INTERVIEW

[Note: This transcript was not edited by Ambassador Tuthill]
**Q:** I am Henry B. Ryan and I am doing an interview with Ambassador John Tuthill in Washington, D.C. The date is March 11, 1992.

Ambassador Tuthill I am doing a book on Guevara Macora and his insurgency that occurred in Bolivia in 1966-67. When you and I were in Brazil I got interested in reading about that insurgency in the information copies that La Paz sent to our Embassy.

**Do you remember any reaction of the Brazilian government to those events in Bolivia?**

**TUTHILL:** About Che Guevara specifically?

**Q:** Yes.

**TUTHILL:** I don't remember, I can take a guess which I am sure would be almost a hundred percent accurate as to what the government, and therefore the military, felt about it. But you could do the same. They were always worried about any insurgency, any left-wing group. So I am sure they were worried and watching it carefully and prepared to do anything that they felt appropriate to see that it didn't spread to Brazil. Because when we were in Brazil, the fact is the communists, the extreme left, were very active.

As you recall when the American captain was murdered in Sao Paulo, the CIA came to me convinced that it was the left wing communist group that did it. The Brazilian authorities were less convinced of this. But this was a case when the CIA were absolutely right. Subsequently it became crystal clear that this Captain, who had been talking about his alleged intelligence activities under Westmoreland in Vietnam when he was studying at the University of Sao Paulo, had brought about a lot of antagonism and it became absolutely extreme when they just shot him down in front of his wife and children.

So I am sure the government and the military were watching this very carefully, but I never had anything directly to do with it.

**Q:** Was it a student group, the left wing extremists or professionals?

**TUTHILL:** The ones who killed the Captain?

**Q:** Yes.

**TUTHILL:** I forget the name of the guy. He was subsequently killed in Brazil in some kind of a fracas with the military. The CIA, I think, was absolutely right on this. This was the well-organized, extreme left wing communist group. The students didn't do it. Students became agitated about the thing and, of course, this organized group decided this was a good target to hit. It was after that that they started to threaten the Embassy and me. Then we started to have some security arrangements around the Chancery, and to a certain extent around the Residence as well.
Q: Do you remember what year that was?

TUTHILL: It was when Costa e Silva was president, after Castelo had left. I left in January 1969. It was either late in 1967 or in 1968. It was not while Castelo was president.

Q: Can you tell me a little bit about what you were trying to do as Ambassador to Brazil as far as US policy was concerned in Brazil?

TUTHILL: It starts with why I was sent there. As Fulbright said in the hearings, "Why are you going to Brazil? You have spent a quarter of a century working on Atlantic and European relations." That is a question that should have been put to the administration, not to me. I should have used that old phrase: This transfer is not being done at your request nor for your convenience.

As you probably know, I resisted the assignment when Ball and Rush sent me a telegram saying, "Is there any insurmountable obstacle to your being named to Brazil?" I sent a message back immediately saying, "Total ignorance of Brazil, total ignorance of all South America, total ignorance of the Portuguese language, no intention to correct these deficiencies, and, as you both know, I have an open end agreement to join the faculty at Johns Hopkins University in Bologna. If these are not insurmountable, obviously I am just what you are looking for." But they were getting desperate. I guess the only possible rationale would be the fact we had a $300 million a year AID program and I had had a lot of experience with Marshall Plan aid in Europe...in France, Germany, Britain and in Sweden. So, if there was any rationale about my going there it was experience on aid programs.

This came to a head quickly. I arrived on a Saturday, I think, and immediately they took me to that great beach that Frank Sinatra was always singing about, the Gulf of Ipanema, and damn near drown me. That Sunday morning we had a meeting at the Residence with the IMF guys and the Treasury guys which had to do with the next bunch of $100 million dollars for the Brazilian government. These characters from Washington had a whole list of things that the Brazilians had to do...credit policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, tax policy and everything else. And especially about monetary policy. I forget now what the policy position was in the United States government, but the Brazilians had to agree specifically to actions on monetary policy.

I will never forget this stupid meeting. I can see the guy, he was then working in State and subsequently went to the IMF. I said, "You know, the fact is that in the United States we don't know what the effect will be of a change in monetary policy. You can do something on interest rates or the flow of funds, but you can't be sure what effect this will have. So how is it that we are so sure what the effect will be in Brazil?" And this character said to me, "That is right, Mr. Ambassador, you are quite right about the United States but we do know in Brazil." I said, "Well, I doubt this very much." So, if there was any rationale of
my going to Brazil, I guess it had to do with the AID program. I don't think that is a very strong rationale, but at least it is something.

Q: What direction was the AID program moving then. One kind of has the feeling, and maybe I am wrong in this, that it began with a great deal of enthusiasm with Jack Kennedy. Then Johnson came in and got more involved with the Vietnam war and there was less emphasis on certainly the reform aspect of it and maybe even on the aid.

TUTHILL: You are quite right. The Alliance for Progress had sort of run out of steam, but the United States government takes two or three years for one of these things to run out. We still had the appropriations and we had AID. Washington seemed, especially the Department of Defense, to be oblivious of the fact that by then Brazil had a huge reserve of foreign exchange because when McNamara told me that our military didn't think the Brazilian military should have M16 rifles, I said, "You know, we can no longer make that decision. We can keep them from buying M16 rifles, but then they are going to buy European rifles of the same type. They have reserves of such a magnitude that they are perfectly free to go into the market for military equipment and that is what they will do." By the time I got there Alliance for Progress had sort of run out of steam.

In terms of the reform aspect of the thing, there was not much left in the reform as Kennedy wished when he started the thing.

Q: You mean that emphasis?

TUTHILL: Yes. Also, you see, in terms of Brazil we were so fortunate to have Linc Gordon as Ambassador when the military took over in 1964 because Linc was and still is...has a sort of liberal orientation, not a helluva lot, but a little bit, slightly left of center...and he supported the Castelo Branco government. I think he was dead right in doing it. But with that support of a military government and with a kind of relaxed attitude as to what they were doing...especially with Dick Walters and others...while I have great respect for Dick in many ways, he went along 100 percent with what the military wanted. So the steam was out by the time I got there of a human rights program of any significance.

And typical enough about the way Washington reacted. When I went around to the various state governments, I made it a point of seeing the governor and the general who was in charge of everything, and the Cardinal, and the trade unions. I always remember the first meeting in Sao Paulo, which was a main industrial area and had the most important trade unions. I sat down with a group of them without any military presence. When I went to the northeast, the military was always there in the front row. But at the first meeting with the trade union people in Sao Paulo one fellow said, "Mr. Ambassador, are you going to show us the road to Montecello?" So the trade unionists were seeking encouragement. We didn't do a helluva lot. I saw them, talked with them.

Q: Was the fellow being sarcastic?
TUTHILL: He was being sincere.

**Q:** He wanted you to, in other words.

TUTHILL: Oh yes. He undoubtedly was skeptical about what we could do and we didn't do very much. I remember later, I guess in 1968, when there was a new Minister of Labor under Costa e Silva and there was a trade union office in Sao Paulo which was raided and people beaten up and files taken away, this was the trade union who had some guys who were connected to the AFL-CIO. I immediately called on the Minister of Labor...

**Q:** These guys were connected to the AFL-CIO?

TUTHILL: Yes, the AFL-CIO had people coming down all the time. Irving Brown, who was an old and close friend of mine, had been very active in Europe and also was active in Latin America. These were people who were sent down by Irving or Irving was related to it. And I think there were even AFL-CIO employees in that office.

So I went to see the Minister of Labor to raise hell about it. He said, "Well, I don't know anything about it." I thought he was lying and became more and more outraged. But then, after talking with other people, I came to the conclusion he didn't know anything about it. That in Brazil there is firstly the federal military, the state military and then the municipal people, and I think looking back that the Minister of Labor wasn't informed in advance, had no power to do anything about it.

Then we had the operation "Topsy" and I was always thankful to Linc Gordon who was then Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American Affairs, that he never raised a finger opposing my sending a lot of his people back home. But finally when we got the whole program lined up, somebody in Washington said, "Why didn't you throw out more of the people working with the state police around Brazil?" I said, "Well, why didn't you speak up a year ago and tell me about this concern?"

**Q:** This was the AID public safety program?

TUTHILL: Yes. Because when I went around to these various states, I did talk with the police and they needed jeeps, equipment for communications, etc. and I thought it was an essential part of the state structure. What happened, however in many cases, was that evil men got in charge of that from time to time. But we did not have...I think it is fair to say that we had very little reform program going on.

You know Howard Baker. Have you talked with him?

**Q:** No.
TUTHILL: Well you ought to talk to him because he is here in town some place. He was the labor attaché. I forget whether he was paid by AID or State, it didn't make any difference to me. But Howard was the main contact on the spot. I met a lot of the labor people with him. He would know.

The other person, and I always see him in Paris, is our old friend Martin Ackerman. I can give you his address if you would like it. Martin would be good on this.

I assume when you are talking about reform you are talking about human rights and labor rights. You are not talking about financial reform or fiscal reform.

Q: Yes. I am talking about human rights. I gather on the financial matters we were still being rather tough.

TUTHILL: Well we talked tough. I read in the paper a year or so ago that the IMF is having a lot of trouble with the various nations around the world getting them to sign agreements. But they weren't having any trouble at all with the Brazilians. The Brazilians would sign anything...they just wouldn't do anything about it. It is so typical.

Q: You were talking about "Topsy" too, and I would like you to talk about if you will? One thing about it I am interested in is the nationalism among our friends. It comes up in Bolivia as well.

TUTHILL: The only reason I got away with "Topsy" was because of the political situation in Brazil. John Mowinckel of those twenty guys on the team was the only guy who supported me. Joan McQuire supported me. There is another picture of John up there. This was at that meeting when there was an art exhibition across the street from the Chancery and a couple of congressmen came in and raised hell. They were complaining about it. Mowinckel, to his everlasting credit, said to one congressman, "You dumb, vulgar son-of-a-bitch." I thought it was just wonderful.

Q: I remember that. I wasn't there when he said it but it went through the Embassy like a flash.

TUTHILL: It was just wonderful. Now, where were we?

Q: The motivation for "Topsy."

TUTHILL: Oh yes. The argument which I put to Washington was...that was in late 1967...that we had so many people. We were interfering in everything. The Brazilians were unhappy about the fact that people wanted them to pay taxes and right in the tax office there was an American. Everything they did they associated--not only the serta but the public in general--all the excesses of military government...military government of the United States was simultaneous as far as they were concerned. And it was true of a lot of
our military people in particular. So everything that people didn't like in Brazil was associated with both the military and the United States government.

And at that time Costa e Silva was president. I wouldn't have done this under Castelo Branco. Silva being an insecure man was very nationalistic. He was making a lot of rather stupid statements. I had a lot of trouble with him. The combination...you know I had that trouble about La Cerno where he told me he read I had seen La Cerno and he hoped I wouldn't do this any more. I said, "Well, I am terribly sorry to disappoint you, Mr. President, but I really have to remain free to see anybody who is not in a terrorist organization and I want to see, just as your Ambassador in Washington is free to see anybody in the United States." But the argument was that with a nationalistic, insecure president, with America being blamed for practically everything the Brazilian populace didn't like, the time had come for us to cut way back.

Therefore I asked for the authority to demand that every agency in the United States government operating in Brazil tell me what they would have to stop doing with a 50 percent cut in personnel. The only agency that I excluded was the Peace Corps Volunteers. I thought those young people were doing such an extraordinarily job and weren't disturbing anybody, except on birth control where you had a conflict with the church, of course. The whole argument was political, that we had to reduce our public posture to a much more restrictive basis. I got an answer back in 24 hours from Rush saying to go ahead.

We didn't cut it by 50 percent, but by asking them to tell me what they would have to stop doing if cut 50 percent, we did cut by about one third. And as you know Frank Carlucci was my deputy through this whole thing.

CIA was cut and was the toughest nut to crack. The military was not, because we had a very nice and able general in Panama who saw my plan and called me and asked if he could send his comptroller and several other officers down to look the situation over. I was very skeptical about it but told him to send them along.

Q: Was that the commander-in-chief?

TUTHILL: Yes. He sent three guys down and they looked the situation over. After a few days they came to me and said, "You are absolutely right, we have a lot of military here and don't know what the hell they are doing. They could be sent away."

So, the whole operation was based upon a political evaluation that the time had come for a much less public posture of the United States government and that we had to stop telling the Brazilians how to do everything.

Typical of it was a guy came in from Bahia to see me and he said that he was teaching geology. I said, "That is certainly very important to this country are you teaching Brazilians to teach geology?" "Oh," he said, "No. I am just teaching geology." And I said,
"Well, when will this ever end?" He said, "I don't think it ever will end." I said, "That is exactly what I am talking about. You ought to be teaching Brazilians enough geology so that they can teach geology." He said, "Oh no, that is not my assignment at all."

**Q: Was he official?**

TUTHILL: He was...I forget now whether he was USAID or USIA, or what. Yes, he was on the United States government's payroll.

**Q: How did the cut in personnel affect your role as Ambassador? Did it make it easier to control the various agencies, including military and intelligence agencies?**

TUTHILL: Most of the military aid program...there was a Major General, a real stupe, because he wrote back on the 50 percent request that if he had to cut he would have to cut the PX, APO and two of the three airplanes. I thought it was an asinine thing.

**Q: He was in Brazil?**

TUTHILL: Yes, he was a Major General and went to higher, greater things later on. He was in charge of the aid to the Brazilian army. He had a place in the Ministry of the Army. I read this thing and called him on the phone and said, "Look, I am going to send in the comments of the country team people as I send this in, but quite frankly I think your comments are ridiculous and I think people are going to laugh at them in Washington. As for the PX I don't even know where it is, close it. As to the APO, who gives a damn. As for the planes, why do we need three planes anyway?" Well, he let it go and, of course that is exactly what happened in Washington. They read it and said it was ridiculous. The military aid program was ridiculous. It was just that guys liked to live in Brazil and they kept out of Vietnam and all sorts of things.

**Q: The military aid program was not run through USAID but directly through the Pentagon. Is that right?**

TUTHILL: That is correct.

Now the military intelligence. That is a different picture. That is rather an interesting picture because Dick Walters was, of course, the man there. About once every six weeks or so, Joan would call me when I came in the morning at 9:00 saying that General Walters wanted to see me urgently. I knew what that meant. I knew what that meant. It meant that Castelo Branco...and they had been together in World War II in Italy...had called him in around midnight and talked to him about all sorts of things. Dick would go back to his apartment where he had one or two cats, and no women, and type out the conversation. And all that rough material he would bring in to me in the morning. It was 95 percent political. So in each case I would say to Dick, "Well, it is mostly political so we will send it through State Department channels." And the telegram always said, "Military Attaché pulled in by the
President of Brazil" so that Dick could get full credit for the thing. That in its pure form would go back to State, Defense, CIA and everybody else, of course.

Now the conclusions were something quite different. On that Dick and I disagreed and sometimes rather violently. After one violent one in Brasilia...after we had opened the Kennedy Library at the university there was a little scuffle there. People started throwing bottles and glasses. It wasn't an organized thing. But one person got hit with a bottle and had to go to hospital, a Brazilian. We had a session in the office about what we ought to do about it. I said, "I think I must go tomorrow morning to the hospital to visit this person." Dick was violently opposed to it. We had quite an argument. When we got through I said, "I am going to tell you what I am going to do. I am going to go to the hospital tomorrow morning." And I did.

The next morning I saw Dick and he reminded me of this later. I saw him in that little quadrangle we had with all those nice flowers and things. I said, "Dick, we had a complete disagreement last night on this. I am going to follow a different course then you recommended, but I want to tell you that I want you to continue to give me your unvarnished opinion. It doesn't mean that I am going to follow it, but I want it straight from you just the way you did it last night." And Dick said later that he never had any boss who gave him directions that.

So, when Dick left, I wrote a long letter of commendation concerning his role because I think...obviously he is extremely conservative, military oriented guy and had all the weaknesses of the military...he was against the university, against journalist and trade unions. But he was straight. The intelligence stuff came through straight and went back to Washington without any alteration. And, as I say, he and I could have some violent arguments about everything, and we have continued through the years, right up until today. On abortion he takes a straight Pope's line. So we have...he's extremely conservative, Roman Catholic, military man with very high personal ideals, but he was an excellent intelligence officer, so there was no problems with Dick Walters.

Q: Could he, as apparently you can in some Embassies, send items directly to Washington without you seeing it?

TUTHILL: He could have at the beginning, but he didn't. CIA was doing it all the time and we caught them. I believe it was Christmas of 1967 when I got a message back from Washington saying, "Through other channels we hear there is a danger of a coup d'etat over the holidays." So I knew it must have been a CIA report. We looked over the situation and came to the conclusion that there was no more risk at that particular time than any other time. There was always the risk. So we cabled back that we didn't think there was any more danger than usual.

When this began there was a guy, Cohagan...After that first country team meeting about proposing operation "Topsy" he came to me and said, "Of course, you realize CIA can't be covered by this." I said, "I don't realize any such thing. If you think I am going to cut
down the size of the Embassy and increase proportionally the role of CIA, you are crazy. So, of course, it will be CIA.

And then we finally had a little working team coming from Washington and I wanted CIA represented but I came back to Washington and said, "I want to know who the CIA man is going to be who is coming on this team." Well, I had had in Germany a very good relationship with a fellow by the name of Seymour Bolton, who was a CIA man. They said, "Well, who would you pick?" And I said, "I would pick Seymour Bolton." So they send Seymour Bolton.

And Bolton, Carlucci and I played it absolutely fair because they were recruiting, which I thought was stupid and useless.

Q: They were recruiting ...?

TUTHILL: ...in Brazil. To get agents. This is the game we play. I asked Dick Helms three times what he thought they were achieving by all this. Each time he said, "Well, Jack, I will look into it." Well, as far as I know, he is still looking into it. He hasn't decided yet.

Q: You mean recruiting contacts outside?

TUTHILL: Yes, they were paying guys to inform them in trade unions, universities, military, etc. Nine out of ten people they would proposition would say no and would go to the press saying that the United States is doing this all the time.

So we did get them cutback. I forget whether it was 30 percent or not, probably something less. The CIA had phony secrecy. They wanted everybody to know that they were CIA but they wanted people to make believe that they didn't know they were CIA. So it was kind of gooney.

Once we had this we got to this question of communications. There was no problem working it out with Dick Walters. We could see everything. With CIA, Cohagan said to me and to Carlucci, "We will let you know if something comes through or if we are sending something out of interest to you." I said, "No, it won't do. I will decided whether it is of interest to me and I will designate Carlucci to be the guy to go into your code room and see the messages coming in or going out. If Frank says no interest to the Ambassador, don't send it. In other words, Carlucci's decision is valid as far as I am concerned." And that was the arrangement we had. It wasn't easy and it wasn't pleasant to work it out. They resisted like hell, of course. But they were vulnerable because they made a stupid recommendation which we had to correct about the possibility of a coup d'etat in the Christmas of 1967.

Q: This is the one you were just telling me about?

TUTHILL: Yes.
Q: I meant to ask you about that. Obviously that came to you from Washington but it indicates that something went to Washington from the mission that you hadn't see.

TUTHILL: So they really got caught off base.

Q: And you felt that if you could have put an input into that it would have been a better message going up or maybe wouldn't have gone up at all?

TUTHILL: Sure. Our considered opinion, which turned out to be correct, that there was no greater danger then than normal. There is always a danger in any Latin American country of a coup d'etat. But it didn't seem proportionally greater then.

Q: With the military communications, would you generally see them afterwards or did Walter just play it by ear if he thought you should have input before...?

TUTHILL: Well, with Dick, I didn't question because I had so much experience with him with this raw information that he was getting from Castelo, you see. And subsequently he was replaced by Moro...and I wasn't quite that sure about him. Because, also with Dick, despite our frequent clashes on policy, I am sure that he never went back to the Brazilian military and said, "Well, the Ambassador says such and such, but you know...." implying that I wasn't important. I never had the confidence with Moro, but I was leaving by the time he came in and left him to my poor successor.

Q: Was there competition between the two? Henderson in Bolivia was concerned about it. And it did play out particularly in the Guevara incident. I think rather dramatically. If there hadn't been competition between the two Guevara might not have been killed. It is an interesting story where the military attaché knew he was captured...he was held for about 24 hours...and learned it almost immediately. He sent a message to Washington to this affect but didn't say anything to the Ambassador. The Ambassador says at least that he would have weighed in to spare Guevara, that we wanted him more alive than dead. But he never had that opportunity. He didn't know until I interviewed him that his military attaché had sent off the message. The attaché had told me. Part of it seemed to be that he wanted to get it off and scoop CIA, and he did. He scooped them by about 24 hours.

TUTHILL: There probably were elements of competition between the two, but Dick Walters was so superior in terms of intelligence in Brazil...if the CIA had sent down their whole organization they couldn't have competed with Dick in getting information and finding out what was going on. I think while their program of recruiting was stupid, they weren't stupid enough to challenge Walters on political information. So whether it changed under Moro, I just don't know. Cohagan left too.

I was not conscious of any serious conflict between the Defense and CIA intelligence activities.
Q: Walters was just very well connected with the military government.

TUTHILL: You couldn't possibly have had a closer relationship. He went through the whole war in Italy with those guys, with Castelo.

Perhaps that is the reason that CIA did these other foolish things...foolish in my view, the recruiting, to have some justification to have all those people there and all that equipment. But they were dead right in terms of the murder of the Army Captain, I mentioned earlier, in Sao Paulo. I will give them credit for that. They were following the extreme communist left wing group and, while the Brazilians maintained that they weren't sure, the CIA were absolutely right on this.

Q: There is one story I particularly want to ask you about. It circulated throughout all the Embassy. You apparently went to Washington and had a meeting with President Johnson at one time during your tour in Brazil.

TUTHILL: Several times.

Q: The story is that you were there in fact when all of the problems were occurring in Detroit. Riots were going on and the President was terribly concerned. He was fairly dismissive about Brazilian affairs, which I wouldn't think would be high on his agenda on that particular day. Did that happen?

TUTHILL: I don't recall. I saw much more of Johnson when I was at the European Community in Brussels than I did when I was in Brazil. As a matter of fact, on terms of operation "Topsy" the reason I knew that Johnson was in favor of it was from Dean Rusk. Johnson didn't tell me, Dean Rusk told me. Dean said that I had the support of the entire cabinet and the President. I did see him from time to time when I was in Brazil, but he really wasn't interested in Brazil.

You remember about every six or nine months we would get a message from the White House saying that the President was thinking about making an official visit to Brazil. Then Mowinckel would prepare the response saying what a great idea and he certainly should do it but not yet. I think I was wearing those out by the time I left because I think there were probably three occasions when we said "not yet."

Q: Was that an idea dreamed up by people at a lower level in the State Department that would have liked to have it happen or did Johnson at that point really want to come?

TUTHILL: I don't really know. As a matter of fact, Walt Rostow told me that when Johnson came to Argentina for some meeting of heads of government, on the plane back Johnson is supposed to have said to Rostow and the others, "Now who do you think of all these heads of government in Latin America I would choose as the man to be with in a
moment of crisis?" There was silence. He said, "You will never guess, it is Costa e Silva." I said, "Oh, Christ." What a misjudgment."

So I do know that Johnson was a little bit fascinated by that huge country. He did have the mistaken idea that Costa e Silva was a man of substance and to be dependent on. But I don't know, he may have gotten restless...you see the Foreign Office and the military were toying with the idea of getting Brazil mixed up with the Vietnam thing. At one stage a proposal was made that one of these secondhand destroyers that we were turning over to them, we could turnover to them off the waters of Vietnam and they could try to arrange someway that the North Vietnamese could shot at it so that they could go to war.

Well, this was never an official policy, but some of them were toying with this. So the official position of the Brazilian government...and Nixon when he came down encouraged them in it...was support of US policy in Vietnam. I think this sort of thing may have influenced somebody in the White House to think that a trip would be appropriate.

Q: On that point, the Brazilians were never interested were they?

TUTHILL: Well, we never told them that Johnson was even considering a trip.

Q: No I mean about Vietnam.

TUTHILL: No, I think it was a small group within the government. I think the guy who was the Secretary General in the Foreign Office and the military, would rather have liked to have Brazil in the war with us, to be militarily engaged in Vietnam. But no, there certainly was no public support for this. I think that is one of the reasons they didn't go any further.

Q: Aside from this group that was for it, was there ever any official toying with the ideal of assisting the US?

TUTHILL: They were very sympathetic to the US. They made the right noises...right, if you mean in support of US policy in Vietnam. But it never went beyond that. I think they were concerned about a public explosion, which I am sure there would have been. It would have been very unpopular.

Of course, when I went to Brazil, it was 1966, and by that time Johnson was unraveling about the whole Vietnam thing. He had become so obsessed with it, and so did Dean Rusk, for that matter, curiously enough. I can understand Johnson going the extreme on it, but I can't understand how Dean Rusk became that involved.

Q: That was 1966, so that would have been the beginning of...?

TUTHILL: Yes, people were starting to get really serious about the whole thing.
Q: Protests were beginning.

Well I think that covers the topics that I was interested in. Is there anything you would like to mention?

TUTHILL: No, the only thing I would urge you to do is to find Howard Baker here in town and Kubisch and Ackerman. Kubisch in terms of the whole relationship with the White House and the State Department. Kubisch was tremendous in backstopping this in Washington. Those would be the people.

In my case, when I left Brazil I went to Hopkins in Bologna; and then I went to Paris, the Atlantic Institute; and then to the Salzburg Seminar in Austria. I went right back to what I worked on before, the European scene.

And even last night...I discovered this meeting with the Brazilian Ambassador was going to be at the International Club and I had other commitments and you can't park near the International Club, so I decided the hell with it.

Q: Okay. Good. I will try to get a hold of Kubisch. Thank you very much.

TUTHILL: Well, not at all.

End of interview