

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ROBERT DOUGLAS STUART, JR.

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INTERVIEW

[This transcript was not edited by Ambassador Stuart]

Q: Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you could give me a little bit of your background--where you came from, where you were educated, where you were born and all that sort of thing.

STUART: Well, I grew up in Lake Forest, Illinois, where my grandfather on my mother's side had been minister, president of Lake Forest College, and, later, president of McCormick Theological Seminary. Mother married a man who came from a Scotch oat-milling background, where religious principles were very important. And I grew up with a sense of the importance of public service and community service as something we talked about around the dinner table very frequently.

Dad had worked for the Quaker Oats Company, with which his family had been involved for years. And then, during those distant days when Franklin Roosevelt was trying to get the economy back on track, there was something called the National Recovery Administration (NRA), and Dad went down to serve as sort of head of the business group that was representing their points of view to the NRA. So he spent quite a bit of time down here in Washington. When I was up at Princeton, I used to come down and see him, so the governmental process was something always of interest.

Q: Well, those were very exciting years, too, weren't they?

STUART: Oh, they were.

Q: I don't think we follow it today the way we did then.

STUART: Well, it was a very critical time in getting the economy rolling again. And it, I think, was a very educational experience certainly for Father, because he had to work with labor unions, with the business community. I remember Dad having thought of John L. Lewis as kind of a spooky type.

Q: He was head of the miners' union.

STUART: The miners' union, absolutely. And coming down to Dad in his room, and finding John L. and Dad reviewing some issues together. And John L. was a very impressive character, who could quote Shakespeare with the best. But, as a result of his interest, Dad later became ambassador to Canada, having been treasurer of the Republican National Committee in the Eisenhower days. So he served up in Canada from '52 to '56.

But, zapping back to personal education, because of this kind of interest in public service, I headed for the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. And, there, got fascinated, of all places, in Japan because of a fellow named Bob Reischauer, who was later killed, unfortunately, by a stray shell in Shanghai very early on. But his father had been a medical missionary over in Japan, and, of course, his younger brother became ambassador to Japan later. But Bob Reischauer stimulated this interest in Japan.

Q: This was when?

STUART: This would be in 1936-37. I graduated in 1937. At Princeton, you write a major paper, which is called a thesis, and you work your tail off on it. And I picked, as a result of Bob Reischauer, who was my kind of principal mentor...now it may seem somewhat strange, but it was "Socialism and Communism in Japan." Really tracking the Socialist resistance to the military domination, which...

Q: This was just when the military had really taken over, basically, in a coup.

STUART: Exactly, exactly. And so many of the people that I was able to talk to had left Japan. I remember a particular Japanese professor at Northwestern who had been head of the Farm Labor Party, but it wasn't healthy for his life, I guess, to remain there, so he came and taught at Northwestern. Professor Bob Reischauer knew him and sort of...his name was Oyama. So I got a lot of unique information on what the Socialist, and sometimes Communist, forces were doing to maintain some sort of resistance, and became interested in...

Q: That must have been a subject that was later... Did they try to tap you for that later on?

STUART: No, I'm not sure the record-keeping system is that good.

Q: No, I was just thinking, during World War II, they didn't have many people who knew much about Japan at all.

STUART: Well, that's absolutely right, that did not come up. I had been an ROTC young brave, and so, after Pearl Harbor, went out to Fort Sill as an artillery officer. We had an

artillery unit. And from there on... But the opportunity to serve in that theater never... I was just somehow assigned to the 20th Corps, which went over to the U.K., and then over in Operation Overlord.

Q: Prior to your military service, after going to the Wilson School and all, what did you do then? Did you go into business at that time?

STUART: No, I had not finished law school. I had two years of law school. And one of the kind of educational experiences for me was a group of us at law school were concerned about not getting involved in the European war (because everything we had learned suggested that maybe it might have been wiser not to have gotten ourselves committed), and so some of us put together an organization that ended up being called the America First Committee. And so I took some time out, after two years in law school, to work on that. When Pearl Harbor occurred, we all closed shop, and I immediately went to Fort Sill and had a perfectly normal career.

Q: I think, for the record, it would be very interesting if you could describe a bit about your thought process. Because the America First Committee is one of these things, you know, that today is sort of...oh, discredited is maybe not the right word, but, I mean, here it was, saying let's stay out of this, and all of a sudden we were attacked. But many of the steps that particularly President Roosevelt was taking--destroyers for bases, conveying and all this--were fought by the America First Committee. And it had very strong Midwestern roots. I always think of Burton K. Wheeler, who was one of them. You can think of the politicians kind of thing, but here was a young man doing this. Could you explain a bit about how you looked upon this?

STUART: The interesting thing is that a kind of well-known president of the United States, Jack Kennedy, was involved in this up in Boston, at Harvard. It was a group that ranged from Potter Stuart, Sargent Shriver. There was a whole group of us; I could go on with a longish list. Kingman Brewster, people like that. He obviously was the president of Yale.

Q: Later ambassador to London.

STUART: And we felt at that time that we should remain strong and out of the European theater. And we didn't think that it was our task to solve the problem, because we felt both the Nazis and the Soviets, the Stalinists, the Communists, were equal tyrannies. As young people, we had grown up with teachers of history and those that had looked at our participation in World War I as questioning whether we had really accomplished very much.

Q: At one point one of the feelings abroad was that it was the so-called merchants of death, that the munitions manufacturers and the...

STUART: We'd all read those books, too.

Q: Was this a factor or was this not a factor, would you say?

STUART: I think it was possibly a factor. I think, during that period, what those of us that had university experience at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, or anywhere--in the Midwest, too--felt the thoughtful people were skeptical of whether we really had accomplished much as a nation in making that effort in World War I. Because the League of Nations had fallen apart, and it really had not succeeded in peace in our time, you know.

Q: Well, there was a counterpart movement in Britain. Wasn't it the Oxford movement: we will not fight for our country or something like that? It was a somewhat different ilk, but, I mean, it was of the same disillusionment from World War I, wasn't it?

STUART: I think it was, too.

Q: Both of these sort of withered in the face of a, you know, war.

STUART: Well, obviously today I feel as keenly as anybody about the importance... The world has changed. Intercontinental missiles, the capabilities of technology have really changed the sort of theory that we all had at that time.

Q: Well, of course, what we're trying to do in this oral history is to go back, and for people who are doing this now to understand how we looked at this. Was the support for the America First coming...? You were actually in an office for America First, was that it?

STUART: Oh, yes.

Q: Where was your support coming from? Was it coming from faculty? Was this Midwestern Republican? Or was this across the...?

STUART: It was pretty much across the spectrum. And the committee we put together was endeavoring to reflect that range of opinion. Because it ranged from...Bob Hutchins actually was never on the committee.

Q: He was president of Chicago University at the time.

STUART: To General Robert E. Wood, who was chairman of Sears. Now that's Midwestern, but Chester Bowles, who later became a senator and really...

Q: Advertising man.

STUART: Advertising man of renown, who was later a senator and ambassador to India. He ran the OPA during...

Q: Office of Price Administration.

STUART: And so we had Kathryn Lewis, John L's daughter, representing... Some labor. John T. Flynn. There was a columnist and a writer from New York. Across-the-board spectrum of people from different parties and different parts of the country, endeavoring to sort of make the point that it wasn't just a group that had a particular...

Q: So it wasn't a hate Roosevelt thing.

STUART: It wasn't a hate Roosevelt club, because we had quite a few people who were Democrats.

Q: When the war started in 1939, when did you get into America First?

STUART: At first, it was sort of on the campuses. But I began to realize that this wasn't going to be something that just a student group could make effective. And then, from there, having gotten several letters... (I don't think we should spend too much time on America First, because I really haven't thought this through very well.)

Q: If you don't mind, it's just a slice of history that I think is important and has reference to foreign affairs.

STUART: Sure.

Q: But anyway, so you sort of went, you might say, public or whatever it is, I mean, went out...

STUART: Well, we realized we needed the support of a kind of mature adult community. And there were a number of people in this country that felt the same way we did. And we enlisted the support of credible, respected, both intellectual, business, people with different range of experiences across the country. And it was around that, that we... And, of course, Charles Lindbergh came across, developed that he had a similar point of view, and this was a national hero. And he was a very effective kind of spokesman for the point of view, because he was equally convinced that the long-range threat was probably equal from both the Nazi forces and from the Soviet forces. And he again felt that it was unwise to commit ourselves on one side of the issue. Now history will, I guess, as things have developed, it probably...I think Charles never fully appreciated the Godawful things, nor did we know the Godawful things that Hitler and the Nazis did.

Q: Well, many of those things hadn't really, really gotten going until really the wartime. I mean, it was there, but...

STUART: I mean, we didn't know it, and the people that were supportive of this point of view didn't know that. I think probably... God, there's no question in my mind, having made the commitment that we made, that I think the questioning of a policy of returning

to isolationism in a world of modern missilery and technology just doesn't make any sense.

Q: Well, it's a different world. Did you have any feeling as the situation progressed, I'm really thinking after September 1939 when the war started, did you have any feeling that you had German pressure, really, you know, from Germany, through the German-American bund and all that on you during this period up till the war?

STUART: Absolutely not. And we were very sensitive to avoid that, because the pro-interventionist press, that would be the implication they would always try to generate. But I think it's fairly clear that I wasn't a... I think, with Robert Douglas Stuart as a name, and General Robert E. Wood, certainly there was no German-American connection--that I can think of on the committee. But it was sort of the subtle innuendo to attempt to criticize and cut down.

No, the people involved were just genuinely concerned that this might not be our war, and that it might be better to have a negotiated peace in Europe between the British and the Germans. Now, historically, I think perhaps you could question whether that was... Because of the Godawful atrocities, etc., and the tyranny of Hitler, whether that was...

Q: Well, I don't think we knew how to deal with tyrants. And then, of course, Stalin was on the other side. Well, when Pearl Harbor happened, what did you do?

STUART: We dissolved the committee right away. And I put on my... I was obviously a reserve officer, having graduated from the military from Princeton. And my father and I got down to Fort Sill about, oh, January or February, after Pearl Harbor. And so we served first as, you know, a trained battery, and I was a battery commander down there for a while, then sent to command general staff school at Leavenworth. And then, you know the way the numbers work, I was just assigned to the 20th Corps as a young intelligence officer, and then we went over to the U.K.

But one of the great breaks I had, it was not a heroic experience, but after I was an aide to this fellow, General Walt Walker, who was a 20th Corps commander. But having been in law school, and having had command general staff school experience, somehow the computer spit out the fact that maybe I could be useful. And I got pulled up to SHAEF headquarters and worked for General Bedell Smith, who was chief of staff to General Eisenhower, who was the supreme allied commander. And the interesting thing...God, we weren't heroes, but we handled these... Bedell Smith was terrific in insisting on one-page summaries of these complex plans and operations. And so, as young staff officers in the secretary of the general staff's office, we saw everything from military and we put together, reviewed what the guts of the plan was, to try to put it in one of the pages for the chief of staff's approval, then he'd send it in to Ike. And we saw everything from the military to the logistics, but further than that, the governmental relationships. And it was a very educational experience to see, you know, these various issues developing,

particularly as we moved into Germany and could see that the battle was going to be won, and the issues that needed to be thought through.

Q: Well, what did this sort of do for the education of a future ambassador? I mean, your view of the situation and all that.

STUART: Well, it obviously gave you a far broader perspective than if I'd just been a little bit more heroic and just stayed with the artillery battery. Because you were getting the intellectual perspective of... Jean Monnet, for instance, had an office at the SHAEF headquarters.

Q: He was later the godfather of the...

STUART: The godfather of the Common Market. And we watched sort of those papers develop and the support given to him. Oh, Bernhard, who was later discredited, Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands, very striking figure and also influential in bringing about the Common Market, was around the headquarters and I would get assigned to work for him and with him. A man named Bob Murphy, Ambassador Bob Murphy, was there and I would work with him, out of the chief of staff's office, but take papers to him, saw him, liked him immensely. And he'd had the Algeria, North African experience.

Q: He'd been the consul general in North Africa and helped sort of set up the French connection when we landed there in 1942.

STUART: Exactly, right, absolutely. So the break I had as a result of some legal experience and being sent to the command general staff school was that you saw these issues of the future developing there as a young officer putting together papers and summaries.

And one of the lessons I remember so clearly was how little... we had been so intent on winning the war that the planning and the... suddenly we have Germany here and we, quite honestly, hadn't thought through how we wanted to go about this. And the dramatic thing that I can remember, being assigned by Bedell Smith to be the military aide to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, who'd been made ambassador to France as we were moving on into Germany. I was assigned to go down and be with him as he met with President Roosevelt coming back from Yalta. And I just vividly remember Ambassador Caffery said, "You ought to meet the president." I had never met President Roosevelt before. This was in a port in Algiers, and we went into an air conditioned room, I think it was the cruiser Augusta, if I remember.

Q: It was the Augusta, yes.

STUART: And here was the president, looking very gray, very white-faced, with beads of perspiration all over his brow. This was about, oh, March or April, and you had a strong sense as a young officer that my goodness, the president is dying. He really wasn't well.

And it also concerns you that the president had been in this kind of really weakened condition at a time that he was negotiating with one of tougher hombres around, Joseph Stalin. And, of course, those histories and those issues have been replayed many times, but it was certainly, to a young officer, it was very evident that he was not well enough to have been there really, and the danger of summitry, because in so many ways it's better to have your representative kind of negotiate and have the thing come back to you so you could make a final decision that's vetted by staff analysts and people that know the process.

Q: Were you, by the way, involved in... I think there was quite a fuss at that particular point about trying...de Gaulle didn't want to go down there or something like that and this was a...

STUART: Oh, de Gaulle was a continuing problem. He had, I guess, felt sort of that he was treated as a junior by Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt. And the French, as you know, are some of my great friends, and one of the things about this headquarters experience, I learned French and made good friends that we still see. But they are proud of their country and very proud people.

Q: And they, of course, were not included in Yalta.

STUART: No. Exactly. And so all of those things were complicated. But that was really an educational experience to see those relationships.

Q: Certainly. I just can't help thinking, I mean, you know, later you had to deal with NATO and all this. I mean, here is something that you don't understand unless you're there. And you seeing it, although maybe from a junior officer, but you were seeing really the principals and some of the major problems.

STUART: Absolutely. We were seeing them more on paper, because we would end up putting those memos together and summarizing them. And so we didn't have the interchange, but just in seeing the material that we were submitting to the process, we learned the issues.

Q: You also went through the famous one-page Bedell Smith school. I was talking to somebody else who was serving in the Department of State when Bedell Smith was under secretary of state, and he talked about learning how to write a one-page message.

STUART: And that is something, honestly, we can talk about later that Foreign Service people, who are, I think, under-rewarded and under-respected by American people, but the emphasis is so much on the completeness of writing and the thoroughness of analysis that cables are much longer than they need to be.

Q: Much longer than they should be.

STUART: Yes.

Q: Well, then, you got out of the Army when?

STUART: Let's see, I think I got back about October '45, and then proceeded to go back to finish up law school, which I had left, you see, because of this America First experience. And so I finished up law school. Barbara and I, in fact we had three children by then, I think. Anyway, we went back to New Haven to finish up law school.

And it was a very interesting time, because there were a lot of talented people there. I mean, for instance, Whizzer White, Byron White, still a justice of the Supreme Court, was someone we saw a lot of. Potter Stewart had been in my class before the war. Bill Scranton. There were just a number of talented people.

And there was an interesting...I'm sure you've heard this many times, but people were always serious at law school because you had to be. But there was a sort of a, I don't know, a commitment that was even more intense after the war. Everybody worked hard.

Q: Oh, yes, and people were coming with a lot of experience, you know. I mean, there wasn't the academic sort of never-never land.

STUART: Exactly. And they were pretty mature people; most of the guys had served for three or four years.

But then, after that, I had this difficult decision of whether to go practice law in the west (Denver was kind of my dream) or to join a firm with which my family had been involved for more than a few years. Father never put any pressure on me but just said there's not much depth of management in your age group and you could make a contribution, versus the law, which I would have enjoyed very much and always thought maybe of getting involved in the political process out there in Colorado.

I ended up going to work for the Quaker Oats Company and spent 38 years with it. And, again, Quaker, although not well-known around the world, 40 percent of the business is really overseas. And I've, because of the background of interest in both the Pacific and the European area, tried to encourage the development of our overseas business. So I traveled quite a bit in that process and became reasonably familiar with the world of Europe and overseas business.

Q: What was your impression...the Foreign Service has been criticized, not just the Foreign Service, the State Department, and I think with some justification, because of not being very good at pushing commercial stuff. Here you are, a businessman, later to have a different perspective. But your perspective in Quaker Oats, did you just sort of bypass sort of the State Department commerce side?

STUART: Absolutely. I didn't personally test it, but our people on the ground just felt the embassies weren't interested in our problems. Even when I ended up being ambassador, our priority list mission goals and objectives, trade and commerce were pretty well down on it. And one of the things I tried to do was to bring it up a little bit, and obviously worked at it. Larry Eagleburger's trying to do something about it now. But institutionally, I think the State Department is oriented to the political area, the economic relationships. But trade and commerce, although there's a commercial officer over there from the Department of Commerce, it gets a lower share of mine.

Q: How did your appointment as ambassador come about? In the first place, of course, you knew what ambassador was, your father had been an ambassador to Canada and was there, I guess, during the very important St. Lawrence Seaway negotiations and all this, which was sort of a major achievement.

STUART: And he always dreamed of something, which has now materialized, after his ambassadorship, a Canadian-American committee, which the objective was, if we could, to break down the tariff walls between the two countries.

Q: Which we've just achieved within the last three or four years--basically a free trade zone.

STUART: Absolutely.

Q: Which is a tremendous accomplishment. But it's taken that long to do it.

STUART: It has, it's a slow process to get the whole process.

Q: What emanations were you getting from your father about ambassadorial...doing this and all?

STUART: Oh, he got immense satisfaction out of it. And particularly for Canada, for him, because he had worked for the Hudson's Bay Company as a young fellow. Dad had played more football and hadn't worked terribly hard at Princeton, and he left after about freshman or sophomore year. His father had concluded that if he weren't going to take it seriously, he better go out and get himself a job. So he worked for the Hudson's Bay Company. We used to have those concessions for visitors up in the north. So he had a lot of experience up in Canada, and then worked for the Quaker Oats Company finally, in Peterborough, and had a long association with Canada and had many friends, so he enjoyed that experience immensely. And we'd go up and visit. For Mother and Father this was a very rewarding period of years for them.

Q: Did this push you on the way to say, "Gee, I want to be an ambassador," or not?

STUART: I'm sure that must have been both that and then, when the idea came along, I'd actually been quite active in the Republican Party. My theory was that lots of people can

go on hospital boards and symphony boards and art institute boards, but this process in our government will only work if we have good people in office. When you're working hard in a business, you don't have a hell of a lot of free time. So I allocated mine to sort of the political process, and started out as a precinct committeeman, and finally emerged as a national committeeman from Illinois in the Republican Party, and served in that for eight years. But I continued to be active in the political process, and probably that's how my name turned up as a possible candidate...

Q: I've just finished interviewing Tony Motley, who was ambassador to Brazil and now gives courses, and was a political appointee and was saying that when he wanted to be ambassador to Brazil, and he really wanted to be ambassador to Brazil. He had been involved in Alaskan politics, I think, and he said...

STUART: Tony, oh, I remember the guy.

Q: And then was assistant secretary for Latin American Affairs. Well, he said that don't let anybody tell you that you don't have to work to get an ambassadorial appointment on the political process. It doesn't just sort of all of a sudden come out. I want students and all to get a feel for... What do you do? I mean, how does this work as far as the, you know...

STUART: Well, I was continuing... From the point of view of the Quaker Oats Company, I had turned over the reins to younger management, and I think I was either chairman, at that point, or chairman of the finance committee. But you really kind of let it be known that you would be interested in an assignment if one were to develop. Quite frankly, because we speak French, I would have loved to have gone to France. But that didn't happen, probably because I had felt that we needed some stronger leadership in the country and John Connally had asked me to serve and represent him in the Midwest, so I was not one of the original Reagan supporters.

Q: John Connally was from Texas.

STUART: The Texas governor that also had been secretary of treasury.

Q: And commerce.

STUART: I'm not sure about commerce. But anyway, he looked like a very forceful... And I was impressed by his ability, his kind of leadership and such.

But anyway, going back to appointments, though, I guess I was not on the top of the list for what I would have liked to have done. But my name was in the hat, and I think several friends kind of kept raising the question, and suddenly some problem developed over in Norway.

Q: I'm going to come to that.

STUART: My name surfaced, and they asked me whether we'd like to go. I had absolutely no connections with Norway. But the security aspects, the military aspects, NATO, brought back SHAEF thoughts, and all the intelligence-gathering over there made the assignment--a beautiful country that was basically friendly to the United States--sound like a very attractive thing to do, so we signed on.

Q: This was 1984. What sort of training did you get before you went out, or preparation?

STUART: Well, the FSI, Foreign Service Institute, runs an ambassadorial course. And, of all people, Ambassador Shirley Temple Black was sort of the honcho and led that. A number of others sort of went in and out of the program. And I think it's a helpful first step.

But I've often thought of, afterwards, if they could have, either after one year or six months, a second chapter to that experience. Because at that time you would know better what to ask about, of experienced people, and you'd have a better idea than just learning in academic process.

But anyway, it was helpful and it at least gave you a sense of what your assignment was.

On the other hand, I never had any particularly complicated worries about being able to handle the job. Because it's a management job, and if you can work with people, which I'm lucky enough to be able to do, I figured you could.

I was worried about my ability to speak Norwegian, which was nonexistent to start with, but the Norwegians really a second language they have English. Only a few of the cabinet ministers do not speak English, and toward the end I got so I could talk to them in Norwegian, because I took lessons. But we were never brilliant in it, because conversation with the senior members of any government over there was in English because they all speak it so well.

Q: When you went out there, did you have any guidelines from Washington, things that you felt that you had to look for? Did they sort of say: When you get out there, we need to do this or that, or watch out for this or that?

STUART: Well, without impugning, there was a kind of a mission to kind of restore credibility and to just demonstrate that you could be an objective representative of the United States. I think my instinct was to maintain a relatively low profile and win the confidence of the key government there.

[TAPE ENDED]

Q: ...with Mark Austad, who had been ambassador at one time to Finland. He had been a Mormon missionary, I think. I'm not sure of all the details, but he was one of these people that we in the Foreign Service kind of watch with horror, because there were newspaper

accounts of his overdoing his missionaryness, and there were some other aspects. He had what can only be termed a very high profile, and it wasn't a good one. It was a rather staid society, and it did not reflect well on the United States. And these were, you might say, personal traits of his.

STUART: Right, you are saying the things that obviously concerned me and concerned the State Department. And just common sense suggested that one maintain a low profile, relatively, and reestablish confidence.

Q: How did you find the embassy? What was both the morale of the embassy and the confidence of the embassy, after having gone through what obviously was a rather difficult time for them?

STUART: Well, I think one of the breaks is that, I guess, in comparison with that, a reasonably kind of uncomplicated business manager, they were willing to listen and to work with him. And one of the messages that you can tell anybody studying this business: If you demonstrate that you are willing to work as hard or harder than any of them and understand the issues. You might not have years and years of study of a specific issue, but you understand the issues well and you run the agency as a manager, you win their confidence very quickly.

My pattern has always been to get up at six in the morning, in business, and work till midnight. And on the point you were making a little bit earlier, I kept the same schedule there, because there is a volume of material that you have to read to be aware of the issues, and there are ceremonial things that take time during the day or dinners. So you really have to put in many hours.

Q: How was the morale of the staff when you arrived?

STUART: I kept the DCM that had been sort of holding things together.

Q: Who was that?

STUART: Ron Woods. He's a very able guy. He'd been holding the show together and had the confidence of the people in the embassy. We quickly established a good working relationship, and I had a high regard for him. And even though his term would have been normally another year, when he had an opportunity to go down to Brussels, I said that's a bigger post. In Brussels, as you know, the DCM is responsible for those three legations down there. And then I think I was helpful in getting him his assignment as DCM over in London now. So we quickly developed a comfortable rapport.

Q: Well, this is terribly important. Did you find yourself tripping over the DCM? Because normally an ambassador does one thing and the DCM kind of manages the embassy. And here you were, you'd come with a management experience. Was this a problem or were you able to divvy up the work?

STUART: It worked very well and Ron was great in bringing me into all these things. After all, I mean, it's 150 people, it wasn't a very large organization. I did the more outside things, I guess as an ambassador is meant to do.

The thing I also am very convinced of is the importance of the public diplomacy role, the USIS function. The USIS, which is USIA back here. And it was my good fortune to have really a stemwinder USIS public affairs officer.

Q: Who was that?

STUART: Ron Carlson, and he was damned good. So I tried focus on those things.

Q: From the American perspective, what was this situation in Norway when you arrived? Sort of political-economic.

STUART: Well, background. Since NATO and the security mission is the principal task in Norway, or certainly was at that time, I put my priority efforts on kind of developing relationships with the military and with the government. The Allied Forces North headquarters (AFNORTH) is there at Kolsås, outside of Oslo, and so I worked hard on developing that.

Norway was increasing their military defense budget a little better than three percent over the inflation rate, and one of our jobs was to make sure that they were continuing to do that, and encourage that.

Norway had learned from the experience of World War II that a small neutral nation in a strategic location just can't afford to be alone, because the Germans had come in and occupied it very forcefully. The Norwegians had demonstrated great guts and their resistance had been fantastic, and it really held down three to four hundred thousand soldiers that otherwise might have been along the Normandy coast or other areas. It made Operation Overlord, the launch of the offensive in France, much more difficult. [DIDN'T NORWAY'S RESISTANCE MAKE IT EASIER FOR US?]

So they were committed to NATO and loyal to it--insofar as it affects their area. Norway is not enthusiastic about out-of-area NATO commitments. So I worked hard on support of that.

The intelligence gathering cooperation is superb. We were watching the really continuing... One of the things we can talk about later is the build-up of intercontinental missilery and capabilities of their navy up the Kola Peninsula.

Q: This is the Soviet navy. Their main Atlantic base, really, is on the Kola Peninsula.

STUART: Absolutely. And I think sixty percent of their intercontinental... it's the short route over missilieries up there. So that information, the development of those was where we had wonderful cooperation with the Norwegians.

Q: There's quite a difference between the Norwegian and the Dane, isn't there?

STUART: Very much. Very much.

Q: I'm talking about on the military side. Because the Danes have always been very, I mean, there's sort of a pacifist element there. Of course, they're in an even more difficult situation. I mean, no ground to defend. But the Norwegians were very much on board in NATO in the military sense.

STUART: They were. Absolutely. Although there were past developments that would raise issues about ship visits. They were generally leftist, and Norway is very emotionally anti-nuclear. They can afford to be, in the sense that they've got all kinds of hydroelectric power and then the great good fortune of oil and gas, which were discovered about '69 and have really made Norway a very well-to-do nation. So you can be very anti-nuclear when you don't really need it for power.

But there was a very anti-nuclear and vocal group. And one of the flaps we had during my tour was when the Labor government came in, they started to change the procedures involved when you got ship clearances. And, as you know...

Q: You're talking about military ships.

STUART: Military, naval ships. Because we have a lot of presence up there, particularly reminding the Soviets that we have the capability of maybe causing them some pain in the Kola Peninsula. So we have exercises up in the northern part of Norway quite frequently.

Q: Marine brigades landing, and things of this sort.

STUART: Absolutely. And the naval exercise where we bring one or two carriers in each year to operate up there, sheltered by the mountains from Soviet missiles that depend on line-of-sight characteristics. Now a lot of people think it's kind of risky, but anyway there is that reminder of our capability.

Q: Also, for the record, this was during the time when the secretary of the navy was John Lehman, who was pushing very heavily for a forward strategy which was to go right up and meet the Soviets head on, right on the Kola Peninsula.

STUART: Absolutely. I think he very correctly recognized that if you didn't hit quickly up there, they could do what the Germans had done once before: maraud our lines of supply going over to the continent.

Q: Norway, particularly during the Reagan administration, was much more of a key, I think, at least in the press, than at other times because of this forward strategy that Lehman was pushing. But obviously this was part of the overall strategy. The Norwegians, the official Norwegians and the non-official--how was this taken? I mean, all of a sudden Norway was more publicly in the front lines.

STUART: Well, the Norwegians, I think, had been generally supportive of NATO. I can't remember, the public opinion polls showed around seventy percent. It would go up and down a little bit.

The peace activists, using the nuclear concern, wanted to, from time to time, get ordinances passed in local ports like Bergen or Tromsø, etc., even Oslo, to ban the entry of any U.S. naval vessel. Because our policy is: Neither confirm nor deny, and we've got to have the capability in case of trouble of having the appropriate weaponry if that's there. And, of course, the NATO strategy of deterrence depends on the potential of a nuclear threat.

But anyway, the Labor government, under Gro Harlem Brundtland, was really very skillful in putting out those local fires. And I've got to give her (she's prime minister once again) great credit. She handled that ship-visit issue very well and in effect told her Labor Party people to cool it, and was successful.

Whereas, in Denmark, that did not apply, and that became a major issue, where we were at the point of having to consider stopping all kind of support, a naval presence, to Denmark until the prime minister finally won on that point. There was even a referendum down there. I think the Danes are of a different temperament. They love the good life. They think that they're going to be protected by Germany. That they don't need to worry about these things very much.

Whereas, Norway is very conscious of their strategic geographic position. And the experience of their occupation by Germany was a much more memorable and traumatic experience for the Norwegians than it was for the Danes.

Q: Well, the Danes, of course their country is such that there was no real resistance that they could put up. But there was considerable fighting, and had the Germans not really caught them by surprise, they probably may have really been able to have held out longer.

STUART: Well, and then, you know, those British, French, and Polish forces that came up into Narvik and that area, they were winning. But at that point, on the continent, the battle was launched and the blitzkrieg hit, and so they had to pull back. But it might have been a very different ball game.

Q: Well, how did you see the Soviet threat to Norway itself at that point?

STUART: We perceived it, and the Norwegians also perceived it, as an aggressive posture, and if any trouble broke out, they logically would roll into Norway very early in the game to command those sea lanes. So it was a very crucial strategy to at least remind the Soviets that they'd pay dearly for moving into Norway. And the Norwegians were very supportive of that concern.

Q: Did you have the problems that the Swedes did of these Soviet submarines popping in and out of fjords and that sort of thing?

STUART: Every summer, every year, there'd be sightings, but quite honestly I never saw evidence of a real live submarine. On the other hand, we had several episodes, you remember in the press, where a Soviet submarine, returning to the Kola base, there was a fire and explosion on a nuclear ship. And the Soviets at that point were so hard at it (well, I think they still probably would be) that they wouldn't accept Norwegian rescue efforts because of the fact that they were part of NATO, and they allowed that crew, except for a relatively few people that got off, to go down there. So there were submarine problems along the coast, but the actual sightings in the fiord were not what had occurred over in Sweden.

And in Sweden the theory was, and I think all our military people felt, that they were probing, they were mining the Swedes, that if trouble came, they better be careful. And the Swedes took a very pacifist response.

Q: Just to get a feel for the time and period, what was the Norwegian feeling towards Sweden, for example, that you were able to gather?

STUART: Oh, it's combination. The World War II generation never really in their hearts forgave the Swedes for allowing the German forces to go through Sweden, particularly the northern areas. And yet, as the war went along and the Swedes began to see that the Allied forces were going to win, later they became very cooperative with the Norwegians and allowed them to operate, for resistance purposes, out of there. So, many of the resistance people were able to move back and forth. So the Swedish attitude changed. But, you know, from the quests, the story that's told all the time about 100 Swedes running through the weeds, chased by one Norwegian, there's a sense of we're being tougher and stronger than the Swedes.

Q: Well, they're mountain folk.

STUART: Absolutely. On the other hand, there's an admiration for the Swedes' business ability and great respect for that. And there is...hate is too strong a word, but there's an affection, too, for the Swedes on the part of the Norwegians. But it's more respect for, because they've been very skillful in their business, their economics and so on, up until recently, and perhaps welfare Socialism is catching up with them at this point.

Q: How'd you deal with the Norwegian government? I mean, who were some of the major people and what were their attitudes towards America that you dealt with?

STUART: Well, starting with his majesty, the king, who just died, generally was very fortunate. Because, you know, at one time, I guess, almost a third of the Norwegian population migrated to the United States, so there are all kinds of relationships. Norway's coast is a long, long piece of northern Europe and it faces west, and their orientation has been much more toward America in those relationships. And the king's family had lived in Washington during the war. I think the king's wife (he was then crown prince), but FDR and Mrs. Roosevelt were very kind to. So he was oriented toward the United States.

Kåre Willoch, who was prime minister when I got over there, was head of a conservative government, very pro-NATO, pro-market economics, the whole spectrum over there. It is considerably left of ours, in the sense that even the conservatives accept the fact that it's a welfare state. But Kåre Willoch was a conservative within that spectrum, and I became very fond of him. A fine mind, an able guy. And his minister of defense, we had good relationships, and his foreign minister, Svenn Stray, became close personal friends of ours.

Then, when the conservatives lost power, Gro Harlem Brundtland came in. Gosh, shows the importance of these educational experiences--she studied public health at Harvard, knows the United States quite well, speaks excellent English, a very able woman. But she was positive to the United States. All of them, particularly the Labor people, loved to kind of needle us just a little bit. They, with their missionary sense, supported the Nicaraguan Sandinistas rather generously, and that was always a point of irritation.

Q: This must have been your major concern, in a way, wasn't it? A major concern.

STUART: It was a major concern; it was a point of irritation. And they would sort of criticize us for not being sufficiently supportive of boycotts in South Africa. But yet it was always interesting that Norwegian tankers could serve South Africa, and chromium from South Africa was essential for urgent Norwegian industry. So there were sort of gaps in their idealism on a practical level.

Q: How was Reagan viewed? I mean, here was a president, very conservative, at least perceived as being very conservative, and in a way the target of the intelligentsia, or whatever you want to call it, in Europe, which is much more of a category than we could call it in the United States. In the first place, was there sort of an intelligentsia in Norway and what kind of a role did it play? Also, how was the Reagan administration seen, and you as a spokesman for them?

STUART: Well, I think the intelligentsia were skeptical of President Reagan. One of the things that's very interesting that you're probably keenly aware, you know, so many Europeans learn about America, the intellectual, thoughtful people, by reading the *Herald Tribune*.

Q: This is the New York Herald Tribune, which is published in Paris now.

STUART: Well, it may be actually in Rotterdam, edited in Paris, and is owned by *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. So it generally reflects *The New York Times*, *Washington Post* point of view.

Q: East Coast establishment, you might say.

STUART: East Coast intellectual liberal establishment, which is not necessarily the heartland of America point of view. And the more conservative point of view of *The Wall Street Journal* is rarely read, although *The Journal* has a European edition and is attempting to get up there. So that point of view, you know, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, were always against President Reagan; they were against the election of President Bush; they were basically Democratic liberal papers, and so that has influenced the thought process of the intelligentsia. And so President Reagan was just, to some extent, not taken seriously.

Now things started to change, as the whole process of change, with his summit meetings...

Q: You're talking about the relationship with the Soviet Union and Gorbachev on the other side.

STUART: Yes, exactly, I should have clarified that. And his stature grew--I just watched it over the five years we were over there. There was a very definite new respect for President Reagan.

Q: Well, was there a certain disappointment when Walter Mondale, who was of Norwegian origin, lost? I mean, was there a sort of bitterness about... I mean, it would have been fun to have had a...

STUART: They would have wanted him to win. They were enthusiastic. One of the sort of more amusing... He's a very attractive, nice guy. And, of course, when he came over, they were dedicating a new tunnel through the mountains from Mandal (Mondale is a translation of Mandal), where all his family came from. And literally thousands of people came up to that lovely valley to cheer him when he cut the ribbon for this little tunnel. And he got off a great line. He said, "Gosh, it's wonderful to have this enthusiasm and all of you rooting for me, but where were you when I needed you in the election?" They all appreciated that.

Q: You didn't have, I take it, a real stronghold, say, as it would be in France or something, of very important opinion-molders of the intelligentsia who were sort of avid American-haters, and particularly avid Reagan-haters, and all this. I mean, this was not a major factor in Norway?

STUART: Well, probably the most influential publication was basically conservative, in the sense of being more supportive of NATO and more willing to be supportive of the Reagan policies. It's the stronger intellectual... There were a number of other... The Labor paper was not very positive about the president. And Norway has an extraordinary number of newspapers--I think there are some 2,700 in this small country--because they're subsidized by the government so as to get different points of view expressed for different parties. But there was no kind of just instinctively automatic anti-American feeling, as in pockets of France or in Paris that you'd have, or that you'd have maybe in Sweden. There was a difference there.

Q: You mentioned Nicaragua. I might, just for the record, say that there was the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, which we were countering very strongly and there was a lot of support for the Contras and all. And particularly the Socialist side in Europe was very unhappy about this. How did this present problems for your work as ambassador?

STUART: Well, it was an issue that we had to continually work, and not necessarily successfully. Because, in a way, a small country like Norway, even though they're friendly in principle, has some enjoyment of asserting their independence by taking a different posture than the United States on an issue a long way away. And they have that missionary sense, particularly about things, out there, a long way away. And they have been big and very generous in terms of their aid policy. The percentage of their GNP that they give to foreign aid is probably higher than almost any country in the world.

Q: That's what I think, yes. I mean, it's very impressive.

STUART: But I, as an American ambassador, would say that sometimes that aid isn't given very thoughtfully. Because, in effect, this money and newsprint and things like that was given through the Sandinista government, and so, in a sense, was aiding the force that our government felt (and I happened to feel it very strongly) was really anti-democratic. And this was true, they give a lot of aid to Tanzania and Kenya and some of those countries (less now to Kenya), but it's given through those governments and it doesn't necessarily get down to the people. But there's an emotional feeling about we should give aid. And there's a little tweaking the tail feathers of Uncle Sam's eagle.

Q: You come from Chicago. I mean, the mayor of Chicago said he'd punch King George in the nose.

STUART: That was Bill Thompson.

Q: And we used to twist the lion's tail when we weren't number one.

STUART: Exactly. There was some of that. And we did work out those issues.

Q: How about something far away but also which must have been reflected in Norway, because their tanker fleet's a very important one. During the Gulf War (the other Gulf War, the Iran-Iraq War), in which tankers, particularly by Iran, were being attacked, and we got involved in that. Did that become an issue for you at all?

STUART: Oh, it became an issue. There's a normal ambivalence. The ship owners were just enthusiastic as could be about our support and our protection and our patrolling of the Gulf. We didn't get much actual help, though I think a couple of perhaps, oh, Coast Guard cruisers were sent down. Perhaps the Norwegians sent a couple of mine sweepers down there.

Q: I think the Europeans sent mine sweepers. We didn't have many mine sweepers...

STUART: No, we hadn't built any for years. Exactly. So I think they sent some of those down. But, in general, I would say, Norway's self-interest in helping their shipping fleet made them supportive of that policy down there in patrolling the Gulf.

Q: What did you find were the major problems that you had to deal with vis-à-vis the Norwegian government?

STUART: Well, they ranged from these security issues on ship visits, which we talked about, to seemingly simple problems (but which became very emotional) of whales and whaling. Because there's a country where the livelihood of many of those villages depends on whaling these little whales. I mean, a whale is always big, but these are the smaller, minke whales. They had been a source of revenue for these small villages in the north, and the International Whaling Commission had decreed that the killing of whales would cease and desist. Our government was generally supportive and tried to get Japan and the Soviet Union and the other whalers, and I think Norway was one of those, to cut down. They cut down significantly, but still, politically, it was infuriating to them because they considered this a perfectly natural harvest. I can remember Kåre Willoch, who was normally on our side, (he was the prime minister when I first got there), saying, "Why are you making such an issue out of this? I've been through the slaughter houses in Chicago and Omaha and you kill all those darling baby lambs. They have a lot more charm and appeal than a darned old whale, but yet you have a sort of a lopsided emotional view of this issue." And so we would try to work these things out and get them to agree to cutting back and pointing toward discontinuance of whaling, although I don't think that issue has really ever been solved.

Q: Just sort of for the record, the environmentalists have concentrated very heavily on the plight of whales, and it's become a very emotional issue in many countries, including the United States.

STUART: Absolutely. And, for Norway, the teeth in this is that if there is certification... the secretary of commerce, that they found that whaling is continuing, in violation of the edicts of the International Whaling Commission, then there can be a ban on the

importation of fish from the country that is offending. And for Norway's fish to be banned would be, both in terms of the new farmed salmon, in terms of cod and others, it would be a very significant and painful experience. So it's emotional.

Q: There is no way to really resolve this, is there?

STUART: No. And then we had the Konigsberg-Toshiba issue, which was one on the security side. Norway's method of controlling the shipment of technology was certainly not up to snuff.

One of the great strengths of the NATO and American navies has been their ability to proceed quietly and detect Soviet submarines underwater by the amount of vibration caused by their propellers. And part of the technique of the American Navy has been the design of a quiet propeller on the submarine, which is done by huge milling machinery that is programmed through computers to get just the right pitches and angles.

What happened is that an organization that the government defense industry called Konigsberg Bopaner, in cooperation with Toshiba, who made great big milling machines, had the programs (I think some of that access had been provided by us), so that these huge submarine propellers could be ground efficiently with the big machinery that Toshiba, the Japanese company, could provide. And it was changing the ball game as far as our being able to track these big, fast Soviet submarines (which, incidentally, are still being launched).

One of the incredible aspects of this whole economic problem in the Soviet Union is the fact the military still seem to be able to get appropriations to modernize their navy and some of their weaponry.

But the Konigsberg issue was a dicey problem.

Q: What had happened with this? Was it a transfer of technology?

STUART: Yes. Yes, without proper clearance. It violated the rules of the international group which is monitoring this. I've lost the acronym for it, but it was an allied commission in Paris that reviewed the sale of technology.

In general, we got support from the Norwegian government on this issue, and then they were horrified when this was brought out. So that was a sort of traumatic thing, but they were embarrassed by that.

Oh, there are all kinds of modest issues of apples and pears. You know, the Norwegians are great at recommending free trade for the rest of the world, but when it comes to products that compete with their agriculture, they're quite protectionist. The Washington apple growers traditionally have been able to ship our beautiful Washington apples in there, at least in the fall, for Christmas time. But the Norwegian apple growers (who

really don't grow a very good apple) had been able to shorten that period up constantly. And there was a violation really of the GATT understandings that we took them to court on. So that's in the area of agriculture; the fish thing we talked about a little bit.

I'm trying to think of other issues we had to work. The support of the Nicaraguan government, the Sandinistas, was an issue that was constantly troubling.

Q: OPEC, did that become an issue on oil prices or not?

STUART: Yes, it did, and we would try to persuade them not to cooperate with OPEC. We had also had issues to make sure that there's a fair treatment of international and U.S. oil companies in the allocation of blocks as they developed the extraordinary resources in the North Sea and in the Arctic Ocean. And we would always be working those issues.

After Phillips discovered oil in the Ekofisk, in the North Sea, sort of more southwesterly, two hundred miles off Stavanger, Norway's arrangements with international oil companies and American companies was that automatically a company called Statoil, the state oil company, would get fifty percent of the action, with the opportunity to go higher. And some of those procedures were pretty onerous in comparison to what the local Norwegian companies would have to cope with. And our effort was constantly to make sure that there was balancing allocation of the various new blocks that reduced the discriminatory kind of arrangements that were approved. So we worked on that issue.

Q: But you're really talking about sort of really two friends and your working on issues that can be talked about.

STUART: Absolutely. Absolutely. It was not a hostile land, by any means.

Q: Were you getting any pressure from the National Security Council--Oliver North, at one point he was riding fairly high--trying to use Norway to get pressure for things? I mean, were you getting problems from Washington?

STUART: No, no, but, gosh, you've been around long enough to know... Do people call you Stuart?

Q: Stu, yes.

STUART: I'm Bob. But, Stu, you know the reality of relationships, that sometimes you don't get people's attention unless you have some leverage. On the Konigsberg thing, to get their attention on this issue, which was serious, we had to postpone a purchase of some Penguin missiles. The Penguin was a very effective small missile that could be mounted on airplanes or ships, and it would have been a very nice contract for them in helping their defense industry. Well, until the right steps had been taken, that contract was held back. There were a number of other instances where Richard Perle in the Defense Department, who was very influential in these, would take a tough line. And I have to

admit, although Richard doesn't always get good notices from the State Department, that kind of pressure got attention.

Q: He was assistant secretary of state for the ISA, international security affairs.

STUART: And so he had the control of... There's a tremendous amount, in our system of defense, in NATO and elsewhere around the world. That is a very key element which provides resources for other nations' military services. And there were just a number of illustrations of where we got their attention. The ship visit policy was where the funding of new aircraft was slowed down until things were straightened out. So it reminds you: good will and good words, each country looks out for their own interests, and sometimes you have to use the leverage of economic and resource power to make sure there is cooperation on announced strategies of cooperation.

Q: Well, Norway, being way up to the north, when one thinks of European affairs, NATO affairs and all, Norway almost falls over the horizon sometimes when people are looking at the big picture, particularly in Washington. Did you ever find yourself having trouble with the European Bureau or anywhere else when pronouncements would come about Europe, and have to say, "Hey, how about Norway?" I mean, did you feel that you were being considered as a big boy in the European interests of the United States or not? Or was there a problem on that?

STUART: Oh, I don't think we had a feeling of being second class. Roz Ridgway, who was assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, had served in Norway on her way up the ladder. I don't think she was political counselor, although she might have been. She was either political counselor or assistant, but she spent time in Norway, so this was always kind of a positive. Roz understood our problems and was very supportive, and I think she's a very able woman. And so we had a good friend in court there. And, as you know, maybe for the record, she was ambassador to Finland briefly.

Q: East Germany.

STUART: And then moved from there to be, oh, really the right hand of George Shultz, the secretary of state, particularly in these summit meetings and negotiations with the Soviets. So we got copies of practically every cable affecting NATO issues, and so we felt we were kind of in the stream from that point of view.

Q: That's good. Well, Shultz came there in 1988 on a visit. Did you get many high-level visits and did these work well?

STUART: Well, I, of course, personally always hoped that President Reagan could come over. But George Shultz came on his 67th birthday, and we had the chiefs of missions of Europe all gathered there, and we had a two- or three-day conference with him. And it was a very successful meeting. George has a Norwegian son in law, so he was able to

play on that and identify, and it was a very gracious and cordial time. And Cap Weinberger, the secretary of defense, came over several times.

One of the fun sides of this, Stu, because we have so much military commitment involvement, you got the opportunity to, gosh, go out in carriers and helicopters, and participate. And, as an old G.I., this was wonderful. And you just had to be so impressed with the quality of our military, which has more recently been demonstrated in the Gulf. They were topnotch people: the admirals, the generals, the military that we had in the embassy, because it was a very important station from the point of view of the defense attaché in their office. We had the Office of Defense Cooperation, and they were well-staffed and just topnotch people. All that was very impressive and rewarding. They were fine people to work with, but they had ability. The military have done a pretty good job in continuing to educate people along the line.

And saying this, at the same time I also want to say that I've been impressed with the Foreign Service people as being under-rewarded financially and under-appreciated, because the State Department, unfortunately, doesn't have any constituency with our American Congress. And one of the things some of us who are non-career ambassadors are endeavoring to do is to be more supportive of State Department budgets. But the State Department doesn't reach out to us very much.

Q: Well, this is a problem. Well, just almost a commercial, but this program we have here should really be done by the Department of State. The military does it. They have oral history programs to talk to people who have done things, to learn from their experience, to pass on to the next generation. And also to give room for study what went right, what went wrong. I mean, it's very obvious the military had not been overly impressive in interventions in Panama and in Grenada. But all those lessons were learned and put together, so that in our effort, which just concluded about two weeks ago, against Iraq, it all worked together. The State Department doesn't have really any way of doing this. Part of the reason for this oral history program is to take the experiences of people like yourself and others to make it available for people to study.

STUART: Well, I think that is just terrific.

Q: But it's being done on the side, with no State Department support.

STUART: One of the things that really was also disappointing about the State Department is that there really isn't... It's symptomatic, but I've seen George Shultz from time to time, Bohemian Grove and other places, and there's just a sense that there was no interest on the part of his successor in tapping his brains, experience. Another example is Roz Ridgway was sort of shoved aside.

Q: And, you know, one can say, well, this is one administration on another, but unfortunately it's symptomatic of also within the Foreign Service. When a person leaves a post, there's very little effort made to extract his or her impressions and all.

STUART: That's an institutional shortcoming.

Q: And it's a very bad one. I mean, you either learn or you don't learn. But we keep recreating the wheel, as they say. So this is what we're trying to do.

STUART: I want to make one further comment, if this is going to be observations studied. Although it is, today, not legitimate to comment on one's spouse in terms of personnel evaluations, I think we're really kind of overreacting, because the spouses of various officers make a whale of a difference. And I want to say, as an ambassador, the ability of my wife to work with the Norwegian community gracefully, effectively, and intelligently was a huge asset. And I think it's too bad that in one's evaluation of a DCM or a political officer, etc., you cannot mention the capabilities of their spouse and their ability to win friends and influence people.

Q: It's part of equality and what happens if you're unmarried and don't have a spouse or something. But the point being, it's not the real world. Because the real world is that the spouses, at least today, women, particularly American women who tend to go out and volunteer and go out and get involved in things, are a very major asset. It's one that everybody pussyfoots around, but it's there.

STUART: And I'll tell you another thing, in relation to the military. The military wives were really much more cooperative and much more in the spirit of the volunteerism that we believe in and preach all the time in our communities at home. And I'm not sure whether in personnel evaluations the wives could be mentioned.

Q: I doubt if they are, but I think the military wives are under more discipline. The Foreign Service used to have it. Not just because there's in the efficiency report, but there has been such an emphasis on doing your own thing and all that a very valuable asset has been lost. And also it's a morale builder, it's important. And if somebody is going in with a chip on their shoulder--well, you can't ask me to do this or that--the team effort goes down.

STUART: Absolutely. I think Henry Catto's recent experience in London, his wife just didn't play a role, and I'm sure that must have handicapped him in London.

Q: Oh, it hurts.

STUART: And it's something that, for me, I was very lucky. Barbara also became terribly fond of many people, but all those things become plus relationships in establishing confidence in the community.

Q: It really goes without saying, but unfortunately now it has to go without saying.

STUART: I know.

Q: It's sad. Well, we've really covered pretty much of everything. You left, when, in 198...?

STUART: We came back in July of '89, because they asked us to stay on until a successor was appointed.

Q: Looking at this, what gave you the greatest pleasure in your time as ambassador?

STUART: I think the satisfaction of feeling that we'd established a kind of balance, a firm and successful relationship with Norway. We made many good friends there. I think we were able to work the policy issues satisfactorily. God knows we enjoyed Norway as a beautiful country. We love sailing and skiing and all the things that the Norwegians enjoy, too.

Q: I guess everybody takes off on the weekends, don't they?

STUART: They do. And that was really, for an ambassador, the moment of R & R where you could rest and relax, unless you were involved, swept up in some of the pleasant visits to things they call *hyttes*, huts. Well, as the Canadians call their places "cottages," these are sometimes very, very attractive places. So people were very kind to Barbara and me.

Q: Well, I want to thank you very much. I really appreciated this.

End of interview