

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM C. SHERMAN

Interviewed by: Thomas Stern
Initial interview date: October 27, 1993
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background

Born in Kentucky and raised in Kentucky, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
University of Louisville
US Navy, WWII; Japanese language specialist

US Army, Korea: Korean Coast Guard Academy: Advisor

English language course
Environment
Military government
US Embassy established
Syngman Rhee government

Seoul, Korea: Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)

1948-1951

Special Assistant to the Director (Statistics)

Performance Review Section
ECA objectives
North Korea
US military
Duties
Korea Military Assistance Group (KMAG0
Housing
US-Soviet meetings
United Nations
38th Parallel
The Korea Herald
Korean government officials
Korean Oil storage Company (KOSCO)
Oil imports and distribution
Living conditions
Unification
Economic development
US White Paper on China

Chinhae meeting Chiang Kai-Shek	
Entered the Foreign Service	1951
Yokohama, Japan: Economic/Political/Military/Visa Officer	1952-1954
Local staff	
Seamen's issues	
Seamen's Unions	
McCarran Act	
Japanese visa applicants	
Economy	
Relations with locals	
Tokyo, Japan: Political Officer	1954-1957
Political Parties	
Elections	
Socialists	
Embassy officers	
Japan's "no war" policy	
Rearmament	
China threat	
Soviet Union	
Nixon visit	
Ambassador Sam Berger	
Bonin Islands	
Relations	
Economy	
State Department: INR: Korea Desk Officer	1957-1958
National Intelligence Survey (NIS)	
Biographic information	
Ambassador Hugh Cumming	
Operations	
Organization	
Wristonization	
Role of State Department in Policy Formation	
State Department: Belgium/Luxembourg Desk Officer	1958-1960
Bureau of European Affairs organization	
Benelux Embassies in Washington	
US-Luxembourg relations	
State Department: FSI: Italian language training	1960

Rome, Italy: Political Officer 1960-1965

- Political Parties
- Relations with Vatican
- Vatican government operations
- President Kennedy
- Iron Curtain
- China
- Embassy officers
- Embassy morale
- Political Parties
- Bill Crockett
- US Ambassadors
- Italian politics
- Outerbridge Horsey
- Embassy split political views
- US Italian Policy
- Communist Party
- Economy
- Italian political confusion
- Vice President Johnson's visits
 - Anecdotes
 - Vatican visit
- VIP visitors
- President Kennedy visit
 - Papal audience
- Vatican
 - Recognition
 - Relations
 - Ecumenical Council
- Efficiency report

State Department: Special Assistant to the Deputy Undersecretary for Administration 1966-1967

- Personnel assignments
- William Crockett
- Assignment process
- Junior Foreign Service Officers Association
- Congressman Rooney
 - Rome visit and tour
- Bureau organization
- "Management by Objectives"
- Country Director System
- ACCORD Program
- "T-Group"
- Ben Read

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> President Johnson's involvement in personnel President Johnson's overseas trips <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness Logistics Egos Bureau personnel changes Personnel conflicts 	
National War College	1967-1968
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kobe-Osaka, Japan: Consul-General World Exposition <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Soviets Industry American business community Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission Japanese tourists Hiroshima visit Japanese post-war psychology Religions USIA 	1968-1970
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tokyo, Japan: Political Counselor Ambassador Armin Meyer Embassy officers Relations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Student League against the War in Vietnam" Okinawa reversion U.S. military US Navy Japanese bureaucracy Political Parties Government of consensus "Chrysanthemum Club" Mercantilism China "Pingpong" trip 	1970-1973
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State Department: Senior Personnel Assignments Officer Negotiating with Bureaus 	1973-1974
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State Department: Director of Japanese Affairs Bureau of East European Affairs: Organization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Personnel Japanese Prime Minister's Washington visit 	1974-1977

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kissinger problems Operations Phil Habib US-Japan 1960 Treaty Kissinger stories Trade Security and defense Japanese operation differences US-Japanese planning talks Japan as regional stabilizing force Soviet Union Contacts Emperor's U.S. visit 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tokyo, Japan: Deputy Chief of Mission Ambassador Mike Mansfield Mansfield's operations style Congressional visits Operations Embassy composition and staff Inspection Corps visit Trade issues US-Japanese Trade Advisory Council American Chamber of Commerce President Carter visit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shimoda Problems Schedule Ohira's death 	1977-1981
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New York City, NY: Member, US Delegation to the UN with the personal rank of Ambassador Deputy Representative, Security Council Duties US Mission organization United Nations Special Agencies Secretariat Secretary General Perez de Cuellar Multilateral Diplomacy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Horse-trading Dealing with anti-US actions Country and regional issues Refugees China Frivolous UN resolutions 	1981-1984

Lack of enforcement
UN effectiveness
Jeane Kirkpatrick
Israel
South Africa
Soviet and China Security Council vetoes
Social requirements and pitfalls
Security Council operations
Lobbying delegations
“Non-Aligned Movement”

State Department: Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs 1984-1987
Japan and Korea
National Security Council studies
Japan trade policies
Relations with Commerce
Congressional interest
Operations
Kwangju “incident”
Security Consultative Group
Relations with the White House
China
Korea
Media
Assessment of UN effectiveness and future

INTERVIEW

Q: Let me start with the usual first question we raise in every interview. Tell us a little bit about your background, where you were raised, where you obtained your occupation and how you became interested in international relations and the Foreign Service.

SHERMAN: I was born in Kentucky and raised in several towns in that state, Pennsylvania and Ohio. My family settled down in Louisville where I went to high school. I started college there at the University of Louisville. Then the war came along, and I joined the Navy in 1943. After boot camp and a couple of training schools, the Navy sent me back to the same college for a while. Until that point, I was a dedicated and confirmed English major hoping to write the great American novel. I had no particular interest at that time in foreign affairs or international politics. But in the course of advancing through midshipman school and officers' training, I wound up in the Navy School of Oriental Languages in Colorado to study Japanese. I guess that was the beginning of my career in the international field.

The war ended six months after I finished language training. But the Navy in those days thought it was going to be involved in the occupation of Japan, and I continued my studies until I graduated from the program in 1946. Instead of going to Japan, I was assigned to Washington, DC to what was called the Washington Document Center, a joint service intelligence operation staffed by American, British and Canadian officers from all services. It was located in an old garage owned by the Stuart Motor Company located near Fifth and K Streets, across from the old Washington Market. The building was six stories high, filled with British, Canadian and American language specialists busily engaged in translating so-called "captured" documents from China and Japan. Every day, someone would dump a mail sack full of books that had been ransacked from some library in Japan behind each analyst's desk. These were not, in any sense of the word, "captured" documents nor were they of any intelligence interest or value. They included everything from pamphlets on horse breeding in Kyushu to outdated texts on commerce and trade. There were teams in Japan which were going through libraries appropriating whatever they could get a hold of and shipping them back to the Document Center. This was done on the assumption that there just might be some material of interest to intelligence. Our job was first of all, to scan all the material coming in. The scanning teams would translate the titles, the name of the author, where it had been published, and write a few sentences about the contents. It was a mindless occupation; the assignment was very boring. An accession list would be compiled and circulated to Washington agencies in the hopes that perhaps some bureaucrat might find a subject of interest which then would require a full translation of the material.

I did the scanning for a while and then was transferred to one of the translation teams. I remember translating the diary of a Japanese tourist who had taken a trip through the South Manchuria area on the Trans-Siberian railroad. That might sound intriguing, but it was not. His comments were mostly about the weather and other subjects of very little intelligence value. It always amazes me how people view Naval intelligence--an oxymoron perhaps--as a glamorous assignment; it certainly was not that.

I had volunteered to stay on duty after the end of the war simply because I wanted somehow to use the language I had spent fourteen months studying. I had hoped to be assigned to Japan, but MacArthur was sending home all the Navy's Japanese speaking officers. I think he understood that language meant power and he wanted to keep that in the exclusive hands of the Army. No Navy people were being assigned to Japan. I thought I was condemned for another year at least to the dull life of Navy intelligence in Washington. Mary Jane and I were married in language school, and in 1946 our daughter was born.. Housing was so difficult to find they couldn't join me in Washington.

One day I received a letter from the Navy saying that my application to remain on active duty had been approved. Miraculously, the very next day I got another letter saying that my application had been disapproved. So I tore up the first letter and immediately took the second to the separation center which processed me out of the Navy expeditiously. No one ever found the first letter; that was the way the Navy operated in those days. Once formally out of the Navy, I simply went across the river to the Pentagon and presented

myself to the Army and asked whether a Japanese language capable person might be employed in Japan by them. They said they would consider my request. Two months later, I received a letter from the Army saying that it would be glad to send me to Korea as a "Junior Principal Assistant". The pay was a princely salary of \$3,300 including the 25% overseas differential.

So I went to Korea. When we reached Korea, we found that the program to which we had been assigned had never been started. The idea had been to send Japanese language officers to Korea as staff aides to military government officials who worked in the various Korean ministries. It was a U.S. Army run program. The concept called for a rotation of these junior staff people going from Ministry to Ministry, learning about military government. Thereafter, we would be ready for some senior position in that military government. As I said, the program never came to fruition. When we arrived in Korea-- there were about fifteen of us-- we had no jobs and were left to our own devices to find a job. I found that Dick Petree, who was a classmate from the language school, was in Chinhae working for a U.S. Coast Guard detachment which was training the Korean Coast Guard. When we occupied Korea, in accordance with an agreement with the Russians we did not allow the formation of an Army or a Navy; we permitted only a Coast Guard and a constabulary to maintain order and tranquility. We were still negotiating with the Soviets in an effort to establish a unified Korea, which of course never came to pass.

So I ended up at the Korean Coast Guard Academy. I was the advisor to the Superintendent of the Coast Guard Academy. I was supposed to be an alter-ego to him, but in fact I established an English course to teach the cadets our language. Many of those students are by now retired senior military officers; there were a couple who became company Presidents. I have seen some of them during trips I have taken to Korea during the course of last forty-five years. At the Academy, I used Japanese; in those days, most of the students spoke better Japanese than Korean. They had been raised during the Japanese occupation of Korea and learned Japanese in their educational system. It was the official language and although many spoke Korean at home, that was not true for all of them. Although Koreans had bitter feelings about Japan and its people, they had no trouble using Japanese with me when I told them that I didn't speak Korean. They had no problem in using our mutual language, so communication was not an issue. The Korean Commandant spoke excellent English which he had learned in missionary schools in Manchuria where he had been raised. I also helped the Academy develop a curriculum. There was another American assigned to the Academy--Bill Shaw --who had been at language school with me. He belonged to a missionary family which had connections with Korea as long as those of the Underwoods.

We lived in housing which had been part of an old Japanese Naval base in Chinhae. The houses are still there. It is close to the Naval Academy. Of course, in those days, the twenty miles of paved road between Incheon and Seoul were just about all that existed in Korea. It used to take five or six hours to travel by jeep over the mountainous dirt road between Pusan and Chinhae.

As I mentioned before, the U.S. Coast Guard was training Koreans so that they could establish their own Coast Guard. The U.S. Army was training the constabulary. The U.S. Coast Guard detachment consisted of approximately ten officers, twenty Chief Petty Officers and four or five civilians (Bill Shaw, Dick Petree and myself and a couple of others). We were actually U.S. Army civilians, assigned to the Coast Guard detachment. There was a Coast Guard Captain in Seoul who was the overall commander. There was a training group in Chinhae, headed by an officer who had headed the seamanship department at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. In addition to the Academy, there was a shipyard in Chinhae also run by the Coast Guard.

Q: What was Korea like in 1946?

SHERMAN: It is hard to imagine for anyone who knows Korea today. We landed in Inchon and were bussed into Seoul, where we arrived late in the afternoon. We came in through the South Gate plaza. It was a big city even then by standards of that time--about 1 million people. It had no electricity because the North Koreans had cut off the supply--the North had all the power generation capability. My first lasting impression was the smell of the acetylene gas coming from the lamps that had been placed on the tables that filled the South Gate area. These tables were made of 2x4's on trestles. The lamps' flames illuminated only about a circle of two feet and also filled the air with the odor of the gas. We would see these spots of light all around the plaza where people were selling cigarettes and bars of soap, called Luck, which were packaged similarly to Lux soap bars. Of course, Lux was in much greater demand, but also much scarcer. People were clothed in old Japanese army uniforms. Nobody wore anything that was not tattered, torn and patched. That was true of shirts and ties, if anyone had them. This was true even of the upper middle class; they too were shabbily dressed. Rice was rationed and scarce. Creature comforts were not in existence. The few cars that did run were old, Japanese made Datsuns and Mitsubishis (nothing like those of today) and were often out of commission. The Koreans have a great knack for making things out of nothing. If something could be held together with bailing wire, they would make it work. Taxis had open hibachis in the back seat for heat. Streetcars and busses were always over-crowded.

The military government was making valiant efforts to cope with the situation. It kept the country going by importing food stuffs and other basics. It brought in fertilizer and fuel. It brought in two huge power barges loaded with generators which eventually became the basis of a power grid for South Korea. But for most Koreans it was a very marginal existence. People lived in old-style Korean houses which were essentially mud walls holding up a thatched roof. There were some who had to live in caves in the hills around Chinhae. These were left over fortifications that the Japanese had constructed as coastal artillery sites during their occupation. Families and groups of Koreans lived in these caves. Trucks were sent out each morning to provide food and sometimes to pick up the dead.

Q: In retrospect, how successful was the U.S. Military Government in Korea during the period you were there?

SHERMAN: I don't think the Military Government was terribly successful. It was thrown together on the spur of the moment. No plans had been made for Korea. It didn't know what its goals were. I don't believe it had a coordinated, thought out plan. It certainly did not have the same caliber of personnel, either military or civilian, that were assigned to the military government in Japan. There we had a central guiding thesis; MacArthur was directly and personally involved in the management of the country's affairs. Korea, both from the policy maker's point of view and that of the logistician, was the end of the line. There were no language or area specialists. We did not have adequate supplies. The American personnel, in the main, were either people that couldn't be used in Japan or second raters. So the Korea Military Government was not a very successful operation. Moreover, the Koreans had no desire to have a military government. They considered themselves liberated and they were very anxious to have us go home so that they could begin the self-government process.

Once an Embassy was established and once a Economic Cooperation Administration Mission was started, we had much better feel for what we should be doing and that certainly improved our inter-action with the Koreans, despite the fact that the Korean government was fairly chaotic. Almost all of the Korean independence leaders, were living in exile during the Japanese occupation of the Peninsula. Syngman Rhee was probably the loudest voice among them; he was the most hyped of the refugees. He had lobbied for the Korean cause in Geneva and in New York. He had a substantial group of Americans, led by John Staggers, who supported him and his cause financially and morally. He was Elaine Lady's father. Korea. Elaine and her husband Harold (who died some years ago) came back to Korea when Rhee was elected the first President of the new Republic and served as advisers on his personal staff. The Ladys and Robert T. Oliver, a publicist, and some other Americans were part of the Rhee machine sometimes called the "kitchen cabinet". In addition to Rhee there were other exiles who returned to attempt to play roles in the new Korea. Kim Ku, who threw the bomb in Shanghai that maimed Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, and who had lived in China and Manchuria was an active contender. Dr. Philip J. Sohn--Sohn Jai-pil--was persuaded to come back from his medical practice in Hawaii to participate in Korean politics. US military government officials were not persuaded that Rhee was the right person to lead Korea and they wanted to have a few other potential candidates in order to make the eventual elections more credible. Not all of the returnees were pro-Rhee; some had their own political constituencies. Various members of the Korean government, which had been established under our Military Government, were attaching themselves to one political candidate or another. The Coast Guard, for example, supported Kim Ku, although in the end Syngman Rhee won all of the political power.

The proliferation of candidates made for a lively political scene, although somewhat dicey at times. People were really fighting with each other. Kim Ku, for example, was assassinated in the Fall of 1948, right after the elections, and that was quite a day. The alleged killer was identified, although there were many stories that the suspect was taking the blame for one of Rhee's henchmen. We did not get very much involved in this internal

political struggle. There was a section of the Military Government that was responsible for liaison with the various political factions. Captain Leonard Bertsch was very much involved in the political maneuvering. I was down in Chinhae for much of this period, pretty much isolated from the activities in Seoul, but we would hear some of the stories.

Q: In 1948, you left the Coast Guard and went to work for ECA in Seoul. How did assignment come about?

SHERMAN: Bill Shaw and I were the only two American civilians left at the Coast Guard Academy in Chinhae. The Military Government was in its last days; the American Coast Guard detachment was being transferred back to the States as was the 6th Artillery Division, which provided us with logistic support. There was no reason for any American presence any longer.

At that point, Bob Kinney, who was then the special assistant to Dr. Arthur Bunce, came to Chinhae. He had known the Shaw family from missionary days. He picked up Bill and myself and said that he would find spots for both of us with the ECA Mission in Seoul. So we moved to Seoul and became members of the Performance Review section of the Mission which was then run by J. Franklin Ray, who had been a professor at Harvard. An advance group of FSO's had come to Seoul earlier in 1948, augmenting the staff of the U.S. Consulate General which had been the State Department presence operating throughout the occupation. Mr. Landon was the Consul General; David Mark was the Vice-Consul. It also had a few American support staff personnel. They lived in the old Consulate General residence and worked in a nearby building.

Gradually, the civilian American presence began to beefed up. Donald Macdonald, Gregory Henderson and Curt Pendergast all of whom had been given some Korean language training in the Unites States joined the staff when an Embassy was established on August 15, 1948. Each of them then headed up a section of the CG. John Rozier (another FSO) did the administrative work, Pendergast did the consular work and McDonald started an economic section. Then ECA arrived and that greatly expanded State Department's presence. Some of the ECA people , like me and Bill Shaw, were recruited from the Military Government. A Joint Administrative Services Section was established, headed by Lewis Benjamin, a real administrative wheeler-dealer. He unfortunately was killed later in an automobile accident in Spain. Harold Noble, Greg Henderson and others started a Political Section. We had no USIA this being the days before that organization was founded. The ECA group was amalgamated with the Economic Section.

Q: What was ECA's main objective?

SHERMAN: ECA's main objective was to put Korea back on its economic feet. The plan was a phased operation. The immediate goal was to re-establish the power grid by constructing hydro-electric power facilities, bringing in two power barges, and attempting to construct or rehabilitate thermal powered plants. Korean coal was mined to fuel these

plants, but it was of such poor quality that it didn't help very much. Once the power grid had been restored, the next step was to reconstruct of the industrial base. We also imported large quantities of fertilizer to boost farm production, particularly rice. That rice was supposed to be of such high grade that it would serve as an export commodity to other nations in East Asia--Japan and Southeast Asia. where it was said to be in great demand -- and provide foreign exchange to the infant republic. This was before the days of the green revolution.

The earnings of the rice exports were intended to enable Korea to earn sufficient foreign exchange to buy foreign manufacturing equipment and thereafter theoretically become a self-sustaining economic entity in the modern world. Unfortunately, ECA and Syngman Rhee did not see eye-to-eye on economic policy. Rhee had spent many years in Hawaii here land was treasured square inch by square inch. He therefore focused on reclaiming land around the Han River. He had grandiose ideas of what could be done; he had grandiose idea of how much the foreign market would pay for Korean rice. There was constant tension between ECA Mission and the economists in the Rhee government. The central problem therefore became how to talk a very stubborn old man into doing things he didn't want to do.

In addition, the Embassy was faced with the political problem of dealing with North Korea. Rhee wanted to immediately enhance Korea's offensive and defensive capabilities because of the threat from the North. He demanded our assistance to provide him with those capabilities. There was a lot of enthusiasm among some Korean military for a push North, but Rhee managed to keep those impulses in check. No one has ever seriously accused Rhee of desiring an invasion of the North. We had an 700 man American military advisory group under Brigadier General Roberts. Those personnel were stationed alongside their Korean counterparts, practically down to the company level. They kept an eye on the Korean military. They were essentially there as trainers, but they also monitored what was going on.

Q: Can you describe the coterie which surrounded Rhee at this time?

SHERMAN: I'll try, but you have to remember that I was a very junior officer at the time--24 or 25 years old. I was certainly not an experienced political analyst, but I watched the game with fascination. Rhee maintained his contacts with those he knew before and during the war. He was still close to John Staggers, who was represented in Seoul, as I mentioned earlier, by his daughter Elaine and her husband Harold, who were cast as international lawyers. They served as advisors to Rhee and served as important intermediaries between Rhee and the Mission and the Embassy. The Ambassador could see Rhee any time he wished, but the rest of the staff often used Elaine and Harold Lady as transmission belts. They often served as the actual Korean action officers on a number of issues. Harold particularly was often involved in working out certain deals.

Robert T. Oliver came out and founded a newspaper--*The Korea Herald*--in English that was published in Seoul. That paper was published regularly and contained adulatory

editorials about Rhee and his activities. Oliver had written a book *"Syngman Rhee: Prophet and Saint"*. So you can well imagine what he had to say about Rhee in his editorial columns.

There were a number of American educated Koreans who served in Rhee's governments. Lincoln Kim headed up the Korean Office of Planning. The Foreign Minister was Ben Limb--Yim P'yun-jik--. Lousie Yim was the Minister of Commerce and Industry, which was a rather unusual job in Korea at that time. Ho Chung , then the Minister of Transportation later became a prominent figure in Korean politics. All of these people were old friends and associates of Rhee's. The Cabinet could hardly be described as balanced. There were no other factions represented; the Ministers were all Rhee allies.

I started at the ECA Mission as a special assistant to the Director, Professor Ray. There wasn't enough work for all of the special assistants, so I moved to the Statistics Section, which was part of the Program Review Office. we published a monthly publication on Korean economic statistics--foreign trade, production, etc. Each member of the staff compiled data for one economic sector or another. That statistical base was absolutely essential to the development of an economic program. The Koreans were not keeping any statistics at all or at least were not making them available to anyone. So our monthly publication as the basis for all economic projections.

I worked on oil imports and distribution. I got the raw material from the American and British oil companies--KOSCO (The Korean Oil Storage Company). That was the consortium that handled all oil imports, basically formed by CALTEX, STANVAC and SHELL with some minor Korean participation. In addition, there were a number of Americans that worked in Korean power plants; they had been in the Military Government as members of its Department of Commerce. They had stayed on. They provided us data on power production. We had advisors at the Korean Exchange Bank and the Bank of Korea, who would supply data. Our Mission had a Commerce and Heavy industry Section, who had liaison responsibilities with Korean firms and the government and they provided some information. Obviously, it was not very systematic way to capture statistics, but it was the best that could be done under the circumstances. We did not at the time have advisors attached to any Ministries, but we had sections in the Mission responsible for following the activities of each economic Ministry.

Bill Shaw was working on foreign trade. He and an another guy kept track of the port records kept by the Ministry of Commerce and Trade. I had my doubts about the statistics that we generated, but they were better than the Korean records. After doing this compilation task for six months, I developed on my own a handbook on the organization of the Korean Government. I tried to standardize the names of the Ministries and the various independent organizations, like the Board of Audit and the Office of Planning. I found the original decrees that set up these various institutions and translated them into English. The product of all this effort provided the best picture of how the Korean Government was supposed to look. The names of the governmental leaders were written in Korean, Chinese letters and English. I summarized the responsibilities of each Office

in each Bureau of each Ministry. It took almost a year to complete this effort. When it was finished, it was the only manual in existence on the Korean government, and used widely both in Seoul and in Washington. It was a labor of love. I never believed that every section of the government did what the law said they were supposed to do, but at least it was an attempt to put the organization down on paper.

Q: I gather that we did not provide "advisors" in such areas as public administration, for example.

SHERMAN: We did not. The only American "advisors" were attached to the KMAG who provided advice to the police. they trained Korean military policemen and worked as liaison with Korean officials responsible for internal security.

Q: Tell me a little about your living conditions.

SHERMAN: The Mission's policy was not to take over Korean housing. So we occupied abandoned Japanese housing. We purchased what is now known as Embassy Compound 2, which consisted of old Japanese houses. We rehabilitated them and used them. Some, like the so-called *Finance House* were rather large. That was run by Al Loren, who headed the Finance Section of the ECA Mission. It was sort of a bachelor officers' quarters. People were invited to live in the *Finance House*. It had many rooms because it had been an old mansion. The house also contained a fancy mess hall. The other houses were assigned to families in the usual basis--size of family, rank, etc. In addition, there were several hundred Japanese railway houses westward out Ulchi Ro near the so-called *Old Queen's Palace*. That area of town was known as *The Gold Coast*. These houses, even by modern Japanese standards, were good sized and in fair condition, since they had been occupied by Japanese railroad workers. Mary Jane and I lived there.

When we first arrived in Seoul, there was no electricity. That lasted for the first few months we were there. We ate and read by Coleman lanterns or candles. We cooked on wood-coal ranges. In their zeal to modernize the housing, the Americans put in modern plumbing in lieu of the old fashioned baths which had fires under them to heat the water. We had running water coming out of taps; unfortunately, it was all cold. So to take a bath, we had to heat the water on the stove for about a day. The large bathtubs were made of terrazzo, which meant that when the hot water was poured into the tubs, only about two inches would be in the tub and that would turn cold very rapidly because the walls of the tub would absorb the heat of the water very rapidly. It was very primitive.

I used to watch carefully for visitors who came to Seoul to see whether it included any friends who might be staying at the Chosun Hotel. We would invite the friend to dinner and when he accepted, I would volunteer to pick him up and sneak in a shower in his hotel room first. Finding a location which had hot water became a major achievement. The Chosun was functioning and had become the center of social life in Seoul. The other major hotel, and perhaps the only other hotel in town, was the Bando (known as the "Peninsula" during the occupation). When we opened the Embassy, the Bando was

deeded to the U.S. government in perpetuity by the Korean government in gratitude for the assistance we had provided in freeing Korea from Japanese occupation. The Embassy occupied the first five floors; the remaining three floors were made into small efficiency apartments for staff and single officers. On the top floor, the Bando had a dining room.

Q: What were our objectives in Korea when you were serving there?

SHERMAN: We had hoped to achieve unification. There was a U.N. mission in Seoul, which had been opened even before our Embassy began operation. It was trying to negotiate with the Soviets and the North Koreans, but neither of those parties were interested in any negotiations. A Joint Committee consisting of US and Soviet representatives met more or less regularly in Seoul at the Duk Soo Palace during 1945 -47 but spent its time arguing over detail, exchanging recriminations and achieving nothing -- the usual stalling tactics that the Russians used in those days. The U.N. and we made various attempts to open serious negotiations to arrange country wide elections, but there was no response at all from the other side. The 38th parallel became a firm and fixed dividing line. It was a ridiculous arbitrary line which even left parts of South Korea accessible only by sea because the land entrances were in North Korea. The border was heavily fortified with heavy military concentrations on both sides, particularly along the mountain passages which permitted access on a north-south route.

Beyond the unification goal, we were very interested in stabilizing the country economically. Once the Rhee government was elected, we then were anxious for a democratic constitution to be written and approved. We had a lot to do with the drafting of that constitution. An American--a German refugee--Dr. Ernst Frankel was a constitutional legal scholar and a wonderful man. He had been employed by the military government, but stayed on after Korean independence as part of the legal section of the ECA Mission. He worked almost exclusively on drafting that constitution working closely with the Korean provisional government.

I think we must have had about 200-300 in the Embassy itself, including a large administrative support staff. That number included also probably 30-40 political and economic officers. The ECA Mission had another 150-200 people. The Military Advisory Group must have had 600-700 officers and staff. So there was a large American presence in Seoul by the end of the 1940s.

Seoul had a "frontier" atmosphere about it by 1949. People dressed well, but there were no passenger cars on the streets for example. There were jeeps which were the common mode of transportation. There may have been one or two private sedans, but they couldn't be driven outside of Seoul because there were no paved roads in the countryside, no repair facility and probably no gas stations either. The trains were not entirely reliable. When I first arrived in Korea, those trains had to stop frequently to clean out coal clinkers from the engine boilers; the coal was that bad. The windows were all broken out of the coaches. There was supposed to be a daily Seoul-Pusan run; it wasn't necessarily so and if

the train did run, it may have taken 24 hours. For me, it was then another six hour Jeep trip from Pusan to Chinhae. It was "frontier days" in Korean in the late '40s.

We operated our own commissary so that we could get adequate food supplies without having to rely on the Korean market which could barely supply enough food for its own people. There was nothing available on the market--no goods, no souvenirs, no artifacts, no available art. We supported that country for many years, not only in economic terms, but also culturally by assisting in the rehabilitation of museums. We helped to get Seoul working again. Progress was very slow. I would not consider that economic development of Korea was successful while I was stationed there. There was visible improvement, but there was a long way to go.

The Koreans worked very hard and were very creative. Their ability to make something out of nothing was a daily revelation. They put things together with bailing wire, string and faith. It was remarkable. Strangely enough, all of this misery was not depressing. The Americans were enthused about the challenges. We worked and played together very well; there were a lot of community activities. We staged some theater productions--Mary Jane and I were intimately engaged in those. We put on the old standards like "George Washington Slept Here" and "You Can't Take It With You". We used Citizens' Hall for the performances. The President and Mrs. Rhee came to opening night.

I spoke both English and Japanese to my Korean contacts. They did not resent the use of Japanese once it was established that I couldn't speak Korean. It was the easiest way to communicate. I could speak a few words of Korean, enough to introduce myself and indicate that I couldn't really speak the language. I used to ask whether it would be alright to speak Japanese; no one ever refused to speak Japanese with me, even though all Koreans were unrelentingly hostile to Japan and its people. They were also upset by their perception that the Japanese were getting more assistance from us than they were. Rhee was particularly bitter because he felt that we were coddling the Japanese and not giving enough assistance to his country.

In the fall of 1949, after we had moved to Seoul, Mary Jane and I, accompanied by our good friends, the Sloanes, went back to Chinhae for a week's vacation. We had arranged to stay with some American friends who were still there as civilian advisors to what had become the Korean Navy. We arrived and moved in with our friends. On the first night of our visit, we were visited by a delegation of Korean officers. We overheard our host trying to explain to the Koreans that he had guests in the house and couldn't possibly move. The Koreans had come to ask that our host make room for a few days to accommodate President and Mrs. Rhee who were arriving at Chinhae the next day for an important and secret meeting with Chiang Kai-shek. (That meeting was supposed to conclude a Korea/Taiwan anti-communist pact). The Koreans explained that they did not have an adequate house for their President and therefore had to ask for our host to put up the Rhees. When we learned what was going on, we volunteered to move next door to the Navy BOQ so that there would be room for the President and his wife. So indeed that is

what happened. Chinhae was completely sealed off. No one could enter or leave the town both for security and secrecy reasons.

The meeting almost coincided with the issuance of the US White Paper on China, which to say the least, did not give very strong support to Chiang Kai-shek. That event delayed the Chinese delegation's arrival and the Rhees were therefore in Chinhae with nothing much to do. I called the Embassy and was told by Everett Drumright, the DCM, that I shouldn't be in Chinhae at all, but as long as I was there, he wanted me to keep my ears and eyes open (the Embassy had not been aware in advance that a meeting was to take place). Those were the instructions that I followed. Madame Rhee noted at one stage that there were no photographers around to record the event. I became the official photographer for the meeting and I still have some shots of that historic event. I took the pictures of the Chinese delegation as it arrived on a C-47 and deplaned. They landed on a small landing strip that probably never had anything as large as a C-47 land on it.

Madame Rhee was very gracious. She recognized that we had been displaced and so, every evening, she would invite us over for drinks at the house they were using. I got a chance to explain to President Rhee the work I was doing on the organization manual of the Korean government. I think he was impressed that something was being done and urged me to finish it. I had an opportunity to listen to Rhee reminisce about his past. He became a very human figure during those moments, and I realized just what an important leader in exile he had been and how passionately he was committed to the rebuilding of his country. The House that the Rhee used in Chinhae also became the site for the bilateral meetings with Chiang Kai-shek.

The Chinese delegation included Chiang Kai-shek, K.C. Woo, who had been the Mayor of Shanghai, the Chinese Ambassador and some Taiwan government Cabinet members. It was quite a group, and very heady stuff for a twenty-five year old junior member of an American mission to be on the fringes of

I sent Mrs. Rhee copies of all the pictures. She graciously then invited us to the Presidential Palace. The Rhees came to see a performance of "George Washington Slept Here" and invited the cast for tea. I saw the President and Mrs. Rhee on several occasions after the Chinhae episode. That chance meeting at the Academy became very useful from my point of view. I called on Madame Rhee much later in 1985, when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary in Far East Bureau. Dixie Walker was then our ambassador in Korea. At that time, Mrs. Rhee was close to 95 years old. I don't know whether she remembered the events of approximately 35 years earlier, but if she didn't, she pretended that she did. On that same trip to Korea, I returned to Chinhae to see my old stamping grounds. I drove down the Peninsula, through Taejon and Kyongju to Pusan and Chinhae. The same two houses--the house that the Rhees stayed in and the BOQ--that were important part of my story about the Rhee-Kai-shek meeting were still standing. Rhee had never been to Chinhae before and was charmed by the place. The navy compound is on a sugar-loaf peninsula that juts out into the harbor. The American government had a house in Chinhae which was occupied in the late '40s by Major Granrud. He had lived there when the

military government was running Korea and had stayed on after independence. Rhee saw the house and said that he would like to have it a summer house. So it was cleared out and spruced up and the Rhees used it for their vacations. It became the Korean equivalent of Camp David and remained that way at least through the Park Chung Hee's regime.

When I visited Chinhae in 1985, I went to that house, which was being treated as a holy shrine. The guide told me that that was where Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek had held their famous meeting in 1950. He said that the Speaker of the Korean Assembly, Shin Ik Hee and General Hodge were in on the meeting which was held to discuss the future of the Pacific. There were several other new myths included by the young Korean CPO who led the tour. He, of course, had not even been born when the events he was attempting to describe happened. I knew the truth: the meeting had not been held in that house, General Hodge had long left Korea, Shin Ik Hee was not at the meeting, etc. It was the first time I had ever been in a position to contradict what had become history. I didn't do it there because I didn't want to embarrass the guide.. But when I got back to Seoul I made my views known about the revision of history to which I had been a personal witness. I told Madame Rhee what I heard and she was mystified since there wasn't any rational explanation. She knew the truth, but obviously no one had ever asked her about what had happened in Chinhae in 1949.

That 1949 episode is one of the reasons I decided to take the Foreign Service exam. In those days, you had to take the orals in Washington. The written portion I took in Seoul along with three others. The written then was a two and half day exam which included questions that required long essay answers. It was quite different from today's exam. I passed both the written and the oral, but in those days there was an interminable period between passing the exam and being offered a job. I was going to spend that time at the Yale Graduate School where I had been accepted. We left Korea in April, 1950 staying a couple of days in Japan and a couple of days in Hawaii on the way home.

Of course, in June, 1950, the Korean War broke out. At that point, there were very few people in the U.S. who knew anything about Korea. Almost all Korean experts were in Korea. So there was a dearth of knowledgeable people in the Department. The State Department Korean desk had only one or two people on it. The Department had Chris Norred and Dick Sneider in INR. Norred had also been one of the junior principal assistants who had gone to Korea at the same time as I . By June, I passed all the tests and the physical exam and was therefore on the list for appointment as a Foreign Service officer. But the actual appointment would not have taken place for many months. I had already decided not to return to academia. I felt that somehow I could be useful in Washington in light of my experience. I went to the State Department and offered my services. Basil Capella was then the Executive Director for the Bureau of Far East Affairs. He said that the Department had an "employment freeze" and he just couldn't give me any hope of employment. He didn't suggest any other part of the Department which might be more optimistic. He was very negative.

So I went across the river to the Pentagon and to Naval Intelligence and offered my services. They immediately processed me back into the Navy. As usual in the Navy, once I had reported and was back in uniform, ready to work on Korea, I was assigned to the Pakistan/Afghanistan/India/Ceylon desk of the Naval Intelligence Service. So I sat there, doing relatively little; finally the word began to circulate that there was Lieutenant (JG) Sherman who had just returned from Korea. Once that was known, my phone began to ring and ring and ring. People were calling for basic information on Korea's geography, people, history, current events, etc. Eventually, after four or five months of advising unofficially, I was moved to the Korea desk of Naval Intelligence. Soon after that move, I received a letter from State Department, offering me an appointment in the Foreign Service--that was about a year after having passed all the entrance exams.

When I had rejoined the Navy, I told them that I was awaiting a call from the Foreign Service. I was told that that would be no problem; that when an offer of employment was made, the Navy would release me or transfer me or somehow get me over to the State Department. Of course, a month after I rejoined the Navy, it issued an order stating that all reserve officers then on active duty were to remain in the Service and would not be released until the end of the emergency. So when I requested my release, I was told that it was very unlikely that it would be approved.

Alben Barkley was then the Vice President of the United States. He was a fellow Kentuckian; he had known my grandfather well; his principal assistant was from the same town I was brought up in. I wrote a letter to Mr. Barkley explaining my circumstances and asking for his intervention so that I could begin my chosen career. I thought that I could contribute more if I were in the Foreign Service than in Naval Intelligence. I didn't really hope that my request would be acted upon, but much to my surprise, the very next day, a special messenger arrived and left an envelope in my mail box at Tyler Gardens--now called Winter Hill--in Falls Church, where we were living at the time. It was a brief note from the Vice President saying that although he had no jurisdiction in military matters, he thought that I had a good case and that he would try to be of assistance. Within three weeks, I was released to inactive duty and was able to join the Foreign Service. That was March, 1951. Of course, the Department was also surprised and was not prepared for my arrival. The next entrance class was already filled; so I spent six months in INR working on Korea, employed in the Foreign Service Staff Corps. I worked for the Korean section of the Office of Intelligence Research. Dick Sneider was my boss.

When the next basic training class began in early summer, I was included. That lasted three months. I had approximately 13-14 classmates. The course was longer than it is today. We spent sometime just familiarizing ourselves with how Washington was supposed to work and how the Department was organized. Various Bureau representatives came to lecture and then we had people to talk to us about overseas posts and the various opportunities that we would have. We spent a week at the Labor Department, a week at Agriculture, a week at Commerce learning about their functions and people. We spent a week in New York and watched seamen's disciplinary hearings, went to Ellis Island, which was still being used as the port of entry for immigrants. We

watched the Custom and IN Services in operation. Luke Battle, then the Special Assistant to Secretary Dean Acheson, described to us a day in the life of a Secretary of State. We were briefed on the major foreign policy issues of the time.

I was one of the older people in the class--I was 29 by then. Most of my colleagues were 25-26 years old. Many had been international relations or political science majors in college or had gone to one of the Washington cram schools. Many had had some graduate level education; some had a Master's Degree. Almost all had had a long term interest in foreign affairs. A couple had been interns in the State Department before taking the exams. They came from various parts of the country; it was not all Ivy League by any means, although I would guess that a preponderance did come from East Coast schools. All of the class was white males.

Towards the end of the training period, we were all asked what onward assignments might interest us. G. Lewis Jones had represented the Near East Bureau; he was one of the most eloquent men that I have ever met. He wove a tale of mystery about his area so that about half of the class volunteered to work in the Near East. I didn't. Gerry Warner, who spoke for the Far East Bureau, made his area sound very dull, but that didn't discourage me. I wanted to go to Japan and that is where I ended up.

But I didn't want to go overseas immediately. Mary Jane and I had been separated for fourteen months when I first went to Korea and that had not been a pleasant experience for either one of us. If I were to go overseas, I wanted the whole family to go together. I had been assigned to the Consulate General in Yokohama, but since SCAP was still running Japan, the State Department had to follow its rules which barred families from accompanying an officer until a specific house had been assigned to him or her. State representatives, until April 28, 1952, were just the diplomatic arm of SCAP. They were not part of a State Department operations. That was true of the Consulates General as well as the Tokyo operations. All were part of SCAP, although on most matters, we operated independently. But when it came to basic rules, we were all under the control of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers.

By chance, I found out that the Army was still running an exchange program with Japan. It was about to bring to the United States five senior members of the Japanese Diet. This delegation was to attend the Peace Treaty signing and then spend three months touring the United States, studying it in depth. The Army needed a bilingual escort officer, who could also serve as interpreter. I volunteered and was in fact assigned to that task. We went to Washington, New York, Boston, Chicago meeting with academics, business people, and politicians. It was a great period during which I learned a lot. Eventually, I had to leave them in Chicago while they went on to the West Coast. The Consulate General in Yokohama, to which I had been assigned, was getting a little impatient. So, In March, 1952, I arrived in Yokohama and Mary Jane and our two kids joined me at the end of the following month--the day after SCAP no longer controlled State operations in Japan.

Our first home was in the old Consulate General building in what had been the Consul General's apartment. It was quite luxurious for a Vice Consul. It took us a long time before we had accommodations as good as those again.

Q: How large was the Consulate General in 1952?

SHERMAN: I would guess that there were about ten officers and five or six clerks. It was a sizeable post, particularly for that time. Our consular district included three very active prefectures. I was assigned as the politico-military officer, reporting directly to Washington. In those days, the constituent posts sent their airgrams and despatches and the rare telegram directly to Washington, with copies of the reports sent to the Embassy. When I first went to Yokohama, I was an economic officer in the Consulate General and one of my jobs was if you can believe it, to expand Japanese exports to the U.S. We had a Consul General, whose job was primarily representation. The deputy, who was supposed to be running the operation, was an old consul (non-career), Charlie Stephan, who didn't do much of anything. He was an old fogey who had all but retired. We had a citizenship officer, a shipping, protection and welfare officer, a visa officer and two administrative people--an administrative officer and a general services officer.

Soon after I arrived, the Department went through some major down-sizing after the advent of the Eisenhower administration. That reduction left Yokohama with no clerks; all we had were Foreign Service officers. We did have a number of resident Americans--Japanese with American citizenship. They were not hired as local employees because they were American citizens, even though they lived in Japan. They fitted into a general world wide category of personnel called "Resident Americans" which had been established for Americans living overseas. They obtained a regular security clearance so that they could handle classified material, although we used them essentially as local employees. They were not subject to transfer to other countries in the world. In the Japanese case, the resident Americans were people who had gone to Japan before the war and had stayed because of family ties.

Since they were all totally bilingual, we used them mostly in consular work. In the 1952 reduction-in-force, they were all fired. Our "Shipping and Seamen" officer position was deleted. By the time the decimation ended, we had a Consul General, his deputy, four or five Vice-Consuls, and an administrative officer. My duties as reporting officer were quickly ended and I was put in the consular section, doing visa, shipping and welfare work. The shipping work was interesting in some aspects. Sometime later, a Foreign Service Staff position was re-established which enabled the Consulate General to return to doing some political and economic reporting. But I stayed with the Consular section.

Shipping would not normally have been a problem in Yokohama, although there was considerable American traffic in the port, much of it due to the Korean War which was still being waged in 1952. Under an agreement with the Seamen's Union of the Pacific (SUP), headed by Harry Lundenberg, a crew would receive a bonus as soon as the ship crossed the date line because it was then deemed to have entered a war zone. As soon as it

left a Japanese port, the ship was deemed to be in a combat zone and the crew received another 100% bonus. So it was quite possible for an ordinary seaman, on a ship that shuttled back and forth between Japan and Korea, to make triple his ordinary salary which added up to a considerable amount. We had about twelve cargo ships called "Knot" ships because they were all named after different knots--the "reef", etc. They shuttled regularly between Yokohama and Inchon or Pusan carrying supplies for our troops. Of course, none of these ships were in any danger because neither the North Koreans or the Chinese had any intention of engaging the U.S. Merchant Marine at sea. In view of the bonuses paid, getting jobs on these ships was very competitive. Theoretically, if a seaman had to be left behind by his ship because of illness or other reason, it used to be the responsibility of the American Consul shipping and seamen officer to find him another berth. The American union set up a hiring hall in Yokohama and declared that it would become responsible for the placement of American seamen. My predecessor in the Shipping officer position had said that he would not accept that process and vowed to fight it tooth and nail. The union began to publish a little four page weekly newspaper--"The Harbor Light"--which was a scurrilous and quasi-pornographic rag. It kept referring to the "Communist" Consul General who was providing jobs to the Harry Bridges' union people. Harry Bridges' union was a competitor of the SUP. There were vicious attacks in that monthly paper on the Consul General and his staff. The "Shipping and Seamen" Section of the Department was never as active on any issue as it was on the hiring function in Yokohama. It was obvious to me that the Department was trying to find cover because in the early '50s, seamen's unions were politically very powerful. By the time I took the job, my instructions were to make peace with the SUP, which I did. We basically let the SUP operate its own hiring hall, even though that practice was legally suspect. We didn't try to block their activities. The shipping laws, which were written for the protection of seamen, govern the employment of any seaman who was seeking employment in an American port or any American seaman seeking employment in any foreign port. These laws placed the responsibility for assuring that the seamen were properly assigned and hired in the hands of a Foreign Service Consul. A ship captain could not hire a seaman unless a Consul was present. The Consul had to put his stamp on the employment contract; all the papers relating to the ship's register and the employment had to be deposited with the Consulate. These laws were passed to prevent the shanghaiing of seamen or forcing them into assignments that were not suitable. A very elaborate structure was established to protect the seamen. Any change in the ship's crew, as stated in special articles, had to be done in the presence of an American Consul. That is the way the law was written and I think might still be. I don't think there have been many changes, although in light of the demise of the American merchant marine, the consuls' workload has been greatly reduced. Foreign seamen also needed transit visas as their ships sailed to the United States, which required lot of documentation.

We were also busy with visas. These days was before the McCarran Act was passed in 1953. The Japanese were viewed as "aliens ineligible for citizenship" and therefore not permitted to immigrate to the United States. They could only go to the U.S. as visitors for short periods of time or as students or members of other special legal categories. Because they were ineligible for immigration, we had to be particularly careful about the issuance

of temporary visas to make sure that they were *bona fide* visitors , students or some other on-immigrant category who would return to Japan upon the expiration of their visas. That meant that every applicant was screened thoroughly and investigated by the Consular Section. There were a number of Japanese who even in the early '50s had enough resources to visit the U.S. In addition, we had a lot of requests for transit visas because many Japanese were immigrating to Canada and Latin America. These countries were interested in recruiting particularly farm laborers from Japan. This was the period, for example, when many Japanese immigrated to Argentina. These people had to transit the United States on their way to Latin America. Visas in those days required considerable processing. If one ever watched the Menotti opera, *The Consul*, you can get an idea of how complex the system was in those days. People would come to the Consular Section and be asked to come back again because they didn't have the right size photograph or were missing some document or didn't have a police certificate or they didn't have a health certificate. It was painful. Some didn't get visas because their children might have had TB which made the parents or siblings ineligible. The processing of a visa application could take months--many, many months in some cases. There were people who applied over and over again without any hope of approval. It was a different occupation from that of a visa officer today.

Q: What was the economic situation in Yokohama in the early '50s?

SHERMAN: It was recovering from the war's devastation, but still bad. Yokohama was particularly hard hit because the city's principal activity were the export of tea and silk. Silk became an increasingly minor factor after the invention of nylon. The tea business was also in a depressed state. The Yokohama port had been almost entirely taken over by the U.S. military; there were very few private facilities left in the port area. The city had been decimated by our air raids during the war. The Occupation Forces had established a large logistic depot in Yokohama after bulldozing large tracts of land. Property lines became non-existent. In most cases, that was not an important factor because much of the property had been requisitioned by the military; very little had been returned at that stage to its owners. Other Japanese cities, where the U.S. Army was not such an overwhelming presence, managed to rebuild at a much faster pace than Yokohama. Yokohama was a special case. To this day, the impact of our war bombing and our post-war presence has turned Yokohama from the flourishing export-oriented city it was before the war to essentially a bed-room community of Tokyo. Its industrial and commercial base has never really returned.

The port has revived, but ships now stop in Tokyo as often as they do in Yokohama. The port of Shimizu, which is just a little south of Yokohama, has expanded greatly, as has Kobe. Yokohama has lagged far behind other ports in its recovery; the government has been and still is active in trying to further develop it, but in fact Yokohama never really recovered from the war and its aftermath. It seems more like an old time museum--not a live town.

Politically, Japanese cities have never been very powerful. There are only rare instances of regional political powers. National politics are the major interest. The various prefectures have governors' races; the cities and towns have mayoralty races. But local officials do not have a great deal of authority and have to depend on the central government for financial support and direction. They can be very obstructive. For example, during the early '70s, the Mayor of Yokohama, a socialist, decided that heavy vehicles could not cross the city's bridges because it was not safe in view of the bridges' condition. That happened right during the Vietnam war when we were sending our heavy trucks and jeeps back to Japan for rehabilitation. Once repaired, those vehicles were transported to Yokohama for shipment back to Vietnam. So a complete deadlock developed. The Mayor wouldn't let the repaired vehicles down to the port area and we had no other port immediately available. The Foreign Office finally worked out a complicated by-pass arrangement which involved driving a very circuitous route over roads that were barely passable, but at least did not cross the Yokohama bridges and finally led to the port area. Local officials had therefore a negative power, but in general were greatly dependent on the Tokyo bureaucracy.

Q: Tell me how you felt living, as an American, in a city that we had damaged so heavily and whose citizens had suffered greatly at our hands. What was your relationship to the local citizens?

SHERMAN: The relationships were very good. The Japanese response to the occupation was completely cooperative. They behaved entirely in a friendly fashion. We never met a hostile population in Japan. In Yokohama as well as in the rest of Japan, we had an active information program and an active American-Japanese Society. There is hardly a Japanese locality that doesn't have a sister-city relationship with some American city or town. We never noticed any resentment about the damage that we wrought. The city government would periodically seek return of certain properties or facilities and by the mid '60s, almost all of the free standing facilities had been returned to the city or the original owners. Our presence became increasingly consolidated in base areas.

There were problems of course during this first tour in Japan from 1952 to 1956. They were called "base problems" which involved such matters as camp-followers, some theft and other low level criminal activity that tends to congregate outside a base's perimeter. The citizens were not happy with this. A number of Japanese movies were made, dramatizing and sensationalizing these conditions. The Socialists, the Communists and some of the labor unions used these conditions for their own political purposes. But by and large, the population was not terribly unhappy. We still have problems. We have noise problems created by night landing practices on carriers, we have problems caused by too many people in spaces too small, we have problems created by our large presence in places like Okinawa. But in general, the Japanese towns that are supported economically by our military presence, like Yokosuka, are cooperative and there is certainly no real tension between Japanese and Americans. It was true in the early '50s; it is true today.

Q: You left Yokohama in June, 1954 and were assigned to Tokyo.

SHERMAN: That is correct. There is again a story behind that assignment. Mary Jane I had gone to Tokyo in July, 1953, at the invitation of Bob Blake, then a member of the Embassy's Political Section, to have dinner with him on July 3. Then, the next day, we were his guests at the customary Fourth of July reception at the Embassy. We also served as unofficial translators between American and Japanese guests. There were a lot of Japanese political leaders there and needed all the translators they could find. At one point, I found myself translating for Mosaburo Suzuki, who was then the leader of the left-wing Socialist Party. Sam Berger, who had just recently arrived to be the Embassy's Political Counselor, had been trying mightily to make contacts with the Socialist Party and the Sohyo, the largest Japanese labor union. So I interpreted for Sam and Suzuki and in the process I managed to convince Suzuki to set up an appointment for Berger with the head of Sohyo, a Mr. Takamo. Everybody was very happy with the event. I went back to Yokohama and shortly thereafter I heard from the Embassy that I was to be transferred to the Tokyo to be a member of the Political Section. So, after home leave in 1954, I reported for work at the Embassy in Tokyo as second secretary in the Political Section.

I was assigned to follow internal political matters. The Liberal Democratic Party was just being formed so that Japanese politics were in a state of turmoil. Later, I became the principal contact with Kishi Nobusuke, who was the main founder of the L.D.P. and a subsequent Prime Minister. That was an interesting experience.

Japan was not yet principally a one-party state, although it was clear that it was headed in that direction. Japanese politics then, as now, was very much a matter of individual leadership with factions springing up here and there. Politics were not essentially a matter of ideology or policies; they revolved more around individual leaders. The battle at the time was between Yoshida, who had been the leader of the Liberal Party, and Hatoyama, who had been his predecessor as leader of the Liberal Party. Hatoyama had had a stroke and had to step aside for a while; when he had recovered, he wanted to reassume his position which had been taken over by Yoshida. Eventually, with an election looming, Hatoyama split from the Liberal Party and formed his own group, which was victorious, making Hatoyama Prime Minister. The Liberal Party lost its majority status and just became one of several conservative parties.

The role of the individual leaders is a matter of historical tradition in Japan. It was so even before the war. It really goes back to feudal days and the rise of clans. This system of factions, formed around individual leaders, is still true today in one guise or another. We were not really concerned with this form of politics. We were very concerned with the power of left wing parties and factions and were very much opposed to them. In those days, the Socialists were much more of a threat than were the Communist Party, which was stable in size and not growing. In terms of policies, it was the Socialists, and particularly the left wing elements, that seemed to us to be closely linked with the Communists. That was a large party, depending primarily on the resources of the Japanese labor unions.

There were efforts made to establish a more democratic socialist movement--analogous to a European socialist party-- and to inhibit, to the extent possible, the growth of the far left. A split did develop among the socialists--left and right wings. A man named Nishio, probably with the assistance, both overt and covert, of the United States established a more democratic socialist party. The term 'socialist' in Japan meant the same thing it did in the West--a system in which the major means of production were state owned and operated. The left wing socialists were essentially Marxists in terms of philosophy. They did not look to the modern versions of Marxism, like the Soviet Union, as models but rather went back to the early days of socialism for their philosophical base. We are of course discussing events that took place at the peak of the Cold War and therefore the United States tended to look at issues, such as Japan's political situation, in rather black and white terms.

At the same time, a more democratic labor council was established to combat the influence of the radical Sohyo I don't believe that the AFL-CIO had a full time representative in Tokyo at the time and were not very active, although periodically a representative would come through. The Embassy had a Labor attaché and the CIA had people who covered the labor movement.

Also the conservative forces in Japan united under the flag of the LDP. They were of course never truly united, but at least marched under the same flag.

Q: How large was our Tokyo Embassy in the mid-50s?

SHERMAN: There were probably about 125 Americans there although I can't be sure because there were so many other agencies' representatives in Tokyo that it was hard to track the number of employees in the Embassy.

As I said, Sam Berger was the Political Counselor and therefore my boss. His deputy was Bill Leonhart. The DCM was Jeff Parsons, the Ambassador was John Allison. Jules Bassin was our Legal Advisor. It was an active Embassy that worked well. When Allison arrived he decided that there was an over-abundance of reporting and particularly an excess of airgrams. He felt that the reporting should concentrate on the major issues and that not all luncheon conversations needed to be reported. The Embassy had been a prolific papers producer; after Allison took over from Bob Murphy in 1953, the production rate dropped markedly. Much of the Embassy's work fell in the politico-military sphere related to our military presence in Japan. The Japanese military efforts were greatly impeded by their no-war constitution which kept their military capabilities well in restraint. Furthermore, there was not then, in the mid-50s, nor today, any popular support for rearmament or the building of a major defense establishment. In those days, even putting a machine gun on an airplane was viewed as an aggressive military action that the Japanese people strongly opposed. It took years of academic and public discussions to reach agreement that Japan had a right to maintain "self-defense" forces. In the mid-50s we were primarily interested in maintaining absolute freedom to operate as

we saw fit from our bases in Japan. Dulles was very anxious to consolidate an eastern arch consisting of countries opposed to the "red" threat. China was a big issue for us at the time. We sought Japanese political support for our Cold War policy positions as well as logistical support for our military activities.

The Japanese were nervous about China. They looked to us to provide the "nuclear umbrella". The question was always whether the "umbrella" leaked. I always thought that the question was whether it was raining or was about to rain. We felt that it was raining at the time. We were seriously concerned about the mainland Chinese. The Korean War had just ended in an armistice that has lasted until today. The Soviets had a presence in Tokyo although their people had not been granted diplomatic recognition. They dealt with the Foreign Ministry as an unrecognized foreign entity. The Soviets had established a mission during the SCAP days and had never left even after the end of the military government. There were no formal relations between the USSR and Japan. The Soviets were in effect represented by an unrecognized mission. They maintained their SCAP car license plates and all the other benefits that they had acquired during the military occupation, but in fact did not legally exist in Tokyo. The Soviets have never signed a peace treaty with Japan. This anomaly did create some interesting events. In the mid '50s, ECAFE held its annual meeting in Tokyo. Ambassador Allison gave a large reception for all the delegates. The Soviets were members of the organization and therefore showed up the party even though uninvited. I was at the door and had never seen any members of their mission. The Soviet that showed up was a Mr. Dominsky, who was the head of their unrecognized Tokyo mission. He introduced himself when I met him at the door; I then took him to introduce him to the Ambassador. Dominsky and his colleagues mingled with the guests for a while and then departed. We didn't have regular contacts with the Soviets, although the Foreign Ministry had a Soviet section which kept in contact with the unrecognized mission on an *ad hoc* basis.

During this same ECAFE conference, we showed a cinerama film in one of the large Ginza theaters. Cinerama was a big deal at the time; very few people had ever seen it at that time. After the show, I noticed that Dominsky had been in attendance; so I went over and asked him how he had enjoyed the show. He said that it had been very nice, but that the same technique was available in Moscow, except that there were no lines on the film, as there had been on the one we had shown.

We were in frequent contact with other Western Embassies, particularly the British and also the French, Australians and Canadians. We taught the Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders at our language school in Yokohama. The British had a different tutorial system which they had maintained for many years. At one point, the French asked whether they could send some of their officers to the Yokohama school, but we decided that our training was designed for English speakers and that from a tutorial point of view, it would be very difficult to assimilate speakers of a third language.

Q: In general, would you say that the Embassy in Tokyo in the mid '50s was an effective operation?

SHERMAN: I was still a very inexperienced officer. This was my first embassy assignment. I thought the Embassy was a good one. We worked well together. We had some brilliant officers assigned there . Sam Berger was essentially removed after a visit by Vice President Nixon in late 1953, before I had actually been assigned to the Embassy, although I had some liaison responsibilities for the visit because of our military presence in the Yokohama district.

Nixon visited Japan and gave a speech urging Japan to amend its constitution to remove the "no war" clause in light of the great threat to civilization posed by the communists. The speech went over like a big lead balloon. The Japanese wouldn't even consider such an idea, although it was American policy to push them in that direction. During that visit, Nixon had Embassy briefings that are normally provided to high ranking American visitors. I am told, not having been present, that during one of these briefings, Berger was alleged to have said that the Communist Party in Japan was not a threat, but rather it was the Socialists that were a danger. Sam was a conservative on foreign policy issues, having been a member of the AFL-CIO. His claim to fame had been that as Labor Attaché in London he was the only person in the Embassy who had any connections with the Labor government when it took power. That situation is supposed to have changed Foreign Service policy about having regular contacts with opposition parties.

Nixon was reported to having taken serious offense at Berger's views, stating that anybody anywhere who thought that a Communist Party or member was not a threat to the United States had no business being in the Foreign Service, much less a Political Counselor at a major Embassy. He also is said to have indicated that in any case there were too many Jews as Labor Attachés and Labor Counselors. I heard this story directly from someone who was present at the meeting. So shortly after I reported for duty at the Embassy, Sam Berger was transferred as DCM in Wellington. He was replaced by George Morgan, who had been the author of a major piece published in *Foreign Affairs*, which was a follow-on to George Kennan's famous article. George was very scholarly and not very imaginative He had none of the flamboyance that Sam had. That made the Political Section a somewhat duller place and it ran at a slower pace.

Q: Did the officers stationed in the Far East feel neglected by Washington, which has always been accused of being Euro-centric?

SHERMAN: Not really , because Dulles had a great interest in the Far East and particularly Japan. That was not always a benign interest from Japan's point of view. The recent State Department Historical Office's release of its series on Asia (1955-57) includes a long memorandum of conversation which I wrote after attending a meeting between Dulles and the Japanese high command. At the time we had considered and had decided to return the Bonin Islands to Japan. This was a small group belonging essentially to the Ogasawara Island chain, which we had occupied with a small contingent of Navy personnel. They were supposed to be of some strategic significance; they were supposed to have had some submarine pens, which eventually was discovered not to have been the

case, but the Navy had been determined to hold on to them. The process leading up to the decision to return the islands was a big inter-agency battle, but finally common sense won out. There had been about 500 people on the Bonin Islands who had been evacuated to Japan, and after a number of very cold winters in Tokyo wanted to return to those forsaken but nevertheless warm dots on the map. They wanted to return to their homes, such as they were. We had permitted repatriation only of descendants of so-called original settlers--Portuguese and some people from Massachusetts. The original settlers had of course inter-married with Japanese, but their descendants had names like Gonzales and Savory--certainly not Japanese. We had somehow reached the conclusion that people with names like that had been the descendants of the original settlers and were therefore eligible for return, but that was not to be so for people with Japanese family names.

So Dulles came to Tokyo and, as recorded in my long memorandum, met with senior Japanese officials. I was not the official interpreter, but I was asked to attend the meetings under the guise of being the note-taker so that I could overhear and understand what the Japanese were saying among themselves. Dulles started by saying that we had reached the decision to return the Bonin Islands, but that on his trip to Japan he had changed his mind. That caught everyone's attention, although it was not received favorably by the Japanese. Everybody was wondering what was going on because the Japanese had fully expected a "done deal". Then Dulles proceeded to say that the U.S. government had decided to make available to the Japanese a certain amount of fissionable material to be used in research reactors. That was supposed to be a sop to the Japanese, who had been interested in having such material, but it was not certainly an acceptable alternative to the return of the Bonin Islands. Hatoyama was the Prime Minister at the time. A Diet member, Frank Matsumoto--a native Japanese, raised in the United States--was being used as a translator. He was of course bilingual. At one moment in the discussion, Frank looked over to me and said: "Bill, what is Japanese for "fissionable material"?. I had no idea how that term was expressed in Japanese, but I had been reading the newspapers' headlines which had been discussing enriched uranium. So I suggested that the term "enriched uranium and things like that" be used to explain fissionable material. All the Japanese nodded their agreement. Dulles turned and looked at me, with an approving glance. Walter Robertson, who was then the Assistant Secretary for East Asia, passed me a note saying that it was most important that the discussion be translated accurately. My reputation was made! There was never any question thereafter about my Japanese language competence.

Q: Just one more question about the 1954-57 period. How would you characterize U.S.-Japan relationships during this time?

SHERMAN: I would say that those relationships were positive. The U.S. still considered itself as the mentor and the Japanese, at least in part, accepted that view. They saw the U.S. as its principal ally--its only serious ally. They saw their fate totally bound to U.S. policies and were determined to maintain a close relationship at all costs. They did have their own agenda with their own objectives and were beginning to move towards them. They were looking forward to the day when they could exercise their complete

independence, when their economy would be self-sustaining, although they never in the 50's foresaw or even aspired to become a world power, certainly not in military terms or even political.

On the economic front, the Japanese were rebuilding their base. The advent of the Korean war certainly provided an additional boost since Japan was used as a logistic base for the U.N. operations, but I can still remember that during my Yokohama tour, we were providing free advertising space in Department of Commerce publications for Japanese looking for export opportunities to the U.S. I actually went looking for Japanese to use this free service, especially among those firms that were already in the export business, like paper flowers or handicrafts. At times, I even suggested some approaches to increase exports to the United States. Dulles maintained that there wasn't anything made in Japan of interest to the American consumer. It's amusing to see how well he understood what was beginning to happen.

Q: In 1957, you were assigned to the Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) in the Department of State. How did that come about?

SHERMAN: Over my dead body! Mary Jane and I just had our third child toward the end of my tour in Tokyo. It was not an economically propitious time to come to live in Washington. I was still an FSO-5 with a relatively low income which barely kept body and soul together overseas. Ambassador Allison cabled to the Department taking up my case, suggesting that the Shermans be assigned elsewhere overseas. No amount of objections or intervention worked. The last telegram on the subject from the department read: "We regret, but Sherman must return for a Washington tour".

So we returned and rented a house in Falls Church, VA. My assignment was the Korea desk of INR. By 1957, the work there was essentially part of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) program. The U.S. was just waiting for Rhee to disappear from the scene. No new policies were being considered until a new leadership was installed in Seoul. I replaced Dick Petree who had been working on Korea for at least six years before he went to Tokyo on his first Foreign Service assignment.

INR, in 1957, was a relatively large organization because it had been the beneficiary of large sums from the N.I.S. That program was based on an assumption that it was possible to put together all the intelligence--political, economic, demographic, geographic, etc.--available on a specific country. The U.S. government decided that it would compile this massive country encyclopedic reader from data bases existing in all agencies, especially the intelligence ones. Even the Holy See was included with two sections: one discussing the Holy See as a as a religious society, and one as a temporal power. For an analyst, this compilation was an endless occupation. No soon had a version been written, cleared and published, it was out-of-date, so that analysts had to begin again on an up-date. CIA was the lead agency, and the major financial sponsor. The funds were in part distributed to other agencies and the State's share went essentially to INR which employed a lot of people with those resources. For example, Evelyn Colbert was working on this endless

program. As far as I know, those compilations are still in some dusty corner somewhere, but I doubt whether it is ever used; the information gathered in the late '50s was never used then. You have to remember that all this was done before the advent of computers and therefore was a highly human resource intensive effort. We used to send people all over the world to do the research. I took one three month trip to Korea to analyze the educational system in the country to write the chapter on education for the NIS volume. The country volumes, in addition to commentaries, included all of a country's basic documents: the constitution, basic legislation, etc. It was an exhaustive effort, using the "vacuum cleaner" approach to research. We tried to cover every country in the world, although obviously there existed large gaps in certain areas like the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. We even wrote histories for those countries which became a major effort for European countries for example. Much of the material was of course readily available in other forms for anyone who needed to have the information. There was no reason in the world why the government needed to duplicate what was more than adequately covered by experts. Each country analysis had a section on "key country personalities" which provided in-depth biographical summary of every individual who was thought to be a leader or a potential leader. That of course had to be constantly up-dated as circumstances changed.

Biographic information has of course been standard fare for Foreign Service reporting for many years. I have never felt that it was very useful to conduct strictly as a compartmentalized effort; that is, a self-standing exercise. I remember arriving in Rome and meeting Mary Mack, an older officer in the Political Section. Her full time job was that of biographic reporting officer. That is all she did. You could of course keep as many people busy on that subject as you wish. It is very difficult to decide whom you want to trace. The only time a policy-maker found biographical information useful at all might be during a coup when he or she needed to know something about the new leaders. Too often of course those were not the people we would necessarily have included in our list. In any case, under such circumstances, a post could respond telegraphically with whatever information was needed and available. I should say that there were a lot of defenders of the biographical information system. Of course, many of them were biographic reporting officers, but there were some others. As I said, I never felt that it was worth while. I would make the same comment about CIA's efforts of recent past to provide in-depth psychological profiles of some foreign leaders. I remember talking to some of these fancy psychologists who would come to Tokyo to ask questions such as: "Has Mr. Morita ever had a mid-life crisis?" which to me was a good illustration of the weakness of the exercise.

Q: Who was the head of INR when you served there?

SHERMAN: It was Hugh Cumming, who had just been our Ambassador to Indonesia where he had been replaced by John Allison, my former Ambassador in Tokyo. Cumming was still heavily involved in Indonesia issues, as is true for many people who are assigned to Washington. but still living in their precious assignments. Hugh wanted to know all that was going on in Indonesia and would second guess from his Washington vantage

point. About six months before I reported to duty in INR, the process of morning briefings had been started. A representative of each INR geographical desk would come in early in the morning and would screen all the overnight cable traffic and many public reporting sources, like wire services and newspapers. These analysts would cull all that material and if they saw material which they deemed sufficiently important, they would brief Bill McAfee who would then digest it further and brief the Director of INR. That worked pretty well for most of the world, but we in the East Asia section, had to include all material that so much as mentioned Indonesia because that was Cumming's wish. He was involved in a complex and personal feud with Allison. They had different perceptions of the situation in Jakarta and differed strongly therefore on policy prescriptions. I never knew enough about Indonesian policy to form a judgement, but I can well remember the exchanges of elaborate telegrams between the two principals. In one, Allison said that the cable he was sending had been drafted primarily by Mary Vance Trent, a political officer at the Embassy and that he had not changed a single word. The analysis in the cable reflected the uncensored views of an observer on the scene, unswayed by Ambassadorial opinion. The message was not lost on Washington. Cumming nevertheless persisted. He sent, under the guise of a NIS mission, an INR officer, Culver Gleysteen, who had served in Indonesia while Cumming was Ambassador. Culver's real assignment was to sent back, in personal letters--not official communication channel--reports on the situation in Indonesia and in the Embassy. That process, particularly reporting on the Embassy, struck me to be somewhat beyond the pale.

My boss was the Director of the North East Asia Office. That was first Joe Yager and then Bill Magistretti. The Office Director's boss was the Deputy Director of INR. I had a close relationship with the desk officers of the East Asia regional bureau. The desk at the time was run by David Nes, assisted by Chris Norred and Greg Henderson. Chris was an old Korea hand; he was the INR Korea desk officer when I had that temporary assignment to INR when I first joined the Department.. He later served twice in Seoul, although not very happily, as I remember it. The regional desk would call on us for assistance, to do research and write reports. This was particularly true for us because Chris had been in INR and had some appreciation for our capabilities. I should mention that I had a colleague in INR who also worked on Korean issues, Dan Sullivan.

Q: By 1957, you had been in the Foreign Service for about six years. Had there been changes in the Service during that time?

SHERMAN: We of course went through a convulsion shortly after the arrival of the Eisenhower Administration. Those that survived the serious reduction-in-force were reinvestigated for security/loyalty under the general supervision of Scott McLeod. We had gone through the "some of you may be trustworthy" (enunciated during the first speech to the Department) period of John Foster Dulles. I suppose the Department was not as happy a place as it had been in the '40s.

In 1955, Wristonization began. As I mentioned, I replaced Dick Petree who had been "Wristonized". Dick Sneider was "Wristonized" and assigned to Tokyo as politico-

military officer. In 1957, the process was still continuing. There was still a lot of turmoil with people still wrestling with the question of whether they should shift to the Foreign Service. There were family tensions with some wives not wishing to leave Washington and leap into the great unknown of overseas living. Also, generally speaking, most of my Foreign Service friends were a little nervous about the integration process because a lot of the "Wristonees" were coming in at higher grades than they were, even though perhaps of the same or younger age, giving rise to concerns about promotional opportunities. There was some resentment of the process and some feeling that the "newcomers" were not as well qualified as those who had been in the Foreign Service. It was a natural reaction that could have been anticipated. But by and large, there was no highly organized or vocal opposition. There was no single Foreign Service voice that took issue with the Wriston report or its implementation. There were undoubtedly a number of highly qualified people who joined the Foreign Service and who went on to have distinguished careers. My problem with "Wristonization" was not that a career system, with essentially entrance only at the bottom, had been breached, but I was concerned that the major thrust of the Wriston report was on its emphasis on specialization. The Foreign Service was no longer to be a group of generalists, who could be expected to do almost any job in the diplomatic sphere. The Wriston program changed that orientation 180%. After the acceptance of the report, the Department and the Foreign Service became specialist oriented. It was a manifestation of the time, with the emphasis on specialization being manifested in other areas like banking, which ceased to rotate its personnel through the various functions and began to hire personnel to spend a career in a specialization like loan or financial investments, etc. This view was then imposed on the Foreign Service.

I have always thought that the preponderance of Foreign Service work can be done by a generalist, who has had some experience in the field and therefore has some feel for the needs of Washington in general and the Department of State in specific. The officer must know the country he is working on relatively well and of course, must have some basic competence. The balance of Foreign Service work--probably about 20%--requires specialized knowledge. I have in mind such activities as science, the more esoteric sides of economics-e.g. financial reporting (which is usually done by a Treasury attaché in any case--), labor and agriculture reporting. Most of this work is already being conducted by personnel from other agencies, who are experts in their particular subject field. I would prefer to have a State Department Foreign Service consisting of officers and staff who could be moved from one post to another to perform essentially the same kind of tasks wherever assigned. I don't think the nature of political and economic reporting and the conduct of diplomatic relations varies that greatly from post to post. For the highly specialized technical work, I would prefer that to be left to other agency personnel or by people from the home office in Washington on temporary duty assignments. In many cases, the highly specialized tasks require expert attention for only relatively short periods of time; there is no need for a full time officer being assigned for two years to a post in such situations.

The role of an Embassy in a foreign country is to provide Washington with political and economic information, analyze the state of the country-US relations and the potential for

internal stability, negotiate agreements or treaties, mediate disputes and provide the necessary consular services. essentially an Embassy analyzes, reports and conducts negotiations. Of course, today important negotiations are conducted from Washington by phone or at summit meetings. That range of responsibilities does not require a major research laboratory. The functions I have mentioned should be able to be performed satisfactorily by someone who knows something about the country he is living in who is not necessarily an expert in one functional field or another.

The Department of State is the coordinator and generator of foreign policy decisions, with the major decisions coordinated by the National Security Council and decided by the President. The NSC is needed because it is the only mechanism now available for settling inter-agency disputes, some of which are real and some which are essentially bureaucratic.

Q: In INR, did you get involved very much in the Korean policy development process?

SHERMAN: Not very much because in those days the theory was that INR was to operate like the Swiss Foreign Office. That was the phrase that was frequently used by INR managers to underline their view that INR officials had no role in policy development. It was INR's responsibility to analyze the facts and to array them so that the regional bureaus and the "seventh floor" could make an informed decision. The theory never worked fully in practice, but that didn't dissuade the proponents. We were asked what the situation was, what factors were affecting that situation, what the likely outcomes might be, etc. INR was supposed to be strictly an objective, neutral analytical organization. It had no operational responsibilities.

Q: You left INR in September, 1958. I gather you could hardly wait to get out. How did you manage to be assigned to the Belgium-Luxembourg desk?

SHERMAN: I was delighted to leave INR. My reassignment was probably the responsibility of John Burns, who had inspected me in Yokohama. I therefore knew him as a friend. He was in 1958 the Executive Director for the Bureau for European Affairs. When the Belgium desk was about to become vacant, I think that John suggested that I be assigned to it. I knew nothing about what was going on. One day, Bill Magistretti called me into his office and said: "As you probably know, there are some efforts being made to assign you to the Belgium desk". I could barely believe my ears; I had never heard of such a plan and furthermore I thought that my chances would not be very good since I knew nothing about Belgium and had no special qualifications for the job. I was not unhappy to go to EUR, but it certainly came as a major surprise. I don't know that Bill ever believed me, but I had nothing to do with that assignment. I only found out later that it was John Burns who had suggested the transfer, based on his review of my performance in Yokohama and later.

Q: Let me ask you about the structure of EUR in 1958. Who was the Assistant Secretary? What was its structure?

SHERMAN: The Assistant Secretary was Livingston Merchant. The Bureau was organized around European regions: West Europe, East Europe, North Europe, etc. We also had an Office of Regional Affairs, headed by Lane Timmons. The Soviet desk, also part of the East Europe Office, operated as a self-contained unit. It took care of its own personnel and operated pretty much independently of all levels below Assistant Secretary. The Office of Western Europe (WE) was headed by Bob McBride, who succeeded Tully Tolbert when the latter went to Rome as the Political Counselor. WE was divided into sections: Italian-Iberian Affairs, Benelux and Switzerland Affairs, French Affairs. In the Benelux section, we had an officer-in-charge, an economic officer, a desk officer for Belgium-Luxembourg and another for Holland-Switzerland.,

I had to bring myself up to speed on Benelux affairs in a hurry because shortly after I took over the desk, King Baudouin visited the United States. I suspect that it was the first time that any senior level of the U.S. government had to become knowledgeable about Belgian affairs. Belgium was a small country, but I found it very interesting. I had a lot of fun on that desk.

Belgium and Luxembourg did not have a very high priority on the list of foreign policy issues facing the Bureau of European Affairs or even the Office of Western European Affairs. De Gaulle was at his orneriest forcing the Office Director and Deputy Director to focus essentially on France. After that, for them, the important agenda items concerned Italy and the Iberian Peninsula. Benelux did not appear on their screen very often. Our division ran itself, largely unsupervised. So, as an FSO-4, I was left pretty much to my own devices.

The Belgian and Luxembourg Embassies in Washington were accustomed to dealing with the desk officer. Their Ambassadors did not demand to see the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary every time they had a request. We at the desk officer level were able to handle most of their concerns. The Belgian Ambassador, Bobby Silvercruys, rarely came to the Department. At one point, he was the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, a position which goes to the ambassador with the longest service in Washington. He had married Rosemarie McMahan, the widow of the late Senator. So he knew his way around town quite well and didn't really need the Department's assistance. Occasionally he might wish to see Bob Murphy, the Under Secretary, or another high level Department official. On those occasion, I would accompany the Ambassador on his call, but that was the extent of the services we had to provide the Belgian Ambassador.

The Luxembourg Ambassador changed while I was on the desk. George Heisbourg, who had been the principal secretary of the Foreign Ministry, came as the Ambassador from Luxembourg. He went about making all his calls, which we had arranged for him. I accompanied him to these meetings. He could not have been nicer. We were frequent dinner guests at his Embassy. The Luxembourgers were known for their pro-American attitude and were always warmly received wherever they went. I made one trip to Luxembourg and Belgium at the end of a fiscal year to use up some leftover funds. I spent

a week in Belgium and three or four days in Luxembourg. When you walk passed the Foreign Ministry in Luxembourg, the windows were wide open; anyone could have reach in and taken all the papers off the a desk. I, a lowly desk officer, called on the Prime Minister one morning. In the afternoon, I attended a parliament session and sat in the VIP gallery. The Prime Minister walked in, looked up and waved at us. Luxembourg was very casual.

Of course, there is a long history of US-Luxembourg relationships, made immemorial by Perle Mesta. Even before that, we had as Charge a career Foreign Service officer, George Platt Waller. He was "crown happy" as Wiley Buchanan used to describe him. He emphasized his relationship with the Grand Duchess, not just the Duchess. He used to caution everyone to use the correct title for the lady. He wrote a despatch that was preserved at the FSI for a long time in which he described at some length the extreme conditions that were imposed on Luxembourg when it was invaded by the Nazis. He stayed there, maintaining a presence. We often read George Platt Waller's despatches because they were so typical of an era long past. In one, he wrote; " To the Honorable Secretary of State: Sir: I have the honor to report that yesterday the remains of St. John the Blind, were returned to their historical resting place, the Cathedral in the Grand Square of Luxembourg City. As the Department will recall, St. John the Blind died in 1539.....I remain your obedient servant, George Platt Waller". That was his style and he was one of the last to write that way!

It was these episodes that led me to say that "I had fun on the desk". I had some contacts with other agencies, but they were somewhat limited. For example, when the French Defense Minister came, I took him over to call on the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy. Then Colonel Vernon "Dick" Walters was the translator. I became acquainted with some of the other agencies when I took Ambassador Heisbourg around on his calls. The government had not at that time established a Country Director system so that my contacts with other agencies were somewhat limited.

One event that I can still recall was the tenth anniversary celebration of NATO. The headquarters were still in Paris. The anniversary celebration was held here in Washington and was attended by all the head of governments. That was a major event, which kept us busy for some weeks.

Q: Then you were assigned to Rome. How did that come about?

SHERMAN: It happened much to my surprise. One day, as I was happily working on the Belgium/Luxembourg desk, Wells Stabler, who had become the Office Director for Italian/ Austrian Affairs after having been Benelux Office Director, called and asked me to stop by his office. He told me that, as I may have already heard, Outerbridge Horsey, then DCM in Rome, had requested that I be assigned to Rome. Horsey had been the DCM in Tokyo during the last few months of my tour there. I had not heard of Horsey's request and I was surprised that Outerbridge would even remember who I was. These were still the days in the Foreign Service when an Ambassador and a DCM could request or reject

almost any assignments to a post in their country. The vacancy in Rome was not to occur until the following year. I was to replace Gus Velletri in the Political Section.

Horseys advice to me was that I attend early morning Italian lessons at FSI starting almost immediately. The assignment was made well in advance of our departure and I did study Italian at FSI. I continued that at the end of my tour on the desk because my replacement arrived a couple of months before my departure time allowing me to study Italian full time. That gave me a language rating of 3/3 by the time I arrived in Rome (sufficient to converse easily, but not bilingual). The ability to communicate in Italian was a great help. In Japan, people used to arrive without knowing a word of Japanese and left after their tour without knowing much more of the language. But in Italy, that was not possible. From the moment you arrived, you had to be able to navigate in the language.

When I arrived, I found there was a major policy dispute between the Political Section and Outerbridge Horseys and Tully Torbert, who was the Political Counselor. The issue was the question of a center-left coalition to govern Italy. Velletri was a strong advocate for the US to support such a coalition. Horseys was very much opposed. The Political Section position to which I had been assigned was responsible for liaison with the Christian Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Vatican. so I was in the middle of things. For a while at least I could plead newness on the job to avoid taking a position on the dispute..

I think it was Velletri had actually started the work with the Vatican. He had some family connections with officials in the Vatican. Horseys also had a lot of personal connections in the Vatican. His sister was a nun and he was a devoted Catholic. But Pius XII had laid down a dictum that there would be no relations, formal or informal, with governments that did not officially recognize the Holy See. So when Velletri went to the Vatican, he went in an unmarked car without CD license plates. Of course, senior Vatican officials were well aware of Gus' visits, they publicly denied any connections with the American government. By the time I arrived, the pattern had been pretty well established and, when required, I could go to see Archbishop Dell'aqua, who in effect ran the Vatican's Foreign Ministry. He was not actually the Cardinal who was the Secretary of State, but he did manage the Vatican's foreign affairs on a day-by-day basis. So I could see him when necessary, but my usual contact was with Monsignor Cardinale, the so-called Chief of Protocol.

When the Ecumenical Council was convened, we made it clear to the Vatican that we were interested in the meetings. We talked to Cardinale often during this period as well as to the American Cardinals who attended the Council. The Ambassador was very interested and that helped. He would go to the Vatican, after I made the necessary arrangements, seeing the Pope or any official that he wanted to see. We were invited as official "guests" of the Vatican for the opening of the Council. So that even with Pius's restriction, we had adequate access to him and his staff. When Horseys went, he went as a private person. In light of the sensitivities on both sides, the Ambassador had established a rule that only he and I would be allowed to visit or contact the Vatican officially. He

was trying to avoid any semblance of official connections between the US and the Vatican, especially in light of the political sensitivity of President Kennedy's position as the first Catholic president. Once Pius XII died, the official restrictions were lifted. John XXIII couldn't have cared less whether there were formal relationships. Paul VI was the same way; no one mentioned the Concordat or any other formal limitations on contacts.

Vatican II started in 1961--Vatican I had taken place sixty years earlier. It had a number of sessions over an extended period of time. For each session, all the Catholic leaders -- Cardinals and bishops--around the world would come to Rome. They would meet in Council for three months and then would return to their dioceses. Then they would come back to Rome. The Sacred Congregations (similar to ministries in a secular government) and the special committees of the Council stayed essentially in permanent session, but the Plenary sessions were convened periodically and then lasted for three or four months. We tried to stay in touch with the American prelates in attendance, particularly the active ones. The American Jewish Committee was very interested in the proceedings because the Council did discuss its historical and current relationships with the Jewish community. The Council did produce a new statement (a *schema*) on Catholic-Jewish relations. It was important to the American Jewish community that the statement be as forthcoming as possible. So we followed the progress on that issue. We arranged for meetings between the Jewish and Catholic leaders. It was a narrow line that we walked because we couldn't give any semblance of becoming involved in what were essentially church issues. We were very mindful of the separation of church and state under our Constitution as well as the appearance of any impropriety. President Kennedy was certainly not anxious to give any impression of personal involvement or interest, although I think that the White House did follow the Council's proceedings quite closely. As I said, Salinger maintained contact with the Vatican even before Kennedy's visit. Washington did not show any official concern or express interest in the Council's proceedings, but no one ever told us not to report.

Beyond the Council's meetings, we were also interested in the Vatican's information on events behind the Iron Curtain. They had good sources, but it was not, as many have suggested, a great depository of information. It had a lot of intelligence, but it was primarily church related. They knew about their bishops and converts and church attendance and what churches had been closed; that was of limited interest to the United States government. The Vatican was incidentally only aware of security or political intelligence. It was more active in some places than others, but by and large, its information concerned religious matters and not issues of interest to a country's government. We had practically no requests from Washington to pursue any particular matter, so I was pretty much left to my own devices on what issues to pursue and report.

We did have conversations with the Vatican about China. The church was essentially out of business in China and therefore not a very fruitful source. I used to see Cardinale about every other week; we were on the phone frequently, but many of these meetings and conversations dealt with visitors. We did institute a series of lunches hosted by the Ambassador for various Cardinals--we rarely had two at the same time. The discussions

around the table were mostly philosophical. He invited all the leading church theologians-- John Courtney Murray, Malachi Martin, Xavier Renn and Cardinal Bea. These were mostly Jesuit commentators on church developments. Bea was a German who had started as a simple priest and suddenly been named a Cardinal without going through any of the intermediate stages. He was most active in coalescing the Council. These lunches were unrelated to Embassy business, but were intended to pursue some of Reinhardt's personal interests, although some of the conversation was recorded in despatches to Washington.

Q: Tell me a little bit about who the various officials in the Embassy were?

SHERMAN: When I arrived, the Ambassador was James David Zellerbach. He was followed a few months later by G. Frederick Reinhardt. The DCM was Outerbridge Horsey first; he was followed by Frances Williamson. The Political Counselor was Torbert when I arrived; he left soon thereafter and John Auchincloss was acting head. Then Terry B. Sanders was assigned as Political Counselor. He had had no previous experience in Italian matters and was an impossible man to work for--the worst boss I ever worked for. He stayed a little more than a year and then was followed by Bill Fraleigh. Jack Herfurt was the Administrative Counselor. He had followed Leo Gentner. The Economic Counselor was Sydney Mellen, who had followed Gardner Ainsworth.

I think the Embassy functioned reasonably well. We had very good language capability. Even most of the secretaries spoke Italian. That was almost a necessity because at that time, many Italians would speak only Italian and the secretaries had to be able to respond. All officers spoke Italian, certainly enough to get along. Some were bilingual almost. The USIS operated well. The Consular Section was busy and handled its work-load efficiently. The Political Section was active. The relationships between the various sections of the Embassy were good. I don't remember any policy disputes that occurred except for question of whether the United States should support a left-center coalition. That important and probably key US policy question was essentially a political issue dealt with by the Political section. I was of course also interested in the Vatican Council. Economic questions were pretty much relegated to the back-burner because Italy was at the time enjoying "the Italian miracle". There were some trade problems on such things as shoes, which were usually stimulated by one U.S. politico or another, but there were never any serious trade or economic issues between the two countries.

Life in Rome was pleasant enough. The office was generally pleasant. It was not so for Bill Fraleigh because he felt that he was being by-passed on matters that were in his area of jurisdiction. The main bone of contention of course were the Vatican issues because he had some friends there with whom he maintained contact and whom he believed should have been consulted. It was an unusual situation. My colleague, Steve Peters, who was the contact man with the Socialist Party, entertained members of that Party frequently. Bill Fraleigh was of course dutifully invited to all these affairs. The Socialists were anxious to meet with U.S. government officials; they welcomed any invitations from U.S. Embassy staff. Those contacts were important to them.

The Christian Democrats--the Party that I covered--had no particular interest in the U.S. Embassy. They were reluctant participants in any American social occasions. They were the governing party and didn't feel that contacts with Americans were of particular benefit to them. Getting appointments in their offices with them was difficult. When I did get a chance of meeting, it more likely than not to be a cup of coffee late at night on the Piazza Navona. It was unusual that they would show up for a dinner party. They might accept, but would usually call at the last minute and cancel. So that was nearly impossible for me to introduce Fraleigh to the Christian Democrats as Peters did for the Socialists. I think that added to Fraleigh's frustrations and concerns that I was keeping information and contacts from him.

My relationships with the Political Counselor were also complicated because I was a very close friend with the DCM, Francis Williamson. That, I am sure, added to Fraleigh's unhappiness. Francis died while in Rome and after that, Fraleigh wrote a very damaging efficiency report.

Like all large European Embassies, Rome lacked close cohesion after work. There was not much social interchange among the officers. It was not at all like Tokyo, where there was a good deal of Embassy community activity which stemmed in part from the fact that all the staff as housed relatively closely together. It was very difficult to settle in Rome. First there was the Italian way of doing things--the landlords, the service industry, etc. The Embassy provided virtually no assistance to newly arriving staff. An officer was on his or her own to find living accommodations, negotiate the lease, pay bills, etc. It was a difficult adjustment for someone who had just arrived from an Embassy like Tokyo. Of course, in Rome, the top-ranking officers--Ambassador, DCM, the Counselors--and the staff lived in government-owned housing and they didn't have the same problems as the more middle grade and junior officers had. It was only later that I recognized how many of those personnel problems Bill Crockett had tried to address as Administrative Counselor in Rome, for which he was severely criticized by the Inspectors and others. Staff morale was relatively good, although, again as in all European capitals, the staff corps people are largely ignored because the assumption is that anybody living in "the lap of luxury" should be able to navigate on their own. Anyone who could not enjoy one of those posts was obviously the one at fault and not the system. The single women had a difficult social circumstance in the Italian world. It was not a hospitable atmosphere for a single woman. Unless in the company of another woman or an American male, they were prey to the well-known Italian male predilections. The Embassy showed absolutely no concern for that problem, which was a serious morale issue. The Embassy did not organize any after-work hours activities. Mary Jane and I started a small theater group as we had done at every other post we had served in. We put up a set and the actors read from scripts, but went through the on stage action. It became very popular and that group went on for some years after we left Rome. We had a lot of fun. We also performed in some regular theater productions. The Embassy gave us no support, but the Ambassador and other members of the staff came to watch.

The Zellerbachs had Embassy people at their official functions. They were called "co-hosts" and assigned specific functions, like keeping people from wandering upstairs to the family quarters, making sure that everybody was being served and that they all would leave at the appropriate time. It was very formal. The invited Embassy staff had to arrive fifteen minutes before the guests. Mrs. Zellerbach would brief us on what needed to be done, etc. The Reinhardtts were much more informal. They would also invite Embassy staff, but they were treated more as guests than as hired waiters. Mrs. Reinhardt had very definite ideas about the Foreign Service, which she has frequently expressed in places like the *Foreign Service Journal* after the Ambassador's death. She was considerably younger than Freddie and they had young children. So the whole atmosphere at the Residence was much more relaxed.

Q: What were the views of the Embassy on the internal political situation in Italy at the time?

SHERMAN: There was a huge problem which was dumped on me as soon as I arrived. It revolved around a center-left coalition. There were a substantial number of officers in the Political section, primarily the more junior ones--George Lister, Clayton Mudd, Gus Velletri and others--who believed that the way to maintain democracy in Italy and to keep the Communists out of power, was to bring the Socialists into the government--the so called "opening to the left". That strategy had been vigorously opposed by earlier Christian Democratic leaders like De Gasperi, and certainly by the Catholic Church. These groups felt that any contacts with the Socialists should be taboo. The leadership of the CD consisted primarily of conservatives who were unalterably opposed to the "Opening". The debate about the political strategy was an open and wide ranging debate in Italy. Some Embassy staffers supported the "Opening" strategy; others supported the maintenance of a pure CD government. Outerbridge Horsey and Tully Tolbert strongly supported the position that the Socialists be kept out of the government. They did not object to us maintaining contacts with the Socialist Party or reporting on its activities, but our reporting was carefully edited to avoid giving any impression that the Socialists were part of a "democratic" family or that they would assist in the containment of the Communists if they were ever to share governmental powers. Our reporting tended to suggest that the Socialists, if in the government, would assist the Communists in acquiring greater power. Pietro Nenni, the Socialist leader, was viewed as just as much of an enemy as Togliatti, the Communist boss. The Ambassador did not come down on one side or another.

George Lister was our main reporter on the Socialist Party. He had most of the contacts. Whenever he would write his reports, his commentary and approach would be generally favorable and benign towards the Socialists and the center-left points of view. By the time Outerbridge Horsey got finished with his review, the draft report would be substantially altered to alter any favorable references to the Socialists or would include countervailing views. At times, the redrafting was so drastic that George Lister would refuse to be shown as the drafting officer. I would guess that more than half of the reports out of the Embassy

therefore would show Outerbridge Horsey as drafting officer. Outer felt very strongly about the US taking a firm stance against the "Opening to the Left".

In retrospect, I would guess that Horsey approved my assignment to Italy because I had had no previous Italian experience and he must have felt that he could control my views and keep me on the "straight and narrow". In fact, that was not the result. I found myself more and more sympathizing with a new center-left strategy. I might not have been as extreme as George, but I was certainly more supportive of that Christian Democratic faction, led by Aldo Moro, who believed that the CD was the party of center moving to the left. That, of course, implied first a closer relationship with the Social Democrats, under Saragat, and eventually to the Socialist Party. Moro and his faction were vigorously opposed by the *Dorotei* (named after the church where that faction first met), led by Flaminio Piccoli and Mario Scelba--conservatives who did not want any relationships with any part of the Left. The fight among the Christian Democrats was fierce. It was fascinating to observe. I was greatly impressed by Moro, particularly by his performance at a major CD meeting in Naples. He spoke at about 2 a.m. with great passion; it was a major piece of political drama during which Moro expressed his views of the future, his fears, his dreams and hopes. It was oratory at its best. I became a devotee of Moro's and his strategy.

So I too began to have differing views from Outerbridge Horsey and had discussions with him. Of course, he saw current events through a prism of long experience in Italy which went back to the pre-war days; it was difficult therefore to argue with him in a historical context when you hadn't had the same experience. He had been present at the birth of the CD; he had known De Gasperi well. He had strong feelings about the Communists; he was close to the Catholic Church and very sympathetic to its position, which was relatively inflexible.

There was a comparable and simultaneous debate in Washington on this major political issue. The Office of Western European Affairs tended to support the Horsey position; INR, where John DeSciullo was the major Italian analyst, supported the "Opening to the Left" position. There were others in town who agreed with INR. Sometimes, the officers on the Italy desk would "run off the reservation" and show some tilt towards the more liberal position. The Embassy was always concerned with the selection of the Italian desk officer because it wanted to make sure that it had a vigorous defender of the faith in the right place in Washington.

Before the Kennedy visit, Arthur Schlesinger came to Rome to review the political situation. George Lister was his control officer. He took the opportunity to unburden himself on his problems with his bosses during their trip in from the airport. Schlesinger, in his book, noted that Outerbridge Horsey was leading the Embassy down the wrong policy lane. He said that the Kennedy Administration, in general, supported Christian Democratic movements in the world and that it tried to get European support for Frei in Chile, for example. He suggested that Kennedy supported movements that leaned to the left such as worker-priests, etc. I believe, that as result of Schlesinger's visit, Outerbridge

Horsey was eventually moved from Italian affairs in 1962 and sent to Czechoslovakia as Ambassador.

Q: If our policy was tilted, did that govern any of our day-to-day activities? Did the US government's internal debate have any effect on our relationships with the Italian government and parties?

SHERMAN: It probably did. We had a complicated arrangement, which included the work of other agencies which followed Italian politics closely, especially CIA. There was a degree of U.S. financial assistance to certain political institutions, but I don't know the details because I was never privy to them or directly involved. That assistance had started, I am sure, before my arrival in Rome and was still going on while I was there.

The basic U.S. objective was to frustrate the Italian Communist Party by any means possible. The debate was not over the broad goal; it was over the means to accomplish the objective. The question was how best to fight the Communists. There was not a more dedicated anti-Communist in the world than George Lister. He was more passionate about that than Horsey was. But he felt that the best means to defeat the Communists was by encouraging the Socialists to split irrevocably from the far left through a center-left coalition. He also thought that the ultra-conservative leadership of the CD should be frustrated. Horsey supported the conservatives and so did some of Horsey's successors. Graham Martin, when he was Ambassador, reinvigorated the old civic committees which had been established to push ultra conservative policies in the CD party. No one went so far as to support the MSI (the crypto-Fascist Party) nor the Monarchist Party. It should be noted that the Communists at this period were receiving almost the same percentage of the vote as the Christian Democrats (mid-20%). They were particularly strong in some local elections and especially in the "Red Belt"--Tuscany, Romagna. So they were a potent political force in Italy, although quite different from their French and other counterparts. The Italian Communists leadership consisted of rich, capitalist people. They had TVs, refrigerators, cars; they lived comfortably. When a Sicilian traveled north to Milan, for example, to find a job, he would probably be met and welcomed by a local Communist Party official, who found lodging and a job for him. The Communists would take care of these new "immigrants". That is how they built their power base. They operated a political machine which took great pains to take care of its "grass roots" supporters and potential voters.

The Communist Party did follow the lead of the USSR on foreign policy issues, but it didn't really spend much time on those issues. Italy under a Communist government, would have been just as difficult as Italy was under other governments. Italians usually don't vote *for* a Party or a person; they vote against. If the Communists had been the government, they too would have suffered the anger and complaints of the voters, like the CD did. Anything that went wrong, either for the state or an individual, would have been the government's fault regardless of Party in power. Knowing this predilection, the Communists preferred to be outside the government. There was a wonderful satirical movie made in which the CD members were in a room watching the election returns. The

American Ambassador was also in the room. The scene has the returns indicating a Communist victory. Then the set changes to the room occupied by the Communists, who are becoming increasingly disturbed by the possibility of a victory as the CD people were dismayed by the possibility of defeat! It was a wonderful commentary, which not only illustrated the political scene in Italy, but also the Italians' ability to laugh at themselves.

But the intra-Embassy debate was a healthy one; it was out in the open. No one's opinion was being suppressed. Horsey did alter reporting cables because he felt that he was the senior representative of the Embassy, but the disagreements among the staff were well known in Washington.

Some one said that the "Political situation in Italy was desperate, but not serious!". That is the way it was. The political system was crumbling even in the early '60s. Nowhere else in the world could one find 35 governments in 30 years. Governments were always falling. The process worked, but only because band-aids were being applied to it from day to day. There was no coherence. Some policies were agreed on, but there wasn't any political leadership strong enough to wend its way through the bureaucracy, much less change its culture. Government was viewed as an impediment, not as an avenue for change. The bureaucracy was an employer and a large one at that. The political system generated confusion, not clarity or national goals. The government was always in shambles. Even in those days, everyone was aware of the *bustarello*--the little white envelope stuffed with money that was handed to one official or another.

The economic system, on the other hand, was booming. The "Italian miracle" was in full swing in the '60s. Everything was great. People lived better and better and were full of optimism, even for Italians. Everybody had a job and felt secure. The South, which as always was the "economic basket case", was being helped by emigration to the North. Newspapers were flourishing giving great opportunities for public debates.

Q: Let me ask you about Vice President Johnson's visits.

SHERMAN: There were two Johnson visits. The first was in 1962 on a stop in a long journey. He and Mrs. Johnson and Lynda Bird were in Rome rather briefly. My responsibility was to take the party to the Vatican for an audience with the Pope. Lynda was, at the time, in love with some Lieutenant (JG). who was stationed in Naples. She was 18 or 19 at the time. Bill Crockett was the State Department's honcho on that trip. I remember that because at the time, Johnson's foreign policy advisor, who was a Foreign service officer was leaving and the Ambassador and Jack Herfurt, the Administrative Counselor were pushing me to be his replacement. That was the first time I met Crockett. The visit went off without any major hitches that I can remember, although Johnson acted as he did on all trips. That was the trip on which he decided he wanted to buy some Italian neckties. Outerbridge Horsey was sent across the street to bring back to the hotel a sample of 500 neck-ties. Johnson would select ten and pay half the price asked for by the shop-keeper. I can still see Outer sitting in the hotel suite's waiting room, saying: "I am just not going to do that!. I am just not going to do that!". But he had little choice.

The second visit came after the Pope died in April, 1963. This time, the Vice President came without his family, although he had a large delegation along, including Jim Farley, an Afro-American clergyman, a Congressman, etc. He stayed at the newly opened *Cavalieri Hilton*. The hotel gave him --very aptly--the "Petronius Suite" which was on the top floor. Jack Valenti, in his normal officious persona, ran around checking everything--the soap, the Cutty Sark bottle and all the other pet demands that went with a Johnson visit. Johnson went into the bathroom and read the USIA Bulletin there which featured his picture on the cover. He couldn't stand any pictures of himself; it was always the photographer's fault. In this case, in addition, it was also USIA's fault for using his picture. He demanded that all the copies of the Bulletin be destroyed and be replaced with an edition using a line drawing of himself that pleased him. And so it was done.

Vatican ceremonies are interminable. They go on forever--four, six hours. There was Johnson sitting in his white tie and tails, without any staff or entourage around him. He was surrounded by other world officials and diplomats with whom he had nothing in common. I have still have pictures of him, looking around fiercely, obviously very unhappy and uncomfortable. Finally, the ceremony ended and Johnson returned to the hotel for a club sandwich. The sandwich had too much mayonnaise on it which gave him indigestion. But he had to make a call on Italian President Segni. The State Department had not sent an interpreter, for reasons that I still can not fathom. So I was chosen and became the official interpreter for a meeting between the President of Italy and the Vice-President of the United States. It was not an easy chore and I faced the prospect with a great deal of trepidation. But the meeting went off all right.

It was right after that meeting that I also interpreted for Johnson while he wandered the streets of Rome, shaking "flesh". We stopped in Trastevere, in a store where he bargained for a rubber raft for one of his daughters. The shop-keeper kept saying: "*Questi sono pressi fixe*" ("These are fixed prices"). I kept pointing out that this was the Vice President of the United States and asking that she make a deal. She would not give a lira! Of course, Johnson didn't pay for any of these purchases anyway. There was a "bag man" along.

I still have a tape recording, made by USIA man, of that walk during which Johnson repeated how important the Italian immigrants were to the United States and how he had appointed one to a Cabinet post. Of course, as luck would have it, the first people we met were German tourists, and I don't speak German. But Johnson persevered on, handing out Senate gallery passes and ball point pens with his signature on them. One of the local people came up to me to inquire who the VIP was--he thought it might be Mr. Hilton. I translated that as well. Finally, we wound up back at the Hilton, only to run into Mary McGrory who happened to be in Rome on vacation--she is a great Italophile. Doris Fleeson's daughter, Doris Anthony, was a press attaché at the Embassy and she was there as well. Johnson turned to me and whispered ; "You have done good! Now tell me who that is that just greeted me and asked to speak to me". I told him that was Mary McGrory.

So he turned to McGrory and said: "Hello, Mary. Good to see you!". It was an amusing day!.

It was a busy month because Johnson came at about the same time as Humphrey visited and just before the Chief Justice, Earl Warren came. Warren came as head of a delegation that included Mike Mansfield, Charles Englehardt (the minerals king), and Rabbi Lewis Finkelstein. That delegation was the official US representation for the coronation of Pope Paul VI. Immediately thereafter, President John Kennedy arrived. So within a three week period, the Embassy hosted the President, the Vice-President and the Chief Justice and some other well known politicians, all of whom wanted to see the Pope, which made the groups my responsibility.

Kennedy waited in Milan until the coronation ceremonies were completed so that he wouldn't interfere with the Warren delegation. So we had Johnson, followed almost immediately by Warren, who was followed immediately by Kennedy. President Kennedy was in Rome for three days. The first two days were devoted to US-Italy bilateral issues. The third day was reserved for the Vatican. As I mentioned, plans for a Kennedy-Pope John XXIII had been worked out earlier through non-State Department channels. But by the time the visit came, there was a new Pope. So the visit did not go as smoothly as might have otherwise. First of all, there was a big battle between the State Department and the Vatican Protocol staff concerning who would attend the audience. The White House wanted to have a large group present, but didn't want to list every one as members of the official party because that would not be good public relations-wise. The Vatican, on the other hand, was equally determined that only people listed as official members of the presidential party, would be permitted to attend. Furthermore, the Vatican Chief of Protocol wanted to call on the President before the audience. I tried to arrange that, but Kennedy would have no part of it. The Chief of Protocol could see the Secretary of State if he wanted, but that wasn't satisfactory. So the Chief of Protocol's nose was out of joint. When we arrived at the *Cortile San Damaso* where the entrance to the Pope's offices were, we were met by a mob scene, with everybody in Rome seemingly trying to get into the elevators. The protocol people were trying to clear a path for Kennedy. Finally we ran into the last hurdle which were the Swiss guards who were under instructions to let in only the members of the official party. The head of the Secret Service, who was more Catholic than the Pope, got very upset and was furious with me, wanting to know what I was going to do about this mess. At that point I saw Archbishop Dell'aqua hurrying through the crowd so that he could participate in the audience. I grabbed his cassock and told him that we had a problem. I also grabbed Angier Biddle Duke, who was the U.S. Chief of Protocol and I got the two to talk about who was to be let in. The Swiss guard, who had been so steadfast in his refusal to let anyone in not listed, was finally subdued and the whole group was allowed to enter into the chamber. Only Evelyn Lincoln was blocked because she was told that her costume did not meet standards; her blouse was too see-through. The Swiss guard would not let her in. She finally had to borrow a jacket from one of the newspaper people and that passed muster.

In the meantime, the Swiss Guard was still furious with me for having found a way to get the non-listed people into the audience. They kept looking at the newspapermen who were in their usual scruffy duds; they shook their heads in great disapproval of an Papal audience's dress code. The newspaper people were being equally pugnacious and ignoring the Swiss Guard's comments entirely. It was a circus! There had been no opportunity to brief the President about Vatican protocol or about how an audience was conducted. Finally someone decided that it would be wise if I could ride with Kennedy to the Vatican to brief him in the limousine. So I dutifully showed up at the Villa Taverna--the Ambassadorial Residence where the President was staying. Kennedy and Dean Rusk came out and got into the limousine. I got in and sat on a jump seat.

I immediately found out that the President didn't want to talk about Vatican protocol; he wanted to be briefed about Italian politics. He had met with most of the political leaders the night before at the Quirinale, including Togliatti, the Communist leader. Mary Jane and I had been invited to mingle with the guests after dinner in the garden. Kennedy had some Language Service interpreters with him, so that the Embassy staff didn't have to fill in this time. He met and talked with the party leaders then; he met and shook hands with Togliatti. It was a situation that couldn't be helped. the host for the dinner and the party afterwards was the President of Italy; he could not exclude the Communists.

In any case, on the ride to the Vatican, Kennedy wanted to talk about Italian politics. So that is what we talked about. Periodically he would turn his head towards the window and wave to the crowd. The first time he did that, I stopped talking. Kennedy said: "Don't stop talking; I can listen and wave at the same time!". Then he said he only needed to be told one minute before arrival at the Vatican so he could comb his hair. And that I did. When we got out of the car, I tried to mend fences as best I could and introduced the Vatican Chief of Protocol to the President. I had earlier suggested that if he did meet the Cardinal, the President might wish to express his regrets that he hadn't been able to see the Cardinal on the previous day. Kennedy's reply was that he would leave regrets to the Secretary of State.

I should also mention that in that ride to the Vatican, Dean Rusk raised the issue of Vatican recognition, saying that he felt the time had come for the United States to recognize the Vatican. He thought that the domestic political objections would be minor. Kennedy disagreed, noting that Harry Truman, a Baptist, could not obtain agreement to recognition and that he, Kennedy, as the first Catholic President, wouldn't have a chance of succeeding.

That caravan going to the Vatican must have been a spectacle. There must have twenty cars and trucks. It was, of course, a big deal since Kennedy had been the first President to call on the Pope. The meeting with the Pope was somewhat smaller than the audience, but included, as best I can remember, was Arthur Schlesinger, John Roche, Sorensen, O'Donnell--all of the White House staff--and Dean Rusk and the Charge, Frances Williamson (the Ambassador was ill and was in the military hospital in Wiesbaden). But

the conversations were just between the President and the Pope. I was not present during that meeting.

We did have a small incident on our way to the Vatican. One man broke through the ranks of the police keeping the people on the sidewalks and ran to the limousine and threw an envelope into it. There was a note in it, asking the President for some favor or another. The Secret Service were horrified, as you can imagine. The crowd was fair-sized. Kennedy was extraordinarily popular in Rome.

Q: Earlier, you mentioned that at the beginning of your tour in Rome, you received a poor efficiency rating. Tell us a little about that and what consequences it had on your career?

SHERMAN: Bill Fraleigh was the Political Counselor, as I mentioned earlier. We never had any public arguments or disagreements, but I always had the feeling that he was irritated that only I and the Ambassador were privy to US communications with the Vatican and to any reporting on the Holy See. He was cut out of work that one of his subordinates was doing and that didn't make him very happy. Also as time went on, my political reporting on the DC were sent to Washington in preference to his commentaries. Being in competition with one's boss is not anything that I would choose to do, but on several occasions I would be directed by the DCM to write a report in a political event, only to find out later that Fraleigh had done the same thing. In most instances, the DCM would choose my draft. The DCM had a high regard for my work, which pleased me, but made my relationships with the Political Counselor even more tenuous. Before the end of my first two years in Rome, the DCM died during an emergency operation.

When it came to efficiency report time, I found myself facing a very negative report. I was supposed to have been a procrastinator; that is, I had not been responsive to his requests for reports. I must admit that it did happen on one occasion because I thought his request had been unreasonable and a waste of time. He had asked for a report on the election of the Mayor of Rome; that was not an "event" in Italian politics and had no consequences whatsoever beyond the Rome municipality. It would have been of zero interest to Washington and I was busy on other matters at the time. The whole tone of the efficiency report was harsh, which was very unusual for the times because in those days, efficiency reports were written in subtle and delicate tones so that you had to read between the lines and understand the code words if you really wanted to find out what a supervisor thought of a particular employee. I was accused of cutting him out of information, didn't invite him to representational functions and all sorts of other slights and criticisms. I thought it was a most unfair and biased report. For example, I really didn't host any representational events because my contacts with the DC leadership was primarily during office hours. I may have had an occasional cup of coffee late at night at the Piazza Navona, but the Christian Democrats would seldom come to dinner at our house because they really didn't feel obliged to socialize with Americans. They were the party in power and didn't have to find occasions to make contacts with the Embassy, as, for example, the Socialists did. Pietro Nenni, the Socialist leader, would be delighted to

accept a dinner invitation from one of my colleagues; he had to be "on the make" and all the Socialists were delighted to have contacts with the American Embassy.

So his terrible efficiency report was written by Bill Fraleigh. We had an Inspection Team in Rome at that time. In those days, Inspectors spent considerable amount of time talking to each officer and staff employee, making personal evaluations of all staff members. One of the Inspectors spent considerable amount of time with me probing about my relationships with Fraleigh. He had seen the report; I had not. From my responses, he pieced together the real situation and wrote a separate efficiency report that challenged all the criticisms that Fraleigh had made. The Inspector not only challenged Fraleigh's assertions, but indicated that they were just plain wrong and that they stemmed from a situation over which I had no control and for which I should not be held responsible. That Inspector's intervention negated Fraleigh's report and negated any adverse effect his report might have had on my career. Furthermore, when the Ambassador heard from the Inspection team what they had found, he also became involved and he took the opportunity to write a separate note, noting how satisfied he was with my work on Vatican matters since I had taken him to see the Pope, although I did not attend the private meeting he had with His Holiness Paul VI. When the two of them came out of the Pope's office, the Ambassador started to introduce me. The Pope said that that was not necessary since he and his staff knew me very well and that the Vatican had always found me very helpful. The Ambassador reported that incident in his comments on my work and that was also very helpful. hatchet job

The only other time that I found the efficiency rating used as a weapon was in the days when they weren't available to the rated officer at all. They were never shown to an employee, even when you came home to Washington for consultation or assignment. Someone in Personnel would give you an oral thumb nail description of what the ratings said, but you were not permitted to read them yourself. This happened to me after my first tour in Yokohama. I barely knew what an efficiency rating was. My rating had been written by the Executive Officer of the Consulate General. I don't know what that person had against me except that I was assigned to live in a house that he wanted to have himself. I couldn't think of any other reasons why my efficiency rating was so full of venomous comments. I was accused of not knowing much about my work and not doing it well. In fact, when efficiency reports finally were made available to employees, my counselor in Personnel noted that such a report would not have been acceptable under the new standards and would have been returned to the drafting officer for rewrite. It was just overly biased and prejudicial without any supporting evidence. I suspect that that efficiency report did have an impact on my promotional opportunities because most of the people who entered the Foreign Service at the same time as I did received their first promotion much sooner than I did.

In neither situation, did I write a rebuttal. In the first place, in those days they were not permitted. Furthermore, I have never seen a circumstance in which rebuttals have had any beneficial effect on promotion or assignment panels; on the contrary, it has been my experience that rebuttals tended to aggravate an officer's standing rather than aid it.

Q: Did the Kennedy visit have any consequences for US policy towards the Vatican?

SHERMAN: Most of the possible consequences were already on track by the time of the visit. Relations were no longer as remote and as glacial as they had been when Pius XII was the Pope. The separateness of the Vatican as a secular state, which Pius XII had guarded so jealously, was beginning to crumble. Although important American people, officials as well as private, were always received by all Popes, from John XXIII on, no Pope had any particular difficulty having Embassy staff come to the Vatican to discuss matters of mutual interest with members of his staff. The Kennedy administration was quite circumspect about its relations with the Vatican, concerned that it be criticized for being too close, for obvious reasons. But it was anxious to maintain a dialogue with the Vatican. Major efforts were made by both sides to stress the parallelism of policy between Pope John XXIII, with his opening to the world and trying to modernize the Church, and President Kennedy and his "New Frontier". These parallel trends were already underway when Kennedy visited, but his call on Pope Paul VI highlighted the two policy tracks. It was the symbolism of the presentation made by the Cardinal Secretary of State who, after the meeting with the Pope, in a separate ceremony at the North American College gave Kennedy the gifts that he would have received had John XXIII still been alive. One of those gifts was a signed copy of the *Pacem in Terris*, the encyclical which was the highlight of John XXIII's papacy.

Q: I gather that President Kennedy's assassination and funeral caused quite a stir in Rome. Can you describe that period?

SHERMAN: It was a fascinating period, which were particularly interesting to me because of my job as liaison to the Vatican. As I mentioned, Kennedy's popularity in Italy was extraordinary. The Italians are usually pretty blasé about political leaders--their own as well as foreign. But the crowds who witnessed Kennedy's visit were enormous. When he was assassinated, the Italians took it as a personal tragedy. The taxi cab drivers, most of whom belonged to the Communist Party, parked a cab in front of the Chancery, decorated with a large funeral wreath, as a symbol of their sorrow. People stood in line for hours waiting to come into the Chancery to sign the condolence book. Every senior Italian official came to pay condolences.

It was the general custom that when a head of state dies, the Italian government would sponsor a memorial service usually at *Santa Maria Degli Angeli*--the little Michelangelo church near the Termini railroad station. It became quickly clear to me that that church could not possibly hold the crowd that wanted to attend, both Italian and American. During this period, the Ecumenical Council was holding one of its sessions. That added to the throng that wanted to pay its respects. So I called the Vatican to inquire whether it would be possible to use one of the major basilicas for the service. The Vatican volunteered *Saint John Lateran*, which was the Pope's church in his capacity as Bishop of Rome. It was a big church that could accommodate a large crowd. When I mentioned the new site to the Italian government people, there was some rumbling because the

bureaucracy was concerned about the precedent. I pointed out that Michelangelo's church was very small and that the crowd would be quite large. Finally, they and we went to *Saint John* Lateran which like most Italian churches, had no installed seating, but was very large. We discussed the necessity to rent some chairs, but were told that the Vatican had an office, the *Floreria Apostolica*, which handled such problems. It would bring the chairs and drape the church and whatever else had to be done to make it suitable for a funeral ceremony. We then realized that the main altar was at the end of the nave, far removed and not visible by anyone standing in the second half of the church. But there was a second altar, which stood at the center of the transept. That was the Papal altar which was reserved for the exclusive use of the Pontiff. I asked whether it would be possible for that altar to be used for the Kennedy's ceremonies. That furrowed many brows. My friend, Monsignor Cardinale, said that he thought it might be possible to issue a Papal Bull, which was required if the papal altar was to be used. That Bull would be posted so that all would know that the Pope had personally approved the use of the altar. And that is what was done.

We had been discussing the ceremony with the American Cardinals who were in Rome for the Ecumenical Council. Cardinal Spellman was the senior American ecclesiastical official. He was the one who would conduct the Mass. All the American Cardinals were in Rome at the time, including Cushing, who as Archbishop of Boston had, of course, a special relationship to the Kennedys. He was chosen to deliver the homily. The rest of the cast was to include members of the North American College and Monsignor Dante, the great liturgy expert, who had taught all the Cardinals when they were students at the College and who tended to treat them as if they were still his students. The Vatican's protocol people were there to make sure that everybody dressed and behaved appropriately. A Mass of this kind can get very complicated and it really required considerable expertise to make sure that all went according to script.

In any case, the preparations for the ceremony required me to be in frequent contact with Cardinal Spellman. At sometime during this period, I got a call from the Cardinal who expressed great surprise that the Pope had released the use of the altar to him. He sounded almost overwhelmed. I expressed great surprise and congratulated him on his honor. He did not know nor did I ever tell him that the arrangements had been worked out between the Vatican and some functionary at the American Embassy.

The Embassy staff had been working around the clock, putting black borders on all the Embassy's envelopes with magic markers, getting the condolence books ready (we must have gone through 9 or 10 books, each of which held 10,000 signatures) and doing all the other myriad of tasks that take place when a President dies. We had a huge set of regulations--the Combined Federal Regulations--that governed our practices; I think that probably has been changed by now.

But in any case, the ceremonies went off very smoothly. In attendance at the Mass must have been at least 300 Cardinals. They of course were the "Big Wigs" and sat wherever they wished. The *Floreria* kept bringing more and more chairs. The whole church was

people packed in like sardines from wall to wall. It was incredible; I had never seen a crowd like that in a church in Italy.

In addition to making the basilica available for the ceremony, the Vatican sent official condolences. I should note that I was never fully apprized of the "back-channel" communications that took place between the Vatican and the White House. Pierre Salinger certainly was involved and perhaps even the principal connection. I was aware that such communications did take place, but was never fully cognizant of their contents. I used to hear rumors or get small hints by Monsignor Cardinale, who was the Vatican representative in the communications.

Q: After five years in Rome, you were assigned to Washington in 1965. How was that assignment made?

SHERMAN: At one point in time, I had expressed an interest in doing personnel work. The then Executive Director of EUR wanted me to work on his staff as the personnel officer. The decentralization of the personnel work, as directed by Bill Crockett, had not yet taken place. That directive which came along later in 1965, just before I returned to Washington, took much of the personnel responsibility out of the central Personnel office and assigned it to the operating Bureaus. By the time I actually returned, Fred Irving had taken over as Executive Director of EUR and he decided that he wanted someone else in that personnel job--Vic Dikeos. So I was assigned to the personnel job in the East Asia Bureau instead, replacing Cleo Noel. I worked for Marshall Jones, who was the Executive Director of EA and Orson Trueworthy, his deputy. Since the Crockett new management approach had been put in effect, we were all dealing with a new situation in the personnel field. There were still little pieces of the old system hanging on here and there, but the core decentralization of the assignment process had been put in place.

It was my first tour in the personnel function. Everyone always wants to know how it works and frankly, I was amazed that it worked at all, given the enormous problems that the Department's personnel system had. I liked my job, even though it was a very turbulent period created by Crockett's new approach. There was a lot of concern and irritation about the Bureaus taking greater control. Those who were satisfied with the old system, groused of course and predicted catastrophes. On retrospective reflection, I think it was a wise move and it worked satisfactorily. Personnel responsibilities should be on those who have to live with the consequences of their actions. When the assignment responsibility lay with the central Personnel Office, it did not have to live with the consequences of its actions; the good and the bad was left to the Bureaus, particularly the Regional ones.

I headed the personnel shop for the Bureau. I had three or four people working for me. Our main responsibility was to see that people in EA had onward assignments and that EA would get those officers it was interested in. As I said, I think that the personnel system worked better with the assignment responsibility delegated to the Bureaus primarily because those Bureaus were much more familiar with the personnel

requirements in the posts in their geographic area. A central Personnel officer could not possibly be current on post's needs; he or she was primarily interested in getting the people who needed assignments placed in some position. As long as the "unassigned" list was small, the personnel officer had accomplished his or her duties. It is true, I believe, that a personnel officer in the Personnel Office may have had greater concern for an employee's career, but that knowledge was not enough to compensate for the priority importance of staffing a post so that it could operate at maximum efficiency. That goal required both an intimate knowledge of the jobs at a post, but also the personalities of the existing staff and the likely effect that a newcomer would have on effectiveness of the post. Such concerns were of little interest to an officer in a central personnel office; the "good of the Service" was of secondary importance to the career development of an employee and the need to reduce the list of "unassigned". The difficult assignments were worked out much more easily by a Bureau than a personnel counselor in a central personnel office.

The Crockett system did not give the Bureaus a *carte blanche*. The Bureaus still had to clear all assignments with the career counselors in the central office. The process centered on an "assignment panel" system, which met every Tuesday--it was called the "slave market"--and hammered out compromises in those cases where a Bureau's goals were found to be not in the individual officer's career development interests. In the central Personnel Office, we found some good career counselors and some who were not so good. Some were inventive and persuasive in making their pitch; some were total failures in making their case. As result, some individuals were more appropriately assigned than others. But by and large, the system did work. Each Bureau got a fair share of the "stars" and every Bureau got its share of "turkeys". No Bureau or officer was shortchanged in the main.

Q: One of the criticisms that has been often made of the Department's personnel system was and is that very few professional personnel experts are involved. Do you have any reaction to that charge?

SHERMAN: I feel the same way about personnel people the same way I feel about any experts, who come to a situation from far away, knowing little about local circumstances. A professional personnel officer is just someone who has spent more than a year in the field. I felt that I was just as much of a professional after two months on the job as one any else. I don't think that it requires some arcane training to be a personnel officer. An exception I would make to that rule is for the people who handle questions of benefits, retirement, classification, etc. Those jobs do require considerable background and knowledge of complex laws and regulations. But the assignment function, which consists essentially of putting the right person in the right job, can be done by any sensible person with experience in the work of the Department of State.

Q: Was AFSA a factor during the 1965-66 period?

SHERMAN: AFSA was a factor, but not a major one yet. The "revolution" had not yet begun, although the Junior Foreign Service Officer Association was very active. But neither group had much of an effect on my work in personnel.

Q: You stayed in personnel work for about six months. How did you get assigned to Bill Crockett's office?

SHERMAN: I had been back from Rome for about five months when John Rooney (D, NY and the Chairman of the budget subcommittee which handled the State Department budget) was making his annual trip abroad after the Congress had gone into end of the year recess.. That was always a crunch point for Bill Crockett, who, as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, was responsible for the care and feeding of Congressman John Rooney, the Chairman of the House's Subcommittee on Appropriations for the State and Justice Departments. These annual trips went wherever Rooney felt like going that year. He was always accompanied by the chief of staff of the Subcommittee, Jay Howe, Mitch Cieplinski, an old cohort from Brooklyn, Ray Farrell, the Commissioner of INS and his wife and others.

In 1965, this crowd was to sail to Italy and then go on to Israel, and then to France. When Crockett reviewed the staffing of the Embassy in Rome, he found that Fred Reinhardt, the Ambassador was in Washington for selection boards, that Frank Meloy, the DCM, was accompanying Mike Mansfield through Southeast Asia, and that Ralph Ribble, the Administrative Counselor, was also in Washington serving on the selection boards. Crockett did not feel that he could take Rooney to a post so badly denuded in its leadership. There wouldn't be anyone in Rome who could support a Rooney visit. So he decided to take Reinhardt and Ribble off the selections boards and sent them back to Rome. That would have done terrible violence to the promotion system. Reinhardt went to Crockett to protest and suggested that Sherman be recruited to go to Rome to help with the support of the delegation. The Ambassador pointed out that I had had considerable experience with Congressional visits and that I knew Italy and Rome especially very well. I also spoke Italian fluently. He also pointed out that I had good connections in the Vatican which would be helpful in getting Rooney to see the Pope, which was a must. Bill finally agreed to do what Reinhardt suggested, partly because the ship was sailing the next day. I had only met Crockett briefly the one time when he had come through Rome with LBJ.

So I was instructed to get on a plane and go to Italy and be available to meet the ship when it anchored in Naples. I was to stay with the delegation from then on. We spent a week in Naples and then a few days in Palermo and then to Rome for another ten days. I was instructed not tell anybody why I was in Italy; Crockett didn't want any word being spread that the Department was doing anything special for Rooney! If anyone asked, I was to say that I was going to Italy only to facilitate that part of Rooney's trip. So I flew to Naples and met the ship.

I was introduced to Rooney as an officer from the Embassy who had been assigned to assist the delegation. I don't know whether he knew that I was Washington based, but I suspect that Crockett may have told him. Then the trip began. Somehow it seemed to go well. Rooney's son, Skippy, was living in Rome. He and his father had been somewhat estranged because the son had married a woman that hadn't pleased the parents. She was not a Catholic and that was a problem. Skippy joined the group and we became friends. Rooney was pleased by that turn of events and that helped. In those days, I was still able to stay up all night drinking with the Chairman and still be able to get up the following morning in time to rearrange that day's schedule in accordance with the Chairman's whims.

From Naples, we went to Palermo and repeated the same process there just with a different scenery and different characters. But the daily process was the same. After Palermo, we visited Rome for a week. The main focus of that stop was to get Rooney an audience with the Pope and with Cardinale Wsyinsky, who was important to Rooney because of Rooney's Polish constituents. I did arrange those meetings. The schedule then called for Rooney's group to go to Israel.

Crockett's original understanding with Reinhardt was that I would leave to group after it left Italy because my principal *raison d'etre* was to translate and make all the necessary arrangements in Italy. So I expected to return to Washington after Rome. But Rooney insisted that I stay with the group for the whole trip. So I went to Israel for a week which has been my only trip to the Middle East. We covered Israel from one end to the other, by car and plane. I just became part of the traveling show; I made the martinis and carried the cigarettes, but I also had plenty of time to enjoy the sight-seeing. Then I went with the group from Israel to Paris and had three or four days there. Then it came time for Rooney to catch a ship to return to the United States. He wanted me to come back with him on the ship, but I would not have landed until after Christmas and I was anxious to get back to my family. So I firmly, but very politely, asked to be excused from the ship ride and Rooney finally relented. But I must say, that he was very warm when we separated. He had during the trip repaired his relations with his son, Skippy, who had gone through Italy, Israel and Paris with us--that had not been the original plan, but since the father and son had reconciled, the US government paid for both of their transportation and accommodations. At the Hotel George V, he wrung my hand and thanked me profusely for all that I had done. He felt that I had been very helpful to his son. Actually, all I had done was to describe what Foreign Service life was like, but I guess Skippy was happy that he had someone to talk to and let his views be known to his father.

Q: How did this trip fit in, if at all, with your assignment to Crockett's office?

SHERMAN: One early morning, about 3 a.m, during the Rooney trip, Rooney had gone to bed and Bill Crockett and I were just chatting. At some stage of that conversation, Crockett said: "You don't seem like a Foreign Service officer". I responded with some heat that I was a true-blue; that I entered through a very stiff competition and that I was five degree Brahmin--I had taken a three day exam unlike the then recruits that were

taking only a one day exam. I had even passed through the old Board of Examiners, headed by Joe Green, who was everybody's nightmare. Bill then went on to say that he needed to have someone like me in his office; John DeWitt was leaving and he wondered whether I would consider replacing him. I accepted on the spot, without hesitation, because I was interested in what he was doing and because on that trip, I had become attracted by Bill's vision of how his job was to be done and by how he handled himself both with Rooney, the rest of the group and people like myself. I had, of course, heard many negative comments about the way Crockett handled Rooney. Some of my colleagues resented the treatment that Rooney--a mean, old, drunken Irishman, was receiving from Crockett and the Department. On the trip, Bill made it clear to me that he didn't like it any better than the critics did. On the other hand, he understood, as other did not, that keeping Rooney appeased and knowledgeable made him a very effective advocate for the Department in Congressional battles, particularly on budget issues. Once his requirements had been met, and once Jay Howe, his close assistant, had filed them in his remarkable mind, the Department did not have any further problem with Rooney. He would fight any attempts to cut "his" budget; he looked upon it as his personal fiefdom and wasn't about to let anyone else impinge on his territory. He exacted his own tribute and penance from his parishioners, but once he had arrived at the what he considered the appropriate stage, he would defend his recommendations to the bitter end. Bill thought that what Rooney demanded out of the Department was a small price to pay, even though he personally had to carry a very heavy burden. Those were the days when committee chairmen were kings and unchallenged by any younger knights. Rooney certainly got away with murder as did Wayne Hayes for example.

I had of course heard the name "Crockett" long before I met him. He was well known throughout the Service. He had left Rome many years before my assignment there. I had heard all the comments from those people who thought that Bill was "out to wreck the Service". That reputation did not deter me one iota from joining his staff. As a matter of fact, once I had gotten into the job, Bill did get some good feed-back about my reputation in the Service, which, I suspect, he had not known very well when he offered me the job.

The relationships between Crockett and the Secretary and the Under Secretary were not close. Most of the dealings between the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (known as "O") and the Under Secretary's office were conducted through George Ball's special assistant, George Springsteen. Ed Adams was Crockett's special assistant who used to have to negotiate with George. One day, Ed came into the office very pale; he had just finished being subjected to one of Springsteen's frequent temper flares. He said that he just wouldn't do that anymore; it was demeaning and too painful. So Crockett turned to me and asked me to take on the chore of relating to George Springsteen. I got my baptism of fire soon thereafter. One of our secretaries decided, without consultations with any one else, to revise the Department's parking pass allocations list. There were people on the list who really did not have a justification for this perk, but it was not a subject to be trifled with. Before I knew anything about, I got a call from Springsteen who said: "it has come to the Under Secretary's attention that Miss.....has been asked to return her parking pass". I said I thought I could take care of

that problem and hung up. We reinstated the pass immediately. From then on, George used to come to me periodically and I never had any trouble with him. He never shouted at me once. That was true of other Seventh Floor denizens like Ben Read, who was then the Executive Secretary.

Q: How was "O" organized when you got there in 1965?

SHERMAN: Bill's basic management program--"Management by Objectives"--had already been institutionalized. So there were about fifty program managers reporting to him. In his immediate office, Bill had Roy Little, who handled the Confidential Funds; Mich Cieplinski, whose role was essentially the tending and feeding of John Rooney; Bill Trone, to coordinate the Department's administrative general services operations; Ralph Roberts to coordinate budget and fiscal matters. These latter three had some official titles like Deputy Assistant Secretaries, but in fact, coordinated the program managers that fell in their category. Ed Adams and I were the two special assistants, assisted by a more junior officer. Ed did the personnel work. Bill handled the liaison with the White House because of his close relationship to Lyndon Johnson. Betty Donovan was Bill's "gate-keeper". Much of the secretarial work was done by Margaret Bowman; she was the one who would come in early when Bill would dictate from the notes he made on a yellow pad during the night sitting next to his furnace.

I also got involved in personnel work, but my main task was to monitor Bill's meetings to make sure that whatever decisions were reached would be transmitted to the appropriate program manager and implemented. At the beginning, I think Ed may have been concerned by this process because it might have impinged on his responsibilities, but I quickly assured him that that was not going to happen and that I would pass on to him anything about personnel matters that may have arisen during these meetings. Sometimes, Bill would raise his hand when he ushered his visitor into his office. That was the signal to me that he wanted to have a private meeting, but that didn't happen very often. Much of the workload was created by Ambassadors who wanted some favor, like a "water storage" facility (commonly known as a swimming pool). If Bill would agree to proceed, then I would ask the action office to move ahead. I also attended all of Bill's meetings with his program managers. At least once a year, they would have a session to evaluate their past year's performance and establish targets and actions to be taken during the following year. Bill would approve those goals and objectives that he felt were appropriate and they became the manager's marching orders for the following period of time.

Dick Barrett, who was one of Bill's program managers, would have periodic meetings, often with another new idea or two. Sometimes, we would have an impromptu "T-group" session. Katie Louchheim would talk to Bill about women's issues. She also did a lot of political work since she had been one of the senior officials of the Democratic party.

Bill's management style was new to me. I hadn't been really involved in any management effort. So I was sort of wide-eyed. I read "The Human Side of Management" which was the godfather of the "Theory X, Theory Y" concept. I listened to Dick Barrett's passionate

expositions on the subject. I did have a wondering reaction when I looked at "O"'s organization chart. There were so many people reporting to one individual. But Bill handled it all so smoothly that the span-of-control theories were completely disregarded without any dire consequences. Of course, I have never encountered anyone like Bill Crockett in his ability to juggle so many balls at one time without seeming overwhelmed and without being immobilized in making decisions. He had an uncanny ability of being able to determine his own priorities. As I said, I had never been a program manager; like most younger Foreign Service Officers, I had never supervised more than one half of a secretary. While in "O", the NSC issued a new NSSM which established the Country Director system which was intended to make the State Department's Country Director the linchpin in the US Government on all matters relating to activities in his or her country of responsibility. That concept required all the Regional Bureaus to abolish a number of Deputy assistant Secretary positions to eliminate the layer between the Assistant secretary and the Country Directors. We laboriously negotiated with every Assistant Secretary not only to abolish these positions, but to reorganize their Bureaus so that almost every country had a Country Director and so that regional Offices were abolished. I became deeply involved in this reorganization effort. I also became involved in developing seminars for Country Directors so that they would have a better understanding of the significance of the NSSM and the opportunities that the new scheme gave them to improve their management of all U.S. efforts in their countries. Some of the new Directors responded by taking a leadership role; others just went on as before. For example, Dick Sneider grabbed the ball and ran with it ; he really became the country director for Japan ; so did Dean Brown for France; many others did not. I thought many missed great opportunities; power was raining on them, but half took out their umbrellas and half collected the rain in buckets. So the program did not become totally successful simply because some were reluctant to exercise the power granted them and because other power centers, like the Pentagon, would not surrender what they believed to be their holy rights. The new system required more management ability and more chutzpah than many Foreign Service Officers were able to produce.

There was a lot of activity in "O" at the time relating to the "Hayes bill". Bill was trying to have the Foreign Service Act amended to provide greater flexibility for its administration and to provide greater applicability of it to other government agencies involved in foreign affairs. The Foreign Service was showing great resistance, led by Sam Berger, the chairman of the Department's Committee on Professional Standards. It was known in the Department as the "Berger Committee" and had about forty members. The most active members were Bill Knight and Freddie Chapin, who did most of the Committee's drafting and were in the forefront of the discussion. The Committee was established in some respects as a counter-weight to Crockett because Berger felt, and often stated, that the business of the Foreign Service was not "management"; it was "diplomacy".

Sam was a friend who had in fact brought me up from Yokohama to work in the Embassy in Tokyo some years earlier. He asked me to join the Committee. I asked him whether he knew that I was working for Bill Crockett. He said he knew, but did not consider that a

problem. So I did attend most of the meetings and I think I did manage to keep my credibility in both camps, without violating my personal integrity. I presented "O"'s views on many issues, not always successfully. Berger later testified before Congress on the status of the Foreign Service making many of the same comments he had made to his Committee. In describing his activities as an Ambassador, I remembered he said that he met with his Political Counselor every day, he met with Economic Counselor every day, he met with his DCM every day and then he met with his Administrative man once a week--maybe. The point that I tried to bring before the Committee, and it was one that Crockett often made, was that every substantive decision an Ambassador or an Assistant Secretary made almost always requires resources: money or people or things and sometimes two or all three. So unless the administrative staff is prepared to support the substantive decision and knows what the objective is, the decision maker will not succeed. Policies are not implemented in a vacuum; more often than not, they need tangible resources to succeed. They cost money and man-hours. I must admit that this argument never was accepted by the Committee. There are tomes written by or about Foreign Service "ambassadorial greats" like Ellis Briggs or others who will say that they managed their posts with only a handful of people. We know that that wasn't true. That handful represented only the people the ambassador saw. There were many more "worker bees" who actually got things done and made the ambassador successful. We forget quickly that it takes a driver and a motor-pool to make sure that the ambassador has a car available when he wants to deliver a demarche to the Foreign Minister.

I must say that I never felt any resentment from my Foreign Service friends for working in "O". No one ever called me "traitor" and no one ever tried to use me to get some changes made in rules and regulations or for any favors. I was always very candid with everybody about what I was involved in. I often found myself as an advocate for Crockett and many of his programs. I used to say to my friends that they were shooting at the wrong target. Bill Crockett, I felt, had done more for the Foreign Service than any of his predecessors. He brought many benefits to the Foreign Service, like emergency leave, educational and hardship allowances, a responsive medical system that tried to take care of personnel at hardship posts, etc. He was very good for the Foreign Service. Whatever personnel problems individual people may have encountered were largely the fault of the Office of Personnel, not Bill Crockett's. These were not systemic problems, but the usual and eternal problems that any individual may encounter in any institution.

On a different note, I should make some comments about the "T-groups" that were still very much alive at this time. Crockett used as one of his consultants, Alfred Merrill, the author of *"The Man behind the Mask"*. That was the basic reader on "T- groups" and their utility as management tools to change an institution's culture. Merrill came to talk to us and after that Crockett decided to vigorously pursue the ACCORD program, headed by Dick Barrett and Jack Haar. It was an interesting approach which was new to me. I flew to Chicago to attend a three day seminar sponsored by the National Association of Management. The subject was the use of behavioral sciences in management. I heard some excellent lectures which piqued my interest and led me to support the program. We started by taking large chunks of the Department--office directors and above--to the

Tidewater Inn in Easton, MD. on the Eastern Shore. We took them in small groups--five to ten. They spent five days together in a room with a trainer, usually a psychologist, who had experience with these techniques. These people would talk in an unstructured way. In doing so, people reacted in different ways. Some took a leadership position and tried to dictate an agenda. The trainer would then interrupt and point out that the issues were all about present problems. The discussions were to focus on matters of longer duration so that the participants could begin to plummet their own motivations, their own psyches, including all the insecurities and deficiencies that we all suffer. Eventually, the objective was to have a group organize itself and become a well functioning organism, having grasped a deeper understanding of themselves and others.

The genesis for this approach was the findings of many, including the psychologist and management expert ,Chris Argyris, that the Foreign Service consisted of a lot of very smart individuals who however, because of their individual personalities, had a difficult time working together. They tended to work alone and in many cases withheld vital information from their colleagues in misguided attempts to compete and control. I think, in general, that was a fair criticism. The group sessions had mixed results. In the first place, the effort was a new approach for the Foreign Service and that is difficult to swallow in any circumstances. For example, George Allen, then the Director of the FSI--a distinguished senior diplomat--went to the Inn and left in outrage after the first day, painting the whole experiment as "brain-washing". The trainers did not seem very concerned by these failures, even though I thought such well known defections by highly respected senior officers were a set-back to the process. They did not understand the Department of the Foreign Service and the impact that an Allen would have on many others. Argyris was the senior trainer who had to cope with these problems. Unfortunately, the only access he had to the Department was through the "O" area. He and his fellow trainers began to believe that the Department's best people were in the "O" area because we were the only ones that seemed open to trying new techniques. As far as the trainers were concerned, the rest of the Department was staffed with hide-bound, stuffed shirts who were impossible to deal with and could never be changed. They used their very simplistic analysis as descriptive. They would ask someone: "Are you an "O" person or someone from other parts of the Department?". It was a poor approach because it made the ACCORD program that much more controversial and that much more likely to fail. Some other aspects of their performance left much to be desired. They sometimes would bring a tray of lemons to the conference room. Everyone was to pick his or her lemon by just pointing at a particular slice. But the participant was to view the lemon closely enough so that he or she could distinguish it from other lemons. It was an effort to teach that although things may seem very much alike, they are, in fact, not so and have individual characteristics which distinguish one from another. You could easily see how that exercise might have an unfortunate impact because all the participants thought that they had important matters waiting for them back in their offices and would be resentful of spending a week picking out one lemon from many others. That approach was in addition to the resistance that most of the participants brought with them in any case. I must say that some of the groups were successful in bringing the participants around to viewing their setting with fresh eyes; in other cases, the "T-group" was a dismal failure. I

think, overall, that the ACCORD program cost a lot of money; it made a few converts, who subsequently would tell their subordinates: "You are saying such and such, but I hear that you are really thinking such and such". So a few management-human relations problems may have been solved, but by and large, the experiment was a failure which was too bad because it was not intended to be a "brain-washing" experience, but one that would bring greater cohesiveness to the Department and the Foreign Service. It was intended to change the culture of the Department and the Foreign Service by trying to break down traditional patterns were dysfunctional. I thought that the basic assumptions made to develop the ACCORD program were sound; the execution was sloppy. I will not blame that on Bill Crockett; he was spread too thin to be able to monitor the program adequately. The personalities of the people who were pushing the program, the over-sell of the program and the magnitude of their efforts all militated against success. Had the sponsors started on a much smaller scale, concentrating on a few key change agents, I would guess that in the end they would have been more successful.

Q: Was the programming system still alive at that time?

SHERMAN: It was. People were still producing the long reports. We took the program over to the Bureau of the Budget. It did not get a very good reception and it became apparent that it would not allow any funds for the continuation of it. Bill Crockett, more or less, just sat at the conference table and permitted BoB to take its step. That passivity really upset Barrett. He left the meeting, like Achilles retreating to his tent. He just stalked back to his office and closed the door. That afternoon, Chris Argyris told Bill that he had an unhappy employee on his hands. So Bill asked Barrett to come to his office and held a two-three hour "healing" session. Bill was at that point just bowing to inevitability; he felt that BoB had long before made up its mind and that to continue the battle was just a waste of time. In addition, Crockett recognized that there was virtually no support for the project in the Department mainly because the concept was not well understood, either by the consumers or the analysts. For example, the word "promote" was used widely (e.g. promote certain substantive goals). It was very difficult to allocate the time of an officer who may have spent "promoting" a number of substantive goals; furthermore, the time spent on each "promotion" was bound to be rather limited. It was also very difficult to quantify negative objectives. How does an officer show how he spent his time preventing the host country from taking some action or not taking any action at all on some issue? It was conceptually a very difficult if not impossible program. We assigned people to run the program in a number of embassies; that was never very successful.

I personally did not accept, in the mid-60s, the assumptions on which the programming system was based. That is, I did not believe that you could to any degree of utility, associate resources with foreign policy objectives.

Q: Let me ask you about Crockett's relationship to the Foreign Service in the mid-60s period. From your observations, how were those relationships?

SHERMAN: I thought they were improving, by and large. It seemed to me that when he had an opportunity to discuss issues with various Foreign Service groups, like the Junior Foreign Service Officers Association or AFSA or others, the meetings were always congenial and afforded both sides an opportunity to raise questions and debate issues. Bill was able to present his considerations that led him to one decision or another with clarity and vigor. He was not himself a controversial figure, by and large. His support of the Hayes bill was not popular because it permitted the entry of new people into the Foreign service at levels above the entry one. That violated one of the traditions of the Foreign Service which brought people in at the bottom and then promoted them through the ranks or selected them out if they did not meet the standards. That objection is still being articulated today.

Q: How would you describe Bill's relationship to Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Ball?

SHERMAN: I always thought they could have been better. Bill was over-sensitive about those relationships. He had an inferiority complex with respect to Rusk and even more with George Ball. He never really made a full effort to defend his programs and his organization. He relied more on the protection offered by his relationship to Lyndon Johnson to achieve his objectives. I think he could have made a greater effort to bring the Secretary and the Under Secretary to provide him support, but he just wasn't comfortable with either and therefore didn't pursue his case with them to any great extent.

it is true that Rusk and Ball didn't get involved in management/administrative issue very much. But, for example, on one occasion, while we were trying to support a Presidential trip to Southeast Asia, Ben Read, then the Executive Secretary called me in Manila and said that the Secretary was appalled by the size of the support staff that we had assembled in the Philippines. Read said that the Secretary wanted all of them to return to their regular duty stations immediately. Rusk allegedly felt that all the necessary support could be provided by the Embassy. Read said that Secretary knew that there were more people in our Embassy in London than there were in the whole British Foreign Office and that the US presence in Manila was just another manifestation of gross over-staffing. I pointed out to Read that he must be referring to the substantive people that were along with the President because the administrative support team was there because it took a lot of people to meet the President's needs or at least what we had been told were his needs. Reid said that it was the administrative people particularly that had aroused Rusk's indignation and he wanted them all returned to their duty stations immediately. He said it was an irrevocable decision. So I told Bill about the call. He strolled down to the Presidential quarters in the hotel and I never heard another word about the subject. But it was clear that every time Bill had to seek Presidential or Congressional support, he felt guilty about it. He didn't like to do it because it made him feel as an "outsider". The irony was that all of Bill's efforts, whether it was support of Presidential or Congressional trips or any of his programs, were directed to making the Department of State look better and work more efficiently, but many of his actions were just not congenial to his colleagues and were not seen as meeting the intended purposes.

Q: What do you recollect about Bill's relationships with President Johnson?

SHERMAN: Three were a lot of telephone calls from the President, mostly about individuals that the President wanted to have hired. Johnson would even in many cases specify the salary he wanted the individual to make. It was sometimes the husband of one of his secretaries. Ed Adams, who had the responsibility for following through, would find a position for the individual, but in a number of cases, that would be the last the Department would see of him. People like John Gonella were "phantom" employees. They in fact were White House employees on State's payroll. They might have been Veterans Administration or INS employees. Johnson knew exactly what they made and could therefore dictate a specific salary. The transfer to State's rolls often involved a pay step increase or a grade promotion. Johnson personally got involved in these cases. I remember occasions when Bill would be away from his office--for example, addressing a group in the auditorium or somewhere-- when Johnson would call. I would take a note to Bill that the President wanted to speak to him. Bill would excuse himself, saying something like: "If I told you what was in this note, you wouldn't believe it" and left for a few minutes to speak to the President.

Q: What other activities did you get involved in while assigned to "O"?

SHERMAN: I spent so much time on Presidential travels once Lyndon Johnson started to travel that I didn't have much time for anything else. The first few months were quiet because Johnson had to wait for Hubert Humphrey to be elected Vice-President before he could really leave the country--there was of course no Vice President after Kennedy's assassination. Almost immediately after Humphrey's election, Johnson planned to attend a Chiefs of State meeting in Manila--the so called "Manila Summit". We had eleven days notice. The day after the President made his decision to attend, I was on my way to Manila with Bill Moyers on the advance team. Johnson decided also to go to Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia--Canberra and Brisbane--, Thailand, Malaysia, Pago Pago before attending the Summit. After finishing the advance, I returned to Washington only to join the President's party as it left for Southeast Asia. It was the first of several Presidential extravaganzas that I engaged in. Crockett had never done it with Johnson as President; he had done it often when Johnson was Vice-President. But this was a different ball game.

We improvised all along the line. I sat most of the time with a pad on my lap writing cables back to Bill Trone asking for one thing or another, mostly additional personnel like communicators, general services officers, etc. We suggested who might be assigned to support the trip on a TDY basis. At each post, we assigned a coordinator who had responsibility for all administrative support. It was essential that we recruit additional personnel. I remember arriving in Wellington and going to the Captain Cook Hotel, the only major one in town. I asked whether they had room for the President of the United States and his party. The woman at the desk said: "We can book him in May!". Housing was so scarce in Wellington that we recommissioned a couple of disused North-South island ferry boats; we used them to accommodate the press. Idar Rimstad was brought in

from Paris to be the coordinator. It was an adventure everywhere. One administrative type laid down on the tarmac in Wellington to prevent a plane from leaving because we had to load something else on it.

Soon after the Southeast Asia trip, Johnson went to Punta del Este for a Latin American Chiefs of State meeting. I did the advance work on that one too for about a week. I never got to Punta del Este for the actual visit because I was diverted to Suriname in order to prepare for a refueling stop. The plan had been to refuel in Guyana, but the runway was filled at one end by rubble which was frequently ingested by the jet engines. That wouldn't do, so we took off from Guyana not knowing exactly where we were going to find a refueling stop. While we were in mid-air, Marvin Watson decided on Suriname, which was still a Dutch colony. Bill Stinson and I and a few others were dropped off there and we put a refueling stop together.

Then there was a quick trip to Bonn to attend Adenauer's funeral. That was a sudden one that couldn't be advanced very much. I also went with Hubert Humphrey to the inauguration of Park Chung Hee, the President of South Korea. I did the advance on that and then manned the control room. By that time, Bob Peck was handling trips; Bill Crockett had left the Department and Rimstad had succeeded him. Idar had gone to Germany with Johnson; that had been his baptism.

Q: Did the Secretary have a valid complaint about the support the Department provided Presidential trips?

SHERMAN: There were too many people on Presidential trips. We did "over-kill". It could have been done with fewer human resources, but our response time to Presidential requests could not have been done as fast. The President might have had to wait for a few minutes to get something done. There were hundreds of people particularly for the Southeast Asia trip. I think the total bill for that trip was something like \$10 million per day. Marvin Watson, then White House Chief of Staff, said that if anyone ever even whispered that fact, he would personally see to it that the person was decapitated. In those \$10 million was even greater than it is today. That Southeast Asia trip went for eleven days; it should not take \$110 million to take a President to an international conference. Much of it was funded by other agencies and therefore never public knowledge. The Department had a \$1 million appropriation for "Contingencies in the Diplomatic Service". It didn't go very far when Presidential trips were undertaken.

Q: How effective did you think Lyndon Johnson was on these overseas trips?

SHERMAN: I think Summit diplomacy is really not a worthwhile investment of time and money. Undertaking a trip makes a statement on its own. What is said and done while on the road has little impact. The fact that Lyndon Johnson met individually and in a group with Marcos and other East Asia leaders, including the South Vietnamese, was of no significance. That he took a day off from his diplomatic endeavors and visited our troops in Vietnam, was of importance. That and a few other events provided some short TV

sound-bites that had some effect probably on domestic public opinion, but in terms of moving any international issue forward, it had little effect. I found the trips exciting as a worker bee seeing all these leaders close up. I was awed by the resources that could be marshaled to support a Presidential trip, but substantively, the trips were not earth shaking or even of vital national significance.

The trips became easier to manage as we learned the routine. We developed check lists so that we didn't have send embassies scurrying all the time to find tapioca pudding or pickled baby okra or Snappy Tom in the middle of the night. We learned and had these items on hand. Johnson was a man who had peculiar personal tastes. He also needed a lot of extras. For example, he never slept. He had to have his orthopedic chair in his bedroom. We dragged that around from post to post. We leap-frogged extra-wide king sized beds so that one would always be available at his next stop. We developed a total black-out capability because Johnson demanded complete darkness in the room in which he slept. We knew that the shower had to be 7'3" above the floor. The lectern had be 42" on the belly side. We soon found out about all his predilections and were after a while prepared to meet his demands. What we didn't know, the White House staff or the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) knew. A lot of egos had of course to be massaged during the course of these trips. I remember that while I was in Manila, I got a call from Air Force 1. The White House staff had the list of room assignments for the hotel it was to use in Manila. Crockett called me and said that the staff wanted to have Jack Valenti (who was no longer in the White House) moved from the room he was occupying--he had arrived in Manila few days earlier--to another floor. I raised my eyebrows, but went to his room and shoved a note under the door saying that the White House had requested that he move from his room to another one on a different floor. I signed it "Control Room" I had just returned to the control room, when my phone rang and Valenti said, "Can you tell me who on the White House staff made the request that I move?". I told him that I didn't know who had made the decision; I was just passing on the information as I had received it. Valenti said: "I think I'll stay in my room until you can tell me who it was who wants to have me move!". I called the plane back and reported that Valenti would not move. The issue was abandoned!

As it was the hotel was completely booked; we could not have found another room for Valenti. The other Chiefs of State were also looking for rooms and got very little if anything. We had the hotel practically to ourselves, but we were very tight. Bill also called one time to ask what room Liz Carpenter was to occupy. I told him; he then wanted to know whether that was a good room. I told him that that had been the room reserved for him; I am not sure where we finally found a cot for Crockett. There were no other rooms in the hotel and no other good hotels in Manila.

Q: During all these trips, what impression did you form of the White House staff? How much of the irritating demands were the result of staff initiatives rather than Presidential demands?

SHERMAN: In the case of the LBJ White House, most came from the President. Of course, that was one of the reasons he liked Bill because Bill was able to respond to his

demands in ways that the Kennedy White House staff would never do. Bill treated him as a VIP and Johnson appreciated that. When he became President, Johnson just wanted to be a bigger VIP. So all the petty demands, I am sure, were Presidentially generated. Anyone else who might have played that game might have asked for the wrong thing or might have gotten in the way of the President; neither situations were to be sought. I have to say that the trips of other Presidents that I have been involved in as part of the "host party" like Kennedy's trip to Rome and Carter's trip to Tokyo and Reagan's trips, were not much better than Johnson's. The requirements were still in effect, although they seem to come less from the President himself than from the staff around him, although I am sure that the Presidents are not reluctant to be served as they are. The entourages are growing with every new President. We now have a Boeing 747 as Air Force One, rather than the 707 of the 60's. That increases the number of potential strap hangers greatly. Air Force One is filled with staff; the press charters its own plane. I am willing to bet that there is also a back-up 747 flying also filled with White House staffers. So the size of the accompanying staff has increased tremendously since the 60's. It is not that much different when Congressional leaders or groups travel. They also come with staff members, although fewer, of course. But the demands of these groups are also very taxing.

Late in 1966, Bill Crockett seemed to have lost some interest in his job. He appeared to be more difficult to see and did not appear to share his views with the staff as much as he used to. One day, I received a call from George Springsteen asking me if I knew when Bill was leaving. That took me by surprise because I had had no inkling of any such occurrence. Springsteen seemed surprised that I didn't know; he assumed that Bill had told his staff since he had announced his intentions to the Under Secretary. To this day, I don't know what triggered Bill's decision to resign. He may have felt that he was unappreciated by the Foreign Service or there may have been some problem that just got to be too much for him. I just don't know. Or the hours may have finally just worn him down. He used to arrive very early in the morning, as I mentioned, to dictate the ideas he had had overnight. I usually got to the office around 8 a.m. and we all stayed then roughly for twelve hours. So it was a long, long day, particularly for Bill who probably spent 14 hours in the office every day; he was there Saturdays mornings as well, but never on Sundays unless there was an emergency. He may just have worn down; he had been Deputy Under Secretary for 3 ½ years.

I suspect that there was also some tension between Ball and Crockett that finally caused Bill to submit his resignation. Late in 1966, there was an incident involving Wayne Hayes and George Ball. Hayes had become deeply involved in the Foreign Building operations. One of his interventions concerned our building down in Bogota, Colombia. Our Ambassador there had decided on a new building to be rented and felt very strongly that he had selected the right one. Hayes was getting different information from other sources and opposed the rent of the Bogota building. All arrangements had been finalized, but Hayes was refusing to authorize any funds for this lease. I am told, and this is second hand, that Ball decided to call Hayes and told the Congressman that he would not tolerate any further interference in State Department's business. Of course, Ball had already

decided to resign by this time, but that was not known. Hayes hung up on him and immediately had drafted a bill which was passed by both chambers, taking away some of the Department's leasing authority in the foreign buildings program. Ball was probably just releasing his personal frustration, but it cost the organization heavily. That also probably had an effect on Bill's decision to resign because it was just one more limitation on the Department's ability to manage its own affairs.

In any case, he had apparently told Ball that he would stay long enough to go on a final trip with Rooney. That trip was a long journey through Latin America.

After Springsteen's call, I immediately went to see Betty Donovan, Bill's personal assistant, to seek confirmation of Bill's resignation. She said it was true. She told me that Bill had been offered a job with IBM which he had finally decided to accept. I had never heard of his conversations with IBM; I doubt whether anyone else besides Betty knew about them. I was horrified that Bill had decided to resign and was particularly unhappy that he had decided to leave the Department entirely. I asked him why, at least, he didn't consider taking an ambassadorial assignment; he had supported so many of his colleagues for ambassadorial appointments that at least he should take one himself. That might have permitted him a change of pace, but would allow him to try some of his management techniques even if on a smaller basis. But Bill felt that the Foreign Service would never accept him. I told him I thought he was wrong: the Foreign Service accepted many appointees, many of them not deserving, but they were served well and faithfully by their Foreign Service staffs. I was sure that the Foreign Service would serve Bill just as loyally. Marshall Jones, who had been one of Bills' assistants, had been appointed as Ambassador to Malawi. I really did not believe that Bill was right in his judgement about the Foreign Service. But he wouldn't accept my arguments; he said that he wouldn't wish to put Verla through what might be contentious Senate hearings. He was just adamant about resigning even though I believe that he, by the end of 1966, had come to believe that the Foreign Service saw him more benignly than it had a year earlier. After I joined the staff and began to be a regular traveler with Bill, I would arrange, time permitting, for Bill to meet alone with the staffs at overseas posts we visited. He would tell them briefly about his plans and aspirations for the Department and the Foreign Service and then would answer any questions that they might have. Those sessions, I think, were very useful to both sides. I thought that Bill was receiving positive feedback from the overseas staffs, which to some extent should have been comforting and reassuring to him about the Service's views. I was somewhat disappointed later when I read Bill's oral history; he seemed to still have somewhat bitter memories about the Foreign Service. I regret that greatly because there were many people in the Foreign Service who respected him. There were some who didn't, but that was to be expected. I always had his picture in my office after I worked for him because I happen to believe that he was the most impressive and dedicated boss that I have ever worked for.

When Bill's last days came, the Secretary had a farewell reception for him on the 8th floor. All the principals of the Department were there as well as some of Bill's staff and some others. I can still remember Dean Rusk, in making his speech, saying that his job

had been easier because he had always Crockett at his right hand to say "NO" when necessary. I thought that was one of the most misguided and uncalled for remarks that I had ever heard. Bill Crockett had spent more than three years in finding ways to get things done; "NO" was not a word he liked to use or in fact did use very much. His whole human fiber was attuned to saying "YES"; he had spent a whole career trying to support people so that they could function better; he had always tried to find ways to accommodate requests; he had drummed that approach into his staff. For the Secretary to call him a "NO MAN" at the end of his career, I thought, was most inappropriate.. Bill, I am sure, was chagrined. I wrote a note afterwards saying that I thought the Secretary was 180% wrong. I was just astounded and I believe that it said more about Rusk and his knowledge of what was going on in the management of his Department than it did about Bill.

In retrospect, I think Bill Crockett's tenure did a lot of good for the Department of State. He widened the base of the Foreign Service in ways that I consider largely constructive. He enhanced the role of management without diminishing career principles. He made the Department a far greater master of its own internal process than had previously been the case. That is not to say that all of his innovations were successful. His reputation was tarnished by such initiatives like the ACCORD program. The Department could have done without that; it didn't help the management of the Department nor did it change the Department's culture to be more "open". There may have been other approaches that may have been taken, but ACCORD was not the right one. CCPS also falls in the category of failed efforts; it was very expensive and didn't produce any positive results. All of the great gurus, who were called upon as advisors, like Allen Enthoven, Charlie Hitch and others, eventually also became discouraged and threw up their hands in surrender.

On the other hand, I think that "management by objectives" was a successful management technique. That helped people to focus on their activities and arrange their goals in some priority, although efforts to use that technique on a Service-wide scale were never successful. He was also a great boon to the Foreign Service because he introduced administrative programs which made the Foreign Service more effective. I am dismayed that so few know that it was Bill Crockett who made their lives easier and better. I always resented Outerbridge Horsey's role in the inspection of Embassy Rome which took place in the mid-60's. That report savaged and devastated Crockett who was the administrative officer; the inspectors took umbrage at the many innovations Bill had introduced to the Embassy to make the life of the Foreign Service officers and staff so much easier at no cost to the American tax-payer. For example, he started the practice of the administrative section taking the cash for the monthly charges on a staff member's utility bill and paying to the local utility office. It would have taken that staff member hours and hours to do the same thing, but by having an Embassy local employee take on the burden, it saved a much more highly paid staff member time which could be devoted to his job. He did that in many ways although none of the measures were major management changes, but provided support here and there for the substantive staff so that it could work more productively. It was a different support that Horsey and his other colleagues had been accustomed to in their younger days and therefore they severely chastised Bill for his

efforts. These senior officers' views were summed up by their scathing comments about the Embassy commissary selling canned spaghetti or sauce. Fortunately, the inspection report had little effect on Embassy operations and many of Bill's initiatives are still around today. But Bill was no doubt hurt, not career-wise, but personally.

While Bill was traveling with Rooney, John Steeves, who was then the Director General, became acting Deputy Under Secretary. John was never a real member of the Crockett team. John had his own agenda. I was the one who suggested him when the Director General's position became vacant. Bill was intrigued by having on his staff a senior Foreign Service Officer who had not entered up through the examination process; Steeves had "lateraled in" through the Man-power Act. Steeves became very pompous very fast. He had been our Ambassador to Afghanistan and I think that went to his head. He was certainly not a personnel manager; he was not a very effective Director General. Beyond that, he didn't agree with many of Bill's initiatives.

When Bill came back from his trip, he took his papers and worked in a little office in the Deputy Under Secretary's suite. Steeves occupied the main office. Crockett was still officially the Deputy Under Secretary; no replacement had been named, but he was concentrating on closing up his career in the Department of State. Bill continued to send memos to me on matters that he would like to have done, as he had always done. I would write "action" memoranda to the appropriate program manager; it was the routine that we had long practiced. One issue that came up in this interim period concerned a physical move for one part of the Office of Personnel from one floor to another. Bill had originally approved of the idea; then someone came to complain and Bill sent me a note asking that the move be rescinded. I passed that word to Bob Peck, who decided to raise the issue at the next staff meeting because he was apparently confused. Steeves got absolutely furious. After the meeting, he asked me to stay and he really lit into me. He wanted to know how I, a lowly assistant, could over-rule a decision that had been made. He further said that Bill Crockett had told him that he would not involve himself in day-to-day issues. I told him what had transpired; that I had gotten my instructions from Crockett who, as far as I knew, was still the Deputy Under Secretary and I was still his special assistant. Therefore, when I got instructions from Crockett, I followed them. Steeves said that I was not to do that again. He was livid. I told him to take it up with Crockett.

After a few weeks of this interim, Idar Rimestad was appointed as Deputy Under Secretary. He was Rooney's choice for the job. He was not anyone else's choice; I don't think he was even Bill's choice. Bill's candidate was Jack Herfurt, who was then Counselor for Administration in Rome. Jack would have been a much better choice for that job. Idar could get things done, but he would break a lot of crockery in the process. He was certainly not a smooth, polished operator like Herfurt. I think that Idar's selection probably took place one evening at Duke Zeibert's over a drink or two. Rooney must just have decided that Idar had been a faithful servant who had managed to get things done for the Chairman. As far as I know, the White House of course approved the nomination, but did not involve itself any further than that. Rooney shortly thereafter fell terminally ill, but Idar became Deputy Under Secretary nevertheless. I left the staff to go to the War

College, even though Rimestad asked me to stay. I told him that I would stay for a brief period just to tide him over, but, as a Crockett follower, I was not the person he wanted because I could only tell him how things used to be and that would eventually become very tiresome to him. He did ask me for suggestions for replacement and eventually Pat Byrne was appointed. Ed Adams retired and was replaced by Jules Bassin. Roy Little had taken ill and was followed by Frank Meyer in the job of budget liaison with the Congress and managing the confidential funds. Bill Trone also got sick and was replaced by Bob Peck. Joe Meresman left, so that a few weeks after Rimestad's appointment, there was an entirely fresh crew in "M".

I stayed long enough to accompany President Johnson and Idar to Germany for the Adenauer funeral. I also went with Humphrey to Korea. Later, even after starting the War College, I was desperately afraid that I would be asked to support the Johnson around-the-world trip which ended in the Vatican on Christmas Eve. Fortunately, it didn't happen.

When I said that I wanted to go to the War College, Idar said he understood, but that he hoped that as long as I was working in "M" I would free to tell him that he was wrong when I thought so. I did indeed use that invitation on a couple of occasions. I don't think Idar really liked that. For example, he had decided that he would manage his operations through an underground network of old friends who were strategically located in various offices. He would sit down at a large table in the cafeteria in the morning and while having breakfast, he would discuss problems with his old friends, who knew they could catch him at that time and give him their opinions.

We had one argument over how the Department's communications network would operate. One of Idar's friends, during one of the infamous breakfasts, told him the Department's system was not very good. In fact, it was great and best of all, CIA was paying for a major portion of it. The diplomatic communications system, which was very good, was built in fact on CIA's budget; their people helped staff it, support it and pay for it. Idar was told that by some "Morse code" communicator that in some fashion the Department was being robbed blind. I finally wrote him a memorandum, explaining how the system worked and asking for policy guidance if he wanted to change it. I took it to him; he took it and ostentatiously placed it on the corner of desk that was reserved for matters that he didn't have intention of ever addressing. I told him that he couldn't do that; he could not ignore our communications system. He looked at me and didn't react. I then told him that I was going to use the invitation he had extended me when he first came into office; I told him he was flatly wrong. He glared at me and I left the room. About an hour later, he walked into my office, with the memorandum in his hands; he slammed it on my desk and I noticed he had approved my recommendation. As he left, he said that this was the last time he would ever do anything like that. In the final analysis, Idar did not get along very well with the communications staff, despite my efforts.

In the few months that I worked for Idar, he changed a number of Crockett' initiatives. For example, he alienated Eddie Williams, who Bill had chosen to head up the Department Equal Opportunity Employment Office. I think Eddie sensed that Idar was

not committed to minority opportunity philosophy as Bill was. So he also left and was replaced by an Afro-American who however had no real standing in the black community as Eddie had.

Idar went into battle against Steeves. They would get into arguments, both publicly and privately. Steeves would threaten to take the issue up with the Secretary, which never happened, but it was a hopeless match. It was confrontation that Steeves could not possibly win since Idar was the Deputy Under Secretary.

Bill had always been very adroit in finding some task for a senior person, such as an ex-Ambassador, who might himself or herself temporarily unemployed. Those tasks, which they performed individually or as part of a group, gave these people a dignity and self esteem which they badly needed when the Service could not come up with another assignment. These temporary assignments permitted these people to leave the Department with heads held high, rather than just being unceremoniously being dumped into retirement, as the law permitted the Department to do. Idar thought that that process was mostly a waste of time and money. Outerbridge Horsey, who had been asked by Bill to review the Junior Officers' Recruitment Program and Training, produced a report after the review. Idar savaged Horsey, face to face, after he read the report. It was one of the most brutal meetings I have ever attended. It was insulting and demeaning to a person who had devoted the major portion of his life to the Foreign Service. Horsey left that meeting a shaken man. There was no need for that kind of punishment. The report was not that controversial and Horsey was obviously at the end of his career. Idar just didn't like the process or perhaps even the "old line" Foreign Service Officers. Idar was not a genius when it came to getting along with people.

He also had a different view of the goals of "management". For example, he thought that Barrett's operations had no place in the Department and he dissolved that office soon after taking over as "M". He did not see any benefit in having an "Arts In Embassy" program or Katie Louchheim's efforts to raise America's awareness of the Foreign Service. Those kinds of efforts just did not fit in Idar's definition of "management".

I was very interested in going to the War College. Selections were made by a committee and therefore not easily subject to pressure or influence. Every FSO-3 was automatically considered for senior training. At a later stage in my career, I participated in the selection process and learned a little about the various considerations involved in making the selections first for senior training and then for the specific training program. It is as objective as any personnel process can be and I was delighted that I was selected. I had had friends who had attended the War College who had found it a very interesting assignment. I also thought that it was an appropriate time in my career to take a year off for academic pursuits. It gave me an opportunity to become reacquainted with my family which probably had forgotten what I looked like after the hours I spent in "M" and on the road with various VIPs. I couldn't have been happier when I was selected, especially since the senior training assignment was the War College which I preferred to the Senior Seminar because I thought that the War College provided closer interaction with the U.S.

military which would be very instructive and might pay off to a greater degree later in my career. It certainly met both of my expectations. I often ran across classmates subsequently and the fact that we had known each other during that year was very helpful in establishing a close working relationship.

So I enjoyed my year at the War College. It was the one year that Andy Goodpaster was the Commandant, which added a special dimension. At the time, the War College still had planes at its disposal which permitted the students to choose a visit to one of five different areas. I opted for Africa because I had never been there, except for Casablanca. That trip was a great experience; we took three weeks to travel throughout the Continent and saw and learned a lot. I thought that a year away from a desk which permitted time for reflection and learning is a very valuable asset; it is also very useful for the breathing time it provides.

Q: After the War College, you were assigned to Tokyo. Was that your choice?

SHERMAN: I had actually hoped to go to Seoul as the Political Counselor. I had just received a promotion to FSO-2 while at the War College which made me eligible for that assignment. I had been in Korea many years before, as I described earlier. Bill Porter became Ambassador in the Summer of 1967. He had been part of the U.S. delegation headed by Hubert Humphrey that went to the Park Chung Hee inauguration the year before. As I mentioned, I had worked on the preparation for that visit and had accompanied the delegation. So I met Porter on that trip and I took the opportunity to tell him I was interested in that job--he had already been announced as our next Ambassador by that time--even though I was not eligible for an assignment until the following year. Sending a newly appointed, but not announced, Ambassador as part of a delegation made matters a little tricky for the Charge' who at that time was George Newman. In any case, Porter eventually chose Dick Peters for the job of Political Counselor and the then the Bureau offered me the job as Principal Officer at Kobe-Osaka. As it turned out, that was probably the better assignment for me in any case.

The Consulate General at Kobe-Osaka in 1968 was approximately 10-12 Americans. The Consular Section was in Kobe and the Administrative Section moved from Kobe to Osaka and back. The Economic Section was in Osaka. I worked in Osaka primarily because that was the location of the World Exposition which as my main focus for the years I was the C.G. All of the other normal activities of the post really took second place.

It is somewhat unique in the Foreign Service to have a Consulate General with two main offices, separated by roughly thirty miles. I did not travel very much between the two offices. My predecessors and successors tended to use the office in Kobe to a large extent because it was more spacious and far more pleasant and the commute from the CG's house was far better. But since most of my time was taken up by the Exposition, I stayed in Osaka most of the time. Kobe didn't need any "hands-on" supervision, although, as I said, I would occasionally visit our offices in Kobe. I did travel to Tokyo and to prefectural capitals in my district.

The Consul General in Kobe-Osaka is a unique assignment under any circumstances and was even more so while I was there because of the Exposition. Osaka historically and traditionally was the business center of Japan. All of the large industrial combines--Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, etc.--had started in Osaka and had kept their roots there. By the end of the war, it became apparent that Tokyo would become the center of Japan. So the CEO's and business leaders, while maintaining their homes in the Osaka area, spent most of their time in Tokyo because that became the center of commercial activity. All of these business leaders maintained a sympathetic and sentimental attachment to the land of their forefathers. Therefore, when the U.S. first established its posts in Japan right after the War--i.e. the diplomatic branches of the Military Government--Osaka was a natural place for a presence. Osaka was one of the Japanese cities that have a special designation--along with Kyoto and Tokyo (as illustrated by the fact that the Tokyo city administrator is a governor, not a mayor). The Osaka is a *Fu*, which is a higher rank than a *Shi*, which is the next level. Kobe, however, also merited attention. There always existed great rivalry between Osaka and Kobe. They are in two different prefectures. Traditionally, the U.S. had had a presence in Kobe because it was a major port. After the War, Osaka also became a major port. It became clear to one of my predecessors that having only a presence in Kobe was insufficient; so the Department rented space for him in Osaka and gradually the post became known as Kobe-Osaka. While I was there, we requested that the post designation be changed to Osaka-Kobe as an indicator of the changed importance of the two cities. Kobe, of course, was greatly distressed by the change, but I felt that the new designation was a far more accurate description of the situation on the ground. Nevertheless, I still had to deal with two sets of Japan-American societies, two sets of city government officials. I suppose that a foreign Consul General in Minneapolis-St. Paul might face the same problems, although those two cities are closer together than Osaka and Kobe were. I had to do a certain amount of representation with the city officials of both municipalities, but there was very little if any official business conducted. That just wasn't necessary and I kept it to the bare minimum. There were consular corps in both cities which had to be periodically called out for some civic function or other--building dedication, ribbon cutting, Miss Kobe contests, etc.

We built a beautiful new Consulate building in Kobe. It was clear from the beginning, even before people moved in, that this was a summer palace. It never was fully utilized; it always had empty office space. Many of the rooms intended for offices became storage space. It was a great waste of money. During my tour as C.G., I continued the efforts started by Owen Zurhellen to consolidate staffs so that we could all be together in one city, which had to be Osaka. Long after my departure, that consolidation took place; we now are only in Osaka and the office building in Kobe has been sold--to finance the new building in Osaka. Because of the Japanese tax system, which charges you by the ground square footage, we wound up building a very beautiful tall square edifice in Osaka. So in summary, U.S. representation started in Kobe, slowly over many years shifted to Osaka and is now entirely in Osaka. We still do some consular work in Kobe, trying to help the shipping and travel industry, but our base is in Osaka.

My principal contacts were the business people in Osaka. I spent a lot of time supporting the American business community, which consisted of 60 or 70 people involved in joint ventures or building nuclear plants, representing 40 to 50 companies. There was a branch of the Japan-American Chamber of Commerce in Kobe-Osaka, I thought the Americans needed more support than they were getting from that source. So I worked hard at keeping them aware of what was going on in the foreign policy arena. The American companies had already penetrated the Japanese market by the late 60's. We had American banks--e.g. the Bank of America--, American businesses--e.g. Goodyear-Sumitomo, Dupont--accounting firms, airlines, services--e.g. Northwest and Pan American--, construction companies--e.g. General Electric, which was building a nuclear power plant.

I did a lot of traveling, doing representational work. The consular district was very large, covering fourteen or fifteen prefectures, covering the island of Shikoku and on the main island, almost from Hiroshima to Nagoya and from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of Japan. Hiroshima was of course a place of concern; it was politically sensitive and we tried very hard to keep good relationships with that city and the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, which consisted of 50 or 60 Americans who worked there. There were many missionaries in our consular district, most of whom lived in the rural areas. I started a program in which I and one of my staff would spend a day in one prefecture, trying to explain what the American Consulate General could do for the locals in terms of services. That included not only consular services, but also trade assistance for those Japanese that wanted to trade with the United States. That program was not always successful, but I think it provided the Japanese a better understanding of why an American diplomatic establishment was set-up. I have mixed feelings about the role of constituent posts. It is not always clear to me that they are always necessary; it depends largely on the country whether they are effective and how useful they are. In the case of Osaka-Kobe, it was a very productive operation. We used to issue three or four million visas each year; that was when we still required visas for all visitors to the United States. The staff that handled that work-load consisted of only three Americans and five or six locals. It is true that most of the visas were for visitors, there were only a few immigrant visa cases processed. What helped us, of course, was the assistance of the travel agencies which filled out, or had filled out, all the basic visa application papers. They used to bring these large batches of applications for the groups that they were taking to the United States. Without the travel agencies, I don't think we could have handled the work-load with such a small staff. Many of the Japanese used to go on group tours to Hawaii or Guam; some went to the United States, mainly to the West Coast. These tour packages were relatively cheap and the Japanese are great group tourists. The large number of visitors was an indication of the economic recovery that Japan enjoyed twenty-five years after the War. The tourist agencies would charter a JAL plane, loaded it with its customers and off they went to an inexpensive hotel. It was not very expensive, but there were enough Japanese by this time who could afford that small expenditure so that the visa issuance work-load was very high. The yen in the late '60s was still 360 to a dollar--those were the great days for us.

The Osaka-Kobe consular district was also very busy on commercial matters. The two way trade between that district and the U.S. was almost as large as the U.S. trade with the

Common Market. The two-way trade at the end of the '60s was very large. The trade deficits were not yet the problem they were to become, although we could see glimmers of difficulties ahead. Much of the export from Osaka-Kobe were textiles; it also exported metals, minerals, pharmaceuticals and other manufactured goods.

Q: Tell me how it felt to be a United States representative when you visited Hiroshima--the site of our first atomic bombing?

SHERMAN: It was a remarkable experience. In Hiroshima then and even today, one can clearly see some of the destruction caused by the bomb. You can always see the ruined dome which was the site of a pre-war Exposition. You can see the Noguchi mausoleum, a memorial for the hundreds of thousands who died. That is a site that everyone visits, and the Japanese burn incense or deposit paper cranes in front of it. There is an Atomic Bomb Museum that has horrifying exhibits of the many types of damage that was done; however, the exhibits are crowded and rather poorly presented--I understand it is better today. Most of the exhibits were in large glass cases so that the horror was not as fully exploited as they might have been. Around these terrible reminders of a terrible catastrophe, the city has developed into a hustling, bustling community with a major automobile plant--Mazda had its headquarters near Hiroshima. By the late '60s the city had been rebuilt and was functioning well. As was true for all cities that had been bombed, Hiroshima was rebuilt in a much more sensible fashion with a grid, much more able to handle modern traffic than it could have managed had it remained as it was pre-war. While I was Consul General, the prefecture had a young, active governor who compared himself to John Kennedy because he had also commanded a PT boat and was about the same age. Hiroshima had one of the most active America-Japan societies in my district.

There was an American Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission which consisted of scientists studying the genetic after-effects of the radiation created by the bomb. That Commission had records on everybody who was anywhere near the epicenter, how far away they had been at the time of the explosion, etc. The Commission gave an annual physical examination to each victim. Even though working in a country like Japan, where autopsies are rare and seen as irreverent, the Commission conducted autopsies as the victims died; the local population willingly supported this deviation from their social mores. All the information was on computers. The Commission increasingly became a joint operation until today it is almost entirely Japanese managed and staffed. In my days, the Americans were in charge of the Commission and as I mentioned before, we had about 50-60 doctors and public health experts living in Hiroshima.

The Hiroshima population was warm and friendly. It was extraordinarily cooperative, even more so than in other Japanese cities. I don't want to underplay in any way the devastation that the atomic bomb caused, but Hiroshima was not taken over by drum-beating, placard-waving peace activists that might be expected and that could be seen in other Japanese cities and sometimes at international disarmament conferences where they became self-appointed advocates for "Hiroshima victims." Of course, there were many

Hiroshima citizens who had strong opinions on disarmament, but they were not the disruptive publicity seeking kinds that one found elsewhere. The United States was not criticized because it had dropped the atomic bomb. We were perceived as Japan's allies. The US presence in Hiroshima, which consisted of a small USIS library in addition to the bomb Commission, was very welcome. I used to go to Hiroshima frequently because I arrived in Osaka-Kobe two years before the 25th anniversary of the bombing which was 1970. Alexis Johnson, then our Ambassador to Japan, had not paid an official visit to Hiroshima; soon after my arrival, I organized an Ambassadorial visit. So I was in Hiroshima within the first two weeks after my arrival in Osaka-Kobe. Reischauer had, of course, been there earlier; I think he visited almost every prefecture in Japan. But I am not aware of any special attention that the U.S. establishment in Tokyo paid to Hiroshima also Reischauer may have done something special because he was the kind of person who would have thought in terms of Hiroshima's history. But in general, our Ambassadors didn't have the time or resources to devote too much attention to Hiroshima or most cities outside of Tokyo. I found Hiroshima fascinating; I felt some inspiration when I saw how the people had risen from a devastating blow and had turned their tragedy into a positive asset. The bombing was part of the city's history, which they respected, but they would not let that dominate their lives. They built a vibrant economy and looked to the future and not the past. They were more interested in re-establishing a major industrial center than in wallowing in their past.

In general, the Japanese were remarkable for overcoming their major military defeat and the scars, both physical and psychological of war. It was not so much a matter of "forgiving and forgetting" as it was a matter of perception of life as a continuing and moving experience. Events both positive and negative happen; they can not be denied, but the present and the future are more important than the sanctification of the past. The Japanese are known for their ancestor worship which is an integral of the Confucian tradition. They do not have a central and dominant religious belief -- certainly not an institutional one. Shintoism revolves around propitiation of natural deities, many representing various natural forces like wind and fire. It is not an ethical system. Confucianism is the ethical system that dominates Japan and Korea. It does not have a Supreme Being at its center like Buddhism, but it is more oriented to giving some structure to daily life. Buddhism centers on the search for perfection and the "after life". The three philosophical strains co-exist in Japan and often reinforce each other as the same person may show allegiance to two or all three strains. You are born Buddhist and you die Buddhist--there are ceremonies for each. You are married in a Shinto shrine, but you live as a Confucian. Christian penetration of Japan has been minimal; its adherents have remained at about the same number since the 17th Century--about one million, mostly Catholic. Protestant missionaries have had relatively little success in Japan unlike Korea, where they did have an impact. Japanese do not worship every week; there are holidays that are important, but religion as we know it is not a central theme in Japanese life. Many have a family shrine which is used for offerings to ancestral gods, but Japanese life does not revolve around religion.

Q: You mentioned earlier that the International Exhibition became your predominant occupation soon after your arrival in Osaka-Kobe in July 1968. Were plans already underway for that major event when you arrived?

SHERMAN: The planning for the US participation were well underway in Washington. Howard Chernoff had been named as Commissioner-General and had assembled a staff, under the aegis of USIA which was the lead agency for the Exhibition. He spent some time in raising private American financial contributions which are always necessary if the US is to make any kind of showing. He also supervised the architectural work for the US Pavilion. There was also a small staff already in being when I arrived in Osaka detached from the C.G. devoted to this major enterprise. It was going to be a big deal. Every major company was going to have at least a booth. The local Chamber of Commerce, the Rotary club and other organizations were entirely focused on the Exhibition, even though it would not open for another two years. There was a large clock in the center of Osaka which counted down the days until the opening.

Ground had not yet been broken for the US Pavilion; so I was there for the first shovel-load. Chernoff moved to Osaka in 1969. I had some experience with Expositions since I had been involved in the closing of the one that had been held in Brussels. I had noticed that Commissioner-Generals and Ambassadors seemed always to be at odds about who was the chief US representative. I was determined that such a situation would not occur in Osaka and that the State Department and Exposition staffs would collaborate fully. There would no competition for being "top dog". I saw the Exposition as a tremendous opportunity for the United States which I was not going to have messed up by "turf" warfare. There was enough work to go around for everyone. The CG was besieged by a steady stream of visitors, most of whom knew little about Japan and we anticipated having to help a lot of visitors with the usual traumas of unpleasant incidents like lost hotel reservations, lost belongings, thievery, etc. The Exhibition was scheduled to last 6-8 months, which meant that there would be an extended period of visitors, whose potential problems would be the responsibility of the Consulate General, while the Commissioner-General could concentrate on the problems of the Pavilion and the exhibitors. I called on Howard before I left Washington and then I hosted receptions for him once he had established his quarters in Osaka. So we developed a very close relationship. He was sensitive to my problems as I was to his. We tried to have our respective staffs mingle so that there was good cooperation at that level as well. In the end, I think our efforts paid off.

My days would start with a drive to our building in Osaka, which always took over an hour since I lived half-way between Osaka and Kobe. It was a long commute, even though most of it took place over a super-highway; even in those days, traffic was bumper to bumper--"natural clogging" as the Japanese would describe it. Then I might have a luncheon engagement in Kyoto which was 30-40 miles away. That was another hour's drive. After lunch, I might go to Senri Hills where the Exposition was being built. Although there was good public transportation available, my schedule was such that I had to use the car and I spent much of my time just going from one engagement to another. I

think I was in my official car on an average of 100-150 miles each day I was in the Osaka-Kobe area.

The Exposition kept me very busy. I had to represent the United States at every ground breaking ceremony, at every national day and at every reception for a Japanese or foreign VIP visitor--e.g. when Prince Charles of Great Britain or the twin sister of the Shah of Iran appeared. These social occasions invariably took place at the Exposition grounds, not in town, which meant another long round-trip. Sometimes, the foreign visit coincided with a national day celebration. Then we would send special groups to the Exhibition like Ozawa and the San Francisco Symphony; they performed at the Osaka Festival Hall. At one time, there was a film festival in honor of the Exhibition. All of these events required me, as the Consul General and the senior U.S. representative in the area, to attend some social event, unless of course I was sick or out of town. It would not have been acceptable to send a substitute. That made for a huge representational work-load, most of it meaningless and unproductive, generated primarily by the Exposition. All Consul Generals have some representational work-load, but nothing compared to one who has a major international exhibition in this geographical area. These continual social requirements started sometime before the opening of the Exposition and during the Exposition, which lasted for several months, as I have mentioned earlier. My representational responsibilities were not lightened at all by the presence of a U.S. Commissioner-General. Protocol required that we both attend this endless series of social occasions.

When I first arrived in Osaka-Kobe, I tried to establish a "management by objectives" system for the Consulate General. The consular program of course was already well established and ran smoothly and didn't need much of my supervisory time, despite the fact that we were the second largest visa issuing post in the world--Tokyo was the largest. Political and economic reporting was not a major concern, but commercial work was important. That usually consumed the work of two American officers and several local employees. The Exposition certainly increased the Commercial Section's work-load just because more American businessmen came into our district and requested information about commercial opportunities. Franchising was becoming an important aspect of business opportunities at the time. It was about this time, for example, that Kentucky Fried Chicken started in Japan with a concession at the Exposition. That was the start; other American firms soon followed with their outlets. The Commercial officers were very much involved in helping the American franchisers establish their networks in Japan. We also worked closely with the American business community to help them expand their investments. The Exposition did not have a major impact on US-Japan trade which was already well developed.

The Exposition and related activities became a major factor in our work-loads. My deputy, Rod Armstrong, put together a loose-leaf notebook, in both English and Japanese, that was intended to assist American visitors. It included such information as doctors, attorneys, hotels, restaurants, etc. A copy was available at the front desk of all the hotels in town for the use of Americans with questions or problems.. If the guest needed any

services and if he or she couldn't communicate, the hand-book was intended to overcome the language barrier. As it turned out, it was not needed nearly as much as we anticipated. We did a lot of contingency planning, but in the final analysis, we found out that the Japanese were well organized and we didn't encounter any serious problems. The most exciting event during the Exposition came when two of Czechoslovakian guides one night decided that they wanted to defect. They consulted with some of the other Exposition staff, including some American guides. The guides did not come to us and eventually changed their minds and went back to Prague.

The Exposition was a terrific boon to Osaka and to Japan as a whole, just as the Olympics had been for Tokyo and Japan in 1964. I was in Italy at the time, but I benefitted from the Tokyo Olympics because the Japanese rebuilt their city traffic paths; they built a super-highway system, which was the latest in urban planning although they have had to expand it several times since then. The Osaka Exposition did the same thing for the Kansai. A whole new network of highways and roads were constructed in and around Osaka. A whole new infrastructure arose on an amazing dimension, bringing with it thousands of jobs both in construction and other commercial enterprises. So the Exposition had an enormous impact on Osaka's economy as well as that of the region.

Q: I would like to ask about the CG's relationship with the Embassy and with the Department in Washington. Did you get much supervision from either?

SHERMAN: Not very much. In fact, I was surprised by the amount of autonomy I enjoyed. I had never been a principal officer before and it was the first time I was really on my own. I had expected closer supervision particularly by the Embassy. I was pleased that I was given as much flexibility as I did. I took pains to keep the Embassy informed of my activities and events in my district. Dave Osborn was the DCM to Ambassador Alexis Johnson and it was to him that I reported. The Embassy did not have a Supervisory Consul General--a job that was often seen in the Foreign Service in earlier years. Dave decided that a monthly letter from each of the constituent posts was adequate for supervisory purposes. That enabled him to keep track of the major events around the country. If he had any special requirements, he would phone or write. We were in touch as necessary with all of the Embassy sections when we needed help or guidance. We had a close liaison with the consular and commercial sections especially. We had a branch USIA operation in Osaka, which was autonomous. We were quartered in the same building, but the Osaka USIA office was not part of the Consulate General. This was during a period when USIS was striving for maximum independence and didn't want to have any Department of State interference with its operations. I always included the USIS Director in my staff meetings so that he could keep abreast of political and economic events; we had a close social and personal relationship, but I never tried to give him any directions or guidance. There were USIS branches in both Kyoto and Osaka; the one in Kobe had been closed before I arrived. The one in Hiroshima was closed during my tour as Consul General. We cooperated and worked well together, but I was well aware of the Agency's concern about its independence.

Some of our reports went directly to Washington; others were submitted first to the Embassy. We received all material from the Department that was sent to all posts. We only had a limited telegraphic capacity.

I thought it was important for my staff to know what was going on outside of Osaka. So I instituted a system which permitted one officer to go to Tokyo each week as a courier. He would bring back copies of all the telegrams that the Embassy had received and sent in the previous week. We rotated that assignment throughout the staff so that everybody had an opportunity to go to Tokyo. Once the cables were in the C.G., they were held, under security protection, available for all Americans to read. We didn't have access to the very highly classified material, but the bulk of the telegraphic traffic was available to us. That enabled the staff to keep current on Japanese affairs, certainly, and other world wide events of note. It kept people from becoming too insular.

That courier run was also used to bring back some of the necessities of life. When I first arrived in Osaka, the Army had a small commissary which was available to State Department employees. It was small, but since the prices for certain basic goods were sky high on the Japanese market, the commissary played a very useful economic role for our staff. For example, meat and liquor, for example, were both very expensive and sometimes scarce on the Japanese market. For those of us with representational responsibilities, it would have been prohibitive to entertain very often if we had to rely entirely on the Japanese market. The commissary closed soon after my arrival, because the US military presence in Osaka or anywhere in our consular district was almost nil by 1968. So we started to order as a group large quantities of the necessities from the commissary in Tokyo. The courier would take that bulk order with him and deliver it to the commissary. We then contracted with a shipping firm to deliver the goods from Tokyo to us.

There was some rivalry between us and the Soviets at the Exposition. We used to issue bulletins about the number of visitors each of our Pavilions hosted during a period. There was no Soviet consular representation in Osaka. Their only presence was their Exposition staff. We had the better attraction because the moon rocks retrieved by our astronauts were on exhibition in our Pavilion. That was an exclusive; no one else had them. In general, our space exhibit was great. We showed the suits worn by the astronauts, the space modules they used as well as the space ships they actually had flown. The Soviets had huge portraits of Yuri Gagarin holding a dove and mock-ups of their space vehicles which seemed to lack credibility.

We had a constant stream of visitors to the Exhibition. They frequently were my responsibility rather than Chernoff's. There were some visitors who came just to see the Commissioner-General, but most were in Osaka under State Department auspices and that meant under my charge. I would take them around the Exposition. Then there were a number of Americans who had connections in Washington who, while being in Japan, thought they just had to see the Exposition. There were a lot of Congressional delegations. Even John Rooney with his usual entourage came. I was expected to

shepherd the Congressional delegations. The Commissioner-General's office included two protocol officers who did nothing but take care of visitors.

I enjoyed my tour in Osaka. I think I left the staff more unified than I had found it when I first arrived. We started some recreational activities, like field event days with three legged races, tugs-of-war and other contests. We developed a Consul General softball team that played in local leagues. I worked hard to build morale which I think was successful. Even now when I return to Osaka now, the few local employees who are still there from 25 years ago, I am greeted warmly by them and that is very rewarding. We were fortunate to have a good local staff. Employment at the CG was prestigious even after the War and it was a long term arrangement. Our turnover as very small. That was true for the Embassy in Tokyo as well. When 30 and forty year service awards were handed out, the lines of recipients were long. I don't believe we had anyone on our staff who had worked for us before the War, but many of them stated with us right after the War. We did hire a few while I was there, but the turnover of the Japanese staff was minimal. All of our staff were very good.

I was there for the whole Exposition run. On the last day of the Exposition, I transferred directly to Tokyo to take up my job as Political Counselor.

Q: That transfer took place in September, 1970, I believe. How did that transfer come about?

SHERMAN: Armin Meyer became Ambassador to Japan in mid-1969. He was not a very successful Ambassador in Tokyo. The Embassy's morale was very low primarily because of the demands that Mrs. Meyer put on the staff. He had not any experience in East Asian affairs. His forte had been the Middle East where he was Ambassador in Lebanon and Iran. He tried to transfer what he had learned in that part of the world to Japan and had very limited success. Although he tried hard and certainly did his best, Meyer didn't empathize with the Japanese; he didn't know them or their language. So Meyer was a "new man on the block". Both he and she had chips on their shoulders particularly with respect to the Japanese experts. So the Embassy was not a particularly happy place. I had an opportunity to meet him several times when he came to visit Osaka and the Exposition. His visits were always major productions which place heavy demands on our limited staff. He came for opening day of the Exposition; he came when David and Julie Eisenhower were with us. Osaka was also the center of the Japanese textile industry and we were in the center of the US-Japan dispute about textile trade. So for all of these reasons, Meyer came to see us eight or nine times in the first year of his tour.

Meyer traveled a lot, but never visited other posts as often as he came to see us. We got along tolerably well during these visits. During one of the visits, he told me that Dick Ericson, his Political Counselor, was about to be transferred and he wanted me as the replacement. I told him that I would be pleased to take that assignment, but it almost came to nought when we had a major social misunderstanding with Mrs. Meyer. But that was overcome sufficiently that I did transfer to Tokyo. I accepted the job even though I

knew the morale situation at the Embassy. I thought that problem was manageable, particularly for the Political Counselor.

My Japanese language skills were good since I had used Japanese often while in Osaka. No one is ever bilingual in Japanese because of the many different levels of speech which can exclude a foreigner from any particular conversation. But I could express myself in Japanese and be understood. I could get along in most conversations; my Japanese came back to me in Osaka even though I had not spoken it regularly for twelve years.

Dick Sneider was the DCM. He had come to Tokyo about the same time as Meyer had. Dick had been in the NSC working on Okinawa reversion. He was assigned to the Embassy to finish off that reversion issue. But the then DCM, Osborn, was due for transfer; so Meyer, who needed a DCM, decided he would take Dick even though I think they did not know each other. It was very unusual situation because in those days most Embassies had DCM's who were known personally to the Ambassador. But the Ambassadorial position had been left vacant for six months. I don't know for sure, but common wisdom was that the job had been offered to several people who turned the offer down. It was said that John Rockefeller had been offered the job as well as some other notables with Japanese experience or contact. The story was that Armin Meyer became available after his tour in Iran and Alexis Johnson, by now the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, suggested that Meyer be sent to Japan in the absence of any other acceptable candidate who was willing to go. Alex's view was that any Career Minister in the Foreign Service should be able to take any assignment in the Foreign Service. (Incidentally, I think that is a very defensible opinion.) And that is, according to the grapevine, how Armin Meyer ended up in Japan. One night I got a call from Mr. Hotta, the head of the Sumitomo Bank, asking me whether I knew that a man by the name of Armin Meyer had been appointed to be US Ambassador to Japan. I told him that that sounded very strange in light of Meyer's unfamiliarity with the area. So I was surprised when the nomination was actually made.

Q: You had met Ambassador Meyer during his visits to Osaka. You knew the DCM, Dick Sneider. Who else was in the Embassy at the time?

SHERMAN: Herman Barger was the Economic Minister. He was followed by Les Edmond. Bill Wells was the Station Chief. Alan Carter had come to reorganize the USIA operation in Japan and therefore I knew him from his visits to Osaka. He changed USIA's presence in Japan dramatically, and in the process, of course, ran into some controversy. I knew almost all of the staff in the Political Section.

The DCM and the Political Section staff were East Asian veterans. The Economic Section had a few East Asian experts, but little Japanese language fluency. In general, the Embassy was well staffed with Japanese experts, many of whom spoke Japanese. The Political Section was all fluent in Japanese.

Q: How were our relationships with the Japanese in the early '70s?

SHERMAN: They were good, even though the Vietnam war was still going on. There were a lot of anti-US student demonstrations--it was almost a daily occurrence. All demonstrations were orderly and many quite large. There was absolutely no violence. There were also still some union demonstrations, but they also were primarily non-violent, especially since the police had become so expert in crowd control. By regulation, all the demonstrations had to follow prescribed routes and procedures. Any diversions were promptly and effectively suppressed without bloodshed. But there were a lot of demonstrations, which consisted primarily of sloganeering and chanting and yelling in front of the Embassy. The "Student League Against the War in Vietnam"--the so called *Beheiren*--was in the forefront of the demonstrations. As I said, labor was also involved as were the Socialist and Communist Parties.

The Embassy's principal task was the completion of the Okinawa reversion process. We were negotiating at all levels on all aspects of the process. We had no guidelines because the event was unprecedented in world history. Territory has rarely been returned by a victorious power, especially after it had been occupied for many years. Eventual reversion had been foreshadowed by Dulles when he expressed the view that Japan had "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa. Once that had been said, the Japanese began to center their attention on reversion. The Nixon Administration had managed to get Congressional approval for reversion, even over some opposition, particularly from the Navy. The Navy believed that its bases in Okinawa were essential for maintaining its strategic role in the Pacific, and in the final analysis, the US retained total control over those facilities. The U.S. military was the only part of the US Government that really opposed reversion. The Japanese continued to press us to give back the islands. Prime Minister Sato's statement made during this period that "the U.S. occupation of Japan will not really be over until Okinawa reversion had been accomplished" pretty well summarized the feelings of the country. Dick Sneider, who had spearheaded the reversion process in Washington just continued his role when he became DCM in Tokyo. He conducted the negotiations essentially as a personal matter; he had a small staff--mostly legal people and a Vice-Admiral, who was the Navy's watch-dog to make sure that its interests were protected--reporting to him which worked exclusively on Okinawa reversion. There were others working on Okinawa proper as the High Commissioner sought to work out an amicable procedures and negotiate with Okinawan civil officials. We in the Political Section had little to do with reversion. We were involved when Okinawa was part of larger political issues, but on a day-by-day basis, this issue was handled by Dick and his staff. Whatever economic work had to be done in connection with reversion was done by the Economic Section. We worried about making sure that the professionals in Okinawa retained their rights and privileges when the Japanese took over; we worried about traffic because on Okinawa people drove on the right hand side of the road--US style--which was not true in Japan. So a lot of changes had to occur for reversion to work. The whole reversion process took three years, followed by a short transition period.

All these negotiations took place while Vietnam was still going on; the treaty permitted us to use the bases to rehabilitate ships and equipment damaged during the war, but did

not allow planes to take off from Okinawa and fly directly to Vietnam. We had to go through the process of making a refueling stop elsewhere; the Japanese did not wish to be or to give the appearance of being directly involved in our operations in Vietnam. They supported us logistically and in many other ways. But the use of our bases in Japan to do anything other than protect or defend Japan created a Constitutional problem for the Japanese..

Later on, we had a serious problem when the Mayor of Yokohama, who was a Socialist, declared that the streets and bridges of his city were too fragile to carry the heavy tanks and equipment which were being driven to the docks for loading for shipment to Vietnam. We maintained that the US-Japan Security Treaty gave us complete rights to ship material across Japan and between US bases. The Mayor's position turned into a real confrontation and for a time we were in a complete stand-off. Finally, the Foreign Office drew a very circuitous route over mountains and other natural barriers which was certainly the long way around but didn't cross any of the Mayor's bridges. That broke the impasse and we were able to load our ships. This was just one example of the many political difficulties that the Vietnam war created for us in Japan. There were many Japanese opposed to our activities in Vietnam, that we were well aware of it on a daily basis. The Government, however, did everything it could to solve our problems and to support our position.

Q: We have talked a little about the Navy's role in the Okinawa reversion process. How in general was the US military-Embassy relationship in Japan?

SHERMAN: Alexis Johnson, when he became Ambassador, had established a position for a Political-Military Affairs Counselor, primarily to accommodate some conflicting personalities in the Embassy although I think that Johnson liked the idea anyway. He had done the same thing when he was Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. He had set up a Pol-Mil staff in his own office. The position of Political-Military Counselor was first filled by Scott George. That cut the Political Section out of direct involvement in negotiations and liaison with the military. The military-civilian relationships were conducted primarily through a series of committees that included Embassy, US military and the Japanese government, both civilian and military. Scott was replaced by Howard Meyers. Sneider, who was a Political-Military specialist, kept a close eye on political-military matters. The Ambassador was also involved though his contacts with the US Commanders in Chief of the Air Force and USFJ and with the CINC in Okinawa. When I arrived in 1970, the Embassy still had a Political-Military Counselor. When in 1972, the Okinawa reversion process had been successfully concluded, I recommended that the Embassy return to a more normal organization with the political-military work being integrated within the Political Section. There wasn't a separate section in Germany or in Italy and I didn't understand why, after reversion, there needed to be one in Japan. Howard Meyers had left by this time; Chuck Schmitz, who had been the chief lawyer working for Dick Sneider on reversion, followed Howard as the man in charge of the Political-Military Affairs office. On paper, that section was part of the Political Section. Sneider had left to be followed by Tom Shoesmith. I insisted that the Political Counselor be

responsible for political-military affairs and so it was done. It had worked that way ever since and very smoothly at that.

Our contact with the US military was on a daily basis, by phone, if not personally. The military rarely met alone with Japanese civilians in the National Defense Agency. There were of course a lot of daily contacts on a military-to-military contacts, but normally, if there were any discussions with the defense Agency, the Embassy participated. As I said, much of the work was done in committees, particularly the Joint Committee, which consisted of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Agency, the Embassy and the military of both countries. There we discussed issues arising under the Administrative Agreement, the Okinawa Reversion Agreement and other important matters. My main contact was usually the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force; the CINC dealt with the Ambassador. Our relationships were generally productive and congenial. The only problem that I can recall was that encountered by Tom Shoemith when he first arrived; he didn't see eye-to-eye with the general in charge of the military facility at Zama, who was also the same person responsible for the transportation of tanks and heavy equipment to the docks in Yokohama. The General wanted to take a strong stand and demand US "rights" to the freedom of transportation of equipment throughout Japan; Shoemith was counseling restraint. Tom was sure that a peaceful resolution could be found given enough time; the General was not willing to brook any delay. He just wanted to bull his way through the streets of Yokohama.

So periodically, there were differences between the US military and civilian arms. The military were much more inclined to pound tables and demand, even knowing Japanese reluctance to raise politically sensitive issues. But on the whole, the cooperation was good and there was no competition. Most of the issues that we discussed were related to the status of US forces. There were always problems about some incident or another caused by a GI--minor incidents of cab drivers bring robbed by a drunken GI, or some incident related to prostitutes. They were relatively infrequent and were handled at lower command levels. The more serious problems involved the question of administrative cost sharing, such as would arise whenever new housing was constructed. Also there would be questions about utility cost-sharing and the wage scales for local employees. Periodically, the citizens living around a base would complain about the noise made by airplanes landing and taking off, particularly during night exercises or about airplane interference with their TV reception or destruction of property during some military exercise. Many of these problems arose in Okinawa because our presence was so much greater there than in other parts of Japan and because Okinawa was used often for military exercises. We had some exercises in Hokkaido, but most of them occurred in Okinawa.

Q: What were the major political issues that you had to confront during the three years you were in Tokyo as Political Counselor?

SHERMAN: There was a considerable amount of disarray in the Japanese government after Sato's resignation and his replacement by Tanaka. Tanaka was a controversial figure whose ascendancy to power was a stormy affair. That turn of events created considerable

amount of reporting and analysis by the Embassy. The one-party system had been entrenched in Japan for many, many years, but it must be understood that the "one-party" label that Americans have applied to the Japanese political system is very misleading. The "one-party" label masked a number of competing factions, which made for vigorous competition in the political process. We had to follow closely what was happening in each faction.

The Socialists were viewed as a much less of a menace than they had been in the '50s and '60s. They were not pro-American by any means, particularly when it came to the Vietnam war. Of course, they had a lot of support from non-Socialists on that issue and we had to devote a lot of public relations effort to explain the US position on the war. As I mentioned before, the students especially had a field day with that issue. They not only demonstrated frequently, but sometimes would barricade their campuses, effectively closing them down. One day, an American plane ran into a tower on the campus of Fukuoka University. The plane was held captive by the students as a symbol of American war making. The campus was closed for many weeks. There were some Americans--e.g. a Buddhist priest named Brian Victoria--in the anti-war movement; he used to go on hunger strikes in front of the Embassy.

Economic tensions between the United States and Japan were just beginning. We noticed a marked increase in exports to the US, particularly TV sets and automobiles. Textiles had always been a problem. Ambassador Meyer took great interest in this trade issue, in part because textiles were such an important part of Nixon's "Southern strategy". This southern coalition was instrumental in Nixon's election; many represented states with major textile production facilities and workers, who feared the large imports of Japanese textiles. Finally, marathon negotiations were started which ended in a multi-fiber agreement, which cut back on Japanese exports. The US side was headed by Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy. He set up his offices in the Okura Hotel, and he worked from there. The Japanese resented the U.S. pressure and the resulting agreement. That is not unusual; in general, most of the negotiations end up in resentment on both sides. We also worried about citrus--particularly grapefruit--imports into Japan, which continued to be a problem for many years, although the issue has disappeared by now. The Japanese were limiting imports of citrus fruits because it competed with its own domestic production; they feared that imports would wipe out their own industry. So the early '70s saw the beginning of the trade frictions and the burgeoning of the trade deficits. We were worrying then about a potential imbalance of \$10 billion. We have of course long surpassed that!

Q: Who were your main contacts in the Japanese bureaucracy?

SHERMAN: Our main point of contact was the Foreign Ministry, where we had access to any official. We didn't have to go through the North American Bureau to talk to officials in the Foreign Ministry, unless for example the Ambassador wanted an appointment with the Foreign Minister. We made our own appointments in other parts of the Japanese government, like MITI or the Ministry of Finance. Our contacts with the Japanese

bureaucracy were daily. Then, as it is today, the Japanese bureaucracy was in control of Japanese policy. It had more power than the politicians, as it still has today. The bureaucracy's continuing strength is anchored in the Confucian social system. In ancient days, there were Mandarins; these were experts with long years of experience in the daily workings of an issue. The Japanese bureaucracy was viewed as the modern incarnation of the Mandarins. Very recently, this view has changed, and the bureaucracy is under a lot more critical attention but it is still very powerful. There was no question that in the '70s, the bureaucracy was the dominant policy making element of the government. Sometimes, it could be stymied by determined political opposition which could block necessary legislation or prevent it from being implemented, but that occurred only rarely. The Liberal Democratic Party didn't always stand united on every issue and therefore couldn't always dictate passage of every bit of legislation. Also the Japanese political system almost requires that legislation have some support from an opposition party. The so-called "tyranny of the majority" was not acceptable in Japanese politics, except on very rare occasions. The LDP would never ram legislation through the Diet without some support from one of the minor opposition party. That was just not the Japanese way -- consensus was and is essential. That society lives by consensus and the imposition of one view, even if held by a majority, is just not acceptable; some representatives of the minority have to accede. That importance of consensus is still vital in Japanese politics as it is in their personal lives. No argument can be won by reference to "I have all the chips"; concessions have to be made to minority views. It is a culture that Americans have a difficult time understanding and dealing with. Unless you have lived with it for sometime, it is very hard to understand it and deal with it. It was our job in the Embassy to try to explain this culture to Washington; it was our job to explain to the newcomers in the Embassy who might not have been familiar with it. It is important to understand the Japanese culture if we are to be successful in achieving our objectives; direct confrontation was and is just not likely to elicit the right response. We had to explain this culture difference to visiting Congressmen or any other American policy makers who were inclined to use the direct American approach. Of course, this role placed us in awkward positions at times; some Americans just viewed us as "apologists". That is true still today. There is the so-called "Chrysanthemum Club", as the old "Japanese hands" are known. We are the ones who are opposing the thunder of the American righteous wrath about Japanese trade policies, for example, when all red-blooded Americans are anxious to mount the ramparts and blast the Japanese for their "sins" in the hopes of bludgeoning the Japanese into taking actions which they are not prepared for. This cultural clash has been true throughout the history of U.S.-Japanese relations. If you look at those relations even before the war when Joseph Grew was our Ambassador in Tokyo you can see some indications of this tension. To some degree, all Embassies have to wrestle with this problem of interpreting their host society to the American policy makers, but I think that our representatives in Tokyo bear a special burden in this area.

The perception that the Embassy had "clientitis" existed in the early '70s. Meyer did not want that perception to be perpetuated and he was tough on the Japanese when it came to economic/trade issues. He was right; some of those transactions should have been brought to the attention of Washington and were. The mercantilism exhibited by the

Japanese in those days was just unacceptable. All of the Embassy agreed on that point. There were occasional efforts made to explain to Washington that change in Japanese practices could only be made through other means than direct confrontation. The debate was not about objectives; it was about means.

We also differed with Japan to a certain extent about China. They thought we were much too confrontational with the Mainland. They felt that we would be more influential if we were spoke a little more softly, thereby softening the atmosphere which might permit the Chinese to be somewhat more accommodating. That of course is exactly what took place in the Nixon/Kissinger regime starting with the "China shock". When the Kissinger visit became known in Tokyo, the Japanese were astonished. The professionals were outraged that there had not been any advance consultation, much less warning. They felt betrayed. Here was the United States actively engaged in trying to keep the Chinese Communists from taking a seat in the UN Security Council. We were conferring daily with the Japanese on this issue both in New York and in Tokyo, stirring up support for Taiwan. We had repeatedly promised that we would take no action with respect to China without prior consultation. In the final analysis, we broke our word. The Embassy knew absolutely nothing about Kissinger's trip to China; I think the Japanese came to believe that fact, but at the time it happened, they probably thought that someone in the Embassy must have known. It would have been impossible in the Japanese system for anything like that to happen. Privately, the Japanese felt that Kissinger had betrayed them, although they really had not had much contact with him. He had never visited Japan and had never shown much interest in the Far East. There was a general curiosity about the articulate National Security Advisor, but he was not a target of Japanese attention in Washington. The China trip changed all that; Kissinger got their attention!

The "China shock" was quickly followed by the "dollar shock" and the "soybean shock". No one in the Embassy was very happy about those and I doubt that anyone in the Bureau for Far Eastern Affairs in State was very happy. Marshall Green was the Assistant Secretary at the time and he was totally surprised. The Japanese found it very hard to accommodate themselves to these major lunges in US policies. They all came as surprises to one degree or another and had no history of consultation behind them. The American decision-making process is so culturally different from that of the Japanese that the effects of policy changes were greatly magnified just by the cultural differences. Everybody in the Embassy was dismayed by the shift in our China policy. Many supported closer relationships with Peking; indeed "ping-pong" diplomacy started in Tokyo. By sheer accident, Bill Cunningham, who worked for me and who happened to be a China expert, was walking out of the Embassy and overheard the Marine Guard at the front desk talking on the phone telling a caller that he couldn't do something or other. He heard enough of the conversation to raise his curiosity; so he asked the Marine Guard what the conversation was all about. It turned out that an American ping-pong team coach was calling because he and his players had been invited to go to China and wanted to know whether it would be all right. Bill immediately cabled Washington about this invitation. We of course did not know that Kissinger had been in contact with the Chinese and that this invitation was part of a diplomatic dance that was on-going and that in fact

was a response to Kissinger's "feelers". It was pure chance that the "ping-pong" trip could have been scotched by a Marine Guard; also Armin Meyer was very reluctant to have the Embassy recommend that the players be permitted to go to China. Nevertheless, a reporting cable was sent which became one more step in the "opening to China" process.

Q: Who was the Japanese Country Director when you were in Tokyo and how were Embassy-Washington relationships in the early '70s?

SHERMAN: The Country Director was Dick Ericson, who took that job after I had succeeded him in Tokyo. We had generally good and productive relationships with Washington. The key was the DCM's relationship with the Country Director. there were nightly telephone calls between the two as well as other phone conversations between Tokyo and Washington on specific issues. We were well served by Washington. Our relationships with other agencies were also very good. I certainly had no problems and I don't remember anyone else in the Embassy having any serious issues with other agencies. A number of them of course worked quite independently, such as Treasury. The Embassy, as a whole, was quite effective in these days. After Ambassador Meyer left and after Bob Ingersoll replaced him in the Spring, 1972, the Embassy worked on much more of an "even keel".

Ingersoll had just retired from Borg-Warner. He had no knowledge of Japan. He had to go through an education process to which he took extremely well. He listened carefully and absorbed ell. He was energetic. He saw his role as an American businessman talking to Japanese businessmen. He did that often and extremely well. He permitted us to continue our daily contacts with the Japanese government without micro-managing them. We kept him informed, but he didn't intervene on day-to-day matters. He was a good economist and knew and understood trade both in theory and in practice since he had worked for Borg-Warner. I thought he performed very well.

Q: In March, 1973 you were assigned to the Office of Personnel in Washington. How did you get so lucky?

SHERMAN: When it became time to leave Japan, there was no other appropriate assignment immediately available. I had always enjoyed personnel work; I had always thought that being a senior personnel career counselor would be interesting. I let it be known that if a vacancy was to occur in that branch of Personnel, I would be interested. And so it happened. Of course, my return to Washington became a matter of urgency because the assignment season was late-winter. So I left Mary Jane and our youngest child in Tokyo so that he could finish school and I returned to Washington in March.

By 1973, the responsibility for assignments had been placed in the Office of Personnel. The office for Senior Personnel assignments consisted of three officers--Tom Recknagel headed up that office reporting to Bob Brewster, who was the Deputy Personnel Director who ran the assignment process for the Director General. The two other officers split assignment responsibilities on a geographic and functional basis. I handled East Asia,

Latin America, the Bureau for Economic Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. We tried to find assignments for people below the Ambassadorial and DCM levels. An ambassador still had the right to choose his own DCM, but was no longer able to pick and chose any officers below that level. All senior assignments were made by the Office of Personnel in consultation.

I thought the personnel system worked relatively well in those days. Essentially, the assignments were appropriate for an officer's skills, ability and career. The Bureaus' interests were generally protected, but then this was before the Department went into the "bids for assignment" mode. We negotiated most assignments with the Bureau and we frequently consulted with the officer under consideration by telephone to his or her overseas post. We wanted to make sure first of all that they ere aware of the possible opening and secondly that they were reasonably satisfied with our intended assignment. We had the usual surplus of senior personnel, but it was manageable with temporary assignments and special tasks. The morale of the senior cadre was not too bad in the mid '70s. Morale in the Foreign Service is never good, but it was certainly better than that which exists today. The process was working relatively smoothly; assignments were being made promptly and far enough in advance to permit some planning on part of the officer and the post.

Unfortunately, I spent part of my tour on sick leave recovering from a back operation. By mid-1974, Dick Sneider was nominated to be our Ambassador in Korea and he took Dick Ericson with him to be his DCM. That left vacant the job of Japan Country Director. I was the only person immediately available who had had experience in that part of the world. So that shortened my tour in Personnel, but I looked forward to working the Japan desk.

Q: What was the Bureau for East Asian Affairs like in 1974?

SHERMAN: I reported for duty just around the time when Bob Ingersoll returned from Tokyo to become the Assistant Secretary. Ingersoll had been appointed when Mac Godley could not win confirmation because of his alleged involvement in the Laos fiasco. Kissinger had just moved from the White House to his offices on the Seventh Floor. Ingersoll only stayed for about six months before being promoted to Deputy Secretary and was then followed by Phil Habib. Bob was the nicest person, but he was really a neophyte in the Washington bureaucracy. He worked hard at being Assistant secretary and had good policy sense. He was determined to serve the Secretary as best he could, but I think he eventually found the role of Deputy Secretary hard to accept because he found himself working on all the issues that Kissinger didn't want to touch. That made him the Department's front man on many sticky matters. Habib was replaced by Art Hummel in mid-76 when Phil became Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I spanned three Assistant Secretaries. Habib was the most interesting one to work for. He was the most exciting boss that I ever had.

As Japan Country Director, I first reported to Dick Sneider, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for a brief time before going to Korea in the summer of 1974. Then Owen Zurhellen succeeded Sneider. He lasted for less than a year because he offended Kissinger in 1975 and was shipped out as Ambassador to Suriname. Zurhellen ran into trouble when the Japanese Prime Minister was due for a Washington visit. The event had not been publicly announced. The President, Kissinger and a number of VIPs were scheduled to take a trip to Europe, but it was not publicly known that the President was going to extend the trip to Romania and perhaps to another country. In any case, no one knew for sure when he would return to the United States. I brought the Japanese Ambassador to see Kissinger before his departure on this European trip. The Ambassador wished him well and said that he hoped that all was set for the Prime Minister's visit. Kissinger asked in his usual elliptical fashion: "Mr. Ambassador, would a postponement of a couple of days make a great deal of difference to the Prime Minister?" The Ambassador thought that was manageable as long as the visit dates had not been publicly announced. Once the visit was public and so announced to the Diet, it could not be changed; that would create a disastrous P.R. problem. The President and his entourage went off to Europe and the plans for the Prime Minister's visit proceeded. When it became apparent that the President would not return on his previously announced schedule, Zurhellen, then acting Assistant Secretary in Habib's absence--he was out of the country--told us to keep sending telegrams to the Secretary asking about when the Japanese Prime Minister might be welcomed. We told the Secretary that the announcement would be made soon; each cable had a stronger note of urgency because we knew that the Japanese might announce the visit at any time. We kept asking for guidance because if the dates were not satisfactory, we would have to tell the Japanese immediately, if not sooner. We spelled out the consequences; i.e. once the dates are announced, there could be no changes. Cable after cable went unanswered; we got nothing but silence back from Kissinger. No guidance at all. The Japanese schedule was announced in the Diet. The President and Kissinger returned one night; the next morning the Japanese Prime Minister arrived at ten o'clock.. By this time, Habib had returned and he and I and Zurhellen were summoned see Kissinger for a briefing. Habib was asked to step into the office alone. I was later told that the Secretary gave him holy hell; then he called Zurhellen and me into the office and yelled and screamed at us. He asked how we could have let such a thing happen. The President and his staff had just returned from a long trip; they were exhausted. They couldn't possibly receive the Prime Minister and his delegation. He really raved and ranted; Zurhellen tried to explain that we had sent cable after cable asking for guidance. Henry would not be placated; he just thought that we had failed miserably and completely. The Prime Minister's visit came and went, as did Zurhellen soon thereafter. We never found out what happened to our cables. It would be tempting to think that the staff screwed up since the volume of traffic to the Secretary was always very high when he traveled, but I think it is more likely that Kissinger just wanted to wait; he was well aware of the matter and decided for whatever reason not to pay any attention. I am sure that he could have found a few minutes to give us some guidance; he was tireless and always on the go. But he didn't choose to do so and until today I don't know how and why the whole mess developed.

Then Oscar Armstrong became the DAS for a while; he was followed by Bill Gleysteen who stayed there until he became Ambassador to Korea in 1978.

I mentioned earlier that the concept of Country Director was born during Crockett's regime. By the time I became Japan Country Director, the theory had become well entrenched in practice. I had wide ranging authority to monitor and direct most of the activities that took place in and with Japan. The China Country Director operated in a similar fashion. Both of the occupants of that position had a lot of credibility within the Department and within the U.S. government. In fact, I think the whole Bureau operated as envisioned by Crockett and others. Both within the Department and the U.S. government, East Asian country directors were viewed as linchpins of policy making and implementation. Scott George was then the German Affairs Country Director. We would often say that we had the best jobs in the Department; the problems and issues for both of us were major and of course we handled matters that pertained to two of the most important countries in the world. I would not say the same thing for all other parts of the Department.

Phil Habib gave me a lot of leeway. Once he came to know me, he relied on my advice and provided a lot of support. Phil would be quick to run with the ball if he thought he could do it better than anyone else; he thought that most of the time. But once he was convinced that you could do a satisfactory job for him, he tended to keep supervision at a minimum. I had a very good relationship with him.

Phil's trademark was to appear to be enraged by anything that was going on at the moment. He would always find fault with what was done; he never seemed satisfied. He would bluster and shout, particularly with Dan O'Donohue, at every staff meeting. Dan was the Korea Country Director. Dick Sneider used to refer to himself as the "Charge for Korean Affairs" because Phil always tried to micro-manage Korean programs. Actually, Phil and Dan were very close, and Phil helped Dan in his career on many occasions. But you had to understand Phil's *modus operandi*; otherwise you would be overwhelmed and respond in exactly the wrong way and be left in utter oblivion. I did not know Habib before he came to the Bureau, but I quickly adapted to this boisterous exterior. He would ask a few questions out of the corner of his mouth and then he would grumble some instructions. He always had some gracious comment at the end to the effect that he could have done the job better and quicker himself. If you understood him, you didn't take pay any attention to these rumblings. Indeed, I think I developed very close relationship with Phil Habib. He started out being suspicious of Japan and of Japan experts, but that didn't last very long. Soon, as I said, he came to trust my work and judgement and I found him to be a most inventive and persuasive leader. He was always ready to take up your cudgel if that were necessary. At one point, during the Miki visit, the Prime Minister wanted to modify slightly the security relationship between the United States and Japan. He was seeking some minor change in the Far East security clause of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty. Miki just wanted to move Japan slightly away from the responsibility it had under the security treaty for considering a threat to the security of the Korean peninsula as a threat to the security of Japan.. He didn't quite know how to go about doing it. Kiki Kuriyama,

then the Political Counselor at the Japanese Embassy and I spent days finding an acceptable formulation for this relatively minor change. We finally agreed on a statement that said that the security of Korea was essential to the security of the Far East, which seemed to satisfy Miki as being sufficiently different. None of the rest of us saw it as a change of existing policy or formulations, but it appeared to satisfy Miki's domestic political requirements to present himself as somewhat more independent of the United States than had been the case with his predecessors. After we finally had come up with satisfactory language, we had to get Kissinger's approval. It was one of those days when no one could get to the Secretary through established channels. That evening, at a small White House working dinner, hosted by Ford, to which, much to my surprise I was invited, I carried with me the text and sat on it during the meal). This had been worked out in advance. As we left the table--there were about thirty guests--Habib took the paper and grabbed Kissinger and briefed him on the change. The Secretary looked at it and grumbled and said "okay", but only if the Japanese would publicly state that US-Japan relations had never been better. That was an easy task and so we wrapped it up. But it was an interesting illustration how diplomacy sometimes is conducted.

Furthermore, Habib was loyal to his troops almost to a fault. He could yell at us, but he would not permit anyone else to do so. No one, but no one, could criticize his "boys and girls". He was probably more adept at handling Kissinger than any other Assistant Secretary in the Department.

The relationship with Habib in addition to the policy challenges, made the Japan job an exciting one. It kept me on my toes all the time partly because I worked for a capricious and unpredictable Secretary of State who would become involved in problems and then just as quickly become disengaged. Fortunately, he did not involve himself in Japanese affairs very often--he had more urgent matters to attend to. But every once in a while, Japan would come up on his screen and then we would have to find ways of satisfying him. Usually, the matters that he became involved in were very petty. He was always trying to recover his status in Japan which had plummeted after the "China shock". He tended to dismiss Japanese sensitivity to having been ignored on the China initiative. He used to defend himself by saying that information leaked out of Japan faster than any other place in the world and therefore it would have been too risky to share his plans with the Japanese. Any time his name appeared in the Japanese media, Kissinger seemed to find out about it. If the story was even remotely viewed as critical, he would call Habib and ask for an explanation. He always felt aggrieved by these stories and always wanted them stopped. That is an illustration of the matters in which Kissinger became involved. He stopped in Japan on several occasions and he saw Japanese Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers in Washington on a number of occasions. The first visit, which came shortly after the new Administration was inaugurated, was scheduled after Prime Minister Miki through his son who was a student in Washington inquired whether he could make contact with the new team. The son went to see Jim Wickel who was the Department's official Japanese translator and worked for me in The Office of Japanese Affairs. Miki said that his father wanted to have this contact, but found it difficult to initiate it. He would however send Miyazawa then the Foreign Minister, to meet with Kissinger

secretly. When we informed Kissinger of Miki's plans, he was delighted because he loved to operate in this fashion -- that is hidden from public view. But Miyazawa dawdled around and didn't schedule any meeting. He instead wrote a letter asking whether he and Kissinger couldn't get together at some international meeting that might take place in the near future. That of course didn't please Kissinger at all; he thought he was being led around by some upstart who didn't understand how to conduct international diplomacy. So when the Foreign Minister finally did arrive, he was scheduled to meet Kissinger at 10:00 a.m. He arrived punctually at the scheduled time only to find that Kissinger was at the White House (where he was writing his annual "State of the World" report). So Bob Ingersoll received the Foreign Minister and hosted a lunch for him. The Japanese reporters were very upset by what they perceived to be a major insult and breach of protocol. Finally, Habib and Eagleburger prevailed on Kissinger to return to the Department. So toward the end of the meal, in sweeps Kissinger, full of apologies and contrition. Miyazawa, who spoke excellent English, was able to make few well chosen points, but at the end, all was smoothed over. Kissinger said that he had "to return to the White House to translate his report from German.", but that he would host another lunch for the Foreign Minister the next day. Luckily this could be told to the Japanese reporters before their deadline and nobody reported that their Foreign Minister had been snubbed. It ended well, but for a while, the atmosphere was very tense and we were on edge of a precipice. If Kissinger had not arrived when he did, the reports back to Japan would have been very harsh indeed.

We spent sometime worrying about trade, although those issues had not risen to the decibel level of the last ten years. The trade imbalance was probably on the order of \$7-8 billion at the time, which seemed huge in those days, but was not close to the today's level. There were people in our government--Commerce and Treasury--who were concerned with the imbalance. There was some interest shown by Congress, but little on the part of private industry. The list of commodities under scrutiny were the standard ones: textiles, citrus, automobiles, television sets. The pressure to do something about the deficit was just beginning to build, but it was not yet the major preoccupation.

We focused primarily on security issues. We worried about Japanese contributions to the support of our forces in Japan and the self-imposed Japanese budget limitation of 1% of GNP for defense expenditures. DoD was pressing us to take a stronger position on this defense expenditures issue; they wanted the Japanese to spend more. We did in fact pressure the Japanese on this questions through the Ford and Carter administrations, but it was essentially an unproductive initiative. The Japanese did not take kindly to us telling them they had to spend X percentage of GNP on defense. The Reagan administration, in addressing the problem, talked in different terms. I think this primarily due to the influence of Rich Armitage. The US in the '80's did not talk about levels or amounts of expenditures, but rather discussed the issues in terms of roles and missions that Japan had agreed to undertake after joint consultations. We then said that sufficient amounts had to be spent to conduct those roles and missions without ever specifying exact levels of expenditures. That put the issue in a much more acceptable framework for the Japanese.

Q: Does that comment suggest that the other parts of the US bureaucracy had little understanding of Japanese culture and modus vivendi?

SHERMAN: I think that was true. It is the standard complaint of the expert. Japan is different from a Western country and even from other Asian countries. That fact requires that a lot of education be provided for those in the US government who are not familiar with Japanese customs and mores. We spent some time explaining Japanese perspectives and motivations for their behavior. That doesn't mean that we should not try once in a while to change their behavior or their policies, nor should any one in the US government take on the role of apologist for the Japanese. But if you want behavior modification, you have to understand how that can be done in the Japanese framework. US goals can be achieved with a minimum of bruised feelings if approached in manner acceptable to Japanese society. It has been done and continues to be done in certain instances. The most effective way to change Japanese behavior is to identify common points of interest rather than the points of disagreement. Japanese do not respond well to a confrontational style of negotiations. They do respond to consensus and compromise which is carefully worked out. It is important for negotiators to insure that "face" is not lost on the part of either side. Too often these important, and sometimes vital, aspects of negotiating with the Japanese are ignored by Americans, who view using these tactics as "coddling of the Japanese" who, they feel, are smart enough to do things the American way. There are easier, better and probably more successful ways of negotiating with the Japanese than the tactics we use today and did in the '70s as well. There is always someone in the US bureaucracy who wants to bull his or her way through the "Japan shop". That perhaps is an appropriate tactic if all else has failed; sometimes the "shock" approach is the only one that will work, but we must recognize that every time we use the direct and forceful approach, we pay a price. I was very fortunate that Habib particularly understood that question; if he didn't, he trusted that I did. Both Habib and Hummel relied on the advice of their country directors and that made for a smooth working operation.

My relationships with the Pentagon were good, in general. I worked primarily with ISA. For part of my tour, I worked with a War College classmate who was in ISA handling Japanese matters. In the Department, we worked with the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and that worked well. Of course, it helped that by the time I had finished my tour as Country Director, I had lasted in that position longer than any of my predecessors and I should add, longer than any of my successors, even though it was only three and a half years. But that gave me a familiarity with issues that many others did not have. I set a record which I don't think has been broken to date. I don't think that length of service in a particular position gives a State Department official an advantage in the Washington bureaucratic in-fighting. I do think that State is at a disadvantage in that arena because its officers serve overseas more than they do in Washington. Washington is a unique environment that requires some familiarity with its processes. Bureaucratic in-fighting is a skill that Foreign Service officers either do not have or do not cultivate and therefore that puts them at some disadvantage in the Washington environment. The State Department officials who navigate well in Washington are often the civil servants who do not serve overseas, but are in Washington all the time. It is the constant rotation between

Washington and overseas that puts a Foreign Service Officer at some disadvantage when he works in Washington. We don't know where the power lies either within the Department or in other agencies. And we don't have the opportunity to build up the personal relationships which the civil servants develop over decades.

Q: What other agencies were you in close contact during this period?

SHERMAN: In those days, the NSC was in tight control of inter-agency contacts. They supervised inter-agency work closely to insure proper coordination and control. This was the period when Kissinger was both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. That "dual hatted" role did not affect us in our daily work. The Seventh Floor and the NSC had their own channel of communications so that both staffs were fully apprized on current matters. So we didn't have to worry about keeping both staffs apprized; their coordination was very good. The Seventh Floor was, as far as we were concerned, Kissinger and his close collaborators. Despite the fact that Ingersoll was the Deputy Secretary, he had little, if any involvement in Japanese affairs. The same thing happened when Habib became Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Even he didn't get involved in Japanese matters. We had semi-annual planning talks with the Japanese, which were led on our side by the Policy Planning staff. The Japanese delegation was headed by their Foreign Ministry's Office of Research and Intelligence. Win Lord--the Director of the Policy Planning Staff--, Sam Lewis--his deputy--and I would go to Japan for the meetings, most of which were held in remote locations to minimize outside distractions. We would talk about world problems and try to coordinate where we could our policies. Then six months later, the Japanese would come to the US and we would continue our discussions. The focus of these talks were global issues, to US-Japan relations. I thought that these exchanges were useful; Win Lord seemed to enjoy them as had his predecessors. They helped maintain close relations with the Japanese.

We also had separate discussions on China and the Middle East, although Japan's involvement in that part of the world was very limited and didn't grow until later. The Japanese participated fully in these discussions; the issues were of interest to them. They did not however try to stake out independent policy positions; they were primarily interested in being brought up to date on our views. They tried to support us as productively as possible on our positions. In those days, the key goal of Japanese foreign policy was to maintain close relationships with the United States and to support us to the best of their abilities in our global goals. We agreed that the Japanese basic policy was correct; we did not try to push them to be more active. We were very mindful of the limitations imposed on the Japanese by their Constitution and did not try to urge them beyond the limits of foreign policy activity that they had decided on. Their Constitution prohibited military alliances outside of the United Nations and limited Japanese participation in military strategic planning. At the time, we did not see Japan as a possible surrogate for our policy in any parts of the world. We did believe that Japan could play a constructive role in the area surrounding that country. We thought Japan could be a stabilizing force, particularly in the economic field and especially in Southeast Asia. We didn't expect much, if any, political leadership from Japan because neither we or the

Japanese could foretell what the reaction of other Asian countries might be if the Japanese were to try to bring any massive political influence to bear. The scars of World War II were still too fresh in Asia to expect any of those countries to follow the Japanese on political issues. The Japanese would have been willing to play a constructive role, but were not about to rush in where they might not be wanted and we were certainly not going to push them faster than they wanted to go, in the mid-70s, at least.

We thought that the Japanese could still play a constructive role on China in this period. It was still early in our relationships with mainland China, we had just been re-initiated only a few years earlier. The Japanese, by now, had more or less gotten over the "China shock" and they were anxious to support as much as they could our opening to China. They followed our lead; they would not stake out an independent path, but they did give us full support as an independent nation dealing with China. We thought that the Japanese could be very helpful in assisting China's economic development. There were several large projects, like the Chumen oil fields, which the Japanese supported.

Once the Shanghai communique had been issued, we did not believe that the Mainland-Taiwan issue was any longer a major impediment to Far East stability. We essentially viewed those tensions as resolved by the communique. Essentially, we did not see the United States having a policy in the Far East independent of the over-all Cold War strategy that governed all of our foreign policy strategies. In the Far East, as well as in all other parts of the world, all major issues were viewed through the Cold War prism. For example, we viewed Japan as a logistic and intelligence base for our confrontation with the Soviet Union--the "unsinkable" aircraft carrier--300 miles away from the Pacific end of the USSR. Japan provided a base for air coverage of the eastern portion of the Soviet Union, if that became necessary. Our bases in Japan were well located to provide a very potent strategic arm which would, while forward bases for our defense, could at the same time be a vital component of Japan's defense. Our problem was to manage this defense concept in a political manner acceptable to them so that it would not infringe on their strict constitutional limitations on military actions. The government undoubtedly understood that it was part of our "containment policy", but it had to be careful in its explanation to its citizens of its defense expenditures and policies. The political opposition stood firm in its strict interpretation of the Constitution which prohibited Japan to be involved in any military operations except self-defense.

The NSC official for Japanese affairs was Dick Smyser, a Foreign Service Officer. He had responsibility for all Far East issues. He was an expert on Vietnam having worked with Kissinger in this issue for sometime. He and I talked almost every day. Whenever the NSC wanted to reach a policy decision or adjudicate an inter-agency dispute, it would issue a NSSM. The bureaucracy would crank one up and then a Presidential decision would be made.

We kept in close touch with the intelligence community and Defense Department. The intelligence community served us well and was quite responsive to our needs.

There wasn't enough Congressional interest in this period on Japanese affairs to require me or any of my staff to spend much time with Members of Congress or staffers. If there were any hearings, they were handled by the Assistant Secretary or sometime by the Deputy Assistant Secretary. I remember that I briefed one Congressman one time; he was the chairman of the Far East subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Soon after that, he was moved to another subcommittee.

Q: I would like to just briefly return to the question of the Japanese bureaucracy. Did you have any difficulty dealing with that bureaucracy in the 1974-77 period?

SHERMAN: No. The Japanese bureaucracy was, by and large, essential to the operations of the Japanese government. It was more important to work with the bureaucracy than it was to work with the politicians. Regardless of what might have been said about it, I think the Japanese bureaucracy is still the largest single collection of well-trained and idealistic--in their own terms--people in Japan. They feel that they have a mandate to get a job done and they get it done, most of time well and in a timely fashion--according to their clocks. I dealt again primarily with the Foreign Ministry, although I also had contacts with MITI and the Finance Ministry. Later on, when assigned to Tokyo, I also became acquainted with other Ministries, such as Postal and Telecommunications--which has been causing so much trouble on the current Motorola issue--, and the Health and Welfare Ministry--on import of medical equipment, and the Justice Ministry--on American lawyers practicing in Japan. Those Ministries are much more narrowly focused and domestically-oriented. They have little knowledge, and perhaps even interest, in international affairs and therefore are much more difficult to deal with, unlike their sophisticated counterparts in the Foreign Ministry and MITI. In the '74-77 period, these American investment and export issues were just beginning to emerge; they of course became serious bones of contention in later years.

This period between 1974 and 1977 was very active. The Japanese Emperor paid his first visit to the United States. It was of course purely ceremonial and strictly governed by protocol. The Emperor had done a little travel outside his country, but not much. So the Japanese required strict conformance to their practices, not for security reasons, but just because that was protocol. They were greatly concerned that the royal institution not be minimized in any way. Practically, the whole Imperial Household Agency was in the US at one time or another checking on this or that detail. For example, the Emperor was scheduled to visit Shea Stadium to see a football game--baseball season had unfortunately passed by the time he visited. The Japanese called Angier Biddle Duke's office in New York--he was then the city's Chief of Protocol--wanting to find out how many times a visitor had been booed at the Stadium. They were assured that it would not happen to the Emperor and it didn't. The visit went very well; in fact, as the Emperor was leaving, just before the game concluded, some fan raised his beer cup and said: "Thanks for coming, Emp!" The Japanese also insisted vigorously that the Emperor would not have his picture taken except with another chief of state or that he would not sign any guest books. Of course, in the final analysis, the Emperor had his picture taken with everybody from the President to Mickey Mouse. He signed every guest book that was put in front of him,

signing "Hirohito" in laborious Japanese script. He was very human and warm and the trip and the pictures that came from it did wonders for his image in Japan. The Japanese had never seen that side of their Emperor's personality, and they liked it. It was a typical case of staff over-protection. He had a marvelous visit. We were deeply involved in the trip's plans down to the last detail. It took months. I was supposed to accompany the Emperor during his U.S. stay, but unfortunately my mother died at the time and I had to send a substitute. She died slowly over a six-weeks period and I wrote a note to Phil Habib saying that I couldn't devote full time to the Emperor's trip. I suggested that he bring someone else to the desk to take over my responsibilities. Habib called me immediately after he had read my note, saying that I should not worry about the visit and that arrangements would proceed as planned. They did and the visit was a great success. The Emperor very kindly gave me a gift: a box which I still have and an autographed picture of him and his Empress.

Q: In June, 1977 you transferred to Tokyo as the Deputy Chief of Mission. How did that come about?

SHERMAN: Mike Mansfield had been selected to become our new Ambassador to Japan. I don't know exactly how the selection was made. I had known Mansfield, although not well. During my first Foreign Service Officer assignment, I worked with Congressman Mansfield when he was part of the US Delegation to the UN General Assembly. Later, while I was assigned to Rome, he came for the coronation of Paul VI and as I explained earlier, I was the control officer for that delegation. I escorted him and Maureen Mansfield around at the time for three or four days, along with Earl Warren, Rabbi Lewis Finkelstein, Charles Englehardt and others.

Of course in 1976, there was an election in the US won by Jimmy Carter. Within ten days of his inauguration, Carter sent Mondale to Tokyo for discussions with the Japanese. In the meantime, Dick Holbrooke had been named as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. So Japan was high on the foreign policy agenda of the new administration and that kept us hopping during the first half of 1977. In the Spring of that year, the new Ambassador had been selected and the DCM selection process begun. I was due for an overseas assignment in any case and Holbrooke was in the process of restructuring the whole Bureau to meet his own needs and desires. I was of course hoping that I would be selected by Mansfield to be his DCM and I was very glad that he did so. Before he made his selection, I escorted him around in all of his meetings around Washington. I arranged all the meetings and went with him. So I got to know Mansfield relatively well during his indoctrination period.

Mansfield had traveled widely and therefore was familiar with the role of a U.S. Ambassador. Hodgson had left Tokyo in February, 1977 so that the post had been run by a Charge' Tom Shoemith for several months. When Mansfield's appointment became public, Hodgson flew to Washington to brief the Mansfields. on his experiences. As far as Mansfield was concerned, he did what he had always done: consider the question carefully, reach a decision on what was right and then do it. He never had a problem

engaging the Japanese; he was just a very skilled leader who knew how to approach issues and get them resolved if he could. Mansfield did not see himself as a manager of a US establishment; he viewed himself as a symbol of the American presence in Japan. He was the President's personal representative and felt responsible for the image of America in Japan. He was at first very reluctant to be a highly visible Ambassador; he wanted to limit his public appearances to no more than two or three per annum. His initial inclination was to view his assignment as a semi-retirement. That of course, changed rapidly once he became ensconced in Tokyo. He communicated frequently with the media, both American and Japanese. He did like to meet with individuals, often early in the morning. He was always polite and attended even routine ceremonial functions because he was the Ambassador, even when he personally would have preferred to do something else. He became famous for his ability to walk in the front door of a National Day reception, shake a few hands, often have his picture taken and be gone in a few minutes. He moved into an active role very slowly and somewhat reluctantly. He acted very much like David Bruce did in London. Bruce met with the Queen and the Prime Minister and perhaps a few key Cabinet officers, but never with lower officials. Of course, the way Mansfield decided to be an ambassador was very much a function of his own personality. I don't think the role he defined was done consciously, but he molded the Ambassadorial role to fit his own style and behavior.

Mansfield very rapidly established close ties to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The Japanese held him in awe; he was by far the most important American politician who had ever been appointed as Ambassador. They were overjoyed by the appointment because it signified to them that the new US administration held Japan in highest regards. While in Tokyo, Mansfield tried very hard to maintain his contacts with the US Congress. He always said that he had no ambition to return to Congress after his stint as Ambassador except perhaps to escort a foreign Prime Minister. He used to say that he had enjoyed his years in Congress, but that he would not return to serve. He did so when he came back to Washington go to Congress just to discuss the "good old days", but, as I said, he would escort the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister whenever they visited Washington. He was always right there whenever these key Japanese would meet the Foreign Relations Committee or Senators or Congressmen. That was always very helpful to the Japanese because Mansfield would be the "gate opener" and would lend his prestige to their discussions with members of Congress.

He would always host any Congressional members who might be in Tokyo. He would personally brief them and would exchange views with them. He was always well informed on trade statistics, for example. He could tell each Congressman exactly what the trade between his or her State, in some cases even district, with Japan was at the time. He never forgot a statistic. He always knew what was important to these members of Congress; he had never forgotten the lessons he had learned as Majority Leader. He was very skilled in handling Members of Congress. He never used these occasions to ask for any Congressional action or favor. He would present the case as he saw it and would then leave to his audience to take whatever action it considered appropriate. I think that on a couple of occasions, Dick Holbrooke asked Mansfield to take on a couple of political

assignments--lobbying. The issues had nothing to do with US-Japan relations. Mansfield refused; he didn't even do any political work for the Administration in his home state of Montana. After having left Congress, he never used his ties or connections to do any political work of any kind.

He never demanded that he be kept abreast of anything, except perhaps occasionally on economic statistics. He may have asked the IRS representative to help him with his income taxes, but he never demanded anything. He expected the staff to let him know what it considered important. I made certain that he saw every important substantive cable from the Embassy. He was always the first in the office. The Marine Guard would give him the key to his office suite. He would start the day by reading the newspapers. Because of his careful readings, he was extraordinarily well informed on both American and Japanese current events. I would get to the office around 7:30 a.m. and start my day by having a cup of coffee with the Ambassador. Some days that session would last a few minutes; some days it lasted two hours. Sometimes, he would reminisce about his political life; sometimes he would want to discuss a Japanese political issue or about mutual security affairs or about events of the day or the week or about internal Embassy matters. I was never quite sure what the subject of the day's conversation might be, although I always had an agenda that I wanted to cover with him. Sometimes he would suggest some form of communication to be sent to the Department--and he would usually say: "Make it strong, Bill". Sometimes he would ask for a personal message to the President or the Secretary to be drafted for his signature. That insured that his views were always well known in Washington on the major issues. As far as I remember, he never called the President; he didn't feel he had to and in any case, he hated telephones. He would see the President whenever he was in Washington, almost every time. Same with Secretary of State; he rarely called Vance from Tokyo. Holbrooke would call him from Washington and Mansfield would talk to him, although very reluctantly. Sometimes, he would refuse to take the call; I would then get on the phone and tell Holbrooke that the Ambassador didn't want to talk to him. Holbrooke could barely believe his ears. I remember one day, while I was back in Washington for consultation, Holbrooke called Mansfield because some private group--it may have been the Council for Foreign Relations or something like that--were visiting Tokyo and had not been invited for any kind of social occasion by anyone in the Embassy. The members of this private group had expressed some dismay to Holbrooke. Dick thought that Mansfield should make some kind of effort. He was about to call the Ambassador when I intervened and suggested that he would be wasting his time. Fortunately, Holbrooke thought better of it and didn't call. He would not have received a very cordial reply from Tokyo! In addition to his personal reluctance to host large receptions, you must remember that both Ambassador and Mrs. Mansfield were children of the depression. They barely scraped through their youths. Spending money came hard to them, particularly for what appeared to be frivolous matters. We had a very hard time convincing Maureen to spend money for representational purposes, even if were not her own. She was a little more relaxed about spending the government's money, but there was always a struggle about the size of a guest list for any function at the residence. I tried to stay as far away from issues of that kind as I possibly could. Some of Mansfield's predecessors--particularly Jim Hodgson,

who was a business man--had made the Residence available for what were social functions sponsored either by Department of Commerce or Agriculture trade teams or even American private business groups. These groups would either pay the costs directly or reimburse the Embassy. Soon after the Mansfields' arrival, someone called Mrs. Mansfield and told her that there would be a social occasion at the Residence that evening and wanted to make sure that there would be sufficient sustenance for the guests. Maureen was outraged by the call; after that, I issued instructions that the Residence would not be available for that kind of activity. I added that only the Ambassador could determine what events would take place there, that he would be the sole host and that all costs would be paid by the State Department's representational funds. If a commercially oriented reception took place, it was because the Embassy deemed it to be important, not because a company or trade group wanted to use the Embassy property...

I did a lot of drafting; sometimes I would assign the task to others. The messages would be shown to the concerned principals in the Embassy so that we would all be saying the same thing to the public. Mansfield almost never wrote anything himself; he would approve our drafts or ask for certain changes to be made. He of course saw all "first person" messages; sometimes I would show him other messages that were being proposed by Embassy officers when I thought they were important enough to have the Ambassador's approval. I was determined that he would never be caught unaware on any major substantive issue. I was equally determined that I would not play any games with him, as some other DCMs may have done with their Ambassadors. I was not going to pursue any personal agenda and present Mansfield with a *fait accompli*. The Embassy was his Mission and not mine. I was there to help him and to marshal the resources of the Embassy to support him. I think we made a good team. I think he was satisfied with my performance and I was certainly delighted to work for him.

My main task as DCM was to run the Embassy--in my fashion--and be its principal point of contact with the Department in Washington. I was also responsible for the operations of our other establishments in Japan whose Principal Officers reported to me. We didn't have a Supervisory Consul General as was the case in other countries. We had a Consul General in Tokyo, but he was only responsible for the consular operations at the Embassy. Each Principal Officer submitted a monthly report to me on their activities. I used to contact them by phone when some one special would visit their district or when we needed something done. I did a modest amount of traveling throughout Japan. I took a couple of trips to Southeast Asia to compare notes with my counterparts there. Whenever there were major changes in the Cabinet--a new Prime Minister or a new Foreign Minister--you could always expect the newcomer to visit Washington sooner, rather than later. The Ambassador always accompanied the Prime Ministers and I usually accompanied a new Foreign Minister. I would represent the Embassy during the course of his meetings with various Washington officials.

We had our usual battles with Washington on the staffing of the Embassy. We had more than 300 Americans representing all agencies. Of that number, only 100 or so were from the State Department. There were 33 or 34 different agencies represented in Tokyo,

including such as the Bonneville Power Administration which was buying generators in Japan. The Ambassador always felt that there were too many official Americans in Tokyo; our presence was just too large. During one of the many efforts to reduce overseas employment (called MODE this time), which begun just as I arrived in Tokyo, the Embassy was certain it could do something about reducing the American presence. That view was held despite the failure of many similar previous efforts. This time, the Ambassador was determined to do something.

He was particularly upset by the Office of Naval Research which had a small staff in Tokyo. No one was quite sure what they were doing; it something to do with cooperative efforts with Japanese scientists. One member of the staff had taken an official trip to China without any Embassy clearance or even notification. In the late '70s our relationships with China were still sufficiently delicate that we did not allow many US government officials to travel there for fear that it might be misunderstood by the Chinese or that they might take some P.R. advantage from such a trip. So Mansfield targeted the ONR office and was convinced that it should be disbanded. That was the office that he would eliminate. That got us into a battle royal with Washington. It took us two years of constant cable traffic, arguing back and forth about these three or four people. We enlisted the assistance of the Department, which, in matters of this kind, was and is just useless. We had high ranking Navy officials coming to Tokyo to review the situation. We took the issue up whenever we were in Washington. In part, the bitterness of this issue was the consequence of a major bureaucratic battle we had had with Foreign Office made several years earlier during the Okinawa reversion period and the security treaty days when the ONR office was opened. The Japanese viewed the office as an intelligence collection operation and were very reluctant to allow it to open. ONR was an open liaison operation and in the final analysis, the Japanese government gave us permission to open it. But the scars were still showing in the late '70s. After two years, ONR closed shop in the Embassy. It just moved to a military command doing the same thing under a different sponsor. It was ridiculous! The Embassy wasted a lot of time and effort and accomplished nothing.

I might at this time mention my fight with the Inspection Corps. Within a month of my arrival, a team of Inspectors came to take a look at our operations. The chief inspector was Terry Arnold, an old Philippine hand. Sheldon Krys was his deputy for this inspection. The confrontation between the Inspectors and the Embassy started almost immediately. The team had gone to some constituent posts first. In Sapporo, the Consulate had hired a local, but before he could report for duty, the Inspection team recommended that his position be abolished. It was much too late; all the paperwork had been done and the person was ready to report for duty. The team had behaved in a very high-handed fashion and had left a lot of bruised feelings in Sapporo. On their first day in Tokyo, Lea Anderson, our Administrative Counselor, took the team on a tour of the Embassy. After that, the team came to me and said that the Embassy was too big. I suggested that they might wish to hold that comment until they were finished with the inspection instead of starting with a conclusion. Their comment was not addressed to me because I had just arrived and had had nothing to do with the size of the Embassy.

Nevertheless, the team kept coming back to this issue every time we met; we were not entirely unsympathetic with the general view because the Ambassador himself had reached the same conclusion. But we were irritated by the team's knee-jerk reaction. Mansfield met with the team a couple of times in very formal settings, like their first courtesy call and their final call during which he listened to their oral report without comment. He didn't entertain them or have a discussion with them.

In any case, every time the team and I met, we had a disagreement about one thing or another. For example, the team took exception to the long standing practice of the Commissary selling to other foreign diplomats. It was a practice that had been approved by the Japanese Foreign Office many, many years earlier. It was a useful practice not only to develop good will in the diplomatic corps, but also to generate funds for the Commissary and other non-governmental expenses. Part of our profits from the commissary went into a world-wide pool used to assist commissaries at smaller posts that needed financial support. Arnold and his group took exception to the practice. That gave rise to a major dispute and debate. I still remember discussing the subject with Arnold at the Marine Ball toward the end of the inspection trying to shout over the blare of the band. I found the whole inspection a total waste of time and money. The major recommendation was about the size of the Embassy and the desirability of it being reduced by 10%. The team wanted us to volunteer a reduction of our personnel ceiling by that percentage. Of course, the team did not suggest where the reduction should take place; that was to be left to us. Then their report recommended that we cease commissary services to other foreign diplomats in Tokyo. I really took umbrage at the whole inspection effort in our written response to the report. Our response was so harsh that the Inspector General was upset and felt offended. I thought it was a lousy inspection which wasted everybody's time and lots of money. The Inspector General's office refereed the issue of sales to the Legal Advisor who ruled that it was illegal for US commissaries to sell to non-US diplomats. So, much to our embarrassment, we ceased that practice. But we refused to accept the general recommendation on personnel reductions on the grounds that no specific suggestions were put forward by the inspectors; we couldn't do anything with a recommendation that just said that the Embassy was too big. Months of back and forth with Washington left a lot of ill feeling on both sides. Mansfield supported my positions, but didn't get involved in the bickering. I am generally pro-inspection, if the team takes the attitude that it is at a post to try to help to improve efficiency. But when the team sees itself as an adversary, then an inspection is worthless and maybe even worst. The end of this story was that the whole inspection report was buried and considered null and void.

Q: What about the quality of your staff?

SHERMAN: Tokyo had and has always had a first class staff. Being such an important post, all agencies try to send their best people. The senior staff were all very good. The language capability was adequate, certainly as far as the Foreign Service Officers were concerned. The Economic Section could have used more Japanese language officers, but to find people conversant both in economics and in Japanese is very difficult. The

Department has always had difficulties recruiting first class economists and then couldn't really spare the ones it did hire for language training, particularly hard languages. I got along very well with the Station Chiefs, first Bill Wells, then Horace Feldman and Bill Grimsley. That has always not been true for some of my successors. A lot of Foreign Service Officers are just psychologically opposed to CIA and therefore have difficulties relating to intelligence personnel. I had the full cooperation of the Station which was helpful many times.

The Embassy, traditionally, had been close to the American military contingents. The Military Attachés, as is often true in countries where the Defense Department has troops or ships, did not play a significant role. We had an American Military Defense Assistance Organization which was basically an sales force for American weapon systems. It did not conduct any training functions. The MDAO was part of the Embassy and the Chief reported to the Ambassador, but his reporting channels were through CINCPAC in Hawaii. He had very limited contacts with the other American military commands in Japan. Years earlier, when we had a MAAG in Japan, there was some confusion about command relationships because that group saw itself as a staff section of the US military command, while the Embassy thought it to be an integral part o its operations.

The Embassy had had a Politico-Military section with close ties to the Japanese Defense Forces. By the time I arrived in Tokyo, that section had been abolished and the work was being done in the Political Section by a politico-military officer. The Political Counselor and his staff worked with the American military stationed in Fuchu and provided the Embassy a day-to-day liaison. Of course, the military could have contacted me at any time and the CINC could have called the Ambassador at any time. But that rarely happened because the Ambassador only became involved in large public issues and seldom, if ever, became involved in operational matters. One that Mansfield was very active in was when an American submarine rammed into a Japanese merchant ship and then submerged and didn't stick around to see whether any assistance was required. Most of the issues that required Embassy-Command contacts dealt with host nation support and sometimes status of forces. The issue of Japanese financial support for American forces was in part dealt by the Politico-Military section of the American desk office of the Foreign Ministry and in part by the Self-Defense Agency. For the American side, much of the work was done by the Embassy's Political Counselor supported by US military representatives. The US military related primarily to the Japanese on a service-to-service basis and with the Self-Defense Agency. If they had a reason to contact the Foreign Ministry, they would go with the Political Counselor or a member of the Political Section. Sometimes, the Counselor or a member of his staff went to the Self-Defense Agency accompanying a US military officer. The routine was well established and there were no bureaucratic frictions between the US military and the Embassy. The Air Force Chief of Staff at Fuchu was the primary American military representative who dealt with the Japanese. He used to be in the Embassy almost on a daily basis and was certainly in touch telephonically with us every day--either with me or the Political Counselor. Whether I would be involved depended on the nature of the issue and its importance and whatever level of the Embassy had to carry on the discussion with the Japanese. For example, if a

meeting of a Security Subcommittee was required, then I would get involved. If an agreement had to be signed, that would involve me. If senior Defense Department officials were visiting Tokyo, that would also require my involvement. Those visits were not unusual; the Secretary of Defense would come out at least once a year.

Q: Let me ask you about trade issues in the '77-'81 period. Where the tensions already running high?

SHERMAN: Trade issues were beginning to become sticky. Bob Strauss, then the Special Trade Representative, had been given the mandate to do something about the automobile trade imbalance as well as color TVs and some agricultural issues. He was in Tokyo frequently, often with a very high P.R. profile. He and Mr. Ushiba, former Japanese Ambassador to Washington and one of Japan's foremost "American handlers" were the authors of one of the early trade agreements. That was done in a two-three days "three ring circus" atmosphere. I participated in the day and night long marathon meetings which took place mostly in the Ambassador's Residence. Periodically, Strauss would pause and say that he would have to call the President; he used to say that he had promised the President by a certain time and that would always leave only a few minutes to wrap up one issue or another. That would focus the Japanese mind once again and the bargaining would resume. Those were wild meetings! There were simultaneous meetings of a number of groups focusing on one matter or another. Dick Rivers, the USTR's General Counsel and Allan Wolfe, one of the Deputy Trade Representatives would be in different rooms meeting with their Japanese counterparts. During these separate negotiations, Strauss would hide out somewhere, meeting in secret with somebody theoretically unbeknown to anyone else. At one stage, Strauss came to the Embassy where he was confronted with a draft agreement that Rivers and Bill Piez of the Embassy had negotiated out with the Japanese. Strauss didn't want to look at it; he kept saying that he was too tired to look at anything. Dick Holbrooke kept after him--during critical meetings, Holbrooke and Erland Heginbotham, his economic expert and other EA staff members, would be present in Tokyo. Finally Strauss looked at it and exploded. He wanted to know whether Rivers had really worked on it. When he was assured that he had, he said that he would fire him immediately, if not sooner. He had a number of less-printable expressions that he used periodically and he would let them loose in a red hot string at moments like this. Perennially, we had large meetings of this kind, with what seemed as if half of Washington were in Tokyo.

Then there was a Congressional trio who took a keen interest in US-Japan trade matters. Jim Jones, the Congressman from Oklahoma, a Lyndon Johnson White House staffer and now our Ambassador to Mexico, Sam Gibbons, a Congressman from Florida and Bill Frenzel, from Minnesota would visit Tokyo from time to time to pressure the Japanese on one trade issue or another. Mansfield always saw them and worked with them. Jack Button, then the Embassy's Economic Minister, worked with this Congressional delegation, which played a very helpful role in focusing Japanese attention on the seriousness of trade issues

Then there was a period during which Frank Weil, the Commerce Department's Assistant Secretary responsible for trade issues, used to visit Tokyo frequently. He was interested in increasing Japanese imports of American consumer products. The Japanese offered the use of their trade ship; that is the ship which they used to promote their own goods by sailing it around the world as sort of a mobile trade fair. The Japanese offered the use of the ship to us so that we could take our wares to various Japanese sea ports. In the final analysis, that ship ended up being a combination of military surplus wares and a novelty shop. No serious American exporters were going to use a gimmick like that. The ship did carry some American clothing, some furniture, some novelty items, but it was not really a serious trade promotion effort. But the preparations for the ship's sailing took up a lot of the Embassy's time and effort.

We made other efforts. The US-Japanese trade advisory council was very active during the late '70s. There were lots of committees formed, some by the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and some formed by other groups. There was a constant series of meetings and other public and semi-public events. The trade issues did not lack attention, but the tensions kept rising. The American Chamber had Mansfield's full attention; he was very active in that forum. The Chamber met monthly with the Ambassador. We would brief the officers of the Chamber, with Mansfield presiding over the meeting. He would listen to the Chamber's views. He of course knew all the leadership of the Chamber as well as many of its members because he devoted a lot of attention to that group. He thought that an American Ambassador had an obligation to listen to and represent whenever appropriate the views of American business in a foreign country. He also thought that his relationship to the Chamber was useful in the management of the trade issues. The Chamber did conduct a number of studies that were useful to understanding the issues more clearly. You have to understand that at this time there were probably 25,000 Americans in Tokyo, most of whom were involved in trade issues of one kind or another. The Chamber was very active under good leadership, which was assisted by a good professional staff. So the Chamber had adequate financial and human resources to really represent the American business community. The leadership would return to Washington for annual meetings; during this period, it would visit important people in the Legislative and Executive branches. They developed this routine in concert with us. So the Chamber was an influential group on trade matters.

Q: Let's finish our discussion of your tour as DCM in Tokyo with an account of the President Carter's visit in 1979. What do you recollect from that?

SHERMAN: President Carter did come to Tokyo in 1979 and again in 1980 for the funeral of former Prime Minister Ohira. The 1979 visit served two purposes: a) Carter attended a G-7 summit-- the Energy Summit-- and b) a State visit. There was the usual Presidential hoopla: large teams from Washington some of them arriving three months before the event. More would come as the visit time neared and the planning became more concrete. There were at least three hundred staffers and press visitors during the President's visit. Secret Service had a 24 hour watch, with twenty men on each shift. The

Presidential communication requirements are massive. There were two plane loads of press. There were all the experts needed for the summit.

Having been through a number of such Presidential visits, I think I had the Embassy pretty well prepared and organized. David Lambertson, now our Ambassador to Thailand and then the deputy Political Counselor, was in charge of the day-to-day Embassy support activities. He was assisted by a young officer who is now the DCM in Seoul, Chuck Kartman. The Embassy worked well with the Secret Service, the White House Communications staff as well as the White House trip planners. The White House political staff was primarily interested in show-casing the President. Since Carter had a reputation for having started "town meetings", I suggested that we have one in Japan in the little town of Shimoda. That was the port town that was visited by Commander Perry and his black ships and where the first Consul General Townsend Harris had established his residence and office. The Japanese were not at all happy with that suggestions because they felt that the country "bumpkins" of Shimoda would ask all the wrong questions and embarrass the whole country. The Japanese preferred that Carter chat with a group of intellectuals--University professors, writers, etc.--in Tokyo. In the end, atmospherics prevailed and the town meeting was held in Shimoda. It was a warm and human session and the President and the citizens of Shimoda communicated easily and smoothly. They asked human questions, not very sophisticated, but much more meaningful to ordinary people both in Japan and in the United States.

When an Embassy is first told that a Presidential visit is being contemplated, its first reaction is panic. The first question is whether the Embassy has enough resources to plan and support a Presidential visit. The second question concerns the routine work-load: can the Embassy both support a Presidential visit and do its regular work? In fact, an Embassy stops doing its normal work and concentrates entirely on the visit. After that, a list of issues is developed; most of them concern logistics which are the responsibility of the administrative section. Slowly, an outline of a schedule is developed; the routes that the President is to travel are mapped out; stops and photo opportunities are planned. Plans are developed for a communications system which will get material to the President wherever he may be. That raises the major issue of where the President stays. Carter stayed at the Ambassador's Residence; that required the Mansfields to move all their personal belonging out of their bedroom suite into another bedroom in the house, which, for ten days, was almost the only room they were permitted to use. When Kennedy came to Rome, Ambassador Reinhardt was ill and in fact was in the military hospital in Wiesbaden, Germany. Mrs. Reinhardt was in the Residence by herself, but the White House staff told her she would have to vacate the premises and suggested she fly back to Virginia for a week while the Kennedys occupied the Residence. When Johnson went to Bonn, it was the Hillenbrands--he was then the DCM--who had to vacate their home. The Shermans were lucky; the White House advance team looked at our house to see whether it wouldn't be easier to move us out, but fortunately our residence was a little far away from the center of activities and more difficult to secure. Of course, the Secret Service had to secure the house which meant thorough sweeps and surveillance. Then come questions about the feeding and taking care of the media; that is usually a USIS function.

Then of course an Embassy becomes somewhat of a translator between the White House and the Foreign Office trying to explain the position of one to the other. The White House believes that the President's schedule is their business; the host government feels that it is in charge. Accommodations always have to be reached, but they can sometimes take days and days. Tempers flare, feelings get hurt. There are always major turf battles over who can attend what meetings or social functions. I had a huge fight with Dick Holbrooke the night of the Imperial banquet. The Palace rules are that the Ambassador and the Ministers of an Embassy are invited to Imperial functions. Invitations were restricted to those few from the Embassy plus certain people from the delegation of the visiting dignitary. Of course, the number of people who would like to attend an Imperial function are always many more than the Palace will invite. In our Embassy, there were two Ministers: myself and Jack Button, our Minister for Economic Affairs. We received our invitations. Holbrooke was incensed; he wanted to know why Jack Button had been invited. He had a member of the EA Bureau with him--Alan Romberg--who he thought should have received priority over Button. He stormed in his usual fashion and I tried to explain the Japanese protocol to him. I told him that the Japanese had their protocol and we were not in a position to tell them how they wanted to run their business. He finally accepted that fact, but he surely was upset.

Once the visit is contemplated, then it is the sole issue of the day, day after day, week after week and sometimes month after month. Japanese were and are almost paranoid about security, partly as the result of the embarrassment they felt when the Eisenhower visit had to be canceled because of demonstrations over the Security Treaty. They have always tried to recoup from that failure. So when an American President visits Japan, security is almost overwhelming and certainly suffocating. For blocks around where a President stays, the police form a cordon keeping all possible attackers far, far away. They had police snipers on the roofs around the Chancery; I could see them every day from my office as far as my eye could see. In the four or five weeks preceding the President's arrival, the police and the military conducted massive operations. Carter wanted to have a feel for Japan and the Japanese people. He wanted to jog around the Imperial Palace, which is the preferred route for all Tokyo joggers. Then we suggested using the Akasaka Palace--the formal reception building where State dinners and other formal functions were held. No way! The Japanese authorities just wouldn't even consider it. Finally, Carter settled for jogging around the Ambassador's Residence where he was staying. Even that, barely passed Japanese muster because someone could have taken a shot at the President from one of the near-by roof tops. We did challenge the tight security that the Japanese imposed; we constantly argued with the Japanese authorities about that. But the Japanese insisted that security was their responsibility and that they would be held accountable of anything had happened. That was of course true. The Secret Service never complained about the tight security; they were happy with it. But the White House political team and the Embassy did because the security was limiting us in how we could present the President.

On a couple of occasions, the President did manage to escape the security net. He had visited Tokyo before as a member of the Trilateral Commission and therefore had a

favorite *yakitori* restaurant. One evening, the Carter family slipped out and went to the restaurant, escorted by their own Secret Service, but not by the overwhelming Japanese security forces. They stayed there for an hour or so; you can still see a picture of the Carters eating there.

The only serious glitch that occurred during the State Dinner that the Japanese hosted. They didn't say anything while Carter was in town, but expressed their great displeasure to us after everybody had left town. To this day, I am not sure how the unfortunate incident took place nor at whose direction. The dinner was at the Imperial Palace. Somehow or other, Cornelius Iida, the US official translator, appeared on the scene and took a chair right behind Carter. That is never done!. Emperor Hirohito had one translator, Ambassador Masaki, who always handled all translation chores for the Emperor. He was the only one permitted to translate for the Emperor and that was the way protocol had always been conducted. All of a sudden the Americans produced their own translator; I don't know how he got into the Palace or the dining hall. In any case, the Japanese considered this a serious breach of protocol. I was as surprised as anyone else, although there must have been people in the American delegation or staff who arranged Iida's presence. In any case, after the President left the country, I was summoned by the Chief of Protocol and told in no uncertain terms that Iida's presence had been a major breach of protocol and that it would never happen again. It had never happened before and the Japanese would never permit another such serious breach of protocol. I forwarded the Japanese protest to our Chief of Protocol, Kit Dobbelle. I assume that she had some knowledge of the affair, but I never heard another word about it.

In general, I would say that the visit went smoothly. As I said, we had a large staff in the Embassy; most of them had been involved in the visit one way or another. Many had worked long hours for weeks before the visit. One would assume that sometime during the ten days that Carter was in Japan, he could have found time to talk to the staff. But we were informed that he would not have time, but that Mrs Carter would address the staff. So on the day set for this appearance, I went to pick up Mrs. Carter. She said that she didn't understand why the President had not found the time to meet the staff; she said that she wished he could because she understood that everybody had worked so hard to make their visit a success. She was very polite; she met the staff and apologized for the President's inability to attend. That was alright. I was told by someone in the entourage that Carter just didn't make appearances of that kind. But at the end of the visit, as he was about to leave the Residence for his flight to Seoul, he mentioned to Mansfield that the Tokyo visit was about the best organized one that he had ever been involved in. He wanted to express his personal pleasure to the staff. Mansfield immediately called me to assemble the troops so that Carter could meet as many as he could. I went to work immediately, of course, but we couldn't even find the lights in the main auditorium. I didn't know where they were nor did anyone else right at hand; they were hidden in some control room. Our Administrative Counselor got into an elevator and stopped at each floor, yelling out of the door for all who could hear to come to the auditorium to meet the President. It was quite a flurry. Carter had to wait for a few minutes until we could get the lights turned on. When we finally assembled as many as we could, Carter spoke for about

ten minutes very graciously thanking everybody for their fine performance. People were grateful that he had done that.

In all Presidential visits that I had ever been involved in, the White House staff brings with them sackfuls of tie clips, cufflinks, pens and other mementoes with the Presidential seal on them. Sometimes, it would be an autographed picture of the President. These were given to those who had worked especially hard on a visit. For that Tokyo visit, there was nothing. Absolutely nothing. It meant that people like Lambertson, who really spent untold hours on the visit, had no souvenir at all. When it came time to exchange gifts with the Emperor, we presented a bunch of Norman Rockwell plates left over from the bicentennial celebration. Who ever ran the Presidential gifts operations--I think it was one of Carter's cousins--did it on the cheap, making the White House appear like a country store. It did not make the U.S. look very good! When Lea Anderson and I raised a question about the gift to the Emperor with some of the White House staff, we were told to mind our own business in no uncertain terms and never to mention the subject again. The White House did not handle the gifts and souvenirs very well.

The visit in 1980 was essentially unnecessary. Washington felt that there had been a close personal relationship between Carter and Ohira. In fact, it was more a public relations friendship than a real one. In any case, Washington felt that it would be appropriate if Carter attended the funeral. Unfortunately, the Japanese have a different attitude toward funerals. They don't usually have State funerals for a deceased Prime Minister. Those funerals are much more modest and no head of state is invited. Prime Ministers come and go with some frequency; the Japanese plan relatively modest funerals for their political leaders. For Emperors, it is a different story.

So for Ohira's funeral, the Japanese were not soliciting high level foreign attendance. I told Washington what the Japanese were planning and why. It didn't pay any attention to our advice; Washington had made up its mind to do it its way. The moment the Japanese were told that Carter was considering coming, their plans changed; they invited a lot of other senior foreign dignitaries. In the end, however, it was Carter and a few minor European royalty that showed up. Other countries sent their resident Ambassadors or Cabinet officers. Carter's attendance forced the Japanese to have a much larger funeral than they had expected; it did show a close relationship between the Carter administration and the Japanese, but overall, it made the U.S. look a little over eager. We didn't have much time to plan since the funeral took place about ten days after Ohira's death. As a matter of fact, I was in Hawaii when he died. I was attending a SSC meeting. I had leave that abruptly and return to Tokyo to supervise the arrangements for Carter's funeral visit. Given the brief period between the death and the funeral, the Embassy wasn't out-of-business for nearly as long as the previous year. Furthermore, funerals have an entirely different meaning than State visits; they are therefore much less complicated to arrange and to support a Presidential visit.

Q: In June, 1981, you were assigned to the U.S. delegation to the UN. First of all, how did that assignment come about?

SHERMAN: I had left Tokyo in early 1981 to accompany the Japanese Foreign Minister on a visit to the United States. He had a meeting set up with Haig in Washington. Just before leaving Tokyo, I received a call from the Senior Officer Counseling staff of the Department's Personnel Office. I was informed that I had been on a list of candidates for the ambassadorial post in either Malaysia or New Zealand. Some other Foreign Service Officer had been selected for Malaysia; I had therefore become the Department's candidate for New Zealand. I was warned that I might get a call from the President Reagan who established the practice of calling candidates personally to ask the to accept an ambassadorial appointment. By the time I got to Washington, Bill Clark met me at the airport to tell me the New Zealand post had been given to a deserving political appointee. I was fully prepared to return to Tokyo until the end of my normal tour as DCM. It was a fine assignment and I had no problem staying in it. As luck would have it, on my way back to Tokyo, I stopped in New York to see one of my children. There I got an urgent call from the Japan desk telling me that Jeane Kirkpatrick was looking for a deputy--it was designated as an ambassadorial position. I was asked to make an appointment to talk to her. The suggestion came out of the blue; I had no previous experience in multi-lateral diplomacy nor had I ever suggested such an assignment. I met with her the next morning and had a pleasant half-hour or so with her. I also met some of her own personal staff who had been brought to the Mission with her. The day I met with Kirkpatrick and staff was the day that Hinckley took a shot at Reagan. It happened while I was on the plane flying to Columbus, Ohio where I was to see another of my children. After that stop, I flew back to Tokyo.

A few weeks later, Jeane called in the middle of the night and said that she would like me to come to join her in New York. She described the job essentially as a "DCM"; that did not mean Deputy Permanent Representative, but rather someone who would run the Mission for her. She was having troubles with her administrative officer, for example; also the political appointees and the career bureaucrats were having trouble getting along. She wanted someone to smooth those waters and be an inter-face between the political and career staffs. I accepted and reported for duty in June, 1981.

My views of the UN and an account of my responsibilities can be found in the following excerpt from (*"Representing America: Experiences of U.S. Diplomats at the UN"* by Lynda M. Fasulo, Praeger Publishers, 1984)

SHERMAN: Although my job title is deputy representative on the Security Council, by and large I haven't been involving myself with the Security Council. Ambassador Liechtenstein is doing that. When Jeane (Kirkpatrick) asked me to come, she said, "I need somebody to run the mission, somebody who'd do what a DCM (deputy chief of mission) does overseas, somebody who knows the system and how to make it produce, and that kind of thing." So I've concerned myself in the first instance with the management of the mission--trying to make the interface between the mission and the State Department work, which, depending upon circumstances, can be easy and can be very difficult.

I also supervise and monitor the work of the political section of the mission; the administrative section of the mission and the resource-management section, which serves as a general accounting office for the U.S., making sure that its budget doesn't grow too rapidly, that our contribution (to the United Nations) is going to the right places, that new projects are examined for their fiscal soundness, etc. It deals with U.S. citizens who are working for the United Nations-recommending people, supporting people, or opposing people, and making sure that we are adequately represented within the UN system. I also handle the Trusteeship Council when it's in session, and the Fourth Committee, which is the Decolonization Committee of the General assembly. I handle the Far Eastern matters that come up and am ready to do anything else that anybody asks me to do. We are rather loosely organized. We are the only mission in the world that has five Ambassadors, and sometimes I think that the biggest contribution to effective mission management would be to get rid of three of those, at least-just have two, the boss and the deputy. But it still is necessary, I think, and useful to have somebody from the career side of the service to rely on to do a managerial job, and that's the way Jeane has used me.

The big thing that has happened is the proliferation of mini-states-157 members now, with places like Vanuatu, which used to be the New Hebrides. They hire a lawyer here in New York, to represent them. He is not a Vanuatu citizen. Obviously they can't participate in the full range of activities, but they have a vote and it's the same weight in the General assembly as the vote of the United States. A lot of the decision making is done by so-called consensus process, where no vote is taken but nobody voices any opposition and you get a compromise text; and that's consensus.

It's basically a good way to address some issues, because in essence, that gives everybody a veto. If someone doesn't join the consensus, there is no consensus, and they have to take a vote. You might get voted down. I think as long as we have the system, people should vote their conscience. They shouldn't be constrained by the fact that they're the only one voting against it. They should explain their vote. Many times we have stood alone on issues which we have made a matter of principle. It's just the fact that it's so unbalanced-all of the condemnations of the Latin American countries for violations of human rights, with no reference made whatsoever to the countries in Eastern Europe, and no reference whatsoever made to Afghanistan. What can I tell you? The UN tends to use itself, in the General Assembly particularly, as a forum in which to wallop South Africa and Israel at every opportunity but not to deal with an even hand. That is not to say that the UN doesn't do some things very well. The UN Development Program is extremely well run and it provides development funds for lots of the Third World, and it's organized in a competent way. The UNICEF (children's emergency fund), is a good, useful, and well-managed organization. The UN peacekeeping activities in Cyprus and Lebanon and other peacekeeping activities have been extremely helpful as buffers to keep people from killing each other. I think actually [the United Nations] has probably been more helpful in the crisis in the Falklands than it has been on anything in a long time. One of the reasons, of course, has been that most of the action until very recently has been taking place quietly and not in public sessions. The secretary general has been operating and consulting with the Security Council in informal sessions and with individual Security

Council members. The whole argument has been kept out of the limelight, and away from the posturing that takes place when you are on camera and talking for the record. That's good, and it's a tribute to the way this current secretary general [Perez de Cuellar] is operating. He's a creature of the system, he's been with it for a long time, he knows its weaknesses as well as its strong points. He's a bona fide Third World figure himself. He's a very skillful diplomat, and he is an activist. His predecessor [Waldheim] was much less eager to be engaged and came under criticism from people for not doing more and not endeavoring to assert himself more. The Secretariat does what the member states ask it to do. On the other hand, there are always ways for the Secretariat to operate to insure that the member states ask it to do the right things.

Multilateral Diplomacy

Multilateral diplomacy is a totally new world for me. It's not that you don't engage in multilateral diplomacy in the embassies. You are constantly talking with the country where you are about how we can concert with others to achieve objectives. You are aware of what is going on in the world. But over here it is a lot of just horse trading back and forth between delegations-trying to whip up support; trying to find ways of accurately analyzing just how helpful or unhelpful a given country has been to the things that you have wanted to achieve. During this last session, we keep a list of all the votes which were taken-and we had them prioritized into issues that were very important to U.S. interests or less important, on a scale of one to three. We weighted the various issues and then made computer print-outs of the actual voting. Needless to say, you can't use this kind of record as an absolute measure that country X is very much for you or very much against you, because many times there are individual circumstances affecting an individual country. Its vote might seem negative by your lights but it wouldn't be as serious a breach as it might for some other country. Sri Lanka might have to vote some way because of its proximity to India or because of its longstanding position on the Indian Ocean "zone of peace." Sri Lanka's negative vote on some resolution might not be as significant as a negative vote of France or some other country.

What we tried to do is to make the necessary corrections and come up with a score at the end of the session, and then provide that information to our embassy in the host country. We'd say, "This is what happened at the United Nations with your country." Our people in the host country might know that Pakistan, say, voted this way or that way on one issue or another in the UN, but they don't put it together in one conceptual package. We put it together in one package and provide embassies with ammunition so that they can approach the host country and say, "If you want our help to support your candidate for the International Court of Justice," or "If you want \$100 million in U.S. aid," then "we'd be much more sympathetic if we had some unswerving support during the last session of the United Nations." It's not a big thing but it's one way of looking at across-the-board performance. And that's the kind of thing that multilateral diplomacy can do. The embassies in the field, on a bilateral basis, are now prepared to say, "Swaziland, you haven't been doing anything for us lately, so why do you expect us to do something for you?"

During the 1982 session, the nonaligned movement issued a communique' that was markedly hostile to the United States. It singled out the United States by name at least nine or ten times. The resolution, which was mostly produced by Cuba, was rammed through the conference in the middle of the night when a lot of people were not there. They deplored the situation in Afghanistan and in Cambodia but they didn't name any country that might be connected with those two operations. Anyway, Jeane wrote letters to each of the nonaligned signatories who professed to be friends of the United States or who considered themselves as allies. She just said, "I'd lie to know why you lent your name to a document which so impugns the good name of the United States and which is totally unbalanced. I'd be interested to hear from you." Then, there was a brouhaha over this being an undiplomatic way of dealing with the situation. She could have ignored it, of course. There have been delegates here whose attitude toward the Third World was: encourage them, be nice to them, don't get upset when they run off the reservation, because they don't really understand what they are doing, or they have other factors that condition this action. The best way to get them on the democratic side is to be friendly and provide aid, and to ignore their peccadilloes, as we'd do with a child. Jeane has not taken that approach at all. She has asked people, required people, to say why they do what they do. It produced some interesting results. Some people were outraged by it, but not many. Other people were quick to disassociate themselves from the communique', saying formally, "That resolution was not signed by us, nor did we agree with it."

Our aim has been to make people understand that they are accountable for the kind of things that they do. And some ghastly things are done. I mean, some lousy resolutions get through, and by a large majority. we want them to know we take them seriously.

Most of the complaints about the U.N. irrelevancy have very little justification to them. It's not the fault of the UN, but of the member states. The UN is not, never has been, and probably never is going to be a world government which has any authority or responsibility or opportunity for action that is not given to it by the member states. Starting with the early concept of the veto in the Security Council, the great powers have the authority to stop action before it ever gets started. The only time really there has been any massive action by the UN was under the Uniting for Peace Resolution on Korea.

In recent years, that [Korean] situation has never repeated itself. as far as Lebanon was concerned we had worked within the United Nations but also have worked independently, with the multi-national force, with the Marines, with our own special negotiators out there trying to do things. Meanwhile the UN has continued to extend or reconfirm the mandate of the UNIFIL forces out there. But we have never sought a new mandate. The resolutions brought to the Security Council dealing with Lebanon over the roughly two years (1981-83) that I have been here dealt mainly with extending the UNIFIL mandate, keeping things going, and trying not to interfere with the negotiating process.

Another issue in which the UN obviously has some involvement in Namibia. The negotiations, the actual front-line work has been through the contact group, the five major

powers-The United States, France, Canada, Germany, and England-and those negotiations continue. We have independent contacts with the Angolans and directly with the South Africans in attempting to bring to fruition a process which will eventually be ratified or sanctified by the United Nations but where the United Nations ipso facto has not itself played a direct role. There were very much involved with special representatives of the secretary general and others working in this area with whom we are very closely in touch. But institutionally the United Nations has not been so much involved. I think this is good in many respects, because it is a realistic acceptance of where power is. There's no point in having a world situation that requires application of power be handled by some organization that is impotent. You have to be able to put your money where your mouth is. You can go back to Carlos Romulo [former president of the Philippines], who has always said there are two UNs. there is the UN of the specialized agencies and institutions-the UN of UNDP, the UN high commissioner for refugees, UNICEF, WHO, ITO, and all of those-and there is the UN of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Security Council is the only place where resolutions are fewer and further between than they have been in a long, long time. There is a continuing politicization in the Security Council. The General Assembly is irretrievably politicized. I'm fond of saying it's a valid world and an important world, but it's not a real world. People go to the United Nations to make a public statement within a world forum. it provides that forum, and it provides instant headlines for anybody who speaks there, but I don't think that people tend to speak there with much more than the public relations aspect in mind. In other words, you don't go to the UN to ask it to find solutions, because it's unwieldy for doing-it's not an easy forum in which to get a solution.

The Security Council has turned, unfortunately, into a mini-General assembly. we have had virtually 40 speakers speaking in the Security Council. It's very discouraging, and depressing. Time and again in recent months, issues that are brought up in the Security Council are not even brought with a resolution, or a request for a statement by the Security Council president. They are simply brought up and everybody comes and speaks and then it all stops. There's no resolution, the Security Council remains seized with the matter, or they call on the secretary general to report, but there's no resolution.

Any member of the Security Council can request the Council to hear somebody from outside. If it's an Arab who is not on the Security Council and wants to talk on the Palestinian question, he works through the Arab representative on the security Council. With respect to the Libyan complaint against Sudan, for example, the Soviet Union and Poland and other surrogates on the Security Council would produce the people to speak. Of course the Korean Air Lines issue was one in which we were very much engaged and in which the Security Council provided to us a forum that attracted world attention. We pursued a resolution, we got a resolution that was in the end vetoed by the Soviet Union, as one would have certainly anticipated. However, the Soviets had only tow votes, theirs and Poland's-even Nicaragua abstained; China abstained, to my surprise.

China tries to maintain as independent a position as it possibly can, and to take the philosophical position that all the troubles of the world come from great-power

confrontation, and that China allies itself with the aspirations and expectations of the Third World, and takes no sides in the great-power confrontations, that it opposes hegemony by whatever name it is called, etc. Their role has been rather low profile.

Some people say that by our confrontational attitude we've succeeded less than we should have. But I don't believe that's the case. I think that our policy of standing up and exercising the right of reply, of stating our position, stating those things in which we feel our basic principles are engaged, has caused a lot of the nonaligned Group of 77 to think more deeply about their position, their own relations with the United States. This in the end is constructive for us. We don't have to accept so-called built-in majorities. We don't have to just sit there and take it. We are very active here in New York and also in capitals on issues of concern. We've certainly lobbied heavily on Puerto Rico, we did a lot talking around on the Korean Air Lines issue, not that we had to do a great deal, but we did it. This mission has very good personal relationships with almost every other delegation, and that's not to say just with our friends. We aren't talking to the Libyans every day, or the Iranians, or people like that, but we have elsewhere--we're open and candid with the Soviets, and certainly with all of our principal allies, all the members of the Security Council, with the major people on committees, and with the Secretariat.

It's hard to say what kind of backdrop the Korean Air Line incident will continue to provide. Those things don't live in public-consciousness very long, but certainly the worldwide revulsion against the overall brutality of the incident will stick around for awhile, and it may make less attractive or less reasonable sounding some of the proposals, initiatives or rhetoric of the Soviet union. Not just with us, but with people in the Third World who found that incident so repellent.

Taking the UN seriously

As long as there are these vast majorities and bloc voting, and people do not seriously deal with issues, the UN can't be taken too seriously. Virtually 80 percent of the resolutions that came to the General Assembly have to do with condemning Israel or South Africa. They all pass by vast majorities. Since they don't have any effect, nobody feels terribly strongly about them, and rather than disturb their relations with people who aren't directly engaged feel compelled to vote, and to cultivate votes against. So time and again the United States and Israel have stood alone against 155 votes over there on one issue or another. South Africa also has a built-in absolute majority-it may be 157 to 2, but it could be 123 to something.

The UN's resolutions don't have any particular force if no one chooses to abide by them. Hundreds of resolutions are passed every year by the G.A. that just lie fallow; nothing happens, except that they are publicized and the formal debate is published. There is a moral force implied but the moral force doesn't require a follow-up course of action. Sanctions are limited at best and the UN is always very reluctant to vote to impose sanctions, which require, of course, Security Council action. Reluctantly I would have to

say that there isn't much being accomplished over there except that, by its presence in some situations, the United Nations is able to deter or put off war.

To be taken more seriously, the UN should be encouraged to do things it does well, and stop doing the things it doesn't do well. And the only way to do that is by voting against, or withholding funds as we are required to do by Congress. The UN should not be in the business of providing training for the PLO, or SWAPO. Those are not organizations recognized by the charter, and are in essence terrorist groups.

I would be hard-pressed to say that I thought the future of the organization was terribly bright. I hope it gets better, and it does some things very well indeed. Nobody else could do it. My experience here has made me a good deal more realistic about the possibilities of achieving anything in a multilateral forum. We can do a lot of things bilaterally, and we continue to do a lot of things bilaterally, and based on those bilaterally achieved alliances or concurrences of view we were occasionally able to do things in a multilateral forum. But the forum itself is not at all relevant to the *Realpolitik* of the world. Decisions that are being made are not being made in the UN. And I don't think anybody, even the most idealistic, ever suspected that they would be.

At certain heavily trafficked street intersections in Japan, they have traffic lights that play a little tune for the blind, to let them know when to walk. I keep waiting to get one installed here at First Avenue and UN Plaza--one that plays the theme from "Twilight Zone."

(end of quote)

In general, the UN was not very highly regarded by the administration. Jeane gave a lot of speeches, taking a position similar to that described by William Buckley in his book about his experiences as a delegate to a General Assembly session -- "A Dangerous Place". She did operate around the UN with a great deal of panache, while at the same time criticizing the institution in public and private statements. I must say that she had some good reason for her attitude. The UN was a hopeless institution in many respects. The General Assembly was paralyzed; it could find common ground on its anti-Israel or anti-South Africa censures. Basically, those were the only issues that the General Assembly addressed. The Security Council was paralyzed by the Soviet and Chinese vetoes. So the Secretariat, the General Assembly and the Security Council--that is the New York components of the UN--were ineffective and valid targets for criticisms.

The other components of the UN--the specialized agencies--were a different story. The UNDP worked well, WHO was a good organization, the UNHCR had a heavy burden, the UNICEF worked well. There were a few that had troubles, like the FAO and UNESCO. The ACABQ--the Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions--was a nightmare; it was full of problems. The U.S. contributions were the largest and one of the few that were actually made. So we began to stretch our payments out in an effort to pressure the UN to reform. By and large, we were successful in making an impact on the

UN. A lot of people in the Secretariat and in other missions had their feelings bruised. There were some Americans who felt that Kirkpatrick's attitude was anti-international cooperation. In fact, what she was trying to do was to assert American independence particularly when faced with a decision by some international body which the U.S. opposed. Her view represented totally the Reagan Administration's position, as postulated by Judge Clark and Bill Casey. Shultz was more pro-UN, even though the Department's Bureau for International Organizations--our support staff in Washington--was headed by Elliott Abrams, when I first arrived in New York. He and Jeanne locked horns almost from the outset of the administration and the Washington-New York relationships improved only after Abrams moved to become Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, which was later in 1981. Abrams was replaced by Greg Newell, who had been a White House staffer.

I said that I was the "inter-face" between the Mission and the Department. I related to all parts of the Department and went directly to the regional bureau involved in the substance of an issue. I did not work through IO; I did discuss issues concerning international organizations with IO, but on country or regional issues I dealt with the regional bureau. It was Jeanne's pattern that as she would walk to her office in the morning, she would look in to see whether I was in mine. If I was there, she would usually stop for a conversation. One morning, she dropped in to tell me that she had unintentionally committed a real *faux pas* the night before. She had been invited to a reception to be hosted by one of the Far Eastern Missions. She was running late and in her usual fashion she followed her security detail. They led her to the Third Floor of the General Assembly building and to a room filled with people. Someone at the door bowed as she came in and she thought that she was in the right place. She went to the food table and picked up a shrimp. Just as she was about to eat it, the Chinese Permanent Representative came up to her and said: "I am very surprised to see you here. Please let me introduce you to your host, the representative of North Korea!". As the Chinese said that, a picture was taken. The look on her face tells the whole story. She was obviously at the wrong party. Realizing that, she made her apologies for being in the wrong place and walked out. When I heard the story, I told her that it was very funny, but urged her to call John Holdridge, then Assistant Secretary for the Far East, immediately to explain the circumstances. Unless an immediate clarification were issued, the media would report this and then she would find herself in the same position as Andy Young had a few years earlier. She did call Holdridge and explained the mistake. It was the kind of innocent incident that so often can turn into a diplomatic nightmare.

The Mission's social requirements were quite heavy. Every day ended with three or four National Day celebrations or some other social functions. Mercifully, most were held in the Secretariat building which was right next door. One of us usually attended each of these occasions, but we spread the "pleasure" around among the Mission staff so that Kirkpatrick or I were not always attending social occasions. The Mission had other official more senior and closer to Jeanne than I: Ken Adelman--the Deputy Permanent Representative, Jose Sorzano--the U.S. delegate to ECOSOC, Chuck Lichtenstein--the Ambassador for special political affairs. The last two were close personal friends of

Kirkpatrick's and although on paper I was the third ranking member of the Mission, in actual fact, I ranked behind all them.

Q: Let me ask you about the workings of the Security Council. Were Kirkpatrick's statement cleared by Washington?

SHERMAN: Rarely, if ever. She would sometime negotiate with Washington on the substance of her remarks. Sometimes Washington would ask her to modify her comments, but the text of her remarks were never cleared with Washington. That gave her considerable leeway to react to unforeseen developments during Security Council debates. Sometimes, she would leave the deliberations to have long discussions and arguments with Washington, most often with Al Haig, then Secretary of State. Sometimes, she just proceeded without consultations because she had the strength of her convictions and knew that she could muster support for her position. I should note that most of the Security Council meetings are not public. It meets under the rubric of "consultations", which are in effect closed meetings. So by the time the actual Security Council meetings are held in public, they are pretty well scripted and all delegations know what the others will say on a specific issue. The only exception to that rule occurs if there has been no agreement during the consultations. Then you have a public confrontation often involving a veto by one or another of the Five permanent members. Kirkpatrick did not attend most of the Security Council meetings. It was left to Lichtenstein to represent the U.S., although on paper I should have been the U.S. Representative.;

We spent a lot of time consulting with other national delegations on all subjects. We split these up among the five U.S. ambassadors in the U.S. Mission. For example, I dealt with the Asian delegations, Ken Adelman liaised with the African, Jose dealt with the Latin American group. There were blocks in the UN--e.g. Asian, Western European, etc--to which we belonged. These groups held regular weekly meetings; they focused more on administrative matters than on substantive issues. In most cases, what we were told by the UN delegations were consistent with what our Embassies were reporting from their host capitals. The UN national delegations were in general well informed and knew and represented faithfully the views of their governments. That was true for us as well; we did not lack needed information and had a pretty good handle on Washington views. So the information network in New York worked pretty well. There were some very good and active Ambassadors in New York like Tommy Koh of Singapore and Bira, now the Thai Ambassador in Washington. They were very active and influential not only with other Asian delegations but with all delegations.

Q: Tell me a little about the pressures on the U.S. diplomats in New York which are unique to that Mission as compared to other U.S. embassies around the world?

SHERMAN: First of all, New York is a bigger sea. There you deal mostly with multi-lateral issues which are of interest to several delegations. Secondly, there is considerably more "politicking" in New York than in a capital. That is, there is a lot more vote

swapping or "calling of chips" in New York than would be in any capital. It is not rare that you call on a delegation and point out that the U.S. was helpful in some prior situation and that now you expect support from that delegation. Or a delegation would say that unless it received support on some current issue, it would find it difficult to support the other delegation in the future. Of course, some of that is done by our Embassies overseas, particularly in reference to an issue being discussed in an international organization, but not nearly to the extent that it is done in New York. This kind of politicking went on all the time in New York. Sometimes it was just a request to abstain on a particular vote. That occurred when we understood that a country could not vote for a resolution; then we would ask either for "abstain" vote or that a country not be represented during the vote. On some issues, it was just important not to appear isolated; we knew we would lose, but wouldn't wish to be in such a minority that it would be embarrassing. For example, that happened on the vote on Grenada. We knew we would lose the vote, but didn't want to be entirely isolated. So we worked very hard to "call in some chips".

As I mentioned before, we always had difficulties marshaling a respectable vote on Israel or South Africa issues. These questions had a large American constituency, which required the U.S. to take certain positions. We frequently found ourselves in a situation where we and Israel were the only countries voting for or against a General assembly resolution. No other country was willing to take the heat. They didn't have the domestic constituency that we had; they didn't have the commitment that we had. We understood the situation; we accepted the odds as a *fait accompli* and moved on to the next subject. Since the votes in the General Assembly are non-binding, they have little effect in the "real world". In the Security Council, we, of course, had a veto. I don't know how a new UN structure will be organized. there could be more members of the Security Council; there could be more Permanent Members of the Security Council or whether the new members would have a veto power. There will also be questions concerning what was known as the "Non-Aligned Movement" or other blocs. In the late '70s, many of these blocs were anti-west. Now of course we have an entirely new world situation and I don't know how this plays out in the UN.

Q: Tell me a little about press relations and how the Mission handled that problem?

SHERMAN: We had a USIS operation in New York, similar to what an Embassy might have overseas. It was responsible for media relations. We issued the texts of all statements and speeches made in public fora. Every major news organization had a UN correspondent, who would contact the U.S. Mission for interview or just briefing. They were very visible on TV or in the press; I think it is less true today. You don't often see today a newsclip by a UN correspondent. But in the late '70s, it was not a rare sight. Jeane made herself frequently available to the media; she held press conferences as well as interviews. Sometime, we would take the initiative and brief the media on a pending development. I can't remember that we ever tried consciously to mount a media campaign in support of one position or another. But when for example the KAL plane was shot down by the Soviets, we were very aggressive in condemning the act with any media

people who would listen. We had charts, pictures and tapes--provided by a number of different sources--which we used liberally to bolster our positions. Jeane played an important role in the administration in the development of foreign policy; she was a Cabinet member, but I don't think the administration ever used her to carry its story to the media. She went back and forth to Washington all the time; she would frequently make two round trips between New York and Washington in one day. She was always behind schedule, but always plugging ahead.

Q: Your comments about the UN in the interview quoted earlier seemed negative. In the late '70s, did you have much hope for the UN?

SHERMAN: I viewed the UN as a paralyzed institution. It was frozen by its own internal rules. The veto in those days insured that any Security Council resolution was essentially sterile, except for whatever public relations effect it might generate. It was clear that no major foreign policy breakthroughs could be achieved in the Security Council. The General Assembly was almost a joke then. But the situation has changed. The UN today is a far different place than it was fifteen years ago.

The specialized agencies were a different story. What ever positive contribution the UN made to the world was done by and through the specialized agencies. The U.S. Mission in New York did not spend a lot of time on the work of these agencies; they were largely independent. Jim Grant ran UNICEF; Brad Morse ran UNDP. Both those organizations ran efficiently and didn't require any meddling on our part. We might talk to them sometimes on a particular issue, but we were not concerned with the efficacy of their operations nor did we comment on any day to day matters. They both were doing a very good job. We were concerned when the UN was deliberating on the appointment of new officials for some of these specialized agencies, like FAO and UNESCO. In most cases, the headquarters of these agencies were outside of New York which made it difficult for us to provide any oversight even if we wanted to. That was also true for the Secretariat; it did not interfere with the specialized agencies.

Q: In January, 1984, you were appointed as Deputy assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. How did assignment come about?

SHERMAN: I was in New York when one day Paul Wolfowitz appeared. He was then Assistant Secretary for the Far East. He called me and asked whether he could come by to chat with me. I said "of course". He came and offered me the job as his deputy for Japanese and Korean Affairs. The idea did not come entirely as a surprise to me because Paul had checked with Jeane first. I had met Paul at SSC meetings when he was in Defense Department as Deputy Under Secretary for Plans and Policy, but I can't say that I really knew him or vice-versa. When he talked to me in New York, he acknowledged that he had met me before, but that his request was based on the advice he had been receiving by many people.

My main focus was Japan and Korea, but occasionally Paul would ask me to take on area-wide issues. I replaced Tom Shoemith, who was also the principal deputy. But since I was the new kid on the block, I did not inherit that part of the job. John Monjo had been there the longest and felt that he should therefore become the principal deputy. That was not an issue for me; I couldn't have cared less who was the principal deputy. So the senior staff consisted of Paul, John Monjo, Bill Brown followed by Jim Lilley and Tony Albrecht, who handled economic affairs, who was later replaced by Bill Piez. EA has always been a more compact bureau than some of the others. The geographical divisions are not as sharp as they were for example in EUR or ARA; we didn't have the fiefdoms that existed in other bureaus. We were one family.

The job of deputy was very interesting. There was never any lack of issues. The morning would start with a briefing on the important overnight developments. That was followed usually by a series of meetings, both within the Department and in other agencies. Sometimes I would have meetings with representatives of the foreign embassies who wanted to raise certain issues with us. If Paul met with the Secretary or other senior Washington or foreign officials on issues relating to Japan or Korea, I would usually sit in on those. There might be meetings on studies that had been commissioned by the NSC or some other high level organization. Most often, I would be charged with running these studies. I sometimes found myself drafting letters for Paul's signature on matters too delicate to be answered by the staff. These required careful drafting and could only be done by one of the deputies. Of course, some of my time each day was spent just supervising and talking to the country directors. I have always been a firm believer in delegating as much of the work as possible, but that also meant that I had to be knowledgeable of what was happening. The days started early and ended late.

All of the deputies could and did have direct contact with the seventh Floor staffs. Paul didn't want to be an unnecessary layer and he let us manage our business to the maximum extent possible. We were, of course, always available to support Paul during big events, like summits or high level visits. We also supported the Secretary when he went to New York for the annual General Assembly meeting which was always an occasion for some one-on-one meetings with his foreign counterparts. I did a lot of travel; for example, I accompanied Weinberger and Reagan on their trips to Japan and Korea. Paul didn't go on those trips, but sent his deputies instead. Paul went with the President and the Secretary; other Cabinet officers would be escorted by one of his deputies. The deputies would serve as resources for the Cabinet officers so that they could have some knowledgeable person at hand. I also spent a lot of time with the Embassies in Tokyo and Seoul; part of that was on the phone and part was through personal visits.

As far as Japan was concerned, the principal issue was, of course, trade. It was the same problems handled by the same people as was the case three and a half years earlier. We had the same recommended solutions and met the same impasses. Time had not moved since 1981. Washington lacked any appreciation for the Japanese culture and style, just as it had in the late '70s. This despite the fact that the leadership of the government had changed three years earlier. Washington just has a blind spot to the differences between

American and foreign cultures. It is not a U.S.-Japan problem alone; it applies to all foreign cultures. Washington people have Washington pressures; they respond to those by stipulating certain aims. The inter-bureaucratic negotiations determine the aims and the means of achieving them. Once those decisions are made, then our embassies are instructed on what is to be done. They become strictly the implementors. Good embassies take the opportunity to participate in the setting of the goals or the means of achieving them and therefore are part of the Washington deliberations and negotiations. But once the decision are made, the embassies must follow their instructions. In 1984, I was in a better position to argue and explain because I was Washington-based, but I can't say that I made much progress. There were people who were bureaucratic adversaries with whom I still have a close personal relationship, like Clyde Prestowitz, who was the Counselor for Japan in the Commerce Department. He and I did not and do not see eye-to-eye on how to best change the Japanese trade policies, but we are good friends.

I think the system works pretty well, once a new administration has gotten over its phasing-in period. During the transition period, then policy development is a problem. The new team is not familiar with the game, is not familiar with the bureaucratic system. All new people come to the bureaucracy convinced that they must change the system and bring a new clear vision to an administration. That mind set may well raise some problems, as we indeed are witnessing today.

I may have been more aware of the domestic discontent with Japanese trade matters only because I heard the criticisms more frequently. But the Department of State is not one of the agencies that receives a lot of domestic political pressures. It is certainly not in the same situation as Commerce or the USTR. Those agencies are in daily combat with the semi-conductor industry or the rice growers' association or the automobile industry. We did of course hear frequently from Congressional staffers about trade issues; that was enough to keep us sensitive to domestic perceptions. I would be on the phone with the staffers or would visit them in their offices frequently. The domestic politics of an issue is always more important than the views of an expert or the international ramifications. For a politician, the American voters are the ones he/she serve, not a foreign constituency that has nothing to do with getting him/her elected or kept in office. And that is the way it should be, as difficult as that might make our international relations.

I had a lot of contacts with other agencies. In EA, at least, we had a weekly *ad hoc* meeting, attended by NSC, Defense and CIA, chaired by our Assistant Secretary, to discuss issues in the region. Rich Armitage or John Kelly would represent DoD, Gustin Sigur or Dave Laux would represent the NSC. These meetings would convene late Tuesday afternoons. All of the EA deputies would attend; no one below that level was permitted to attend. It was a good forum to discuss ideas about certain issues, strategies and tactics. It was a great technique to synchronize the work of the major foreign policy departments and agencies. People used these meetings as opportunities for discussions in depth; nothing was held back. It was an off-the-record meeting and attendees were quite open and frank. Some decisions were made although the forum was not empowered to do so officially. But it did decrease the number of formal inter-agency meetings. I think Dick

Holbrooke had been the first Assistant Secretary in EA to use this device; Paul used very actively and constructively. So the Bureau had very good relations with other agencies. We did not waste a lot of time on bureaucratic "turf wars".

On the Korean front, our major issue in the 1984-86 period was whether Kim Dae Jung would be allowed to return to his homeland. He had been exiled a few years earlier and the Korean government was still very reluctant to have him return. There was strong pressure from human rights groups to have us weigh in on Kim's side. There were also some Congressmen who weighed in on his side. There was considerable interest in having a senior government official accompany Kim back to insure that he wouldn't be harassed when he landed in Seoul.

The Kwangju "incident" which had taken place three years earlier, was still being discussed and used by human rights groups as evidence of the "brutal dictatorship" of Chun Doo Hwan. I visited Kwangju during my tour as Deputy Assistant Secretary and even though the event had taken place many years earlier, I still heard many comments. That visit took place after Bill Gleysteen, our Ambassador in Seoul at the time of the incident, and John Wickham, then our CINC in Seoul and others had submitted a report on their role in the Kwangju incident. Nevertheless, memories still festered and I don't know that the report changed the minds of anyone in Kwangju. I just heard recently from someone who had been in Kwangju; he reported that the same mistrust of Americans existed as had 10-12 years earlier. There will never be an end to the Kwangju episode. While I was the DAS for Korea, I was very much involved in the debate on whether the United States or any of its representatives should subject itself to testimony in front of the National Assembly or any Korean body. I always opposed such a process, both on the precedent it might set and because I was concerned that any statement would be twisted to serve the purposes of those who thought it profitable to maintain an anti-American view. I visited Korea 5 or 6 times in that two year period and the subject of Kwangju was always raised by someone. I went to the Security Consultative Group meetings as the State representative on the American delegation.

We also had some trade issues with the Koreans, like photograph albums and footwear. Those are continuing issues which are usually always under discussion, sometimes more intensely than other, but always there. During my tour as DAS we also engaged the Koreans in low key discussion about the location of a new Chancery. We were not making very much headway until the Korean Ambassador's new residence in Washington was ready for occupancy. At that stage, I suggested that the move might be delayed until we had some satisfactory answer from Seoul about the future of our Chancery. Once I had suggested that, there was a solution reached in a matter of days.

I spent a lot of time on the social circuit with both the Koreans and the Japanese. I find it somewhat amusing that as soon as I left the Department, the Koreans dropped me like a hot potato.

Q: Let me ask a question about EA's ranking in the Reagan administration's foreign policy agenda. Did the Bureau feel at all neglected?

SHERMAN: I don't think so. Paul Wolfowitz certainly felt that he had the ear of the Secretary and the President. We had no difficulty getting decisions or guidance from the administration's leadership on any issue which we felt was worthy of their attention. Mike Armacost was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs for much of this period; he was very sympathetic to our views and had, of course, had a lot of foreign policy experience. Japan was high on the list of foreign policy problem issues. Sigur was a *bone fide* Japan expert and therefore didn't need a lot of background briefing while he was in the NSC. It was much different than from what it is in 1994.

There has never been an over-arching foreign policy for the Far East. The parts of the Far East are too dissimilar to be covered by one policy. The Far East did have a major role in our over-all Cold War national security strategy, as illustrated by our forward deployments, the bases in Korea and Japan. By the mid-80s, the question of troop withdrawal from Korea was no longer a subject for debate; they were there to stay. The Japanese were making good strides toward meeting their military roles and missions, under the Security Treaty and related arrangements. They were increasing their annual contributions to meet our financial cost of maintaining a military presence in Japan. Their defense expenditures actually crossed the magic line of 1% of GNP. We had warm relationships between DoD and its counter-part Japanese agency. I would say that the strategic security aspects of the Japanese-American relations in the mid-80s were in very good shape.

Trade was a troublesome issue, but it was not the over-riding tension that it is today. There was no discussion of action and counter-action on part of either the Japanese or the American governments. Trade had not become the general policy question it is today; the discussions centered on one item or another. Today, there seems to be a general U.S. government view that the Japanese are not being fair and that therefore trade issues have to be discussed in some comprehensive manner. That was not true in the 1984-86 period. During most of my tour as DAS, our relationships with China were stable and improving. There were no major confrontation as occur presently. North Korea was under my purview, but its policy was frozen in time and we didn't devote much of our efforts to doing anything about U.S.-North Korean relations. We reacted; we did not try to undertake any new initiatives. It is true that while I was the DAS, the Soviets came to us to inform us that the North Koreans would accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That was the first time the North Korean had made a movement to become part of the world community. The North also opened its borders a crack by allowing some Americans--some even official--to visit their country. It was also during this period that the Chun government opened some secret channels for discussion with the North Koreans. We were well aware of these conversations and we supported the dialogue letting the South Koreans proceed at their own pace and in their own way. On one occasion, Ed Derwinski, then the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, met a North Korean official in Vienna. We had to walk back from that meeting because he didn't understand the sensitivity

involved in such an encounter. We had a firm policy of having no contacts with the North Koreans.

I found my tour as a DAS very interesting. It got me closer to the Washington policy development process than I had been before. It was a difficult personal period because I was quite ill for part of the tour and absent from the office entirely. I enjoyed the two and a half years immensely and I think it was the capstone of my career in the Foreign Service.

End of interview