I was going to be a forward observer. This was during the Korean War. And we started getting these letters back from previous classmates who had been there, and the decimation rate among forward observers was very high. So they came around one day in the ROTC unit and said, “We’re looking for six qualified people” - I was in the business school at this time - “who think they might be of more use to Uncle Sam as finance officers than as forward observers. You have to write an essay and explain why you think that.” So I did that, and I was one of the six selected to have my commission in the finance corps. So they sent me to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, outside of Indianapolis, which was the finance center for the army, for training. And while I was there, I developed an eye problem, which turned out to be a retinal detachment. And they did the surgery, fortunately for me, at Camp Atterbury, which was not yet closed, close by, but they had a good ophthalmologist who had been in private practice. And he performed the surgery on my right eye. But then they closed that camp and they aerovaced me to Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio.
Q: In Texas.

RAU: In Texas, near Fort Sam Houston. And when I got out of the hospital down there, after recuperating, I was assigned to a new finance office that they had just opened there - myself and a captain who was in charge of the office - the office served transient personnel, because they had all these people coming back from Korea who were hospitalized down there and had to be paid. So I spent the rest of my active duty down there at the Brooke Army Medical Center.

Then, when I came out, I realized that I was a little bit rusty on the academic side to take the exam. The exam was given in December then. So I applied for and got into, I guess the best way to describe it is a cram course that Georgetown University was running. It was an offshoot of their School of Foreign Service, and one of the people that was running it was Al Zucca, who was an old Foreign Service type later I worked for. Anyway, I took that course from September to December.

Q: What year?

RAU: This was 1955. Of course, in those days, they didn’t have the oral right away, and you didn’t know if you had passed the written. So I had been offered a job as a part-time instructor - I was married at this point - if I would go back and work on a master’s program at the University of Missouri. So I did that. I started back and taught the basic course as an instructor in political science and took my masters degree from there. In the meantime, I was informed that I had passed the written and that I would be offered the oral. And the oral was given, I guess, the following summer in Omaha, Nebraska, which was the closest point to me at the time. So I went there and I took the oral. At that time - I guess they’re back to it now - they told you immediately if you passed or not.

Q: Do you remember any of the questions or how it went?

RAU: Yes. One of the questions I remember very well, because they were asking me what kind of things I was working on in this working for a master’s degree in political science. And I told them I was working on a paper on the US participation in the Korean War and the genesis for it. And they asked me questions about, “Well, how did Harry Truman manage to send troops there? There wasn’t a declaration of war by Congress,” etc. And I went through the whole thing: this was a police action, the UN, etc. etc. They were interested in that subject. There were three examiners on the panel. And basically it was about that. Then they asked me what my interests were outside of history and political science, and I explained to them. And they also asked me a very good question, I thought. They said, “What are you going to do if you don’t pass the exam and you’re not accepted by the Foreign Service?” I said, “Well, I’ll probably go into academia. I’ll probably go on and get my Ph.D. and go into teaching someplace.” My wife was then a librarian at Stephens College, part time. So they told me I’d passed the orals (they told you immediately then), and I remember one of the examiners, when he asked me what my
hobbies were, and I said, well, I was a jazz musician and I had my own band in college, etc. And he said, “What did you play?” I said I played the reeds - saxophone, clarinet. And he said to me, after he told me that I’d had passed the exam, he said, “Now when you go overseas, you can take that clarinet with you, but leave that saxophone at home.” I thought how narrow this man was. It turned out he was from the Department of Commerce. He was one of the examiners on the panel, and he apparently thought that was something you don’t do.

Anyway, so then I was offered an appointment. I guess it was June or July of that year. This was ‘55 - no, summer of 57. I was finishing up this master’s degree and a teaching contract, and I said, “Well, I can’t come before August because I have this commitment.” So they deferred it until August, and I came into the class in August of ‘57, the basic officers’ course.

Q: In this basic officer’s course, can you give a feel for what the basic group you came in with was like and your training at that point?

RAU: Yes, I can tell you a little about that because we had two ladies in the course, which was at that time unusual. One was Phyllis Elliott, who later became Phyllis Oakley, and Phyllis is still, I would say, a good friend. And the other was Anne Roper Berry. Ann worked for me in Athens later on, but they were both in that time when women had to resign if they got married. And they both did and then came back in when they were offered appointments, and the last I heard of Anne, she was minister down in South Africa, in the Economic Section. She’d been in London and Paris, etc., and done very well. Her husband, Max Berry, was a Foreign Service officer. And then we had people like Bill Luers, who was in the class. He was ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Last I heard, he was the head of the Metropolitan Museum in New York. Peter Sebastian was another one in the class. He was the oldest member. That was at a time when you couldn’t be over 32, I guess. He was right on the edge of that. And let’s see, who else?

Well, in terms of the course work, I remember a lot of this was - I had just come out of academia so a lot of it was fairly new to me - but a lot of it wasn’t that difficult. But I remember we had a lecture by Ambassador Robert McClintock, just come out of Beirut, I guess, at that time, and someone asked him the question, because this was a topic that was coming along at that time, “What do you think about group thinking in terms of solutions to problems?” And he said, “I don’t know what it means?” He said, “There’s no such thing as group thinking.” He said, “Decisions are made by people, not by groups. Some individuals may be more important in making those decisions than others.” And I thought about that then, and I’ve thought about it ever since, because at one point in my career, before I went out to Istanbul for the last time, I served on the Boards, and the oral examination was basically that kind of thing. I don’t know if you’ve done any oral examining with the Boards, but you know they have a group of four of them that have a problem to solve, and they come up with different solutions, and then they have to convince the others of the merits of theirs. It was basically the same kind of thing that he was talking about earlier on.
Q: When you came in, were you thinking of any particular type of work or area, or were you just sort of laissez-faire?

RAU: Well, as I said, I had just come out of training in political science. I didn’t have much of an economic background at that time, I must say. But I thought politics and political science for a political officer, which was what I was thinking about. They didn’t have a cone system then, but I was fortunate - if you want to get into the first assignments-

Q: Oh, I do. We want to go through each assignment rather methodically.

RAU: Okay, when I came in that September in the class, I finished the basic officer’s class, and I had had some high school and college French, but I didn’t have enough to pass the examination. So I was put into French training and qualified in that. I guess I was in there for four months, five months, something like that. And then I was assigned - because, again, this was the department. Before I came to Washington for training, I got a phone call from Washington saying, “Would you like your first assignment to be in Washington or overseas?” This puzzled me because I thought, Foreign Service - everybody goes overseas, at least in the beginning. So I told them overseas, so they promptly assigned me to Washington for my first tour. I had the good fortune - I was in NEA-EX, and Vernon Merrill was the head of the group then. He’s retired, lives out in Washington State now, I think. And I worked for Paul Deibel doing Greece, Turkey, and Iran, which was the division they had at that time. And I got a good look at all the posts doing the post management part of it from the Washington side. And I could scout out and see which posts would be better for a junior officer to serve in. So I picked out Thessaloniki, because by that time I had looked around and saw - I had an outside interest in Arabic, but I wasn’t sure about that, so I thought, Where else in this GTI (Greece, Turkey, Iran) area? And I chose this post in Northern Greece. And it was fortunate for me that I did because Bob Folsom was the consul general out there. Anyway, I got the assignment to Greece.

Q: How long were you in NEA/EX?

RAU: Almost two years, but in the meantime, the last part of it, because I really didn’t have enough to do, I convinced them to send me over to FSI. And the wife of the Greek instructor at that time agreed to take me on as a part time student. And I started studying Modern Greek with her, Aliki Sapunigis, for two hours a day, from the Department. Then I’d go back and work in NEA. Enough so that you know I could really build on this when I got to Thessaloniki. Because at that time, if you were in Salonika and you didn’t speak Greek, you had a very limited circle of friends.

One other thing I did in the department I thought was interesting, too: I’ve forgotten the award - it was one of the major awards - but the NEA candidate for that was Ambassador Raymond Hare, and they knew I could write a little bit so they gave me the job of putting
together his nomination for the award from the bureau, which meant I got to see his personnel file, going all the way back to 1927 or so - fascinating personnel file - and I wrote this up. He was the NEA candidate, and he did get the award that year. So I was very pleased with that. That was one of the better things I did. But I say, I used that assignment primarily - you know how post management works: you have to take care of the needs of the post whatever they are, try to look at staffing patterns and who should fit into this, give a hand at least to the Bureau on who their candidates should be for different positions.

Q: What was your impression of how NEA was run and all that? I mean, was it sort of a collegial group or was it a cold distant group? Did people know everybody?

RAU: I thought NEA, in terms of collegiality, in terms of comradeship, etc. - was one of the better bureaus because they had a large number of people who had served only in NEA going back and forth between NEA posts for many years and were language people in many cases. In reading back through these histories of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus: Bruce Laingen was on the Desk then as the Greek Desk officer; Arch Blood was the Cyprus Desk officer. And I got to know them fairly well. I’d go back and forth. The post management part of this was in the old part of the Department that was on 19th Street, right there on 19th and Pennsylvania. This was before they built the New State. Then we would have to truck over there to see the desk officers, etc., when we had to. But I had quite a bit of contact with them, and I really got the impression that NEA was a bureau that took care of its own and really knew what was happening to their people.

Q: When you looked at this, were you staking out for yourself mentally the Greek-Turkish or Cyprus part of it, as opposed to the Arabic side?

RAU: Yes, I was at that point, because without having the Arabic language training, I didn’t feel I could really make much of a mark by going into an Arabic post as an outsider. And I wasn’t sure yet I wanted to go into Arabic training. And I was only in the training assignment then for two years anyway. But it was good that I got that basic background in Greek, because when I went to Thessaloniki I was able to build on that.

Q: You were in Thessaloniki from when to when?

RAU: ‘59 to ‘61.

Q: Incidentally, how did NEA respond to the - I don’t know if you’d call it a crisis, but it was when we sent troops into Lebanon and all that? Did that cause a stir or not, or was that a problem for you?

RAU: Well, we all knew all the stories about McClintock and his dog, and all that business,

Q: A poodle.
RAU: Yes. No, it didn’t; at least in my level, what I could see, it didn’t cause that much of a stir that I could see. It was just that the President made the decision they were going to send troops in and they did. The Marines went in and did what Marines are supposed to do in many places.

Q: In Greece, can you tell me a little about the post in Thessaloniki in ‘59 when you got there? And then we’ll talk about the situation in Greece.

RAU: Yes. The post was small. It was a consulate general. The consul general was a man by the name of Robert Slade Folsom, who is now retired and lives down in Florida, I think. But he had been a professor before he came into the Foreign Service, a political science professor, some eastern University, I can’t remember which one it was. The good thing was he had just come out of Personnel in the Department and was very interested in the junior officer training program. So I think there was one other junior officer there. Henry Wexler was the consular officer. Charlie McCaskill was the political officer. John Curry - Jack Curry - was the administrative officer, and then there was a USIS officer, Phil Carroll, and a cultural officer. So it was a fairly good-staffed post for a post that size. This was right after the Greek Civil War, and there were still people on our staff who were covering this that had very strong feelings one way or the other, but usually pro-monarchy. The reason I liked the post was not only that it gave me a chance to really learn Greek and get to see Greece from that (I would have been lost in Athens at that point) but I also had a teacher that became a very good friend, George Mikoulopoulos, who was a gymnasiarkhes - ‘teacher,’ ‘principal,’ I guess - of a boys’ high school. And he kind of took me under his wing. We traveled all over, and he taught me a lot of Greek. We went to Mt. Athos together a couple of times, so that was a real benefit. Secondly, the consul general, Bob Folsom, really gave me a chance to see all parts of the operation, small as it was, in Thessaloniki. First of all, he made me an economic-commercial officer, because he wanted to have some commercial reporting. So, I did some voluntary reporting on the sewing machine industry in northern Greece because for their “proika,” you know, for their dowry - they used to give away sewing machines. And the pharmaceutical industry in northern Greece, etc. I had a lot of fun researching those. Then after that, we set up a commercial library in the consulate.

From that I went on to do consular work and did all of it. Fortunately, we had good local employees that saved me in many cases. Otherwise, I’d have been up a creek without a paddle in some instances. We had the one I remember distinctly at that time. There were a lot of young Greeks, especially girls, that were trying to get to the United States one way or another. The quotas were oversubscribed, etc. You know this better than I. We had the old business about certification by the state labor board, if they had a skill that was in short supply that couldn’t be met from US resources, that you could give them a special visa for this. Well, what the Greeks discovered at this time was belly dancing. And we had these girls who would come in with contracts from some place in New York City where they had been hired to be a belly dancer, and we had to look into whether they really had that kind of skill or not, reassure ourselves before we could issue them such a
visa.

Q: Well, of course, all of the great belly dancers came out of the Greek community in Alexandria. But I don’t think they were taking their bellies up to-

RAU: -to northern Greece. I don’t think so either. But they managed to wangle these contracts, and of course, if they got certification from the New York State labor office, who were we to say?

Q: Did you have any problem with protection or welfare and that sort of thing? This was a little before the great mass of Americans started having their “wander-year” in Europe with their marijuana-

RAU: That’s right. We had that later, but not in Greece. We had a few seamen occasionally that would turn up there, not very many, but a few, because there were still American vessels that were coming into Thessaloniki. And there were a few problems there, but nothing of any major significance.

Q: What were relations like with your northern neighbor Yugoslavia at that time?

RAU: Yugoslavia had a consulate general there, and they had a very good Yugoslav consul general. Charlie McCaskill was our Greek language officer, trained by the department. That’s another story I’ll tell you in a minute. But we would go to receptions and the Yugoslav consul general would be there and he’d be chattering away in Greek. He knew Greek very well. They had this free port situation in Thessaloniki for goods that would go up to Yugoslavia, supposedly in bond, but some of it would always slip through one way or another. No, it was a very well run operation from what I could see. It was small, but it was a consulate general.

Q: But there weren’t tensions on the border or anything like that?

RAU: No.

Q: Did Macedonia intrude? I’m talking about the name Macedonia.

RAU: There was an Institute of Macedonian studies that was in Thessaloniki, and vicariously [sic], I guess, it was in the same building with the Greek Third Army headquarters. They were very interested in that, obviously. And the man that ran it - I can’t remember his name now - he was very much a rightist. He was very much a monarchist. And they had long sessions, and I attended a couple of them, when they were talking about Greek Macedonia and the importance of keeping the Red menace out of that part of Greece. Because you know, after the Greek Civil War, a lot of these guerrillas were supplied by Yugoslavia and Macedonia and came down into Greece. And the famous case of taking the children back, you know.
Q: The Greek guerrillas took thousands of children and took them to the Soviet Union. Horrible!

RAU: Yes. So there was still a lot of ill will. Strangely enough, at that point, they didn’t look upon Turkey as a menace to them. Their biggest menace was Bulgaria.

Q: Normally the Third Army sort of sits there ready to go at the Turks.

RAU: They do now, that’s for sure.

Q: But at that time what was the feeling towards Bulgaria? Did you ever get there?

RAU: That’s another interesting story. Yes I did. Again, junior officer doing different kinds of work. We had our first show. When our legation in Sofia opened, we had our first trade fair there, in Plovdiv. And I had been working with the Thessaloniki trade fair as the economic commercial officer. So I convinced the consul general, Bob Folsom. I said, “I’d like to go up and take a look at that to see how we’re doing this, since we just opened this legation up there.” He said, “Well, if you can get a visa, go ahead.” So I went down to Athens, since there wasn’t any consulate there, or embassy, and I got a visa through the Bulgarian embassy. I got a visa to go to Bulgaria on Yugoslav Airlines, which flew from Athens via Belgrade to Sofia. Finally, I got to Sofia, and I - what was the name of the officer there in the legation? - Anyway, I can’t remember his name. I went to see him, and we had a nice chat. He was doing economic work there in the embassy. And he said, “Well, how are you going to get down to Plovdiv?” And I said, “Well, I’ll probably take the train down.” And he asked me where I was staying. They had me in the Hotel Moscow, which was a real third-rate fleabag, but the main hotel, which was the Balkan Hotel in Sofia was filled. They didn’t have any more vacancies, but I could eat my meals over there. I went over there for my meals. And in the course of one of the meals there, I ran into this group - there was a Brit and an Italian, who was a real wild man, and they both spoke some German. And I realized that if I went down by myself - I didn’t have any German; I had Greek but that was about it - I would crash. So I struck up a conversation with them, and the Italian, who was a businessman, said, “Oh, I’m driving down there tomorrow. Why don’t you come along with me?” And I said, “Well, fine, I’d love to.” So I went with him, and I remember, he knew that part of the world pretty well. He’d traveled around, and he had sacks of these hard candies in the back window of his car. Every time we’d get near some place where there were little kids, he’d give them some candy. So we’re getting about half way down to Plovdiv - it wasn’t that far - but about half way to Plovdiv, he says, “Hey, I’m running low on gas.” Well, at that time there were no petrol stations in Bulgaria, but he looked down the hill where we were stopped, and there was this truck place where they were filling trucks with gasoline from barrels. So he talked to the kids next to him, and they led us down to this place, and they gave us enough gasoline to get to Plovdiv. We got to Plovdiv, and we went through the exhibit. We had a dental exhibit there because this was our first effort, and they had, I think, three or four Bulgarian-speaking US dentists who were manning this exhibit. I went through that. I went with the Italian through the Chinese Communist pavilion. I remember that...
distinctly. He was into machinery of some kind, and here we were walking through there
and he is exclaiming in a loud voice. He said, “Oh, look at that machinery. That’s so
outdated, antiquated, we had that years ago” or whatever, laughing, etc. I was thinking to
myself, this is the wrong place to be talking about things like this. Anyway, yes, I did get
up to Bulgaria at that time.

Q: Was it still simmering, the case of the American newsman?

RAU: The Polk case?

Q: The Polk case.

RAU: That was pretty much finished.

Q: In fact, I heard something on the radio just the other day about it; I can’t remember
what. Could you explain it? It was George Polk, wasn’t it? Could you explain what this
was, because this kind of was there all the time?

RAU: George Polk.

Q: Could you explain what this was, because this was there all the time?

RAU: Well, this was a throwback to the confrontation between the leftists and the
rightists, who were the monarchists in Greece. And George Polk - they still don’t know
for sure who killed him - was a correspondent who was covering the post-Civil War
period in Greece, basically, and was in Thessaloniki, and one day he turned up dead,
floating in the harbor. They pulled him out and did all kinds of investigations. As I say,
they’ve never been able to track it down. There were two books written on this recently.
One is by the brother of Edmond Keeley on the Salonika Bay murders. The other is by
Kati Marton, who is now the wife of Dick Holbrooke and was formerly married to Peter
Jennings. She’s a Hungarian. And she wrote a rather good book on it too. And both of
those books more or less concluded that this was done by the rightists. They felt that Polk
was getting too close to things, and they didn’t want him poking around in military affairs
between the civil war, because he was trying to meet with some of the guerrillas on the
other side. When I was there that was almost, what, ten years after the fact.

Q: What about society in Thessaloniki, getting on with the Greeks and all that? How did
you find that?

RAU: Well, it was easier for me, and my wife to a certain extent, because we made a real
effort to learn Greek. We lived in a suburb then of Thessaloniki, for the first year we were
there, called Harilau, and I would drive in to the office, which was about a 20-minute
drive, every day. But all of our neighbors were in that area, and we had one small child at
that time - the second one was born while we were there. And so we got to know a lot of
the community right around us. They lived there. Our landlord we knew fairly well. He
lived not in the house with us but close by. It was really a northern provincial town. It was not like it is now today. It was pretty much a backwater. We had a NATO sub-headquarters there in Thessaloniki at the time, and we had couple of officers assigned there. And then there was one military officer, one captain I guess it was, assigned to the Higher Defense College in Greece. He was the Greek language officer and went to that. But the American community was pretty small, except for the farm school and that was even small. That was the American influence, Bruce Lansdale and the farm school up there. There was a YMCA that was run by an American. The others might have been Greek-Americans, but there weren’t any native-born Americans, very few. One of the big problems on the consular side, going back there - not just consular but on the political side as well - was the number of Greek-Americans who had come to Thessaloniki to retire, who had worked in steel mills in Pittsburgh or whatever. And they would sit in the cafes all day and talk about how things were so great in Pittsburgh and so terrible in Greece. And we thought, You know, you came back here because you’re money goes further, but you’re not helping our reputation at all by sitting around talking like this.

Q: Cyprus wasn’t a particular problem as far as impact there and our role as...

RAU: That’s another story, because after my tour in Thessaloniki, I was supposed to go on to Cyprus. I was assigned, in fact, to Cyprus as consular officer. Charlie McCaskill had already been assigned down there. He had gone on to Cyprus. But Ambassador Briggs - Ellis Briggs, the ambassador - came back on home leave, and there was an officer who had gone through Greek language training in Athens, Ed Ledbetter. I don’t know whether you've ever heard of Ed.

Q: I know Ed.

RAU: Well, they had been having trouble finding a place for him, an onward assignment. And so Briggs was saying, “Well, what about Cyprus? He’s a good language officer.” They said, “Well, we’ve already assigned Rau there.” So he said, “Does he speak Greek?” They said, “Yes, he is very qualified for it.” But they decided since they had an investment in Ledbetter, why, they broke my assignment, and there’s where the Arabic reared its head, because I had put on one of these April Fool’s sheets that I was toying with the idea of going into Arabic language training.

Q: You might explain what an April Fool’s sheet is.

RAU: Well, this was a sheet that was due on April 1st.

Q: It was called the “Post Preference Report.”

RAU: That’s right, in which you indicated which you wanted your next assignment to be and where you were heading, pointing yourself. And I had said on one of those previous ones that somebody read that I might be interested in learning Arabic and going into Arabic training. Since I had been able to qualify in “hard” languages, they thought I might
be a likely candidate. But before they would put me into Arabic training, they assigned me as vice-consul to Port Said, in Egypt, which was then the UAR [United Arab Republic].

Q: Before we go there, could you talk about what was your impression of how Charlie McCaskill worked. Because Charlie ended up dealing an awful lot particularly in Greek-Cypriot affairs, I think even in Turkish affairs, too. What was your impression of him?

RAU: Charlie was, as you know, he was a Wristonee. He had made the switch-over and I thought really was making a sterling effort because he was a South Carolina boy who really never had - except for maybe some military experience - but he’d never been outside the country to live, and was really dedicated to this Greek. He really went ahead and learned Greek pretty well. I think he qualified around the 4 level or so. And was very interested and made a lot of friends in northern Greece and introduced me to a lot of people in northern Greece. We went on trips together. He was a political reporting officer and I was doing whatever else there was, commercial-economic. And he had two boys at the time who were sub-teenagers, I guess, 10 or 12 years old, so we got to know them very well. They were good friends. As I say, he left after our first year there and went to Cyprus because his tour was over. And John Owens came to replace him. Do you know John?

Q: I know him, yes.

RAU: He was a good language officer, too, but had a different approach than Charlie did. No, I think Charlie did a very good job in that situation. He later went back, as you know, as political counselor to Athens.

Q: I realize you were at the junior level, but how about George Papandreou and his group? Did that have any reflections in your area at that particular time?

RAU: Only in the sense that my Greek language teacher, George Mikoulopoulos, was an old phileleftheros, you know, an old liberal, and he really thought George Papandreou was a wonderful person. He hadn’t had much time for Karamanlis, or the government in power at that time. And he used to fill my ears with things and have me try to read things that were done by Kazantzakis and people like that, in Greek, and we had long sessions on things like this. But no, I didn’t have any feelings about Papandreou as a person.

Q: The political tides weren’t running too heavily, were they? I mean, I mean, just in general in Thessaloniki, were there sharp issues or concerns with the parties that we were aware of there?

RAU: The only thing was that the press there had a couple of papers. The Makedonia paper was very much oriented toward the left side, and they would print scurrilous articles sometimes about the US and about the relations between Greece and the US. But
it wasn’t anything that really... The Third Army really ran northern Greece. There was no question in anybody’s mind at that time. Some of the people that worked for us in the consulate had very good connections with the military, etc., and so we were oriented toward the people who were in power at the time, no question about that.

**Q: What about our embassy? Was that just someplace far away?**

RAU: No, I made a couple of trips down there. Don Gelber was a friend of mine, was in my class, and he was the one that met us when we first arrived in Athens. And as I say, Briggs was the ambassador and Sam Berger was the DCM, and he was interested in all the junior officer programs, very interested in seeing that junior officers got the right kind of training and that those that showed promise were pushed along, etc. Jack Horner was the political counselor at the time, and all of these people... I don’t think Monty Stearns was there at this time. He came shortly after. He was in the process of courting Toni at that time. Sid Jacques was the economic counselor, and I got to know him a little bit after a couple of trips with him because, as you can see, my interests were kind of veering off toward the economic side now more than the political. I would say that the post at that time with Briggs at its head was pretty much devoted to keeping up the relationship with the monarchy and with the Karamanlis government at the time. They didn’t ignore the opposition parties, but they did what was supposed to be done, I guess, with the one in power.

**Q: Then you were assigned from there to Port Said. Wow!**

RAU: That was quite a change.

**Q: You were in Port Said from when to when?**

RAU: ’61 to ’63.

**Q: Could you talk about what the “Post Report” said and what you were doing ’61 to ’63?**

RAU: Yes, well that was an interesting time in my career for one principal reason. It made me realize, when I saw what the plush posts were in the Arabic world, that I didn’t want to raise a family and be an Arabist. But I did use the two years there to learn something. Certainly, the whole purpose of the Port Said consulate, really, was the Suez Canal, the traffic going through the Suez Canal. There were just, what, two officers and an Agency person there, a code clerk, at that post. We did some consular work that would come through there. We had a couple of crazies that we had to deal with one time. (End of tape)

**Q: You were saying you were getting kind of bored.**

RAU: Yes, and the inspectors came out. We had an inspection. And when they came out
they asked me about it, and I said, “Well, what’s here I’m doing, but there’s not a lot here: the volunteer reports; I’m trying to learn some Arabic with a local instructor...” But we were raising a family, so it really wasn’t a question of social life. There wasn’t a lot of social life there because the Nasserites were in control and they kept a distance from us.

**Q: This is a very difficult period, wasn’t it? We were just not on good terms with Nasser.**

RAU: Dulles had turned down the Aswan dam business, and what we had fortunately going for us - the only thing I can remember with a great deal of fondness - is John Badeau was named ambassador, and he was a real Arab scholar, and he knew Nasser very well.

**Q: He was from the American university in Cairo, I think.**

RAU: That’s right. And he would come down to Port Said to relax and spend a day or so. And he’d come to the consul’s residence - Frank Walters was the consul there then - and he’d come to his residence, put his feet on the balcony there, watch the ships going up and down the canal, and he’d tell us more about what was going on in Egypt than they learned in Cairo, I’m sure, because he knew everybody. It was a chance for him to let his hair down, and as I say, we really profited from that when he came down to visit.

**Q: What was your impression of our relations with Egypt at that time?**

RAU: To show you how tenuous they were: first of all Port Said was a shipping town, and the lifeblood of the town were the shipping agencies that had been there. They were all decimated now. All the foreigners that had run them had gone, or most of them except for a few old-timers who were hanging on. And the Greek community was pretty decimated that had been there. There was a small Italian community. It was an interesting post in that sense because all the residents of Port Said and Suez that lived in that area spoke a smattering of about five languages. And they would use them interchangeably in the middle of a sentence. They knew what they were saying, but you had to sit down and try to decipher what they were saying. We got to know a few people there well. One was the son of an old pasha, who had a lot of money but not too much sense. We would have a big picnic with the foreign community on Sundays down on the beach, and he would bring servants. They’d cook up all this shrimp and fish and stuff, wonderful stuff. But those were few and far between. We did not have a relationship with the local community per se - I mean the people in power. We knew governor Rushdi, and it was all on a very formal basis. We did do one thing, though. We sent the governor of Suez - I’ll think of his name in a minute - we sent him on a Leader grant to the states. And this was the guy who was later put in prison for a plot against Nasser. He had gone over to see Agriculture in Arizona, which was similar to Suez, I guess. He was a very intelligent guy, but apparently got his nose in the wringer, so to speak.

So when I mentioned to the inspectors that I was bored with all this, they went on to Cairo, and as you know, Cairo had had a major evacuation before that. So the first thing
they asked the administrative officer, they asked him, “Where’s your E and E plan?” He said, “Well, the remnants of it are in that safe. We don’t have any E and E plan.” They said, “Why?” He said, “We don’t have anybody to write it.” They said, “We’ve got just the guy for you.” Ha, ha. So they assigned me to Cairo on temporary duty, for, I think two or three months, and Ron Wood’s wife, Judy, acted as my secretary. She was looking for some sort of a job, and we put together an E and E plan for the embassy, including a perimeter of defense, compound defense, etc. And Bill Boswell, who was the DCM there approved it. I guess later on they used at least the perimeter of defense, I don’t know. But that was probably the highlight of the two years there.

Q: Just to get a feel for the atmosphere, was the place loaded with pictures of Nasser?

RAU: Oh, yes, incredible. One instance I will relate to you. My wife stayed behind but I went out ahead of her because she was having the third child and we didn’t know what the health facilities were like in Egypt. So she stayed to have the baby and came out when he was six weeks old. When she came there, I had things arranged, the apartment, etc., but it was coming up on Victory Day, which was when they threw all of the British and French into the sea, the Egyptians.

Q: 1956.

RAU: Yes. Nasser would come to Port Said on that day. So we had this little baby, and we had an assistant naval attaché there. How we managed to do it over the years, I don’t know how we did - by hook or by crook - but we did. The Russians would complain like hell, because they had a vice consul cover for their assistant naval attaché but ours was actually an assistant naval attaché. The fiction was that he lived in Cairo and would make visits down there, but he had a family with a couple of kids, etc. Anyway, we went to his apartment to watch the parade because he had a good vantage point for watching. And while we were in the apartment watching this, we had said to the maid, “Do you want to go to the parade? If you do we will make other arrangements.” “Oh, no, no, no, I’d rather sit back.” So here comes this parade, and they had what they called the 25-piastre crowd that whooped them up in front of Nasser because they’d really excite them. Q: They’d pay them some money.

RAU: Yes, and they’d throw these petitions at Nasser’s car, usually with a stone attached to them or something, but he would honor a few of these that he would get. And the car looked like a mess after that parade. Anyway, we’re looking down, and this parade’s coming down the street, and here’s this little carry-cot sitting on the side of the curb. We recognized immediately it was the one our youngest son was in. And he’s sitting there, and my wife says, “My God, I can’t get down there now, it’s too late to get over to him.” And so she just kind of hid her head and said, “Well, it’s in God’s hands.” Well, the crowd went through and on and parting, and here was this carry-cot still sitting there until it was over. We went back and immediately fired the maid and had to get another one. But that was the kind of thing. Yes, Nasser was still the man in charge, so to speak. He
made one trip there a year but his influence was very much felt.

Q: Did Israel weigh heavily? Were relations with Israel a topic of conversation?

RAU: Well, it was in this sense. This was the time of the UAR with Syria. And we were there when the Syrian breakaway took place. And one of my classmates, Dick Dwyer, was in Damascus at the time, and he was making the trip over - something, I can’t remember. Anyway, he called up on the telephone - and we knew all of our phones were tapped - and he said something about “This is Dick Dwyer.” And I said, “Oh, Dick, how are things in Damascus?” And he heard this *whirr whirr*, this whole system cranking up to record all this stuff.

My wife took one trip over there, I guess just about the time of the breakaway. I didn’t go with her because I felt I better not leave here; I might not get back in. We had these children as well. She went to Beirut, and on to Jerusalem. They went through the Mandelbaum Gate at that time, with her parents. Her mother and father had come over. So, yes, Israel was still very much the target. Obviously, they couldn’t get over the ‘56 war.

Q: When did you leave in ‘63?

RAU: It was the summer of ‘63, July.

Q: Did the Cuban Missile Crisis have any particular effect that far away?

RAU: Not out there. It didn’t bother us. We weren’t much into that. In Port Said there were no daily newspapers there. We had short-wave radio - that was about it. We’d listen to Voice of America once in a while, but I didn’t get the impression there was a major crisis.

Q: At one point there was a great deal of emphasis on the ability of the Suez Canal pilots.

RAU: To run things.

Q: When Nasser took the place over in 1956, the thought was, well...

RAU: They won’t be able to run it.

Q: They won’t be able to run it. Was this something you were all looking at?

RAU: We looked at it very closely. We knew the people in the Suez Canal Authority pretty well. Mahmoud Younes was the one running the Suez Canal then. And I must say, when I talked to American sea captains who came through, they were very impressed with the way the canal was being run by these Egyptian pilots. There were a few foreigners still there. We had an American, Alec Langtrey, who was still a canal pilot.
there. Most of them were Egyptians, and they did a good job. When we sent aircraft carriers through there, they built a superstructure right on the flight deck so you could watch both sides of the canal, because they were constantly having problems with that silting up and, you know, digging it out.

I guess one of the biggest things that happened in those two years in Port Said was we had one of these Greek-American shipping lines in New York, Kouloukoundis, that went bankrupt, and he left something like 24 or 25 ships stranded all over the world. Well, we had two of them in the canal, one in Suez and one in Port Said. The Suzanne and the Bridgehampton - I'll never forget that. And these guys were not allowed to get off. They were on board, and they'd been on board this vessel. As we'd say, they hadn't seen a white woman in I don't' know how many months, and they weren't allowed to get off. Well, Bill Boswell, who was the DCM, realized that this was getting to be a political problem. So Frank Walters took the group from Port Said. We managed to get them off. The State Department chartered an aircraft to Cairo, and we were to take them by bus from Suez and Port Said to Cairo when they'd get on this plane to go back. Well, the ones I had in Suez, when they came off that ship, the first place they headed for was the nearest bar, you know, and I had to threaten some of them. I’d say, “Look, you haven’t seen the inside of an Egyptian jail, but you’re about to if you don’t...” You know. Well, there were fistfights and all kinds of stuff. Well, I got them to the airport, finally, both buses, and here trots out the captain of this chartered aircraft and stewardesses. There were two or three stewardesses. So Frank and I got this captain aside and said, “Look, these guys have been cooped up for something like two or three months, and we’ve just managed to get them here to the airport. You could have some problems aboard this flight. What do you do if you have those?” He said, “I’ve got a solution for that, very simple.” I said, “What is that?” He said, “We call the stewardesses up to the front of the airplane, we go up to 25 or 30,000 feet, and we turn the oxygen off. Then they all go to sleep, and we fly on.” Whatever brain damage they might have had from that, I don’t know.

Q: Anyway, 1963, by this time you had decided the Arab world was not for you.

RAU: That’s right. So then I had applied for functional training. The Department was looking for economic officers at the time, and they didn’t have the 26-week course here at the FSI. But once they selected you for this, they gave you a shotgun course in basic economics here at FSI, and you were allowed to go to any university in the country. They had a pretty good economics program. So I was chosen for that, came back, did the six weeks, and we had selected the University of California at Berkeley, for a couple of reasons: one, we had never been to the West Coast and I wanted to see it for a year; and two, Andreas Papandreou was teaching out there. He was on the faculty, and I thought, Well, I’d be interested in being exposed to him as a professor. He was called back that year, so we didn’t have him. He went back to Greece. But we went out to Berkeley and spent that academic year there. That was a very seminal year because it was the year of the Kennedy assassination, it was the year the free Speech movement started on the university campus - a really fascinating year to be there. Anyway, I applied, you know, the usual kind of post you want to go to, and I applied for and was chosen to go to South
Africa as the second economic officer. And we went to South Africa for three years.

Q: Well, let me talk a little about your time in South Africa. Compared to the University of Missouri, how did the University of California strike you?

RAU: Very large. Berkeley at that time had 25,000 daytime students. The University of Missouri when I was there had about eight, nine, something like that. And the University of California system was obviously the largest, probably, in the world, or one of the largest. And I looked at it from the point of view that they had more Nobel Peace Prizewinners on one campus than any other university and I thought I’d be exposed to some of these people. Well, I was sadly mistaken. It was mainly graduate students that were teaching, except for one or two courses I had with full professors. But it was a good year in the sense that it really sharpened the facility. There were two of us out there, Mike Calingaert and myself, and I thought about this later when the Department went to its own training program of 26 weeks. We had one advantage over these graduate students that were there studying. I should say also that at that time the University of California did away with its terminal master’s program. You had to be going for a Ph.D. You didn’t get a master’s degree unless you were there for the Ph.D., and once you got the Ph.D., they just gave you the master’s. So our thoughts about getting a master’s degree there were out the window; you couldn’t do it in one year. We had one thing going for us. We didn’t have the background or the drive that these people who were going for a Ph.D. had at the time, but we could write. We had had some experience writing. So when we did term papers and that sort of thing, they were head and shoulders above the graduate students.

Q: I think this is something that is often forgotten. We accept it as a given. The Foreign Service really can write quite well.

RAU: That’s right.

Q: And we just do it at the drop of a hat.

RAU: You put it together and it’s comprehensive and understandable.

Q: You were a married man with children and all that, but how did the Free Speech Movement hit you?

RAU: Well how it hit me was you go through the Sather Gate, which was the main entrance.

Q: Was that Mario Savio?

RAU: Yes, Mario Savio. You go through the Sather Gate, and there’d be all these tables there. You could sign up for everything from the Communist Party to the Ku Klux Klan, I guess, if you had wanted to along these tables. And I said to myself, if I had a very bright young man - my oldest son - who was just out of high school, would I send him to the
University of California? And I said, not unless he was very well established in his own mind, because the temptations were enormous there for these kids. Everything was going on at that time at the university.

Q: In retrospect, it may be some generational thing, but it seemed like a bunch of spoiled kids having a good time.

RAU: The only time I saw where there was silence was when the Kennedy assassination happened. We were sitting in a classroom, and we heard about the shooting, and we had a graduate student who was teaching us, and one of the students said, “Mr. [Such and such], I’ve noticed they lowered the flag to half mast outside there.” And he said, “Oh my God, that means he’s dead!” So we all went out on the campus. We broke up classes there. And usually that campus, the main campus there, was just a hubbub of activity, people shouting and screaming and all kinds of things. Here they were gathered in little groups, usually around a radio, listening to reports of this. And it was so quiet you could almost hear a pin drop in the whole place. A very moving sort of thing.

Q: Did Kennedy’s spirit hit you. You were overseas during most of this time, but there was an impetus by some, because of Kennedy, public service was a good thing and all that. Did you feel that going throughout the junior officers, or not?

RAU: Well, I did feel it to a certain extent because of the appointees he made as ambassadors. I mean, we always have a lot of political ambassadors, but he seemed to make some very outstanding ones, like Reischauer and Badeau and people like that, who were really qualified, could do a better job.

Q: John Kenneth Galbraith and...

RAU: Yes, the people who could probably do a better job than the professionals could do in those cases. Badeau had known Nasser when he was a lieutenant in the Egyptian army, you know. And so that kind of person would have been hard to best with a professional. So from that point of view, yes, I was really impressed with that administration.

Q: How did you find the economics that you learned both at the university and at the FSI? Was it really useful, or did you kind of learn on the job?

RAU: I didn’t really learn economics until I went to South Africa. And there I really learned economics because I had one of the few bosses in the Foreign Service who was a trained economist, a banker. Bob Eisenberg had been with a bank in Czechoslovakia before, and he really knew economics, and he taught me a lot.

Q: You were getting some of the jargon and all, but not that really deep-rooted feeling for economics.

RAU: Well, you know, with a few exceptions that the department had need of really well
trained economists, I felt that you’re better off probably, once you’d got some of the basics down, for what the Foreign Service needs, to learn the way I did.

Q: At the post. Well, why don’t we stop at this point, Bill, and we’ll pick it up the next time in, what’ll it be, 1964...

RAU: That’s right, when I went to South Africa.

Q: Where in South Africa?

RAU: Pretoria, the embassy.

Q: Alright, great.

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Today is the 13th of July 1998. Bill, you were in Pretoria from 1964 to when?

RAU: To 1967.

Q: What was your job in Pretoria?

RAU: I was the second man in the Economic Section, second secretary of the embassy, and also at that time - I don’t know whether they still do it; I guess they don’t now - they ran separate chanceries, because the Parliament met in Cape Town and the ambassador and the Political Section would go to Cape Town to the parliamentary session for six months and we ran a second chancery in Pretoria, the Economic Section headed by the economic officer at the time.

Q: Who was the ambassador during this time?

RAU: Well, I had several. Joe Satterthwaite was there when I first got there. He was replaced by Bill Rountree and I guess Rountree was there for the entire time I was there, or I was there for the entire time he was there. And Ed Clark was the DCM - G. Edward Clark - and then Peter Hooper later.

Q: This is another time another place. What was the feeling towards South Africa in ’64-’67?

RAU: Well, that’s an interesting question because I think it’s much to the point. When I was assigned, it was the one and only appointment in the Foreign Service where I had this much lead-time. I was going to the University of California at Berkeley when I had this assignment to South Africa and I was able to do some research, particularly on the economic side, while I was out there.
I stopped by the department on my way out, and the African Bureau had a deputy assistant secretary by the name of J. Wayne Fredericks, who was a Kennedy appointee. Fredericks had been with the Ford Motor Company. I think he ran their plant in South Africa. And he insisted on seeing, or said he wanted to see, every officer who was assigned to South Africa before they went out. So I went up to see him. We had a nice chat, and the first question he asked me was, “What is your feeling about the racial issue?” Mind you, this was just about the beginning, before the riots started in Los Angeles, Watts, and other places. And I said, “Well, my personal feeling is that I judge a person by his ability and not by his skin color. If he can do the job, then fine; if he can’t do the job, then I don’t want to have anything to do with him, because sometimes in Foreign Service situations you have to count on other people just as you do in the military, so I want the person to be qualified, able to do the job.” And he said, “Well, you’d better know where you stand on the racial issue much better than that, because when you get out there, you’re going to be tested almost every day.” He said, “You will find that among the white community there are a group, the Afrikaners, that are very much, on the surface at least, like our Westerners. They love outdoor living, they’re hail-fellow-well-met, they love to go out and hunt a lot, they have Braifleisch, which is the equivalent of the Texas barbecue all the time.” He said, “You will think you are back in the Southwest of the United States in many cases,” he said, “until this one issue comes up. They will bring it up; you don’t have to. The question will always be ‘How do you think you’re going to handle the situation in the United States? We know how we’re going to handle it because we’ve got the solution, complete and utter separation between the races.’” And he said, “You’d better be prepared to argue your case for complete assimilation, if you will, or integration, because you are going to be tested.”

And I found that to be accurate when I got out there. Every party, every reception, any time we had any kind of social tête-à-tête with the white South Africans, principally the Afrikaners, not exclusively, that question came up. And they always said, “You’re having these problems there, and the reason you’re having these problems is you’re giving them too much.” There it basically was: give ‘em an inch and they’ll take a mile, which ironically turned out to be true, because we got there the year after Mandela had been sentenced in the Rivonia trial, and he was in jail. And there were all kind of whites and blacks who were either out of the country or were in jail in South Africa. It was very severe apartheid that Verwoerd, who was the prime minister then, had put into effect. One little example to show you there were some humorous sides to it, too. At one point my wife was pregnant with our fourth son, who was born in South Africa, and the son was late in coming, so they say, but we got an invitation from the Liberal Party to attend a reception in Johannesburg, which is about 35 miles from Pretoria, and Alan Paton was supposed to be there. My wife is an English literature major, and she said, “Oh, I’d love to.”

Q: He’s the author of-

RAU: Cry, the Beloved Country, Too Late the Phalarope, etc. - wonderful writer in his time. So she said, “I’d love to go to that reception and meet him.” And I thought to
myself - and I mentioned it to her, too - “Well, maybe that’s the way to get this baby on the way, bounce over those roads” - which were pretty rough in those days between Pretoria and Johannesburg. “Maybe it will engender something.” In any case, we went to this reception. Alan Paton did not show up because he was ill or some other excuse - I don’t remember what it was. But she related a conversation that she had that night when we were on our way home. She said, “You know, I met this woman who was commiserating with me about the kind of life we had in the Foreign Service. Here I was pregnant, going to have children overseas, having to cope with all these changes and then to have children in a foreign environment, etc.” And my wife said - “Well that’s part of the job. You have to accompany wherever they go, and I could choose to go back to the States but I prefer to have the child here in a small clinic,” etc. And then she turned to the woman and said, “Are you married?” And the woman said, “Oh, yes.” And she said, “Is your husband here?” And she said, “No, he’s not here.” Sara said, “What does your husband do?” And she said, “Oh, he’s a saboteur. He’s in jail. He blows up pylons.”

Q: We were just really engaging in our own civil rights actions in the United States at this time. What was the atmosphere of the embassy as far as engaging on this issue, because it wasn’t that clear in the United States in those days?

RAU: It wasn’t that clear in the embassy, either. Without mentioning names, I can tell you that there was almost a dividing line down the middle among those who felt that the current South African government had the right answer and others who said that this was wrong and that we should be opting or trying to get people to be on the side of democracy and get the Africans too. As I say, this division was pretty stark, but the embassy was playing the game of, for example, when we had the Fourth of July reception we had two receptions. We had one for the government people and others who would come, and normally that was a fairly good turnout, and then we had a second one, which was an open reception, where we invited the Indian community, Chinese, black, whatever, of prominence, and to that one the government people would not come. And so we held two separate receptions for the Fourth of July. Now we were lucky. I say we as diplomats there, because if we wanted to entertain blacks or others in our homes, we could do that. They probably were watched, and if they were on any suspicious list, they might have been picked up and questioned after leaving. But we were lucky in another sense. My wife was part of a group that tried to get scholarships for African students, for black students. And they also ran a feeding scheme for one of the townships, Mamelodi Township outside of Pretoria. So through them I got to meet the principal of the Mamelodi High School, which in numbers was the biggest high school in the area. He had gone to Fort Hare, which was the only university blacks could attend in South Africa then, and he was a fairly well educated man. And we had them out for a dinner party. I remember it very vividly because I went to USIS and they had some films - in those days, there were no videos. They had some films of Miriam Makeba, the South African singer who was here in the states and was kind of a national hero among the blacks, and so I checked one of those out and brought it home, and we had a party. And it was mainly blacks. There were a few whites there, but it was mainly blacks, friends of this principal of the high school and others. We showed this film, and, oh, they enjoyed this very much.
And at one point, Dixon Mphahlele, who was the principal - we’d had a couple of beers or drinks, I can’t remember which - and after the dinner party, I was sitting with him, and I said, “Dixon, you’re an educated man,” I said, “how do you survive in a system like this, where your horizons are definitely limited?” And he said, “Oh, yes,” - the South African blacks at that time, at least those in the country still that weren’t in jail, were pretty docile - and he said, “Yes, it’s a problem at times,” he said; “however,” he said, with a little twinkle in his eye, “we have one thing going for us that they don’t know about.” And I said, “What is that they don’t know about?” He said, “We can out-produce them.” He had eight children, I think. The ratio was very broad at that point.

Q: A little earlier on, in 1960 to ’61, I was in INR, in African INR, and I didn’t deal with South Africa, but I knew all together there and the general consensus was that someday there was going to be the night of long knives, that the only way the South African white government would go down would be by a revolution and a mass exodus of whites with lots of bloodshed. What was the feeling about how this thing would end - or would it end - at that time at the embassy?

RAU: Well, there was a feeling among those who were in favor of the system ending. There was, I would say, a sense of discouragement, because every time these people, that is, the opposition - the non-whites, if you will - started to get organized, they’d be broken up by the state security system. BOSS as they called it, the Bureau of State Security, was a very efficient system. Mandela was a perfect example. When he was getting to the point where he seemed to be an organizer in this, and they found some, what turned out later to be rather trumped-up, charges, he was thrown in jail for 28 years. So there was a sense that, yes, if there ever is, but then the only way this was going to happen, really, was from some outside intervention. Nobody really thought that this kind of revolution would be engendered from the inside, because, as I say, you have to have organizers for that and people who are in the forefront, and the state security apparatus seemed to have a pretty good hold on that.

Q: You were an economic officer. You were, what, 35 miles, you say, from Johannesburg? That was the economic heart of South Africa, wasn’t it?

Q: Yes, except that the central bank and the government offices were in Pretoria. And my dealings were with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the central bank and that sort of thing because South Africans - as I say, I’d done some research on this when I was out at Berkeley - they were great believers - and there’s still a school that felt that way - that the gold standard - gold was the end-all and be-all - and that once people went off the gold standard, there was no margin for security there. And so the people that were proponents of that system were people that I mainly associated with in my official capacity. The central bank followed that kind of rule all the time, and the South African rand, the currency at that time, was very strong, very solid, very stable.

Q: Well, what were you looking at in the economy? Did you have a particular slice of the economy?
RAU: Yes, I was looking primarily not at their foreign economy, because they didn’t have much. There were very few nations they traded with. They didn’t need to trade. They were self-sufficient in everything except oil. And they started to make oil from coal about the time I was there and were producing maybe as much as 15% of their needs that way. And then other countries would sell them oil, either secretly or otherwise. So they never really ran short. And everything else they had in great quantities in the country.

Q: Well, how did you see the economy, EU, and the others looking at it? Did you see it as a strong one?

RAU: It was a very strong economy, with the benefits accruing primarily to the whites, with a few exceptions. The Indian community had some good merchants that had done fairly well, but very few blacks at the time. And I’ve often thought that lower middle-class, middle-class whites had the best living they could have had any place in the world there, if they could ignore this other problem of race, because they all lived in good housing and they sent their children to good schools. A lot of them had swimming pools. They lived a living standard - they had servants, they all had servants - they had a living standard that nobody could equal anywhere in the world that I know of for that middle class community.

Q: Did you find that particularly from, say, the Netherlands or Great Britain that there were people coming in there, or people who had served, let’s say, in the Rhodesias or elsewhere, Kenya, who were sort of using this as a hidey-hole?

RAU: Your point again is well taken, because while I was there the former Southern Rhodesia declared its independence.

Q: UDI.

RAU: UDI. And Ian Smith, who was the leader at the time - I remember, we had a number of tracking stations in South Africa for tracking space shots and that sort of thing, and I was out at one of the tracking stations with a congressman or a staff member from Congress at the time - when the UDI speech came on the radio, the “Unilateral Declaration of Independence.”

Q: Yes, UDI, not SDI.

RAU: And he, Smith, paraphrased the Declaration of Independence of the United States. When you read it, you can see that immediately. But as a result of that, as you know, the British embargo etc., the whites were not able to survive. They survived for quite a while, and they had aid from South Africa, but they weren’t able to survive. And when the Smith régime fell, when he gave up and they declared their real independence, quite a few of the white Rhodesians came down into South Africa and settled there. And they were people who had had certain skills that the South Africans could use, like agriculturists of
different kinds, farmers, tobacco farmers, that sort of thing. So yes, there were a lot of
them that found their home in South Africa. There was a Rhodesian mission there and I
got to know some of the people in the diplomatic mission from Rhodesia. Certainly their
natural allies in South Africa were the English-speaking South Africans, not the
Afrikaners, although the Afrikaners were in charge of the government, so they had a little
bit more, let us say, liberal attitude toward race than the Afrikaners normally did, but they
still believed that we were on the wrong track and some sort of gradual assimilation,
maybe a qualified franchise for those who were educated, would be the answer,
eventually.

Q: Were South African - I’m talking about particularly white - eyes focused on
developments in the States?

RAU: They were definitely focused on the States. Papers would be filled with the riots in
California. It was always the negative side of things, not the positive side of things. While
I was there also Robert Kennedy came to South Africa. He didn’t come to Pretoria; he
went to Capetown, Johannesburg. He had an enormous reception by the black
community. He was, I won’t say snubbed, but he was treated just civilly by the South
African government at the time, because they knew what he stood for and what he was
there to represent. But yes, they did follow events very closely in the United States.

Q: Did you find that South Africa was being used sort of as a visiting place for maybe
both sides of the race question or those who wanted to get press attention from the United
States.

RAU: Not both sides. Certainly the ones who were friends of South Africa, if you will, of
the government - they came, and they were entertained royally and shown around and
shown what they wanted to see, etc. And there was no question, as I said: from the
economic point of view, things looked good there if you were white. Everything was in
order, where chaos was, in a sense, reigning in a lot of black Africa at the time, but they
were dealing with independence.

Q: Well, I would imagine that as an economic officer one of our goals, of course, is to
promote trade, and this was basically a no-no for us.

RAU: Well, that was where we really had problems, because we had a military embargo
on trade with South Africa, but our British and French allies honored this in the breach,
especially the French. The South African army started ordering Panhard armored cars and
Alouette helicopters and things, and the French would supply all these things, whereas we
– I must say, though, that our military at the time, we had only attachés there, but they
thought our official policy was all wet. They were all in favor of a better relationship with
the South African military. It was again the old Communist threat. You know, “These
people will be on our side when the chips are down.” It’s so much so that I remember one
of the air attachés there who became very close to the régime. He retired and decided to
stay there. He stayed in South Africa. And the Agency also, the CIA, was very heavily
involved with the state security operation.

*Q:* How did you find dealing with the South African government? What would you say relations were like that you would find and your colleagues would find?

RAU: Well, on the economic side, it was easier for us. The relationship was good, because what we were looking for - and they had some very good statistics; they had some good publications that were put out in both English and Afrikaans. And I started, I took Afrikaans lessons while I was there just so I could read the newspapers and some of the publications. When I went to call on usually anybody below ministerial rank - because the economic counselor took care of that sort of thing - I was given just about anything I asked for. Now I must say that during that period Southwest Africa was still a part of South Africa; it wasn’t Namibia then. And Pat O’Sheel, who was the number two political officer, and I went to Southwest Africa and spent the better part of three or four weeks up there. He was looking at the political side, and I was looking at the economic side. We had some interviews with some of the black leaders up there, in their cars, sitting in their cars or our car someplace. The church, the Anglican Church in Southwest Africa, was a friend. We went and talked with them about different things. I remember Bishop Mize was very much in favor of keeping Southwest Africa out of what was happening in South Africa. It was very hard to do. On the economic side, we had huge copper mining up at Tsumeb, which was basically an American operation, and we had the diamonds and we had fish and other aspects that were very lucrative products coming out of Southwest. But you had a sense that Southwest was a little bit more liberal in terms of the racial relationship than South Africa was.

*Q:* How about those of British stock in South Africa? Did they seem to come a lot more liberal?

RAU: Not really, with a few exceptions. There were some journalists, in Johannesburg primarily, who felt that way. The *Daily Mail* and *Johannesburg Star* papers had British elements that worked for them, and later Alistair Sparks and people like that who had a British education anyway, became first-rate journalists. And they were of the more liberal persuasion, shall we say.

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*Q:* Let’s start where we left off. We noted that this did not include Turkey, and we need to finish up your South African tour, which is when to when?

RAU: The South African tour was from 1964 to 1967.

*Q:* In the South African assignment, you were at what post?

RAU: As I said before, I was in Pretoria as the second man in the economic section.


Q: Looking over what you've already said, what shall we talk about today?

RAU: We’ve covered most of the points on South Africa and the political situation when we were there. We discussed the embassy’s position, which was awkward to say the least, and our relationship with the South African government officials as well as with the rest of the South African population. I guess where we left off was, you had asked me a question about some of the liberal whites in South Africa that we had associated with. That is, they were liberal in the sense that they saw that apartheid was not working and they wanted to find some solution. I think the only thing we can say is that the architect of apartheid was assassinated while I was there, Prime Minister Verwoerd. That seemed to be a turning point, in a way, for the whole apartheid policy and the homeland policy. When I left in the summer of 1967, a rigid form of apartheid was still very much in existence. I suppose this was brought home to me most poignantly when we left.

We were staying in a hotel in Pretoria, and we had taken our female house servant with us who was taking care of the children. They had separate quarters at the hotel for people who had servants who were managing children. My wife and I had gone out for the evening and, when we came back to the hotel--our train was to leave the next morning, I got a call about three o’clock in the morning from an Afrikaner police sergeant at the local police station. He asked me if I had a woman by the name of Molly Tanyani in the group, and I said, “Yes.” He said, “Well, we have her down in the jail, and she’s given your number.”

So I got dressed and went down to the jail and bailed her out. I think I mentioned before that Molly was a Bantu - they call them the Blacks, the Africans - and was very well educated in practical terms. She spoke two or three languages: she spoke English well, she spoke Afrikaans, she spoke two or three native languages. Like all Africans, her personal life was a mess because of apartheid. She had been born just outside the city of Pretoria in a black township. Anyway, the police sergeant had her in jail there, and the reason was that she had gone to visit a friend in one of the white areas of Pretoria and had overstayed her welcome so to speak. After a certain hour, they were not supposed to be in this white area, and she was in the area visiting her friend in her quarters when the police, for whatever reason, made a raid and picked her up for being in an area she wasn’t supposed to be in after hours. So, I bailed her out, and we started walking back to the hotel. Tears were streaming down her face, and I said, “Molly, forget about that. I am just happy that the Afrikaner sergeant called me. He was under no obligation to do that but he did.” I said, “What would have happened if I hadn’t come down and he hadn’t called me?” She said, “Well, as usual, they would have probably held me for a week or so and then they would have released me, and I would go back to whatever I was doing.” I thought to myself, “What a waste of people that this can go on.”

Q: What were you and your fellow officers sitting around thinking about this? How did you see South Africa evolving or devolving in the long run there? And, did you see this coming from changes, and what did you feel would be the role of the liberal whites?
RAU: Well, almost to a person, everybody in the embassy and most people I talked with at the time thought this was going to end very tragically with a lot of bloodshed. There was going to be some sort of revolt that would be put down harshly but it wouldn’t be put out. They would still continue running it. Mind you at this time, all the African leadership - all of it - was either in jail or out of the country. But, fortunately for mankind, I should say, it didn’t happen, and I think that was principally because of Nelson Mandela. This was another amusing part of it. The move to get Mandela out of prison on Robbins Island was really instigated through the Ministry of the Interior, and most importantly through their CIA, the Bureau of State Security. They were smart enough at least to see that this man might be able to control things if they could get him out and back him as a leader among his own people. This was especially true with the leadership of the African National Congress, which was outside the country.

Q: While you were there, did Nelson Mandela ring any bells to people?

RAU: Oh, yes. He did because, as I mentioned, I was assigned there in 1964-1965, and the Rivonia trial had just put him in prison the year before. It was a very celebrated trial. We knew all about Nelson Mandela and that he’d gone off to jail. They kept throwing different parts of the apartheid laws against him so that he now was in prison for a lifetime sentence. Yes, we knew very much about him, not much about his legal work, but his work as a leader.

Q: When you left South Africa in 1967, you went to Turkish language training. How did this come about?

RAU: At this point as I said earlier, I had been in Greece, and I had spoken Greek pretty fluently, enough to pass the exam. An assignment of mine had been changed because they had another officer who was a language officer over there after training. I didn’t have the Greek language under the Department’s long-term training; I did it more or less on my own. So, they broke my assignment to Cyprus and sent the language officer there in my stead. I thought, well, if I want to get back to that part of the world, I’ve got to do it the official way. I had a choice of either Turkish or Iranian (Farsi). Fortunately for me, I chose Turkish. I didn’t know much about either language but, because I’d shown a facility with difficult languages, they gave me the assignment to Turkish language training.

Q: How long was Turkish language training?

RAU: It’s the same as it is now, I think, 44 weeks in Washington.

Q: This was basically from 1967 to 1968.

RAU: That’s correct.

Q: One of the off shoots of language training is that you pick up an awful lot from your
teachers about the culture and the country. I mean just in interaction.

RAU: Precisely.

Q: What were you getting from the Turks?

RAU: The Turkish teachers you are talking about.

Q: Yes.

RAU: It is interesting that you mentioned that because you always in your lifetime meet some unforgettable characters. One of them that I met at the time was our principal teacher who was head of Turkish language training, a man by the name of Selman Arâgli. Selman had been in the United States for quite a while, still very Turkish in his mannerisms, but he was pretty well acclimated to the United States. He knew a great deal about Turkey, and he was a real raconteur. He told a lot of stories about Turkey and kept us amused. What he was doing was writing the principal textbook, which probably has gone through several emendations since then on Turkish language training. He used our class—there were three of us in our class to begin with—as guinea pigs to try out some of these new ideas he had for this textbook. We in a sense helped him to write that textbook.

Q: When you were going to go up against the Turks as a diplomat, what sort of characteristics were you getting from your Turkish teachers? How would they be different?

RAU: I used to compare them with the Greeks whom I knew fairly well. What I was gleaning at that time and certainly came to understand more clearly after I got there on assignment was that the Turks were much more, shall I say, deliberate people. They were slow to anger, slow to accept something, slow to pick up on something, unlike the Greeks who were very quick and very quick to make an idea, right or wrong, and to go off sometimes in the wrong direction with their idea. Turks are much more deliberate people. But once they were seized with an issue or something, they were like bulldogs. They really got after it. That was and still is part of the problem between Greece and Turkey, the difference in the attitude of these two peoples.

Q: Were you getting anything from your Turkish teachers about the Greek-Cyprus-Turkish problem?

RAU: Yes, we had briefings on that, and one of the officers in our training, Art Giese, was very interested in the Cyprus question as well. In fact, we had to write a study paper while we were there in language training, and I wrote mine on the approach of Greece and Turkey to the Cyprus problem at the United Nations. It was kind of a litmus test, if you will, of the relationship between the two. The Greeks were very good at presenting the Greek case before the United Nations on Cyprus and the Turks, although good, did not understand the importance of world opinion and getting, for example, the Arab nations on
their side in this dispute. As a result, most of it went the Greek way in the United Nations.

Q: Now your assignment was to where?

RAU: The first assignment was to Izmir, Turkey.

Q: And you were there from 1968 to when?

RAU: I was there from 1968 to 1971. I was supposed to be assigned for two years to Izmir and then to replace Myles Green who had moved from Izmir to Ankara. I was a political officer at that time, and I was supposed to go to Ankara. I spent a third year in Izmir at the request of the ambassador and the new consul general. We changed consul general while I was there, and they wanted some continuity.

Q: Who was the consul general when you arrived?

RAU: It was Guy Anderson Lee.

Q: And who was the ambassador?

RAU: At that time it was Bill Macomber. He was later replaced by Bob Hanley.

Q: Now, what was the situation in 1968 when you arrived in Izmir? What was the situation you saw in Turkey in the local area but, first, sort of broad?

RAU: Well, I guess about late 1968 - we got there in July - they had an election and Suleiman Demirel, most recently president, was re-elected as the head of the Justice Party and as prime minister of Turkey. At the same time, there was an increasing amount of Leftist influence and street violence, or urban terrorism, as we call it today. It was really beginning back then. We would see all kinds of demonstrations against visits by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, for example, in Turkish ports. We had them then, and we still have the visits, but they were always surrounded by all kinds of attempts to make the visits unsuccessful.

Q: What do we feel was motivating the Leftist groups?

RAU: That’s a good question. If you believe the official policy and line at the time, they were all Communist-supporting or Soviet-supporting groups who were intent on getting Turkey out of NATO and making Turkey more independent, meaning making them more dependent on the Soviet Union. I don’t think that was necessarily the case. The Turkish educational system was almost bankrupt at the time, and a lot of these revolts were led by students. There weren’t jobs available for graduates when they got out of universities, and the university system was honey-combed with all kinds of different people who were students, part-time students, or non-students who were instigating a lot of this trouble. I think a lot of it was domestic oriented rather than foreign oriented.
Q: What were the dynamics of Izmir itself?

RAU: Do you mean as an official community, or as a community per se?

Q: Well, I mean both as an official community and as a community per se. What was going on in Izmir?

RAU: Izmir, as you probably know under the old name of Smyrna, was one of the first American consulates we had in the whole Middle East. It had always had a Levantine community, a large community of Greeks, Italians, French, and British so-called Levantine because their families had come there years ago. They stayed on but they still carried the passports of their original nations. They made up a large part of the population in Izmir. While we were there, that was changing. We still had the NATO contingent there because there was a sub-NATO headquarters in Izmir. Our principal job, officially, was to keep a liaison as well as possible between the Turkish populace and the American military or NATO military that were there in the community. While we were there, the Greeks had a one-officer consulate, as I recall. The British had an honorary consul there, and most of the others did not have official or career representation. So, we played a major role in trying to keep this whole community in liaison with the military community and the rest of the official American community.

Q: What was your impression of the Turkish bureaucracy in the area?

RAU: Well, it was Ottoman bureaucracy in those days. It still is to a large extent but it was much more so in those days. We had a very dynamic mayor, Osman Kibar, who was what they called in Turkish, a Dönme. Apparently back in his ancestry, he was Jewish, one of the Jews converted to Islam. He was a very popular mayor, and he did a lot for the city. The crowning glory, of course, was the Izmir Trade Fair, which was held every year. The governor was a good career servant, Namik Senturk, who went from there as governor to Istanbul. I met him there again. With the exception there when you got down below the upper levels you really got into a maze of bureaucracy that made our red tape officials look like pikers in comparison.

Q: The 1968 to 1971 period was a time when an awful lot of Arab students around the world and a lot of Americans were taking off. They had discovered the wonders of hashish and that sort of thing. It wasn’t what we consider the more deadly drugs but it was rather hashish and some opium. Israel was sitting in the middle of a poppy field, practically, and was also on the route back for people who’d join Afghanistan and all that in those days.

RAU: You’re right.

Q: You must have been up to your neck in Americans in drug encounters.

RAU: We were not involved so much as Istanbul, which was much more, but certainly
that’s when they put a DEA station in Istanbul in about those years.

_Q: Do you mean the Drug Enforcement Agency?_

RAU: Yes. It was called the BNDD, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. One celebrated case we had was the young man whom the Turkish police picked up who had been boarding a Turkish ferry boat to go on over to Greece. We sent an agent down from Istanbul to interview him and, in effect, take him into custody because he was wanted in the United States for narcotics offenses. I received him in the consulate because I was the political officer at the time. I remember that he walked into my office - a very handsome young man about my age, I should say, at that time - and the first thing he did was to take out his weapon and slap it down in my out box. He said to me, “Now tell me what you already know about this man.” I said, “Well, you know as much about him as I do.” The Turkish authorities had picked him up, and he had in his suitcase a big load - I don’t think it was hashish - it was processed opium in some form. Anyway that was the beginning of it, and I realized that this was really going to be a great thing. We didn’t see a lot of the Turkish police who were working on narcotics because, even though we were responsible for the American side, that was something the Turks kept pretty much to themselves. We did not have an Agency (CIA) presence in Izmir, so there wasn’t any liaison directly there.

_Q: Well, did you find yourself attending trials, making prison visits, and that sort of thing?_

RAU: We had a consular officer there who did attend trials.

_Q: Who was the consular officer?_

RAU: Originally, it was a woman by the name of Inez Pulver, and Inez is still living here in the District. I see her occasionally. She was a very motherly-like person, and some of these were very young people, young girls or young men who were off on a journey around the world. I remember one in particular who had been an art student out in California that Inez took a liking to. They managed to get her out of jail but she stayed with Inez for a couple of months while her trial was pending. Finally, she spent a limited amount of time in a Turkish prison but then they released her. After every election, the new prime minister could choose to release prisoners of a certain kind, and so she got released from prison. The art student still corresponds with Inez, who turned her life around.

_Q: How about dealing with our military? Again, you are dealing with a lot of young kids. You and I have had our time as young kids in the military. It’s sort of a time that breeds irresponsibility, you know, raising hell and all that. When they are stuck in the middle of a Turkish society, particularly in a rural, conservative one, I’ll bet there are a lot of problems.
RAU: There were problems but I must say that the military had a good set up there. The headquarters, which was the NATO headquarters, was commanded by a three-star American general. The Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force had a two-star American general as commander at that time. We had top brass there, and they had people under them who had the responsibility of making sure that the American contingent, the American community, really toed the line. We did have a Defense Department high school. If any of these kids got out of line, their parents were sent packing right away with the kid. They didn’t run afoul of the Turkish system to any degree, and they had a lot of activities for them. They had a big softball program and a big athletic program with playing fields. They had a movie theater and that sort of thing.

Q: You mentioned this demonstration. How did you deal with it?

RAU: Yes, well, we got wind of them as quickly as possible, and we’d notify the American community through our own internal system that this demonstration was coming on. Usually, when we got wind of them, there were certain places where demonstrations would gather. One was Ataturk Square in the center in Izmir. So we would tell people to stay clear of them even though a lot of them lived very close to there, as we did, near the water front. But just to say, “Don’t get involved in any way; this is an internal Turkish situation.” The Turkish police were pretty good at keeping them separated and breaking up fights. There were attempts at laying bombs and that sort of thing outside the high school but never against the NATO headquarters. It was pretty well protected.

Q: Speaking of demonstrations and all, this is also the time American students were raising hell in the United States over the Vietnam War. Were there any reflections of this in Turkey?

RAU: Do you mean among the American community?

Q: No, were the Turks pestering you about it?

RAU: Very few Turks that I met or knew were interested in the Vietnam War. They were more seriously interested in their own situation at home. As I say, mostly internal politics were the focus of demonstrations. Even the American kids that I knew, and they went up through high school seniors since most of them were military brats, were not interested in making demonstrations against the Vietnam War.

Q: What were the politics of the Izmir area? What did the Izmir consular district consist of?

RAU: It is a pretty large consular district. It is in the bread basket of Turkey. It has most of the agricultural area including, as you said, the poppy-growing area. Tobacco is a big crop there also. There were some long-time American tobacco people residents who were there as buyers for the major tobacco companies. It was principally an agricultural area.
There is little industry in the area to speak of. There are a couple of small plants, and now some of them have grown very large. They are run by Turks, beer making and that sort of thing. Most of the economy was based on agriculture. The consular district was very large. It overlapped in part with Adana where we had a consulate.

Q: What were the politics in that area?

RAU: They were pretty conservative by and large. Demirel comes from Isparta, a Justice Party stronghold. It was a successor to the old Democrat Party and, although business oriented, it was pretty much conservative. It was not like the old Republican Peoples party, which was more to the left and center.

Q: Were you monitoring what was going on in the area?

RAU: Politically, you mean?

Q: Yes.

RAU: I monitored the area politically and economically because we had no economic officer per se. We did get one young training officer in there and did some economic work for a while. By and large, we had consular and, then, I did the political-economic. The consul general was, in effect, showing the flag, and an administrative officer.

Q: How easy was it to talk to the political types?

RAU: It was pretty easy. The problem was and it’s still true, I’m sure, that you can get the “it is” of sitting in the capital city on the sea breeze side and not get out often enough in the other provinces. We tried to get out as often as possible, if not officially, then unofficially. Every place I went, I went to see the mayor, the chief of police and the local governor who took his orders from Ankara. It is a very centralized government. We got to see them. In some cases, we’d call on the chief of police because, if it were a place where there might be Sixth Fleet vessels calling, we’d want to move them through. It was pretty easy to meet the Turkish government officials.

Q: Did you run across examples of fraud? When I was consul general in Athens, we used to send a federal agency officer, Corins, over and we used to have to go up and had all sorts of problems.

RAU: Are you talking about Social Security cases?

Q: Yes, Social Security cases, and there were people who ran Social Security. These were Turks who sort of made sure the checks were collected and got their cut and all that, and there were a lot of dubious checks being issued. Did you get involved with that?

RAU: I didn’t because that was the realm of the consular officer, and she usually
accompanied the Turkish official when they were out in the district some place. But I know what you said existed.

Q: Were we doing anything about the poppy growth?

RAU: We were essentially doing it through the embassy, which later came to pass much more when Ambassador Hanley came in. He’d been in Vietnam on one of the programs there. This was a major role of his in getting the Turkish government officially to go out of the opium poppy growing business. They were trying to find a substitute crop for the farmer who lived on these crops, not just illicitly, but by selling them to the state factories. They found a way, and they finally got the Turkish government, though a caretaker government, I might say, to go out of the opium poppy growing business. It cost that prime minister his life. He was assassinated.

Q: At that time, were we seeing Turkey trying to exert influence in the Middle East in Syria and Palestine?

RAU: I didn’t see it from my vantage point. I am sure there was some of this going on through the embassy in Ankara where they were following this. I might add here that I’m a great supporter and admirer of the Turkish foreign service. I think they get first-rate people in their embassies, and they have good sense in terms of protecting Turkey’s interests in which direction they should be going. In that sense, yes, I think they were well represented. There wasn’t any major move because everything was oriented now toward the Soviet Union, toward looking north. I didn’t take official interest in the contacts and communication with the lands to the south, all the Arab countries.

Q: Was religious fundamentalism much of a movement at that time?

RAU: No, it was there but it wasn’t much of a movement. In fact, the fringe parties had a small contingency. During election, they would vie for seats in parliament but they were very small. They didn’t have much influence. That later came to pass, as you know, when communications improved in religions and when Turgut Ozal was elected prime minister. It was really a new American style campaign that he ran. He had television in every village and made talks. No, fundamentalism had not reached the point where it is today.

Q: What crimes against Kurds did you witness?

RAU: There were Kurds, and they were pretty well assimilated in the population. Most of the Kurdish population was unassimilated because they were way out in southeast Turkey. Most of those were in the Adana consular district, and we didn’t go in there. Maybe the embassy did, but we didn’t. So what we saw were members of the cabinet who were Kurds.

Q: Was there much in the folklore about the Greek Wars in the 1920s and the expulsion from Smyrna and all that?
RAU: I remember one evening. We had a consul general - you probably remember him from Cyprus - named Toby Belcher. Toby Belcher came over on holiday, and I put him together at dinner with the commanding general of the Turkish air force there in Izmir. He was a very articulate man who spoke good English. They had a real discussion on the whole issue of Cyprus while we were there. They both agreed that there had to be some sort of solution short of Greece taking over Cyprus and of Turkey invading northern Cyprus. It was a constant topic of conversation, and this is the source of the famous business the Greeks always refer to, the Turks having an army down there all poised to invade Cyprus. They may have planned it but, if they had an army, nobody knew about it. It wasn’t there, not even landing ships or anything.

Q: Well, having served in Greece, I know the Greeks are really preoccupied by the Turks. But, I’ve understood that it wasn’t reciprocated very much. How did you feel?

RAU: That’s very true. When I first got there I was trying desperately to learn my Turkish better, but I still had my Greek fairly well. I made friends with some of the Greeks who were there in the community. You might remember that, at this time on the military side, this was during the junta in Greece.

Q: Yes, the junta took over April 22, 1967.

RAU: They had re-installed their contingent in Izmir. They had Greek air force officers there who were with NATO. They would usually fly home every weekend but they were there during the work week. They didn’t bring their families to live there except occasionally but they had a good working relationship with the Turkish military that were part of NATO. It may not have been good in Greece in terms of the bilateral relationship.

Q: What was the situation with the students? You were talking about students getting jobs and all that. Did we have much of a USIS or being able to make much contact with do anything for the Turkish students?

RAU: Yes, we had that small leader grant program, and we had a Turkish-American Association site there. The board was run essentially by Turks but there was the public affairs officer there, a man by the name of Benno Selke, when I first went there. He and his German wife who had a wide circle of Turkish friends. I don’t know if they had many friends among the Turkish student community. You must remember, there wasn’t a university in Izmir.

Q: Oh, there wasn’t?

RAU: No, any student contacts were at a much lower level than they were normally associated with.

Q: Was there any influence from the Turkish writers and of Turks going to Germany and
all? Was this a significant way of thinking in Izmir?

RAU: There were quite a few Turks who went to Germany from Izmir, principally to work in the automobile factories. We didn’t hear any bad words about it. I was always a little bit surprised that the Germans didn’t have more of an official presence in Izmir. They did in Istanbul. USIS ran a full exchange program and Izmir contributed to it because they had a lot of young people who would make good leaders. But the program was run out of Istanbul so we didn’t see much of it there.

Q: You left there in 1971.

RAU: As I say, I had been scheduled to go to Ankara, and then I had this third year in Izmir. One day I got a telephone call from Dave Cuthell, who was the DCM in Ankara at the time. He said to me, “Bill, we’ve had a sudden opening that’s happening in Istanbul.” The number two man, Bob Dillon, had been called back to establish a new Turkish office in the Department. He said, “There’s a vacancy now. How would you feel about filling that, rather than coming to Ankara?” I said, “Which plane do you want me on?” In many ways it may not have been the best for my career, but it was certainly a better place to live. I went up and replaced Bob Dillon instead of going to Ankara.

Q: Robert made quite a name for himself working on, I think it was Izmir, by knowing most of the people of the Justice Party because they were from that area. People in Ankara had sort of dismissed them and they didn’t have those contacts.

RAU: I think that’s true. In fact, some years ago when Sara and I returned to Washington, Suleiman Demirel was president. I think Bob Dillon was a very good friend of Demirel’s and still is, I guess.

Q: I’m not sure. Have we filled in the gap, do you think?

RAU: I think we filled in the gap up to the time of the assignment to Istanbul.

Q: Again, were you looking at, quote, “Soviet Menace” while you were in Istanbul?

RAU: Yes, it was always there. In fact, the Soviet consulate was a fairly good sized consulate general in Istanbul. And they had the advantage because they had a lot of Turkic speakers whom they could post in that country - you know, native Turkic speakers from the provinces, etc. We got to know them fairly well. They had some very bright consuls general and other officers while we were there. And I remember one of them who - according to what I heard from our Agency people - was really a naval attaché in disguise who was there as vice-consul, and he decided to cultivate me because I lived out in Rumeli Hisar and they were interested in these vantage points where they could watch the ships, etc. So he did it through my dog. He said he had some sort of interest in dogs and he wanted to see Alex, my dog, and he arranged - we had a sort of crazy Scotsman who use to come and stay in our house when we went on home leave, and he was a writer
and he wanted to get to the Soviet Union. So this fellow arranged passage for Marcus Brook, this writer, on a Soviet cruise ship which was going up through the Black Sea. And they more or less paid his way, and he went up and was supposed to write articles for the British papers on that trip, so they used that as a pretext, because he had been living in my house, to come up and visit me, take an interest in my dog. Yes, we got to know them. I guess the one time was when Nixon visited Moscow while we were there and the Soviet consul general called Jim Spain, our consul general, and said, “You know, we would like to celebrate the arrival of your president in Moscow by inviting you to a dinner party.” And they had, as most of the consulates did (we were one of the exceptions), these big summer places on the Bosporus where they used to retreat when the weather got hot. The Germans had a huge compound. And the Russians had a fairly good-sized one. So we were invited out there. And Jim selected, I don’t know - three or four officers to go and himself. And they had a like number from the Soviet consulate. We had this huge groaning banquet table with a waiter behind each chair and many, many vodka toasts - you know, to your president, and to friendship between our two countries, etc. - and then we went out into this garden, beautiful garden, and they showed a film of the ballerina Plisetskaya.

Q: Oh, yes.

RAU: Jim used to make fun of this, but I’m sure this guy was frightened to death. In the middle of this film, the film broke, and the lights had to come up, and he was back there nervously sweating trying to put this thing back together - and finally did, after a long time. And the lights went down, and they started the film up again. And I looked back and they had another operator. Whoever he was was gone and never seen again. But it was an interesting night, and we didn’t get to know them that well but at least we had a chance to rub elbows with them.

Q: How did you find getting to know Turkish politicians and leaders and all? Were these people you were out looking for?

RAU: Yes, when they would come down for the weekend. They were not resident there, most of them, except for the mayor and the governor. We got to know them, but all the central politicians were in Ankara most of the week. They’d come down on the weekend and we’d talk to them, when they came down to spend the weekend in Istanbul. We got to know the journalists fairly well because they were right there in the community. The best journalists were in Istanbul. Of course, USIA had a very large program for English language training and also for the library and cultural events. They did a lot there. But no, political leaders, with the exception of the governor and the mayor and the Third Army commander, which we got to know pretty well in Istanbul, too.

Q: The Turkish Third Army? Vs. the Greek Third Army?

RAU: Oh, I’m sorry, it’s the Turkish First Army.
Q: I was going to say, you got your armies mixed up.

RAU: That’s right. It is the Turkish First Army. That’s right

Q: Did they seem as much on the alert as the Greek Third Army?

RAU: Yes, except that their alertness was not directed so much against the Greek borders; it was directed more on the northern borders.

Q: Toward Bulgaria?

RAU: Yes, toward Bulgaria and over in eastern Turkey you get to the Soviet Union, of course. And yes, very much so. We had a couple of officers, as they did in Thessaloniki, that went to their Higher Defense College in Istanbul, a couple of American officers.

Q: What about fleet visits? Did you get any fleet visits?

RAU: Yes, they called those off because of the terrorism while I was there. But we did get quite a few, and we had to watch very carefully where these sailors went when they came on shore because they had to be in protected areas. Of course, the Turks always knew when the fleet was coming in. Keeping it classified was a joke. The ladies of the evening would all find out about it a week or more before, through their grapevine, and it would be all over the place when they were coming in. But eventually, because there were a couple of sailors - they weren’t hurt badly but they were thrown back into the sea, etc. - so they had to call off these visits for a while.

Q: What about American tourism?

RAU: There wasn’t any at that time to speak of. The few people who knew anything about Turkey where those, like I was, that had served in the area before and knew about the possibilities. Real tourism had not really hit in Turkey as it had in Greece.

Q: How was the social life there?

RAU: It was interesting and just about right, because we still had a burgeoning family. I contrasted when I went back years later as consul general and the social life was really incredible. I mean it was six nights a week two or three things just go, go, go. And I realized then that the consul general, if he can, will try to get somebody to substitute at some things. But in many things the Turks are not interested in seeing the number two or any replacement. They want to see the consul general. So I didn’t have that when I was there with Jim Spain. I went to a lot of things that we had in common, but he had to go much more than I did, of course. When I say “had to,” it was just an act of presence - you had to be there, that’s all, make an appearance. What was interesting at that time was the beginning of the Istanbul Festival. The head of one of the largest pharmaceutical companies, Nejat Eczacibasi, started the Istanbul Festival, which grew into a world-class
music festival, arts festival. And we attended some of the original sessions of it. We got to see *Abduction from the Seraglio* of Mozart in the Seraglio. Incredible. Anyway that was another story later on. But yes, the social life was hectic, but it wasn’t frenetic, as it later was.

*Q:* Well, you left there in ‘73.

RAU: Yes, this was at a time when we fully expected to go back to the department. They said, “You’ve been out a long time except for training.” And I said, “Okay, I’m ready. Offer me some sort of position that I can come back to.” Just about when I had convinced my wife we were going back to Washington - in fact, we didn’t own any property in Washington - so when I’d just about convinced her of that, I got a call from Washington and said “Would you consider going as economic counselor to Kabul, Afghanistan?” And I said, “Whoa, that’s one I have to try out on my wife before I can do that one.” And we finally decide to go, and I think it was for principally one major reason - well, two reasons. Ted Eliott was the new ambassador there, and I had a great deal of respect for him, and, two, all of our sons - because when we went to Istanbul, I didn’t want to put my son in private school in Europe some place, and there wasn’t any high school there. He was ready for his sophomore year, so he came back to Washington and stayed with friends and went to Chevy Chase High School for a year. But this would give us an opportunity in Afghanistan to have all four of the children with us because there was an international high school in Kabul. There was a big AID mission and a UN presence, so they had a high school. So on those conditions, I said yes.

*Q:* You were in Kabul from ‘73 to-

RAU: To ‘75. We wanted to drive overland to go there from Istanbul. We could have done it. The ambassador’s wife, Ted Elliott’s wife did it. She drove down in a Land Rover. But there was a *coup d’état* that took place in Kabul. The king was in Italy on vacation or something, and he was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammed Daoud, while he was out of the country. And so I couldn’t get a visa because all the people in Ankara etc. were *persona non grata*, and our embassy told me to fly in and they would have a visa for me at the airport, which is what we did.

*Q:* In 1973 when you arrived there had just been this coup. Was this just a garden variety palace coup or-

RAU: It was more or less a palace coup because Daoud was a cousin of the king, and he was of royal, you know, princely blood as well. So he took over and it was, well, a continuation of the same old without a king. He established a republic, so called, and he was the prime minister and president both, and for two years we lived in, I’d say, relative - well, not altogether - isolation because we had a big AID mission. We would go down to the southwestern part of the country to where they were doing a lot of agricultural things, but most of our life was still around Kabul. In fact, it was an R&R post, and the closest place we could get to outside that environment of Kabul was Peshawar in
Pakistan. We’d drive out there once in a while to spend a day or so. That was about it. Beautiful country but very stark, very primitive, feudal, tribal, which it still is today.

**Q:** You were economic counselor.

**RAU:** I was economic counselor there. The AID mission was on the other side of town, and that was a major part of the US presence there. I acted as the ambassador’s representative to the AID mission. I attended all their staff meetings got involved with all their projects on behalf of the ambassador.

**Q:** I would have thought that being an economic counselor, other than the AID role, there wasn’t much to look at.

**RAU:** No, there wasn’t. I made an arrangement with the consular officer there, Bruce Beardsley. Do you know Bruce?

**Q:** No.

**RAU:** He was the consular officer there. Now, anybody who asked for a visa to come to the States who claimed he was a businessman, I wanted to see him, I wanted to talk to him. And he did. He’d introduce me. The funny thing was these guys would come in in turbans and the long dress, etc. and they were in the market, merchants in the bazaar, and when Bruce would ask them, “What wherewithal do you have to show that you won’t become a public charge when you get to the United States?” they would open up (a couple of cases I remember) a passbook from the Dime Savings Bank in Brooklyn. They’d have something like $40,000, because they were dealing everything in that bazaar. The biggest export at that time from the United States to Afghanistan was used clothing, these huge bundles of used clothing.

**Q:** They were mostly suit jackets, weren’t they?

**RAU:** They were remnants. You know at the end of the season, they’d pack them all up and sell them by the pound or whatever, and they’d buy up a whole shipload of these things and send them over. Then you’d see them when you’d go out in the bazaar. You know, they’d be hanging up. You could buy last year’s fashion, whatever.

**Q:** How about with the government? Did you have much to do with the government?

**RAU:** Yes, I had a lot to do with the minister of commerce, and that was mainly on the aid program. That’s what they were really interested in, with the agricultural assistance program, training programs for sending people to the United States, etc. I didn’t have much to do on the strictly political side. The ambassador, Ted Elliott, spoke Farsi fairly well, and he learned Dari well enough to, in fact, give a television interview with them. So he and the DCM and the political counselor had most of that under their belts. And the foreign minister (he was not a full-fledged foreign minister because Daoud kind of kept
that to himself), he was kind of a deputy foreign minister. Wahid Abdullah was his name.

The one event that was hard to forget in Kabul was when Henry Kissinger came to Kabul on one of his trips to India, I guess it was, and he stopped off in Kabul. It was supposed to be only for a few hours, and of course, the embassy was in complete turmoil trying to take care of him, because he traveled, as you know, in very royal style. He’d have one plane that would carry his car to the next one and people who were dealing with various parts of the world where he was going would join him at different times. Wells Stabler was one of those that came on this particular flight.

Anyway, he came, and this Wahid Abdullah, this deputy foreign minister, convinced Henry that he should stay there and go see a real *buzkashi*, a game they play there. It’s a primitive form of polo.

*Q: Oh, this with the sheep, the headless sheep?*

RAU: Well, the headless calf they used to use. Goat I think it was originally. It means ‘pull the goat’ or ‘drag the goat.’ But they played it with a headless calf, and they would change the carcass at half time. It was so beat up. Anyway, there was a place called the Jeslyn Grounds which the king used to observe it in Kabul, but it wasn’t the real thing because it was an enclosed area - good horsemanship, but they had to stay within that area. But Abdullah said, “No, you’ve got to see it up north,” in Mazar Sharif, which is up near the Russian border, the Soviet border. And there they play it in a natural bowl surrounded by mountains, and in the middle of this they’ll ride off into the mountains fighting over this carcass and come back five minutes later. So we all flew up there, several of us, with Henry, who decided to do that. But that meant, because Kabul had an airport where you couldn’t take off at night, that he had to spend the night there. We had to make all kinds of last-minute arrangements for him and his party. And they had to go to the Intercontinental Hotel there; we kind of took that over. And he spent the night, but I remember the whole staff was exhausted after this day and a half of the Kissinger mission. He came out to the airport with us the next morning and shook hands with us saying, “Thank you for your help. I know it was an imposition.” He went off on his way to India, I guess it was, from there.

*Q: How about the Soviet hand? How was that?*

RAU: Very strong. It’s the only place I’ve been where they had a much bigger embassy than we did. Even including our AID mission, they had a huge establishment there and a very good working relationship with the Afghans, including Daoud. A lot of them had been trained in the Soviet Union, a lot of their army had been trained in the Soviet Union, and we were definitely second-class in terms of that relationship. We were trying to keep Afghanistan neutral, not get them on our side. As you know, it all came tragically to an end afterwards. Spike Dubs was killed out there.

*Q: After you left, there were four years and all hell breaking loose and the Soviets getting*
involved: did this seem at all in the cards when you were there?

RAU: It didn’t because I didn’t think that the people we knew who were at all politically minded were at all communist-bent. I mean, Islam was still very much in the ascendance there, and I couldn’t see them really doing this for ideological reasons. And as long as the government didn’t want it to happen I didn’t think it was going to happen, but then they had two they had a Chinese communist-oriented party and a Russian-oriented communist party. And the first one was the Russian-oriented that won out, and they seized power, and when their leader was in danger of being overthrown that the Russians were invited in, or the Russians invited themselves in. Brezhnev. But no, when we were there, I wouldn’t have thought that was a possibility. And then as it turned out, it wasn’t a possibility.

Q: And it still isn’t.

RAU: It’s a feudal society. It’s a tribal society. The best example I can give you of that: as I mentioned, Ambassador Elliott was a good Farsi speaker and he decided - there weren’t any roads all over the country - there wasn’t a railroad all the way around - he decided he was going to go in a four-wheel drive vehicle and see parts of the country nobody else had seen. And he did, he took a convoy of them. They went up north and they went over to Herat on the Iranian border and then back down to Kandahar, etc. And he would spend a lot of time spending the night at teahouses, which was the only place there. And he’d come back and tell stories about this. You know we’d be in this one teahouse, and this huge picture of the king would be on the wall. He’d say, “Why do you have a picture of the king on the wall? He’s been out of power for almost two years.” They’d say, “Oh, he’s our king. He’s still there.” He wasn’t there. Their leader was really the feudal leader of that tribe, and that’s exactly what defeated the Soviets.

Q: What about our aid mission, since you were very much involved with it? What were they after?

RAU: Well, it was mainly a traditional aid program in the sense that they had a small contingent that was trying to help the business community in Kabul, such as it was, but the principal function was in agriculture, on making them self-sufficient in agricultural goods. And one of the things we were able to do in the embassy, strangely enough, was to help these two young men who had an arrangement with the Genesco Company in the States for shipping animal skins - that was another big product there - for making shoe leather to this Genesco in Tennessee. And we helped them put together a working arrangement with Genesco where Genesco took all of their - there’s a technique they call the “wet skin” process, where they get it to a certain process. So we were able to do that, and that was one of the few business ventures involving an American firm I know of. Another thing was Pan American still had very much a vested interest in Ariana Airlines and Pan American had a representative there in Kabul who took care of them, made sure that they had Pan Am pilots and trained Afghan pilots, etc. But other than that, there wasn’t any American presence as such. And the AID mission concentrated primarily on
trying to improve the self-sufficiency of Afghan agriculture.

*Q:* So this was not a country where we saw any particular gain for us; it was just a matter of keeping them neutral.

RAU: That’s right. It was a continuation of the old British “great game” in that area: who was going to win the hearts and minds of these people? It used to be the British and the Russians and the Indians; now it was the Americans and the Russians. And if we could keep them neutral, we thought we had accomplished our purpose.

*Q:* Did the hand of India rest at all in Afghanistan?

RAU: No, Pakistan, to some extent, but not India. India had a mission there, but it wasn’t much. Pakistan had a very active mission. They were active with some of the Tribal elements, trying to keep them helping Daoud and some of his people.

*Q:* What was your impression of Daoud?

RAU: He’d had an interesting background. As I say, he was a prince of the royal house, if you will. We got to know a person who ran the one first-class attempt at promoting tourism up north in the Bamiyan valley. He was an Afghan who had been in California. He had also dealt in used automobiles, etc. And his wife had been a model in California, a very beautiful girl. Well, when she went to school when Daoud was Minister of the Interior, at that time I guess, she was the first woman to go to school without the *chador,* without everything covered. And you now, she was in danger of being stoned, etc. Well, he protected her, Daoud did, made sure that she could go to school. So he was a strange bird. He overthrew his cousin the king because he had power, a lot of power, he was power-hungry in a sense. But he was not a young man when he did this, and he was not a young man when he was overthrown again and killed.

*Q:* We’re talking now in 1998 where you have an extreme fundamentalist group, the Taliban who are dominant right now, for what it’s worth, in Afghanistan. Did fundamentalism raise its head very much?

RAU: It wasn’t a primary factor, except as I mentioned earlier: that I couldn’t see this country ever going communist, because from an ideological point of view, it was completely anathema to them. But later the student movement, which was what the Taliban movement was, has returned into a very strict fundamentalism, in some ways stricter than Saudi Arabia. Women have gone back into *purdah,* no education for them, etc. We have a group here in the Washington area called the old Afghan League. It goes back to the ‘50’s. They send out invitations once a year or so. I went to the last one of those gatherings, and they had somebody there from Doctors Without Borders who had been out there recently, and he had some statistics that just blew my mind after the Soviets had been there. He said that they think that there are something like 10 million land mines in Afghanistan and that there is no way they’re going to eradicate all this. The
number of cases they’re dealing with there with all the lost limbs and that sort of thing, when they go out gathering firewood. These are kids, you know, little kids. Some of these the Soviets, when they came in there, made to look like toys. So the kids were trying to pick them up, and they would blow up. It’s really bad news. It’s really a wrecked country. I saw the article in the New York Times just a few months ago. The central part of Kabul - we used to live near there - it reminded me of Dresden; it was just a shell of a city.

Q: Well, is there anything else we should talk about here?

RAU: No, I mean, if you want to continue the assignments, after that I went back to Washington.

Q: We’ll continue that, but I mean -

RAU: Oh, I see. In Afghanistan.

Q: Yes.

RAU: No.

Q: I thought we might stop at this point. And so in 1975, did you finally go back?

RAU: I finally went back to Washington.

Q: What did you do?

RAU: I started out in the Office of Commercial Affairs in the Economic Bureau and spent some time there, and then my last year in Washington I worked in Personnel as a counselor for economic officers.

Q: So we’ll talk about that next time.

RAU: Good.

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RAU: Right, in EB, as it was called then.

Q: And you were in the Economic Bureau from when to when?

RAU: I was in the Economic Bureau from 1975 to ‘79? ‘78-‘79, and then I went into personnel and worked as a counselor for economic officers.
Q: In the Economic bureau what were you doing?

RAU: I was in the Office of Commercial Affairs, which had been established, I guess, at the outset as a result of - it had been there for some time, but it had started to take on some momentum because - this was when Jules Katz was the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Jules was basically an economist. He was not interested in the commercial side of things very much. I shouldn’t say that, but it’s true. In any case, we were in danger (and we did) of losing the commercial function to the Commerce Department as a career function, and we were trying to stave that off through a variety of means making ourselves more in tune to the American business community, which is interesting because that seems to be a lot of what the emphasis is on now, trying to help American business people abroad, but in those days we started a program called the Executive Diplomats Seminar run out of the OCA, Office of Commercial Affairs, where about three or four times a year we would invite in usually vice-president-level of American firms for a two-day session in the department. And we were able to call on the resources of the entire Department, up to but not including the Secretary, to give a presentation on a part of the world or what ever it might be. And these people, who had business interests, or their companies did, all over the world, signed up for this and came for a couple of days in Washington. They probably had other things to do, but they attended this session for two days. Then we finished it all with a kind of informal cocktail party where we would have people come from various parts of the department to participate with them on a very informal basis. But is was a not for attribution but a hands-on performance where people were asked a lot of questions about US policy toward various parts of the world. And our job was basically to - we didn’t restrict ourselves strictly to State Department people, although they had the bulk of the responsibility for this. We did get people form other agencies to participate in this.

Q: Treasury, Commerce.

RAU: Exactly.

Q: Agriculture

RAU: Yes, any of them where the mix of people who were coming for this had an interest, for example.

Q: What was your impression of the interest in United States trade abroad at this time?

RAU: Well, this group that was coming there were primarily those interested in foreign trade and foreign investment. But in general terms I’d say that the US business community had not really discovered the rest of the world in terms of an interest in doing business with the rest of it. We were a big powerful country. We had a market here that was second to none in the world. So why have to go overseas? Of course, all that changed, and the people who were there for this seminar were those who were in the
forefront of making the changes, at least in the business community.

Q: What were you doing specifically?

RAU: We divided ourselves in that office into geographic areas, and I was handling the Middle East primarily and South Asia on the commercial side. We also attended these commercial officers’ conferences that were held in various parts of the world. So when one was being held in my areas, I would go there as a representative of the Department to attend them.

Q: I would have thought that you would have had real problems in your particular area because of politics. I mean the Arab boycott of people dealing with Israel, and India with its nationalistic protectionist policy.

RAU: It’s true, there were great problems with that, but those were the kind of things that, at least in these seminars that I mentioned, the business community wanted to hear about. What was the US policy? Was there any potential or possibility of a change in certain ways that would be more profitable and better for the business community or not? What was the priority of the Department? They knew pretty much what the priority was; it was always the political side of things first. But they wanted to see how much of that could be oriented toward more economic and commercial.

Q: Let’s break it down into two parts. The first one would be the Arab boycott of any companies that had substantial interests with Israel or traded in Israel. This is the Arab League. At this particular point was this a major problem, or not?

RAU: It wasn’t for the groups we were dealing with. It was for some businesses, obviously. For some business that had a major interest in Israel, the Arab world was more or less closed to them. But a lot of these firms that I was dealing with, at least, were construction firms. And they were much more interested in the Arab market than they were in Israel. So the Bechtels, the Fluors, and people like that who attended or sent their vice-presidents, the boycott didn’t bother them because they didn’t get that much in terms of business with Israel.

Q: Well as things started to open up, the ’73 war, known as the October War or the Yom Kippur War, between the Arabs and the Israelis, had that closed things down, or actually by ’75 and on, were you just beginning to see the Arab world opening up more to American firms?

RAU: Yes. Well, for example, I remember particularly that the five-year plan that the Saudis put down was worth about a $140 billion at the time. I talked to a representative of the treasury in Jeddah. We didn’t have an embassy in Riyadh at the time. I talked to him at some length, and I said, “I don’t see how they’re possibly going to make use of $140 billion in the five-year plan?” He said, “Oh, they’ll spend it.” He said, “I’m not sure they’ll spend it wisely, but they’ll spend it.” Then I remember when I went on my one and
only trip to Saudi Arabia, I saw the beginnings of Jubail, the city they were building up north of Dhahran. It’s a huge city today, and it was built from just desert. There was nothing there. And Yanbu’, on the other coast, they were having this pipeline that was built between the two, to exchange oil, and that one really blew my mind because the American construction companies were very prominently involved in both those constructions and they were faced with a myriad of problems. When I visited up in Jubail, I remember, we had a long session with the companies that were in charge of the construction program up there and especially those who were running the camps where all the laborers were, because there were no dependents there (these were single people). Most of the laborers were coming from countries like Korea and Pakistan and - what else?

Q: Philippines maybe.

RAU: Philippines to some extent.

Q: Bangladesh.

RAU: Bangladesh, yes, mainly Pakistanis. And they had to run some sort of program for these people. When they weren’t working, they had to adapt to their cooking ways, so they’d have different kinds of cooks for the Koreans and the Pakistanis, etc., and the only thing they had in common was they could show them some films at night, if there wasn’t too much English in them - it was mainly action or something, show them that. But also they played a lot of soccer together. That was the only sport they seemed to have in common. But it was a major problem for them because they had no common language, and they had to keep them there. I found out at that time that the Koreans had a natural entrée in this because, with their surplus labor force, they were giving the young men there an option of doing their military service or going to work for one of these construction firms in the Gulf. And all of them chose that because they could send money home, rather than going into the Korean Army. So they had a natural advantage on that. But yes, I’d say that American firms in the countries I was dealing with primarily, there wasn’t any problem with them getting contracts; they were doing alright. The one place they did have problems: we had a law on the books - I guess it’s still there - prohibiting the payment of bribes, or *baksheesh*, if you will, and the American business community, almost without exception, said, “You know, this is a crazy law because all of our competition don’t have any laws like this, and it’s a part of doing business in this part of the world. You’ve just got to do it.” But we had that law.

Q: Were we making any attempt to get smaller businesses, like people who make fountain pens or tape recorders or other items or something like that to get them to get out into the markets?

RAU: To get out into the external markets?

Q: Yes.
RAU: Yes, we did. It was an uphill battle all the way, because to do that they had to be willing to put forth some seed money with the expectation that they wouldn’t get any quick return on it. And a lot of them either didn’t have the wherewithal or were not prepared to gamble to that extent. As I say, because at that point they had such a nice market in the United States, they didn’t want to take that chance. But there were a few that were willing to make the effort and put forth a little bit of seed money, if you will.

Q: What about the Foreign Service culture? You were saying that Jules Katz, whom we’ve interviewed, and others really weren’t looking towards - they were economists. Did you find it was sort of hard both within the Department of State and within the embassy to get our people to sort of focus on trade development and trade rather than looking at the political and economic picture?

RAU: Yes. The answer in words of one syllable, yes, it was difficult. Katz was focusing primarily on the macroeconomic problems, and the problems of business people, with few exceptions, were something he would turn over to somebody else to try to deal with. And as a result we had - I think Bob Strauss was then the trade representative, and he made some sort of trade-off when he went up to testify before Congress with the Department of Commerce on their appropriation that if they would give him such and such, he would see that the trade function was transferred to the Department of Commerce, and that’s exactly what happened.

Q: Did this happen on your watch?

RAU: Yes.

Q: How did it hit you all?

RAU: Well, we could see it coming, and I helped prepare some of the position papers that Jules Katz would sign off on, on why this would not be good for US foreign policy to have this move over to Commerce, the whole idea of training programs, etc., and there were not a lot of career Foreign Service officers who were prepared to make the jump into unknown territory. But there were a few older ones that saw that as a possibility for promotion or better opportunities in Commerce and did make the jump. I worked for a while for Calvin Berlin, who was an old-time commercial officer who’d done rather well in the Foreign Service as a result, and Al Zucca was another one. But these were exceptions, really, to the rule, and most of them did not make it to the upper levels if most of their career was spent in commercial work. So it was a problem, and it was a problem in the embassies as well to get the economic counselors to focus on it, except when he felt he was going to lose some of his staff to Commerce, where they wouldn’t be directly beholden to him. When the die was cast, when we knew it was going to happen, we tried to work out a *modus vivendi* at every post where they had commercial officers from Commerce, so that they also had to function as part of the embassy and not just as a separate office.
Q: What was your impression during this time of the Department of Commerce as both an organization and as a player in the foreign affairs world?

RAU: Well, Commerce - as I’m sure other people have indicated, and I’m certainly not going to have anything new to say on that - but it’s always been a highly politicized department with a great deal of turnover in the upper levels. And the career civil servants who have worked in the department have varied in their quality up and down the line. There were a few that are equal to or better than anything we had in the Foreign Service, but most of them were not. They were strictly civil service types who had spent their entire careers in Washington.

So I’d say, probably the general opinion in the Department among Foreign Service people was that if they took this role over of being the commercial arm of the Foreign Service they would probably make a mess of it and it would come back to State in a few years. That didn’t happen. It’s like bureaucracy any place. Once they get entrenched in something, they’re not going to let go of it. And that’s where it is today, for good or ill.

Q: What about you? Were you looking at which way to jump at all?

RAU: I wasn’t looking about going into the Foreign Commercial Service, no, but I was looking for after the four years of getting out of the Office of Commercial Affairs and doing something else. And that’s when the opportunity came of going to Personnel and to advise economic officers on next assignments across the board. You know, all the bureaus had their own assignments people, but for economic officers across the board you have two counselors who are slated to try to help them in looking for new posts.

Q: You did this job in Personnel from when to when?

RAU: I replaced Peter Higgins, who was there at the time. I think it was about a year, a year and half. It would have been longer, but while in that job Dick Benedict, who was the economic counselor in Athens, had a child - I think he was dyslexic. In any case, he had to leave prematurely from the assignment and come back to the States, and the Department was faced with a dilemma because it was a language-designated position and they didn’t have any senior officers ready, willing, and able at the time to go into Greek language training for a year to do this, because, of course, it would set them back. So I already had the Greek, and I volunteered to go in his place, which I did.

Q: Let’s talk about this approximately ‘79 to ‘81 period.

RAU: It was to ‘80, actually.

Q: ‘80. You were basically advising economic officers about assignments and their career paths and all that.
RAU: That’s right.

Q: Was Frances Wilcox still in the game as a power?

RAU: Yes, she left, though, shortly, I guess about the time I left. She was there most of the time I was there, but she was definitely a power.

Q: Was it expected that you would kind of check things out with her?

RAU: Well, we always checked with her, but there were principals in the ambassadorial level who were heading the Bureau of Personnel who sometimes would lock horns with her, but generally, in terms of personnel and EB and some of the critical economic positions abroad, her position carried a great deal of weight.

Q: Well, and also she knew the territory and really was looking after . . .

RAU: She looked after the people that she favored; there’s no question about that, and she had a good eye for people who had real potential as economic officers.

Q: So in many ways the fact that she might have been, sort of, the “economic dragon,” she was a good dragon.

RAU: She was a friendly dragon.

Q: A friendly dragon.

RAU: The only problem we had with her, basically, was that she was of the type that really didn’t care about the rank of the officer. If she saw the potential there, it would be no problem for her to suggest putting an FSO-3 in those days in an FSO-1 slot. She thought he or she, mainly he, was capable of doing the job. And so we had to be very careful about doing that because there were a lot of senior people then who were, as you know, walking the halls, looking for assignments. And they would take issue with somebody who was put into an assignment that was two grades above his personal rank.

Q: What about the problem we just referred to, the movement of commercial activity over to Commerce? I would have thought this would cause quite a bit of tension at this particular time in Personnel. On the economic side, what do you do with people whose main expertise has just been cut out from under them?

RAU: That’s true. It did cause a lot of problems. I had several people in my stable at the time who saw this as a death knell for them in terms of advancement in the Foreign Service. Some of the senior ones, as I say, opted to join Commerce because they couldn’t see any future for themselves at State. The more junior ones, who didn’t have that much experience but had done some commercial work, were flexible enough that they could still go into economic jobs.
Q: Well did you have as part of your repertoire an enhanced number of economic jobs? Was there an effort made to take people who were relatively junior or mid-grade heading towards a commercial specialization, and were we able to put them into training which would turn them into full-fledged economic officers?

Q: Economic officers? Yes, because the Department at this time, just about this time, established the 26-week economic course, and those that showed potential for this kind of work were put into that course. So that they could kind of jump over to straight economic jobs from commercial, if they had the potential.

Q: During the time you were doing this, I guess, at this point they were getting around to the new Foreign Service Act, weren’t they?

RAU: Yes

Q: From your perspective, was there concern about what the new Foreign Service Act would do to your stable of economic officers?

RAU: I don’t think there was any concern per se of that, because when the promotion lists came out, economic officers got their fair share, by and large. The political officers were the ones complaining - and, of course, a lot of the consular officers, too, as you well know. But no, I think the economic officers were doing alright - I’m talking about the straight economic officers now - and there wasn’t any attempt that I can see in the new Foreign Service Act to give any special dispensation. But there was, I think, a broader recognition of the importance of economic training for Foreign Service officers in the future, that we could no longer just rely on the traditional political skills. There were too many economic things they had to know in order to do whatever job they were doing well.

Q: Well, did you have the feeling that you were part of a process of turning the ship of state around so that it was looking more at economic and other factors besides just the political ones at this point?

RAU: I think, yes, I had that feeling, that there was a change of course that was starting. Now at the very senior levels it didn’t have much effect. When you started looking at who was chosen for deputy chief of mission or for ambassador in some cases, it was almost inevitably a political officer; it was not an economic officer. But you could see there was a greater emphasis being given to even the political officers receiving economic training so that they could do the job properly. And I think most of the senior ones who were ambassadors could see the need for this, and they established training courses for them to take greater economic training.

Q: What about the personnel system as a whole? Things were beginning to change there too about people bidding for assignments. The old system was pretty much, “you could
RAU: Yes, it was. When I was there they had a system in place, I don’t know what it’s like now, but they had a system in place where worldwide you’d bid on various jobs, and then we would go through and determine which were realistic bids in terms of grade and past experience, etc., and which were unrealistic, maybe stretch assignments, that sort of thing, which were all one would put in. And then we would do battle in Personnel with the geographic representatives, because they always had a very specific list of candidates that they wanted to have, especially the bureaus where they traditionally have taken good care of their people. NEA was one of those, for example, and Tom Carolyn, who was representative for NEA at the time in Personnel, he had a pretty good, specific list of people he was looking in different places, whereas we had ours, a more general one, where we would try to place people no matter where in a position that would be career-enhancing for them, and where they could still do the job, of course.

Q: When push came to shove, how did things work out usually?

RAU: Well, you win some and lose some. It was like baseball. We would sit around the table and discuss this assignment. Some would be more convincing than others in their descriptions of the merits of a particular candidate and if it wasn’t a job that had a great deal of Sixth- or Seventh-Floor interest, you could usually win on the merits of the case. However, if there was a great deal of Seventh- or Sixth-Floor interest, that inevitably had to be taken into consideration. And they usually won what they wanted, unless it was egregious.

Q: You were going as economic counselor to Athens. How did you feel about this?

RAU: I was happy to be going back. I had done my first assignment in Greece, and now I was going back to Athens. There was a good deal of political turmoil and it turned out economic as well. I mentioned earlier I had hoped to study under Papandreou when I went to Berkeley, so when I got to Athens in 1980, they were having national elections that fall and PASOK was swept into power, under Papandreou.

Q: PASOK was the name of the Panhellenic Socialist Party. You were in Athens from when to when?

RAU: ’80 to ’84.

Q: Could you give a description of the situation as you saw it, both politically and economically, in Greece when you arrived in 1980?

RAU: What struck me immediately was that the old French saying that plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose was taking place politically. Karamanlis was still there; he was
president now, but he’d been prime minister when I was there about 20 years before. And George Rallis was still a figure and all the old personalities were still there, except for the royal house, of course. And then, on the scene swept this new green wave of PASOK, which was eventually to become the first socialist government in the history of modern Greece. Before the elections, we had a new ambassador come in in the person of Monty Stearns, and before the elections, we all were sent out to different areas to kind of test the pulse, and I know I went to Crete and part of the Peloponnesus to check the pulse, and it was very apparent to most of us that PASOK was going to win, but not by the overwhelming majority that they did win by. We thought it was going to be a much closer election than it was. I guess there was a great deal of ferment among the younger people. They were tired of the way things had been in Greece, for decade after decade, nothing was happening of any great consequence after the reestablishment of democracy, and they thought that some of these people were old and tired and that they should get rid of them. And that’s what they did in the election. We always had the hangover after that of the feeling that Papandreou definitely had beaten the American government... He trusted Monty Stearns, or at least he said he did. He had a working relationship with him, but he didn’t trust the American government very much. He thought that they were not necessarily friends of Greece, or friends of him anyway. The result was that we never had that kind of close personal relationship with Greek government officials that we had had before. Monty prided himself on the fact that he thought he would have a good working relationship with Papandreou. We were of two minds in the embassy. We in the Economic Section could see what Papandreou was doing was not really in the interests of Greece, and we reported as such in many cases. When he would call for normalization of certain things, it ended up being nationalization of whatever was left in the Greek private sector, which wasn’t much because the ship owners had all their wealth and principal offices out of Greece anyway. He couldn’t nationalize Greek shipping because they’d all pick up and go to London or wherever they already were. But some of the others - the cement industry and some of the others - he managed to take under his wing, to nationalize them. So in that sense, in the economic sense, it was experimental on his part, trying to make things work better under a socialist government, and we didn’t think it worked too well. I remember taking a Congressional delegation to see the minister for economic affairs, and he was a well trained professorial type economist. And we got on the subject of Greece’s membership in the Common Market. He said that “We in PASOK oppose this because we don’t think it’s in Greece’s interest, that Greece is not ready for the Common Market and the Common Market is certainly not ready for Greece.” And he said, “Look what it’s done to the Mezzogiorno in Italy. They haven’t progressed since they went into the Common Market.” Same thing. And at one point Papandreou also was threatening to take Greece out of NATO. He made a statement at one point that “We don’t see NATO as an ally that’s going to help us. If there is a Russian or Soviet threat,” he said, “You’d do the same thing as if it were Yugoslavia. If the Soviets decided to go into Yugoslavia, they’re not members of NATO, but you’d still come to their assistance.” He said the same thing would happen here. He said, “We don’t get much of a benefit out of NATO.”

Q: Well speaking about the NATO thing, this is fine talk, but one of the principal reasons
Greece was in NATO, from the Greek point of view, was so that they could balance the Turks off, because if Greece pulled out we would have basically moved our bases over to Turkey.

RAU: That’s right, and I think that’s why it prevailed, why they didn’t do it. And the same thing when you look at the Greek membership in the Common Market. The benefits they have gotten out of the agricultural part of the Common Market have kept Greek governments afloat since they entered. They’ve always been a major benefactor [sic] of membership rather than a contributor - up to now.

Q: Well, looking at Andreas Papandreou, you had wanted to study under him and all, how much did you find as an economist what he was doing with his country came out of what he had been teaching and what he had been taught and sort of his economic philosophy, or was he going a different course?

RAU: I think he wanted to play both ends against the middle. He saw his role as trying to increase the independence of Greece from either the Soviet side or the US side. And on the economic side, he felt that Greece was too dependent on aid programs from the United States, in which he was right, in a certain sense. Take the case of aluminum. He wanted to give up the bauxite, or he wanted to have a contest with bauxite between the Russians and French and the American interests, and he was willing to let the cards fall where they may to see what he would get in return for that. Would the Soviets offer him some things that would make this more worthwhile? Would the French make that more worthwhile? Etc. So I think that he had a desire to make Greece more independent of entangling alliances, if you will, but it didn’t work out for a country like Greece to do that.

Q: In a way, when he wanted to get out of entangling alliances, did you have a feeling that when you stripped it away it was really to get away from America?

RAU: Yes, basically, basically, because he knew America very well. He had lived here, been a citizen of the United States, served in the American navy, and had an American wife at that time. So yes, he knew the United States well, but I think he felt that he didn’t want to have the kind of relationship with the United States that previous Greek governments had had, which was abnormally close, let us say. And he wanted to be a more independent-minded representative of his country.

Q: How was Papandreou viewed, you might say, from the embassy as a whole, particularly from the ambassador and then from the Economic Section?

RAU: Well, as I said, I think because of his previous association with Papandreou, Monty knew him better than anybody as a person. We didn’t know him in the Economic Section as a person. I had first Anne Berry working for me as a reporting officer, and then I had Basil Scarlis working in her position, and neither one of them had had any experience in Greece before. Basil had some of the language because he was born of Greek parents, but
none of us really knew Papandreou as a person, whereas Monty Stearns did, and so he kept, and probably rightly so, any relationship with cabinet level people, and primarily the prime minister, to himself. Other people didn’t have that many meetings at the ministerial level with the PASOK government. And we on the economic side tried to follow a course where just reporting the events as we saw them, in terms of what the government was doing, we weren’t trying to skew it one way or the other, and let people draw their own conclusions. But many times they were not in accord with the way the political section and particularly the ambassador wanted to go. But I must say, to give him his due, we were allowed to report these things as long as we could support what we said.

**Q:** Did you feel under any pressure from the Greek lobby. Was this something you had to keep in mind all the time?

**RAU:** Not on the economic side. I don’t know how much money the Political Section had in terms of pressures from the Greek lobby. I don’t think it was that great because a lot of the Greek lobby was not in favor of Papandreou. They thought he was a bad influence for Greece. That’s talking about the US side.

**Q:** Did the Greek side of Cyprus come in to your economic scheme at all? Even though it was an independent country, I was just wondering whether the Greeks were doing anything to invest there.

**RAU:** Not that I was aware of. I don’t think there was much Greek investment there. There was some Cypriot investment in Greece, wealthy Cypriots who invested in Greece, but I don’t think there was much money flowing the other way.

**Q:** I would have thought on the economy you would almost have two things: one, you would have the entrepreneurs - and entrepreneur and Greek are almost synonyms - who were off doing their thing and much of it, I suppose, was like the ship owners, doing it under another flag, and it was hard to pin down where the money was and where the action was.

**RAU:** Oh, that’s true.

**Q:** And then you’d have sort of the rest, which would be basically a sort of a not-very-efficient industrial base which needed government protection.

**RAU:** Well, you could say that - yes, needed government protection in the sense that they didn’t want to be monopolized by one particular firm or one particular person. But when you took going enterprises, and I think of Titan cement, for example, some of those who were actually doing some exporting, too, into Africa, and you, in effect, took them over. I mean the government came in with their policy that they wanted to “regularize” this industry, and so George Tsatsos, in the case of that particular company, was in danger of being in prison, and he left the country. That happened with quite a few of them, who fell into receivership, if you will, by the government; and to a certain extent, we have the
same thing with the Hellenic Aeronautical Industry (HAI). They had some very clever and
good engineers out there, but to win contracts on anything, you had to be assured that they
would be able to operate under the rules that we operate under in a Western county. That
didn’t take place under Papandreou. It was very difficult.

Q: This was a time of great unrest in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut. Was Athens the site
of quite a few companies that had moved from Beirut?

RAU: Yes. They came in before I arrived there under what they called Law 89, which
was a law which gave them tax-free status and their ability to set up offices in
Athens/Beirut. And a lot of them did that. We had a whole stable of what we called Law
89 companies. In fact, Commerce set up a separate office in Athens to deal with the Law
89 companies and staffed it with - actually, as it turned out (this is just a side comment) -
the father of Greg Kinnear, the movie star now, Ed Kinnear, who was the very effective
head of that office. He had been in Beirut before and was moved to Athens when the
office folded. And he did a very good job in his relationship with those companies.

Q: Did these play any particular role as you were watching the economic development in
Greece, or was this just something that was sort of located there but not part of the
economic game?

RAU: Well, what they were trying to do was avoid having to pay Greek taxes or fall
under the purview of the government. As long as they kept their nose clean and ran an
operation which did not infringe on what was happening in Greece - I mean, most of their
business was offshore - they just looked at this in a kind of bemused way.

Q: I take it that as far as economic decision were made by the Greeks, we were
essentially just bystanders reporting what was going on.

RAU: Yes, except for - well, this is, I guess, economic in a sense - except for military
assistance programs, where the old seven-to-ten ratio still played its role. But that wasn’t
something that the Economic -

Q: That was seven for Greece and ten for everything -

RAU: - for everything that Turkey got. The Congress had laid this down. It had become
almost a law. It was not a law, but it had almost become a law. But we in the Economic
Section didn’t have much of a role to play in that. It was something that was constantly
being discussed, and I remember that in staff meetings time and again it was pointed out
that the Turks were using this money to purchase American equipment, etc. The Greeks
never purchased it. They kind of banked it. They didn’t make the purchases with it. And
this is when the government was toying with buying French aircraft instead of American
aircraft, etc., so as I said, we didn’t play a major role in those decisions.

Q: How did we look upon Greece as a member of the European Community at that point?
RAU: We did a couple of long studies in the Economic Section where I could sympathize to a certain extent with some people who were saying that Greece was not anywhere near the standard of the current six - or eight, or whatever else it was at that time when they were bringing in Greece and Portugal - yes, and that it’s going to be a while to go and that we are going to have to give up some of our God-given rights, if you will, to be able to produce things here in order to allow in a flow of German goods or whatever else from the Common Market. As it turned out, however, the major recipients of benefits from the Common Market association were Greek farmers. They all ended up with new tractors, seed money - literally - and things that kept them going, and then they voted PASOK when the next election came on, as a result. We know that very well in this country, but this was something new for the Greeks.

Q: What about anti-American demonstrations? Was it November the 17th or November the 18th?

RAU: Yes. That was always a very big thorn in all of our sides, because these demonstrations that commemorated the tanks going into the polytechnic school in Athens always blamed the Americans for not stopping them, or maybe in some cases they felt that we were behind it. And the marches on the Embassy were led by Mrs. Papandreou, and that never sat well with anybody - members of Congress or embassy staff or anybody else. So that was bad. And then what really started happening in Greece - what happened in a lot of other places happened there, too - was this group that started an assassination program. And while we were there, we lost an assistant naval attaché to gunshot wounds, and there were threats made against several others. And I remember distinctly, the house that was assigned to the economic counselor was one of these massive places out in Halandri that the US government got, I guess, just about the time the Truman Doctrine came in, that John Enepekides bought for the US government something like 10 or 12 properties. This was a huge place. We used to call it “Tara on the Aegean.” It had a big garden where you could actually do your jogging around the back, all walled in. And my wife was out there jogging one morning, just around breakfast time, when she heard the shots that were just down on the avenue a few blocks from us, and it turned out it was the assistant naval attaché who was killed in his car. So those kinds of things really started to put a damper on any kind of relationships. We had to be very much more careful than we had been.

Q: Greeks seem to be very ineffective in dealing with that sort of thing.

RAU: They never were able to really solve that November 17th group, who were supposedly right-wing but nobody really knew, and a small cadre of people were doing this.

Q: The Italians were able to take care of the-

RAU: - the Red Brigades-
RAU: Well, that was another thing. All these groups Papandreou kind of accepted with open arms. They’d set up offices there and have representatives and have other people flying in and out all the time, and our people didn’t know who these people were in many cases.

Q: Was there at all a feeling in the embassy that basically we’re in a hostile country? I mean it’s all very nice and the Greek-Americans are an important political factor, but this is “Indian country.” Was there at all that feeling?

RAU: Yes, there was, among a large group of the embassy population, especially because we have this history of a long, close military relationship with Greece which no longer existed. I mean, under Papandreou, the relationship with the Greek military was, at best, correct; and there was never a very intimate relationship on any level that I could see. And then when they started losing people, either to kidnappings or to assassinations like this, it made for a very, very tense situation. A lot of people in the embassy community felt that we’d better just stay close to home and watch what they did, not have too many Greek friends. It was unfortunate.

Q: You were there ‘80 to ‘84. I was there ‘70 to ‘74, under the Colonels, but one of the thing that disturbed me a bit, and it was a completely different kind of government, was that both our military and the CIA had an extraordinary number of Greek Americans there because they spoke the language, but they tended to come out of the normal first generation immigrant - you know, extreme, basically to the right - and they were really very comfortable with the military régime, and this was really not representative of the United States. It was sort of like the anti-Castro Cubans down in Miami today. Had this period gone?

RAU: That had gone, but I must say, the Agency did what I think was a silly thing, and then they finally corrected it. They put a woman in charge who had not had any overseas experience at all, and she became chief of station. She had her own house, which was a couple of blocks down from where I lived, and she in effect led a completely sheltered life. She had one or two parties where she would invite a very specific number of people to her house, but she went from office to home and home to office. She lived alone; she didn’t have a husband. And it was just the wrong person to show the Greeks in that position, because they all knew who it was. And then she was replaced by John Berg, who was a different type altogether. He was a professional - had no experience in Greece, but he was a real professional. John and Peggy got to know more people. They had a nice residence where they gave receptions, etc., and parties, so it changed a bit. But in terms of Greek-Americans, no there weren’t any on the staff then, neither in the military nor in the Agency, so it had changed to that degree.

Q: By the time you left there, were there any major events in this ’80-84 period?
RAU: Except for PASOK being the government in power, taking over? That was the major one. No, the events, I guess, that we would be following closely were happening in Turkey, not in Greece. Greece became a member of the Common Market, if that’s a major event.

Q: Oh, yes.

RAU: I think the major event, obviously, was the first socialist government to rule Greece.

Q: Were you noticing an edginess on the part of the Greek business community when PASOK came in?

RAU: Well, a lot of them who could afford it left. They moved to London or someplace else. If they had old money, they kept the family money, most of it out of the country, except for real property and things. But the average Greek businessman - you know as well as I do that Greece does not have any major industrial complex to speak of. Shipyards and shipping is the lifeblood of the community at large, in big terms. They tried to establish an airplane industry to manufacture light airplanes and repair military aircraft, etc., but by and large, no, the business community pretty much tried to exist under a socialist regime. And the PASOK did not try to nationalize down to that level, to the small shop-owners. They knew that would be foolish. But even trying to nationalize the few big ones there were was a mistake, which they later, I think, would admit was a mistake.

Q: We had sort of three major military places. We had the airport with repair facilities and as a transit place at Hellenikon. We had two radio intercept stations. One was at Neomakri, which is out near Marathon, and the other one was on Crete.

RAU: Right.

Q: What was happening with these things? There was talk about getting kicked out of there all the time.

RAU: Yes, there was, and as you know, eventually it did happen. We had to in effect cancel the Sixth Fleet visits because they were not acceptable to most of Greece, and even using the facilities there, that naval air station there on Crete, became very difficult for our fighter aircraft - you know, off of carriers. We couldn’t use that very much. They didn’t bother Neomakri so much at that time, because it was still there, but it was still operating, doing what it was always doing, in terms of an intelligence base. But eventually people, I think, could see the handwriting on the wall. None of these was going to last; they were all going to go.

Q: And the technology was changing too.
RAU: The technology was changing where they didn’t need them as much.

Q: You know, in a way, the more you close down these places, the more cards you are discarding as far as dealing with the United States.

RAU: That’s right.

Q: I would have thought that, not maybe from the military side, but from the embassy side there would be a certain amount of enjoyment in seeing some of these places go so you wouldn’t have to spend all your time worrying about “What about our bases” and you could deal with this country in a sort of a cold-blooded way.

RAU: Yes, I think that’s true, but there was a sort of hangover that existed, as you know, from the old Marshall Plan days, where we had a special relationship with Greece, and a lot of people could not forget that. You know, that relationship was beyond the bounds of military bases, etc. It proved not to be the case.

Q: I have to put my prejudices in these questions. I never felt that. I never warmed up to that. Individual Greeks I liked; Greeks en masse, the Greek government - of course, I was there at a bad time - I just found them not a very mature group of people to deal with.

RAU: I think that’s probably pretty close to the way I felt, although individually I had a lot of good friends with some of them. But you know, any conversation we got into, whether it was with somebody from the foreign ministry or whether it was somebody from the business community or an academic person or whatever it was, the whole subject of Greece’s relationship and its position in the Mediterranean and Turkey came up. And they had a mind-fixation on this that they couldn’t get rid of. I never had that feeling - having had the benefit of serving in Turkey, too - that the Turks paid more than five minutes attention to this, unless there was major explosion that happened, you know.

Q: You left there in ‘84. Where?

RAU: Well, that was at time when I could see the Foreign Service handwriting on the wall, and I thought, well, my next post would probably be my last post, and I wanted to go back to Istanbul as consul general. I made that fact known. Dan Newberry was there, and with the approval of the ambassador, he extended for another year. So that threw the assignment out of cycle. So I came back to Washington on leave and was walking the hall and went into Senior Assignments and pleaded my case, but I said, you know, “What’s available for me?” And I saw Harriet Eisen, who was then in Senior Assignments, and she said, “Well, you know, you’d be natural for consul general in Istanbul. You’ve got the language. You’ve got previous experience there. Now you’ve got Greek experience as well.” I said, “Yes, tell me about it. I’d love to go. But the timing’s all wrong. Dan Newberry has extended there.” She thought about that for a while; then she said, “Well, if we can make some sort of plan to assign you there a year hence, when Dan leaves, would
you be willing to accept the assignment?” I said, “Yes, on one condition.” She said,
“What is that?” I said, “That you give me the assignment in writing now, not pending
onward assignment, and that whatever you do with me in that year is up to you- (end of
tape)

So as I was saying, when the assignment was made, they assigned me, first of all, over to
that holding pattern in BEX, Board of Examiners, doing interviews, oral examinations for
candidates for the Foreign Service or whatever else came down the pike. I enjoyed that
for a year.

Q: It’s a fascinating job. I had it for a year.

RAU: And I think every officer should have that experience. A lot of them felt it was a
waste of their time, but I didn’t. I felt that you really got a chance to see what the kind of
people were that we were bringing into the Foreign Service, and also it gave me an
opportunity - I did some exams out of Washington as well, different centers. And I guess
one of the more fascinating experiences, the department, at that time, was deciding to
bring in a lot of security officers, and they were spreading their net. They didn’t want to
come to us just retired police officers, etc.; they wanted to try to bring in some others who they
could train in State Department parlance as security officers here. And I remember, I went
to Miami, I went to San Antonio and one other place, interviewing candidates for regional
security officers. And one in Texas I still remember very distinctly. This young woman
came in. She was a schoolteacher in a Texas school, bright as a penny. She knew
everything, so we gave her the hypothetical situations, you know, escorting a dignitary in
New York City and the kind of things that might happen to her there, and she handled all
that very well, right kinds of responses, and one of us - I can’t remember whether I did or
one of the other examiners - said, “Well, just what attracts you to this? Why do you want
to go into this kind of work?” Oh, incidentally I should have mentioned too: her mother
came along with her to the interview. She didn’t sit in on the interview; she was outside
in the outside office. And it turns out that this young woman had been raised on a ranch in
Texas and Daddy had taught her how to ride and shoot about three or four or five
different kinds of weapons, so she was extremely well qualified, both physically and
background training and bright, as I say, so I could see that we were going to have a
different crew manning the security offices.

Q: What was your impression, basically, of the oral examination and the assessment part
during this ’84-85 period of the people coming into the regular Foreign Service?

RAU: I thought it was a very good process, the old engaging in this discussion group with
the other four, knowing when to give up, etc, when to surrender and become part of the
group, your position; but I had one basic objection to the process, which I understand has
changed now, is that they did not let people know when they took the oral whether they
had passed or failed. They only let them know in writing later on. We knew, when we
made the evaluation. We knew pretty well who was going to pass and who wasn’t. And I
always thought, It’s not fair to them, really. We ought to be able to share that with them
and tell them, you know, “You came close, but you didn’t make it,” and “Try again.”

Q: I did that from ‘75 to ‘76, and we used to tell them. It was a different type of exam. I suspect that the reason they didn’t was there was a great effort to avoid, almost, human confrontation.

RAU: Well, that was a mistake.

Q: I think it was a bad mistake.

RAU: Now I understand they are telling them now when they take the oral, as I was told, you know, pass or fail, right there. You want to try again, go ahead.

Q: Particularly if the person on hand who has been part of the evaluation can tell the person, they’ll say, “Well, should I take it again?” and you can either say, “We strongly urge you to take it again,” or, “Well, of course, you can take it again,” but without any great recommendation, which is quite fair to the person.

RAU: Sure. When I took it, I know of cases where bright people out of undergraduate work, 21 or 22 years old, were told to go out and get a job at a filling station or something for a year, get some experience. But just to say, you know, “We will notify you,” but you knew who had passed and who hadn’t, I just didn’t think that was fair.

Q: It was very bureaucratic, and I think there was an actual almost fear of facing up to people and telling them. They wanted to stay away because of suits and whatever else. What was your impression, though, of the -

RAU: The candidates?

Q: Because they weren’t just young people; they were older, too.

RAU: It had all changed, as we talked about earlier on. When I came in, you could not be over 32 years of age. If you were a woman and you were not married and you got married, you had to resign. All this has changed, where there was no longer an age limit and women were chosen, you know, the same way as men, and I thought that was all to the good. The candidates we got, for the most part, had much more experience than we had when we came into the Foreign Service. The only thing we had over most of them that are coming in now was we had the military background; they did not.

Q: Yes.

RAU: And I still think that for a young man who has been a military officer, that you get that sort of command responsibility at an early age is the best thing in the world that can happen to you. We don’t get it in the Foreign Service. They put you into a senior position in the Foreign Service, and all of a sudden you are in charge of either a major aid program
or you’re in charge of a group of people, or maybe if you’re an ambassador you’ve got a large staff, as I had in Istanbul, of 50 people or so, and you haven’t done this before, you know. You haven’t administered or taken care of a group like that. But in the military you’ve got that very early on.

Q: What about dealing with minorities, particularly African Americans or Hispanics at that time. Were there sort of extraordinary efforts made to recruit more?

RAU: Well, I’d heard that there were these efforts being made; that is to say, that they were going out and trying to recruit in all-black colleges or into places where there was a large group of Hispanic Americans or something going to school. But I must say that the candidates that we were examining, with rare exceptions, were almost all the old traditional white Anglo-Saxon males or females. I didn’t see very many candidates that were Latinos or were Black. There were a few, but not many,

Q: Well then, you had in writing that you were going to Istanbul. What happened?

RAU: Yes, I went. Yes, the assignment held. I took a brush-up in Turkish. I joined the advanced Turkish class toward the end of that year and took, I guess, about a month or so kind of brush-up for me, and then in September of ‘85, I went to Istanbul.

Q: You were there from ‘85 to when?

RAU: To ‘88.

Q: ‘88.

RAU: And this was a very energizing period of time in Turkey, because Turgut Ozal was the prime minister, and he had decided to open up the Turkish economy. You talk to Turkish businessmen and say, “What was the one thing that Ozal did that was most pleasing to you, that you think was the right thing?” And that was freeing up the currency, because before, when they would have to go out on a business trip or something, they either had to have money out of the country or they were only allowed to take out a certain amount without smuggling. And he just made it free - you know, “You can go, take out whatever you want, bring back whatever you want” - and made it so much better for them. I guess the best way I can explain my feeling when I went back the second time was in looking at the consular office in the consulate there and seeing the kind of people on the Turkish side - we had a lot of Iranians at this time - but seeing on the Turkish side the kind of people who were trying to come to the United States. We’d been there before, and I did some consular work before, in Izmir. The average young person in Turkey who was educated wanted to get out. He wanted to go out to the United States for an education and then stay there, not come back. He didn’t see any future for himself in Turkey. This time, when I went back, a lot of the bright ones were coming back, under the influence of the kind of open régime that Ozal was fostering. And I must say, I had a great deal of time for Ozal and his people, a very simple man who spoke from the heart and made his
message very clear to the peasants as well as all the way up the line. And this was a time when Turkey was really beginning to expand its line abroad as well as internally. They had a lot of large construction companies, etc., that were winning contracts all over the world. Turks are traditionally very great engineers, and they were winning them in the Middle East they were winning them, as later became the case, in the Soviet Union and all over Eastern Europe. So it was a very energetic, as I characterized it, time, especially in Istanbul. I didn’t know the backcountry that well. I’d get out there once in a while in my consular district I was in, maybe on vacation. But Istanbul was a full-time occupation. The city was growing. It’s now about 12, 13 million. It’s expanded enormously from what it was before, almost all of it on the Asian side. We used to say that you could take a train - to show you the extent of Istanbul’s expansion - you’d get a train at Hyderpasha on the Asian side and start off in the direction of Ankara, and it took you an hour before you were on the outskirts of Istanbul. Just growing like crazy. In terms of our life there, my family’s and mine, but principally my wife - the children were gone by that time - it was - do you remember these cardboard cutouts down near the White House where you could have your picture taken with the President or something? Well, my wife and I got invited to so many things - and the Turks didn’t want to see a number two; I mean, it was very hard to send someone else - that we seriously thought about having those cutouts made up and sending them over to the party saying, “He made an acte de présence; he was here.” Yes, it was just - but it became exhausting, with five, six nights a week, for two or three affairs every night. And these were big affairs. I mean, the whole Istanbul festival in the summer had really taken off, a world-class festival now, and you got invited to everything, and you had to show the flag, in effect, to go to these things. So that part of it became very draining after a while. But I must say that we enjoyed - we still do - the Turkish people and relating to them, and the result is I now have a son who’s a teacher in Uskudar in Turkey and he’s married to a Turkish girl. So it’s still going on.

Q: What about the political situation there? One is particularly these days concerned about fundamentalism. But there’s also sort of the equivalent of the Red Brigades or the Grey Wolves in Turkey, terrorism and all that. Were these factors you dealt with then, or not?

RAU: Well, the biggest event that happened of that nature while I was there was the bombing of the Nevi Shalom Synagogue, which was very close to where the consulate was. It happened on a weekend. I was in the office, but just a few other people were, and we just were having a crisis task force for about 24 or 48 hours because we didn’t know what this was going to mean, until they found out who had caused it, etc. That was from outside, though; that wasn’t Turkish. It was an attempt by somebody trying to do away with part of the Jewish community in Istanbul.

Q: What was it, Iranian or PLO?

RAU: No, it was mainly Arab-sponsored. I don’t know if it was PLO or not, but it was definitely Arab-sponsored.
**Q:** What about Turkish fundamentalism. Again we’re talking about the ’85 to ’88 period.

RAU: Well, I think that Turks are now beginning to realize in changing, as my son tells me, their educational system, because what happened when I was there - and it’s really mushroomed - was the establishment of these so-called Imam Hatip schools. These were fundamentalist schools which did the traditional thing. They would get village people who would come to Istanbul or one of the large cities because they were looking for work or whatever, and they would meet them at the buses when they came in by bus and introduce themselves and say, “Now we’ve got this situation where you are going to need help, you are going to need a place to stay, you’re going to need food, you re going to need a job, your children are going to need education, etc. We’ll help you.” Basically what they said was, “In return, we want you to remember on election day who you should vote for.” And it worked. They got their first fundamentalist government, even though, as the Turkish ambassador here and others rightly said, it was a minority government. It was not a majority government, but still they had enough following to form a government.

**Q:** Now this election was after you left?

RAU: Yes, but you could see that it was coming, because people had not - Ozal, to give him his due, could see the dangers of this. And for example, on the Kurdish problem, he wanted to open that up. He wanted to let the Kurds have their own radio station, to have their own schools, be taught in their own language, have their own newspapers, etc. He was beginning to open that up. The problem was the military. The military followed Ataturkist tradition basically, which says, you know, “Give them an inch, and they’ll take a mile. We can’t allow that to happen.” And that’s the other thing that still makes - after Ozal died - this was after I’d left Istanbul, when I was back in Turkey - I talked to a number of people and with some here in the embassy, too, who said, “You know, Turkey has to get another leader, and they’re going to have a long time before they have another one with the leadership qualities that he has.” And it’s true. They’ve been floundering ever since. They elected a lady prime minister, and everybody was very hopeful - you know, Western educated and all these things, speaks very good English - and she became a tool. In order to make coalition with the fundamentalists she went over. It was a big mistake, and the others, in order to seek a place for themselves, including the current prime minister, have refused to make the necessary changes. So economically, Turkey’s doing very well, but politically, they’re still under that threat of a military takeover.

**Q:** Well, now, I would imagine in Istanbul you would not be particularly aware of the military, or not?

RAU: Oh, very much so. We had an artillery unit outside of town that we would visit once in a while that was in our consular district, and the First Army command is there, and that was one of the people you called on along with the governor and the mayor, etc. You went to all their dos that they would invite you to. Got to know the commanding general fairly well, and of course we had a couple of officers who were still going - I think they are still going - to the Higher Defense College in Istanbul, American officers.
And then we had the fleet visits, of course, and you got to know the Turkish Navy stationed there. I got to know the admiral in charge there fairly well. So yes, there was a lot of relationship with the Turkish military.

Q: When you’re up in Thessaloniki one is very much aware of the Third Army and what it’s concerned about, which is the Turkish Army. How about when you’re looking from Istanbul at the Turkish First Army? What were their concerns?

RAU: Their concerns were more to the north and also the Bosporus and the straits themselves, until this Seismic, the one ship that went looking for oil of the coast, and the brouhaha that ensued with Greece. Then they became very interested in this. But the Greeks would not believe that the Turks were not looking in on everything that they did. And the Turks, I still believe with my heart of hearts, that they didn’t really. I mean, they took it into consideration, but except for the fact that Cyprus was only 50 miles away and they knew about that, they weren’t concerned about anything on the Greek border.

Q: Well, now, by the time you were there - we’re talking about 10 years eleven years after Cyprus was partitioned by force - was Cyprus sort of considered a fait accompli, that’s that and move on to other things, by the Turks you’re talking to, or were they thinking - I mean, the Greeks, you keep talking about negotiations or doing something. I was just wondering how you were sampling the Turks.

RAU: The Turks - they still do today - they poured a lot of money into Northern Cyprus. It has become a tourist Mecca for a lot of Turks to go over there because it is cheap and air flights are frequent and the weather is always good there, you don’t have to worry about that. So it has become a tourist Mecca for tourists. I don’t think they’re that concerned. I mean Denktash was spending a lot of time coming to Ankara all the time to talk to whatever Turkish government was in power.

Q: Denktash being the Turkish Cypriot leader.

RAU: The Turkish Cypriot leader since, you know, since the beginning.

Q: The turn of the century practically.

RAU: Yes.

Q: He and Clerides. I mean, those two are like the Siamese twins of-

RAU: Well, they both went to law school and knew each other in London. The Inns of Court in London is where they got to know each other. But I don’t think the Turks - yes, the Turkish military was very aware of the situation because they have 20,000 plus troops there and they keep a pretty tight rein on that. When I was in Athens was when they declared a separate state there, and the Turks recognized it immediately and nobody else did. Pakistan flirted with recognizing it at one time for a while, but never did. And the
Turks, although they spend a lot of money there and have to expend resources keeping the army there as well, I don’t think unless there are some sort of moves, which the Greek Cypriots seem to try to design to put the gouge in once in a while (like these missiles), I don’t think they’re concerned about it. But they are concerned about something like that, because they see it as a threat not just to Northern Cyprus but to the Turkish mainland as well.

**Q:** Well, now, as the American consul General six times a week going to two to three functions, what was the main thing that Turks who would grab you and take you aside wanted to know about and talk about?

**RAU:** It wasn’t me so much, but yes, they did do this. While I was there we had a political Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé who I think spent half of his time in Istanbul. Any drop of a hat, he was down in Istanbul, not in Ankara. So we had to, in effect, entertain him, and he would go to many of the same functions that I was going to, but for those that I got to know pretty well, there were many times we had long discussions, not about aid programs - the Turks did not broach that with me so much; they knew about that - but maybe the military situation, as to say, what was the US position? What was going to be the our position with regard to - they knew that our American military were very much in favor of the Turks, not just those who were in country, but all those that came in at times. But they wanted to know what our position was with regard to Turkish membership in NATO. Did we still consider them a very stalwart member of NATO, the southeastern flank and all that. And also what about supporting the Turkish position to get into the Common Market? That was always a very big one that was always brought up. And they were trying to interest more American firms to invest in Turkey, which they would bring up with me occasionally. We had a program - I say we, it was mainly run by Richard Perle while I was there, who was an under secretary of Defense at the time. He’d worked for the senator from-

**Q:** From Washington, Scoop Jackson.

**RAU:** Yes. He had a theory - was very supportive of Turkey. He had a theory, he said if we can get the right mixture of staff aides from these various senators and committees - not the senators and representatives necessarily themselves - to come to Turkey, that we will have a good group that will support whatever position we want to take on Turkey on the Hill. So he would fly over with a planeload of these guys or gals and then we would call on the Turkish business community to help out, because we didn’t have the financial resources, but they would host them and take care for them for two or three days in Istanbul. I think it made a lasting impression on a lot of them, because it was their first experience in Turkey; they didn’t know anything about Turkey.

**Q:** In a way, this is to counter the -

**RAU:** The Greek-American lobby.
Q: -which is probably more pervasive than the Jewish-American lobby.

RAU: It think it may be.

Q: I mean the Jewish-American lobby is, essentially, you take New York, Miami, and Los Angeles out of the equation, and you begin to fall off, whereas the Greek-Americans are all over the place.

RAU: They are spread all over and friends of mine always ask me, “Why can’t the Turks do this, you know, like the Greeks?” Well first of all, the Turks don’t have an Orthodox Church that they all gather around. And the Turks seem to assimilate more into the American community, when they come here, than the Greeks do.

Q: Did you find that you were having - I wont say problems - but aware of some of the Greek-American Congress Senators like Sarbanes of Maryland and all who were reflexively pro-Greek and anti-Turkish?

RAU: We didn’t have that much trouble with the Congress when I was there. We had to keep our relationship very clear and correct with the Patriarch, the Ecumenical Patriarch who was there. And although he was an old man and later died, I got to know the man who is currently Patriarch, his second in command there, pretty well, and he’s a very bright articulate man as well, well thought - of, not only in Turkey, but elsewhere as well. He’s quite an improvement.

Q: I would have thought - you had been in Greece, you’re an economic officer looking at the Greeks getting into the European Community. I think there they’ve got one veto and you can’t get in. And then it’s a foregone conclusion that once the Greeks got into the European Community they would never, never, never allow the Turks in.

RAU: That’s true, except that I don’t blame the Greeks as much because everybody knew that this was what the Greeks were going to do and pressure could be applied to them to change their minds by other members, but I’m convinced in my own mind that countries like Germany don’t want Turkey in the Common Market because they want it to remain a Christian community. And that’s why I think we’re going to have more problems, in terms of the European Community, than taking in parts of Eastern Europe. And Ozal has said when he was alive that the Europeans don’t want Muslims in there, and Turks are, at least in name, Muslims; they’re not Christians.

Q: How did you read the ties of the Turks that you saw to Islam? I mean, was it of a different nature?

RAU: Except for the village Turks, some of the village Turks, the average Istanbuli and people from the large cities, they don’t pay that much attention to organized religion, with a few exception. They really don’t. They’re not fundamentalist in the sense that some Iranians are, for example.
Q: What about Israel? Did this play much of a role?

RAU: That’s one of the most fascinating things, I think, about the current relationship. If you go back in history, when Spain threw out the Jews in 1492, the Ottoman sultan at the time invited them to come to Turkey, and they were a class that brought a certain amount of modernity to Turkey. They were first-class merchants; they were first-class in many fields, doctors, etc. The result is that some of the most prominent Sephardic families in Istanbul are a major part of the business community now and own large segments of it. But they always considered themselves - for example, to give you an example: I went to the memorial service after this Nevi Shalom bombing-

Q: The synagogue.

RAU: - of the synagogue. There was the Israeli representative there from Ankara, and there were many members of the Jewish community in Istanbul, but the spokesman for the community, when he stood up to speak, it was in the sense that “We are Turks first and Jews second” and that this has been an insult and a force against Turkey, not so much against Judaism per se or Israel. And that’s the way most of the Turkish Jews see themselves now. They’re more Turkish first and Jews second. But Turkey has regularized and improved its position with Israel now, because they never have had much of a love or even a liking of the Arabs, anyway, and now the technical abilities of the Israelis are being exchanged in Turkey for the rights of their pilots to be able to use Turkish airspace for training, and I think the Turks are very happy with this and so are the Israelis.

Q: During a good part of this time the Iran-Iraq war was going on.

RAU: Yes.

Q: They were kind of neighbors, I mean, Turkey had a common border with both. Did that have any particular resonance during the time you were there?

RAU: Well, it did in the sense that we were overwhelmed with Iranian visa applications. There were a lot of Iranians that were secretly fighting each other within the city of Istanbul. There were certain sections of Istanbul that became Iranian rather than Turkish. The signs in the store windows, etc., were all in Farsi. They just took over part of the city. But where we had problems was in the visa lines.

Q: How did we deal with the Iranians visa-wise?

RAU: Well, finally, after much importuning Washington, we got two officers who were fluent in Farsi, because our biggest problem there was that the people that would come in as interpreters for them were charging them - even to make an appointment they had to have a pass at a certain time, and they would sell those off, and it was a major problem. But it did help a lot when we got those two American officers who spoke Farsi. But I’m
sure it’s still a major problem for them, differentiating between and among the legitimate ones.

**Q:** Were Turks that you would be talking to at all choosing up sides on Iran and Iraq or was it “a plague on both your houses” or “isn’t this sad” or how were they? What were they?

RAU: They played it pretty close on both sides. I mean they were even-handed, let us say, to both sides. They did, however, have, as you know, major truck traffic in an out of Iraq, much more so than Iran. I knew the Turkish ambassador to Iran fairly well through his brother, and I don’t think the Turks had any real great love for the Iranians. But on the trade side, they don’t like the Arabs either, but they certainly liked the arrangement they had for pipelining oil from Iraq, and that was a big loss after the Persian Gulf War, when they closed that.

**Q:** This was a time when it hadn’t reached the dissolution point but it was moving towards a point of the Soviet Union. There was change under Gorbachev during this time. Were they following events closely in the Soviet Union?

RAU: I’m sure the military were, but I’m not sure... Well I shouldn’t say that. The business community was, because by that time they started building in Moscow - the Turkish construction firms, major projects: hotels, housing, all run by Turkish firms or put up by Turkish firms - and they all opened offices in Moscow. So they were starting to expand in terms of their business relationship with the Soviet Union at the time. In the consulate - the Soviets still had a fairly good-size consulate in Istanbul, but I didn’t see much activity there on the business side with them, which was by and large, besides the representation function, what the consulate was all about - plus the visa-issuing and the consular part of it. So I didn’t have that much contact with them *per se*. We had a couple of committees which are still in existence that we got together with our colleagues for administering the cemeteries there, the allied Christian cemeteries, etc. We would meet once in a while and go over there, but other than that we didn’t see them.

**Q:** I would assume that during this particular period there wasn’t a lot of traffic of the Soviet Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean back and froth, so you weren’t having someone at your place look out the window looking at Soviet ships.

RAU: They had a special office there - which I’m sure they still do - in the consulate, that they ran.

**Q:** But it wasn’t a big deal.

RAU: No, it wasn’t a big deal. They’d have a boat, and they’d go out and check anything that goes through but they rely on the Turks quite a bit for this too, because the Turks are the ones that really keep an eye on the military warships that go through.
Q: When you left in 1988, whither Turkey, did you feel?

RAU: When I left in ‘88, I thought as long as Ozal can stay alive - I mean he had a family that was getting him in trouble - but

Q: Do you mean the usual thing, corruption, brothers-in-law or something like that?

RAU: That’s right. Sons, daughters. And Mrs. Ozal wasn’t any help to him either, Sema, but as long as he was in control and was in power I thought Turkey would be able to turn the corner. When my wife and I led a group of people to Turkey - I think I mentioned this earlier - and we landed in Ankara that day and the flag was at half mast, that was the day he was killed, or died, coming back from a trip to Central Asia, where he had been. I think Turkey still is in for a period of prolonged turmoil, politically especially, but it’s a very resilient country. When you have over 90% inflation, as they had for the last 10 years almost, there is a disparity of incomes that is taking place, but to show you the kind of incomes that exist in Istanbul, the school my son teaches in, from 6th grade through high school, is probably the equivalent - he says better - of any U.S. junior college today. The tuition for that school is US$ 8,500 a year, and they have too many applicants. They can’t take them all.

Q: We’re talking in today’s terms that $5,000 is considered, for a good school here in Washington, where there’s a lot of demand, pretty steep, so it gives an idea.

RAU: It gives you enough perspective on it. The other thing is that my son’s wife now, who has finished college, is going to be teaching in the school with him, but they’ve set up a new primary school that’s all taught in English, from the beginning, an immersion course. The tuition for this primary school, for the first year at least, is $13,000 a year.

Q: Good God!

RAU: What they are doing is they are charging them the $8,500 that the others pay and asking all the parents who have a child going to that from the first year to put in an extra $5,000 to help the school get started. I mean, with that kind of money, if you have several children, $13,000 a year to go to primary school is a lot more than I can afford, or most Americans, for that matter. So there’s a lot of disparity of income in Istanbul, but it’s a very wealthy country in many ways, and it has a wealth of young people. I mean, over 50% of the people are below the age of 20.

Q: When you left in ‘88, what?

RAU: When I left in ‘88 I came back here, I worked for one year for a Greek ship owner trying to find business for him here in the United States here. He is a very wealthy man, and he had extensive interests and wanted to try to spread them into other fields. That was not panning out too well. I couldn’t find anything to satisfy him. I tried to get him interested in shopping malls like Potomac Mall out here, etc. He didn’t want to get into
real estate, and I didn’t know anything about shipping, and he’d made all his money in shipping. Just about that time an old friend of mine who was a vice president of Bechtel, Howard Wahl, who was then the chairman of the Turkish-US business council, I had a meeting with him, and he said, “You know, there’s an opening where we want to get a new executive director to put on this Turkish council and you’d be a perfect one for that, but first he’d approached me because Parker Hart had been a consultant with Bechtel.

Q: He was a long-term - he just died - Middle-East hand.

RAU: Yes.

Q: In Turkey and the Arab world.

RAU: Right. He said, “How would you like to be a consultant for Bechtel?” I said, “Well, you’ve got Parker Hart; you don’t need me.” He said, “No. Parker’s getting old. His sources, etc., in Turkey, at least, are drying up, and we want to get someone who’s younger and has had this experience.” I said, “Well, frankly,” I said, “I wouldn’t mind doing that, but the one that would more intrigue me is this job as executive director of the business council, because there you’re trying to get more American firms to relate to Turkish firms. I know most of the Turkish firms. I’d like to get to know more of the American firms. So I took that job for five years and that was run out of the US Chamber of Commerce, and we held the annual conferences here, in Turkey one year, in the US the next. And finally in 1993, I guess it was, that group, the Turkish-US Business Council was amalgamated with the Turkish-US Council that was already in existence here, and they already had an executive director, so I decided I’d retire for the second time, which I did. And since then, I’m not gainfully employed.

Q: Well, that’s obviously a good point to stop. Great.

End of interview