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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the ninth of February 1999. This is an interview with John Richardson, Jr., that is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I’m Charles Stuart Kennedy. Well, John, to begin with, let’s start, can you tell me when and where you were born and something about your parents, your family?

RICHARDSON: I was born in Boston, February 4, 1921. I came from a privileged old Boston family and I grew in a very happy childhood. A fifth child in my family, last child and the only boy, therefore I was spoiled from the start.

Q: What did your father do?

RICHARDSON: My father was a lawyer, a leading lawyer, in Boston.

Q: You later went to Harvard?

RICHARDSON: Yes.

Q: Is he from Harvard, too?
RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes.

Q: There was a...

RICHARDSON: On both sides way back. Yes.

Q: What about your mother?

RICHARDSON: My mother was also an old Boston family. Hope Hemenway was her name. Mother was a Lawrence and father was a Hemenway. We lived on the place she grew up in.

Q: Where in Boston did you live?

RICHARDSON: We lived outside in the Blue Hills area between Canton and Milton at Blue Hills Farm.

Q: What about early schooling?

RICHARDSON: I went to elementary private school and prep school at Noble and Greenough.

Q: What about life at home? Did people sit around the table and debate politics?

RICHARDSON: Yes. My father was very interested in politics. My mother was interested in peace so I did grow up with discussions.

Q: Did you come out of the Republican side, I assume?

RICHARDSON: Oh, yes, of course. In fact, my father was Republican National Committeeman for many years in Massachusetts.

Q: So I assume they used to talk about that man in the White House?

RICHARDSON: Oh, definitely. Absolutely. There was no greater horror.

Q: In elementary and high school, what were your interests?

RICHARDSON: Blue Hill Farm was a large family compound. In the summer, the same was true. We had a summer home in Cohasset, Massachusetts, on the shore. There my father’s family had gone for years. There were cousins on his side that I played with in the summer, so I was surrounded by family both winter and summer.

Q: Did you develop interests either in reading or in sports?
RICHARDSON: Yes. I became a reader pretty young. I loved to read. Also sports.

Q: Any books stick out or authors before prep school?


Q: In prep school you went to what...?

RICHARDSON: Noble and Greenough.

Q: Where was that located?

RICHARDSON: Dedham, Massachusetts.

Q: Dedham, Massachusetts.

RICHARDSON: Another suburb.

Q: So you really weren't very far from home?

RICHARDSON: No.

Q: What did you do at prep school?

RICHARDSON: It was a small school. I think it was easy to do well in it. We got a lot of attention. I did well in school academically and also pretty well in sports. I liked people. It was easy for me to get along. I was president of my class most years and that kind of thing.

Q: What about the academic side? What was grabbing you at that time?

RICHARDSON: I think history. Current events. Because of the family I think I was interested in current events. I remember winning a prize in current events, the Time Magazine prize and that kind of thing. I wrote a column for the school magazine on current events. Also, English.

Q: The Time prize for those that might not know, Time Magazine used to give you a book.

RICHARDSON: Doesn’t everybody know?

Q: I got a book anyway. I won one, too.

RICHARDSON: Did you?

Q: In prep school, essentially you probably started about 1933 or so?
RICHARDSON: Yes. Right.

Q: So ’33 to ’37...?

RICHARDSON: Actually ’39 I graduated.

Q: Graduated ’39. So that was the midst of the Depression.

RICHARDSON: It didn’t affect my family in any obvious way to me.

Q: Was it just sort of over the horizon somewhere?

RICHARDSON: Yes. It was over the horizon. It was obviously there and of course being a current events buff, I knew about it but it didn’t affect me personally.

Q: How about history. Any teachers or...

RICHARDSON: Not so much in prep school. My favorite teacher was an English teacher that got me started on writing-enjoying writing. Not so much history. By the time I went to college I was interested in history and I majored in History in college.

Q: I think one of the great benefits of the prep school in that era anyway was writing. Wasn’t it?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes.

Q: Everything I knew about writing I learned about writing I learned in prep school.

RICHARDSON: Me, too.

Q: What about international affairs during prep school?

RICHARDSON: I was intrigued with the world situation. I was a radio buff you might say. I loved short wave radio and spent a lot of time listening to broadcasts from foreign countries. I can remember Hitler talking and sounds from Hitler and from England and from other places so I enjoyed that kind of way of touching on world events.

Q: Was there any doubt in your mind where you were going to college?

RICHARDSON: Absolutely none. I remember raising the question of the possibility of looking at something else. My father looked so stricken I never raised it again.

Q: You went to Harvard in 1939.

RICHARDSON: Yes.
Q: Could you talk about Harvard in 1939?

RICHARDSON: Well, it was…My classmates, the majority of them were prep school kids I would say, certainly all my friends that I both went to Harvard knowing and that I became closely associated with in college were prep school kids. It wasn’t true of the college as a whole but it was true of my social set. While I made friends outside, my close friends were all from the same background I had. The college itself, I didn’t think the teaching was great. I thought they only had one or two teachers that I really remembered and thought of as real strong influences. One was a history teacher, Professor Merk, who was well known for his theories of the Western expansion. Not many others. Other than that I was sort of a normal, average college prep school kid. I was active in athletics and active in extracurricular things. I didn’t work very hard and I got B’s.

Q: The gentleman B.

RICHARDSON: That’s correct.

Q: What about in the history at that time was the influence of Charles and Mary Beard and economics drive everything and that sort of thing?

RICHARDSON: Yes, I was would say superficially and slightly aware of that but no student of it.

Q: Again, did the outside world intrude at all?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Sure it did because the war, which of course started in ’39 in Europe. We were all very much aware of it. I should have said that I had a kind of a crossroads when I went to college because I had spent the summer before college in a Quaker work camp in Pennsylvania. That was a very powerful influence. I was very impressed with the Quakers and their way of thinking, therefore I seriously considered the idea of being a pacifist. When I went to start at that fall in college with the war already under way in Europe I felt I had to make a choice. I was either going to be a pacifist and set that course then or else I was going to presumably be in the war sometime and also I was going to get trained. I felt I either would join the ROTC or I would come out as a pacifist. I struggled with that right at the beginning of college. I decided to go the conventional route and give up the idealistic pacifist thing. So I joined ROTC.

Q: Was there much of a movement at this time of sort of anti-war groups? A man I’m interviewing right now, Harlan Cleveland, was saying how he belonged to an organization at Princeton called the Veterans of Future Wars which was an anti war, anti militaristic thing. How about that movement?

RICHARDSON: I’d say it was tiny at Harvard but it was there. It was definitely a group and I was aware of it, particularly aware of it, because I had made this decision myself. I
was conscious of the fact I might have gone the other way. There was such a move. Not in major numbers, I don’t think. In small numbers but vocal.

*Q: Was Harvard at that time one of those things that Boston and Harvard group as being very close to Britain?*

RICHARDSON: Yes. There was, I think a strong bias in that direction. But not everybody was. My own father tended to be isolationist in his thinking at that time. He had been a great fan of Herbert Hoover’s and helped get him elected President in ’28. That’s why he was Republican National Committeeman. He followed current events from kind of a conservative Republican, at that time, point of view. I was influenced by that when I was in school and I wrote a lot of sort of isolationist kind of stuff in school.

*Q: This is the America First...*

RICHARDSON: That’s right. The America First movement. That’s right. So I was influenced by that. I think I had changed my mind certainly by the time the war started in Europe.

*Q: In ROTC did you have any choices or what did you do?*

RICHARDSON: Well it was horse artillery. You cleaned up behind the horses and other things like that.

*Q: You got to wear those boots.*

RICHARDSON: You got to wear those artillery boots and look silly and have parades and all that. I don’t think I learned anything.

*Q: I had a cousin who was in the horse artillery at Stanford. This was sort of the thing one did.*

RICHARDSON: Actually the thing one did at Harvard was to be in the Navy ROTC. Most of my friends were in the Navy. I couldn’t get in because my eyes weren’t good enough.

*Q: During the time before we got into the war were there people coming and talking to you all at Harvard?*

RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes. I think there were. I think we heard the debates at the time about U.S. policy and I was interested in that kind of thing so I continued to be interested in what was going on in the world.

*Q: Did you find any change say in your family at all say after the Battle of Britain started and all that?*
RICHARDSON: Yes. I think there was. I think that my mother was particularly taken with the British—the terrible situation that Britain was in and the threat Hitler represented. My father was I think rather torn by it.

Q: Where were you December 7, 1941?

RICHARDSON: In my family’s living room, home from college. I boarded at college. My family was well off so I could do that even though I lived near by. But I was home for the weekend that Sunday. Like everybody else we heard it on the radio.

Q: What happened at Harvard when the news came out?

RICHARDSON: You know, I really don’t remember that particularly.

Q: Was there a cranking up of the ROTC?

RICHARDSON: Oh, yes. There was more emphasis on ROTC and we sort of became more serious—everybody I think.

Q: I notice, I’m looking up here at part of an oar. Your sport was crew?

RICHARDSON: It started out I had been in football—played football and crew at Noble and Greenough School. I never admitted it to anybody but I really didn’t like football. I didn’t like the violence, really. I think, looking back on it, I realized I was afraid of it and was miserable but I couldn’t admit that to anybody. I never did. Nor to myself, I think. By the time I got to college, I had to go out for football. I mean, I had to because that’s what I was expected to do by my father and so on and my friends. I played end in school and I switched to center because they needed a center. The only thing I was good at was tackling. Odd since I didn’t like the violence but I was good at that. Centers played both on offense and defense in those days. So I played behind the line and I did well at that so I got on the first team freshman team as center until in the first game…I never learned to center properly. I’d never done it. Throwing the ball between one’s legs was not something I’d done before and I threw it right over the kicker’s head in the first kick. That was the end of my football career and from there on gracefully retired gradually and went out for crew which offered the pleasing compensation to any embarrassment by encouraging you to row all year around. Therefore, I was no longer expected to play football.

Q: What about socially. Did you date?

RICHARDSON: Very little. I was very shy with girls. I had some girlfriends but it was all terribly proper and Bostonian and intimate.

Q: I am about seven years younger than you are but I caught some of that.

RICHARDSON: It was a different world.
Q: After we came into the war in December ‘41, did things pick up or what were the pressures on you all then?

RICHARDSON: Well, I think psychologically it became a little difficult because various of my friends who weren’t in ROTC were going and volunteering. I felt a little out of it to be in ROTC. We were strongly urged to stay with it and finish college and stay and get your military, so called, training. I think that was baloney looking back because there wasn’t any…I mean the relevance of the military training we had with those horses was pretty limited. But I did stay. I stayed and graduated early. I went in the summer and graduated in January of 1943.

Q: So then here you are a superb horse artillery...

RICHARDSON: They then send you to OCS so you can make up for what you didn’t learn in the four years.

Q: Almost catching up with those who had not taken ROTC.

RICHARDSON: Yes. Exactly.

Q: Where did you go to OCS?

RICHARDSON: Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Q: How did you like that taste of a different world?

RICHARDSON: Not much but I always had learned to sort of do whatever I was supposed to do and try to do it well and all that. It had been bred into me pretty much.

Q: What did they do with you then?

RICHARDSON: After that?

Q: After that?

RICHARDSON: They assigned me to a replacement training center in Fort Bragg, North Carolina to train recruits in artillery.

Q: So you stayed in the artillery field?

RICHARDSON: I stayed in the artillery for a year and by then I was really antsy because most of my friends seemed to be making great careers abroad and doing wonderful things and I was still in this silly replacement training center. So I sought a way out and the way out, only way I could find-they didn’t transfer you just because you asked to be transferred-so I joined the paratroopers. That got me out in a hurry.
Q: You say you really didn’t like the violence. How did you…?

RICHARDSON: By then I think I’d buried all that. I don’t think I thought about it.

Q: Where were you trained-paratrooper?

RICHARDSON: Fort Benning, Georgia. They did classes there every few weeks.

Q: Then where did you go?

RICHARDSON: I joined a parachute field artillery battalion. This was a new idea, a poor idea I may add, very dysfunctional. The idea was that you take these French, 1898, 75 mountain howitzers that came in pieces to put on the backs of mules and drop them out of planes and put them together on the ground after they came down under parachutes. It was a very impractical way of doing warfare. But we did it.

Q: Were you assigned to any one of the major divisions?

RICHARDSON: No. Not at that time. We were in a separate battalion. Camp McCall, North Carolina, now it doesn’t exist, near Southern Pines. We went, finally, I got married just before I went abroad.

Q: Where did you meet your wife?

RICHARDSON: I was on a temporary MP detail in South Carolina on a Sunday. We used to be on a roster for weekends, occasionally. There was a Corporal in a jeep and was driving through a pretty little southern town when it seemed to be time for supper. We were supposed to be checking on the MPs. They didn’t have enough officers, so they borrowed line officers and put them in an MP brass and which we were very embarrassed to wear, being proud paratroopers. Anyway, this Corporal and I came into this town and it seemed to be a good time for supper so we stopped at the only restaurant. There were two girls in the restaurant. One of them immediately hit me between the eyes and I spent the entire time while I was eating—I got rid of the Corporal—to try and figure out how to pick her up. I had never done that before. I had no technique and no opening line. I couldn’t think of any. Then my supper was over and I got rid of the Corporal again. I started to walk out, paid my bill, opposite where these two girls were still sitting, drinking coffee and I turned around and said, “Will you join me for a cup of coffee?”

They’d been sitting there for an hour drinking coffee. It wasn’t the most brilliant opening line. They said of course, “No, thank you.” They’d had theirs. By then I was committed and I sat down and got their telephone numbers and I followed up afterwards. That was in June of ’44 and by November we were engaged. I went down there to her home most every weekend I could get away. In fact, the Colonel raved and ranted about hitchhiking outside the camp which you weren’t supposed to do when you were an officer. I never got caught at it, to get down there, but there didn’t seem to be any other way to get there.
So anyway we got engaged. It was a cross cultural experience. She was from a southern family with a father who lost his parents when he was a child and grew up in a children's home and was a brilliant guy. He'd made his way through divinity school and Ph.D. in addition and was a Baptist minister and professor. Not a very liberal in his views. No dancing, no smoking, no swearing and you can’t take the girl out of the house all the time you’re calling on her because I don’t know your parents. So I never got to take her out of the living room, which was smaller than the small study we’re sitting in. Her parents were next door in the kitchen and heard everything. It was very difficult and painful.

Q: To be hit with the full impact of a Southern Belle for somebody who’d been brought up in Boston...

RICHARDSON: Where girls didn’t even care to look good.

Q: Yes. I lived in Annapolis. I was a kid going to school up in New England and a Southern Belle was something. Maybe not today but then...This was something.

RICHARDSON: It was a tremendous impact.

Q: How did the family feel about this?

RICHARDSON: They were very good about it. My wife, I’m still married to the same girl, always says that my mother was wonderful. My parents were both so crazy about me - being the only boy and the last child and all that, that they would have accepted I think anybody that I wanted to marry. It was very far out from their point of view but they never gave any sign of it.

Q: Where did you go? You got married...

RICHARDSON: I was married in January 1945. I knew by then I was on my way overseas. My father-I had taken the virtuous position that we shouldn’t marry until I got back because I might not get back and that leaves a widow and all that. My father said, “Baloney. If you want to marry her go ahead and marry her.” He talked us and her parents into going along with that. So we got married and two weeks later I went abroad. I was in the very last phase of the war in Europe in a major airborne operation across the Rhine in March of ’45.

Q: This was sort of the last hurrah for the paratrooper.

RICHARDSON: That’s right.

Q: Were you with a division?

RICHARDSON: Yes. My battalion joined the 17th Airborne that had been in the Battle of the Bulge. We were not there with the 17th but we were in the last operation with the 17th Airborne.
Q: How did that go?

RICHARDSON: It was for me a very formative experience. I found it really devastating. I was absolutely terrified after I got shot at and so forth. One doesn’t I think ever know how one is going to react in a very extreme situation. We’ve all been through that. For me I was astonished and horrified that I… I thought I had behaved so badly. I was so petrified I could hardly move. We were shelled from very close to where I was setting up the guns. A shell landing between me and the first gun I was pointing the aiming circle at, knocked me over backwards. I wasn’t hurt. I was in sort of a state of shock. I was no use as the Executive Officer of that battery for several hours I would say. Although they gave me a Bronze Star for my valor, I was actually hiding along with most of the rest of the battery in an abandoned anti aircraft emplacement. It was a very important experience for me because I found how much I disliked the whole thing. People were hurt and I didn’t like that. One of the most vivid recollections of that-really for me terrible day was seeing, it still bothers me-seeing German soldiers, by then they were all kids, coming out of the woods a hundred yards away, 10 or 15 of them all with their hands in the air and they were mowed down by American paratroopers. I can see it now.

Q: The war ended quite soon after that didn’t it?

RICHARDSON: Oh yes. That was absolutely the end. It ended in May.

Q: Where were you dropped?

RICHARDSON: At place called Wesel in Germany, which is just down the Rhine from Dusseldorf, in sort of a farming area- big fields and so on. A big landing area.

Q: This was part of service surrounding the...

RICHARDSON: It was simply to secure a crossing but it turned out to be somewhat of a military anti climax because General Patton had gotten across ahead of us in a different sector - an unplanned operation.

Q: This is one of the problems of the time. When the war opened up again after the winter stalemate, every time they planned something, the ground troops would be there before you could get there.

RICHARDSON: That’s right.

Q: The war ended in...

RICHARDSON: May 8, 1945.

Q: What did they do with you?
RICHARDSON: On that date, I was in a rest area, an officer’s rest area in the South of France which I’d gotten sent to because I guess somebody did me a favor. I was kind of wrung out I think and I had some skin trouble and one thing or another so I guess they thought I was pretty tired. So I got to go to this rest area which was a wonderful experience for me because it happened that I got there the day before, May 7th at this Riviera Hotel in Nice. The news came of the end of the war and I’d always loved the music of the Marseillaise so I thought I’m going to go hear it sung and so I walked down town. Most of the other officers - this was my impression - most of the officers didn’t do that. Most of them got drunk where they were in the hotel. Liquor was either free or very cheap and all that. So they stayed there and got drunk and celebrated. I went down town to celebrate. I thought it’d be fun to be with the French. And it was a wonderful experience. It went all night. I fell in with a Polish family. A mother who was a refugee in France. One of her sons who had been in the French Army all these years and they had just been reunited and the other son had been reunited also with her, who had been in the British Army. We went from one bistro to another all night long with lots of Marseillaise singing. We just stayed together. We had a wonderful time and it was one of my early experiences that led me later to become a real, real fan of Poland-very interested in Poland because of that family. That’s very vivid to my mind now.

Q: What about the occupation. When they transferred you to...

RICHARDSON: We stayed right where we were. In fact we’d been up well halfway across Germany chasing the Germans and then we came back because the industrial area, the Ruhr, had to be cleaned out and so forth. That was the end of the war. Then we were simply assigned an occupation area where we happened to be at the time, our division. That happened to be very close to where we jumped, just by chance. So we were there for a couple, two, three months. So when I came back from this rest camp, to the battalion, we were on occupation duty and it was also an important experience for me because we had two displaced persons camps in our area. We tried to help. One we provided some sort of management for the camps. Also we had, in a battery like ours, we brought people from the camps to do the menial work so they could work for food and money from us. It was a way of providing help. That was interesting because I saw up close what those people had been through. That was important and very influential later I think.

Q: These were mainly non-Germans?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes. They were all non-Germans I would say. They were from all over Europe. Every place in Europe. They came just from wherever they happened to be. They were almost all men. They had been working in the factories in slave labor.

Q: What about relations with the Germans just from your perspective?

RICHARDSON: Well, we were trying to enforce the anti-what was it-no fraternization policy, which was difficult with the men. I found that, to my shock, that the men in my battery liked the Germans better than they had the French. I used to have to do the weekly Pentagon speech to the troops about what you are supposed to believe in, what’s going
on. I still remember making the regular weekly speech about our noble Soviet allies and what a great thing they were doing for humanity and so on and I was absolutely almost blown out of the room by the angry questions and comments from the enlisted men who didn’t for a minute buy it…I was shocked. It is interesting and actually there was a strong feeling in that group and I can still remember it because I was surprised. “We ought to go and clean out those commies before they get us, now while we can do it.” I thought that was terrible. It took a good many years for me to realize they were probably right.

Q: You also did mention this feeling about many of the troops really preferred the Germans?

RICHARDSON: Oh, yes. I think the difference was they noticed…The particular thing that I remember about it was that they were particularly impressed that the Germans had all this good plumbing. We were living around in German houses. We knew what it was like inside and they were so nicely fixed up. The French, they were dirty, relatively. Of course they didn’t take into account the Germans might be living better because they were doing better.

Q: The occupation duty. When did you get pulled out of that?

RICHARDSON: We were low on points. You had to have points in those days to get back to the States and points came from length of service overseas and battle experience and all that. We had very little of either so we were sent back very quickly. We were supposed to be…We were sent back in early August to the States on our way to Japan. During our leave, while we were on leave I think, from that, at home the atom bombs were dropped and the war ended in Japan. Which I found to my great relief. I had no desire to be part of that next outfit.

Q: I think the general consensus was we were talking about millions of casualties.

RICHARDSON: Yes. That’s what everybody assumed and I didn’t care to be one of them.

Q: Sometimes there’s a controversy about should the atomic bombs have been dropped. I assume this was not our controversy.

RICHARDSON: Not a controversy that affected me except to say, “Why not?”

Q: This is hard for today’s generation to understand that?

RICHARDSON: It is, but that is certainly the way I felt and my family felt.

Q: How long did you stay in the military?

RICHARDSON: I had to have the points to get out because I had come in late and so I was in it for about another nine months, something like that. Stationed at Fort Bragg,

Q: She must have been at least pleased to be close to you ... Well had she stayed with her family?

RICHARDSON: She was finishing college. She had finished college soon after I left and stayed with her family.

Q: How were you finding this North South arrangement?

RICHARDSON: Well it was difficult. Very difficult, especially for her. When she had to go up and meet my family...

Q: You were saying about the adjustment... The war is fine but all of a sudden when you are on regular duty...

RICHARDSON: She had to meet my family. My family was a very... I don’t think they had ever met anybody like my wife—but it was a very parochial Boston family. So they couldn’t have tried to be more welcoming and so on but the patterns were so different. She tells about, I think, the first time that she was there without me because I was abroad and was greeted with a tea where all the relatives came. She said, “Every time I opened my mouth, everybody stopped talking.”

Of course, she had this extremely broad southern accent that nobody had heard before. And they were astonished by it. They all tried to be very warm and friendly but it was difficult for her. Both of us of course came from such different backgrounds, it was a lot to learn.

Q: I started to say today there has been much more of an amalgamation but there really was a South and there really was a...

RICHARDSON: Oh, was there ever.

Q: Not only a North but a Boston North.

RICHARDSON: Absolutely. A Boston North and she had never been as far north as Virginia. North Carolina was the furthest north she’d been—ever in her life. That was really deep south.

Q: I remember dating a girl that happened to be down in Meridian, Mississippi and said she’d been up north to Jackson. Did you have any idea—I mean you did have your degree—of what you wanted to do with your life?

RICHARDSON: Yes. I did have an idea because of the war and that experience in it. I wanted to do something about peace and all that. I remember talking with my father on a visit to Boston when I was still in the Army and we were fishing together out on the
canoe and he asked me what I was going to do. I said, “I’d like to go back to Europe and do relief work.”

And we nearly turned the canoe over at that point because he was so horrified. He managed to contain himself and talk me out of it and said, “Why do you want to do that?”

I told him why and he said, “Well that’s fine. So you want to do something in international relations. That’s a good idea but that isn’t the way to do it.” He advised me to make a success, to get some achievement in the private sector first. “Don’t join the Foreign Service. Don’t go do humanitarian work in Europe. Be like me. Be a lawyer.”

Of course that’s what he’d always wanted me to be. So he got his point and I became a lawyer.

Q: You went I assume to Harvard Law School?

RICHARDSON: Of course.

Q: How did you feel? All of a sudden you’d had your military experience, you’d been in the south, married a Southern Belle and all of a sudden back to...

RICHARDSON: I’ve always been pretty adaptable. I sort of readapted pretty easily. I didn’t mind it. I didn’t like law school much but nobody does I guess. Unless they are real scholars, which I certainly wasn’t. We had two children while we were at Cambridge in those two and a half years. I had to work hard to get through. I found it quite difficult. I was not a really good student-never was-I got a B minus I think. It was something I just felt I had to do. From there, using my father’s old boy network, I explored law firms in New York and Washington still pursuing my idea which he thought was all right. He wanted me to stay in his firm in Boston but I ruled that out. For obvious reasons I didn’t want to be/feel dependent all my life and so forth. So I did at that time try to get into a firm that would do international work. I was still bound on an international career eventually and I was interviewed in Washington at the Covington, Burling firm by Donald Hiss.

Q: Oh, yes.

RICHARDSON: Nice man. I was reading in Allen Weinstein’s new book, on Soviet espionage that Donald, like his brother may not have been straight, but I didn’t know that.

Q: Talking about Alger Hiss, of course, he came out of the Philadelphia Quaker background.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. That’s right. I was interviewed in New York by Sullivan and Cromwell because my father knew one of the Dulles brothers. He happened to know Allen Dulles. They were co-trustees. My father did trust and estate work. He was trustee for a woman who was a friend of Allen’s. Indeed she was his mistress when he was the
Head of OSS. They had a big OSS operation in Switzerland. Mary Bancroft. She wrote a book about it later. It’s in my shelf over here which I thought was a little indelicate particularly when Mrs. Dulles was still with us. Anyhow, Allen Dulles was the other trustee, a New York lawyer for Mary Bancroft so Father knew Allen so I was interviewed at Sullivan and Cromwell by Allen Dulles and was hired by him in effect. I don’t think I probably would have got in otherwise. I didn’t have that high marks, wasn’t really the right person for that very high tone office but that’s the way I got in.

Q: Well, Sullivan and Cromwell, could you explain where it ranked- (end of tape)

-what it was like?

RICHARDSON: What it was like? It was one of the top firms in Wall Street. They did investment banking and other such work, some in international work but it turned out the international was a very small part of their practice. I never got to do any international work. What I did was work in the corporate department, writing prospectuses and trust indentures for our investment banking clients.

Q: Sounds thrilling.

RICHARDSON: It was unbelievably unthrilling but I did it. I regret to say it was a great mistake. I stayed there far too long. I stayed there six years. I would have done better to leave at three years, but it didn’t matter in the long run. It wasn’t something I was enjoying. It was something I did. I did all right at it but I was not great at it. And when I finally concluded that this was foolishness... I got paid to begin with I think $3,600 a year. They did not pay high prices for young lawyers in those days and it was terribly hard work-huge effort. I mean very long days and nights and very little seeing my family and all that. It was a pretty miserable existence as I look back on it. But I was always adaptable and I enjoyed the competitive atmosphere. I think having all the bright people around me in that firm was good for me. I had to keep up. It was challenging. It was good training in that sense.

At the same time I continued to be interested in what was going on in the world and I got interested in politics while I was there. My wife and I got interested in doing something to get Eisenhower nominated to the Republican ticket against Taft in ’52.

Q: ’51.

RICHARDSON: Yes, I was part of a little bunch of young lawyers in Wall Street who started something called “Youth for Eisenhower” and it became a national young people’s movement to draft Eisenhower. Most of us were Republicans who wanted to save the Republican Party from Senator Taft, who we regarded as out of date in his thinking.

Q: He was from Ohio and very much of the isolationist...
RICHARDSON: That’s right. Isolationist. Very conservative Republican.

Q: But the leading Republican.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. He was expected to be the nominee and Eisenhower came out of the woods so to speak and appeared on the scene, agreed to run and won on the first ballot. My wife and I went to the convention and enjoyed meeting the great man, his wife and working toward his victory which came very promptly. So it was good fun. I’d been at one other convention before with my father. We went to the Willkie convention in 19- whatever it was-'42 I guess.

Q: No that would have been 1940 convention.

RICHARDSON: ’40, ’40, that’s right ’40. That had been fun. I had been for Willkie and he had been for Taft.

Q: That’s when the “We want Willkie”...

RICHARDSON: That’s right. That’s right. I was yelling and my father was looking disapprovingly. We were very close, my father and me. We never got angry about things but we were in different camps.

Q: Before we move on to the Eisenhower time, when you were in the South and married into a southern family, did race come into the thing? I mean here you were looking at this, coming from the Robert Shaw Gould, Robert Gould Shaw...?

RICHARDSON: Absolutely. As a little boy I saw that. I was taken by my mother to see that.

Q: They were talking about Godans Plaque on Beacon Hill.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. In my family there had been a background of abolitionists in the family and so on. So it came naturally. Fortunately, my wife’s family, and she herself were, for southerners, very broad minded. Because of the Christian background and so on they were much more accepting of blacks as people than many southerners. My wife was always a very compassionate kind of person and interested in everybody, no matter what they looked like, who needed help. From that point of view, she was also inclined not to be in conflict with my views.

Q: After Eisenhower was elected in 1952 and took office in ’53, did that get you involved?

RICHARDSON: No, it did not. I was still at Sullivan Cromwell. I didn’t stay in politics after that brief effort. I didn’t become active, I guess, again - in politics - until 1960. But in the meantime I had become active internationally because I had…When I left Sullivan Cromwell I saw my way out-as still able to keep a job and with family-I had basic
security because my family would never have abandoned us, but I of course wanted to support myself and my family. It looked to me like the investment banking houses that we worked for had better employment opportunities than I had at Sullivan and Cromwell. They made much more pay and worked much less. I could see that, I worked with them. So I thought, well, the thing for me to do is to get out of law into investment banking. So I called up an old friend, a room mate from Boston who was a leading partner in one of the Boston firms, Paine Webber, and asked his advice about which one of my clients I should go to work for. Paine Webber was not a client. We had several investment banking clients notably Goldman Sachs and First Boston. So I said, “Which one should I try or does it make any difference?”

He said, “Well why don’t you work for us?”

I said, “You need somebody like me?”

He said, “Yes. We’ve got a big business in Wall Street and we could use a lawyer in that office. So why don’t you come to work for us?”

So again the old boy network worked beautifully and I went to work for Paine Webber in New York, 25 Broad Street.

**Q: When did you start that?**

RICHARDSON: 1955. That was a huge change because I suddenly had time to do other things because it was relatively easy work. I wasn’t any more interested in it than I had been when I was working on the lawyer side of the same thing but it was a much better situation because I could do extracurricular things and I’d always, even in school and college, I’ve always done extracurricular things. This gave me time to follow my international interests. I started getting involved with groups that were interested in Eastern Europe. Partly because of that Polish family on VE Day and also I’d met a refugee family from Poland when we first came to New York in ’49 named Nagorski and they became very close friends. So that involved us in refugee and Polish matters. Then I really got engaged when the Hungarian Revolution broke out.

**Q: This is October ’56.**

RICHARDSON: Yes. Correct. October 23rd. It was a huge event in the world at that time. It made such an impression that people would rise up against totalitarian communist rule in Eastern Europe, which they did in a big way. So that’s where I got started in my international activities. I had called the…Somebody said that the International Rescue Committee was a refugee relief organization that would know some Hungarians. I didn’t know any Hungarians. So I called them up. They said, “Yes.” They gave me some Hungarian refugee names.

I asked, “Were they doing anything to help the revolution?”
They said, “No.” That was not their activity. They were in the relief business.

I got hold of those Hungarians and they were eager to help in New York to do something. What they were trying to do was to raise some money to rent a plane in Brussels and buy some bazookas and go and drop them in the right places.

Q: *Bazookas being an anti tank...*

RICHARDSON: Anti tank weapon. Yes. I thought that was a little bit wild but it seemed like a good thing to do so I started raising money for it. This was all in the first two or three days. I raised-I got some commitments and then I got cold feet. I thought I don’t know enough about this-what’s the U.S. position? Nobody knew how much we’d get involved or how active we’d be in trying to help or not help or whatever, and the papers were full of it. I naturally followed it but I didn’t know so I thought I better find out before I went any further. I called up Allen Dulles who I hadn’t been in touch with since I’d left Sullivan and Cromwell six years before. Not six years before, about three-two years before-three years before. He, meantime had gone to Washington, become Head of CIA. I said I had a problem I wanted to talk to him about.

He said, “Come on down on Saturday.” He was a very gregarious man.

I went down there on Saturday morning to Washington and went to see Allen. It was about the 28th I think of October. I told him what I was doing and asked him I said, “I don’t want to be told it’s stupid or it won’t help or something, but I need to know if I’m... Is there some national security problem I don’t know about that this is going to involve?”

Well he laughed long and loud and called in the experts and assured me that the Soviets were going to intervene in force probably within a week and that it would be all over and that if I dropped bazookas it would just get a few more people killed.

I went back with my tail between my legs and called my Hungarian friends and backed out which is a very embarrassing thing to have to do. I couldn’t tell them why. I just told them I couldn’t do it. I couldn’t say Allen Dulles told me. That was a rather searing experience for me. I think because of that I got started in trying to look for something else to do in Eastern Europe. That revolution was over very quickly and of course there were 200,000 refugees. I know what I did first. I called the IRC when I went back to New York or the next day.

Q: *International...*

RICHARDSON: International Rescue Committee. This outfit that had steered me to these Hungarians. I called the same woman back, Anna Matson and said, “I’m not going to do the bazooka thing I told you about. What are you folks doing about the refugee flow or whatever?”

She said that their chairman was going to Europe that afternoon. Leo Cherne was going
to go to Vienna and going to try to get into Budapest and open a relief office in Budapest as a way of sort of symbolizing American support for the freedom fighters. He would like to take a present. If I could find a present for him to take with him that would be a help. I said, “What kind of a present?”

She said, “Oh, I don’t know. Maybe medicine for the wounded.”

So I said, “Well, I’ll try.” I remembered that there was an office of the Pfizer Company in my building. I went by it every morning. A big drug company. Their New York Office was on Wall Street. So I went down and talked my way up to a Vice President about the idea of making a gift - a big gift - of medicine. Then everybody was following this story. It was tremendously exciting. That’s what produced this picture on the wall, “The Man Who Wanted to Help Hungary.” They called the president of the company, McKeen, that’s his picture there, in New Jersey and said could they make a gift and send a big gift with Leo Cherne. He was the IRC chairman. He just died and I was at his memorial service three days ago in New York. He was chairman. He was going over. They did get a big box of medicines out to the airport when he went and he did get into Budapest for the International Rescue Committee. A staff person in Vienna got an old car and they loaded it with loaves of bread bought in Vienna and my big case of medicine and took it into Budapest. They were stopped by freedom fighters and by Soviets and so forth on the way in - had a very exciting trip - got in, got to the American embassy, which of course was functioning, and were told that Mindszenty, the cardinal who’d been in prison for several years under the Soviets, had been released and was making a speech that afternoon from his palace steps. So Cherne and this other fellow go over there with their loaves of bread and their box of medicine and they’re the only Americans on the scene I guess so they get pushed up to the front of the crowd. Leo used to tell the story when he’d make speeches about this-in fact he told it when he went on the Ed Sullivan Show, which was a big TV show when he got back-told the story of this adventure in Budapest, that he’d arrived on the steps of the palace. He said, “Here I am, a little Jew from back in the Bronx of New York with a hat on my head and this huge box of heavy medicine in my hands and I don’t know what to do and I don’t know what to say.”

Which I didn’t believe because Leo never failed to know what to say. It was a good story though. Anyhow, he got back. When he came back he called me and told me the story and he said, “Watch Ed Sullivan tonight and I’m going to be on it.”

It was a dramatic appearance that he made on the Ed Sullivan Show and it produced a huge wave of contributions from all over the United States to the International Rescue Committee which was then under very severe financial straits and it saved the organization. Leo said, “Will you come on our board?”

I said, “Yes, of course.” I’ve been on it every since except for the times I was at Radio Free Europe and the State Department when I got off it. But I’m still on it now. It’s been a long association. Very important in my life.

Q: How long did you balance the International Rescue Committee and the investment
banking?

RICHARDSON: Well, actually what required more balance was-I got involved because of the Hungarian thing-I was by then so intensely interested in Eastern Europe...Even at Sullivan and Cromwell a fellow by the name of Karl Harr, who was later a NSC, National Security Council-they didn’t call it that then-in the Eisenhower Administration, got me involved in an idea-a crazy idea; even crazier that dropping bazookas-of developing a sort of guerrilla force with refugees in Europe. I mean really nutty. The idea of using East European refugees to sort of infiltrate and cause trouble for the Soviets. Really irresponsible.

Q: CIA was doing a great deal...

RICHARDSON: They were more irresponsible than I was because they had authority and power. I didn’t. A bum idea on both sides I would say. I wanted to do something after the Hungarian thing. I felt terribly deflated by what had happened when they were taken over. So I talked to my Polish friends and found out what was needed in Poland. At that time they thought the most urgently needed thing was medicine which is just what I had been able to get for the Hungarians. I had also...while the Hungarian thing was going on I went up to the International Rescue Committee every day for that 10 days or so and telephoned companies to get supplies. It was easy. Everybody wanted to give. Everybody wanted to help. Just because I’d happened to find that the Pfizer company did it, everybody else would do it and they did. So we’d gotten a lot of supplies. I’d found it was very easy and thought well maybe I could do the same thing in Poland. So I started a project to provide medicine to Poland. This was starting in the spring of ’57. It worked out. That People to People in Action editorial is about what I did in Poland, which was a medical assistance project. I went to Poland probably four or five times in the ‘50s to organize the distribution side of it. So I got acquainted with Poland. What it was like in a communist country on the ground. It was a successful program. A lot of companies gave to it. It produced a lot of medicine.

Q: I would have thought there would have been a problem with the Communist authorities getting medicine from a capitalist company.

RICHARDSON: Well there was. It was tricky. At first, when I went over there, and persuaded the authorities that I was serious and that I could get something for them-they were terribly short of medicine-and they went along with it. I had to negotiate an agreement with the government. CARE had opened an office in Warsaw so we made CARE ... 

Q: Care being a...

RICHARDSON: CARE being the relief organization-American relief organization. They agreed to be the manager of the thing if I would set it up and get the medicine. So I had to work out an agreement with the government.
Q: You’re talking about the Polish Government?

RICHARDSON: Yes. The Communist Government. Yes. That was not easy because the American firms had to be persuaded that the medicine would be properly used for people who needed it in Poland. So it wouldn’t all go to the special communist party hospitals or to the Soviet Union. So it took some doing to set up a system that would satisfy everybody on both sides. So I got some experience there that was useful, I think in trying to work that out. What I did was set up a committee. Another friend—a great friend I’d knew all my life since school, who’s died now—there’s his picture up there—John Page—I got him to go with me and the two of us had a wonderful time on these trips to Poland going around and interviewing doctors and professors in medical school. We were trying to set up the committee throughout Poland that would undertake, as leading people in medical fields, to guarantee to the Americans that this medicine would be properly used. They were not people in the party. They were just professionals and so forth. Heads of medical schools and all that. Heads of hospitals. So we did that. We recruited this group and we got an agreement drafted and agreed to by the Polish Ministry of Health. On my last trip over there I went to sign the agreement with another minister, the minister of social welfare, Minister Zawadzki, and Page was with me. We went to call on him because he had to sign the agreement also. Everything had been endlessly worked out in detail in the contract and he was very polite and said how generous the Americans were and gave me all this talk. Then he said, “There’s just one little problem.”

Of course this was the kind of thing you as a diplomat would understand. That’s the way these things are. I had never run into that before. It’s not the way lawyers did it.

Q: You don’t save it until last.

RICHARDSON: So when he told me the one little problem was that I couldn’t have the committee, that they did not have private committees in Poland, that wasn’t part of their system—when he told me that I was absolutely dumbfounded and literally couldn’t speak I was so upset. I couldn’t say anything I remember—just choked. I couldn’t say anything. I just stood there. I was standing up in front of his desk I remember and I finally just turned around and walked out because I couldn’t say anything. I just physically couldn’t speak. We went downstairs. Page and our staff... We had a young woman, an International Rescue Committee person, who came with us and was a translator, a Polish person, the cousin of Nagorski, my friend. The three of us stood on the sidewalk and decided what to do and we decided, well, we’ll just go home, this is probably the best thing we could do. So we went home and I really concluded that nothing was going to happen. I went back to work at Paine Webber. I got a call about 10 days later from the Polish ambassador in Washington, Pasofski, I think his name was. A fine man who later defected. He said, “Mr. Richardson, there’s been a very bad misunderstanding.”

I said, “No, there couldn’t.”

He assured me it was a misunderstanding and it could be fixed.
I said, “Well, how?”

He said, “Well, suppose I - I haven’t talked to Warsaw about this - but suppose I was to suggest that that committee of yours would be made a committee of the Polish Government. Would you accept that?”

I said, “The same people?”

He said, “Yes.”

I said, “Sure.” I could have kicked myself that I hadn’t thought of it.

I still couldn’t quite believe it would work but it did. So the system got set up and it produced quite a lot-seven or eight million dollars worth of medicine in Poland. Particularly it happened that one of the companies, the Eli Lilley Company was making the first Salk vaccine for polio. There was a terrible polio epidemic that summer in Poland. Lilley offered us a tremendous amount of short-term vaccine. It only lasted for a few months. It was down near the end of the time. They said, “If you can get it over there quick enough and get it distributed quick enough you can have it for nothing. We can’t sell it. It’s too late.” So they sent of the total six or seven million, they sent… it was enough vaccine they claimed that they could do all the children in Poland between two and four or something like that. It was a very large number of shots that they could give. And they did. Pan American flew it over free. It didn’t cost anybody anything. It was distributed by CARE. Everything was labeled “gift of the American people”. That was a requirement in the contract. It was a successful effort. I enjoyed the whole thing immensely.

Q: Did you early on, particularly during the Hungarian uprising, pick up your working colleague John Foster Dulles who was a... Did you ever meet him?

RICHARDSON: Yes I did. I can remember one meeting particularly. If I ever met him again at another time I don’t remember it in that year anyway. But I was on the 16th floor at Sullivan and Cromwell. I was going out to lunch. I got on the elevator. The only other person on the elevator was Mr. John Foster Dulles coming down from the 21st floor. He said, “Good morning young man. Where is your hat?”

Q: You were supposed to wear hats in those days?”

RICHARDSON: Yes indeed. I didn’t fail thereafter.

Q: You carried it. Were you getting any emanations from your people you were dealing with on the Hungarian side about Dulles’ pronouncements about rolling back communism and all? There’s a lot of bitterness at that time because we seemed to be promoting a roll back of communism but when the chips were down we backed off.

RICHARDSON: That’s exactly the way I would see it now as to what was going on. At
the time I was so wrapped up in the revolution that I wanted us to be much tougher than we were. I would have been happy if Dulles had followed through on the way he talked. I’m not so sure now that that would have been very wise.

Q: I don’t think...Emotionally yes but, politically it could have caused...

RICHARDSON: It could have been a war.

Q: It could have been a war. It was an awkward place. We probably couldn’t have done anything.

RICHARDSON: We couldn’t have done anything. In my view he was irresponsible really.

Q: In his pronouncements?

RICHARDSON: Yes.

Q: By this time you probably had pretty good connections with the drug industry as well.

RICHARDSON: Yes.

Q: Did you find them calling you and saying we’ve got this and that surplus and things of this nature?

RICHARDSON: For Poland yes. The committee worked wonderfully. We did get lots of help. I didn’t try to do it anywhere else. I did get into another thing in Poland at that time. If this is an appropriate time to mention it?

Q: Sure.

RICHARDSON: The picture on the wall there is of a hospital in Krakow, Poland. It’s a children’s hospital. The fellow who did it, that wrote a little thing to me on it, was a fellow named Bennacki-Poray, called on me when I was at Paine Webber, after the Polish thing had gotten out in the newspapers and so forth. He’d read about it and he came to see me. He said he was a Polish refugee. He was a very little guy about five feet two with a Tyrolean hat and a strong accent and he was an architect from Poland. A refugee, had a family, living over in New Jersey and a very struggling practice. I’m sure he didn’t have much income. But his daughter had been very ill and her life had been saved in an American hospital. He’d gotten the idea of building a hospital in Poland. He was a strong Catholic. It was sort of a give back and he wanted my advice because I’d been involved in doing things there. Well, the only thing I did for him was to not laugh at him. It was a crazy idea but I didn’t laugh at him. He and I and Page, this old friend of mine, saw him about once a month thereafter and had him over for lunch because he was bound and determined to do it. The only thing we talked him out of was that he couldn’t do it by raising private money. He talked about 10 million dollars. You don’t raise 10 million
dollars in the middle of the cold war for a hospital in Poland. Not in America you don’t. So we told him the only place you get that kind of money is in Washington. I had already found out because I’d tried to use my connection with my old friend Karl Harr, who was then in NSC, to see if I could get some money for my Polish project from the government. I’d gone down, had a meeting at the White House with the people from AID, State and so forth to see if I could get any money to help us do this project. Well they were all very polite but no there wasn’t any money. They didn’t have it and didn’t think it was very practical and so forth. I said, “It’s not going to be easy but that’s the only big place you get money and you can’t get it from the executive branch, I can tell you that right now. I couldn’t get much it—much less of a quantity but maybe the Congress. That’s the only way you can get it. If you can interest a Congressman maybe he will call his colleagues or something. Well he went to work. This guy that had never had any experience before. He looked like nothing. He went down to Washington and he started calling on Congressmen and Senators starting with his own and he lined up an amendment to the then pending AID bill for a Polish Hospital in Krakow—children’s hospital. That’s the most extraordinary, I think, lobbying feat I’ve ever heard of. A guy with no background—nothing. No friends, nobody and he got it done. And it was passed a couple years later and that hospital, I visited it this spring with my wife—she’d never been in Poland before and I’ve been a lot of times so we took her on this trip. I had an invitation to the Polish Government on another thing and I went down to see this hospital. It’s absolutely thriving, a magnificent hospital now in Krakow—children’s hospital. It does great work and had developed a lot of international connections which is one of the things that appealed to me at the time about it because they could have exchanges and so forth with the west which they did and it all developed very beautifully as a result of this one guy. I always thought it was one of the biggest one man accomplishments I’ve ever seen.

Q: What about in your dealings, you mentioned Congress…I remember being told there are more Poles in Chicago than there are in Warsaw at one point and all that. Did the Polish community come into your...Were you connected with it or not?

RICHARDSON: Yes or No? Really not on these projects much. I had started—this Polish refugee friend and I had started something with the Polish community back when I was at Sullivan and Cromwell which we called Packages for Poland which was just sort of a CARE idea sending packages to everybody. They would produce the addresses and I would raise the money. I helped set up a little non-profit and so forth. It went for about a year. Then the Poles, the authorities, were getting too many packages from the West and shut it off—raised the duty up so high I couldn’t do it. So I’d had that connection before with the Polish community. Really I only got involved with the Polish community, not so much on these projects, but in 1960 when I got involved in the Nixon campaign, which I did because I thought Kennedy was so innocent and untrained and inexperienced and such a poor senator in the way he did his job and all that he might really be an irresponsible and ignorant President. I didn’t like Nixon much but I thought at least he knew something. He was Vice President. He was considered by my friends to be very knowledgeable about world affairs and so forth.
RICHARDSON: Yes. That’s right. So anyway I worked for Nixon in 1960. In those days a business like Paine Webber could just put you on leave and pay you to go and work for whoever you wanted. Of course in the case of Paine Webber, they wanted you to work for the Republicans anyway so it was the right thing to do. So I had six weeks of working in the campaign. I was in charge of the Eastern and Southern European vote, which I knew nothing about. I’d never been in politics. It was how things were done in those days. There couldn’t have been a siller way to put somebody like me in charge. I didn’t have any idea what to do. I had money. I had a budget. I collected volunteers and people. We went to work but we didn’t know what we were doing at all. Not a clue. As far as I could make out nobody else in the campaign did either which was my first experience in electoral politics and it appeared to be the worst organized thing I’d ever seen in my life. It was a very, very trying experience. I got involved with the Poles because I had been involved with Poland, I realized how many Polish voters there were and how important they were and in important places and so forth so the one thing I tried to do was sell the campaign management that it was important for the candidate to talk about and particularly be good for some magic reason that I didn’t fully understand, it would be good if he mentioned from time to time the Oder Neisse River Line.

Q: Oh, yes.

RICHARDSON: That would be good. I made the argument for doing that and I could never get anybody to take it seriously at the top level of the campaign. I got more and more frustrated. Then finally I was sent... Every four years the Polish community has a national get-together in Chicago on presidential years called the Polish American Congress Convocation. They all get in a big hall. All the leaders of Pologna, from all over the country and it’s a great opportunity of course for the candidates. My candidate didn’t care to speak there. So I was sent, because I was in charge of that, to make the speech. So I went out and I got a fellow who was a Polish-American that somebody told me was a great thinker on domestic American politics and he helped me write a speech. My wife went with me. He went with me. We went out on the train feeling very important for my first big speech. We arrived at this convention hall in the middle of the campaign and I’m on the program. It says representing Vice President Richard Nixon, John Richardson.

Q: Wow.

RICHARDSON: Right before me is a representative of Senator Kennedy. It doesn’t say who. So the program goes along and we’re all getting ready and I’d finished up this speech and really worked on it and I was going to deliver a fiery, fiery speech on Nixon-full of arcane Polish references. There was a commotion in the back of the hall. We looked back there and pretty soon who came striding up the aisle but John F. Kennedy with his gorgeous wife on his right and Stanislov-his name’s gone-his Polish brother in-law-Polish Count, refugee-on his left. The three of them come up to the platform. The whole crowd of course is absolutely jumping on the chairs and he comes up, he makes a
graceful speech.

Q: Radziwill…

RICHARDSON: Radziwill. Radziwill. You got it. Good for you. Count Radziwill. The three of them make a wonderful tableau up at the front and he makes a very graceful speech and gets a huge ovation and the three of them trail out the hall and two thirds of the crowd follow them and I’m next on the program. So I get up and make my speech to the few Republican stalwarts who remain. It was not my greatest performance.

Q: Too, it turned out that the election really hinged on Illinois.

RICHARDSON: It did.

Q: If Nixon had spent a little more time…

RICHARDSON: I often thought even if he’d just come to that damn meeting he might have picked up enough to make a difference. I was so fed up with him for not listening to me and for running such a rotten campaign, which of course I didn’t have anything to compare it with—I’d learn later that everybody else found all campaigns like that but I didn’t know that. When the election night came, I had my staff, my office was in New York on Park Avenue. The staff was around, we were just going to spend the night listening to returns and celebrating we hoped. And all night you didn’t know how it was going to come out. I to myself—I never said it to another person except probably my wife, I don’t know—I didn’t know which way I wanted it to come out after working all that time because I was so angry with them I can’t tell you.

Q: Why don’t we stop here and I’ll put at the end we’ve come up to the election of 1960 and Nixon has just lost. We’ll pick up what you’re doing right after that.

RICHARDSON: Well, that was my last political foray of an electoral kind anyway. I was then still in Wall Street at Paine Webber and still engaged in Poland in the two activities there—the hospital and the medical assistance project on the side. I was also becoming more active in the International Rescue Committee and I think it was 1960 or 1961, one of the two, that I took a trip for the International Rescue Committee, which I thoroughly enjoyed, to Hong Kong to lay the basis for opening an office and to make a report to the board with respect to whether we should have an active program there. That was at a time when the beneficiaries of Mao’s great leap forward, were pouring over the border from China into Hong Kong. There was a huge influx going on. It was easy enough that we found a Foreign Service Officer who was in the consulate general there and he was very interested in refugees. He wanted to leave the Foreign Service so he took off and became our Director in Hong Kong.

Q: Who was that?

RICHARDSON: Halleck Rose. Very gregarious, capable, intelligent, committed
individual. So I had gone there and an old friend, a classmate from college, a roommate from college, Henry Heyburn from Louisville, a lawyer friend, had called me and was saying, “Next time you take a trip, let me know. I’d like to come, just do what you do. Just go along and carry your bags.”

So he did on that trip. The two of us went together and we had a wonderful time because it was very easy to see-make the report-and see the obvious evidence of the terrible need for more assistance there.

Q: What was your impression of how the British were dealing with this? After all Hong Kong is a small, small place. China was certainly not a friendly country. They had to have the feeling of almost anything they did could overwhelm them.

RICHARDSON: Yes. That’s right. I think the British were very worried by it but their behavior toward the refugees I thought was excellent at that time. I think much later it changed and they became fed up with it but at that time they were doing everything…

Q: We’re talking about 1960-61?

RICHARDSON: Yes. That’s right. At that time they were doing everything they could, I thought, in dealing with a hopelessly difficult problem. I mean people were arriving in the hundreds and even thousands.

Q: What was the United States and the rest of the world doing about this?

RICHARDSON: Nothing essentially. I think that’s fair to say. I mean there was a consulate and they did what little-but there was no money, there was no program.

Q: There was no program, nothing equivalent to the Refugee Relief Program?

RICHARDSON: No. No. No. That all came later. There may have been a little bit but it was very small.

Q: Was the Rescue Committee doing anything to promote the equivalent to a Refugee Relief Program for the Chinese?

RICHARDSON: Yes. We always had a public side, an advocacy side, to our programs. Leo Cherne who was the guiding genius, who just died a couple weeks ago, was very effective in getting attention both political and journalistic for the refugee cause. He said to me, “I worked on that one.” And that was part of my being there was to bring back information we could use publicly-the stories and so forth.

I found myself very moved. I think it was probably the first time I went into a regular refugee situation and actually saw refugees in the large camp and arriving and all that and being dealt with. It was a striking experience because I can remember being in the reception area where people were being processed by the British. The people in obviously
very bad shape. They were giving them, where they needed it, clothes—some kind of clothes to cover themselves. One of the men who got the suit of clothes came up to me and took his own shirt off his back and gave it to me, feeling that I was one of the people who was helping obviously. I still have it in the back of my closet. It’s made up entirely of patches—a good symbol of what those people had been going through.

Q: Did the refugee side and helping refugees at all at this point...Were you seeing...Was there any conflict between the intelligence gathering...Did these two conflict at all?

RICHARDSON: I wasn’t aware of it if they did. I was then, as a matter of fact I had an official position at the International Rescue Committee. My title was President, in other words, under Leo Cherne. I was a significant volunteer leader. If there was any connection I did not know about it. I know that Leo’s position was that we should not get entangled with them. So that’s all I can say about it. You never know about these things.

Q: In a way it’s perfectly overt. You have to get information from the refugees to understand what is happening. So the intelligence function I’m talking about, somebody gathering from the other side when you are dealing with people. You also want to find out what’s going on and of course China was such a closed society this was an important opportunity.

RICHARDSON: This was an important opportunity and I presume that was a large part of the activity of that consulate at that time.

Q: It was. Oh, absolutely. The Kennedy Administration came in on January 20th, 1961.

RICHARDSON: Yes, they did.

Q: Did you see any change? It was a more, you might say, liberal organization than the administration—than the Eisenhower one. But from your perspective did you see any difference? For your interest?

RICHARDSON: That was the year, ’61, that I joined Free Europe. In fact, it was I think March of ’61 right after Kennedy came in. I was approached out of the blue by the board of the Free Europe Committee, in the person of C. D. Jackson who was then a Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for Cold War Affairs in effect. He was a former publisher of Life—very able guy. He called me up at Paine Webber. He had been on my letterhead of the Polish Medical Aid Project. I think my friend John Page had gotten him to put his name on it but I’d never met him. He called me up and said would I have lunch with him? I was flattered. He was a big shot. I said, “Of course. I’d love to.”

I had no idea what it was about. We sat down. He said right off, “What I’m here for is to recruit you to be President of Free Europe.”

I was absolutely astonished. I never thought of anything of that magnitude. I thought I wanted eventually to get into something international which was compatible with my
interest but I hadn’t even thought about Free Europe. I didn’t know anything about it. I knew from being in Poland the importance of Radio Free Europe but I didn’t even know there was a Free Europe Committee running the whole thing. He explained it all to me at lunch including the fact that it was CIA supported and that that was a big secret and asked me if I would consider being President. I said right off, “Yes. Of course I would.”

Q: Could you explain what, at that time, 1961, what was Free Europe and what was it doing?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Free Europe had been started about 10 years earlier-eight years earlier I guess. The original notion—it was started by some senior people from New York who sold Eisenhower on it including Allen Dulles and his brother Foster and others, a number of other people. The idea was to set up radio stations that would be utilized by the exiles and refugees from Eastern Europe to in effect break the Iron Curtain - the silence, the control, the monopoly of information of the communists in Eastern Europe. It started with that simple idea. The first idea was that all the money would be raised privately. Eisenhower announced what he called the Crusade for Europe which was to raise money for this new Radio Free Europe idea. It of course immediately became apparent as they got into it that this was a very costly enterprise. They made the choice right then to go to the CIA rather than to go into public support from the Congress on the theory that public support would make our diplomacy in Eastern Europe much more difficult. Of course it would.

Q: Why?

RICHARDSON: The theory was that the State Department was dead set against any open support on the grounds that it would embarrass the ambassadors who had to get along with those regimes. To have open support was something that was clearly totally subversive from their point of view—the communist point of view.

Q: This was what was known as plausible deniability.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. What they were looking for was plausible deniability and that’s the way it always ran until the thing broke down just as I was leaving eight years later. I mean until that wall broke down. I was immediately, as I say, entranced with the idea. I said the only problem is, it’s a big problem for me, I’ve just been made a partner a year ago at Paine Webber. They’ve given me a lot of responsibilities and I can’t exactly walk out in a hurry because he said they’re in a hurry. They want you right away. I said, “Well, I don’t think I can do that. I don’t know how long it’ll take.”

He said, “I’ll fix that.”

I’d say probably the next day or the next day or two the Senior partner of Paine Webber came around to me. He said, “I’ve just had a call from Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA. He said you’re wanted for a national security purpose and you have to leave Paine Webber.”
I said, “Yes, I heard about it.” So I got out of Paine Webber. Of course they were cooperative. Within a month I was in Free Europe starting that job. That was just as the Kennedy Administration got under way. It didn’t change Free Europe’s role at all. Every president starting with Eisenhower was very supportive of Free Europe to the extent that there were in my time-and I presume before and after-at least once a year there would be a White House affair where the President would invite prominent businessmen to come and hear the pitch for Free Europe. All the Presidents thought well of it. There was never a problem in terms of that kind of support. Well, you asked what it was at that time. It was a non profit, tax exempt organization established under the laws of New York with a board of directors, self perpetuating, as they normally are in NGOs, board of directors initially selected mostly by Allen Dulles-his friends-with one or two from the State Department presumably picked by his brother. The State Department people when I came were Livy Merchant and Bob Murphy, both retired at that time. The rest of the people were, many of them, several of them, all OSS colleague of Allen’s. John Hughes, the Chairman, who was a textile manufacturer in New York, was a close colleague of Allen’s from OSS and had been Ambassador to NATO in the Eisenhower Administration. The others were similarly of that background. It was an active board that met. I start with the board because that’s where the leadership was. That’s who I reported to was the board. I was in touch with John Hughes several times a week and saw him often. He was my boss as I saw it. He spoke for the Board. The Board would meet, I forget, once a month I think at the University Club for lunch with me. We would deal with the nuts and bolts of the organization. The organization’s programs included in addition to Radio Free Europe, which was centered programmatically in Munich, Germany, with technical capabilities mainly in Portugal. This was a short wave base. We also had medium wave but short wave was mostly what we did. That was something to do with the ionosphere that I won’t bother you with. I always used to be a little anxious when I went to do my normal sort of oversight visits to the plant at Raret outside Lisbon. I used to be a little anxious about those visits because you would go into this with engineers, both American and Portuguese, who would be so proud of what they were doing and I would walk around- and I’ve always been technologically challenged at every level. This was to me a matter of walking through a building and looking at a lot of boxes and dials and things and saying, “Oh, yes. Very good. Very good.” That was the extent of my oversight.

The arrangements that Free Europe had with...Of course maybe I’ll come back to the Radio and first say something about the other things we were doing. At that time we had a substantial, significant program of support for political exiles. They were organized by nationality and also within an organization called the Assembly of Captive Nations. These were former Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of these countries who were being given a stipend from our money to organize public events and keep in touch as they could with their home land. In effect, it was money if you really look at it objectively, was money spent by CIA, in effect secretly, through us, mainly as an anti communist, anti soviet propaganda effort. I think that’s fair to say that that’s what it really, that was a major reason for doing it and it was also to fly the flag that people at home might feel that their cause was being represented here and that would be a morale builder at home. It was also intended to reach Americans. No question about it. In that sense, as I see it now, it
was out of order. It would be out of order today because the CIA couldn’t use money like that and they shouldn’t in my view. But at the time I didn’t think about all that.

Q: But it’s fair to say that the time was quite different then.

RICHARDSON: Yes.

Q: Let’s talk about the—before we move to the radio—the Captive Nations thing. I would think that it would be a little difficult to support dissident politicians away since they often would represent political movements which might not either have any relevance or be of...they were the other side of the coin from the soviet regime. These were not all benign governments over there.

RICHARDSON: They were not.

Q: They never had been.

RICHARDSON: No. That’s true. That’s quite true. Needless to say the people who’d been selected for this support tended to be the better, the higher quality, on a democratic standard than others. They were…I don’t think they were…Yes they were. They were. The Romanian was I think a democrat but he had been a Foreign Minister in a tough regime. They were open to that kind of attack. Of course they were attacked all the time both from this country and from outside. They were ridiculed all the time. I got to, of course, know them as people, as individuals and I felt very sympathetic toward them. It used to infuriate me that so much of the liberals on the left in this country just assumed they were all terrible gangsters from the Fascist right and so forth without ever asking any questions.

Q: In a way what you are talking about is the endemic problem of the American public, and also not only just the public but also those that should know, including the academic world- often really in those times certainly and probably today—don’t understand what is going on.

RICHARDSON: No.

Q: They have their own prism through which they’ll see things. Did you find yourself...I mean...As you were telling me how this thing was constituted it comes right out of the eastern establishment to which you belonged.

RICHARDSON: To which I belonged. Absolutely.

Q: It was very much an elitist....

RICHARDSON: Absolutely.

Q: Was this a problem?
RICHARDSON: No. I don’t think so. I think all of that kind of sociological analysis really hadn’t been done much yet. People including me weren’t aware of what extraordinarily privileged people we were to have come from that background. Of course I see now as clear as a bell. My entire career has resulted from being a part of that elite.

Q: I mean being called up by somebody and going to the club...

RICHARDSON: It’s even closer than that. I thought for years that I had gotten that Free Europe job as a result of merit because I had become so involved in Poland and I’d been active in American Friends to Captive Nations and other kinds of organizations like that. I thought that was the reason I was selected. It took me about 25 years to realize Allen Dulles picked me. Allen Dulles picked me. How did I know Allen Dulles? Because he was first of all, he got me to Sullivan Cromwell because he had known my father. I told you that a previous time. So that’s how I got to Sullivan Cromwell. Then of course when I was going to Poland on these trips, I probably said this earlier, he used to be interested to have me come and tell him what I saw. He knew me. He knew what I was involved in. Obviously, when they were looking for a President, I was a candidate in his eyes and that’s how I got it. That didn’t occur to me. I was blind to that old boys network that I was benefitting from.

Q: The networks are networks anyway. One within the network...You had earned your credentials.

RICHARDSON: Oh. Yes. Yes.

Q: I’m not degrading at all.

RICHARDSON: I’m not embarrassed. It’s just amusing to me that I was so insensitive to my own situation.

Q: Sticking with the Captive Nations thing first, I would have thought that you would have been up against all sorts of pressures- the Polish community in Chicago, the Albanian Committee in Youngstown, OH. All these...Croatia which I’m familiar with. I would have thought the Croatians in Cleveland and...

RICHARDSON: I didn’t have to deal with the Croatians. My friend Bernie Arrow who was the Senior Vice President had come out of the Dulles brothers office at Sullivan and Cromwell, of course a Russian refugee himself-he was the great promoter of these exiles and their cause always in Free Europe. A wonderful friend of mine and a senior advisor in his job, but Bernie always said, “Boy, I’ll tell you one thing. We are terribly lucky we never had to broadcast to Yugoslavia.”

The answer is we didn’t broadcast to Yugoslavia. Croatia was not a problem for us.

Q: What about say Poland which has this huge group particularly in Chicago and
elsewhere. How did...

RICHARDSON: It wasn’t a problem. They were very supportive. They would put pressures on the radio sometimes directly or indirectly but I never had any problem. They were all supportive. They thought it was wonderful.

Q: Did this at all intrude on the political side because the ethnic vote every time there was an election there was a...Politicians go off and eat Polish sausage...

RICHARDSON: Well, I think I told you that was my challenge in 1960 to lead that effort for Nixon. I certainly was familiar with it. It was not a problem—not a political problem or a management problem for me. It was an asset. They would be counted on to be always supportive.

Q: What about with the new administration? Did you find that...?

RICHARDSON: Same attitude. Just the same. Very supportive. Of course Allen stayed on for, you’ll remember, until the Bay of Pigs. So there was no change in my immediate relationships. I worked with the CIA staff, the covert side, the program side-what do you call it the...I can’t think of the name of it. That side of CIA... Anyway, Cord Myer was my opposite member more or less in CIA so we would be dealing with each other.

Q: I’d like to come back to that and still try to cover the program side first. Let’s do the non radio program side and come back to the government...

RICHARDSON: The program also at that time included-and here I’m on a little delicate ground from a security point of view, how much to say about it.

Q: Say a little more than you feel you might feel comfortable and you can edit it out.

RICHARDSON: All right. I’ll do that. Good idea. There was a very big book delivery program to Eastern Europe that we operated.

Q: Benjamin Franklin Press or something like that?

RICHARDSON: No. I don’t remember the name. Some innocuous name. It was a very, very large and very, very effective and important program which identified significant people throughout Eastern Europe, determined...most of them, the significant people you wanted to reach did travel at some point to the west. They would go to a bookstore because that’s what almost everybody wanted was books. They couldn’t get them where they were. So the bookstores were our front. It was a covert arrangement through those bookstores to make books available to people who came from Eastern Europe and they would get what they wanted within limits. There were also other methods of delivery but that was the most important one. In Paris and other centers in Western Europe where people came-they got to know-everybody learned in Eastern Europe who was a reader at all that if you got to Paris you could go to A, B or C and get books free.
Q: How did they get them back in? That was their problem?

RICHARDSON: That was their problem. It didn’t seem to be a great problem. As I said, it was a very popular program. It was very large numbers of books.

Q: Do you recall the types of books?

RICHARDSON: Mostly…I used to review it. It was part of my responsibility to talk to the guy who was in charge of the program—wonderful man, Romanian refugee, very bright. Still around. He’s just my age. George Minden. He set up this whole mechanism himself. He was a genius at it and he was very, very careful about security. Very careful about what, who, where—anything compromising and he set up an elaborate network of bookstores and supply of books that never got found out. Nobody ever penetrated it. The other side didn’t penetrate it. It was a remarkable achievement. It went on for 20, 25 years I guess.

Q: What kind of books?

RICHARDSON: Political books, social books, economic books, cultural books, literature, broadly the kind of books that any sort of literate person would be interested in that the communists wouldn’t want them to read. Therefore they weren’t published domestically. It didn’t matter what it was. Whatever it was that they didn’t want them to read that’s what we could give them.

Q: And the languages, it would just depend?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Just depend. Most of the intellectual elite of course knew some French or English or something. The others, there was a very big Polish publishing operation in Paris, too. A guy named Gidroych ran it and developed it. That was all for Eastern Europe. Theoretically it was for Western refugees but really it was for Eastern Europe, for the people from there. It was a hugely successful effort to keep people there in touch with what was the thinking and the ideas and the beliefs and so on in the Western elites. It was very important kind of contact. I sometimes actually wondered whether that effort in itself might not be almost as important as Radio Free Europe.

Q: I’m sure. A book has a long lasting effect. Was there a committee that selected these books? Was there a problem because you remember the horrible days of Cohen and Shine and McCarthy going around essentially trying to sensor our books at our libraries?

RICHARDSON: Since this was all secret, there was no public pressure on it. And it was very secret. By far the most secret that thing I was involved in. It was therefore done without any oversight by the outside world and inside it was done completely by George Menden and four or five people who worked under him, one for each country, and they were people that he picked and that I knew and that were very responsible, very bright,
very capable people who picked these books. That’s all the review there was. Now that isn’t so because the CIA was very interested in that program so that they got to look at all the lists, and got to review them and they could object and so forth. That was just a normal level of bureaucratic review really, which wasn’t a serious impediment. We had a pretty much of a free hand.

Q: Did you get any feedback from this program?

RICHARDSON: Oh yes. Oh yes. Plenty of feedback. Through the bookstores you could get a lot. I don’t have any doubt that the CIA used it for intelligence—that network—of course they would have. The Radio Free Europe people also were in touch with it and would have used it for our own research. So it was used that way and effectively. It was an important source of information.

Q: Just to follow through on this, what about…you would be pushing certain books…

RICHARDSON: Pushing? No. We didn’t push. Make available.

Q: Make available. Okay. At the same time for somebody who’s turning in— in Poland, was there an effort to say, John Gall, Kenneth Galbraith published such and such a book discussing how the economic system works and...

RICHARDSON: No. No. None of that.

Q: I was just wondering I thought there would be reviews or something of this nature to let them know...

RICHARDSON: No. No. No. It was not done that way. It would have been from a security point of view too difficult anyway to do that. The bookstores themselves might emphasize one book or another and the bookstores themselves were usually run by refugees so they…this is really good. But that would be something that they push, not that we push. That was a very important program.

Q: I’m sure a very important program.

RICHARDSON: The other things that were largely things that developed during my tenure, there were a couple of them. We set up an organization called the…I can’t think right off. The idea was to connect with refugees in Latin America to encourage their active political participation in the countries where they were. That was the essential idea because we, as everybody else did who knew what was going on in the world, recognized that this was a world wide effort on the part of the Soviets and that they, among other places, were working in Latin America. Since there were a lot of Eastern European refugees in Latin America, we thought this should be something that would help them to be more effective and counter the Soviets underground so to speak. So we started something called the Interamerican—I can’t think of the exact name-IDF-Interamerican Development Foundation. That was it. A private, non profit, CIA, through us funded
effort. John Page, my right hand... I don’t think I told you that he came to work for me at Free Europe. John Page, the guy who had been with me in Poland and knew what I’d done. A roommate of mine in college had been in AT&T and so on. When I got to Free Europe, I will say this about that, that I immediately realized this was a huge thing that I had no idea how to run. I had never run anything. I had never supervised anybody more than a secretary and so I really was an odd choice. It was a big thing. It was then a budget of about 18 million and that was a lot in those days. So I very soon realized that I was in way over my head. I called up Page who was then the youngest Vice President in the Bell System. He was in Seattle, with the Bell company there. He married my cousin and we were very close. I said I’ve got this new job as you know and I can’t possibly run it and why don’t you come and be my Executive Vice President. I knew he was good executive. He’d done very well in the Bell System. So the next day he called me back and said, “I’m on my way.” He became Executive Vice President and stayed with me for four years. It saved my bacon. I never would have been able to do it without him. I got all the credit and he did all the work. It was a wonderful system. He was a very good executive. A very down to earth guy. Everybody loved him. He was serious, purposeful and effective and he understood personnel and all these things that were absolutely foreign to me. Unions—we had a union for instance. The newspaper guild which was a very hard nosed New York union, they were our union in New York and not everybody was part of it but there were enough so that it was hell on wheels to manage it and they had caused my predecessors endless trouble. Page took it in hand. He got to know the people. He made friends with them. He was good at it and we never had a serious problem after that. In all ways he became the person that made it all work.

Going back to the Interamerican Development Foundation, we had a guy, I think it may have been his idea to do it, who worked for the radio in New York, named George Truitt. He took on the task of setting this project up and organizing it so that—with a small staff—so that you could communicate with people in Latin America and provide them with enough help to get started in civic and other kinds of activities in sort of a civil society thing. It was, I think, did very good work. It was useful to those countries in terms of civil development and also useful in fighting the Communists. So I was very pleased with it. I thought it was an effective political action kind of thing. But again it was of course all covert—in the sense that nobody knew it was CIA funded.

Q: *Was it heavily weighted toward anti Castro in Cuba or was it more than that?*

RICHARDSON: No. It was much more than that. This was of course just at the time Castro came into power.

Q: *Oh that’s right. Castro was not seen as...*

RICHARDSON: He was not the big threat that he seemed later on. It was much concern that there not be a whole domino effect following Castro and how do you prevent it happening in 15 other places? That was the concern then. But it was right at the beginning. He was not probably himself terribly effective in the rest of Latin America at that time. He was solidifying his own position. I remember seeing him come to New
York on that famous trip. I think it was 1960.

Q: Staying down in Harlem...

RICHARDSON: At first he stayed up town at a hotel in Park Avenue right near Free Europe in fact. Then he got thrown out. Hotel management complained because he was said to have live chickens in the room so he wouldn’t get the flu. Smart. We thought it was funny but I realize now he was struggling with fears of the FBI and someone trying to poison him. That’s when he went to Harlem where he probably would be free to do what he wanted. I remember seeing him at the Council of Foreign Relations on that trip when he came to New York. I was a member then. Naturally I went to the meeting and there was this guy in fatigues and guns and everything with his security people with him and came in and made the talk. It was sort of an astounding atmosphere in the Council. All these business types and...

Anyway, going back to activities I think I have mentioned the ones that are most significant now so perhaps we can go on and talk about the relations with Washington and so on.

Q: Yes. Let’s talk about... You were there ’61 to ’69?

RICHARDSON: ’68.

Q: ’68. Okay, could you talk about relations with the various components-Congress, the CIA and the State Department and maybe elsewhere?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Okay. We had no direct relationship with the Congress. It didn’t mean we wouldn’t try to be helpful from time to time, but Washington wanted to handle that. They didn’t want us messing with it. The guidance system that we had was I thought, a very enlightened one and still think so. It was essentially an annual review of a policy paper for each county. That annual review would be done with the CIA and State—usually two representatives in the meeting with us. We would go over a very short, very general policy paper. As I remember them they were a couple pages, two or three pages, something like that. They stated the general policy of the United States with respect to Free Europe’s activities entirely with the radio. I don’t think we ever got into the other things, just the radio. We used to fight about them because they restricted us more than we wanted to. State of course wanted to keep us from belaboring the local dictator too much. I understand it now better than I did then. There was those kinds of things. Also because of ’56 and the Hungarian case there were appropriate restrictions on the way we would use our broadcasts in the event of any kind of incipient crisis or anything like that and also to avoid stirring up crises. We were careful. There were a lot of sound no no’s there. But otherwise in general it was very broad and I thought and still think, very well done. It wasn’t the kind of niggling issues that you might expect—or that I might have expected out of a bureaucracy which wanted to protect their turf and keep these amateurs from making trouble. State might feel pretty strongly about not having this CIA thing messing up their problems and messing up their situation in Poland or wherever. I didn’t
feel that it was a problem, in my time, didn’t become a problem of any serious kind. We had a friendly and constructive, I thought, relationship policy.

Q: You have broad things. What were trying to do?

RICHARDSON: What were we trying to do?

Q: Yes.

RICHARDSON: The way I’ve always said it and I believe that in general it’s true is that the basic notion was to try as far as we could to reproduce the capabilities that a free press would have had in those countries, i.e., being devoted to the interests of the people of those countries, not to the U.S. press, trying to serve their interests and their needs for information that they couldn’t get under the prevailing system. That’s the way I thought of it. There were lots of other words used in other ways but that’s the way I thought it went and that’s the way we ran it and tried to make that stick. Now there were lots of people pushing from Washington for one thing or another as you can imagine but we tried to fend it off and on the whole we had very good help from the CIA on that. Cord Meyer was a tiger while trying to protect us.

Q: Well, you say you’re trying to replace the local inquiring press for example I would have thought a major topic would have been the essential corruption of the Communist system.

RICHARDSON: But wouldn’t the free press have noticed that they had a corruption problem?

Q: Absolutely. But I’m saying in a way this I think would have been a major topic.

RICHARDSON: It was. It was.

Q: How did you get your information?

RICHARDSON: That’s another issue. It varied from country to country. The basics were the same for all. First of all we had the services, the facilities of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) which as you may recall used to record and transcribe everything.

Q: Still does.

RICHARDSON: I think it still does. Yes. So that was a huge advantage. We then subscribed in Munich to all the press that you could get and everything down to the tiniest little printed page that came into Munich was read and analyzed. That research operation in Munich was, I think, widely regarded at the time as by far the best thing of its kind in the world-better than anything CIA had in terms of understanding the political dynamics at the moment going on in these countries. That print and audio facility was
supplemented in a very important way by personal interviews, mainly with travelers from Eastern Europe and each desk, each broadcast department, had people out interviewing travelers directly and that was a very important case. Our most successful station, I always thought, was our Polish station. A fellow named Jan Nowak, who’s still a great friend of mine (He’s 10 years older than I am.) here in Washington was the head of it for many, many years. Parenthetically, the day he got the Medal of Freedom from President Reagan. I went to dinner at Brzezinski’s home in Virginia - a family dinner - with two or three outsiders of which Jan and I were-he was the guest of honor of course having just got this medal which Brzezinski got for him. He deserved it. Brzezinski pointed out at the start of the dinner that there were only three people in history who’d gotten the highest decoration of both Poland and the United States. One was Rubenstein, one was Brzezinski, the other Novak.

Q: What was Novak’s background?

RICHARDSON: He was a young journalist, aspiring journalist in his 20s in World War II and he became an underground hero for the underground both within Poland and between Poland and London during the war. He wrote a book about it which was later a best seller on Poland on his World War II experiences. He started the Polish RFE radio station. It became so well known in Poland that when this all ended in ’89 he was as well known a name in Poland as anybody on the scene. I’ve been with him in Poland and the taxi driver said, “Mr. Novak, I recognize your voice.”

He was an extraordinarily brilliant and able guy. He was first class and terribly difficult to handle, extremely possessive of that station and resentful of the American intrusions into his management and what he was doing. So we had constant fights with him. As I say, it was the best station right along. One reason was that he fought for it. He fought for everything—for money, for policy, latitude. Everything was a fight. He was just terribly effective. He had the best network. There isn’t a politician in Poland today that wasn’t close to Novak in those days and that he didn’t know personally all through those years.

Q: I was just interviewing a man who was a young Foreign Service officer, first post or second post in Potsdam in the late ’60s or early ’70s. He said in his estimation there may be three or four people that actually believed in the communist system in Poland and as far as working with them it was almost embarrassing how pro-American they were.

RICHARDSON: Yes. I agree with that. Of course I did get to know it in the ’50s when I went there. That’s exactly the impression I got. There just weren’t any people—I mean there were lots of people in the party and there were lots of people in senior positions, but most of them didn’t believe in it at all.

Q: Looking at this I would have thought...In the first place could you explain the background of the Hungarian 1956 trauma that certainly had impact on what you were doing? Could you explain what brought it out and how it was reflected in what you all were doing?
RICHARDSON: The uprising occurred as a result of the death of Stalin and the secret speech of Kruschev.

Q: The 20th Congress.

RICHARDSON: Yes. That’s right. This produced an upheaval in the politics of Eastern Europe. Both in Poland and Hungary there were dramatic changes going on in the party leadership. Also, a stirring around at the grass roots in Poland. In fact the Hungarian events were triggered by the events in Poland. Those events…

Q: The Potsdam riots.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. That’s right. The Hungarian uprising in Budapest rapidly spread. Of course it was already a weakened party control and leadership and people not knowing which way they were going and the… I think I was reading not long ago the Soviet minutes of the party leadership at the time and they didn’t know what to do. They didn’t know how to handle it and they didn’t know who to trust and who to back. It was that kind of uncertainty that allowed this thing to blow out of control and the little trouble started. That’s the way I see it.

Anyway the effect in terms of the radio relationship to it, I don’t think anybody seriously argued that the Radio Free Europe tried to start something or that the Hungarian desk did. But what people did seriously argue was that once it started the Radio Service behaved less than responsibly by not purposefully trying to suggest something that was not true about American intervention or any of that, but simply that they weren’t careful enough to avoid the kinds of statements and discussions and announcements and news and so forth that would lead an overexcited population to think that somebody might come help. That they certainly were guilty of that. It was poor judgement on the part of the management at the time to allow…to fail to put a very careful clamp on anything that was said that might stir up further trouble because that would not be a responsible thing to do. As a result of that, much more careful strictures were put on the radio with respect to doing anything to excite any kind of open opposition to the communists. We lived under that and thank goodness we did-only responsible way to behave. I think particular thing a lot of critics missed about the Radio and the Hungarian Revolution is that people said, well, RFE quoted all these statements from Western leaders and so on at the UN. That isn’t so bad in my view. What they did which was probably wrong was to pick up uncritically local, free Hungarian broadcasts, radio stations that were taken over all over Hungary. The Freedom Fighters would be telling the folks whatever they wanted to tell them and whatever they’d believe. Then RFE would pick that up and rebroadcast it.

Q: Oh, yes.

RICHARDSON: That was I think the single most serious mistake that was made. That was very irresponsible because that meant doing what we never did. We were very careful about news. I used to claim and I think there was some justice that we were more careful than the New York Times about checking facts, two sources and all that. And here
we were picking up this stuff without any checking and rebroadcasting it. That was a very serious mistake.

Q: Were there in a way drills, monitors and all to make sure this didn’t happen?

RICHARDSON: Oh, yes. Yes. We had a very, to the refugee broadcasters, very annoying set of systems-daily review, daily checks, daily discussions with the American policy director on what we were going to say about this, and what were we going to do about that and all that.

Q: In a way you were quite a different organization, Radio America, weren’t you? I would think that Radio America...

RICHARDSON: Voice of America.

Q: Voice of America.

RICHARDSON: Completely different.

Q: Voice of America was saying what was going on in the United States.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. That’s right. Completely different. We would say what was going on...there was a section of the radio in New York that covered American developments among other things and some of the rest of the world as well but its mission was different. Something happened in America or about American policy that was relevant to a person in Poland, that affected that person and that he ought to know about, then we would do it but we tried not to do it just simply because we were Americans. Since the people doing the broadcast were not Americans, it wasn’t so hard.

Q: They weren’t really very interested. I go back to my corruption side because this is one of the great weaknesses of the communist system.

RICHARDSON: Yes, it was.

Q: Were we saying we understand that Chairman so and so, Vice Chairman of such and such a plant has now got another bank account or a mistress who can’t type too fast.

RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes. Sure. Sure. Sure. The only constraint on that was that the top people in the government had a special protection under the State Department’s policy. Everybody else was free game. You bet. Open season. Of course our audiences generally loved it.

Q: In a way this would be the spice that would get you to listen rather than to listen to the polemic about awful things are.

RICHARDSON: Not how awful things are because people know about that. They knew
how awful they were.

Q: I would imagine that you would have to, in order for people to listen, you’d have to make it spicy and interesting?

RICHARDSON: It had to be interesting but I think we had more than just news. It was a complete broadcast service. It had entertainment, religious books, all kinds of things like a regular radio service like the BBC would do but with this particular slant.

Q: Speaking of the BBC did you see the BBC as a supplement, a rival?

RICHARDSON: We saw it as both. It was a very well done radio broadcast. All the time I was aware of it, it had a very good audience—not as good as we did but considering they put a lot less time and money into it, they did very well. They had credibility. We knew more about our audiences than I had mentioned, more than just by interviewing. We had a system of polling which I, when I first ran into it, I was very dubious—thought possibly couldn’t be real. We would get regular reports on our audiences, how big they were, what they thought and so forth. Well, it turns out there was fellow named Henry Hart who had developed this system. He was a professional pollster type, in Munich, an American. I was so dubious about it that I thought I better find out for sure. I knew a guy who I lived in the Bronx with, New York, named Oliver Quayle, who ran a political polling operation. That was his business. So I asked him to go over to Munich and take a look and give me a report. He did. He came back. He said something like in this writing, “I think you know more about your audiences than some of the American networks,” which was high praise. He said the systems were sound that Henry Hart was using. The system was this: He called it continuous and correcting sampling or something. What he did was he used all the commercial people who were doing polling in Europe, they had a connection with free Europe and Free Europe would get its questions in to their polling. They would have a particular assignment from us of interviewing people traveling from Eastern Europe. You couldn’t hardly get to Western Europe out of Eastern Europe without somebody having picked you out by chance and interviewing you for a West European poll on something and asking you questions about your own country. That way you could over time get a significant sample because there were—most of the time—there was a good deal of travel back and forth. Most of the time there was enough so that you could get a pretty good sample. It was done very carefully in terms of developing a sample. In Poland you would have this kind and be sure that you had this proportion of these group of people and this proportion of that people and so forth. Over a years time or two years time you could develop a very good sample. Well, that means you couldn’t ask about an opinion on a spot issue or anything but in terms of the basic size of the audience, the make up of the audience, the general attitudes of the audience you could learn it. You could get it and we did get it. We knew a lot about it that way. A guy like Novak always said, “Well, I use that but that’s Henry’s thing but I’m better.” They all used it.

Q: For example, would you find let’s put on some more jazz or something to get people out because jazz seemed to be the way to get to particularly the younger people.
RICHARDSON: Yes. We had those jazz programs and all that.

Q: Would you find yourself sort of moving, changing your formula?

RICHARDSON: Oh yes. The formulas would change.

Q: How about the role of expertise from CBS, NBC, ABC or something like that? Would they...

RICHARDSON: Oddly enough we didn’t ever, until later after I left, we had a couple of professional broadcasters, as President I think one of them was. In our time we didn’t have any such people, although a CBS guy named Gene Later was head of our newsroom, and it’s very odd in a way that we didn’t. But we didn’t. The expertise really was at the desk level and among the refugees themselves. They either were journalists or former radio people or whatever. The American oversight in Munich was headed by a Director of the Radio Free Europe, who in my time was oddly enough a General-Major General C. Rodney Smith—who I was kind of shocked when I came in to find out they had in effect already decided to make him Director. They’d thrown out the prior guy. They were just waiting until I came aboard to make it official. He was a Vice President of Free Europe and he was Director of Radio Free Europe. Major General Retired, an Engineer? I thought it was crazy. It turned out I was wrong. They were right. He did a wonderful job. Novak swears by him still. We both go see him. He’s 95 now over in Virginia. He stayed there in Munich about 10 years and he did a great job. He simply was a good manager and a human being who… I didn’t think he’d be able to understand all those East Europeans and all that. He understood them. A very bright guy.

Q: What about dealing with the “big enchilada” the Soviet Union? What were you doing with them?

RICHARDSON: We did nothing with them in terms of broadcasting. There was a separate operation called Radio Liberty, which still exists, which broadcasts in the various languages of the Soviet Union. That was entirely separate. We had no connection. I knew the guy who ran it, Howland Sergeant, in my time who had been the director of USIA earlier. But we had no direct relationship. It was really such a different problem.

Q: Was there a certain firewall built between you and the CIA as far as operations?

RICHARDSON: Yes.

Q: I always think of the BBC-used to say the poppies will bloom at such and such a time which signals the underground.

RICHARDSON: We tried. We tried. I don’t pretend to know how effective we were because certainly they were in the business they were in. Obviously they would see the possibilities. We very seldom had any direct conflict arise perhaps because we didn’t know anything. Probably because we didn’t know anything. When I got in, came to free
Europe, I was horrified to find that there were a number of telephones in my office in 2 Park Avenue which were direct lines to the CIA. When John Page arrived, he got there within a couple months after I told him that was one problem. He said, “What’s the problem? Rip them out.”

And so he did.

Q: What about the thing that I think about particularly in the time you went there, ’61 to ’68, was the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This was really, I mean we were very close to all out war.

RICHARDSON: ’63 I think.

Q: No. ’62. October of ’62. Because Kennedy was assassinated in ’63 and it wasn’t then.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. You’re right.

Q: How was that handled? I mean when this was going it was a very nervous time for all. Were we passing our nervousness on to Eastern Europe.

RICHARDSON: Yes. Probably. I think, my recollection, I don’t know if it hit on a Sunday or not but I can remember going into the office when I normally wouldn’t in the middle of that and worrying. More than doing anything, just worrying. I think we probably did... I can’t really remember, have any recollection of it, but I would have thought we would have told all the broadcast operations to be over careful in the way they handled everything at that time. We all knew it was a dangerous point. We certainly didn’t want to be part of making it any worse. Those times we would all worry about what we were saying and doing and behave accordingly.

Q: Did you have any problems with the National Security Council because these are people, you know tend to be bright, young people running all over the place. We’re talking about the Kennedy Johnson administration but I think my term would apply to any administration.

RICHARDSON: No really we didn’t. I wasn’t conscious of any. We had...There were a couple of studies done while we were there. One of them was done by Brzezinski and Bill Griffith and another guy. They were trying to advise the Security Council on whether we should open-the perennial question—whether we should open a Radio Free China. I guess the CIA probably wanted to. It turned into a bonanza for us because Brzezinski was terribly enthusiastic about what we were doing and gave us immediately a very eloquent advocate at the top level.

Q: He at that time was...

RICHARDSON: A professor.
Q: He was a professor in Columbia.

RICHARDSON: It was a big bonanza for us because it brought our example right to the top... He said if you do it do it this way and here’s why and so forth.

Q: What happened with that?

RICHARDSON: He and two other people, Bill Griffiths, who had been former Director of Radio Free Europe of the radio and a guy who later became Ambassador of Switzerland, whose name I can’t recall-Hughes I think, were supposed to come up with this recommendation for the NSC. They came up with a recommendation. They thought they had a recommendation to do it and Brzezinski told me soon afterwards I think, or at the time—I forget—but suddenly they had a guy who, Hughes, dissented after having agreed all along that this was the way to go and to recommend they follow the RFE pattern. Soon after he was appointed ambassador to Switzerland. We put two and two together.

Q: Were there any other...?

RICHARDSON: No. There was none of that that I’m aware of. In fact, I did meet with the 303 Committee, or whatever it was then called, two or three times which was of course a government committee.

Q: Jeannie Rostare, I think, was their...

RICHARDSON: It was at the NSC. Bundy was there once in my tenure.

Q: McGeorge Bundy.

RICHARDSON: Yes. McGeorge Bundy. Alex Johnson came from State I remember one time when he was Deputy Undersecretary I guess. They would review issues if they came up. I brought it up. I was fighting for more money. When you’re a bureaucrat you think you deserve more. So I carried it up twice, I think, to that group—the annual budget fight. They were very polite. I don’t think it did any good.

Q: Well in ’68 you left.

RICHARDSON: I left in ’68.

Q: What did you do?

RICHARDSON: I left in the first place because I planned to leave a year earlier, ’67, and they talked me into staying on because the exposure of the CIA connection was very much in the news. I’ll never forget “60 Minutes”—what’s his name who’s still there-Mike Wallace—standing outside our sign in Munich which said, Radio Free Europe Gift of the American People, and he made a little spiel about how much of this was the American people and how much was the CIA. It was very embarrassing. Those things were going
on so I stayed a year longer. I got the idea, which I’ve stuck with ever since that I can
stand a job about six or seven years, not much longer, then I run down. I lose creativity.
You get routinized and all that. So that’s why I left.

_Q: Well ’68, of course was a revolutionary year in France and other places. It was also
the beginning of the Vietnam opposition building up and the fact that the CIA was no
longer considered a good thing [to have involved], how did you deal with that during the
time you were there?_

RICHARDSON: I didn’t find it a problem. I was so wrapped up in what I was doing it
didn’t bother me at all. I never felt embarrassed.

_Q: Did one acknowledge it or...?_

RICHARDSON: No. One didn’t acknowledge it. We weren’t allowed to say that we had
any connection with the CIA. I never had to sign a paper or anything but it was our
commitment that we would never disclose anything. So nothing was said about it so we
just lived with any embarrassment there was from having a connection. But most people
didn’t know about the connection. When they did it was a little unpleasant but that’s why
I stayed an extra year so that we would get through that. And actually I left just before the
Prague Spring so I didn’t have to deal with that one.

_Q: Also, too, I’m sure that your audience in Eastern Europe couldn’t have cared less
about who was..._

RICHARDSON: It didn’t matter at all. If they knew it was the CIA you wouldn’t lose
your audience. Hell no. It was the same audience. I don’t think personally it was a secret
to anybody who was sophisticated anywhere-in the target area or on our side of the
curtain.

_Q: It was sort of like the police chief in “Casablanca” that was shocked, shocked._


_Q: Well, in ’68, whither?_

RICHARDSON: Whither. I left in ’68 without any plan to go anywhere. I by now had
gotten a very swelled head. I thought I was a big shot and therefore that jobs would be
blown at me as soon as anybody heard that I wasn’t there anymore.

_Q: How old were you at that time?_

RICHARDSON: Let’s see, in ’68. I was 47.

_Q: So you were prime executive material._
RICHARDSON: Exactly. The prime of my life. I just hoped for a government big job and thought obviously people will come running. I didn’t do anything about looking for a job. I thought people would come to me. That was how naïve I was. See, I hadn’t had to look for a job before. It just happened. This old boy network always had worked so well. I didn’t know it was that. I just thought it was me. Anyhow, so I left and I didn’t have any immediate appointment so I set up a little office and made myself a consultant on international communications. There was one difficulty. I didn’t have any customers. I went for I think it was 16 months, unemployed in effect. I had one potential big customer which I kept thinking would come through which was the USIA Advisory Committee headed by Frank Stanton who had been on my Free Europe Board. Frank was a friend so he came to me or I came to him, I forget, and said, “Wouldn’t you like to do a study of USIA?”

I said, “Of course.” I made a proposal.

His committee looked at it and they said, “Yes this is a good proposal. We’ll hire you.” The only trouble was somebody on the commission said-this is the summer of ’68—“We should get the two presidential candidates to agree to take seriously whatever this study comes out and says.” It was the question then about whether USIA ought to be separate and was it doing a good job and so forth. Frank told me we’ve approved the plan but first before we go ahead we want to be sure to get the presidential candidates on board. Never got them. Never got to them nationally. None of the staff would let that kind of question through. They never got to them so I never got the job. I was unemployed in effect for 16 months. It was a very debilitating circumstance, very good for my general psychology mind you. I took the time, since I didn’t have anything to do serious, I read. It was the first time in my life since I was in college that I read anything seriously. I read up on what I was supposed to be about, International Communication. I’ve lived off it ever since. I read the physics of it, the psychology of it, the sociology of it, and all that and I really did become somewhat knowledgeable about that subject. I was fascinated with what people were saying about the future of communications and the people up at MIT talking about packet switching. Now it allows us to have worldwide Internet communications and all that. So I enjoyed that part of. Otherwise it was a very humbling experience and very good for me. And finally, thank God, John Page called up one day after about the 15th months and said, “Are you still pretending to be an consultant?” I was very offended. He said, “Well have you had any customers?” I was more offended. Then he said, “Well, have you done anything about getting a job in the new administration?”

I said, “No. I figured they’ll come to me. After all I worked for them back in 1960 and I’m counting on them coming after me.”

Well then he got quite profane. He talked to his brother and the old boy network went to work again. The old boy network in this case was his brother Walter Page who was then Vice Chairman or something at JP Morgan and who had a lot of friends in the White House from Wall Street.
Q: We’re talking about the Nixon Administration.

RICHARDSON: Yes. Three days later I was in the White House being interviewed by Peter Flanagan, a Wall Streeter that Walter Page had called. He said, “What do you want to do?”

I said, “I’d like to be in the State Department.”

He said, “Ok,” And they sent me over. And who was I interviewed by? Elliott Richardson.

Elliot said, “Well, I have two Assistant Secretary jobs left. One is Africa and one is CU.

Q: CU...?

RICHARDSON: CU being Educational and Cultural Affairs. I had just enough sense to know that I would have no capacity to be Assistant Secretary to Africa so I said, “I’ll do the other one,” not knowing what it was.

He said, “We’ve got one problem. I don’t know if we’re related. Do you?” I had known him since we were teenagers because my father was a great promoter of Elliot. In fact he was his sponsor in Massachusetts, politically, and he hired him at Roper and Gray, his law firm, and he thought he was the brightest young lawyer he had ever met and all that. He was just crazy about him. He liked young people. He did all the hiring at Roper and Gray. He always said he was the best man he’d ever hired. So I knew Eliot through that connection.

So he said, “Well that’s great but there’s one thing. I don’t know if we’re related. Do you?

I said, “I don’t know.”

He said, “I’ll find out. I’ll call you.” So he checked and he called me. He said, “We’re fourth cousins through my mother, she was a Shattuck. He said, “Do you think we could say we’re not related?”

I said, “Eliot, anywhere but in Boston, we’re not.”

So I got appointed. That’s how I got that job.

Again the old boy network in full cry.

Q: You did cultural relations...cultural education. Assistant Secretary to that from when to when?

RICHARDSON: ’69 to ’77.
Q: A long period.

RICHARDSON: Yes. The whole Republican era.

Q: Can you describe what the job was at least when you started? Sometimes these things change.

RICHARDSON: Sure. It didn’t change so much when I was there. It was essentially… We had two major programs. The Fulbright Program, we were the staff for it in Washington and the International Visitor Program that we were the staff for in Washington also. In neither case did we have staff abroad. We worked with USIA staff in the embassies. Those were the two major programs and there were…I developed a good many other kinds of programs, some of which were already there but mainly with the idea of increasing work with American NGOs. And that is providing money for American NGOs that were going to do something.

Q: NGO being?

RICHARDSON: Non-governmental organizations that were doing something that would meet the standards of the Fulbright legislation—the Fulbright-Hayes legislation—which called for us to operate programs that would contribute to mutual understanding between the United States and other countries essentially. And that was the basic mission. Needless to say that was, from my point of view, a great joy to be able to work on something as idealistic as that. That also seemed to be some of some importance to, at least some parts of it, to the establishment and the department and elsewhere like the International Visitor Program. But I also, in my time, developed - some of us - developed programs, regular relationships with non-governmental organizations that we could help in a marginal way but it made a big difference to them.

Q: Well, we’ll move to the Non Governmental Organizations in a minute. With the Fulbright Program, my understanding is the Fulbright Program... that Senator Fulbright wanted to keep it out of the hands of USIA. I’m not quite sure why? But was there sort of a stricture that USIA was not to—that State was supposed to do it and not USIA?

RICHARDSON: I think the reason when USIA was split up at the beginning back in the early ‘50s, my understanding is that Fulbright and others wanted to keep the Bureau in State because they saw USIA as being focused on sort of a propaganda mission and that this endangered the purity of the Fulbright program. Therefore that’s why it was kept central. It was an odd structural arrangement. I thought and still think that it was odd and I would do something like what they are talking about doing now: put USIA back in State. In fact I looked at that when I was there and developed an advisory report that Frank Stanton again chaired called the Stanton panel which proposed in effect a much closer relationship between USIA and State just so that it would…to my mind State lacked something and I of course being an outsider I don’t have any expertise at it but one conclusion I came to because I was acting Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs for
two years, while I was at CU when Bill Rogers was Secretary. He wanted me to switch from CU and I never would. He wanted me to be Public Affairs. Why he thought I knew anything about public affairs I never could figure out because I didn’t. I don’t. I don’t care about them. But anyway he tried to get me and I wouldn’t and I wouldn’t and finally he said, “Well do it temporarily while I get somebody else.” I did it temporarily for two years the way those things go. But in the course of all that I... I’m afraid I lost my train of thought.

Q: We were talking about the program.

RICHARDSON: The program. Yes. I never found it difficult to operate in the State Department. On the contrary people used to, people ask me today. Wasn’t it difficult to get any priority for your program and so forth? The answer was nobody cared about my program one way or the other and it wasn’t really that easy to poach on because Fulbright was sitting there on it. So I never had any trouble with the State Department. I did the congressional relations part, all of it. I did all that. There was no problem with State. State was...

Q: Did you get involved with the Fulbright Program of Americans going to abroad at all?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Oh yes.

Q: I always viewed that with a sort of jaundiced eye as getting middle class welfare for the brighter middle class…

RICHARDSON: I think that is a perfectly reasonable criticism to make particularly now. I think an earlier time before I got there, maybe to some degree, while I was still there it still got a lot of the best and brightest because then there weren’t so many opportunities.

Q: It was giving us a world outlook.

RICHARDSON: Yes. That’s right. And it helped in that way. So I do think a lot of it is not really fully justifiable today. It really has become a kind of sacred cow.

Q: Was there any question of who was going on the programs?

RICHARDSON: It was all done in a very elaborate structured system, for assuring objectivity in selection. There’s a board of foreign scholarships so called here in this country which is responsible for assuring the overall objectivity of the scholarly side of it and competitiveness and so forth. There are of course, as you know, abroad in a number of countries, Fulbright Commissions, where the embassy has representatives and the local academia has representatives and they do the selection for people coming here. In those ways, selection on both sides is carefully insulated from government. This is a messy system, expensive system, but it does work. I think part of the trouble is that it is becoming less and less functional, really, as time goes on because there’s so many
different ways that people move around.

Q: Yes. It’s no longer...There was a time...

RICHARDSON: It was a unique thing in the ‘50s.

Q: And even in the ‘60s. I mean people were poor, they weren’t used to it and they’d almost jump start the system.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. That’s right. Now the universities are doing it themselves. I think it’s very different. I sort of owe a debt of loyalty to it so I don’t criticize it publicly but I certainly myself-I mean for this purpose of being interviewed now-I would say that it ought to be very carefully reviewed for what is functional in the future; what is important in the future. It still maintains a good name for the United States that is worth a lot. That ought to be preserved but the programs ought to be greatly revised, I would presume, so as to be sure that they are adding something significant and not adding something—an add on—to the existing pattern of international communication and I suspect now it’s an add on mostly.

Q: What about dealing with your old bailiwick Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union?

RICHARDSON: Well, that was interesting for me particularly. I enjoyed that. We did have a number of different kinds of exchanges both in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. One of them which I otherwise didn’t know much about was the performing arts business. One of the highlights of my tenure from the point of view of satisfaction on the job was seeing the Alvin Ailey Company open in Moscow.

Q: You might explain what the Alvin Ailey...

RICHARDSON: Alvin Ailey is a dance company that is mostly black and derives its impetus from a sense of the African American history and the cultural antecedents of current African American set in both religious and jazz and so on. All these idioms coming out of that community, what this group projects on the stage. They have always been terrific. I had actually known them, I didn’t know anything about the dance, but I did know about them before I even went to State. My wife and I got excited about the Ailey company. So when I got to State I asked about them and are they in our program because the Bureau sent a lot of performing arts groups all over the world. Well yes they were in our program but they hadn’t ever got to the Soviet Union. They had tried but they couldn’t get them. I said, “Well try more. Let’s get them over there.” Eventually we got them there. I went to the opening and it was just an exhilarating experience in the Bolshoi Theater. Of course all the Russian dance elite came. Tickets had been sold out forever. They all wanted to see what this thing they’d heard about forever but nobody had ever seen. I don’t know why they accepted it really because it was a terribly disastrous mistake on their part. For the first half the audience was just stunned as I recall. You could hear a pin drop. Nobody said anything. There was no enthusiasm. There was no response. Everybody just had their mouths open obviously because this kind of very...
Q: You were talking about the reaction at the Bolshoi.

RICHARDSON: Yes. So the first half the audience was quiet. In between the acts I was taken out by the bureaucrats in charge and given champagne and so forth and they were all smiling and congratulating me for the fine performance it was. They were perfectly happy. But in the second half, the audience started to get into it. That music and the dancing is very stirring. It’s emotional for me. They got excited. The audience by the end was standing up and cheering and screaming. It was the most dramatic thing I ever saw. They rushed down to the front of the auditorium and reached up at the end to the dancers. It was just overpowering reaction and the bureaucrats just knowing this was the worst thing that ever happened and this outfit was going to go all over Russia, and they’d agreed to it. I had the pleasure afterwards of spending several hours, into the morning hours, with Alvin and a couple of top people from the Russian dance world. What’s the name of the great woman then was the star of the show? Judith Jameson. She’s had her own dance group, the Alvin Ailey group, now for years. Anyway, the four of us, we had a wonderful drinking and dancing, celebrating occasion. The Russians were just absolutely blown up, blown up by it which didn’t surprised me but I’d been so scared for the first half that they weren’t getting it. But they got it.

Q: Did you find yourself involved in any sort of intramural battles within the State Department or were you able to sort of operate on your own?

RICHARDSON: I really had a remarkably free hand. Nobody as I say above me for the first place cared what we did. Everybody had more important things to worry about. I just got pleasant positive feedback from the Deputy Secretary or whoever else was in on any particular thing. I had only one significant difficulty with the State Department which was with Henry Kissinger as you can imagine. My Kissinger story is a good deal like everybody else’s. I wanted to do something about what I saw as the relationship with USIA which needed fixing. Of course this went back to the fact that I had a proposal for fixing it back in 1969. So I was going again try to fix it. I had a few little changes I thought would bring it into the fold a little more and help me and help the State Department. I sent Henry the memorandum. I got prepared for the big meeting. I got everybody there who had anything to do with it and everything was laid on. It was a big effort—the only big effort I made the whole time I was there-to reach the Secretary about something significant to me. So Henry came in with the assemblage and said, “All right John. What’s this about?”

I stood up, commended soul to God, and got about two sentences and the word USIA came out and he said, “Wait a minute, John. Are you trying to get me to do something about USIA? When I ever have two or three spare minutes, I’ll take care of that outfit. In the meantime, I’m not interested.” And he walked out.

He did write me a nice note on his picture when I left though. It’s on the wall over there. Look at the other side. Look at that message underneath there. Those are the sorts of impersonal things he does well.
Q: It says, “Who has shown that interest and government…” I have a hard time reading his writing.

RICHARDSON: “…who has shown that culture and government can cooperate and reinforce each other with gratitude and high regard. Henry Kissinger.”

Q: Were there any other…?

RICHARDSON: There was one other thing. I got into trouble while I was there. But not because of CU, because of my public affairs job. This was the summer of Watergate and the…

Q: I was wondering, this might a place because I’d like to talk about…

RICHARDSON: Okay.

Q: Why don’t we stop at this point because we’ve covered your work at CU, except for the time at Public Affairs and Watergate and we’ll pick this up and then we’ll move on to...

RICHARDSON: I want to remember to say something about the Foreign Service Officers who worked with me…

Q: Please do.

RICHARDSON: …at CU next time

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Q: Today is the 12th of March 1999. John, why don’t we first start by talking about the Foreign Service Officers who worked for you.

RICHARDSON: Well, I have had the satisfaction of working in many different environments in my life and with more than one government agency. I found the Foreign Service people—not everybody but the ones who were successful—were very impressive people on average. They compared, I thought, very favorably with the kind of quality and characteristics, ability and ethics and so on with any other group that I’ve seen, including I think back to the lawyers at Sullivan and Cromwell and investment bankers and the people I knew at CIA, people I’ve seen in so many other organizational settings in my life. I still remember those individuals, I think particularly of Bill Hitchcock who was my deputy for much of the time. A first class person. I’m still in touch with him.

Q: Where’s he?

RICHARDSON: He lives out in Colorado. That’s his home. I see him on a board out
there occasionally. Dick Fox was an African-American—a really capable guy. After he left
the Foreign Service he was Vice President for many years of Meridian House, running
their International Visitor Operation. Those are two that come to mind but there were a
lot of others who impressed me greatly. I’ve always said publicly and privately to
anybody who was interested in what I thought about the government that the Foreign
Service was really extraordinarily fortunate in both the caliber of the people, and the
training and—even though there are lots of detriments, there are lots of things that are
difficult as there are in any field of bureaucracy. But I’ve been very impressed and I
continue to be and I did want to say that.

_Q: Well, It’s interesting. The recruiting process essentially has worked over the years._

RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes.

_Q: I found it sort of ironic, that essentially the State Department, as with almost every
other country in their Foreign Service goes to really great lengths to get the best they
can. Then they tend to denigrate them and allow the American public to denigrate them
once they’re in. The State Department lacks the guts to say, “ We’ve got a pretty fine
bunch of people and we’ll defend them.” In fact that’s one of the things—one of my hidden
agenda—as I do this program is to by interviewing people who have been involved with
the Foreign Affairs establishment, to create a body of ...an archive of experiences and all
that the present Foreign Service in some way can draw on, too. Well let’s go on to Public
Affairs._

RICHARDSON: All right good. I think I probably said before that I was asked to do this
by Secretary Rogers because he wanted me to leave CU. He wanted me to shift to Public
Affairs which was from my point of view perfectly unacceptable. I wasn’t interested
in Public Affairs. He kept pestering me about it. Finally he hadn’t filled the job and finally
he said, “Well, will you do it for a while in addition to your present job?”

Of course I should have known better. So two years later. For those two years the way I
divided my work I took my in-box from CU every morning at noon or thereabouts over to
Public Affairs with one of my secretaries trailing behind me and we then sat in the Public
Affairs Assistant Secretary Office for the afternoon. I tried to divide it equally but it was
a great problem for me. I couldn’t have been less interested really in Public Affairs
anyhow.

_Q: You were doing this Public Affairs part time thing from when to when?_

RICHARDSON: Oh gee. I don’t know that I can give you the dates. Probably about…Oh
yes. I do know. I do know because it came during the Watergate summer. It was 1972 to
’73.

_Q: What did your job in Public Affairs consist of?_

RICHARDSON: Well, it was really a very easy job because I didn’t have the press
relations thank God. That was-his name has gone out of my head at the moment-a very good guy who worked directly with the Secretary and was an Ambassador later on. I forget.

Q: Did he go...

RICHARDSON: Bob something.

Q: He went to Cypress didn’t he?

RICHARDSON: Yes. He died a few years ago [Bob McClosky].

Q: I’ve interviewed him. I can’t recall the name.

RICHARDSON: Anyway so I really had a very easy job. It was all the other functions of Public Affairs, none of them urgent, all of them fairly short, medium to long range rather than immediate and having to do with the history, the organizational relationships in the private sector and those kinds of things-and trying to keep up the image in sort of medium to longer range terms rather than immediate dealings with the urgencies of the press. Incidentally I had another very good Foreign Service officer there as a Deputy, Bill Blair, who did everything. I just presided. He later became Head of Nature Conservancy after he left Foreign Service. Big job in private life. The one particular thing that stands out in my memory is the Watergate item that came up during my Public Affairs function. That was the summer of the election of ’72 when Nixon was running and when he got into trouble. He had an assistant, Colson, who had risen very rapidly to the top of the political staff in the White House. I had known him because he had worked for my cousin, Leverett Saltonstall, a Senator, before he came looking for a job in the Nixon Administration. When he did, he came among others to see me because, I guess because of, my cousin. Chuck as he was known-Charles Colson-we didn’t take to each other. He was looking for the Special Assistant job which is usually a political thing that goes with an Assistant Secretary job and I wasn’t much taken with him and he wasn’t too much taken with me. So he left there and then he looked at the White House and he got a job-political-over there. He went right to the top in no time flat. He was so good and he was so shrewd and so ruthless that he impressed everybody I’m sure in that particular White House. Anyhow I had a call from him one day that summer and he asked me for a copy of the State Department address list, which Public Affairs handled. We sent out all the routine things like the Bulletin and other things of that sort using that mailing list. And he asked for a copy of that list. I said, “I’ll get back to you.” That day in my little staff meeting-management meeting-I had in the Public Affairs office I asked, “What’s the routine on that? Do we get these requests normally from the White House?”

I was told from time to time they do it.

I said, “Well do you have any trouble with it?”

“No. No.” Not that anybody recalled.
Well, okay. Go ahead and do it, but get it in writing what it’s for. (I’d asked him what it was for and he said for a routine White House need for some kind of mailing-nothing for the political campaign.) So I said get it in writing then I forgot it.

A month or two later I got a call from Leo Cherne, a mentor of mine who I may have mentioned already.

Q: Yes. You have.

RICHARDSON: Okay. …in New York. He was a lifelong Democrat but because of his views about McGovern who was running against Nixon and McGovern’s views on the Cold War, Leo, who was like me a very strong cold warrior, had decided to work for Nixon. He was Vice Chairman of Democrats for Nixon. He called me and said, “John, I have an odd thing here. I have a telephone call from an old pal somewhere in the middle west who I had written to asking for money for the Nixon campaign. He tells me that he has had a mailing, over my signature, which has on the…”

Q: With your signature. His signature...

RICHARDSON: His signature. Yes. Asking for money. The envelope had a label which was identical to the label on his State Department bulletin that he regularly received. Leo said, “Isn’t that peculiar?”

I said, “You bet it’s peculiar.”

I immediately thought back to Colson and remembered that list and of course that’s what he used it for after telling me that it was for some innocuous purpose. I called Chuck and asked for an explanation. He was completely dismissive of me and my little worry. He said, “Well, what do you want me to do?”

I said, “But you told me…”

He said, “Oh, come on John. You didn’t believe that?”

I said, “Well, what do I do if someone from the media calls and I’m asked what did we do?”

He said, “Make up something for Heavens sakes. What is the matter? Good God.” And he used a lot of bad words and hung up.

That sort of gave me a little insight when the thing all broke open as to the mentality over there. Further insight came long after I left the department I ran into Bill Rogers, my former boss and his Secretary of State and we were chatting about this and that and he said, “Did I ever tell you about what happened after the election in 1972?”
I said, “No. What?”

He said, “You were on the enemies list.” He said, “I had to go over and make a special trip over to the White House to save your job.”

Q: In other words, if you even questioned what they were doing...it does give a feel for that.

RICHARDSON: It gives a feel doesn’t it?

Q: Poisonous atmosphere.

RICHARDSON: Poisonous atmosphere.

Q: Really awful.

RICHARDSON: So that was their little story. My only connection to Watergate. Other than that I can remember just the flavor of what was going on in the public press for the next year-almost year-I guess before he finally resigned. Was such that one old friend of mine, and one of my most respected friend’s from New York, brilliant scholar, scholarly kind of guy, wrote me a letter urging me to resign. I wrote back a thoughtful letter why I didn’t think it was appropriate. My job would just be filled by some hack and the bureau had suffered for years from having not hacks but people who didn’t stay. I told Fulbright I would stay and I wanted to stay and I was enjoying it and so forth in CU. Actually I almost lost that friend. It was I think three or four years that we didn’t talk after that. I was so upset and he was so upset about that issue of whether I ought to resign over a circumstance of that sort. I think one could take two sides of it but I still think I probably made the right decision. We did eventually get back together. It was that heated, that issue, with a lot of people I think at the time.

Q: What about within the Public Affairs Bureau? Were you picking up-although you were not the spokesman, you were in the bureau-were you picking up any of the vibrations about that time? This was actually before Nixon resigned? The thing was beginning to build up. What were you getting from the Bureau?

RICHARDSON: I think we all avoided the subject pretty much. That’s my impression. That we all knew something big was developing it was pretty obvious but nobody knew where it would come out and I don’t remember any particular issues other than the one I just mentioned that really affected us directly. As I say, I wasn’t dealing with short term Public Affairs. It was all longer term stuff. It wasn’t directly into the news.

Q: Well a couple of things that interest me on that, looking at sort of a historical point of view. Was anything ever raised at that time about doing something a Foreign Affairs Museum or anything like that? Did that ever come up?

RICHARDSON: Don’t remember it.
Q: Well I mean that’s the answer. What about dealing with the historians office? I was seconded there at one time and from what I gather you would think it would be a rather placid place but from what I gather at least the historians of the Department of State Historian including today, has not been a very happy...

RICHARDSON: Well, they get a lot of pressure.

Q: They get a lot of pressure and the management of that place by a historian, they’ve had a series of people who haven’t really been able to bring it all together. Which I have to say I think remains today from what I gather from people there. Were you getting any of that? Was this a problem?

RICHARDSON: I remember the historians being something of a problem but I really can’t remember any details about it.

Q: Was it Trask? Dr. Trask at that time?

RICHARDSON: I’m not sure who it was. I don’t remember the name. It sounds as though it might be...

Q: I was just wondering.

RICHARDSON: I remember that there were some problems but frankly I don’t remember what they were. I remember it was from time to time caused me a headache but I can’t remember what it was.

Q: Were there any other long term problems or initiatives or anything else that come to mind during that time?

RICHARDSON: I don’t think I put a lot of effort and time into-as I did in CU. Again it wasn’t very interesting. I felt I was in a holding action. I thought from week to week and month to month that I’d be out of there. Rogers had promised me he’d go right to work and recruit somebody. So I believed him. I kept thinking that would happen. I didn’t try to delve much into the workings of the thing. I simply let Blair really run it. I do think I made some suggestions from time to time but I don’t think they were of great significance. I’m sure they weren’t of great significance.

Q: During this time, was there...Were you getting also...I know you were wearing two hats, essentially two Assistant Secretarial ships. Was there a certain feeling of a holding action on the part of an awful lot of the people at the senior level in the Department of State, particularly those that were not the day to day geographic bureaus that Rogers was being superceded by Kissinger? In essence that certainly the end of the first term of Nixon that this was...you were tied to a faltering comet or something like that?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes. That’s right. I think there was a certain amount of gossip
along that line. I had a high regard for Rogers. I was impressed with his background. He was a lawyer like I was. He’d been an Assistant Attorney General and Attorney General back in Eisenhower’s day. He was a considerable figure. That impressed me. I also liked him as a person. He was a very likeable man I found, personally. So when gossip came up I tended to get kind of heated about it, defending him. I was rather a partisan of his, not knowing anything about his actual operation of the important parts of the State Department, but I heard complaints and I would certainly try to take the other side.

Q: I have talked to Foreign Service Officers who worked for or around him. One of the problems was often that he really wasn’t that interested and knowledgeable. Somebody who was translating for him when they went to China and having long conversations with Chinese leaders - the Foreign Minister - when Kissinger and Nixon were doing the real business and talking about golf which was not exactly a subject of great interest to a Chinese communist. He was not a policy wonk.

RICHARDSON: No he sure wasn’t. Looking back on it I can certainly see all that very easily. I think that’s right. He wasn’t. He was miscast. In a sense it seems to be that he was put over there by Nixon as a way of giving him a top post of his old friend who he owed a lot to. Meanwhile he knew that Kissinger was the brightest guy around and he was going to be really running things. And I’m sure that’s the way Nixon thought. And that’s just the way it worked.

Q: Everybody comes across that Rogers was a very nice man, a gentle man. Sort of like being the nice guy in a den of sharks.

RICHARDSON: Exactly. Exactly. I ran into the Kissinger thing one other time. I was in Chile for a conference and it happened to be just at the time of the, seems to me the interval between the end of Frei, the first Frei, Father Frei and the coming in of Allende. It was a kind of crisis time. I met President Frei at that conference. He wanted to see me privately. The reason he wanted to see me privately was he was horrified at what was going on and he, I think…He wanted really to talk to somebody in Washington, but he got me. He wasn’t sure that the ambassador I think was really controlling events, which he was right about. I didn’t know. Of course that was way over my head. I had no idea what was going on. I talked to the Ambassador. His name was Atwood I think. I called him and I said, “I just had this conversation with the President.” Was he ex-President? I can’t remember what he was at that point. I said, “I don’t understand it. He’s very agitated.”

Atwood came down to where this conference center was to meet with Frei and told me at the time he felt very much himself unable to cope because of Kissinger who from the NSC was running a back channel effort to destabilize the country. He had nothing to say about it. So he was feeling embarrassed as I recall. It’s the only other time I’ve run into that. Made me think of it with Rogers because it was another example.

Q: I assume that by the time the election of ’72-reelection of Nixon came around and retook office in ’73 you were ready to get out?
RICHARDSON: Well I was still there. I was still in Public Affairs double hatting. I don’t know when it ended but I would guess probably early in ’73. The only Watergate connection there I remember is at the time I had a little group at CU, of people from different departments - I may have mentioned this before - who met with me periodically to talk about across-the-government cultural relations with the rest of the world. We had from the White House at different times Len Garment, who was sort of the legal advisor on more important jobs, the lawyer for Nixon. He was also the cultural affairs expert in the White House and he used to come. Ray Price was another who came occasionally. He was a speech writer for Nixon. Went to work for Nixon after he left office, stayed with him some time. One of the critical moments in early ’73 when the Watergate thing had really exploded and was just the big story every day in the papers, Garment was over for some kind of affair in the department. He came by my office and we talked. There were one or two others there. It was clear at that point that Nixon was probably going to get impeached or something very much like that. It was that bad. I remember Garman wanted to turn on the TV in my office to get the latest news and find out what was going on. I suddenly realized that I was in the middle of something really historic that was happening during the presidency. I was never involved in it in any way other than to realize I was on the fringes of something perfectly frightful that was happening.

Q: How did things pan out for you in this CU, Public Affairs thing?

RICHARDSON: Finally Rogers did do something about it. I think it was before Kissinger came in. I think he did something about it…Or he may not have? It may have hung over until Kissinger came in and then he named John Reinhardt, who I knew because Reinhardt was a USIA officer I’d worked with. He’d been Director of the East Asia department of USIA and was a colleague. So I was delighted when he was hired. I think he did come in next so it was probably when Kissinger…I think he came in under Kissinger, I’m not sure. Maybe Rogers picked him? Anyhow he came in and took it over and did a fine job. I was delighted to get out of there.

Q: What about CU? What happened?

RICHARDSON: CU went on and it continued to be for me a very satisfying and rewarding kind of work because it had suffered in the past from the lack of continuity of leadership. That was the main thing. It had some able-able-first class people but they didn’t stay. Because I stayed, I think I had a chance to kind of systematize and develop in some directions that hadn’t been developed before. That kind of thing that you can get if you stay long enough. A big difference.

Q: This is always one of the problems in government.

RICHARDSON: That’s right. That’s right. And I think it’s trouble in the Foreign Service. You get these short term assignments, two years. How much can you accomplish because institutionally it doesn’t change that much in two years. If you go to an embassy or something for two years I wouldn’t think you could do a lot. Just from my own
experience these things are complicated. The habits are so strong it takes time. The personnel are so embedded in any kind of organization.

Q: Did you notice any difference in the role of CU with Kissinger? I somehow find Kissinger not exactly focusing on CU every day.

RICHARDSON: No, but of course from the point of view of the Assistant Secretary of CU that was a blessing.

Q: I've heard people that were involved in Africa saying the one great advantage to Africa was Henry Kissinger both as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State until late in his tenure kept away from it.

RICHARDSON: True. True. Dave Newsom I’m sure would say that.

Q: Was there any particular change in atmosphere as far as CU was concerned?

RICHARDSON: No. I would say not. My seventh floor relationships were always with the Deputy Secretary, with Bob Ingersoll and Ken Rush. I can’t think right now who the others were. I felt I worked for the Deputy. In other words he was my boss. It was Elliott to begin with and then it was Rush for a long time and there was one more I think. Oh, yes, from Chicago. But anyway that’s where I …to the extent because my business upstairs from the sixth to the seventh floor was mainly organizational things-budgets, budgets being a big thing, personnel, those kinds of things, rather than policy.

Q: This was of course the period of Kissinger pushing detente. I was wondering in exchanges one of the great complaints I’ve heard about our Exchange Program was that we tended to push Slavic literature scholars into the Soviet Union who were in their mid 20s and 35 year old nuclear physicists came over to the United States to become our scientific help. People are saying hey we have to make sure the Soviets have a fair balance. I would think under Kissinger they would say oh the hell with it or something? Did you feel any pressure on this type of thing?

RICHARDSON: No. I don’t think he ever got into it. He wouldn’t have thought it was important I suspect. As far as I was concerned, because of my Radio Free Europe background, I was interested particularly in that area of the world, the communist ruled countries. Also for the Board Foreign Scholarships, Jim Bellington was Chairman for much of the time.

Q: Now the librarian of Congress?

RICHARDSON: Now the librarian of Congress. And his background at Princeton was Professor of Russian studies, history. So he was very interested in all that. So we had good—what I hoped was reasonably intelligent effort as far as the policy making went so that that kind of thing wouldn’t be like that. I would think we were reasonably sophisticated in the way we tried to run it. So I would discount that somewhat. There
wasn’t inherently going to be big imbalance. Politically the political purposes were similar, both trying to undermine the other in a sense, but the techniques were very different.

Q: The societies…I mean the American scientist wasn’t going to get a hell of a lot from the Soviets. It wouldn’t be open to them. Besides even if it were completely open, they’d just come back and say kind of a waste of time except for a few fields like laser technology. It would be completely closed to Americans anyway.

RICHARDSON: I feel quite comfortable that nothing very significant happened adverse to our interests through those exchanges.

Q: When did you leave there?

RICHARDSON: I left there at the end of the Ford era. That would have been February of ’77. In fact Bill Hitchcock, who was not only a very able guy but a very loyal Deputy.

Q: Jim Hitchcock or Bill Hitchcock?

RICHARDSON: Bill Hitchcock. …tried to get me reappointed by the Clinton people.

Q: You mean the Carter people?

RICHARDSON: Carter people I mean. We had been working on a reorganization thing. I guess I haven’t said anything about that. I probably should.

Q: Yes. Yes.

RICHARDSON: During my time in the latter part of the period, the last three years or so, I had been very interested in trying to work out a different arrangement with USIA. I mentioned earlier I’m sure during this Oral History my one brush with Kissinger on the subject of USIA. He dismissed it out of hand and ran out and left the room, in the beginning of the meeting. I had to pursue that. A friend of mine named…It’s the same Leo Cherne I’d gotten appointed to the Advisory Commission for CU at the time. It was a fairly fancy Presidential Advisory Committee. He became Chairman of it. Because he was Chairman of it I was able to get him to initiate an effort with the USIA Advisory Committee to do a kind of joint effort looking at the relations between State and USIA. The Chairman of the USIA Advisory Committee at the time was Frank Stanton who I had known from my Free Europe days. He was on my Free Europe board. He was then head for many years of CBS. So he was a well known figure. Out of that came a study of USIA and State done by these two Advisory Committees in concert, some kind of collaboration. I was not able to steer it particularly but I of course testified before them and gave them my views as everybody else did. There were all kinds of views. I was inclined to try to find a way to bring USIA into the State Department because I thought… For one thing my observation had been, I thought, perhaps from being in the Public Affairs Bureau, that the Foreign Service people as they came up had too little experience
with Public Affairs, with Press Relations, with all that side of the job of being an
Ambassador. One of the reasons for that was that function wasn’t in the department so
there was no way you could get trained or get the experience. I thought that was a good
reason for thinking that it was a mistake to have USIA separate. Quite apart from the fact
that I had a more directly institutional interest myself because of the way CU had to deal
overseas with the embassies of course, with Foreign Service Officers who were not
working for CU or State. They were working for USIA. They were excellent people I
always thought. I found them very high caliber.

I was always impressed with the caliber of USIA people as I was with State Foreign
Service Officers. But of course there was inevitably some difficulty in running CU
because we were dealing abroad with people who didn’t work for us. So of course I
wanted to try to fix that. Anyway, the so called Stanton Panel had formed just before the
end of the Ford era and administration and did come up with a report which didn’t do
everything I wanted. It was kind of halfway in between what I wanted and what
Shakespeare wanted or his successor wanted at USIA, which was of course what
everybody at USIA wanted, was to keep it out. It was kind of a compromise but still it
wasn’t a bad report. The new Clinton Administration...

Q: Carter.

RICHARDSON: Carter Administration—I keep calling it wrong. Carter Administration
when it came in for one reason or another, I never understood quite why, never did carry
it out. They just picked this and that and changed a few things but by and large they left
everything pretty much the way it was. So that the whole effort collapsed because of the
change of administration.

Q: Well then in ’77 when you left, whither?

RICHARDSON: Whither. I once again, as I had failed to do when I was in Free Europe, I
had made no plans. Hadn’t arranged anything. Hadn’t looked really. Bill Hitchcock kept
saying well maybe we could catch a reappointment by this new administration and so
forth. Of course that didn’t work out. So I found myself out of a job.

Q: How old were you then, by that time?

RICHARDSON: Okay. “77. I would have been 46.

Q: So your prime.

RICHARDSON: Yes. Is 77 minus 21 46? Let’s see. Or is it 56.

Q: 56. Still prime.

RICHARDSON: Dave Abshire was the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
We were chatting one day and he said, “What are you going to do?”
I said, “I don’t know yet.”

He said, “Would you like to come to CSIS? I’m going back to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown (which he had founded and was head of).”

I said, “Yes. That sounds great.” And he did it. And I spent about a year and a half there pretending to be an expert on communication again - international communications. I was going to run a program. It turned out in the real world, contrary to what I anticipated being a naïve person, I had to raise the money. I hadn’t thought about that. I hated raising money especially for myself. I’d always done it in jobs that I had but I never enjoyed it. Unlike my father who was a great money raiser and loved it. I hated it. I found that a difficult part of it. Otherwise a very pleasant interlude where I had no pressure from anybody and I could fool around with what I’d started to learn after Free Europe about communications and try to devise something worth while to study and to get some money for and so on. It came to absolutely nothing. Absolutely zero. A very pleasant place with lots of bright people. I had fun being there. I enjoyed it but it was not a productive at all. So the year and a half ended. And it ended this way: Dave Abshire came to me one day. He was Vice President of the Board of Youth for Understanding, a High School Home Stay International Exchange Program. They had just lost their President and wouldn’t I be interested?

I said, “Oh, no. Oh, no. No. No. I’d been running things forever and I’m very happy not running them now and I’d like to stay right where I am. Are you trying to get rid of me?”

He said, “Oh, no. Not trying to get rid of you.”

Well this went on. I kept saying no. He kept coming back to me. Finally he said, “Will you take it on for a short time?” An interim arrangement.

Q: One of those.

RICHARDSON: Yes. Just for a month while we do this search. I said, “Okay.” I couldn’t very well say no. So I went over there absolutely intending to return and within I think two weeks I was so fascinated with that business. I had previous experience with an exchange student that I probably talked about. We had had an AFS student live with us in the ’60s which I probably mentioned before and we still see her. In fact, I saw her two weeks ago in London. So I was very high on that kind of exchange but what I didn’t realize was that all the people working on it were so excited about what they were doing and so eager. It made it immediately a very attractive place to be. Also it was very attractive physically. The headquarters were on Newark Street in Washington, DC. A very old farm with a nice building in it and nice office and nice convenient place and a beautiful place to be. In a few weeks I called David and said…Oh I’d written a letter to begin with accepting this interim saying under no circumstances did I wish to be considered for the permanent job. I would not accept it if offered. Then about two weeks later I took it back. I said if they still wanted me I would take it. So I took it and stayed.
Q: How long were you with Youth for Understanding? How long were you there?

RICHARDSON: Youth for Understanding. Seven years. No. Eight years.

Q: This would be ’77...

RICHARDSON: ’77 to ’86. That’s nine years isn’t it?

Q: Well anyway, could you explain what the program really was during your time and as you saw your portfolio?

RICHARDSON: Yes. Youth for Understanding worked with volunteers in some 30 or 40 countries who had similar partner organizations that they set up to select and receive high school students. Select students to go abroad and receive students by identifying host families and getting them to accept the students to live with them for a year. The major program is a whole academic year in high school. The U.S. Youth for Understanding organization, although it was the founding organization did not control the others and does not today. They are all equal, independent partners, so to speak, in a network of organizations which agrees consensually on principals and standards and practices and so forth to carry out these exchanges which are very difficult to organize and to do because you are dealing with young children really in foreign countries in situations where they are vulnerable and where there are risks to them of various kinds, where they may very well not find it congenial with the family they get put into and so forth. So there are all kinds of difficult things that have to be handled mostly by volunteers. As well it’s difficult to finance. The financing is done, was done, still is with almost all private money. There is a little government money, but not much. Most of the private money is provided by the families who want their child to go abroad. They pay for their child to go abroad and live with a family. That’s where probably 80 percent of the funds for the whole enterprise come from. The other 20 percent is mostly fundraising of which I did a lot. Mostly in Japan, oddly enough. It was a very satisfying job. I felt it was enormously useful. I still feel it’s enormously useful. I think people who do that turn up later in all kinds of interesting work and constructive work both...It’s sort of like the Peace Corps. It’s very similar, I think, in result to the Peace Corps. You get people for the same reasons who become sensitized to a whole range of issues that other people by and large don’t. Therefore they have qualities and attitudes and skills and capacities that other people don’t for relating across various kinds of boundaries for example, and for empathizing with people different from themselves and being able to form ties with people differently. It’s really a healthy kind of process that produces I think also a lot of leaders. It’s so challenging for a kid at 16 or 17 to do this that I think it has the kind of consequence for that kid that Outward Bound has. It’s so challenging and to get through it is damn difficult, particularly at the beginning if you are in a foreign country in foreign language and going to school right off in that language. That is something to have to deal with, living with a strange family. So I think it is a very useful thing and I found it very satisfying to try to work on it and try to improve the organization and all the other things that you could do in a job like that.
**Q: Has there developed sort of a graduate network of people...?**

RICHARDSON: Not as there should have been. One of the great difficulties with this particular organization was that it never made the effort. And I made the effort but it really wasn’t done well, and still is not done well in that organization. The organization has to put some effort into it to produce a real graduate network. I had done that at State. In fact I don’t think I’ve mentioned this. Somebody came to me one time and said that they were trying to start a Fulbright Alumni Association. I immediately thought that was a great idea and I put money into it - CU money - into it at the beginning and helped them get started. Now it’s a flourishing enterprise. Well that’s what you can do with an alumni thing. And the same thing could have been true with Youth for Understanding but for one reason or another we never got it done.

**Q: When it was your watch were there any openings to countries that hadn’t been considered before?**

RICHARDSON: Yes. Yes. Quite a few I guess. Again I was trying…I’m trying when it happened…I was interested in the communist countries. We didn’t get started in many of them but our German colleagues did with our encouragement. The Germans started in Poland and Czechoslovakia and later on into others. We tried to get into Africa but it was very difficult simply because of the financing of these things-the sending family basically relied on to pay the bills. The sending families in Africa were very scarce who could do that. AFS was successful at that time.

**Q: American Friends Service?**

RICHARDSON: Yes. American Friends Service. The other one which sponsored the young girl that we had in the ‘60s. They got into South Africa and we couldn’t seem to get started. Now Youth for Understanding is in South Africa and was before the change. But Africa is difficult and the other developing countries are difficult. It’s one of the constraints on those organizations in terms of the good they can do. It’s very difficult to operate in really very poor countries. If I had a free hand with government money, I would probably say that that ought to be subsidized substantially. It wouldn’t be a lot of money but it would do a lot of good, I think. Just like the Peace Corps does. Same reasons.

**Q: Were there any sort of crises when you were doing this like war or civil war or problems or just problems of countries or areas or within the United States where it was difficult?**

RICHARDSON: Mostly it was...there were no big crises. There were endless small crises-individual kids, individual family kinds of problems. Problems with schools that would or wouldn’t cooperate, problems with governments abroad-not our government-problems with consumerism. It broke out I remember in the Nordic states and started to require all kinds of rules for these kinds of programs that didn’t fit and things like that.
Those were the kinds of problems usually and the biggest problems always tended to be internal, that is within the family of Youth for Understanding, the squabbling was intense. Just like a lot of other families. We all loved each other dearly and we loved what we were doing but we squabbled like hell about it. Those were the kinds of things. I suppose one of the contributions I made was to try to set up a more effective American based international kind of facilitating, and cooperating and supporting system. I think some of my predecessors had been somewhat too American in their view of the world and therefore made it hard for the cooperation to develop on a fair basis.

Q: How about relations with France? France always gets...

RICHARDSON: It was impossible

Q: I’m not surprised.

RICHARDSON: It goes beyond what one thinks of when one thinks of what’s wrong when dealing with France because it seemed to be that they just couldn’t set up in France, because of the way they functioned, a decent organization. There had never been either a strong AFS or a strong Youth for Understanding organization in France. Yet Americans in that era all wanted to go to France so there was a great demand for it. People loved to have French people come here because they thought it was sort of cultivating and the French were interesting and all that but it never worked. I can’t tell you why. It has to be something about the French but it’s not the usual things you say about the French. It’s something odd. They just couldn’t seem to work a voluntary organization—or not this kind voluntary organization. Do you know France at all? Maybe you have a theory?

Q: No I don’t. Except, while I’ve never served in France but from my interviews and reading and all, you do get the feeling, including today that they tend to regulate-over regulate in my impression—but also it’s very difficult more than almost anywhere to get almost voluntary things going. To give you an example, I made an effort to get the French... find a few contacts to start an Oral History program such as we’re doing which is really a voluntary organization. Zilch. And whatever they do they interview the top people and the files disappear into the Quai d’Orsay vault. The British have one going but the French couldn’t do it because they are not really equipped to deal with volunteers.

RICHARDSON: Maybe it’s as simple as that. Maybe that’s just outside their cultural perspective entirely.

Q: I think the Germans are sort of a mixed bag. They have it but they are not as...in some ways more flexible although they have got the same problems but they seem to be a little more flexible.

RICHARDSON: Well, I can tell you that Youth for Understanding, which a lot of Germans are surprised by, at the time it started in the U.S. which was on-out of occupation, U.S. Occupation Program for bringing teenagers from Germany to the United
States. That’s how it started. A woman in Michigan, Rachel Andreson, who was Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan took some of these kids from the Occupation Program and was thrilled with what happened and started getting her friends doing it and that’s how it all began. The other side therefore were Germans to begin with. One of the first Germans who came over, when he went back as a kid and his parents started a German Youth for Understanding Organization in 1955 or 56, something like that. That organization became the second biggest in the world of Youth for Understanding after the American Organization. It still is the second biggest in the world. A lot of German political people… I remember when I used to go over and try to get them interested in supporting it and putting some money into it and so forth. They’d never heard of such a thing. They couldn’t believe the Germans would take these kids into their homes and so forth. Well they should have known better because they’d had by then programs with the French that made a huge difference post war. The precedent was there and the Germans did very well with the French so there’s a precedent on both sides. They really did do that. So there’s quite a difference. Where there was a good enough reason that everybody could see I guess.

Q: Well I suppose, too…I mean, the French...

RICHARDSON: Part of it was done by town.

Q: Yes and also the French and the Germans were working very hard so they wouldn’t be killing each other.

RICHARDSON: Well, that’s what I mean. There was a huge motivator.

Q: And that probably meant that you could overcome it. Well in ’86 or so what did you do?

RICHARDSON: Oh. Well, I had by then established a pattern. I hadn’t had any job longer than eight years and it sort of came to me in the course of that Youth for Understanding job that that was a good thing, that it had been healthy for me to change. I began to make the sort of rationale for it that maybe I slow down after a few years and get bored with the job or don’t do it because I can’t be as creative or whatever. So I thought I’ll just leave. I could retire now. It’s about retirement time. About a year in advance I called key members of the board and said I would be leaving in a year, so that would give them time to find somebody. I remember one particular conversation. I had spent a lot of time in Japan because I had a marvelous guy who was the whole reason we were successful financially because he was a wonderful development person, Arthur Collingsworth. He was a sort of genius at it. A very difficult person but extremely capable at that. He had developed before I even got there, these connections in Japan which had already produced substantial commitments of money including not the money to buy the place on Newark Street because they moved the headquarters from Michigan, Ann Arbor, to Newark Street, DC but the money to put the down payment from Japan. Then I had to raise the money to actually pay off that loan. I probably should tell this little story about that. It was a big crisis when I got there because my predecessor had
made a slight error of judgement. He was a very young man and understandably he made an error of judgement. We had a big program with Brazil and a lot of money tied up in Brazil that couldn’t be gotten out. He hired a new treasurer and the two of them concocted a scheme to change money on the black market, or gray market in Brazil dollars. He got the new treasurer who came out of an accounting background to take the cash, $300,000, out of the bank, the two of them did and put it in a suitcase and they gave it to the chairman of the Brazilian volunteer committee who was visiting Washington and asked him to take it back to Brazil. He was all for it. That’s the way they do things in Brazil. That’s normal in Brazil. So the chairman thought that was fine. He got to the Kennedy airport on the way back and he was stopped by the Customs official who asked whether he had any excess cash above whatever the limit was. He said, “Of course not.” The guy said, “Let me see your briefcase.” There was $300,000 in cash and this very distinguished artist and civic leader in Brazil spent the night in the pokey in New York while they sorted this out. Needless to say it was a front page story in the Times the next day which was of course the end of my predecessors tenure. It was not only the end of his tenure but it was almost the end of the organization because it came at a bad time financially. So when I got there it was in really bad shape. At my first board meeting, I was greeted-Dave Abshire was Vice Chairman, was not there-I was greeted by the Chairman, welcomed to the meeting. It was in September. By then the bank had decided they would not give us the money they had agreed to lend. We had a mortgage to support credit that was supposed to be available to us. They wouldn’t give it to us. I was out of money and we couldn’t pay the next payroll. I was all prepared with my plea as to how we would get the board organized to raise this money in a hurry and so forth and the first thing the Chairman said was, “Oh John we probably should have told you this before, but at our last meeting we decided that the board’s role is not to raise money. It’s your job to raise money. Just have that clear in your mind.”

That was the opening welcome and I nearly died. This brilliant fundraiser and I, development person, went around and got guarantees from people we knew for loans, short term loans from the bank. We had to change banks. The bank we had wouldn’t loan us anything on any basis. We had to change banks. So that’s where it started. The way we got out of all that and made a success of the financial side of it was the Japanese who turned out to be very eager to give us money because this guy, this smart development guy, had figured it out. That the Japanese would want to give to something right in Washington with a rather distinguished board including political people, Senators, what not, and they would be interested. The big automobile companies particularly would be interested.

Q: Japanese auto companies.

RICHARDSON: Yes. So our biggest supporter was Toyota. Next was Nissan and so forth and so on. We raised one hell of a lot of money in Japan. So I was going back and forth. Well, that’s a long way to the end of the thing which you asked about. I called the man in Japan, who was our key contact, Ichiro Hattori. His picture I guess is in the other room, who died later. He was a young guy who was the sort of scion of the family that owned Seiko Watch Company. He was running the company. He was our key guy. He
was on our board. I called him to tell him a year from now I’d be leaving.

He said, “All right. You’ve done a wonderful job. Thank you very much,” and so forth, “and of course you’ll stay on the board.”

I said, “No, Ichiro. I have a strong conviction and it isn’t done here and that’s unwise. My successor is not going to be happy having me look over his shoulder,” and so forth. So I literally got that far and there was a long silence. He didn’t say anything. There was a complete gap in the conversation. I finally said, “Ichiro, are you still there?”

He said, “Yes.” There was another gap. Then he finally said, “Well John, that’s not the way we think about it in Japan.” Of course I knew that. The Japanese, if you’re a business guy and you’ve been head of an organization, you become the senior advisor of the next guy, you stay on the board and all that. Well, it wound up that I had to stay. I was allowed to leave but I had to stay on the board which I did. It worked out all right. I had to stay and break my own rule which was always not to let anybody else do that including myself.

I did retire with all due fanfare from Youth for Understanding. I went home and I was home for about six months or something. I had already been active in developing two institutions I had been interested in. One was the National Endowment for Democracy which I had something to do with the background of and the other was the U.S. Institute of Peace. The Institute of Peace came into being just after I left or while I was leaving Youth for Understanding. Because I had put a little effort on the Hill and so on, in getting started, I thought it would be a good idea for the State Department and the other Foreign Affairs Agencies to have an outside sort of place-outside their own umbrella research operation organization-that would think big thoughts. I thought that made sense. So I helped to sort of bring it about. When it was formed and the legislation was passed and it was set up with a board, John Norton Moore was the Chairman of the Board who was a professor of law who had been a legal advisor I think in the State Department. They were recruiting for president. I heard about it and I thought gee whiz, maybe I ought to go back to work. I put myself forward to John and I was being seriously considered when Sam Lewis came back from being ambassador to Israel and everybody said, “He’s ideal,” and he was. He was a very good person. Sam was picked over me and as soon as he was, he called me and we had lunch—I’d never met him-and he said, “Would you like to come work for it anyway in some other role?”

And I said, “Well, maybe I would.” So I did. Part of the motivation was purely financial. I had 17 years of government service because through some shenanigans they counted “A” my military, of course my State, “B” Free Europe, which was not government service but which some legislation had been passed that made you if you went back to work for the government I think you could get credit for your time in Free Europe for some odd reason. I don’t remember what. Anyway, that was another eight years or something. I was almost to the 20 year mark. I thought well hell, that would really make a big difference in how we live. So why don’t I do it? So I did it. That was the combination of interest in it and financial retirement income. I went to work and I spent three years
there very happily. I really enjoyed it. I was sort of an advisor to Sam on the private side of America but mainly I was supposed to start a program on education and training. I didn’t. I was unsuccessful really in doing it although now they have a good program I think, but I didn’t get very far. But I enjoyed working at it. It was fun. It was a different kind of environment. I liked almost everything about it. I liked Sam. I enjoyed working with him. It was a nice three years. That was the end. Then I retired again. And I stayed retired after that.

Q: Well, I think this might be a good point to stop then.

RICHARDSON: Sure. Sure.

End of interview