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HANS N. TUCH  

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Q: This is Lew Schmidt interviewing Hans "Tom" Tuch at his home in Bethesda, Maryland. Tom, I'm not going to go into much of a preliminary. We have divided your interviews into three parts, the first part of which was largely your Moscow experience, the second your VOA periods, and this is the third covering the rest of your career. All of the preliminaries of your background are in part one and I won't repeat them here.

I think the only thing I want to do now is to ask you first whether there's anything you want to say about your Moscow experience that you feel you didn't say before, because the first part of it was covered almost entirely by your personal experiences, and less of the actual program. Is there anything that you want to say about your experience in the Soviet program before we go on to the other parts of your career?

Additional Discussion Of Service In Moscow: 1958-61

A. The U.S.-Soviet Exchange Agreement And Its Implementation
TUCH: Well, I'm not quite sure how much we covered in that interview, it's such a long time ago. However, the one thing that one might just mention briefly, is that in regard to the work that we did, was that we signed our first U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement in January 1958. I appeared in Moscow in July '58 just when the first implementation of that agreement took place.

We were suddenly, and for the first time since World War II, involved in what I would call a real USIS program, except that it was not called a USIS program. It was called a Press and Cultural Program, because at that time at least, the Soviets did not recognize USIA as an organization. I myself, in order to be given a visa to work in Moscow, had to resign from USIA. I returned to State and was assigned to the embassy as a State Department second secretary. However, I was charged with conducting what normally a public affairs officer would do.

For the first year I was alone trying to manage or trying to coordinate the implementation of this new exchange program, which involved exchanges of graduate students, pre-doctoral or post-doctoral students; second, the preparation of our major American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959; third, a number of performing art events, the first one of which was the tour of the New York Philharmonic in the fall of 1959; and the visits of a number of distinguished American composers delegations, and artists' delegation, several performing artists, and a writers' delegation. I was the only officer charged with these responsibilities. I had, however, the help and cooperation of a number of other embassy officers, who enjoyed doing this kind of work because we were the only ones who got out of the embassy. We were the only ones who were, so to speak, communicating with the Soviet public, although very much restricted.

During that time it was determined that I needed help, that I needed another officer to assist me, and I was told that I was going to get an assistant. However, as things in the Foreign Service often happen, at the last moment it was decided that what that new program really needed was a high ranking, prestigious officer, and so a new cultural counselor was appointed, Lee Brady, and I became his assistant. Which proves the old adage, "Never ask for an assistant because you may be it."

At any rate, from the fall of 1959 we were then two officers, Lee Brady and myself. I was the number two, and we divided up our responsibilities in that he took the more intellectual exchanges, and I took the performing arts and handled the press in the embassy, was the press attaché.

The program was very much enlarged during those first two years, '59-'60. We had a tremendous number of activities, the biggest, of course, the American National Exhibition in the fall of '59. A number of other USIA officers were involved with that, Jack Masey was the head of design. Actually, Abbott Washburn, the Deputy Director of USIA, was coordinator in Washington of the whole thing under George Allen, who was the USIA Director. George Allen came to the opening accompanying Vice President Nixon.
B. The Nixon-Khrushchev "Kitchen Debate" (Fall of 1959)

Then, we had the big affair with Vice President Nixon and the interaction with Khrushchev, the famous "Kitchen Debate," the trip out to Siberia with the vice president, and all the activities surrounding his visit. At the same time with the National Exhibit, the tour of the New York Philharmonic with Leonard Bernstein.

C. U.S.-Soviet Relations - Ups And Downs

Our program suddenly became very large. Many activities. Now this was during the so-called "spirit of Camp David," where there was a slow rapprochement between the Soviets and us, for the first time, an easing of our relationship. That continued: the Soviets also had an exhibit in New York, and there were many Soviet performing arts groups, among them the Bolshoi Ballet and the Moiseyev dance ensemble coming to the United States. There was a plethora of exchange activities.

Q: You didn't find that the "Kitchen Debate" put any damper on that warming of relationships?

TUCH: No. It just became, I would say, a symptom of that relationship in that we were always at each other, but in a way that we could manage the relationship much more easily than we had before.

D. The U-2 Affair

Now this came to an immediate and very abrupt stop on May 1, 1960, when the U-2 with Gary Powers was shot down, and our relations sank back into the cellar. They canceled President Eisenhower's trip to the Soviet Union; Khrushchev made some very antagonistic and very unfriendly statements about him and about the United States, and our relationship became worse--what had previously become a more normal relationship wasn't very good.

However, our exchange activities continued even during this new period of tension. That tension was increased because of Khrushchev's aggressive statements about Berlin at that time. However, the exchanges continued under our first agreement, and in 1960, after the Gary Powers incident, after the U-2 incident, was renegotiated in Moscow, and renewed for another two years.

Now gradually the exchanges continued, the relationship moved upward again, culminating in the election of President Kennedy and some movements by the Soviets vis-a-vis the new president, indicating that they wanted to have better relationship again.

Q: Yes. The first thing that happened after his election, the day before the inauguration, was the release of two other pilots who had been shot down, the RB-47 pilots who had been held prisoner by the Soviets. They released them on the day after the inauguration.
E. Bay of Pigs Invasion - Relations Tumble Again

TUCH: Again, our relationship, almost like a roller coaster, moved upward again until the Bay of Pigs invasion in April '61, and then the first meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy in July 1961 in Vienna, at which Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson was present. When he came back from that visit, he told us how genuinely shocked President Kennedy had been at that meeting with the crudeness, antagonism, and unfriendliness expressed by Chairman Khrushchev, vis-a-vis Kennedy, vis-a-vis the United States. So our relationship again sank deeper. It really did not revive again until after the Cuban missile incident in October 1962.

1961-65: Service In Washington - Deputy Area Director
For New Soviet Union And Eastern Europe Area; Later Director

I left Moscow at the end of July 1961, was assigned to Washington. Ed Murrow was Director of USIA, and I was assigned to a new organizational unit in USIA, namely the Assistant Director of USIA for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which he created. I became the deputy director of that office, Lee Brady was the director. For the next four years the two of us worked very closely with and for Ed Murrow, and Ed insisted that his assistant directors spend a good part of their time in the area for which they were responsible. So during the next four years, between 1961 and 1965, I spent quite a bit of time each year both in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe for which we were responsible.

Short Return To Moscow Experiences

A. Did Soviets Know of U-2 Overflights Before Shot Down?

Q: I'd like to go back and ask just a couple of questions about the Moscow time before we go on further with this interview. Do I understand that the Soviets probably knew about the overflights of the U-2 or did they? They must have known or they wouldn't have been able to shoot it down. Had they known for some time, as far as you can determine?

TUCH: Well, I really don't know all the facts, but we suspected that they knew about the overflights, but could not do anything about them because they were flying so high and they just couldn't reach them. It wasn't until the U-2 was shot down, that was their first success in this. I suspect that they knew but, they couldn't reach them.

B. Limited Instances Of Direct Contact With Soviet Citizens

Q: The other question I wanted to ask you, and I think in your earlier interview you mentioned getting out on the streets and making contact with a number of Soviet citizens and, therefore, being able to report to some extent to the embassy what was going on, and what might be thought by some of the locals. To what extent was that possible? Were
you able to contact many people, and would they talk, or was this limited to a very restricted set of circumstances when you were mainly able to pick up information, say, in certain instances when you went to receptions of the type you just described or on train trips in the USSR?

TUCH: It was very restricted. We were very circumscribed. We were never left alone without the KGB "goons," as we called them, following us and being with us at every moment of the day and night when we went out. Even when you went to theater or to the opera, the ballet, they would always be with you.

The only exception to that--it's not really an exception--but the only opportunity that we had to talk to people at some length was on trips. That is why we tried to make a lot of train trips out of Moscow. We always had to ask permission 48 hours in advance if we wanted to go beyond a 25-kilometer radius of Moscow. And then very often, I would say at least half the time, they refused us permission to go on these trips. So on a regular schedule we asked for permission to go on trips, and traveled rather widely within the Soviet Union in areas which were open to travel by foreign diplomats. I would say more than half of the country was closed to travel by us and, in addition to that, often when we wanted to go to a certain place we would be told that the area had been "temporarily closed" to travel by foreign diplomats.

At any rate, we did travel, and we traveled very often by train because we felt that on long train trips--you know, some of them take two, three, four, five days--you were in a compartment with other Soviet citizens; you were closed in with them, and you really had to have contact with them, conversations, and even though there may be a KGB agent on the train with you he normally was not in your compartment.

Q: That's interesting.

TUCH: He was not in the compartment with you, or quite often on the train we wouldn't have anybody. We would be followed to the train and then be picked up again at the station where we got off. This happened frequently. So on train trips, you sometimes had the possibility to have very extensive, long conversations over a two-and three-day period, which would start usually, I would say, on insignificant subjects. But Soviet citizens were tremendously interested in anything that an American had to say to them, and they immediately, when they found out you were an American, surrounded you and asked you questions about your living standards, about your life, about your customs and various things. Over a period of time you could also find out what they were interested in.

The thing that amazed us constantly is that in spite of the, at that time, forty years of vicious propaganda against Americans, that we were spies, that we were trying to overthrow the Soviet Union, that in spite of this pervasive anti-American propaganda, the people were very, very friendly towards us. Many of them expressed this friendliness by saying, "We were allies in World War II, and we must get onto the same level of a relationship again. We must be friends."
The interesting thing was that the basis of this friendship goes back before World War II, that many people referred to the friendliness, the cooperation of the Americans back in the early 1920s when Herbert Hoover ran a food aid program for the country and helped the newly established Soviet Union overcome its hunger problems.

Q: This was true even though American troops had joined those that were invading the Soviet Union in support of the White Russians at that time?

TUCH: Absolutely. It was amazing to us that this was constantly being brought up. The gratitude that they felt towards Americans for saving them from starvation.

Q: Did you find any cases in which they gave critiques of their own country; were they criticizing at any point? Of course, I don't imagine you tried to probe for that, but did they voluntarily express any dissatisfactions?

TUCH: No. Usually not. What they would say, and this was, I think, a unique thing in the Soviet Union at that time--unique from other countries under communist rule: In the Soviet Union you still had a great number of people, mostly simple people, who were convinced that communism for them was the paradise of the future; that they may live in misery now and that they may not have the good things in life in the way of shelter, and food, and clothing, but their children will, and their grandchildren will. So they were still, were, what I would call, "believers" and had a rather simplistic idea that communism was going to bring them all the things that the previous hundreds of years had not brought them in Russia.

That was the difference I felt that whenever I left the Soviet Union and went anywhere else in communist Eastern Europe, that in these other countries you had no ideologically convinced communists anymore. You had members of communist parties who felt that communism was giving them the good life and it was their ticket to a better life, but they were not ideologically convinced. In the Soviet Union at that time you still had that.

C. Limited Ethnic Dissatisfactions In USSR

Q: Did you encounter any of the ethnic differences such as have surfaced many times now, and especially recently? The reason that I ask this is that in my very limited contact with people from the Soviet Union, on a couple of occasions I have made the mistake of saying, "Well, our Russian friend . . ." And had a Ukrainian or a Georgian say, "I am not a Russian! I am Ukrainian, or Georgian!" {{Laughter} }

TUCH: Many Soviet citizens felt very proud of their ethnic heritage, especially when you went down to a place like Georgia or Armenia. It was less pronounced in places like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, but I'm sure it existed though it was not expressed to us. In Georgia, very much so. It was very, very distinctive whenever we went to the Baltics; Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. During my first year, the three Baltic states were still off
limits; they were opened during my tour of duty there. A colleague of mine and I were the
first ones to go to Riga, to Latvia, and we spent three or four days there. We found a
tremendous amount and intensity of nationalism, nationalist pride and a great deal of
antagonism towards their Russian masters. In the Baltics it was very clear; it was very
pronounced anti-Soviet, anti-Russian. In Georgia it was less anti-Russian, but very pro-
Georgian nationalism. They felt that they were different. They were not Russians, they
were Georgians, as you just said. But at that time of course, you did not have any of the
ethnic manifestations which have erupted during the last year.

D. U.S.-Soviet Film Exchanges

Q: At what point was the motion picture exchange arrangement worked out?

TUCH: You shouldn't have asked that question. {Laughter} The first exchange agreement
had a provision saying that there would be a subsequent agreement on the showing of
American and Soviet films that would be negotiated separately. Indeed, in October 1959
an American delegation came to Moscow headed by the then President of the American
Motion Picture Association, Eric Johnston. The deputy of the American delegation was
Turner Shelton who at that time was head of the motion picture division in USIA. Turner
Shelton was a colorful, Hollywood type. One of my memories of this particular
negotiation was the first morning when the American delegation walked into the Minister
of Culture where the Soviet delegation was assembled, waiting. And the American
delegation walked in and Eric Johnston, Turner Shelton, several bag carriers, interpreters,
secretaries, behind them, all of them wearing dark sunglasses, a la Hollywood, as they
walked into this very dark room. The Soviets just looked at them as though this is
Hollywood personified. {Laughter}

The negotiation was not a particularly good one. It did result in an agreement but the
agreement was not going to work very well. For one thing, the Soviets were interested in
having their picture shown in the United States. Their films at that time just were not
commercially marketable. They were terrible and they just would not sell in the United
States. No exhibitor wanted to show them. They wanted the American Government to see
to it that they were shown, but the American Government has no great influence with
American motion picture exhibitors.

On the other hand, our films, whatever film we showed, was going to be popular in the
Soviet Union. The last American films that had been shown in the Soviet Union, I think
in 1944, was "Sun Valley Serenade," the Glenn Miller band. I think Sonja Henie was in
that film. The other one was a Deanna Durbin film, I think it was called "A Thousand
Men and a Girl," or something like that. But Deanna Durbin was the big American film
star in the Soviet Union, and this is 1959.

One of the first new American films that was to be shown in the Soviet Union was
"Roman Holiday" with Audrey Hepburn and Gregory Peck. I remember that without
telling us anything about it, they put on this film in the Olympic Sports Palace. For three
days they showed eight showings a day in English, without subtitles and without dubbing. They filled the sports hall eight times a day, it held nine thousand people, and they showed it for three days. There was never a seat to be had in those showings, and they were able to use the admission fees for those three days of showing to dub the film before they distributed it all over the Soviet Union.

**Q:** I see. {Laughter}

TUCH: At any rate, our films then were also not shown very widely and in a restricted fashion because their films weren't showing in the United States and we were constantly haggling over what films were to be exchanged.

Messrs. Johnston and Shelton felt that the U. S. Government ought to make the determination of what American films should be shown in the Soviet Union. Eric Johnston had a certain amount of control and influence over the Motion Picture Association of America and its members. So he could control them, but he could not control those film producers who wanted to show their films independently and make deals with the Soviet Union. Often those were films which were not particularly complimentary to, say, our own society, which were critical of our system. On the other hand the Soviets wanted to get particularly those films to the Soviet Union to show, "Here are the Americans, look they themselves are showing how bad things are in the United States." So it was not a very successful operation because Johnston and Turner Shelton could not control what films the Soviets were going to import from the U.S. So they were finally interested in not having this exchange of commercial films continued.

**Q:** Well, how was the agreement set up? Was there a specified number of films that could be shown in any given period of time, or how was it that it was possible for the U. S. side to be sure that all their films were distributed rather widely, or that only films fairly complimentary to America would be available in the USSR?

TUCH: I don't have specific numbers, but I think it was six or eight films which were going to be exchanged over the two years of the agreement. They were going to be dubbed and shown widely in the Soviet Union. The first problem came about when the Soviets learned they could not show their films in this country because nobody wanted to show them. {Laughter} Therefore, they were reluctant to show our films. At the same time, once the door was open to film exchanges, it became very difficult for the American Government to tell American producers, "You cannot make deals separately with the Soviet Union." How could we restrict them? We had no control over them, so the Soviets took advantage of that and started dealing with independent American film makers to show films that our government would have preferred not to have shown.

**Q:** Did the Soviets still count those films as part of the quota that had been established?

TUCH: I don't recall. The exchange became a shambles. It was never really settled. Then the Soviets started having film festivals every two years in Moscow and invited the
United States. We participated and showed films which were normally not very good films because they were the only films that the State Department would agree to show. For instance, I remember the first one was "Sunrise at Campobello." That's not a very good film! {Laughter}

Q: I remember that.

TUCH: Yet, this was our official entry into the Soviet film festival, and we were embarrassed to have that kind of a film shown, but this is what the U. S. Government proposed and produced. U.S. film delegations came to these festivals, and I remember the first time there was a delegation of a number of producers and directors; there were no film stars, if I remember correctly. We were introduced to the public before the American film was shown on the stage, and as we lined up and our names were called--I was a member of the delegation that's why I was on the stage. There was polite applause as our names were called, and suddenly one member of our delegation whom none of us had ever really heard of before--I don't recall his name right now--was introduced and a roar of applause went up.

Q: It was an actor?

TUCH: No, he had been involved in the production of "Sun Valley Serenade" 15 years before, and everybody in the Soviet Union remembered him; nobody in this country knew him. {Laughter} The delegation the second year included Edward G. Robinson, Gary Cooper with his wife and daughter (Maria, the wife of Byron Janis now) and a number of directors. This was a bigger show at that time because these were known personalities. That was a good delegation because Edward G. Robinson and Gary Cooper were interesting people.

Q: Was there subsequently a later film exchange agreement worked out, or did the thing continue on the basis of the initial one?

TUCH: There was never, to the best of my recollection, another formal negotiation of the agreement. The film exchange was incorporated in the renegotiation of the other big agreement, and it said something to the effect that our exchanges of films will continue on the basis of our previous agreement.

Q: I see. I'm not going to repeat them here, but the stories were legion about Turner Shelton's experience in the Soviet Union, including his initial arrival at the airport and his insistence that Soviet Customs officials could not examine his baggage, but that's another story. {Laughter}
TUCH: We could have a tape just on that subject alone. Should I go back briefly now, I think we've exhausted the Soviet Union.


During those four years as the area deputy director and then as the area director for the Soviet Union-Eastern Europe, we renegotiated the U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement. The first renegotiation took place in 1960 while I was still in Moscow; the second one in 1962 in Washington, and then again in Moscow in 1964. Now the State Department was still heading the negotiation process. In 1960 it was Ambassador Thompson, who was head of the U.S. delegation; in 1962 it was Ambassador Bohlen, and in 1964--for the moment I can't remember who it was. I was no longer involved in '64, but in '62, I participated in the renegotiating of the agreement under Chip Bohlen, and our program expanded greatly.

B. Traveling U.S. Exhibit In USSR

We had a number of traveling exhibits in the Soviet Union every year; exhibits which the Soviets really did not want, but we made it clear, we wanted these exhibits very much because it permitted us for first time to get into the hinterland of the Soviet Union, to the provincial cities. Not only did we have our exhibits there, but the really important element was that we had Russian speaking American guides.

Q: It opened a new possibility, I gather, for talking to the Soviet citizens, because you couldn't do otherwise.

TUCH: Absolutely. These guides were able to communicate as Americans in the Russian language with Soviet citizens all over the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not like the exchange of exhibits because they did not see much value in their exhibits in the United States, and frankly, they didn't have much of an impact here. But we thought this was a good thing for the United States and we insisted on it, and we even threatened that if they would not permit us to have the exhibit exchange we would curtail other exchanges which they were particularly interested in, namely the exchanges in graduate students.

C. Pleasure Of Working With Ed Murrow

Also, I must say that the years I spent in Washington working for Ed Murrow, were for me very productive years, simply because I had the feeling that Ed Murrow understood what we were trying to do in the Soviet Union and not only supported it, but spearheaded it. He furthered it in every respect, getting the right people to go to the Soviet Union.

I remember on one occasion when he persuaded Danny Kaye to go to the Soviet Union on behalf of USIA and do his communications job. What I'm trying to say is that Ed was personally very much involved in the programming and in the efforts to communicate with the Soviet Union.
D. Ed Murrow Took Direct Hand In VOA Broadcasts To USSR

Now, on one occasion he took a direct hand in it and that was, I think, in September or October 1961, shortly after I had come back from the Soviet Union when the Soviets started nuclear testing again. He was so personally incensed at this that he wrote a commentary for the Voice of America himself and ordered all transmitters—we were still being jammed at that time—and he ordered all transmitters that were available to the Voice of America to be massed for that particular commentary to be broadcast. It was a very tough commentary but he had written it himself and he had broadcast it. That was an interesting phenomenon because while he did this, he went to a National Security Council meeting and advised the President, President Kennedy, not to take a retaliatory hard line against this. In other words, he cautioned the administration to be deliberate in their reply. He knew what he was doing. He himself broadcast this commentary, yet he cautioned the administration to be calm and deliberate in their reply on this.

Q: I know that one of the bases on which we sold Ed Murrow the idea and he supported it very extensively, was that he felt the present administration and the European area were so involved with programming for western Europe that they weren't giving an adequate amount of attention to the kind of material that was going into the Soviet Union. He felt that there were other approaches that could be taken but were not going to be taken if we didn't have a separate organization. Consequently, I'm not surprised that he involved himself so deeply in the programming and planning for what went in there, because that was the main basis for setting up this separate organization.

TUCH: Right. One of the things that he was interested in was what we were broadcasting on the Voice of America into the Soviet Union. He was instrumental at the time in changing our whole attitude and tone in our broadcast. He wanted to have an American with experience in the Soviet Union, an American officer who spoke Russian with recent experience to be the head of the VOA Soviet division.

E. Handling Alexander Barmine

Q: How did that grab Barmine?

TUCH: Well, that was the issue. Alexander Barmine—General Barmine, as he liked to be called—had been the head of the Russian division of the Voice of America, I think, almost ever since it started in the late '40s. He was a very hard line anti-communist who had left the Soviet Union in the late '30s when he defected. He had been the chargé of the Soviet Embassy in Athens and was about to be purged in the Great Purge, Stalin's purge, and he defected and came to the United States. He was a very conservative, I would say, almost reactionary, military type who just brooked no interference with what he thought should be broadcast to the Soviet Union. However, he was very well-known and highly regarded on the hill, Congress.
Yet, Ed Murrow felt that a change of direction was in order and needed to be taken. So he worked out a system whereby Terry Catherman, who had succeeded me in Moscow, when he came back in 1964, took over the Russian division of the Voice of America. But what could be done with Alexander Barmine?

So an arrangement was devised whereby Alex Barmine was "promoted" to be my special assistant. I was the area director and he was to be my Soviet advisor in the area. We brought him uptown and he was treated courteously; he was given a nice office right next to my office and from time to time Ed Murrow greeted him and talked to him briefly and made Alex Barmine feel good. He did not feel that he had been demoted. I remember on one occasion when I was invited to the Soviet Embassy for a reception, I said to Alex, "You've got to come along with me. You're the Soviet expert in this and you come along with me, and I'll see to it that you get an invitation." They indeed sent him an invitation. He was at first very reluctant to go into the Soviet Embassy, but finally agreed.

We went to the Soviet Embassy and, lo and behold, he became the center of attraction to all the military types, Soviet military types at the Soviet Embassy who had remembered this famous General Barmine of the 1930s. He enjoyed it. Then, on the way out he told me the story about his defection from his embassy, the Soviet Embassy in Athens, when he walked out knowing that if he had not walked out of that embassy at the moment he did, he would have been arrested and possibly shot.

Q: You said Barmine had been with the Voice since the late '40s, actually, he had started even earlier than that. Perhaps as early as the mid-'40s, I don't know just what year he defected, but I know he started with the Voice when they were still in New York.

TUCH: Yes, indeed, because he defected in 1938, I remember that. This was during the purge. He was a protégé of Marshal Tukhashevskii, who was one of the marshals who was purged, and when he heard that Marshal Tukhashevskii had been arrested, he realized his time had come and defected to Paris.

He came to the United States, I think, very soon there after. The Voice did not start until 1942 and it was located in New York. I'm not sure exactly when we started broadcasting in Russian to the Soviet Union. I think it was probably 1948, '49, but the date of that we can check with Cliff Groce.

Q: It's not significant, anyway.

F. Cuban Missile Crisis: Tuch In USSR Accompanying New York City Ballet

TUCH: At any rate, these four years in working with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, making frequent trips there. I remember one particular trip in October 1962. I wanted to get back to the Soviet Union and I wanted to travel, and I felt that one of the best ways that I could do that without much attention being directed towards me by the KGB, was to accompany the New York City Ballet as the USIA-State Department escort officer. So I
went with them and we went to Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi in Georgia, and Baku the capital of Azerbaijan. We were in Leningrad right in the middle of the Cuban missile crisis. It turned out afterwards, I didn't know it at the time, that I was actually the only American diplomat who was outside of Moscow during that time. They did not permit anybody else to leave Moscow, but I was with the ballet and they didn't stop me.

I was in Leningrad during the worst part of the missile crisis, being, however, absolutely oblivious of what was going on. I didn't know anything until the embassy called me, and they very circumspect asked me, "How are things going in Leningrad?"

I said, "Fine. Ballet's having a big success, cheers and applause every night."

"What is the atmosphere like?" I was asked.

"Oh, it's fine, great, we had no problems."

They said, "Have you been listening to the Voice of America? Have you been listening to the radio?"

I had a radio with me and I said, "No, I haven't been listening. The batteries are dead and I haven't really been able to listen to the Voice of America. Besides, I've been very busy with the ballet."

They said, "You listen to the Voice of America." So that night I made a point of listening and I found out what was going on. Of course, by that time the crisis was over, it had passed.

Q: Had any information filtered out?

TUCH: No. No, people in Leningrad, to the best of my knowledge, were absolutely unaware of what was going on. That compared to the American reaction of the missile crisis--I had a letter from my wife about two weeks later, written right at the worst point of the crisis, and she was obviously very concerned about me and didn't know what was going to be happening to me. But I was completely unaware of it, which is also one of the interesting experiences.

Q: Are there any other things you'd like to say in this retrospect on your four years with the Eastern European area, or should we go on now and talk a little bit again about Bulgaria?

G. Differences In Dealing With USSR And East European Nations

TUCH: The interesting thing, and I think the significant thing during those four years was that we ought to differentiate our relationship between the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. We started to look at openings that we could have in Eastern
Europe in our program exchanges, public diplomacy program, also in our VOA broadcasts. How could we differentiate and adjust our programs to actual realities of the relationship and what could we accomplish?

It became possible for us, for instance, to have academic exchanges with Poland, other exchanges with Poland without an agreement. On the one hand, with Romania and with Czechoslovakia, not with East Germany and, at that time, not with Bulgaria, and with Hungary, we began having agreements. Not necessarily formal agreements, but arrangements for exchanges whereby we negotiated certain exchanges without having a formal agreement as we had with the Soviet Union, in order to conduct programs that we felt were mutually beneficial to our efforts in Eastern Europe.

We did begin some really interesting and fruitful exchanges, exhibits, academic exchanges, magazines in the Eastern European countries. Always, of course, different from what we were doing in Yugoslavia because we did not feel that Yugoslavia was part of that Soviet-bloc mentality.

Q: Was Yugoslavia under your jurisdiction?

TUCH: No. Yugoslavia was always part of the Western European area. In my view that was correct, at that time.

Q: Incidentally, you know there was a lot of opposition among the area directors to setting up the East European area. I was the one that recommended it to Ed Murrow, and he supported me. I think the only other person who supported me was the Latin American area, and the rest of them had varying degrees from direct opposition to doubts about it. But Ed was very strongly determined to set it up for a time.

TUCH: Well, Bill Cody, who was the European area director, of course, opposed it. His little empire was being cut in half. If I remember correctly, so was Walter Roberts, who was his deputy. But with your help, Ed felt strongly that there was so much concentration of USIA's efforts vis-a-vis the communist world of Eastern Europe at that time, and it was so different from what we were doing in Western Europe that he insisted that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should be set up as a separate area directorate.

Lee left in 1964 to be PAO in Paris, and then I succeeded him. By that time--Freudian slip. Who was the director at that time?

Q: Carl Rowan?

TUCH: Oh. By that time, Carl Rowan had succeeded Ed Murrow as the director. Even though I was supposed to go to Warsaw as PAO, he would not let Lee Brady and me both depart at the same time. So I succeeded Lee Brady for a year, and I was then supposed to go to Warsaw in 1965. Dick Davies came in to succeed me as the area director, but at the last moment--and this is sort of an interesting little side light of the history of USIA vis-a-
vis the relationship with the State Department—at the last moment, about three weeks before I was scheduled to leave for Warsaw, the State Department and USIA came to an agreement to exchange officers at a higher level.

**Bulgaria As Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM): 1965-67**

I was asked to go to Bulgaria as DCM, deputy chief of mission, and Art Hummel was assigned to Taiwan as Deputy Chief of Mission. We were the first two non-State Department officers to be assigned as DCM. Of course, he went on to great things after his assignment in Taiwan, became Ambassador to Burma, Pakistan and China. So I went off to Bulgaria as DCM and spent two years in Sofia from 1965 to 1967.

Q: Before we go more deeply into your work in Bulgaria, I'd like to ask you a preliminary question. In the course of your assignment as the DCM in Bulgaria did you find that in some respects you were acting like a USIS officer? Were you doing anything, or did you do anything in that occasion which you might very well have done had you been the PAO in the country?

TUCH: We did have a PAO, or rather a press and cultural attaché John Clayton; Tim Pfeiffer in the first instance succeeded by John Clayton. But being really essentially a public affairs type, I found that being a DCM, I could be a better public affairs officer than I could ever have been as a public affairs officer because I had the opportunity to get out and communicate, especially during my two years there in Sofia. I spent almost half my tour of duty as a chargé.

Sofia was one of the last two legations in the American Foreign Service. We had raised all of our missions throughout the world to embassy status with the exception of Budapest and Sofia. Budapest because we had a very bad relationship with the Hungarians at that time since we were “hosting” Cardinal Mindszenty. In Bulgaria, we did not have a very good relationship either. Budapest and Sofia were our two last legations, historically speaking, I was the last Counselor of Legation in the Foreign Service.

When we raised both to embassy status—and that happened in the fall of 1966, no the spring of 1967, we didn't want to do it separately; we wanted to raise Budapest and Sofia at the same time. The issue with Cardinal Mindszenty didn't get resolved and, therefore, neither one of the two legations was changed. In the meantime, we had had a change of chiefs of mission. Nathaniel Davis, who had been the American Minister in Sofia until the spring of 1966, left precipitously. He was not persona non grata, but he was withdrawn by the U.S. Government as a result of an automobile accident, and there was a major commotion between our two governments at that time. He was finally withdrawn. His successor, John McSweeney, didn't want to arrive and be a minister and then be raised to Ambassador. He wanted to wait until he came as an Ambassador, so we had a long interim during which time I was the chargé. Then finally he did come, because there was no immediate change of status in prospect. He came as a Minister and then was changed to become an Ambassador about three or four months later.
At any rate, the opportunities in Bulgaria for a public affairs program, whether run by a PAO [Public Affairs Officer] or by the DCM, were still very limited, about as limited as they were in the Soviet Union. The relationship could not be established. It was somewhat easier to deal with Bulgarians than it was with the Soviets, and you found people in the population, people on the street that you met, easier to make contact with and easier to talk to. It was, I'd say, a softer system of communism even though Todor Zhivkov was, at that time, the head of the party and government and, of course, he still is today. He was not expected to last that long, but he lasted longer than anyone else.

1966: U.S. Participation For First Time In Plovdiv International Trade Fair; U.S. Visitors Include Senator Magnuson And USIA Director Leonard Marks

One of the interesting things that happened during that time was that we participated for the first time with an exhibit at the Plovdiv International Trade Fair in 1966, and Senator Magnuson was the American official representative to come to Sofia for this exhibit. Senator Magnuson, who just died last month, and his wife came--very charming people, both of them--and, fortunately for me, they were accompanied by Leonard Marks, who had become the Director of USIA. This was his first trip to the Soviet Bloc. I had not met him before, but he came to Sofia actually a day ahead of the Magnusons and was very helpful to me. I was chargé at the time, there was no Ambassador or minister. He was helpful to me in giving me suggestions and advice on how to handle Senator Magnuson; they were very good friends.

Leonard Marks Has Verbal Exchange With Todor Zhivkov, Government Party Chairman And Head Of Government

It turned out that Leonard was a very pleasant person, cooperative in every respect. I had arranged for a visit by Senator Magnuson with Todor Zhivkov, the Chairman of the Party and the government. Leonard said to me, "Tom, you are in charge here, you decide who should accompany Senator Magnuson. Of course you are going, but you decide who should go and I will abide by your decision."

And I said, "Of course, Leonard, you've got to come along. You should come along, too."

Leonard said, "But I will not say a word during the conversation, I'll just be there and it'll be very interesting to attend; but I won't say anything."

Well, I knew Leonard Marks by that time and I didn't think that this was going to be the way he announced it. And sure enough we had been with Zhivkov about three minutes whereupon Leonard Marks interrupted and said, "Mr. Chairman, there's only one thing that I really would like to ask you. Why do you still jam the Voice of America? You are the only country in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that still jams the Voice of America." At that time, I should interject, the Soviet Union had stopped jamming. After
the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty, they stopped jamming the Voice of America and did not commence again until August 1968 during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. And all the other Eastern European countries had also stopped jamming the Voice of America, with one exception, Bulgaria. This was sort of a significant element of our relationship, they still jammed us.

So here was Leonard Marks asking Zhivkov, "Why do you still jam the Voice of America?" Zhivkov, who was not known to be very fast on the draw, outdid himself on this occasion. He said, "Mr. Director, I could stop jamming the Voice of America just like that," he snapped his finger, "But if I did that, what would you and I then have to talk about?" For once, Leonard Marks was speechless.

And then he continued. He said, "You know, Mr. Director, I will stop jamming the Voice of America if you'll do one thing for me."

Leonard Marks asked him, "What is that?"

And he said, "If you give us most-favored-nation treatment so that we can trade with you on an equal basis. End of conversation. {Laughter}

The relationship with Bulgaria was a tough one, but as I said earlier, it was for me, having spent three years in the Soviet Union, a somewhat easier system with which to deal than in Moscow.

Of course, the climate is better than the Soviet Union. It's a small country, it's a beautiful country when one travels around Bulgaria. Rugged mountains and the sea shore and you have a decent climate, so the atmosphere and the whole ambience in Bulgaria was somewhat different. For most of my colleagues, however, it was a very tough post because it literally was the end of the line. Namely, all airlines, if they even went to Sofia, would go to Sofia turn around and go back West.

Q: I want to ask you one more thing. You mentioned that you did get out and around and talk to people, did you feel that because of the fact that you had the title of DCM, chargé, or whatever the case might have been, you were able to make contacts and open some doors that were closed to you had you just been a PAO in the country?

TUCH: I think that it's true to a certain extent, especially as a chargé. I would ride around the countryside in the official car with the American flag flying. That alone was always an entree because Bulgarians felt friendly towards Americans, and if they saw the American chief of mission's car coming down the road with the American flag flying, they would literally stand beside the road waving in a friendly way. That gave one a good feeling, I must admit. I mean this was completely separate from our relationship with the Bulgarian Government which was not particularly good at the time.
Q: I gather that's about, for the moment at least, all you want to say about Bulgaria. Why don't you pick it up from there.

Assigned As PAO Berlin 1967-1970; However Immediate Discussion Goes Back To Earlier Assignments In Germany

TUCH: Well, after Bulgaria I was assigned as PAO in Berlin. I came, so to speak, back into the USIA fold and into a situation with which I was more familiar. Over my 35 years in the Foreign Service, I was able to spend a total of 14 years in Germany on four different assignments. So I would say that the country and the people that I feel most familiar with is Germany, and the German public.

That, of course, has something to do with the fact that I was born in Germany. I was born in Berlin and came to the United States in 1938 as a 14-year-old boy.

Q: Had your German language stuck with you pretty well, or did you have to rehabilitate your capability?

TUCH: I had to rehabilitate my capability, so to speak, because when I came to the United States at the age of 14, I came to my mother's family in Kansas City in the Midwest, and as a 14 year-old stuck in a family where only one uncle spoke German—everybody else did not speak German, they only spoke English—I was thrown into a midwestern American atmosphere and, as a 14 year old boy, I wanted to learn English, I wanted to conform, and I wanted to do as everybody else did and I didn't want to be different. So I tried to learn English quickly, and I didn't really speak German even after my mother arrived three years later, and she and I started communicating in English. I was very adamant that I will not speak German, at that time.

Joined Foreign Service In 1949 About Time Of Inauguration of HICOG

I joined the Foreign Service in 1949 and my first assignment was in Germany. So although I understood everything that was being said and I felt I spoke German, my German was that of a 14 year old boy. Here I was an adult trying to communicate in a sophisticated adult manner; yet, my German vocabulary was that of a school boy. I didn't realize that and it was initially quite frustrating. It took, I think, two or three years before I was able to catch up in my German to the age at which I was communicating. I did manage after a while, but it took some time.

I was hired into the Foreign Service in October 1949 in Germany. At the time I had been working for the Chase Bank in Stuttgart. At that particular moment, U.S. Military Government was phasing out. The German Federal Republic had been established, and the State Department was moving in to take over under John J. McCloy, who became the U.S. High Commissioner. The State Department was taking over all the jobs and facilities
that had previously been handled by military government and they were hiring people on the spot.

**The Story Of Entrance Into Amerika Hauser Program**

I was told it would be easy to get a job by various friends that I had made in Stuttgart, friends with the American Consulate General in Stuttgart. They said, "You just go up to Frankfurt and talk to a man by the name of Glen Wolfe, and he will find you a job." I went to Frankfurt, and I was immediately sent out to Bad Nauheim near Frankfurt, where a Mrs. Patricia Van Delden was in charge of the America House program in Germany.

I didn't even know what an America House was when I was sent out to see her and to be interviewed by her. Interested in making a change, I went out there cold, and--this is a little anecdote--I was ushered into the office of a man by the name of Max Kimental, who was introduced as Mrs. Van Delden's deputy. She couldn't see me, she was busy, he would interview me. We started chatting and he received a telephone call, and he interrupted our conversation and said, "Excuse me for just a few moments, I have to go to a very brief conference and I will be back in ten minutes. Make yourself comfortable. Here on the table are things to read, whatever you want to read, make yourself at home."

I looked on the coffee table and there was a document, a paper which said, "The Future of the America House Program in Germany" by Patricia Van Delden. So I thought, I might as well find out what this is all about since I still didn't know what an American House was. I read the document; it was about six pages. Kimental came back in and said, "Let us continue our conversation. If you were an America House Director, what would you do?"

I just went along with the document that I had just read, and he stopped me after about two minutes and said, "Just a moment." He stepped out and came back with a formidable lady, Patricia Van Delden.

*Q: Formidable is right. {Laughter}*  

**TUCH:** He suggested that I start again from the beginning to tell Mrs. Van Delden what I thought I should do as an America House Director. I mentally went through the document, and to make a long story short, they hired me on the spot. {Laughter}

I was sworn in the next day together, interestingly, with Pick Littell, Wallace W. Littell. I was sent to Wiesbaden as the Director of the America House there, and Pic was sent to Darmstadt as the American House Director. One other person who was working with Patricia Van Delden and Max Kimental in that same office at the time--and this is interesting only for historical purposes--her administrative officer was Irving Scarbeck.

*Q: Oh, yes.*

**TUCH:** "Doc" Scarbeck, a colleague, a friend who in 1961 became the first American diplomat convicted of spying, and was sent to prison. But that is another story.
I was sent to Wiesbaden as the Director of the America House--and here I think it would be useful just to interject a little about what the America Houses, were because they were at that time unique to Germany and Japan.

**Nature Of Amerika Hauser Programs**

After the end of the war, with the military occupation, the U.S. authorities established a number of what became known as America Houses, in German Amerika Hauser, to serve as library cultural and information centers in various cities in Germany. These cities had for the most part been destroyed--and I'm sure it was the same case in Japan--and had absolutely no cultural infrastructure left. These America Houses became the community centers for these cities. They helped these communities reestablish a cultural infrastructure. They had a library, they usually had music programs, lecture programs, children's programs, English teaching facilities. They served as a very broad gauge community center. In my view they did a lot to help the Germans emotionally and culturally re-establish their society.

For instance, one of the things which I think was significant, the America House libraries were open shelf libraries where people could go into the library and pick out their own book, check it out, read it there, or take it home. They were the first such libraries that the Germans had even seen. The directors of the university library and the public library in Frankfurt and Berlin were so impressed with the nature of an open-shelf library that they rebuilt their libraries in Frankfurt and in Berlin as open-shelf libraries. They were the first such libraries in Germany which had in itself a democratizing effect for the population who could go and read anything that they wanted to read, not what the librarian told them they could have.

At that time in 1949, '50, '51, there were over 40 such Amerika Hauser in Germany, which were reduced to a more manageable number of about 25 in 1951, but they were in every major city in Germany.

Gradually as the Germans were able to rebuild their cultural institutions, their cultural infrastructure, these Amerika Hauser converted themselves into American institutions of information and culture and they became American cultural and information centers. The libraries were usually reduced in size; they were weeded to have only American materials in them--some in translation. Lecture and exhibit programs were geared toward the United States. We were teaching English, we were still having children's program. We were bringing people in as lecturers and performing artists, but they were Americans for the most part, except that Germans who had made a trip to the United States often appeared in the Amerika Hauser as lecturers and discussants about their experiences in the United States.

At that time, the public affairs program, the public diplomacy program in Germany was huge. I remember there were American representatives in every "Kreis", which is the
equivalent of county, in the areas which had previously been occupied by the American Military Government. We had a total of 1200 American officers involved in the public affairs program in Germany. With, if I remember correctly, a budget of about $40 million a year.

The first public affairs officer in Germany under U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy was a publisher from Louisville by the name of Ralph Nicholson, who, however, stayed only for a short time and was succeeded by Shepard Stone, who was the first PAO in Germany. Shepard Stone had been the assistant editor of the Sunday New York Times, and had some German background, was close to John J. McCloy, and became the head of the U.S. Public Affairs Program in the FRG.

It's interesting to compare when I was PAO in Germany in the early '80s, what my facilities and resources were as compared to what his were in the early '50s.

He was succeeded by "Mickey" Boerner, Alfred Boerner, who was the second PAO. We had a very large public affairs establishment in Germany, of which these 25 Amerika Hauser were only one part.

I became the America House director, initially, in Wiesbaden, but after five months was transferred to Frankfurt where I remained as America House director until March 1955, five years. That was for me a very interesting and personally satisfying period of time. I was a junior officer, yet I had an institution which I ran with a staff of 55 people, 25 of whom were librarians. I had a program director, I had a program every night of lectures, discussions, and concerts. I had a huge English teaching program, a children's theater program, a youth library, a quite large institution. I was always thinking that I was doing for a salary what I was really doing for fun. It was a highly satisfying activity because the Germans just swarmed into the Amerika Hauser.

Q: As we were discussing not on tape, your title, America House director, often was instrumental in getting you out into the public and bestowing on you a certain amount of prestige to do things that you could not do otherwise. The title of the America House director in Frankfurt was a known quantity. He was respected and he was better known than, say, his boss, the public affairs officer in Frankfurt. Possibly only the consul general in Frankfurt was a better known American than the America House director.

The Senator McCarthy Plague

TUCH: I say it was great fun, working in that job, although we had a number of problems that involved us at that time. The principal one was the McCarthy episode, and I thought maybe I should just say a couple of things about it.

Q: Why don't you say a few words about it. People seem to be reluctant to say very much and I think the more we get on tape, the better.
TUCH: Senator McCarthy had zeroed in, to a large extent, on what became USIA, namely the people who were involved in public diplomacy programs and, of course, on the VOA, as being infiltrated by subversives, by communists, and by "enemies" of the United States--enemies in quotes. Frankly, I personally felt I had nothing to worry about. I was in my twenties. I was 28 at the time.

I had in my lifetime belonged to only two organizations: one, the Boy Scouts of America and, two, the United States Army. So I personally felt that there was nothing in my record that could in any way be interpreted as being favorable to the opposition, so to speak.

My own personal experience with McCarthy came about at Easter 1953. This is by way of an anecdote, but it is exemplary; it is descriptive of what kind of pressures people working in USIA and public diplomacy at that time went through. Incidentally, I cover this little anecdote, and this is a commercial, in a book that has just been written by me and is to be published shortly by the St. Martin's Press and the Institute For the Study of Diplomacy here in Washington. The book is called Communicating With The World. The subject is U.S. public diplomacy abroad. It covers very much the same territory, or at least in part, what my oral interviews do. This particular anecdote is also described in the book.

**And The Senator's "Junketeering Gum Shoes," Cohn and Schine**

Roy Cohn and David Schine, who were Senator McCarthy's famed junketeering gum shoes—that's what they were called—were coming to Germany to look at the "Communist literature" in our Amerika Hauser. Since they were flying from New York to Germany, they landed in Frankfurt and I was advised by my superiors in Bonn that probably they would come to the America House Frankfurt first. Indeed, they came to Frankfurt. I had tried to get my consul general to come to the America House to be with me when they came, but he was unable to be there, he had to leave town. His deputy also, was not available.

*Q: Who was the consul general?*

TUCH: The consul general was a man with the unlikely name of Chetwin Montegue de Renzy Piggott. Montegue Piggott, otherwise a very pleasant person, but he obviously thought it was better for him not to be around at the time.

I received a call from Henry Dunlap, in Bonn. Henry by that time had replaced Mrs. Van Delden as the head of the Amerika Hauser in Germany. Henry asked, "Is anybody going to be with you on this occasion?"

I said, "No." I had not been able to get anybody to hold my hand, so to speak.

And he said, "Well, you need a witness to everything you say, and I will come down," and he jumped on a train and came down, and he was there an hour or two ahead of the arrival of Cohn and Schine.
Now, they came in with a large entourage of correspondents who were following them around. You can imagine, here is a library--it was a Saturday afternoon--a library which is normally a fairly quiet place, being suddenly invaded by these two people followed by a gaggle of noisy reporters.

They came and they said, "We understand you have a lot of communist books in your library. We want to see them."

I said, "I don't think I have any communist authors represented in the library.

They said, "Do you have any books by Dashiell Hammett?"

I said, "Yes, I have the *Thin Man* and *The Maltese Falcon*.

And they turned to the reporters and they said, "See! Nothing but communist books in this library."

This kind of interrogation went on for quite a while. We proceeded to the periodical section of the library and they asked, "Where are your anti-communist magazines?"

I said, "Here, I have them, *Time* magazine."

"Oh, *Time* is a swear word to us," they said. I showed them *Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, Business, The Jesuit Magazine America,* and so forth, and they said, "Do you have the *American Legion Monthly*?"

I said, "No, we don't have the *American Legion Monthly.*" After all--I didn't say this--but after all, we didn't want necessarily to promote military institutions in Germany at that time.

They said, "If you don't have the *American Legion Monthly,* you have no anti-communist periodicals in your library." This carried on for about 35, 40 minutes until, suddenly, one of my friends at the time, a young reporter by the name of Marshall Loeb, who is now the editor of *Fortune* magazine--I have not seen him in about 30 years, so I've not been in touch with him, but we were friends at the time--he came up to me and said, "I'm going to get you out of this, Tom." He walked up to Cohn and said, "Mr. Cohn, my name is Marshall Loeb. I'm with the United Press. I want to ask you a couple of questions."

Cohn said, "Okay."

And Loeb said, "Tell me, Mr. Cohn, when are you going to burn the books here in the library?"
Cohn got very annoyed and said, "We're not here to burn books, we're here to find communist books."

Loeb thereupon said, "Well, Mr. Cohn, my office sent me here to watch you burn the books, you know, just like Hitler did in 1933." At which moment Cohn exploded, of course, and started really becoming very abusive of Marshall Loeb.

Loeb calmly said, "Well, Mr. Cohn, if you're not going to burn any books here, you don't interest me. Good-bye." And he walked off. That sort of broke the ice. In other words, his anger was redirected towards the journalist and away from me. {Laughter} This particular episode, in the midst of which, incidentally, the AP carried an item that the journalist brought to Cohn and Schine, calling them "junketeering gum shoes," and that phrase was coined by the then deputy public affairs officer, Ted Kaghan, who more or less lost his job over it. The PAO, Mickey Boerner, was away on a trip in Italy.

At any rate, that episode exemplified the kind of pressures and the kind of unpleasantness that many of us had to experience at that particular time. I must say, in my case it did not sour me; primarily because I personally was not affected by it. I was told later that they went through my record with a fine tooth comb, but they just could not find anything on me.

It, however, created an atmosphere of fear and suspicion among many, many Foreign Service officers who were serving at that time.

Q: Justifiably. Several of them were sacked.

1955: Upon Departure From Germany Was Headed For Sapporo, Japan, But Redirected To Head Atoms For Peace Exhibit Program Based In Washington

TUCH: Right. Now, I stayed in Germany as the director of the America House Frankfurt until 1955, at which time I was supposed to be transferred to Japan as the branch public affairs officer, or better, American House director in Sapporo. That transfer was changed when I came to Washington, because about six months before that time the Agency had started a major campaign, namely the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a result of, or as a consequence of, the famous Atoms For Peace speech that President Eisenhower delivered before the United Nations General Assembly in 1954, the Agency decided to concentrate on this theme world-wide--to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I was asked to help build an exhibit in Berlin for the Berlin Industrial Fair on that subject. We did do a large exhibit in Berlin, and when I came back to Washington I was told to do the same thing over the next year or two for the rest of the world.

A small task force was formed in what then was USIA's Information Center Service. We were four people, a new officer by the name of Joe Fort was asked to work with me, and two women who had been active in the political campaign for President Eisenhower. One
was Polly Canfield, who later married a USIA officer, and the other one was Lisa Borrison. However, Abbott Washburn, who was the deputy director of USIA, was very instrumental in pushing this new program and in coordinating it. I read recently a book by H. Philipps Davison that was published in the '60s; he is one of the early authors on the subject public diplomacy. He describes this Atoms For Peace Program run by USIA as the first coordinated program by the administration whereby USIA was involved even before President Eisenhower's speech at the United Nations General Assembly, and was consulted on the take-off of a program and not just at the landing.

We built exhibits in India and Japan—you were in Japan at that time, I think, as a deputy PAO to Ken Bunce.

Q: I was the acting PAO when you showed up. Bunce had left.

TUCH: Right, Ken Bunce was not in town.

Q: Bunce had left. He had been the acting PAO, because we didn't have a PAO for about a year, so I was acting PAO when you arrived. Just about the time that the exhibit opened, Joe Evans and Art Hummel had arrived and they then took over as the PAO and deputy PAO respectively.

TUCH: I see. We built this exhibit in Tokyo, very heavily supported by the Yomiuri press organization which was interested in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an antidote to the fear, the prevailing fear in Japan of the atomic bomb.

Q: And also interested in promoting Mr. Shoriki, who was the founder, owner and editor of the Yomiuri newspaper as the first czar in Japan, or the chief of Japan's atomic energy commission, which he did become as a result of that promotion.

TUCH: Right. {Laughter} Where interests combined to conduct a very useful program. I also was sent to Lisbon to build an exhibit for Portugal. We built a number of mobile exhibits, which traveled around Pakistan, and then in other countries. I remained in that job for a little over a year. That for me was also a worthwhile project. It resulted in a book which my friend, Henry Dunlap and I published a couple of years later on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The atom-for-peace task force was then told to concentrate on another major exhibit theme—space satellite exploration. We built the first American space exhibit to be shown, again, in Berlin. That too was an interesting exhibit, but immediately after it opened it came a cropper, because the Soviets had sent up Sputnik and proved that they were way ahead of us in space. This was not a program that we were going to be able to pursue, having been left behind drastically by the Soviet Union.

1957: To VOA In Munich

I left the exhibit program at that moment in order to go into Russian language training and be trained for my assignment to Moscow. I must interrupt myself because before
going to the Soviet Union, I was again sent to Germany for a year, this time to Munich, but with the Voice of America.

At that time the Voice was broadcasting directly to the Soviet Union and to Eastern Europe from its studios in Munich. I was sent to Munich as part of an effort to redirect the tone and content of the Voice of America, which had been an instrument of aggressive anti-communism in the early ’50s. The new USIA director, George Allen, wanted to change the tone and direction of the Voice of America to be in line with our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. So I spent a year in Munich with the Voice as policy officer and writer of commentaries.

Q: Did you run into any substantial opposition on the part of the old line Germans and East Europeans who were operating in Munich at that time and broadcasting?

TUCH: I did to some extent, indeed. Some of the people working in Munich were out of touch with Washington. Many of them had never been to Washington. They had been Eastern European refugees who were hired locally; they were, for the most part, professional journalist and broadcasters, but they were not familiar with American policy or with the United States in general so we had a few problems.

I remember one incident particularly where rather than trying to change the commentaries and news analysis of some of the service chiefs--we were broadcasting in Russian, Ukrainian, Uzbek, the three Baltic languages and Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian--rather than trying to adjust them to the new tone. I found it easier to write the commentaries and try to suggest to these writers to use mine instead of theirs. In some cases that was successful. In one or two it was not. I remember one service chief, who shall remain nameless, looking up at me after he'd read my commentary to replace his and saying to me, "I'm sorry that Senator McCarthy was not able to finish his job of getting rid of all the communists in the Voice of America." {Laughter}

But this was the sort of thing that one had to experience. It was not particularly painful to me. At any rate, I spent a year in Munich, not as part of the regular USIA program but as VOA staffer.

Back To Assignment As PAO/Berlin 1967

I came back again to Germany in 1967, as the PAO in Berlin. I was coming back to my hometown, the city of my birth. I had visited Berlin, but I certainly hadn't lived there since 1938.

Close Association With Head Of East Berlin Opera Company

We spent the following three years in Berlin, again, very interesting years for me personally. Of course we did not have any relationship with East Germany at that time. We had no mission in East Germany so in Berlin we were expected also to get over into
East Berlin and to try to spend some time there to just observe what was going on and to become acquainted with East Berlin. That was for me particularly pleasant, especially since I was able to establish friendly relationship with the then head of the principal East Berlin opera company, the Komische Oper, a man by the name of Felsenstein, who was known throughout the world as one of the great opera directors. We established a, to me, very pleasant relationship. And that got me into East Berlin frequently.

Q: Did it create any difficulties for him?

TUCH: No, absolutely none. This man was on the same level in the East German bureaucracy as a member of the Politburo. As a matter of fact, he lived in the same area as the Politburo members lived, on a huge estate. One of the humorous incidents was the first time we were invited to their home, which was outside of East Berlin in East Germany, and therefore out-of-bounds for us, since we didn't recognize the East German Government. We were part of the occupational powers of East Berlin as part of great Berlin, but we did not go into East Germany. So he invited us to come to his estate. I said we couldn't come because it was outside of Berlin, in East Germany. And he said, "Don't worry about this. I've made all the arrangements. There will be no check on you whatsoever."

So I went back to the mission and talked to our people in Bonn and they suggested, "Okay. Let's do it as an experiment. Let's see what happens. But don't take your passport along, because we are not recognizing the East German authorities," and they couldn't look at our passports. So with some trepidation, my wife and I went over to East Berlin. We left our car at the opera house and went in Felsenstein's car. He was driving a 1968 Ford V-8 station wagon, on the rear window of which was an American flag, on the side windows of which were the decals of our 50 states. {Laughter} Completely covered! It was a station wagon which had every piece of equipment, including a television set. So we rode in this very large American station wagon. When we came to the border I found that we really didn't have to fear anything: the gate was up, the border guards were lined on both sides of the street and gave us a military salute as we drove by without slowing down. We arrived at this baronial estate. As we went through the gate, there was on one side a four-car garage; there was the station wagon in which we were riding; he also had one sports Mercedes and one passenger Mercedes, and another American station wagon in those four garages. On the other side of the gate was a stable where there were four riding horses. Over the entrance hung a huge wagon-wheel chandelier that, he told me, his wife had picked up in Wyoming. We drove in, and it was about as fancy a private residence as I'd ever been in. Mrs. Felsenstein immediately showed us the kitchen, which had only the latest General Electric equipment; dishwasher, garbage disposal, refrigerator, freezer, range; nothing but General Electric. I asked her, "How can you take care of this General Electric equipment over her?"

She said, "That's easy. Once a month a General Electric repair truck comes from West Berlin and visits the residences of every Politburo member and our residence and checks
all of our equipment." {Laughter} At any rate, this is just a side light of our experience in Berlin during that period of time.

**Enjoyment Of Opera In Both West And East Berlin**

My hobby is opera, and we were able to enjoy opera in Berlin, both in West Berlin and East Berlin. When I recently went through my opera programs of our time in Berlin, I counted up that we went to the West and East Berlin opera over 60 times during my three years there. At any rate, it was a very pleasant time for me in Berlin. Except that it was also a very tense period politically, because of the student revolution and anti-Vietnam demonstrations, which had started just before we arrived in 1967. There had been the shooting of an Iranian student in West Berlin by the police during an anti-Shah rally that set off demonstrations and led to the big, so to speak, Easter 1968 uprising in Berlin among the students led by a radical youth leader by the name of Rudy Dutschke.

**Vietnam War Resulted In Serious Anti-American Attitudes And Demonstrations In Berlin**

Life in Berlin took on a definite anti-American tone during the following three years, related to the Vietnam War and the opposition to it by Germans and German youth especially. Our America House in Berlin was sacked, completely sacked, two weekends in a row. Every window was broken. In the second incident 60 policemen were hurt by students who were throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails.

**Free University Of Berlin Intellectually Destroyed By Radical Students**

If you were trying to explain American policy or lecture at either one of the two Berlin universities, you were taking some physical risks, although we did it. We tried to explain American policy, but it was very tough at that time; however, the students were even tougher on the university itself, especially on the liberal faculty members of the Free University of Berlin. I would say that the Free University of Berlin was intellectually destroyed during that time. It was so badly disrupted by the students that even now it has not recovered the reputation, the intellectual and academic reputation, that it had as the most liberal and progressive university in the Federal Republic of Germany.

**Q: To where did the faculty go?**

TUCH: Many of them were driven out. Several of them emigrated to the United States and became teachers here. Others went to universities in West Germany, especially some of the new universities that were being created at that time in the Ruhr, Bielefeld and Bochum University, among them, and to universities which had remained more conservative like Munich, which was not as radicalized as, say, Berlin, Frankfurt and Hamburg were at that time. But some of the universities including the Free University in
Berlin were almost destroyed by the radical students and the leftist assistants on the faculty at that time. Not physically destroyed, but intellectually.

It took many years for them to re-establish themselves. You know, people were appointed administrators, presidents and rectors of these universities who had absolutely no qualifications whatsoever, either as academic people or even as administrators. They were radical students and assistants who took over these universities and mismanaged them badly. There are some that never did recover. I would say that Bremen University is one that has lost its reputation to such an extent that, for instance, graduates of Bremen University have a tough time finding jobs. People will just not hire them because they know they have not had a good education.

**Student Radicalization At This Time Marked Beginning Of "Successor Generation" Problem**

*Q:* I'd like to ask a question about this radical student organization, or student mass movement. I don't imagine that this was a home-grown thing--when I say home-grown, within Berlin. Was there something that attracted large numbers of the radical student groups from other parts of Germany to come into Berlin, or was it really a spontaneous thing that arose within Berlin itself?

*TUCH:* No. Actually, the movement took place all over Western Europe. Certainly, it took place in France, the Netherlands and in West Germany, and it had a very close connection with the movement that was taking place in this country at that time. It followed the American radicalization of some American universities. For instance, the University of California in Berkeley became a model, so to speak, for the radicalized students in Germany. Berlin was particularly fertile because it attracted, for one thing, West German students to Berlin. Berlin was a good university; I mean, the Free University of Berlin had a very fine reputation. So it did attract a lot of students, but it attracted even more West German young people because if you were a resident in Berlin, a student in Berlin, you were exempt from the draft.

*Q:* I see.

*TUCH:* So young people who were already out of sorts with the conservative government in Germany, who were opposed to what we were doing in the world, would drift to Berlin because they knew they could exempt themselves from military service, and take part in the radical movement that was finding fertile soil in Berlin. So you had more of it in Berlin than you had in West Germany, but you certainly had it in West Germany. Especially, I would say, Frankfurt and Hamburg were the other two major cities where the universities became radicalized during that time. But it was a movement throughout the Western free world; the students becoming radicalized. I think that probably it started in this country.
Q: Probably did. Although we became aware of it so gradually that we weren't quite sure whether it originated simultaneously somewhere else, or whether it was an ongoing thing that gradually affected western Europe, too.

TUCH: In Germany, it was a peculiar phenomenon. This turning against the United States especially by the young population was an interesting sociological phenomenon, because in the 1950s and early 1960s there was a great attraction on the part of Germans towards the United States. We were held up as a model. During the Kennedy years, for the Germans the United States became the Camelot, and President Kennedy was their model.

America was over-sold to the Germans, that we were the perfect society, which we were not, and that we should become the model for the Germans. Then in the middle '60s, with the assassinations of President Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King, with the Vietnam War, with our own civil rights revolution, many young Germans suddenly became very disillusioned with America. They had been over-enthusiastic about America before that, and when they found out that we were not the perfect society, that we had our own problems and that we had major problems in our own society, the turn-around became too abrupt. Whereas we had been possibly over-sold in the '50s and early '60s, the radical turn-around, the antagonism towards America, the disappointment with America was also too one-sided and radical.

This shift took place, I would say, between 1967 and 1972. It was almost a social revolution in Germany also, and these young Germans, I remember, had the phrase, "We will march through the institutions" in Germany and convert them and radicalize them. Looking back from the present vantage point, it seems to me that they were not successful. Germany as a society was not overturned or even radicalized, except in three major institutions where they did take over these institutions. These were, first, in electronic journalism, radio and television. The people who run radio and television were radicalized and are now the people who are still very much, so to speak, anti-American. The second element were secondary school teachers, people who teach kids in the high school. The third one, with which I am less familiar but I'm told that it is true, is the judiciary, the judges, especially in the lower courts, who tend in all social issues to make decisions which are quite radical. At any rate, in high school teaching and in electronic journalism--I don't think this is true for print journalism, but it is true, in my view, for electronic journalism--the radical elements prevailed.

In the '80s you had German kids being taught by high school teachers who had become very anti-American. Everything that was bad about America--not necessarily that it was not true about America, but it was too one-sided about America--was emphasized in the teaching in high schools to these German kids. The Soviet Union and the United States were both the same. The U.S. was a restrictive society, these we were unfair, especially towards our poor, that we didn't pay attention to the environment. You had the feeling created that these young Germans felt sort of in the middle between two equally bad superpowers between which they shouldn't make any choice.
Q: I guess they began to feel somewhat defensive against that very kind of thing--i.e., being caught helplessly between to giant superpowers.

TUCH: Yes. What I meant by the fact that the radicalization didn't succeed is that Germany was successful in maintaining its democratic institutions, its democratic society. They remained a close ally of the United States, they remained part of NATO. In other words, the radicals did not succeed in turning over and really revolutionizing Germany as they had wanted to do. Germany to this day remains a close, respected ally and friend of the United States. The problem is that at least these two elements in the German society, electronic journalism and teaching, created an atmosphere that affected the young people. And we realized that this was taking place, that the young people had a different attitude or were taught different things about the United States than the elders had. There was a difference of view on the part of young Germans vis-a-vis the United States, vis-a-vis their society, vis-a-vis the East-West conflict. There was a generational difference.

We also realized that these young people who did not have the same experiences as their elders had had in the 1950s and the 1960s, who had an entirely different experience in growing up and being educated, were about to take over the leadership in the German society. This is taking place right now.

Q: Yes.

TUCH: And so we recognized that changes had taken place, and that we had to readdress our ideas on our association with the Germans and how to deal with this problem, how to cope with it in order to be able to maintain the relationship that we feel is necessary to maintain. The close and friendly relationship with the Federal Republic is the basis of our transatlantic partnership. We--we meaning people in both the State Department and USIA--thought about this quite a bit.

1970: Departure From Berlin; Interlude In Brazil; Return To Germany (Bonn) As PAO 1981-85

I'm getting ahead of myself because I left Berlin in 1970, went to Brazil, and didn't come back to Germany until 1980. On that occasion I was the PAO for the Federal Republic. I spent 1980 to 1985, until I retired, in Bonn as my last post. This whole reevaluation of our relationship, not so much governmental relationship...  

1980: "Successor Generation" Problem Had Become Serious

... but the relationship between our two societies, between our two peoples, especially between our two young peoples, became a preoccupation for us. I would say, that this started already with my predecessor.

Q: Are you speaking now of your predecessor in 1980, or your predecessor in 1967?
TUCH: I'm speaking of my predecessor in 1980, Alec Klieforth, who had been the PAO in Bonn from 1975 until 1980, and a very close friend of mine. When I came to Bonn in 1980, we felt that we had to reevaluate what we were doing in Germany in order to try to correct a problem that had arisen; namely, the drifting apart of our two societies, especially among what we came to call the "successor generations."

**USIS Revamped Youth Exchanges And Youth Programs Generally**

The Germans felt the same way. There were many Germans who had the same views, and we talked with them at all levels; the political level, members of the Bundestag, the academic level, people in the universities and the high schools, on the governmental level. We both felt that we needed to correct this drifting apart of our two societies, and we consulted with one another extensively on how we were going to go about doing it. Both sides felt that one of the ways that we should attempt to do it is by having a much greater concentration of our efforts directed to the youth. On the German part, the youth in the United States; on our part, the youth in Germany. Since I was in Germany, my preoccupation was, obviously, with German youth. We came to realize that we should start not at the university level, but already at the high school level. One, because it was in the high schools that the young people were being radicalized by their teachers. Secondly, that in the German democratic society, political views, attitudes, prejudices were formed on the part of young people before they entered the universities, while they were still in high schools. So we felt that we should concentrate our efforts and direct them to German high school students. We had to persuade the Agency in Washington initially on this, because dealing with population elements below the university level was somewhat new. Youth programs had the reputation of what they call "kiddies exchanges." But we were able to do this, with the help incidentally of a number of members in the Congress who were interested in having youth exchanges take place. There were particularly people like Senator Lugar of Indiana and Congressman Dante Fascell, and others, who helped us persuade Charlie Wick and the USIA administration that we should devote resources to a much greater extent to youth exchanges. We were, of course, speaking of the industrialized world--this did not apply to the developing world where our program had to be concentrated at a higher age level, certainly university level, and not at the high school level--but in western Europe and, specifically in this case, in Germany, we felt that it should be done on a high school level.

*Q: Was this the source of the legislation which now provides additional funds and legal structure for handling the high school level youth exchanges?*

**The Origin Of The German/American Congress/Bundestag Teenage Exchange Program**

TUCH: Yes, it was. I must say, that once the director, Charlie Wick, who initially was not at all interested in exchanges, academic or otherwise, came to be persuaded that this was something that would put a feather in the President's cap, he not only supported it but spearheaded what became known as the President's international youth exchange
initiative. The President's initiative was put forward at the Versailles Summit. He--meaning Charlie Wick--became a real supporter of it, and helped us get it started. But we could not have done it, frankly, without prominent members of Congress. Initially, it was a budget of $2.5 million on the American side and $2.5 million on the German side, which was pushed through the Congress here and the Bundestag in Bonn, to start a German/American Congress/Bundestag teenage exchange program; whereby, each member of the Congress and each member of the Bundestag had the opportunity to nominate or to sponsor one teenager to spend a year in the other country, living with a host family, going to high school, becoming integrated into the community. We felt strongly, and I think experience has borne us out, that such an experience of total immersion of one year in another society at that age, would be an experience of a lifetime, and it would permanently affect the attitude of these young people towards the other country. Not that they would be uncritical, but whatever attitude, whatever criticism they had would be based on fact, on their experience, and not on the hearsay of what some high school teacher told them.

Q: Who may not have been in the States at all.

TUCH: Right. So this became a priority of our program at a time when we were having basic generational difficulties in our relationship, especially during the three-year period 1981 to '84 when we had the question of the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles, INF in Germany. We had the peace movement to contend with, we had a great deal of opposition especially among the young people in Germany to the deployment of additional nuclear missiles in Germany. We had to deal with this particular problem. But that was a short-term problem which one had to deal with and cope with. The short-term problem, in our view, could be solved only if we paid attention to the long-term issue of the relationship between our two societies. For that reason we concentrated on some of these new long-term initiatives. Also, there were a lot of young Germans who could not go to the United States on the exchange program so we also felt that we should work...

Q: For financial or political reasons?

TUCH: Well, I mean, you can accommodate only a small number of people and, therefore, most young Germans would not have an actual experience in the United States. So the second step we took was to intensify our efforts vis-a-vis the high schools themselves to give high school teachers who were not radicalized the opportunity, the resources, the facilities to teach about the United States in a more realistic, we hoped, objective way. One of our programs in this area was to create pedagogical resource centers for high school teachers with materials about the United States.

Q: You mean within Germany?
A. "The American Studies Newsletter" Directed At 20,000 German High School Teachers

TUCH: Within Germany. We started a publication, it was called The American Studies Newsletter, which was directed to the 20,000 German teachers who taught American studies or English in German high schools. The demand for this came from the German teachers. They said they needed this because they didn't know where they could find and obtain good materials about America to use in their teaching. So we started publishing this newsletter.

Q: USIS did this.

B. At University Level, Intensified Relationships With Professors Of American Studies

TUCH: USIS Bonn did that independently of Washington, but with the help and approval of Washington. It is a quarterly that is still going today, and is in my opinion, very effective. We also intensified our relationship, changed our relationship with the German Association of American Studies, which was an association of German university professors who were teaching American studies, primarily, at the time, American literature. We helped them reorient themselves towards concentrating more on American studies as a discipline that included, besides literature and language, American history, American political science, American economics. We also persuaded them, worked with them, to include in their membership not just university faculty members, but also high school teachers, so that the high school teachers could benefit from that organization as much as the university professors could. In other words, our concentration became one of trying to reach the younger generation of Germans at an earlier age and much more intensively than we had been able to do for the previous 20 years, and thereby to cement the relationship, to rebuild the bridge, so to speak, or to surmount the gap that had been created.

Q: I know that Youth for Understanding has a lot of support from Germany itself. Did USIS have any role in orienting the German government, or the German academic circles toward the cooperation with the YFU on this side, or did that take part completely outside the confines of USIA?

C. Cooperation With Youth For Understanding (YFU), American Field Service (AFS), and Experiment In International Living

TUCH: It was a cooperative effort because the Germans were just as interested as we were in this project. They recognized this need also, and they became equal supporters in this youth exchange program, which is managed by Youth for Understanding with the help also of AFS and Experiment in International Living. It was a joint effort and jointly financed by the two governments, although organizations like Youth for Understanding had already carried out a German/American teenage exchange program privately, and still
do. But this Congress-Bundestag program was an effort on the part of our two governments.

Q: This was funded through channels other than USIA.

TUCH: The Congress-Bundestag exchange?

Q: I mean the exchange involving the YFU.

TUCH: That had been carried out entirely privately until the Congress-Bundestag exchange program was established. It had been carried out with private funding.

Q: Now the Congress-Bundestag program does operate through YGU.

TUCH: The Congress-Bundestag program yes. YFU, AFS International, Experiment in International Living, plus the Carl Duisberg Society, which is a German exchange institution, are sort of the agents of our two governments in carrying out this youth exchange program.

D. Amerika Hauser And German-American Institutes (Converted Amerika Hauser)

Contributions

Q: I see. Do you have anything else that you want to say about your last five years in Germany? I presume you carried on still the traditional Amerika Hauser program.

TUCH: We had our six Amerika Hauser, and also our four German-American Institutes, which were in effect binational centers.

Q: Which are not, I presume, Amerika Hauser.

TUCH: Yes. They were converted in the '50s already, when we could no longer maintain so many Amerika Hauser, into German-American Institutes. I always felt that these institutes gave us good value for our investment. We usually paid the salary of the director and maintained the library and the programming in these centers; whereas the Germans, whether it was a local institution, the city, the state or federal German Government or a combination of these institutions, would pay for the rents and the utilities and the local staff salaries. Our investment was approximately 40%, the German investment in these institutions was about 60%, but I always felt that we were getting 80% value for our 40% investment and, therefore, it was good.

Q: Were these institutes in Germany in some part self-sustaining, like the binational centers, say, in Latin America? That they developed programs, particularly English teaching but some other programs also, for which they charged certain fees and, therefore, were able to, outside even the German Government's contribution, were able to finance some of their own activities.
TUCH: That's correct, they were. They, however, required and appreciated our assistance and they remained really American institutions by virtue of the fact that the director was an American. This has changed in the last four years. Budgetary restrictions have forced a reduction of our support to these binational centers, these German-American institutes. They are still running but no longer with as much American input as they had until about 5 years ago. But the Amerika Hauser still exist. Our program of lectures using American participants is very large. The academic exchange program, the Fulbright program, is still the largest in the world. It's, I think, a $5 million program, in which the Germans participate as more than equal partners. In the late 1960s, American budgetary restrictions forced us to reduce our support of the German-American academic exchange program. The Germans felt so strongly about this program that they decided to make up the difference in what we no longer could contribute. So until the early '80s, the ratio was that the Germans contributed 75% to the budget of the Fulbright program, and we 25%. Over the last five or six years, we have been able to bring it again almost to half and half, but the Germans are, at a minimum, very equal partners in this program.

Q: That's much the same thing as has happened in Japan, where for a number of years the Japanese have given almost 50% of the funding, and at one point, I think, they went beyond 50%. I don't know exactly what has happened in the last couple of years. Do you think this pretty well covers what you want to say?

TUCH: I think this pretty well covers. Again, I shouldn't plug a book, but what I have not contributed in these oral interviews and possibly in a more theoretical way, is explained in the book that will be published by St. Martin's Press in the next few months on the practice of public diplomacy by the U. S. Government. I'm sure the USIA library and Georgetown University library will have a copy of this book to supplement what has been said here. (Its full title is Communicating With The World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas.)

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Note: I served as PAO (and DCM) in Brazil from 1981 to 1985. That assignment and that period are not covered in any of the three oral history interviews conducted with me. One of the four case studies included in my book, Communicating With The World, deals, however, with conducting a public diplomacy program under a military dictatorship in Brazil. The case study covers most of the material I would have discussed in an interview. HNT

End of interview