# AMBASSADOR JAMES W.S. SPAIN

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*

*Initial interview date: October 31, 1995*

*Copyright 1998 ADST*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- **Background**
  - Born and raised in Chicago
  - U.S. Army, WWII
  - University of Chicago & Columbia University
  - Entered the Foreign Service - 1951

- **Karachi, Pakistan (USIS)**
  - 1951-1953

- **Ford Foundation Foreign Area Fellowship**
  - 1953-
    - London, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Columbia University
    - The "Pathans"

- **Library of Congress**

- **CIA**
  - late 1950's - 1961

- **INR Director Near East and South Asia office**

- **Policy Planning Council**

- **NEA - Afghanistan, Pakistan Desk Officer**
  - India-Pakistan rivalry
  - Aid to Afghanistan - U.S. and USSR

- **Islamabad, Pakistan - Chargé d'Affaires**
  - 1969

- **Consul General - Istanbul, Turkey**
  - 1970-1972
    - Greece-Turkey problems
    - Cyprus problem

- **Ankara, Turkey - DCM**
  - 1972-1974
    - Problems: Drugs, Greeks, Russians
INTERVIEW

Q: Today is October 31, 1995. This is an interview with Ambassador James W. Spain and is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. If we could start, could you tell me where and when you were born and a bit about your family?

SPAIN: I was born in Chicago in 1926, so I am on the last months of my proverbial three score and ten. I became conscious, I think, fairly early that Chicago had a history and a life of its own. I am probably one of the few people left living who saw Al Capone because my father took me out of the first grade one day, that would have been 1932, and took me down town. We had lunch in a speakeasy. It was the last year of prohibition, and
I remember the free lunch. We went to one of the new movie palaces that were the antidote for the depression and at 3:00 in the afternoon we went to stand in a particular place where Al Capone passed through every day. We saw him.

It was a very ethnic Chicago. There were the WASPs, for example, Col. Robert R. McCormick of the *Chicago Tribune*. The other prominent communities were the Irish, Germans and Poles. Even the gangsters were ethnic. Al Capone, the top of the line, was the Italian gangster. Dion O'Bannon was the Irish gangster who the Capone people killed. And Moses "Mo" Annenberg, was the Jewish gangster. Mo Annenberg was the father of Walter Annenberg, who became very respectable.

I was an only child. My mother and father were both born in Ireland. My father, having gotten out, as he put it, "a jump ahead of the Queen's troops" at the age of 16, lived alone for a while and did everything under the sun. He finally got to driving a street car for a living and working for the AFL labor organization. My grade school was, of course, Catholic.

During the last year of the war I turned 18 and went into the Army. I think up until then I probably hadn't been further away than boy scout camp in Wisconsin or Michigan. I discovered the South in seventeen awful weeks in Camp Polk, Louisiana. I discovered New York being trained as a signal corps camera man. The school was in Long Island City and the crowd of us stayed in a converted hotel at 76th and Broadway. I then went off to Japan just as the war was over and came in with the occupation. I suppose this was where the fascination with foreign affairs really began. I found Japan intriguing. Little paper and bamboo restaurants with a fish or something flying outside, struck me as being a lot more interesting than White Castle (the McDonalds of the day).

*Q: You were in Japan for how long?*

SPAIN: About a year.

*Q: This is during the MacArthur period.*

SPAIN: Yes. I ended up as a photographer to Robert Eichelberger who was the commander of the Eighth Army in Yokohama. MacArthur had just fired his public relations staff under congressional criticism. Periodically I used to go up to Tokyo and take pictures of the General giving medals.

I came back to the University of Chicago, finished there, and joined the Foreign Service.

*Q: Was this to get a bachelor's degree?*

SPAIN: The great Robert Maynard Hutchins was very much in control in those days. They put me into a three-year program direct to a master's degree. I never got a bachelor's degree. This became a problem when I was going to Tanzania as ambassador. I was told
that the White House would announce it the next day. They didn't announce it. I got a call saying the White House had been trying to locate me. Someone comes on and says that the reason they didn't announce it was because my biographic data was incorrect. It had indicated I had a master's degree from Chicago and a Doctorate from Columbia, but there was no BA listed. Where was my BA from? She actually ended up calling the University of Chicago to verify that I didn't have to have a BA in order to get an MA at the University.

Q: This is the high Hutchins period, I guess. Did you take the great books course there?

SPAIN: I didn't take the great books course as such, but both Hutchins and Adler and all sorts of new intelligentsia were all over the place. My wife and I met at Hans Morgenthau’s feet. The place was intellectually exciting at the time. Hutchins was into everything. I recall he got carried away while addressing a student assembly at one point, was extolling the life of the mind and the need for intellectual food, said that as most great religions agreed it wasn't sinful to steal food or shelter for a person and his family. He thought that probably extended to intellectual food, books. The next day the student body cleaned out the university bookstore. However, this got him into trouble with the trustees. There was an elegant appeal from him in the DAILY MAROON and the students brought the books back. I have always thought this was considerable tribute to Hutchins. They went out and stole when he said it was all right, but when he said he was in trouble because of this, they brought back the books.

Q: Did you get any feel for foreign affairs? You were in an exciting time because for one thing so many of you were veterans who had been out and seen the elephant and all that. So both the Chicago and student environments were unique.

SPAIN: When I came back I was looking to learn about the Far East. I had only been to Japan and very briefly in China. There was a limited regional studies program on the Far East at the U of C. I ended up getting a degree in political theory. But, yes, the U of C was where I concluded that foreign affairs was interesting. This began when I was a GI in Japan. I said, “Hey, look at all this lovely, exotic, interesting foreign stuff.” Going to the University of Chicago was certainly the next step. Morgenthau and Quincy Wright were two very interesting professors. Morgenthau was for "scientific politics" and wrote the very geopolitical Politics Among Nations. Quincy Wright was very much for the rule of law. You would go one day listening to Quincy for two hours explaining how the UN was the answer and that international law would solve everything. You would go the next day and listen to Hans Morgenthau sneering at Quincy Wright. A memorable intellectual experience.

Q: At the same time I had Frederick Schumann who was my lecturer. But the UN was very big in those days. For young people coming up, the UN did seem to be exciting. It was going to maybe change things around.

SPAIN: Very much so.
Q: You graduated when from University of Chicago?

SPAIN: I graduated in 1949.

Q: And then what?

SPAIN: I ended up for something less than six months, back in Japan as a civilian involved in a team that was devoted to the "democratization" of Japanese education, under the Department of Defense, or I guess it was still the Department of the Army. This probably didn't do much harm, but I can't believe it did much good. Among other things I found myself for a couple of months sitting at the head table with a former full professor at Tokyo University who read the Japanese history books with a room full of 30 or 40 scribes each with two copies of the book. He read it to me paragraph by paragraph and I said, "Out! That is an undemocratic statement." The scribes then crossed it out.

Q: Was this pretty much your idea that such and such was an undemocratic statement or had somebody sat down with you and said that these were the things we had to watch and these are not the things we had to watch?

SPAIN: I don't recall that we had any guidance at all. Now this may be inaccurate. It was a mixed group ranging all the way from some old and experienced people, including the Chief Superintendent of Schools for New Jersey. I was included to provide, I guess, a youthful point of view.

Q: You left that and went off to Columbia?

SPAIN: No, I came back to the US. I had passed the Foreign Service exam while at the University of Chicago. I was taken in in early 1951 and ended up being assigned as a vice consul in Lahore. The embassy was in Karachi. When I went through Karachi for my two days consultation, I called on the Ambassador. He announced that I was staying there. The ambassador, Avra Warren, threw across the table to me the Fulbright Agreement which was signed the week before and said, "Here, go do what this says!" I looked at it and said, "But, sir, this says there shall be established in Karachi a foundation consisting of...and I am the new vice consul for Lahore." He said, "No you are not, you are taking over from Bolling. You are USIS." John Bolling had had one more assignment than I did and I considered him a terribly knowledgeable and senior character. Then Warren added "I need Bowling for something important."

Incidentally, the first one man USIS in Pakistan, before me and Bowling was USIS in David Newsom.

Q: Hmmm! I am interviewing him again this afternoon.

SPAIN: I'd guess he was there 1947 to 1949. He was a one-man operation.
Q: You were in Pakistan from when to when?

SPAIN: 1951-53. This is when I got interested in the Pathans. I had been hooked on Kipling as a boy. I was not particularly fond of Karachi but when I got up to the Frontier, I found a great deal that was real. So willy-nilly, I ended up with the Pathans portfolio in the embassy.

Q: Pakistan was only 3 or 4 years old when you got there. As you saw it, what was the situation like?

SPAIN: Well, there was still a very distinct flavor of the Raj. It was the Royal Pakistan Army, the Royal Pakistan air force and Royal Pakistan navy. All of the commanders were British. It was during my time that the Pakistanis took over. There were a large number of British civilians still left, but they were gradually going. The refugee problem overwhelmed Karachi. It had been a fishing village of a couple hundred thousand people and by then it was probably a million and a half. It is now something like 12 million.

Manners were very British, at least among the educated upper classes. If you were invited out for anything, to a cocktail party, never mind a dinner, after 6:30 you wore a black tie and a white jacket. They were working terribly hard to establish a country with very few resources and enormous bitterness towards Hindu India, which, of course, felt the same way about Pakistan. Hardly anyone didn't have a relative or two killed in the massacres at the time of the partition. We used to debate in the embassy and Pakistanis whether this bitterness was going to grow or be reduced as the generations went by. At this point all the people over 30 had had close and intimate personal relations with Hindus in the united India in the army or in the university, so they knew the advantages of being one. What was going to happen as the generations passed? My conclusion some 45 years later is that things haven't changed very much.

Q: Our embassy was in Karachi at that point. Who was the ambassador and what was the embassy like?

SPAIN: It was on the second floor of a building down in the center of the town above an automobile showroom. There must have been about thirty people including dependents. There were only two children. One was Dave Schneider’s. Dave and Ann had a child about three months before we did, so there were two babies there. The Ambassador was Avra Warren, who had previously been Ambassador to Finland and subsequently Ambassador to Turkey. He was very much an old time classic Foreign Service officer who was from Maryland. He ate only wild meat and fish. He wore white duck suits, which he changed regularly, twice a day. He was very old style. But, he was a pretty competent character which I recognized even then. His emphasis was entirely on establishing good relations with the establishment. I recall Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, the last prime minister of undivided Bengal who didn't come to Pakistan until 1951. He was considered very suspect by the ruling Muslim league because he had collaborated
with Hindus. By accident my wife and I ran into him, at the only night club in Karachi. He loved to dance. He took to coming to our modest house and while the gramophone played, dancing with Edith. I finally went in to see the ambassador and said, "Hey, we have become really friendly with Suhrawardy," His response was to the effect that that was the kind of stupid thing that I would do. "Don't you know that if the Governor General was to hear of this..." Then he changed his mind, and said, "Well, wait a minute, we are supposed to keep in contact with the opposition. However, don't ask me to have anything to do with this. If you want to go ahead, okay. If we get into trouble, I will just disown you."

Q: Since doing these interviews I have found out that hearing how individuals operated while junior officers is often very interesting. They seem to have been able to get away with a lot more than they could as they rose through the ranks.

SPAIN: In my time most ambassadors looked at it very much that way. "Go ahead kids, have fun. "If you really get in trouble, I will disown you so and send you home!"

Q: Were you getting anything from him concerning Eastern Pakistan and the attitude there?

SPAIN: There was a vast difference between East and West Pakistan. It was recognized from the very beginning. All sorts of people had all sorts of explanations. They eat fish, we eat meat; they eat rice, we eat bread; they are short and dark and noisy; we are tall and light and taciturn. There were gestures to try and bring the two wings together. The first president, still called the governor general, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan, were very much from the West. After Jinnah died, which happened a year before I got there, they brought in an East Pakistani as a governor general. Everyone was aware of the problem, but at that point that very few people ever thought of the possibility that the country would break up.

Q: What about the attitude of the embassy as you saw it? Were you reading reports from our embassy in New Delhi? Did you feel sort of like country cousins or unappreciated?

SPAIN: I, of course, was pretty much at the bottom of the heap and for a good part of the time I was at USIS and didn't see the cables. However, my wife’s cousin was married to a chap in the embassy in New Delhi, Lewis Lind, the commercial attaché. In those days the plane that brought you from Karachi to Dacca was a DC-3, later a Convair. Karachi-Jaipur-Jodhpur-New Delhi-Calcutta-Dacca took about 14 hours. I had to go to Dacca on USIS business periodically. Edith would come with me and get off at New Delhi to spend a couple of days with her relatives. I would do whatever I had to in Dacca and pick her up on the return trip. On one of those trips, Lewis Lind said that he mentioned to his ambassador that his cousin from West Pakistan was here and he asked if I would be good enough to give him an hour of my time. This was Chester Bowles on his first assignment. I went to see him. He treated me as an equal, asking "if we did this, could you do that?". Bowles and Warren were simply at daggers drawn. Washington would send out
something or Washington would have a spokesman say something. Then there would be two exactly opposing cables coming in from New Delhi and Karachi. Although there was some talk, there really wasn't much effort to look at a joint US policy in South Asia, not in the two embassies at least.

Q: What about your work with USIS? What were you doing?

SPAIN: The main thing, which took me the better part of a year, was setting up the Fulbright foundation. This turned out to have some advantages because while I was at the bottom of the heap in the embassy, the Fulbright foundation had its own budget. If I wanted to go up to Peshawar to talk to the university about what kind of professors they wanted next year, etc., I had Fulbright travel money.

I started as a one man USIS, but about a year later USIS had some 25 people, of which I was the lowest ranking. I worked in the cultural field. There was the occasional speech. The office, for most of the time was in the library and I had responsibility managing every couple of weeks the speech presentation by visiting American specialists.

Q: How did you find the attitude of the academic world of Pakistan towards the United States? After all, very obviously, the orientation was towards great Britain as home. Was this a tough nut to crack or were they kind of looking to get away from that?

SPAIN: The younger people I found were particularly eager to get away from it. The old establishment was not unadmiring. Everybody had great expectations of the United States. In their simplest form these centered on the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan was sure we would take its side, and, of course, India felt the same way.

I recall the chairman of the Fulbright Foundation, a marvelous man who had be vice chancellor of Punjab University and was chairman of the public service commission, Mian Afzal Hussein, a very benevolent character. His daughter was at Clark University in graduate school in geography. We started getting an increasing number of young Pakistanis, really Indian Muslims, who had gone off to the US before partition and were coming home. There was a very rigid list of approved universities for a government or teaching job and there wasn't a single American university on it. They would come and say we had to something about this.

So, I talked with Mian Sahib, who was in a position to do something. He listened patiently and said, “I tell you what. We have a number of British universities--Oxford, Cambridge, Leeds, London, etc.--on the approved list. You bring me back four American universities and I will put them on the approved list. Maybe we can put more on later.” I went out of the office with joy feeling this was quite a break through. I sat down and began to realize that I couldn't put down Harvard and not Yale, or Chicago and not California. So, I talked to some of my colleagues and went back. ”This is a generous offer of yours, but we can't do it.” Eventually they loosened up restrictions, and as far as I know by the mid to late 1950s, graduates from American universities were not restricted.
Q: Did you have a feel about what American policy was towards Pakistan and what was in it for us at that time?

SPAIN: Not much while I was there. I gathered from reading later that the very beginnings of the alliance were being discussed.

Q: You are talking about CENTO?

SPAIN: After the Dulles speech of 1953, “The Northern Tier” became the Baghdad Pact and then CENTO. But there was no military or USAID or its equivalent. Pakistan’s attitude in terms of Cold War issues was pretty much the same as India’s. It was after I left that the Pakistan-American alliance was forged.

I recall one issue, that I had nothing to do with, but I knew Warren was working on at the time. The US wanted Pakistan to send troops to Korea. The argument was that if you really want to get in bed with the US and get all those lovely hardware goodies, you ought to prove your good intentions now. They never did send any troops to Korea.

Q: It is interesting that they didn't. Turkey did, Ethiopia did. I would have thought Pakistan with both its military tradition and being one up on the Indians might have done that.

SPAIN: That's logical. If I hadn't been there and wasn't familiar with the events from 1951-54, I would share the opinion questions. But in 1952 in terms of world affairs and such issues as Korea and the gestating Cold War, Pakistanis at all levels were just as neutral as the Indians.

Q: You were there until 1953?

SPAIN: The summer of 1953. By then I had gotten very interested in the Pathans. I tried to get the Department to send me to the University of Pennsylvania, where there was a South Asia study program. Instead I was told me to go off to my next assignment which was to be a consular officer in Caracas. I had no Spanish and not much interest in consular work, so I quit and got one of the first year Ford Foundation Foreign Area Fellowships. I went to Columbia and spent the 1953-54 academic year there, mostly reading up on Islam, and central Asia and the Pathans. I used the Ford grant to go off the second year to spend several months in London and then several months in Pakistan-Afghanistan and then came back to Columbia. I got everything but the dissertation completed. Like most American University students I could read French fairly well and had no problem with the graduate examination. You had to have two languages and I didn't have a trace of any other language. The prospect of having to learn a whole new language from scratch to qualify for a doctorate was daunting. A kindly secretary in the public law and government department discovered that Latin was still on the list of approved languages for public law and government. The Jesuits had beaten a certain
amount of Latin and Greek into me. The first time Columbia set up the exam in the classics department and I couldn't read the classic Latin. I said that there must be some mistake. I didn't want classic Latin, I wanted medieval Latin. They scurried around and sent me over to the history department where some young man, who I don't think knew what it was all about, gave me a copy of the Gesta Romanorum, the medieval fairy tales. That went pretty well, so my second language for a degree in comparative government and a dissertation about the Pathans was Latin.

Q: When you talk about the Pathans, who were they?

SPAIN: Pathan is a British colonial word. The people call themselves Pushtuns or Pakhtuns or Afghans. I suppose the most accurate word is Afghan, but the trouble with that is that there are a lot of Afghan nationals who are not Pathan. There are about 8-10 million Pathans in Pakistan along the North-West Frontier and another 6-8 million in Afghanistan. They emerged in history in Mogul days. The Moguls kept great history. The language, Pushtu, is more Iranian than anything else, but it is quite different from Persian or Dari, the Afghan Farsi. They were warrior tribes in part because they have always lived in those rocky hills that separate Pakistan from Afghanistan and there wasn't anything to do there other than to raid the fertile flatlands and fight each other. This is what the tribes were doing when the Muslim conquerors Mahmud of Ghazni and Mohammad Ghori swept down from Central Asia in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

There is an interestingly highly developed literature and poetry, some of which is very good, although in such a language like Pushtu it is not easy to get at it. And a very highly developed code of law, called Pukhtunwali, which translates "the way of the Pathans." This is built around two concepts that are coming back into vogue. One is the rights of the victim and the other one is the collective responsibility. So when somebody kills another and is tried by a jury of his people, it is not did he kill him or did he not, was it malicious, manslaughter or first degree, it is what can be done for the family of the person who had been killed. And it is assumed that the tribe from which the criminal comes shares his guilt to some degree. Kipling's most famous ballad, "East is East and West is West," etc., is set there. It is a romantic tribal society that has been able to maintain itself.

Q: I imagine there wasn't much at Columbia on this grouping.

SPAIN: That's right. What was there was Islam, about which I knew nothing and looms large in their lives, and Central Asia and a surprising amount of 19th century travelers' books. On the Pathans, as such, there was very little, so I spent three or four months at the India Office library and at the British Museum in London, where there was, of course, an enormous amount of stuff. I also visited Oxford and Cambridge to pick brains there.

Q: When you got your doctorate degree, what was your dissertation on?

SPAIN: It subsequently came out in as a book called The Pathan Borderland. It was comparative government, comparison of British and Pakistani administration on the
frontier from basically a political science, not an anthropological or an orientalist standpoint. I never really learned Pushtu well.

Q: When you finished up at Columbia, what happened?

SPAIN: My initial intention was to be an academic. Some of the people who were there at the time—Schuyler Wallace, Lindsey Rogers, and Jay Hurowitz, encouraged me to go that route. But, I decided that I preferred “doing” to “teaching.” So, I came back down to Washington to try to get back into the Foreign Service. The personnel people, of course, laughed at me asking why I quit in the first place. This was the late 1950s. Having left the Foreign Service was the equivalent of a nun jumping over the wall. You were damned forever.

I had come down two or three times from Columbia. At one point word somehow got to a fellow named Bob Amory, who was then the deputy director of CIA, that there was a South Asian, specifically an Afghan expert, in town looking for a job. I was picked up by a couple of characters in a car in front of the old INR building who talked to me. The result was that I could go on the payroll next Monday. It would take five to six months to get clearance and I could spend that time down in the Library of Congress working on my dissertation. All of this was too secret to even tell me what I was going to be doing. It turned out to be totally innocuous, the equivalent of INR, drafting national estimates. I spent six years there. I learned to write.

Harvard Professor Bill Langer was the first director of the office. Sherman Kent from Yale was the second with Bill Bundy as his deputy.

Q: From Columbia.

SPAIN: We lived first out in Annandale and later in a house in Woodley Park in the District, which we kept until a few years ago. This was an interesting job, better in my view than teaching. But, I really wanted to go back to the Foreign Service.

An exchange program between the Office of National Estimates and the State Department Policy Planning Council was set up just after the Kennedy Administration came into power, in 1961. George McGhee was Chairman of the Council. I had met him in the days when I first went to Karachi in 1951. At that time even the newest and lowest had an hour with the assistant secretary. (McGhee was NEA in the Truman administration.) I came to the Council, still on the CIA payroll. At the end of about a year and a half, the Agency was eager to get someone in my slot. In the meantime, George McGhee had gone off as Ambassador to Germany and Walt Rostow had taken over the Council. Roger Hilsman was running INR and he heard that there was this guy on the Policy Planning Council who knew about the Middle East and was looking for a more lasting job. I ended up as director of RNA, the Near East and South Asia office of INR. Pretty soon Hilsman went to the Far East Bureau and Tom Hughes took over INR. I spent two-and-a-half or three years there.
Q: What was your field?

SPAIN: I was the director of the Near East and South Asia office, which included everything from Greece to East Pakistan. It was all very interesting. There was a bit of a management problem. In most of INR, the office directors and deputy directors were FSOs, the analysts civil servants. As neither fish nor fowl I was supposed to bring them together. Who were back

Q: .....I mean to the desk.

SPAIN: I thoroughly enjoyed INR and INR was good to me. Tom Hughes had considerable influence with Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Katzenbach. By and large, if we had an idea, we could get it to the Seventh Floor. Overall, however, I don't think INR was often a decisive factor in policy decisions. It could throw roadblocks in front of the regional bureaus but that was about all. In RNA we wrote a great deal about the Arab-Israeli situation but I never noticed anyone above paying much attention to it.

Q: On the Arab-Israeli thing, this was a time when there was a very strong pro-Israeli lobby. Did you find that what you were dealing with on this you had to sort of look over your shoulder at the American politics of the matter?

SPAIN: Not really. I think probably because nobody took us that seriously one way or another. But there was another side to the Israeli thing. When I was on the Policy Planning Council with Rostow, I was often invited to local embassies. If an embassy knew who was who was working on their part of the world in the Policy Planning Council, they would get invited to luncheons. INR got no notice at all, except from the Israelis. The number two in the Israeli embassy and I used to meet the fourth Friday of every month for lunch at the Madison Hotel for eggs benedict. This was ironic because Catholics still were not eating meat in those days and Jews were not supposed to be eating pork at all, but there were the two of us on Friday. His wife was very kosher and mine was pretty tolerant but didn't produce meat at home on Friday.

They Israelis were very determined in presenting their point of view. The only bribe I have ever been offered, and my God, that was pretty indirect and pretty small, was one time I was having lunch. I mentioned that I was going to Israel for a couple of days. My companion was going to be back in Israel at the same time. "We must go up to the Lebanese border." Would arrange it and come with me. I said, “Fine, sure.” A little later in the conversation I mentioned something about Edith and me in Rome. He said, “I didn’t know she was coming, she must come with us.” I said, “Oh, no, Mordecai, I am meeting her in Rome, this is a vacation.” He said, “Well, she must come to Israel.” I said "The government is paying for my trip and I am paying for her trip.” We finished the lunch and I got back to the office and my secretary says that the manager of El Al has just called twice for me. I call back and he says that he understands that I am going to make a tour that includes Israel. I told him that was correct but since I was on government travel
orders, I would be going in and out on TWA. “I understand Mrs. Spain is going to be in Rome but is not coming with you to Israel,” he said. “Yep.” “Well, El Al would welcome the opportunity to provide her first-class transportation from Rome to Tel Aviv and back again.” My first reaction was that it was a wonderful idea. Two seconds later I realized I should run for my life. I made excuses that she couldn't take the time for the extra trip. In my almost 40 years that was the closest I ever got to an offer of a bribe.

Q: Going back to the Policy Planning Council. This had been sort of a power house under George Kennan and immediately thereafter. But you were there during the Rusk period, were you?

SPAIN: I was there for about two years in the Rusk period when Walt Rostow was the chairman. He had been deputy to Mac Bundy at the White House, then come over to be chairman of Policy Planning. He went back to be National Security Advisor.

Q: How did you find Policy Planning?

SPAIN: Walt had access to the President and saw a good deal of Kennedy. Certainly the issues on which people worked were real ones. There was, however a theoretically strain there. Henry Owen took up a lot of time with his proposals for a NATO multilateral nuclear force. I never thought it would work, but I didn’t know much about it. Walt had me working for months composing a modern day Sears Roebuck catalog for Bengal. He started with the lovely idea that a major jump towards a breakthrough in the US occurred when two factors came together in rural America. One was a post office in every village which you could count on. The other was the opening of Montgomery Ward and Sears Roebuck mail order stores. A farm wife who hitherto had nothing to do with the $2 a week she made raising chickens could now get a dress and had a mechanism for delivering it. This was a major jump in the development of rural America. Well, why not do it for Asia, says Walt Rostow. You prepare a catalog, pick the goods, ascertain where they have to be manufactured, how much they need to cost, and do a dummy Sears and Roebuck catalog.

Q: Walt Rostow was well known not only throughout the government but elsewhere because he had come up with the economic theory of the takeoff, which you were eluding to.

SPAIN: I'm sorry, “takeoff” is the word I should have used, not "breakthrough."

Q: In other words, what we would today call third world countries, if they get the economic dynamo going up to a certain point, all of a sudden, “wham” they would self-generate and move up. And this was very much in our thinking all over, so this was one of his little pieces.

SPAIN: On Friday afternoons at 2:00, the Council met for collective deliberations. Walt would come in and sit at the head of the table and say, “I am terribly eager to hear what
you each are doing on this or that, but beforehand let me tell you what I have been doing throughout the week.” At five o'clock, Walt was still talking. The secretary would come in and tell him he had to go, and there were various glum faces around the table. He couldn't stop talking.

Q: During this period of time the big thing that was gestating but hadn't gone anywhere was relations with China. We did not have relations with Communist China. Was this on the table at all?

SPAIN: Yes. I had nothing to do with it personally, but I remember it being on the table. Just after I went to INR I remember Hilsman and Hughes and the academic Alan Whiting, coming back from a meeting at the White House and being sort of glum because they had made the proposal to Kennedy about using the traditional American Open Door policy to launch some kind of opening with Communist China. Kennedy listened and said, “Bring it back four years from now when I am a majority President.”

Q: While in INR, was there a feeling towards the role of Pakistan versus India or something like that at this time?

SPAIN: Oh yes! The South Asian division chief in my day was a man named Tom Thornton, who later went to the NSC staff. He was a civil servant. The problem was that we did not succeed in anticipating some important events, like the Indian take-over of Goa or the Indo-Pakistani wars. I don't think that did much for our stature with Dean Rusk.

I certainly enjoyed INR and INR was good to me. It had its impact largely through Hilsman's and Hughes' personal relations with the top political figure. I'm not sure that the bureau as such had much impact on Secretary Rusk, but then I don't know how much impact the regional bureaus had on him, either.

Q: Then you moved over at a certain point to a policy side, didn't you?

SPAIN: Yes. July 1, 1966. Dean Rusk in the first half of that year was fretting about layering--all these people before you got to somebody who really knew something. I was told, and this might be pure gossip, it all began when Johnson called him and wanted to send somebody to some post and wanted to know what the ambassador’s house was like. Dean Rusk said that he would find out. So, he called the assistant secretary who had 20 or 30 countries, and said, “Tell me about the residence in Bango-Bango.” The assistant secretary said he had never been there and called the office director who had 11 countries and says, “tell me about the residence in Bango-Bango.” The office director had never been there either. In fact, one of the few questions I ever got directly from the Secretary was “What is the residence in Islamabad like?” because Johnson was going to give the embassy to Eugene Murphy Locke, a Texas friend.
Rusk set out to establish the equivalent of embassies in Washington. He broke up the big offices. Carol Laise was the South Asia director--Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Ceylon and Nepal. The office was broken into two--Afghanistan and Pakistan; and India, Ceylon and Nepal. For six months or so before Carol went to Nepal as ambassador, she ran India, Nepal, and Ceylon. I came in for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Doug Heck took over from Carol Laise and for two years before Doug went off to Istanbul we had roses, roses all the way. The NEA assistant secretaries during our time were Ray Hare, Luke Battle, and Parker T. Hart. All knew Heck and me well. Their own areas of specialty were elsewhere in the bureau. In effect they said “You guys run South Asia and check in when you need to.”

**Q:** So you had Afghanistan and Pakistan and Doug had India, Ceylon and Nepal.

**SPAIN:** Yes. Doug and I decided early on that anything the two of us agreed on was very likely to go straight through. The embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad were pretty partisan but we weren't going to be. The understanding essentially was "Look, we'll agree every time we can. If we can't we will take turns giving in to support the same thing. In extreme matters of conscience, we will flip a coin.” We had a lovely two years when the country directors did have, I think, considerable influence.

**Q:** What were the arms policy issues? We are talking about 1966-69.

**SPAIN:** The main issue came after the 1965 war. We had cut off all arms supply to the two bad boys. Of course, this meant nothing to India because except for the brief period in Galbraith’s day when the Chinese attacked, they had gotten nothing from us anyway. India hadn't even shown any great interest in wanting it. Pakistan on the other hand had been getting more and more. Part of that was payoff for things like flying the U-2 out of there and the electronic intercept base near Peshawar.

Well, what should we do about arms policy? The cut-off was hurting Pakistan very, very badly. It was not hurting India very much. Lyndon Johnson was a great friend of Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan, and word kept coming from the White House to take care of my friend Ayub. We tried various things.

**Q:** Later this became probably even more pronounced, but were there proponents of arms supply either in congress or the Pentagon or those who were violently opposed to either place?

**SPAIN:** Oh, yes. The Pentagon was very much in favor of going back to arms supply with our noble ally Pakistan. This was in part because of the intercept base, but also because over the ten or fifteen years that had passed by this time American officers and Pakistani officers had developed friendships and a lot of respect for each other. There was a rather strong feeling in INR, Tom Hughes and Red Austin, my successor, that due to size, etc., India was much more important. To make a penny with India was more important than making a dollar with Pakistan. And it was a perfectly sound deduction that Pakistan was
more likely to use any arms it had against India than against the Soviets. Also, at this point the Chinese emerged as close allies. Chester Bowles, back in Delhi, was, of course, dead against any relaxation of the arms embargo.

Q: What about Afghanistan? Was there much going on there?

SPAIN: The first Soviet economic and military aid way back in 1954 was to Afghanistan. It was the first time they came out and started doing what we had started doing a couple of years earlier. The dominant figure, who was out for a while and then came back in was Prince Daud, the prime minister, who was one tough character. In the midst of the Cold War there was concern about Afghanistan's becoming a Soviet takeover, a step on the way to "the warm water seas."

We had a fair size economic development program in Afghanistan, building dams and roads. Also, in the late sixties, the first movement towards a representative government was made by the king. He dismissed his cousin, Prince Daud, as prime minister, and brought in a Hashim Maiwandwal, who had been ambassador in Washington and was well known and respected by Americans. Also, Afghanistan has always merited a little more attention from both the UK and the US than its objective importance deserves simply because it is so damn interesting and romantic and remote.

Q: Was there any thought of trying to turn Afghanistan into an ally or something, or was it just "we will stay out if the Russians stay out?"

SPAIN: In 1953 the Afghans actually asked for military assistance and indicated their willingness to join the Baghdad Pact. The cool headed reaction here, including the Pentagon, was that we couldn't possibly defend them, so "No!" This was when they started turning to the Russians and Soviet influence grew. I think those who knew something about Afghanistan weren't all that concerned because they believed that the Afghans would do to the Russians what they would have done to us, i.e., take what they could get, while maintaining their absolute commitment to independence. We had a big AID project in the Helmand Valley in the south and there were some problems with that. For instance, we built the Arghandab Dam which brought in water for the irrigation of a large amount of new land. But no one ever did soil surveys for the land to be irrigated. It turned out that the more water you put on it the less it could produce.

Also in Afghanistan in the late sixties we participated in our first unspoken cooperation with the Soviet Union in development. They built roads in the north. We built roads in the south and they connected up.

Q: Were there any things where you and Doug Heck felt you had to go on separate policy recommendations?

SPAIN: I don't think there ever was. We both had a certain amount of trouble with our ambassadors and Doug more than I because Bowles was such a forceful, eloquent
character. For instance, when policy went towards a gradual but eventual lifting of the arms embargo, Doug genuinely believed that this was the thing to do. And when major economic aid dollops went to India, I could see the reason for them. I think we were both trying to do an honest job. But part of the reason for the cooperation was the incentive that if we could agree on anything it probably was going to be it.

Q: On the relations of these countries...this was still Nehru, wasn't it?

SPAIN: Well, by the time we finished it was Shastri.

Q: But there was a tendency for the Indians from time to time to stick their thumb in our eye with very obvious pleasure. Did you and Heck have problems keeping people up above you in various parts from getting mad as hell at the Indians and let's do something to them?

SPAIN: Yes, particularly the Department of Defense across the river. Glacial Dean Rusk never showed any feeling that I can remember. We also had for most of that 1966-68 period Indian and Pakistani ambassadors in Washington who were remarkably competent. Agha Hilaly, a long time Muslim civil servant going back to before partition and 30 years a diplomat. He had learned you got some place with Americans by being nice to them.

Q: This was the Indian ambassador?

SPAIN: The Pakistani ambassador. The Indian for part of the time, if I recall correctly, was B. K. Nehru, who was an arrogant Brahman. Hilaly was always happy to deal with me. Nehru often refused to do business with Doug, a mere director, and insisted on dealing with the assistant secretary at the very least. Pete Hart would come down and sit in our office and sit with Doug. Personal relationships and personalities do have some influence. I doubt that they very often swing a policy decision from a yes to a no. But in terms of the question that you ask, the image in the State Department and I think throughout the government was that the Pakistanis were decent, straightforward characters and that the Indians were impossible.

Q: Did the Vietnam War which was heating up during this time play any role in India-Pakistan relations as far as you dealt with it?

SPAIN: I don't think so. I can't remember anywhere. In the Korean War we had wanted them in and was a little outraged that the Pakistanis didn't put something in. In Vietnam the Indians had an internationalized role dating back several years.

Q: International Control Committee, the ICC.

SPAIN: As I recall, we never had any reason to be mad at them, we never thought they were doing the Chinese will. In public opinion in both India and Pakistan there was a feeling that “you Americans would never kill people like this in Europe but you don't
think twice about slaughtering brown or yellow men.” By the time Doug and I left, the basic question, “Should America be in Vietnam at all?” was just beginning to shape up.

**Q: You left there in 1969, where to?**

SPAIN: I went to Pakistan as Chargé. I had become sort of Mr. Pakistan in the foreign affairs community. Nixon had sent former Senator Keating to India and he had plans for some political figure to go to Pakistan. His ties and preferences were much for Pakistan because during his years in the wilderness when he visited India, they sort of spit all over him not paying any attention to him, but he was treated royally in Pakistan. Keating had been in place for several months and whatever the White House had in mind for Pakistan, that person was delayed. My time was practically up in NEA having been there for three years, and Joe Sisco was coming in and cleaning everything out and reestablishing his own order, so by mutual consent Joe Sisco let it be known that he would be happy to see the back of me. I didn't like Joe as I had Battle and Hart, so it all came together. The Pakistanis were making noises that they weren't getting an ambassador, so Joe suggested I, Mr. Pakistan, be sent there as Chargé. I served for less than six months. Then they dug up Joe Farland, who was a Republican political appointee. I came back.

The Kissinger NSC staff was working on something it called program analysis, a quantitative approach to foreign affairs. One of the subjects was Turkey. I knew very little about Turkey having merely visited there and learning a little in INR. But we put together an interagency group of seven or eight to do an analysis on Turkey. It was very interesting. We compared the costs per soldier on the Turkish front with the costs on the central European front. We had several intercept stations in Turkey and we tried to assess their value. If the Turkish intercept stations produced ten thousand pieces of information a day and the cost of operating them was $100,000, you were paying $10 a bite. That didn't seem bad. But if you took that same ten thousand pieces of information and looked at how many of them ever had any impact on another level, even just being published in somebody’s bulletin, and the number drops to a hundred, each one costs $1000.

When that was finished, the personnel people came up with an assignment as DCM in Tehran. I had no reason to be unhappy with that, except that Douglas MacArthur was there, whom I had never met in my life, but had heard a great deal about.

**Q: And Mrs. MacArthur, "Wahwee," who was one of the acknowledged Foreign Service dragons.**

SPAIN: Daughter of Roosevelt's first vice president, if I'm correct.

**Q: Yes.**

SPAIN: I went home to Edith. We both agreed that in our mid-forties we were a little old for this sort of thing and that I would try to avoid it.
Q: And stuck Doug Heck with it.

SPAIN: That, I'm afraid, was the net effect, although Doug actually volunteered. Before I explain that, another confession is in order. Carol Laise, my soul mate from early days in NEA, was now ambassador in Nepal. I met her in the corridor when she was back in Washington on leave or consultation. I said "Carol, it's nice to see you. Are you finished in Kathmandu or are you back on leave?" "I'm back on leave. Why do you ask?" I responded perfectly honestly, "I'm looking for a nice little embassy and I thought if you were leaving Nepal..." She didn't like it. "Well, you don't need to think of Nepal!"

Rodger Davies, may peace be upon him, was acting assistant secretary while all this was going on. One day he called me in and said, “Here is a cable from embassy Saigon. I remind you that what embassy Saigon wants these days, embassy Saigon gets. It is from Ellsworth Bunker. It says ‘I want to reorganize our information structure and put the three separate information units under one minister counselor for public affairs I understand that Jim Spain is looking for a job. He would be ideal.’ My first thought was that Carol probably had something to do with this.

Q: Carol Laise was the wife of Ellsworth Bunker. Ambassador Bunker was in Saigon and Ambassador Laise was in Kathmandu.

SPAIN: Rodger had something to add. “I spoke with Doug Heck on the phone an hour ago. His marriage is breaking up. He wants to get out of Istanbul and is perfectly willing to go alone to Tehran as DCM. Why don't you go to Istanbul? I need an answer by 3:00 because I am going to have to respond to the Saigon cable.” I had another consultation at home. At the end of the afternoon a cable went out expressing NEA’s and Spain’s profound sorrow that they could not respond to the challenging opportunity in Vietnam. Spain had been paneled two days ago for Istanbul.

Q: So, you were in Istanbul from when to when?

SPAIN: I was there 1970-72.

Q: What was the situation in Turkey at that time?

SPAIN: When we got there just before the Fourth of July, 1970, it was the classic Turkey of the previous several years: deteriorating stability but not spectacularly so. In September-October, terrorism suddenly flared up in a very, very big way. Our kids in Istanbul one day were late coming home in the school bus full. They were full of joy and delight because the bus had pulled off the side of the road and sat there for two hours while the police and leftist terrorists fought it out with bullets and hand grenades. Unlike the kind of Tamil terrorism in Sri Lanka which hasn't any interest in foreigners, Americans were the prime targets for the Turkish left. My major interest in Istanbul was the protection of Americans. This was the time of the "hippie problem." At any one time we might have a dozen Americans in jail on drug charges. Billy Hayes, the famous
"Midnight Express" character, was arrested three months after I got to Istanbul. Edith used to visit him bringing books and candy. She said when the book came out, “I always told you Billy wasn't really a bad kid.” I asked what she meant. She said, “He didn't even mention us in his book.”

The military intervened on March 12, 1971 and the battle with the terrorists ran the rest of that year. It was really acute. They would catch a bunch of them and then their friends would break them out of jail.

Q: How did you deal with the authorities at that time?

SPAIN: There were two security issues. One was a personal one: how to keep our people alive. The Turkish First Army commander came to call on me one day. We had asked earlier for him to give us a rundown of what security measures they were taking and we should take. His beribboned aide carried a suitcase. The aide stood at the door at attention while the general told me they have people doing this and doing that. Then he said, “But we do expect you to do your part too.” At his order the aide emptied the suitcase on the table. He'd brought us fifty pistols for distribution to our personnel. Bob Dillon, the deputy, and I carried guns from then on. So did a few others, but, knowing our people, I was afraid to offer them to some--and others refused to take them.

The other problem centered on U.S. Sixth Fleet port calls. The U.S. Navy liked Istanbul as a leave port. The Turkish Navy liked to have the ships come in. It wasn't about to admit that it couldn't protect the American sailors. Besides, its officers believed that it was good if the ship visits provoked the terrorists to come out where they could smash them. So, the American military and the Turkish Navy were always in favor of a proposed port call. The Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Turkish First Army (which was responsible for security in Istanbul) were against them. Sometimes the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and often the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul were against them. So it went for at least two years.

Q: From your observations how were the relations with the Greeks? I was American Consul General in Athens, 1970-74, so I was looking...

SPAIN: Was Henry Tasca there then?

Q: Oh, yes.

SPAIN: Did you know that he used to sneak over to visit Istanbul?

Q: I never paid much attention where he went. I went over there one time.

SPAIN: Later I will tell you some Tasca stories.

Q: Well, tell me some Tasca stories with the machine on.
SPAIN: This is something of a diversion. One of my pals in Istanbul was the Greek Consul General, a wonderful man named Nico Karageorgas. One day he said to me “As you know, Mr. Slade is coming from Athens on Thursday of next week.” I asked who Mr. Slade was. (Slade is not the actual name; I can't remember it.) Nico said “You mean you don't know? It's your Ambassador Tasca.” I had to admit that I didn't know a thing about it. “Well,” Nico told, “he comes occasionally. It is unofficial, personal, but he always lets me know and I thought I should tell you.” I asked “What the hell is he up to?” The reply was “Well, sort of visiting, sightseeing, rest and recreation.” He paused and then added “You know, he is negotiating with the Patriarchate for a title. You know the Vatican gives papal knighthoods to distinguished laymen. Well, he'd like one from the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate. Of course, he couldn't use it while he's a U.S. official but I understand he's going to retire soon. Don't tell him I told you about this.”

We had the Tascas out to dinner. We were sitting down when a gas barge exploded out in the Bosporus. We all ducked under the table. When things were back to normal, our Turkish butler came in to pour the wine. Mrs. Tasca looked at him and said to Edith "How do you stand them? Look at him. He would just as soon kill you as talk to you!" It was just as well that they didn't talk. Recep understood English perfectly.

Q: She had problems with Greek members of the household staff. I think in four years they went through over a hundred. She was Roman Italian and had no use for anybody other than Italians.

SPAIN: She had some kind of title, I think.

Q: She may have. The story was that her father was in charge of cleaning up garbage in Rome under Mussolini and for that he picked up some sort of title.

SPAIN: Somebody, an American, it may have been Bill Crawford or Arch Blood, told me she was referred to as the Countess Garbaggio.

We've gotten off the main track...

Q: Well, I was in Greece at the time and very obviously the Greeks, NATO, etc. was very interesting but the real thing was the Turks and the Turkish threat. They were ready to take umbrage at anything that the Turks were doing. What was your impression of the Turks looking at the Greeks at that time?

SPAIN: Their outlook was much the same. They resented the Greeks not taking them as seriously as they thought the Greeks should take them. They were a great power and the Greeks weren't. How dare they think they could go to war with us. There was no terra irredenta sentiment. Ataturk had made a point of that. Anatolia is us and we are Anatolia and that is it. Turkey is truly secular compared to most Muslim countries. By and large
the Turks disliked Greeks, not Christians. They had stereotypes about them: lazy, deceitful, untrustworthy.

I was in Ankara during the 1974 Cyprus invasion when the Turks sank their own two ships which they thought were Greek. Bülent Ecevit, normally a pretty cosmopolitan character, was prime minister. He called Ambassador Macomber in. I went with him. He told us the two Greek ships were heading for Cyprus. When they crossed into Cyprus territorial waters, they would be sunk. That would mean war between Greece and Turkey. The U.S. had to stop them. We got in touch with Embassy Athens—which insisted that there weren't any Greek ships in the area. Macomber went in and told Ecevit “Look, Mr. Prime Minister, Ambassador Tasca and Assistant Secretary Sisco are in Athens. They have talked to the Greek generals and colonels. There are no Greek warships near Cyprus.” I went to Hasan Ishak, the minister of defense, and repeated the message. Later we were able to report that the Greek authorities had told the Embassy “If the Turks can find any Greek warships there, tell them to go ahead and sink them!” This shook Ishak enough that he took me into see Ecevit. The prime minister listened and shook his head. "Well," he said, "you may find this useful after all. You will discover that the Greeks never tell the truth. They can't. You will see this proved when those ships cross into Cypriot waters and we sink them!"

Well, of course, the Turkish Air Force did sink them—and it turned out that they were their own ships!

*Q: To me that story, which is true, of course, is so incredible. It is not a minute to minute decision. It was a long thing...*

SPAIN: It went on for 36 hours.

*Q: How can you lose your own ships like that?*

SPAIN: I don't know. Most ships in both navies were American-made. They looked alike. Then there is a possibility that there was army, navy, air force rivalry and lack of coordination in Turkey. But, still it is incredible.

*Q: Now you have left Istanbul to go to Ankara as DCM, is that correct?*

SPAIN: Yes.

*Q: When?*

SPAIN: In 1972.

*Q: And you were there until when?*
SPAIN: 1974. I was due to leave the day before the Turks invaded Cyprus. In fact, my replacement was Don Burgess, who had shown up a day or so before. My wife had left, although I still had the younger two boys with me. Burgess and I camped out in the house taking turns having somebody in the embassy 24 hours a day. I finally got away perhaps two weeks later.

Q: You were working for Ambassador Macomber?

SPAIN: Initially Ambassador Handley, for the two years in Istanbul and one year in Ankara. Macomber came in for the last year I was in Ankara.

Q: How did you find the operating style of Handley and then Macomber?

SPAIN: About as far different as you can imagine. Handley, who had been ambassador before in Mali, was an easy going, story telling, St. Mary’s County Irishman. He had been in Ankara a couple of years by the time I showed up and had done everything there was to do. He was totally relaxed. I was told to do what I wanted.

Macomber was very different. He was vigorous and aggressive--and, like Handley, very effective. Handley had more or less sweet-talked the Turks out of opium production. Now, in 1973, there was an election coming up. Macomber was convinced the new government would repeal the ban and go back into production. No one else in the Embassy, including me, agreed. The ambassador turned out to be right. Faced with the problem all over again, Macomber set everyone scurrying about to find a way to prevent illegal leakage of the drug. A new German "straw" processing system had just been invented. It reduced the amount of poppy gum in peasant hands to nil. Legitimate production was controlled entirely in strictly supervised factories. Our problem with illegal leakage was over.

I learned a lot from both Handley and Macomber.

Q: Before we get to this Cyprus thing that sort of came like a bolt out of the blue, didn't it, what were some of the issues you were dealing with?

SPAIN: Drugs, the opium war, was probably number one. Force goals were another major issue. These were set by NATO and the Turks thought they should be higher than they were. How much military assistance we "owed" them. Who owned oil in the Aegean Sea. The threat of Greek declaration of a 12 miles limit around all of the islands there. Air control responsibilities for the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The Armenian terrorist campaign against Turkish officials which began in the US in Los Angeles.

And we had some interesting Montreux Convention work. The first Soviet aircraft which was built at Odessa on the Black Sea was assigned to the Baltic fleet. When the time was ready the USSR wanted to take it out and bring it around through the Mediterranean. The Soviet position was that because aircraft carriers were not mentioned in the Montreux
convention, they could take it out. Our position was that they couldn't take it out because it was bigger than anything mentioned. Well, they finally took it out as we all knew they were going to. The Turks wanted the thing as far away from them as possible and were not about to stop them.

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Russians began flying several planes a day with arms to Syria over eastern Turkey. To my surprise, air passage over eastern Turkey is also covered in the Montreux convention. The Russians were declaring all of these as Aeroflot flights, civilian cargo and food supplies. We had reliable intelligence that they were Soviet air force planes carrying arms. We kept trying to get the Turks to stop them. That part of the Montreux Convention is not very specific. It simply says that civilian planes may fly upon identifying themselves and their cargo. The foreign secretary asked "Well, what do you want us to do, shoot them down?" I took some pleasure in passing the query to Washington. No, the Department didn't want the Turks to start a war with the Soviets.

Q: From your vantage point at the embassy, how did the Turks view the Soviet threat?

SPAIN: Very seriously. Far more seriously than most of our allies, Pakistan for instance, or even some of our Western European allies. One of the first things that most Turks would tell you "If you are an American and your father, grandfather or great grandfather was killed in a war, any number of people might have killed him, Spanish, Mexican, Germans, your own people in the Civil War. But with the one exception of World War I, any Turkish ancestor who died in battle was killed in the 27 wars with the Russians." That was very real to them. They had very much on their mind in living history the 1946 Soviet claims to their Kars and Ardahan provinces and to control of the Straits.

In 1973 when I was chargé, Handley was off somewhere, within six weeks of each other Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson died. We had the usual condolence books. I had left my suit coat home and was wearing a sweater at the office. The consular officer came racing in saying, "There is a line all the way around the block coming to sign the book for Harry Truman." I raced home, got my suit coat, and came back. It was a damn good thing that I did. I had just returned when word came that the president of the republic was coming to sign the book and was walking to show ultimate respect.

I was out glad-handing the line at one point. A classic old Turk with a huge mustache talked to me. Beside him was a big classic clean-shaven young Turk. The old man told me that he was a retired Turkish army sergeant. He had been in Korea. With a tear in his eye he described how in 1946 in Istanbul with his then baby son in his arms he had stood at the edge of the Bosporus and watched the battleship Missouri sail in to save Turkey from the Russians. He had never forgotten Harry Truman for that. By the time it was over, we had a dozen books crammed with signatures to send off to Bess Truman.

Lyndon Johnson died about six weeks later. The highest official to come was a protocol officer and he didn't walk. Other than the diplomatic corps, we had about 20 Turkish
names. The Turks still hated Lyndon Johnson for his 1964 letter telling them that if they invaded Cyprus and the USSR struck at them, we would not come to their help.

Q: I think we had about the same reaction in Athens, too. Truman was remembered. Was there a feeling that the Soviets were messing around with the internal security of Turkey at that time?

SPAIN: Yes. It was nothing like it had been before they took over Eastern Europe, but there was suspicion that they were financing the ultra-leftist terrorist groups. Turkish and American intelligence collaborated in trying to pin this down. We tended to believe that the Turks sometimes overestimated what the Russians were doing. But instinctive fear of the Soviet Union and concern about its machinations was very, very real in Turkey.

Q: Could you talk about the events leading up to the Cyprus situation which was July 14, 1974?

SPAIN: The primary Turk concern about Cyprus was not a desire to take the island over. Their interest was the equivalent of the American/Cuba phenomenon: a hostile power 40 miles off-shore. The real political driving force was all those Turks down there that had been killed. The only real link between the Turks in Cyprus and the Turks on the mainland was that they were Turks and the mainland was not about to see them slaughtered. When the Greek government-supported coup against Makarios came, the Turks assumed that it was the first step towards “enosis,” union with Greece. With some reason they were convinced that if this happened a lot of the Turks were going to be killed. Turkish public opinion would clearly not permit that. They went ahead as they had in 1964 and 1967 to demonstrate their intentions and determination to prevent this. Right down to a few days before they actually invaded, there was not a unanimous feeling on our part as to whether they were bluffing again. But this time they did go in. In my manuscript...

Q: The manuscript you are referring to is...?

SPAIN: A draft of a book called In Those Days. In there is one of the most peculiar little bits of diplomatic history I have ever encountered. Joe Sisco on an airplane loaded with Bob Dillon and others, showed up about three days before the invasion. He came in to talk with Ecevit and left convinced that the Turks were going to invade. By this point we all were. The group went off to Athens with the very sensible intention of trying to prevent a Greek-Turkish war. The next day in comes a letter from President Nixon to Prime Minister Ecevit. It is stronger and tougher than the 1964 Johnson letter. You know the context of the Johnson letter.

Q: Regarding Cyprus.

SPAIN: Yes, in 1964 the Turks were going to invade Cyprus. Johnson wrote them a letter saying that if you invade and the Russians jump you because of that, don't think that
NATO will protect you. The Turks never forgot or forgave him. But, this Nixon letter was even stronger. I don't recall the exact wording, but it said you mustn't do this and if you do you will be punished. At 12:30 in the morning Macomber and I set out to deliver the letter. We thought it was a mistake, but was slugged "From the Secretary" and signed by the President. We had to enter the prime minister's office by the back door because a mob in front is screaming for Greek blood. We come up the stairs to the prime minister’s office. An aide opened the door and ushered us in. We stopped in the door way because he is on the phone. We started to back out and he said to sit down.

“Well, I'm glad you understand, Henry,” is, I think, the first phrase we hear. It was apparent that Henry Kissinger was on the line. Ecevit was one Kissinger’s Harvard seminar types. We heard only half of the conversation but it was pretty clear that Henry was saying “Bulent, old boy, you really shouldn't do this. We will try to help you otherwise, but you shouldn't start this war.” Ecevit replied “I understand your position, but with God helping us we can do no other. I assure you that we are not trying to conquer Cyprus, just to establish a beach head from which we can negotiate a settlement.” At the end he remarked “Yes, I understand. Of course, I know you must tell us not to Henry, but I am glad you understand our position.”

Here we are carrying this letter signed “Nixon” saying if you do it we will smite you. Macomber looks at me and I look at him. He signals me to keep the letter in my pocket. When Ecevit got off the phone he asked, “What can I do for you gentlemen?” We said nothing in particular. We had just come along to see how things stood. He told us “Well, as I was just telling Henry, we are going tomorrow morning, but you Americans have no reason to worry about it.” We went back to the Embassy.

Bill Macomber got on the phone to Athens to try to get a hold of Sisco. My job was to get the Operations Center in the State Department and let them know that we hadn't delivered it and weren't going to unless reinstructed. Wells Stabler, an EUR deputy assistant secretary was running the Washington Task Force. He told me "That cable was put in by the Secretary, himself. He even signed it. Are you sure?” I replied that we were sure and would tell why in a classified cable. Understandably, he was mystified. “Okay, now let me get it clear. You are saying that Ambassador Macomber is not delivering the letter unless instructed further to do so.” “Yes, that is right.” Of course, the next morning the Turks were pouring onto Cyprus.

For three days we never heard a word. Then I came across a routine "official use only" telegram. "Ref Deptel [whatever the number was], Disregard." I have often wondered what a historian who gets into the archives 25 years hence is going to make of this...There was a Nixon letter that was sent to the embassy. The embassy was told to deliver it. It was stronger than the Johnson letter. But there was no blow up in Turkey over it and no one ever heard a word about it.
Q: Were you able to have communication with the embassy in Athens to say that they really mean this and you had better do something with the Greeks? Or did you feel that we were all working in kind of the same way?

SPAIN: I think everyone in Athens--including the Greeks--knew that it would be disastrous for them to attack the Turks. Our communications weren't bad: two or three hours for an exchange of classified telegrams; one out of two or three en clair telephone calls getting through. On one call I began “This is Jim Spain in embassy Ankara. May I speak to Ambassador Tasca please?” He comes on and says, “Hello.” Then I hear a voice in the background asking “Who is that Henry?” Henry says, “Ankara.” The voice says, “God damn it, Henry, give me that phone.” “Hello, this is Joe Sisco. Bill?” I say, “No, this is Jim Spain.” “Where is Bill. I want to speak to the ambassador.” I told him that Bill was busy with something else and he spoke with me. But I remember that “God damn it, Henry, give me that phone.”

Q: Did they ever acknowledge anything that you had done afterwards?

SPAIN: The Turks? No, they never admitted they were wrong about the ships.

Q: Then you left about that time, did you?

SPAIN: I left two weeks after.

Q: Were we telling the Turks about the power of the Greek lobby in Congress or at this point did it not matter?

SPAIN: That was part of the dialogue. My own feeling was pleading Congressional necessity isn't a very good diplomatic instrument with the Turks--or with any other host government I have known. Most feel it is our problem. Ankara's reaction was simply: if you are as strong and noble an ally as we think you are, you shouldn't be bothered by a group of greasy restaurant owners.

Q: Well, then you left in the end of July. Where did you go then?

SPAIN: I came back and went off as a diplomat-in-residence at Florida State University.

Q: Okay. Why don't we stop here.

Q: Today is November 1, 1995. Jim, will you explain why the Florida State University assignment?

SPAIN: I had been on six or seven regular assignments in the Department and overseas. I suppose Personnel felt it was time for a change. I welcomed the idea. There was no assignment I particularly wanted open at the time. Perhaps things would be better after a year.
Q: Just a quickie about Florida State. Did you find much interest in foreign affairs there?

SPAIN: Yes, of a different kind than I was accustomed to. I didn't do much the first semester. I was assigned to the political science department as an adjunct professor. I announced at a faculty meetings that I would be happy to fill in at any class for which I was wanted. I think it helped establish personal relations when I added “If you ever want to get away from your Friday class for a long weekend, I would be happy to take it.” I the second semester I shared teaching a seminar on American Foreign Policy since World War II with a diplomatic historian named Tom Campbell. All in all, my year as a "diplomat-in-residence" was pleasant and useful.

Q: Then, you got out of Florida when?

SPAIN: The spring of 1975.

Q: And then what?

SPAIN: Then I was sent to Tanzania.

Q: This is as ambassador?

SPAIN: Yes.

Q: How did the process go?

SPAIN: Someone once described it as "appalling." Carol Laise was Director General. I visited Washington a month or two before I was due to finish at Florida State and asked Carol what were the chances of an ambassadorship. Her reply was “We don't know anything. Don't call us, we will call you.” Next I went in to see Larry Eagleburger, who at that point was an aide to Kissinger. He greeted me by saying, “I suppose you want to be an ambassador?” “Yes.” He asked me if I spoke Spanish. “No.” “How is your French?” “Read it perfectly well but would need six weeks training to be able to speak it well.”

He looked over some loose leaf notebooks and pushed aside two of them. “Ah, here it is, we have just had to pull a man out of Tanzania. That's for you. Has Henry anything against you?” “I don't know. When I was chargé in Pakistan some years ago, he got very mad at me for what he thought was a breach of security on his efforts to open China. He wrote me a stinging letter, which included the phrase, “and as to your future career in the Foreign Service--insofar as you have one--you will never do a thing like this again.” Larry said, “He's alone now I'll find out.”

He walks into the Secretary's office and comes back to report, “Nah, Henry doesn't have anything against you.” He remarked that it might take a couple of months but they would try to get me out there as soon as possible. As I was leaving he said, “Oh, by the way, will
you stop in and tell Carol you are going to Tanzania.” I walked down the corridor to the Director General’s office where I had seen her two hours earlier. I said, “Hey, Carol, Larry Eagleburger wants me to tell you I am going to Tanzania.” I expected that she was going to go through the roof. She just looked up, smiled in a tired way, and said, “Congratulations.”

Q: What was the problem in Islamabad involving Kissinger?

SPAIN: I was chargé in Islamabad in 1969. President Nixon with Kissinger, still National Security Advisor in those days, came for an official visit. There was a Nixon-Yahya tête-à-tête meeting with no one else present. When the U.S. party was leaving, I said to Kissinger, “I think I have a pretty good view of what has been talked about and agreed on except whatever went on between the two presidents. Would you see that I get a copy of the memcon on that?” He looked at me rather coldly and said, “If the President writes a memcon and if he and I think you should have it, you will get a copy.”

A week later I was summoned by Yahya. He wanted me to convey an urgent message to President Nixon. He wanted him to know that he was going to fulfill his promise but it would take not one but two weeks. He had assumed that his ambassador was in Beijing and he had just discovered that the man was in fact in the hospital in Shanghai. As soon as he recovered and got back to Beijing, the thing would be done. To expedite matters, Yahya had already directed that he send the message straight from Beijing to the Pakistani ambassador in Washington for delivery. So, I say, “Sure, I will pass it on.”

It wasn't hard to figure out that something was going on secretly with China. Against my own better judgment--it was the only time I ever used "back channel"-- I sent through CIA an "Eyes Only" message to Kissinger in the White House, by-passing the Department. Two weeks later I got a letter from him saying in effect: "How dare you interfere in my work! How dare you violate my confidentiality! You must never say anything about this to anybody ever under any circumstances. As to your future in the Foreign Service insofar as you have one, you had better never do a thing like this again.”

Q: How were you supposed to get the message to him?

SPAIN: To this day I don't know the answer to that. Edith and I sat up most of the night drinking and cursing. We drafted and redrafted three or four messages which in effect said, “Stick it, Herr Doktor!” But, by morning we said, “Oh, hell.” and did nothing.

I would like to think that Kissinger was the kind of man who had forgiven, if not forgotten that, and was willing to send me off Tanzania. But I suspect he just didn't remember the incident.

Q: Going to Tanzania. Did you have any problems getting approved? Were there White House candidates in the bidding?
SPAIN: No. As far as I know, in Henry Kissinger’s early days at State there wasn’t any of this. What Henry said, went.

There was a Congressional problem, however. I always thought I got along well with politicians. Fulbright had retired the year before but the Foreign Relations Committee was still mostly the old committee with John Sparkman chairing. There was a marvelous woman from somewhere in the South, an older woman, who was the NEA congressional liaison type—Kay Folger. She took me over, as was the habit then, to meet the chairman as soon as the nomination was announced. The chairman asked two questions, figuratively patted me on the head, and said, “It will be a pleasure to have you with us next Tuesday, Mr. Ambassador.” Well, On the way back to the Department Kay said, “You're in. He called you 'Mr. Ambassador.'”

I appeared at the Committee meeting right behind someone who was going to some fairly important European post. There were six or seven senators present. When that nominee was heard, they all cut and ran, except for Sparkman, Clifford Case of New Jersey, and a newly elected Senator from Iowa named Richard Clark. Clark had an aide who was just out of college. She knew something about Africa and had gotten the impression, understandably, that this anonymous character (me who had never had a thing to do with Africa) was Kissinger’s hatchet man put in to replace that great and good American Black, Beverly Carter. (He was the ambassador Kissinger had pulled out for allegedly negotiating with terrorists.) She had also learned about my years with ONE in CIA. Clearly her concept was that the silly State Department was sending out a spy to deal with the great and good neutralist, Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania. Clark started his questioning along this line. "Do you not think that your record with CIA, etc......?" Fortunately, the newspapermen had gone out when the important ambassador and the rest of the senators had. I did the best I could to answer, “No I do not think it would have any effect...” But it didn't go over with Clark, who was a freshman senator eager to show how alert and bright he was.

At this point Hubert Humphrey walks in. He has a staff aide with him that I knew was engaged to be married to Clark’s staff aide. Humphrey sits down and listens for five or ten minutes. Then he says, “Senator, do you know Julius Nyerere? Well, I do. I have seen a lot of him. What do you think he thinks the Chinese ambassador is, a Confucian scholar? What do you think he thinks the Soviet ambassador is, a rug merchant? What do you know about ONE and Sherman Kent?” He suggests that he hasn't heard language like Clark's in the Senate since Joseph McCarthy.

Sparkman smiled benignly and said, “Thank you Mr. Ambassador.” I was confirmed a couple of days later. But for 45 minutes to an hour I was in a bad sweat.

Q: Because we are trying to pick up various things about the Foreign Service, you alluded to what happened to Beverly Carter. What was the alleged problem?
SPAIN: Let’s see if I can condense that Gothic tale to just a minute or two. There was a chimpanzee sanctuary run by a famous woman named Jane Goodall out on Lake Tanganyika. I'm talking about the spring and summer of 1975. There were a number of graduate students in biology and zoology there, including two Americans, an Australian, I think, and a few Europeans. Just across the lake in Zaire there was a rebel movement against Mobutu. One night the Zairian rebels came across and grabbed some foreign students. They were taken back across the lake and ransom was demanded.

Kissinger had just formulated the U.S. Government policy of not paying ransom for or negotiating about hostages. The parents of the two Americans, who were connected with Stanford, showed up in Dar es Salaam wanting to pay the ransom. The money was in London and they couldn't get it transferred. They convinced Beverly Carter to let it be sent through the pouch. Then, one of the rebel leaders showed up in Dar es Salaam. By coincidence an American missionary who had spent his life out in Ujiji near the preserve and where Stanley found Livingston was also in Dar. The parents made arrangements with him to be the go-between with the rebels. He would take the money across the lake and bring the kids back. To keep everybody in touch an embassy communications officer would go to Ujiji and stay there.

The night the missionary was supposed to go across the lake he lost his nerve and refused to go unless the communications officer came with him. The Foreign Service person agreed. The money was handed over. They didn't get the kids right then but they all were sent back within a few days. No one ever told Bev Carter that one of his people had actually crossed the lake. Still, that should have been the end of it with rejoicing everywhere. But almost simultaneously Kissinger and Mobutu came together at some international meeting. The life President gave the American Secretary of State hell for violating his own no ransom policy and supporting rebels against his government. He insisted that an officer from the American Embassy in Dar was present when the money was handed over.

On the day of the rescue Kissinger sent Carter a commendation for the successful recovery. After he talked to Mobutu he pulled him out for having been party to a hostage negotiation. This was less than fair. Bev knew there was a communications officer in Ujiji, but it was only long afterwards that he found out he had crossed the lake.

Q: Before going out to Tanzania, in many ways you were the new boy on the block.

SPAIN: Very much so.

Q: You were there from when to when?

Q: Okay. Julius Nyerere was a renowned leader in African terms and was the darling of particularly the socialist bloc--the Swedes, and socialists in England and Germany, etc.--What were you being told about Nyerere before you went out there?

SPAIN: As I recall, I was briefed particularly on ujamaa scheme, collectivized farming. There were no policy problems between the U.S., and Tanzania, other than their constant voting on the other side of issues in the UN. Tanzania’s uniqueness in Africa was one thing that was emphasized to me. I only had a week in the Foreign Service Institute. The briefing was entirely adequate. There was someone to give me a crash course in Kiswahili. It was explained that Nyerere was the big man among radical--as opposed to "good"--Africans. He was a radical and a socialist, generally hostile to American policy, a strong supporter of rebel movements in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. The country was under real threat from the large number of Soviet and Chinese advisers. The Chinese were building the Tanzam railroad. There were 20,000 of them there.

Q: You arrived there in 1975. What was the political situation there at the time?

SPAIN: Nyerere had ruled the country since independence in 1960-61. It was a one party state. Its democracy was not representative. The only thing that could be said was that it was that Nyerere's rule was relatively benign. I am quite sure he never ordered anybody killed. There were a few people in jail but not many. Some were from Zanzibar, under sentence of death there but kept alive on the mainland. The country struck me as radical in its international policy and downright stupid in its economic theory, but pretty moderate in human terms. People didn't get killed. They might get relocated under the ujamaa system of farming, but Nyerere never even thought of "liquidating the kulaks."

Q: Was this ujamaa a relocation system?

SPAIN: In Tanzania the land to people ratio is very good. It is a big country with relatively few people. The traditional African rural society was a couple of huts, a family and extended family on top of a hill with its own few coconut palms and a casaba patch. On the next hill there was another family. It was not really village life. Nyerere's great aim was to bring education and medical facilities to his people. That was pretty hard to do it when they were scattered like that. So he set up the idea of ujamaa, the family village, and the people were all ordered in. Government would dump a truck load of cement blocks and a few pipes and say here, build it. It was a pretty inefficient operation and a lot of the people sneaked away to their old homesteads to harvest their coconuts, etc. Sometimes when they were brought back or even when they were first ordered into these collective villages, some of them didn't get on the trucks fast enough and got a rifle butt on the side of the head. It was not without brutality, but nobody was ever killed that I know of. And Nyerere did bring educational and medical facilities to the villages, far better than those in rural Kenya at the time.

I got there not long after the first round of ujamaa. Food production had gone straight down. Typically, Nyerere, instead of ordering, “shoot the capitalist pigs,” said “Well, all
right, we have the people in villages now where they have medicine and education. Rearrange the land system so that there are private plots and each family can keep what it grows.” The next two years food production went straight up. Then he insisted on going back to doing things "the right way," and collectivized again. After I left they had to decollectivization again.

Q: What was the role of the American ambassador there?

SPAIN: In a public sense it was very modest. The US wasn't popular. I saw my job as knowing Nyerere and seeking possible areas of cooperation with him. When I showed up the assumption was there were very few, if any, of these. He was a hopeless socialist full of silly slogans, such as “No man should have an automobile until every man has a bicycle.” Still, he was clearly a very sincere and humane man.

I thought times were changing. I and DCM Herb Levin one day came to the conclusion that we mind find common ground with Nyerere on Rhodesia and the Namibia. We started reporting and analyzing his views on these issues, selectively but I think accurately. Lo and Behold and behold! Henry Kissinger got interested. He came to visit Dar three times in 1976. David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, joined him for a couple of his meeting with Nyerere. The "Anglo-American" plan for the independence of Rhodesia began to evolve. Nyerere was more cooperative than Kissinger expected. He made no bones that he would give all the support he could, including arms, to the Namibian and Rhodesian rebels. That was to end "colonialism." But he saw the situation within South Africa differently. That was a fight between Africans and Africans. The Boers, as he always called the Afrikaners, were Africans too, bad Africans, but Africans. As he told an American visitor, "Unlike the British in Rhodesia, they have no place to go home to."

From 1976 on Tanzania became more important in US thinking. Nyerere was Chairman of the "Front Line States," Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana and one or two others, who were dictating the African position on Rhodesia and Namibia. Kissinger's visits were the first real policy contact with the US. Then in 1977, literally a week after the inauguration, who shows up but Andy Young, our new UN PermRep. A lot of Tanzanians took to him immediately. The first African chief of state that Carter invited to the United States after his inauguration was Nyerere and he developed a great empathy with our president.

During the visit I could easily see why. I was amazed that Carter, a former naval officer from Georgia, president for only a few months, faced with multiple world challenges, knew the names and numbers of all the players on the Southern African scene. He carried on five hours of discussion with Nyerere as competently as anyone in the State Department could have. I met Nyerere a few times in later years and he never failed to praise Carter as "a good man and a true democrat."
One of our problems on Rhodesia was British Foreign Secretary David Owen. Despite his Labor Party background, he rubbed most Africans the wrong way. And, even when he made a concession, he did it grumpily and grudgingly. Still progress was made. There was a real dialogue with Nyerere. Andy Young visited Dar five or six times in 1977. Cy Vance came for one important meeting with all the insurgent leaders. Out of it all came the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia. When a Conservative government came back to power in London, Owen was replaced by Peter Carrington. Strangely, the radical Africans found this smooth aristocrat much more compatible than "red brick" Owen. Carrington, of course, had a good deal of personal experience in Africa and I think he used it to "pull the wool over" Margaret Thatcher's very conservative eyes in her early days in office. He perhaps made it up to her by throwing us out of the negotiations and the "Anglo-American Plan" became just "Anglo." But expected blood baths were avoided and Zimbabwe got its independence.

Q: What was your role?

SPAIN: If I did anything useful, it was to convince Washington that Nyerere was not a brutal African dictator and a Communist stooge and to persuade Nyerere that the U.S. was a decent democratic country and not merely the world's bully. It helped that I found Nyerere fascinating. He had an MA in English from Edinburgh University and loved word play. I never read a book that he hadn't read. He translated Shakespeare into Kiswahili. He had the same Catholic secondary education at a mission school that I had. I recall going in to see him one day and being confronted with the question: “Mr. Ambassador, do you remember what the ultimate sin is?” I said, “I think it is despair.” “Yes, it is despair. You are dying and you are in despair of God giving you mercy.” I agreed. “Isn't there something else," he asked, "final impenitence?” I agreed again. “You are dying and you don't ask God for forgiveness because you are convinced He wouldn't give it to you if you did.” “Yes Mr. President.”

He delivered his punch line. “I am on the verge of despair about Ian Smith. Will you please tell President Carter that. If he doesn't do something about him soon, we're all going to be damned!” I passed the message along, although I left the intricate theology out.

Another story. Nyerere came back from an OAU meeting in Addis or Khartoum during the war with Uganda. I went in to see him and said, “Well, how did things go, Mr. President?” He replied, “You know how they went, you read the newspapers. They all condemned me for warring with my African brother, Idi Amin. I told them, let me tell you about my African brother. He is a murderer, a pervert, a monster. Then my fellow heads of government called me names. They said I was a rampaging elephant. That didn't bother me. You can see I'm a little guy, barely 100 lbs. Then they called me a mad buffalo. I shed that too. But finally one of them called me a mischievous little black monkey. That hurt! Look at me and that hurt. Look at me. I jump around and I talk with my hands. I do look something like a monkey.”
You can see why I am very fond of Julius Nyerere.

Q: Well he seemed to have had particularly good relations and charmed money out of the Swedes and other socialists. He would call up and seemed to get whatever he wanted. Did you find this was true?

SPAIN: Most Western development aid to Tanzania came from Scandinavia, particularly the Swedes. They liked the intellectual socialist, the benign father of his people who didn't kill or imprison people, while trying to create a new way of life with better prospects. The fact that it all didn't work very well didn't bother them.

Q: Were you able to at any point sit down and have a good discussion with him about the effects of a lot of this socialism, that it was cutting down on a lot of opportunities and that maybe a more capitalist form of government might make some sense, to unleash the mercantilistic energies of the people?

SPAIN: I must confess that I really didn't try. For one thing, unlike other parts of Africa, no one was starving or dying of uncontrolled disease in Tanzania. For another, despite Nyerere's close identification with radical socialist theory, I don't think he cared much about economics. He was basically a humanist with a keen sense of both tribal traditions and modern politics, a social science type. Besides, our AID program in Tanzania was very small and I didn't have much to bargain with. Above all, the primary US interest at the time was a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. I was much more interested in promoting that than in arguing economics.

Come to think of it, there was one time just before he came to the US on his official visit. He told me he wanted to try to make clear the "north-south" problem between the "haves and the have-nots." He asked what I thought about his proposed approach. He talked about a Tanzanian man and wife out in a village who sew and reap a hundred kilos of sisal. As always happens in dealing with sisal, they cut their legs. Sooner or later they are likely to get skin cancer. It is a pretty miserable life. They earn enough to have 3 ounces of carbohydrates and 1 ounce of fat a day. (I forget the exact statistics.)

That sisal is sent off to the United States. The shipping cost is controlled by the Westerners who make a profit on it. What originally cost 5 cents, when it arrives costs 15 cents. An American company buys it and makes it into a ball of twine. It sells it to a stationery store 65 cents. The stationery store sells it to a customer for 98 cents. Part of the difference between 98 cents goes in wage to the unskilled clerk behind the counter. Her weekly wages enable her to buy new clothes, go to movies, take a vacation. My people don't get enough out of the process to do any of these things. "That is what I means by north-south inequality!"

I told him that he should try his explanation. Incidentally, he was much more precise and eloquent than I have just been. He put the idea into a speech in San Francisco. I don't think anyone understood what he was getting at.
Q: Was there concern at all during this that Nyerere would become a tool of the Chinese and Soviets? Henry Kissinger was seeing so many things in East-West terms.

SPAIN: Yes, there was some concern, particularly because there were a great many Chinese there, 20,000 at one point when they were building the Tanzam railroad. Such military equipment as Nyerere had was Soviet supplied. Russian diplomats and technicians were fairly much in evidence. Press and public opinion favored both Russians and Chinese. I personally didn't share it. As far as I could see, if anybody was trying to take over the country, they weren't doing a very good job of it. And, also, with the Tanzanians, as with the Egyptians and the Afghans and every other people I had known in Asia and Africa, there was a real nationalism. Just taking aid from a country didn't mean they were going to be absorbed by it. The Chinese put in an enormous amount of money for the Tanzam railroad and their numbers were of some concern at the time. But as we can see now, all they achieved was building a railroad.

Q: What about Zanzibar? One of our concerns has been the communists getting a foothold on the Indian Ocean and Zanzibar being a traditional port and all that. Did this play any role?

SPAIN: After the Zanzibar revolution when the Africans overthrew the Sultan just a year or two after independence, the Russians and particularly the East Germans were very active there. The latter provided apartments buildings, a color television station and receiving sets, etc. When the island joined with Tanganyika to form Tanzania, Nyerere was, I think, a restraining influence on Communist penetration. By the time I got to Dar there was little reason to fear a Communist take-over. It seems to me that our mistake in Africa and Asia during this period was not in fearing sinister Communist intentions but in not taking into account local ones. No country wanted to be a Communist satellite--any more than it did to be an American one.

Q: I think one of the themes has been much of the Cold War that back in Washington the political leaders and congress were sometimes reflected in the Secretary’s statements, were seeing communist menaces around and all, where those in the field were seeing these things self-contained and these were people take opportunities to get a little extra arms or aid. Did you see this split at all?

SPAIN: I certainly did. In the case of Tanzania there was much more concern in Washington than there was in the field. One of the amusing sidelights of Henry Kissinger’s second or third visit was this. He stayed in the Kilimanjaro Hotel. When the party was clearing out to go to the airport, I was told that the Secretary wanted me. I went upstairs. People were carrying away files and suitcases. In the middle of a table there was a "bug" protector that was still making weird electronic sounds. Henry gets both of us hunched over this thing. He said “Thank you very much. This visit has been useful. Your arrangements were fine, but I want to warn you about one thing. This fellow Nyerere is not on our side.” This was a pretty accurate reflection of the spirit of the times. The fact
was that Nyerere certainly wasn't on our side, but he wasn't a tool of the Chinese or the Russians either.

Q: What about the situation with Uganda? Could you explain for someone who wouldn't be familiar, what had happened in Uganda that caused it?

SPAIN: Idi Amin was a monster. He jumped in to grab a piece of northwestern Tanzania. He send his army down without notice and occupied it. Why? God knows. Tanzanian forces mobilized and started getting in there, but before any real fighting took place, the Ugandans withdrew. You could make an argument that whatever it was it was over. But Nyerere took the position, probably correctly, that Idi Amin remained a major threat to Tanzania. If something wasn't done about him, he would come back in and do the same sort of thing again. He had started the war, and, by God, the Tanzanians were going to finish it. Personal enmity between Julius Nyerere and Idi Amin was enhanced by philosophical differences. There really wasn't anything economic or political at stake.

Q: How did that work out?

SPAIN: The Tanzanians chased them all the way to Kampala. Nyerere replaced Amin with Milton Obote, a previous Ugandan prime minister who had bee in exile in Tanzania for some years. He ran the grocery store where we bought out food supplies. He was another intellectual socialist but without Nyerere's charm, humanity, or intelligence. He started killing people just as soon as he got back to Kampala and was overthrown again. I really have no idea of what has gone on in Uganda since.

Q: Was there a difference between the Tanganyikans and Ugandans and the Kenyans?

SPAIN: If you look at it from an anthropological standpoint I don't know if you would really find much difference. Uganda had had this complicated thing of Buganda where there was actually a monarchy and one tribe that had the history of ruling. Tanzania’s great blessing was that it had a hundred or so tribes, none of them were anything like a majority in the country. I think the biggest tribe in all of Tanzania was 6 percent of the population. Nyerere himself came from a small tribe up near Lake Victoria which had only 5,000 or so people. Kenya is more evenly split between Kikuyus and Luos, tribes of almost equal size which are intensely jealous of each other.

Q: It would seem to me that a place like Tanzania where the Americans were not, although we were talking to them in polite terms, but they were not with us on UN things and that type of things. What would you do when you got your yearly shopping list of things to do? Would you go around and say, “Please vote this way,” knowing they were going to stick their thumb in your eye? Could you make any grounds or was this a proforma thing?

SPAIN: Sometimes I didn't even due it pro forma. I went in twice a year on two issues. One was Puerto Rico; the other was nuclear non-proliferation. Nyerere would sit there
grinning, not reflecting hostility but really not hearing me either. At one point Kissinger sent out a demarche that included the phrase "for Tanzania to vote for Puerto Rico independence would be an unfriendly act."

I remembered my international law courses which taught that "an unfriendly act" was one just short of war. Nyerere had had a few courses in international law, too. I figured throwing that at him would just make him furious. But I also knew that the Secretary felt strongly. So I said, “Mr. President, I know you strongly favor Puerto Rican independence, but I want to stress that the people of the United States feel strongly about the subject too. They become unhappy when they see countries that really have little interest in the matter constantly voting against us. They think acts like that are unfriendly.” I added that I would really like to brief him on our view of Puerto Rico sometime. He politely agreed.

The subject was up again in the UN a few months later. Before instructions went out to beat everyone who disagreed with us about the head, I asked for briefing material from the Department. I got an armload. When I went to see Nyerere this time, he had his foreign minister and three or four others present. We had our little seminar, very conscious of the fact that on this occasion at least we weren't engaged in a confrontation. All I got out of Nyerere was a comment that "Yes, some of this is new and interesting. Next time we face this issue, I will be better prepared.”

Before very long, of course, we had to face it again and this time, according to Washington, the Tanzanian vote may be critical. I never really understood this use of words. It might be critical to the UN vote in the Committee of 77 but that really didn't make a damn bit of difference to what we would do. However, I went back to Nyerere and said, "You remember how we discussed Puerto Rico. I'm told your vote is likely to decide the outcome this time. Do you really want to be the country that faces the U.S. with a demand for Puerto Rican independence?"

He asked a number of questions and called up his foreign minister. Then he said, “I don't think we would be the single vote that puts it over, but I will make you this promise. My representative will be instructed that if it comes to that, she is to excuse herself to go to the bathroom.” Actually, the independence issue was defeated by several votes that year, so Tanzania felt free to vote it favor of it. Not a great achievement, was it?

Nyerere's standard answer to my pleas for Tanzania to sign the non-proliferation treaty was that it was an "unequal treaty." Some countries had to sign it and some did not. “Mr. Ambassador,” he told me one day, "you come in and tell me that the U.S. has signed it; bring it with you and I'll sign it then and there.” Obviously I got nowhere with him on the subject--except that he occasionally tease me: "When are you bringing me your non-proliferation treaty?"

Q: I would think that in a country such as Tanzania that as the ambassador one would feel very leery about having the CIA around there because anything they did would...in the first place it wouldn't have any bloody effect. But almost anything they did could get
into the papers and be blown up all out of proportion and we would just have egg all over our face, etc. How did you find this?

SPAIN: We had a small CIA station there. Two of the three station chiefs I had were pretty good citizens. They understood that covert collection had more prospect for loss than gain. Unfortunately, they were under constant pressure from their headquarters to collect at any cost.

Q: We are talking about rogue elephants, somebody going out...

SPAIN: They weren't cowboys, but I saw no need for them. State political officers produced better information on Tanzanian affairs. The Agency people claimed they were tracking Soviets and Chinese through the port and airport. They also had "high priority requirements" for information on Zimbabwean and Namibian rebel leaders. Andy Young and I were in regular contact with all of these and I never saw the Agency come up with anything that we didn't know already. I did see some stuff they produced that was plain inaccurate.

Q: We had full relations without restrictions on talking to these people?

SPAIN: Yes. The only restriction was that no American official could go into Rhodesia. Later the one exception to that was Steve Low, who was ambassador in Zambia. He was designated a roving ambassador or something like that and actually visited Rhodesia. There were no restrictions at all, even during the Kissinger days. And, after Carter, Young, and Moose came into the picture, it was talk, talk, and talk. My wife gave Sam Nujoma the first American social event that he ever attended, a birthday party for him in the house in Dar es Salaam in 1977.

The CIA's problem, incidentally, was in Washington. The White House asked for all available information on the rebel leaders and the Agency set out to get it by hook or crook. Equal priority was give to collection in Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and four or five other places, including South Africa. I tended to be somewhat skeptical of the hair-raising stuff that came out of the last. When I raised a question about this scatter shot approach, suggesting that they might look for information about Mugabe in Maputo (where he spent most of his time) and about Nkomo in Lusaka (which he made his headquarters), I made a lifetime enemy of a swashbuckling spook named Clair George.

Q: Clair George being?

SPAIN: The chief of the Africa covert division of CIA. He told me once that I was the worse ambassador of the whole crop. Simply because I had said, “For God’s sake, fellows, don't risk getting blown trying to recruit a drunk who was once Robert Mugabe’s driver, Robert Mugabe has been long gone from Dar.” I didn't shed many tears when George, having ascended very high in the Agency, was convicted of felony in federal court a few years ago--and I didn't break out the champagne when Bush pardoned him.
Q: Were there any other areas we should cover?

SPAIN: On Tanzania, I don't think so--other than the interesting aspect of diplomacy when you come back with an official visitor to the United States. As I said Nyerere was the first African chief of state that Carter invited back. I accompanied him.

Only twice in my life have I been in substantive sessions in the White House. I was with Carter and Nyerere, Vance, Moose and Brzezinski for something like five hours. Then too, five or six days are allotted for the distinguished visitor to see the US. We took our own plane out to Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles, and the rural Midwest and South. Nyerere didn't play bridge but his foreign minister (now President of Tanzania) did. ....weekend and apparently is the likely new president.

Such visits are very useful in terms of getting a feel for what people in the field often tend to forget. One is that the American people, while polite and interested, simply don't care all that much about foreign affairs. Another is Washington meetings, hordes of people tripping over their own feet; everybody serving his personal interest; nobody ever willing to make a decision. I couldn't help thinking how great it would be if I had no one but Carter, Vance, and Moose to deal with. But governments don't work that way.

Q: What would President Carter and his Secretary of State Vance be doing talking to Nyerere for five hours? That is a lot of time.

SPAIN: Rhodesia and Namibia were high priority issues at the time. Kissinger had devoted three or four days to them in 1976. We were in the middle of the negotiations for an independent Rhodesia. The personal chemistry between Carter and Nyerere was great. Toward the end of the discussions Carter shuffled his papers and said, "Well, I think that is all Mr. President. It has been very useful." His National Security Adviser who had been sitting down the table and hadn't said a word coughed pointedly. "Oh, yes," said Carter, "There is the matter of the Cubans in Angola." "Yes, indeed Mr. President," Nyerere responded. "I thought we were going to agree on everything, but that is something that we can disagree on. Let’s talk about it." Carter didn't seem very eager. He said, "We feel that’s bad." Nyerere gave his standard reply: as soon as the South Africans get out of Angola the Cubans will get out. "How can you guarantee that?" "Because the President of Angola has promised me and I will see to it that he lives up to his promise!" There isn't.

Brzezinski broke in. “Mr. President, are you aware that the number of Cubans in Angola compared to the total population of Angola is larger than the number of Americans who were in Vietnam at the height of our involvement?” “Oh, really, how interesting,” replied Nyerere. Carter started folding up his papers. “And, Mr. President,” asks Brzezinski, “Are you aware that the number of Cubans in Angola compared to the total population of Cuba is very much larger than the number of Americans in Vietnam at the height of our involvement compared to the total population of the United States?”
This time Nyerere didn't say a word. He waved his hand with a condescending smile. Carter grabbed his papers, stood up, and announced "Well, it looks like we really are finished!"

As is obvious, I was personally very fond of Nyerere--not necessarily a good thing for a diplomat. He was a very remarkable man and, I think, a very constructive element in the peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa that eventually emerged.

Q: What was your impression of Andrew Young? He came out right afterwards. Andrew Young was a well-known civil rights leader but one gets the feeling that he was in a way over his head in the diplomatic world.

SPAIN: In terms of professional diplomatic knowledge and technique, he might have been. But he was very charismatic, a public leader with vision. Nyerere was very fond of him. So were most of the rest of the African Front Line leaders. They may well have trusted him more than we professional white diplomats. Andy putting his foot in his mouth in New York in the very sophisticated ambience of the UN is one thing. Andy going off and buying Makonde carvings, eating cassava or leading “Happy Birthday To You” for Sam Nujoma was a very real asset. I can't think of anything that he ever did or said in Africa that was negative. I was very fond of Andy. That's how I ended up as his deputy at USUN for a brief period. While in Tanzania, I was asked by a top Washington official “Is it true that now that Don Easum has retired you are the only Foreign Service officer that Andy Young can stand?.” I hedged, saying “You might better ask him.” There was a chuckle. “Well, that is not the real question any how. Is it true that you are the only Foreign Service officer that can stand Andy Young?” I said, “I like him.” “Good! Go be his deputy in New York.”

Q: When did this happen?

SPAIN: June, 1979.

Q: So, this is your next job?

SPAIN: It lasted six weeks.

Q: Could you tell the story of what happened?

SPAIN: I came back and was confirmed by the Senate...

Q: This was a deputy...?

SPAIN: As Deputy Permanent Representative, Jim Leonard, I think, held the job before me. I asked Andy “What do you want me to do?” “Run this place,” was the reply. I am told you are a Middle Eastern type. We need more dialogue with the Arabs. We have to
talk to the PLO. We can't do it in Washington, but we can do it here. Get to know the Arabs here at the UN and maybe eventually we can get something started.”

I paid a month’s rent on an apartment in New York and went back to Tanzania for ten days to pack out. We got all our household effects and airfreight on the way to New York. The night before we were due to leave Carter fired Young. There were frantic calls from Washington. Warren Christopher told me “Look, we don't know who the President is going to choose. Whoever it is, we don't want to present him with a pre-packaged deputy. Can you stay in Dar a while longer?” I told him that I had said goodbye to the president and the foreign minister. The protocol chief would be waiting at the airport in the morning to see me off. I added that I didn't care whether I went to New York or not, but I really thought I should get out of Tanzania. He said, “OK. But take a while getting home. Take some leave.”

We went to Fiji where our daughter was in the Peace Corps and spent a couple of weeks with her. I got another call in Fiji saying that it looked like the President was going to appoint the president of Notre Dame, Father Hertsburg. Would I be willing to be his deputy? I didn't know him from Adam, but it was the same sort of thing with a public figure, so I said yes. By the time we got home Carter had appointed Don McHenry, previously number three on the USUN staff. He knew infinitely more about the UN than I did. I thought that what was needed now was a political deputy. Don was very nice. He said that as far as he was concerned my appointment held. We mulled it over for a while and I decided that I didn't want to. Looking at a computer run later I found that I was listed as Acting PermRep for a few days between Andy’s formal resignation and confirmation of Don's appointment. That was my USUN experience.

Q: Well, then what happened to you?

SPAIN: Everybody in the hierarchy at the time said, “Don't worry, take your home leave.” (We had waived it for the assignment in New York.) The situation was complicated by the fact that my wife had discovered a lump in her breast on the way back from Tanzania. She had a modified mastectomy. After that the doctors were so sure that everything was all right that they didn't recommend radiation or any other additional therapy. While awaiting a medical clearance for her, I spent the better part of a year serving on a promotion board and doing performance reports on FSOs assigned out of the Department.

Then Edith's cancer returned. There was another operation. While we were awaiting the doctors' verdict, Director General Harry Barnes telephoned me to tell me that I had been promoted to Career Minister and to warn me that I could expect a call from the Secretary asking if I wanted to go to Turkey. I had served twice in Turkey and spoke Turkish. It was the one job in the Foreign Service I really wanted. Harry clearly expected a shout of joy and an instant yes. Instead I asked if I could let him know next week. In a few days after the doctors operation, I came back with another "all clear" verdict. State Med said it would clear her for overseas in sixty days. When the call came I was able to say a happy
yes. But, of course, the doctors were wrong again. The cancer appeared again after a few years and finally killed her. But meanwhile, we were in Turkey.

**Q:** You served in Turkey from when to when?

**SPAIN:** From 1970-72 as consul general in Istanbul; 1972-74 as DCM in Ankara and 1980-81 as ambassador.

**Q:** What was the situation in 1980 when you went out to Turkey?

**SPAIN:** Security had been deteriorating again almost from the time I left in 1974. Right and left extremists were back to battling in the streets. Military aid had been cut off for several years and was restored just before I came back. My first task was to complete and sign a defense and economic cooperation agreement that put the U.S.-Turkey alliance back together. My predecessor, Ron Spiers, had done most of the work on that. Demirel was back as prime minister. Violence was growing; the politicians were squabbling; and the military was obviously growing more and more restless. I had nine or ten months with Demirel. Things were bad. We sat in the second floor sitting room in the residence in Ankara and listened to gun battles going on all over the city. Americans were prime targets of the left. Between June 1979 and September 1980 eleven Americans were killed. Then on September 12, 1980 the military took over the government. In two days they had the graffiti scrubbed off the walls and all the agitators (as well as some innocents) locked away in jail. We were back to peace and quiet, if not democracy.

**Q:** This has been the pattern in Turkey hasn't it?

**SPAIN:** That was the third time.

**Q:** And the military does let go after a while. Unlike other places, here you’re hearing the gun fire and watching the situation going down, you must have been thinking, “We know the military is going to take over. As a policy we are opposed to this, but in your heart of hearts you must have felt soon rather than later they have to do it.” How did you handle this in your reports to Washington?

**SPAIN:** You describe the pattern correctly. We tried to keep Washington up to date on events from day to day. There were complaints about military behavior from the human rights people, but these existed even before the military took over. It has always been true that the Turkish police and military take more than a legitimate amount of glee in banging students and other agitators over the head. But I don't recall that between January 1980 when I came and September 1981 when the military intervened that I ever had any instructions to tell them to do it. I think most people in Washington recognized the situation for what it was. They didn't approve of military takeovers but, if there ever was a case where one was justified, this was it. There was also less reason to be concerned about a military takeover in Turkey than in most other places because the Turkish military had a good record of intervening and getting out in a finite time.
Each intervention took longer. If I remember correctly, the 1961 intervention when they hung prime minister Menderes lasted something like 18 months. The 1971 takeover, which happened when I was in Istanbul, ran 20 plus months. The 1980 takeover stretched to three years or so. This kind of thing is accepted by most Turks. There is a tradition dating to Ataturk, if not an actual constitutional provision, for it. In 1961 they jumped a little fast--Menderes was juggling the army promotion lists, not exactly a crime deserving the noose. But in 1971 and 1980 they waited until well after law and order had broken down under the elected governments.

*Q: At the time of this unrest were we seeing anybody else’s hand in it outside of Turkey? Or was this a Turkish problem?*

**SPAIN:** There were all sorts of reports about Soviet inspiration and support, but in fact, I think the opposition to the government came primarily from Turks of both the extreme left and extreme right. It was not a Soviet inspired or led attempt at revolution. The USSR likely provides some money and arms to the leftists but it wasn't decisive.

*Q: Did the Kurds play much of a role at this time?*

**SPAIN:** No. The Kurd problem is endemic in Turkey. It's always there. Some individual Kurds probably supported the leftists but the mass of the Kurdish people simply weren't involved. Demirel's position was undermined by a certain amount of Kurdish agitation in the East and the military probably feared that too would grow. But the fight was between Turks of different political views.

*Q: What about Cyprus at this time. In 1974 the Turks took over a significant portion of Cyprus and we violently protested and the Greeks did it, but I take it by this time Cyprus, as far as the Turks were concerned, was no longer a problem, or was it?*

**SPAIN:** As far as the Turks were concerned the Cyprus issue was frozen. Nevertheless, there had been a number of international efforts at a solution in the years since the Turkish invasion. We supported UN efforts and bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey. In the summer of 1981 the NATO Ministerial Meeting was in Ankara. The Greek foreign minister was there. So, of course, was the Turk. Ed Muskie, our Secretary of State for only a couple of weeks, came. So did the eternal Peter Carrington for the UK.

We had some conversations on Cyprus in our house hosted by Muskie with all of them. At one point we seemed close to a mutually acceptable concept. We thought we had at least established a platform on which the Greeks and Turks could sit down and reach agreement. But at the very end the Greek Foreign Minister announced (having checked with Athens, I suppose) that there wasn't time to try to implement things. In October there would be elections in Greece. The leader of the opposition, the infamous Andreas Papandreou, was already charging the Karamanlis government with being soft on Cyprus.
Nothing could be done until after the election. Well, Andreas won the election and nothing ever happened.

Q: Did you find the Turks sort of felt what is the Cyprus problem now? We have our people on one side and the Greeks on the other.

SPAIN: The Federation of Northern Cyprus has taken on a life of its own. A Turkish military withdrawal would be more difficult now. But as late as 1981, the Turkish position was still that they didn't want any land on Cyprus. What they wanted was a guarantee that the Turkish Cypriots could live in safety and equality. Did they mean this? I think they did. If a way could have been found to achieve this, I think they would have withdrawn. The establishment of a separate state for the Cypriot Turks has changed all this.

Q: Could you go there?

SPAIN: When I was ambassador? The Turks would have been delighted, but I carefully never did. The Greeks could have interpreted it, not without reason, as showing some kind of acceptance of the Turkish presence--which was not U.S. policy. A lot of our embassy people wanted to go on leave because it was very cheap, convenient, and interesting. I made myself rather unpopular by refusing to let them do so.

Q: I can see why not. The Greeks would have taken this to the halls of our congress. In an earlier era you had gone through an estimate of what our listening posts were doing on the Black Sea. Did you have a chance to take a look at our military establishment there and possibly think it should be reduced?

SPAIN: I did a lot of touring of U.S. military installations--more, I think, than our resident American generals really liked. If my figures are correct, there were something like 24,000 uniformed Americans in Turkey in the 1960's. 16,000 or so in the 1970's, and only 5,000-7,000 when I got there in 1980. Let me add that I am far from sure about the accuracy of those figures. At all times military personnel were an important part of my constituency. Unlike in Western European countries, where they were directly under military theater commanders, the people in Turkey were responsible to the embassy.

Q: So there had been a significant reduction.

SPAIN: A number of the intercept facilities had been closed. I gather they have all been closed now. When I was last in Turkey there were two left, one at Sinop on the Black Sea and one near Diyarbakir in the east. The latter was actually over the horizon radar. There was a NATO US Air Force establishment at Incirlik near Adana a few small nuclear weapons custodial units at two or three other places in Turkey.

Q: Well, anything else we might cover about Turkey?
SPAIN: I was in Turkey for much of the time the Embassy Tehran hostages were held in Iran. We and the Turks talked a lot about them. Turkey was the only NATO country not to withdraw its ambassador. They argued that his remaining would help and they certainly passed on to us everything he learned about the hostages. The hostage crisis also provoked a certain amount of tom-foolery by U.S. agencies. One of them recalled to active duty an aging young reserve officer once stationed in Izmir who insisted he could raise a Kurd levy to go into Iran and rescue the hostages. He was apparently authorized to come to Turkey to get the process started and actually got the American general at NATO Land Southeast in Izmir to lend him his airplane. Don't think so. Then he showed up at the CIA station in Istanbul claiming the Authority of the President himself and demanding to use their communications. The Agency was as aghast as I was. We kicked him out.

To recap my experiences in my brief year-and-a-half as ambassador in Turkey" we got the U.S.-Turkish alliance patched up; we made a little mileage toward a Cyprus settlement but it went down the drain with the elections in Greece; we worked out a way with the Turkish Government to handle the growing number of Soviet defectors who jumped ship or plane in Turkey; we kept a good flow of economic assistance going after the USAID program had ended; we probably contributed to containing bristling Turkish-Greek hostility.

Q: You left there in 1981 I assume because the Reagan administration came in and Turkey was one of those posts that I am sure would be looked at by a new administration. Who replaced you?

SPAIN: Robert Strausz-Hupé.

Q: Who was a Republican stalwart, about as far right as you can get. You came back and what happened?

SPAIN: I was a bit bitter. To my surprise when I came back I found myself scheduled for an appointment with the new Secretary, Alexander Haig, whom I had known slightly when he was NATO in Europe. He was very jovial and ended up saying, “We have a surplus of fine FSOs and there is no place for you to go right now, so you get a Foreign Affairs Fellowship. Go off for a year and write a book. If you don't want to write one, read a couple.” I spent a year at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. During that period I discovered that in the Reagan White House I was considered "Andy Young's friend who helped give away Rhodesia." that didn't sound promising in terms of another ambassadorship. Edith's cancer had reappeared and we weren't really ready to go off anyway. The Department suggested I take another year on detail until things straightened out. I moved over to the Rand Corporation.

Q: What were you doing at the Rand Corporation?
SPAIN: I had no defined duties. I contributed as best I could to their seminars and meetings. As far as Rand was concerned I was simply a reasonably useful free body. What really what came out of those two years was a book, *American Diplomacy in Turkey*.

At the beginning of 1984 the Department realized that contrary to law the USUN hadn't been inspected for seven years. The main reason was that Ambassador Kirkpatrick wouldn't let the inspectors in. She insisted that with her own cabinet rank she was not responsible to Secretary Shultz—who, she was convinced, was "out to get her." I am not sure came up with the idea of my trying to see what I could do. It was probably Bill Harrop, who was IG at the time. The concept was that I had never been in the IG’s office. I was an experience former ambassador. I certainly was not one of the Republican "in-group" in Washington.

It turned out to be a very interesting piece of diplomacy, as difficult as I ever had with a foreign government. I telephoned Kirkpatrick and got her to agree to let me come to her office in New York. I did all I could to convince her I was not George Shultz’s hatchet man coming up to get her and that inspections could be useful. I told her stories about how as an ambassador I had overridden or ignored inspection reports and managed to get my nose in the USUN door. Eventually I infiltrated a full inspection team.

We had a new problem every day. I was walking down First Avenue one day when I ran into the British UN Under Secretary General whom I'd known for years. I stopped to talk with him. Jeane Kirkpatrick was going by in a car and saw me. When I got upstairs there was a message saying Ambassador Kirkpatrick wanted to see me urgently. She was pretty mad and wanted to know what I was doing talking to foreigners about her. She had never authorized that--and that man was practically a communist anyway!

As it happened I hadn't said a word about her or USUN, but I argued. "Look, I know a lot of foreigners around here. What am I supposed to do?" She conceded that it would probably be all right for me to talk to them, even about USUN, as long as they were understanding and supportive of the American position in the UN. In fact she asked the Pakistani Permrep to lunch at the Waldorf the next day so we could talk to him together.

I should add that I found Jan Kirkpatrick a very intelligent and decent human being. Her political views were fixed but her attention could always be caught by an idea and was willing to discuss it. By the time I left we were on a Jeane and Jim basis. Her great disability was her utter ignorance of how government worked. She saw plots where they didn't exist and missed some that did. She surrounded herself with equally inexperienced ideologues of her own persuasion--one of which, incidentally, Allan Keyes, is currently a contender for the Republican presidential nomination.

We got the inspection done, although I had to put down something close to a mutiny in my own team. Some of its younger members wanted to enforce everything to the letter in a way that they might have gotten away with in a small post overseas with a new junior
FSO ambassador but which would have sent Kirkpatrick screaming to the president. She
did appoint a number two, which improved management somewhat. She did take
measures to reduce the communications gap between herself and the four other
ambassadors on the one hand and the hundred or so other people in USUN on the other.
All in all, our effort was probably worthwhile--and the law was observed. It was,
however, as delicate a piece of diplomacy as I was ever involved in.

Q: Yes, I have often told young officers that real diplomacy is within the Department of
State or an embassy. With a foreigner it is rather cut and dry because they know what
they want. But if you want to be effective you have to be able to do it within. Well, then
what happened?

SPAIN: Our daughter was killed in an automobile accident at Thanksgiving time 1983.
Edith died in the summer of 1984. After that the Department assumed I was ready for
duty again and so did I. The first thing that came up was really intriguing. Charles Percy
was offered ambassador to India and decided not to take it. Next the Department turned to
me. The nomination had been approved and was on Shultz's desk when he got a call from
Presidential Assistant Michael Deaver saying don't bother sending a name over for India.
The President and I have our man and you will be delighted to know that he is an FSO.
The Department was far from delighted. I was told not to give up hope yet. But when
Shultz got to Reagan it was immediately apparent that Deaver had tied the President up
for his friend. (I didn't shed any tears over Deaver's subsequent conviction either.)

Then Sri Lanka opened up. The Department suggested I go there. I needed to get over the
family tragedies. The post was pleasant and undemanding. I went, spent three-and-a-half
years (1985-89) and retired.

Q: What was the situation when you got to Sri Lanka at the end of 1985?

SPAIN: The Sinhalese-Tamil conflict had been brewing for some time. Tamil radicals
had assassinated the mayor of Jaffna and ambushed and killed a number of Sinhalese
soldiers. In 1983 there had been riots in Colombo in which Sinhalese had killed a lot of
Tamils. The By 1985 much of the north and east was out of government control but few
yet realized that the country was in a state of civil war. For instance, one of the first duties
of an American ambassador in Sri Lanka has long been to lay a wreath on the grave of
Harriet Winslow, at the girls college just outside of Jaffna, originally an American
missionary school. She was John Foster Dulles’ great, great, great grandmother. It was on
my schedule. At the last minute embassy advisers recommended delaying my visit. "Wait
a month or two until things clear up," they said. In fact things got worse and worse. It was
not until 1987, when the Indian PeaceKeeping Force was in control in Jaffna that I laid
the wreath. I did it surrounded by Indian troops.

Q: What was the government like in Colombo?
SPAIN: The government was dominated by the elderly J. R. Jayawardene, head of the United National Party, who had been elected first in 1978. He represented a pronounced and deliberate turnabout in economic policy from the socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party of the Bandaranaike's. The economy was booming under his new free market approach.

Our main bilateral issue was expansion of a VOA station. There had been a small relay station in Sri Lanka for 30-40 years. VOA wanted to upgrade it to being one of the six key stations in an around the world network. The problem was not public opposition but of finding the land for it. We would settle on one site and somebody would come in to JR and complain and we would have to find another site. Every time Sri Lanka was ready to sit down and negotiate, VOA would lose its money. When VOA had its money, then a new problem would crop up in Sri Lanka.

As the civil war intensified there was also growing US concern about human rights violations. I regularly expressed our views on these to Jayawardene. Our USAID program was significant but not enormous. It went on and on, seemingly without accomplishing very much.

The basic question before the government was whether a military solution to the Tamil insurgency was practical. When I got there the president was convinced that it was if only the US would provide military assistance. We had made a decision not to. At that time there was a lot of sympathy for the Tamil rebels, albeit more in Europe and Canada than in the US. Most of us who thought about it, including our military, were convinced that the government forces, like ours in Vietnam, couldn't win. Gradually J.R. accepted the fact that he wasn't going to get arms from us. After a while things got worse. Indian gave direct support to the Tamil militants. Their explanation was that it was the only way to get the Sinhalese government to make decent concessions to Tamil grievances. In 1987 Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardene made a deal to send in Indian troops to disarm the rebels and "restore normalcy" in return for "an equitable solution of Tamil grievances." At the time I thought was a good arrangement likely to bring about a solution to the ethnic problem. It turned out a complete failure.

Q: Were we playing much of a role or was India the real broker in this thing?

SPAIN: We were quite active. We welcomed the Gandhi-Jayawardene agreement with presidential letters. We committed ourselves to $75 million of extra development aid for the reconstruction and renovation of war-devastated areas. Initially, we had some problems doubts about the initial agreement because there were side letters to it in which the Indians insisted on Sri Lanka's pledging to have no foreign military advisors, to give no access to foreigners to the naval base at Trincomalee, and to grant no facilities to foreigners for military or intelligence use. These all seemed directed at us.

I went off to see JR and said, “What is this all about?” He assured me that the US had no reason for concern. The US, Sri Lanka, and India knew that the VOA facility had no had no military or intelligence implications. As far as he knew, the US didn't want
Trincomalee. It had made clear that it wasn't going to provide military assistance or advisers. So Sri Lanka had made these meaningless concessions to Indian fears.

We got behind the July 29, 1987 agreement. Half an hour after it was signed I delivered congratulatory letters from President Reagan to JR and to Rajiv Gandhi. This was at a celebratory tea party—which half JR's cabinet didn't attend to show their disagreement with the pact with India. The tea party had its amusing aspects. Rajiv and JR kept me sitting with them. The rest of the diplomatic corps twittered. They had never expected the Indian-Sri Lankan agreement. Now here was the American ambassador sitting with the two leaders and passing papers around. For a few hours I was a very popular character as my colleagues tried to find out what was going on.

In short, we did have a role in the affair, but we didn't know about the agreement in advance. We didn't do a thing to affect the agreement other than to get assurances from JR that the things in the side letters about limiting foreign involvement in Sri Lanka didn't apply to us.

**Q:** Were there any problems with Americans coming there for tourism purposes and getting into trouble?

**SPAIN:** No. In the three and a half years I was at the embassy and the six years I have lived in Sri Lanka in retirement since, I think there was only one American arrested. It was a very different scene from the one I knew in Turkey in the 1970's. Relatively few American tourists come to Sri Lanka. It is half way around the world and on the way you fly over the Caribbean and the Mediterranean with their competing beaches. Most tourists are northern Europeans. Their embassies have welfare and protection problems but normally ours doesn't.

**Q:** I heard somewhat indirectly that there are some Sri Lankans down in Florida involved in drug business. Was there any kind of a Sri Lankan drug connection?

**SPAIN:** I wouldn't be surprised if there were some of them here and elsewhere. There are no drugs produced in Sri Lanka. Ten years ago when I got there drugs were virtually unknown in any form. Then a good deal of heroin started to pass through from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. It is much easier to get the stuff down to Colombo by ship or by air and get it out to Europe from there. Out of this transit traffic a local addict population developed. There is also some evidence that the Tamil rebels are involved in the trade to raise money to buy guns.

**Q:** I take it that outside of wishing the Sri Lankans well as far as settling their ethnic disputes, this was not an area of great interest to us, was it?

**SPAIN:** Correct. In 1985 I went over to the Pentagon for a briefing. I expected the US Navy at least to urge me to get it facilities at Trincomalee. No one mentioned it.
Q: A famous naval base during World War II.

SPAIN: Yes. I brought the subject up. Our military couldn't have cared less. Diego Garcia, they said, was all they needed in the Indian Ocean. Later in a conversation with the Sri Lankan foreign minister, he said something that suggested he might be willing to talk about Trincomalee—which he assumed we'd like to use. I replied, not very diplomatically, “Mr. Minister, if you called me in here to tell me you were offering the base, I wouldn't even have to go back to Washington, I would tell you simply 'thank you, no thank you!'” Let me add that I understand why everyone is impressed with Trincomalee. It looks as San Francisco Bay must have looked when the first Spaniard saw it. It is an incredibly lovely enclosed harbor. But it doesn't have a single deep water dock. Everything has to be unloaded by lighters. It is a beautiful place, but I don't think it is ever going to be of a particular strategic value.

Q: Were you involved much with UN votes?

SPAIN: No. Sri Lanka usually voted with the moderate commonwealth. I can't recall a single controversy, unlike Tanzania, with whom we had conflicts on almost every UN issue.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover?

SPAIN: No. I think we have covered things pretty well--from my point of view at least.

End of interview