The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

MARGARET D. TUTWILER

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born and raised in Alabama December 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finch College, New York 1969-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama (New College) 1971-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typing school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Republican Party, Birmingham, Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Nixon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watergate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridiron dinner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Washington, DC - Private Businesses 1976 |
| Mutual Fund Office                   |
| Bo Calloway and President Ford’s Re-election campaign |

| Alabama - President Ford’s Election Campaign - Political Advisor 1976 |
| Carter and Playboy interview |
| Campaign                     |
| George H.W. Bush             |

| Jim Baker                     |
| Schedule coordination        |
| Bush recognition problem     |
| Scheduling                   |
| Caucuses                     |

<p>| Detroit Convention          |
| Campaign issues             |
| Reagan-Bush relations       |
| Problems                    |
| Becoming a Ronald Reagan supporter |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The White House - Assistant to Chief of Staff Baker</td>
<td>1981-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press corps dealings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamwork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Reagan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Meese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Reagan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White House career staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President’s role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bush</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Press</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Baker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Assistant to President (Political Affairs)</td>
<td>1984-1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan 1984 campaign staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force One</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Department - Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Public Relations</td>
<td>1985-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaza Accord (G-7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Secretary Baker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax reforms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bush Campaign</td>
<td>1988-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Baker’s role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukakis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan and Bush’s staff relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President as presidential candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush-Baker relationship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department - Spokesperson</td>
<td>1989-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State Baker’s style</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appointments
Soviet relations
Soviet Union
Gorbachev
Administration
Duties
Press relations
Collegial atmosphere
Gulf War
Soviets leave Cuba
Baltic states
Shevardnadze
German unification
NATO
Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Israel
“Background” briefings
Foreign trips
Jackson Hole meeting
Soviet spokesmen
Soviet press
Arms control
Yeltsin
State-Pentagon relations
Soviet Union disintegration
Afghanistan
Latin America
Tiananmen Square
Ex-Yugoslavia
The French
Mitterrand
Congressional relations
UN
Baker resignation

The White House - Assistant to President for Communications 1992-1993

Issues

Tunis, Morocco, Ambassador 2001-2003
Contemplating returning to public service
Impact of September 11
Public Outreach and picture books
Innovative fruit tree project
Mr. Berrington’s wheelchairs
Fortress embassy
Impact of satellite television
Programs teaching English
Addressing the Moroccan Press Club

Baghdad, Iraq, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Apr-May 2003
Service before an election
View of the integration of USIA and State
Who controls the money is key
Handling Al Jazeera
Does public diplomacy work?
A Moroccan example
Personnel and morale

INTERVIEW

Q: This is tape 1, side 1 of an interview with Margaret D. Tutwiler. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. To begin with, could you tell me when, where you were born and something about your family.

TUTWILER: I was born in Birmingham, Alabama on December 28, 1950. My parents are from two of the oldest families in Alabama. My mother’s family, a gentleman named Henry DeBardeleben...

Q: What does that mean?

TUTWILER: I just looked it up recently on the Internet and there are DeBardelebens back in Germany until 1159. I don’t know what it means. This gentleman designed the first coke furnaces and did work in the mineral area of Alabama. He is very famous in our state. My father’s family, the Tutwilers, were also involved in minerals and real estate. One of the early Tutwilers helped bring in the first railroad to the state of Alabama. His best friend’s name was a Mr. Temple, last name, and there have been four generations of Temple Tutwilers. A woman in our family in the 1800s, Julia Tutwiler, was the first female admitted to the University of Alabama, wrote the Alabama state song and was very much into education. She got women separated from men in prison. There is a Tutwiler prison for women in Alabama. The largest dorm on the University of Alabama campus is named in her honor. So, both families within the confines of the state of Alabama have been good citizens and have been successful and contributed to our state.

Q: And, also I assume these were examples that you grew up with having them trotted out before you from time to time?
TUTWILER: I was aware of them. I am very proud of my heritage on both sides. I was raised knowing that I was blessed in many respects and with a real deep sense of duty, paying something back, and love of country. My father jumped on D-Day in World War II. He was in the 82nd Airborne. He was shot but did not take his cyanide pill but crawled into a fox hole and took pictures of the invasion while he lay on the beach. We went back as a family 22 years later. What I saw on that beach was just a beach. But, I knew standing there with my father he was seeing something quite different. In fact, on the day of his jump, his buddies took him into some farmhouse where he passed out unconscious. We drove around but couldn’t find the farm house. My father died in 1982. I actually flew back onto those beaches with President Ronald Reagan for the anniversary celebration. That was pretty unbelievable, to imagine that number one, my father survived the beach and the invasion and number two, that I, his daughter, was flying back there in a helicopter with Ronald Reagan, the President of the United States. It was really quite overpowering.

Q: What was your father doing when he wasn’t involved in World War II?

TUTWILER: He was an investment banker for our family. He did a lot of civic things in our city. He went to an office but didn’t work in a corporation or other business. After the war, his brother who had been fighting in the Pacific was killed in a small plane crash coming home from the war, and his father had recently died and my father had gone to the University of Virginia and he never went back. He managed all of our family financial affairs.

Q: How about your mother? What was her background?

TUTWILER: My mother was a housewife and she used to say that her greatest accomplishment was to raise three good citizens, which I believe she did. She was a wife and a mother. She was patriotic and civic minded but basically she spent her time on her family.

Q: Where did you go to school?

TUTWILER: I actually went to a private school in Birmingham, Alabama that my mother had gone to. It had one teacher in one room and went from first through fourth grades. My best friend and I were the entire fourth grade.

Q: Was this where first grade was in row one and second grade in row two, etc.?

TUTWILER: Yes.

Q: I went to one of those, too, run by a couple of ladies.

TUTWILER: It’s true. Miss May Ward was the teacher. Then I went to a private girls school in Birmingham that at the time was named Brook Hill, today it is coed and has
merged with a private boys school and is called the Altamont School. My mother had
gone there also. I was there from fifth grade through twelfth.

Q: While you were at Brookhill what were your interests?

TUTWILER: History, government. It used to be known with all of my friends that I
really would not talk on the phone at night when the evening news was on. I was never
really interested in local politics or news, but really interested in national and
international news. I just have a natural interest in it.

Q: How about reading? What sort of reading were you doing?

TUTWILER: Whatever was mandatory. There was one book that spurred even to this day
one of my hobbies, the Romanovs, and the book was Nicholas and Alexandra by Robert
Massey. I was fortunate enough to have lunch with Mr. Massey in the early 1990s.
Because when we were in Ekaterinburg on a trip with Secretary Baker, Secretary Baker
knew of my interest for 20 something years in the Romanov family and the Secretary had
a private dinner that night with the Governor of Ekaterinburg. The next day I went to the
morgue and went into the room with Secretary Baker and saw all the bones of the Tsar,
his wife and children. It was unbelievable, an incredible and fascinating experience.

Q: He also wrote a very good book called Dreadnought which is a history of British
naval expansion.

TUTWILER: Massey? Yes, fascinating.

Q: An excellent author. Sometimes I have a feeling that when you go to a place like
Birmingham you feel like you are falling off the edge of the world as far as newspapers
go and all that. Were the Birmingham newspapers covering national and international
news?

TUTWILER: I don’t remember. I remember watching the evening national news,
Huntley Brinkley. I am a more visual and verbal person. If someone gives me a huge
dissertation to read, I will not retain it as well. I retain better visually and verbally. I read
the newspaper and the national magazines. I was always interested in what was going on,
but at the same time I had a very normal childhood. I had a boyfriend and friends, cared
about clothes, a normal teenager. I don’t want to give the impression that I was a
studyholic or bookworm. I wasn’t.

Q: I have found, particularly with the men I interview, on asking what was their great
interest in high school, it was not particularly political science or something, but usually
girls and sports. Was the segregation/desegregation crisis a subject of conversation?

TUTWILER: I only remember one time. Martin Luther King was either being arrested or
was coming back to Birmingham, I don’t remember the specifics. Our family owns
property downtown in Birmingham and my father came home and told us that he along
with some other property owners downtown were very fearful that the situation would explode into a lot of violence. They had signed some type of paper that said if one brick is thrown they were not going to tolerate it. Whatever needs to be done in the city will be done to prevent violence. He cared deeply about the city, especially the core downtown area. He believed that a city is only as vibrant as its downtown area and if you scare off the merchants, bankers, lawyers, the city is just going to die. He spent a lot of time working on making sure that people stayed downtown and didn’t flee to the suburbs with their businesses. He spent a lot of volunteer time on those types of things.

I never saw any violence. I don’t remember any violence. I don’t remember any unpleasantness. That is the only thing I remember.

Q: When you graduated in 1969, were you pointing towards anything in particular?

TUTWILER: I was focused on getting into college. I was never a student but am fairly competitive. No matter how many times my father grounded me for bringing home Cs and Ds, it didn’t work. I was very stubborn. However, in the tenth grade I figured out I didn’t want to be left behind and had to get serious so I could get into college. From that time forward I was either on the A honor roll or B honor roll through my senior year. So, it was my own motivation, but it was driven by being competitive and not wanting to be left out. I wanted to go to college. My father said he would refuse to pay for any college in the state of Alabama! He wanted me to have a broader experience. My parents believed very strongly in travel being one of the most educational things you can do for your children. We took family trips before I graduated from high school to Europe once or twice, the Caribbean, Mexico, and all over the United States. So, he was right. It was more educational in many respects than what you learn out of a textbook. He wasn’t against the state of Alabama, he loved it, but he wanted us all to be broadened and did not want us going to one of the two state universities.

Q: Where were you looking?

TUTWILER: I don’t remember everywhere I applied, but applied all up East. I was not interested in Hollins, Randolph Macon, or Sweet Briar (not that I could have gotten into Sweet Briar), where a lot of my friends went. Those places were boring to me. I applied to all schools up in New York and the one that I actually went to was named Finch. It no longer exists. My grandmother had gone there when it was in the FAO Schwartz Building down off Fifth Avenue and Mrs. Finch actually taught. My grandmother had to go to class with gloves on. My mother had gone there but it was a junior college. I wanted to do something that was radically different than the deep South. I loved the South and have never cut the emotional bonds to the South, but I wanted something that was radically different. Being downtown in Manhattan was about as radically different for an 18-year-old as you could get.

Q: I think the South has gotten much more homogenized than it was at that time. It is not as regional as it used to be.
TUTWILER: There are a lot of terrible misperceptions about the South and I ran into that at times in Manhattan. My college roommate was a wonderful woman from Lowell, Massachusetts, Dottie Burke Stone. She now lives in North Andover. She had never thought of North/South before. I grew up with that. There was definitely a feeling of North/South. She became used to that over the two years. She was in the majority that had been the winner so it had never ever been on her radar screen. It was definitely on mine. In classes, any time professors wanted to use an example of segregation and almost anything that was wrong in the country, they would use the South. I was one of six southerners in this entire school, real southerners from the deep South. I had terrific government professors and I would always raise my hand and say, “Wait a minute. That is not true. I live in Alabama. What you are telling these people is not true.” I used to have oral arguments like that.

Q: Well, that was great training for later on being a spokesperson.

TUTWILER: Maybe. I had to articulate, to be convincing and defend what I knew was true.

Q: You were at Finch from when to when?

TUTWILER: I went for two years.


TUTWILER: Yes. I had been dating someone for many years and I wanted to come home because of him and all of my friends who had been on the East coast for some reason all came home. I was going to go to Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.

Q: You had transferred?

TUTWILER: No, I had applied and gotten in but at the last minute because so many of my girlfriends were returning from the East coast to go to the University of Alabama I decided also to return. My father had been worn down by then. It was one of the few things that I have ever done in my life that I have a little bit of regret about. It was a total waste of time.

I was not into nor did I do as a junior the sorority bit, although all of my friends did and we had the best of all worlds. My best friend, Kacy Ireland Mitchell, and I lived off campus and had an apartment. It was great. My first experience at kind of having my own home and all that goes with that. I was in all upper-level political science classes. All the boys in the class were going on to law school. My classes were good but I was pretty much bored. It was not that challenging. The professors I had had in New York, especially one government professor named Michael Segal, were incredibly challenging. I felt especially the last year of college was a big waste of time. I was impatient to get on with it. These two years were like just ticking off the clock.
Q: I’m not from New York and am not speaking from prejudice one way or the other but I would have thought sort of the rough edges of New York would be kind of invigorating compared to the politeness of Alabama.

TUTWILER: I’m not against, but have never been turned on by sports and at that time football was a very, very big deal in Alabama. So, even though I was in the most senior political science classes you could take, I always joked that on Monday the guys would all be talking about football that had occurred on Saturday. There were very few women in these classes. By Wednesday they would start talking about the football game that was coming up. Then they went into basketball. Sports just are not my thing. I don’t dislike it. I think it is wonderful. But, I just wasn’t interested. However, I have to say that I wanted to leave New York. I was tired of concrete. I was tired of hypocrisy in some respects. I met the biggest bigots I have ever met in my life in New York City. Much more so than in Birmingham, Alabama. For an 18 and 19 year old, New York was a very expensive city. I had a job that I worked in the afternoons in a bakery with my roommate. It was up on Madison Avenue. Famous people came in, including Mrs. Kennedy. I didn’t consider Central Park getting away. So, at the end of the two years I had really seen what I wanted to see and done my thing in New York. I was ready to go home or be closer to home and a city with space and sky.

Q: You say your male classmates taking political science were pointing towards law. What were you looking at?

TUTWILER: I didn’t know. I wasn’t focused on it. When I went back to the University of Alabama instead of doing the normal liberal arts track, I joined something called the New College which was very experimental. For instance, I could take 50 political science classes. It allowed one to take classes in subjects that you were interested in. It had some requirements. I think I had to take a French class. But, basically what it was designed to do was to let one take what they were interested in. So, I lived in a lot of political science classes. In fact, the head of New College, Dr. Neale Berte, is now president of Birmingham Southern. I do not know if New College still exists. So, when I went to Alabama I was assigned to a special brand new college that was a little different and most importantly let a student take hours of class in the subject he or she was interested in.

Q: Did you find yourself a little out of sync with your friends in sororities?

TUTWILER: No, it didn’t bother me at all. Again, these were lifelong friends. I knew there was no way as a junior I was going to do all the rigmarole required by a sorority. It just didn’t make sense to me. I was very happy living off campus with my best friend, Kacy. All of our friends who were in sororities were in our apartment all the time. So, I had a foot in both worlds. It was my choice. In fact, we were pressured a lot by friends of our parents who could not believe that we were not going to go into a sorority. It was a pretty rebellious thing we did but not a big deal.

Q: You graduated in 1973?
TUTWILER: Yes.

Q: *With a degree in political science, I presume.*

TUTWILER: As far as I remember, yes.

Q: *What was next?*

TUTWILER: Some point after I came home, my father sat me down and said that he was very proud that I had graduated from college but as far as he was concerned, my diploma was worthless. Why would anybody hire me with a general liberal arts education? What skill did I bring to the workplace? He couldn’t name one. I was furious. But, he was right. So, what he made me do that summer was to go to a secretarial business school in downtown Birmingham called Alverson Drawn and take three or four hours a day of typing and shorthand. He was right, had I not been able to type a letter I would never have gotten my first job. After that I went to Europe for three months with my friend, Kacy. I had been to Europe twice before and this time wanted to go behind the Iron Curtain. I was fascinated by Russia and China. Kacy wanted to see Greece and parts of Italy we hadn’t done before. We sailed over on the *Leonardo*, which was a new experience instead of flying. I wanted to spend time in Moscow, St. Petersburg, because of the Romanovs, Warsaw and Prague. We spent approximately six weeks in communist countries.

Q: *You saw Greece, too?*

TUTWILER: Yes. We were gone for about three months and ended up skiing in Austria with friends of Kacy’s. We stayed with this young married couple. The husband had been Kacy’s family’s ski instructor on a previous trip.

Q: *Well, I was consul general in Greece while you were there but I don’t recall visiting you in jail, so I guess you were okay.*

TUTWILER: Yes. It was a fascinating trip. I had a curiosity of wanting to know for myself not books, teachers, TV, what was communism. This was 1972 and the Russians did not understand a trip by two 21 year old girls. Everywhere we went they would say “gruppa” and we would say this was the group, just the two of us. When I think back on it, I think it was pretty brave on my parents’ part. While we were there Nixon put the troops into some kind of worldwide alert. I was oblivious. My father’s view was that I would be safer inside that country. Nothing was going to happen to me there.

Q: *This was in 1973 and probably the October Arab-Israeli War.*

TUTWILER: It took me about 10 days or a week in the capital of the Soviet Union and I remember vividly thinking that it was the most make-up work place I had ever been in in my life. I am fairly impatient, fairly direct, but they put us through an incredible bureaucracy for every circus ticket, ballet ticket, to do anything. It took about 25 people
to accomplish one transaction. I thought it was insane. It wore me out.

Everybody was nice and I wasn’t scared. The Russian people could not have been nicer. We would go out in the afternoons on our own, even though I did not speak Russian, and they would help us out. What was interesting was when I went from Moscow to St. Petersburg, I demanded and got away with going on the day train. Normally they took foreigners overnight. I wanted to see the countryside. The train was horrible. It had wooden benches and the people were dirty. It was just awful. But, I loved it. I thought it was fascinating.

What was really interesting, just like at the airport when we landed in Moscow, this total stranger comes up and says, “Miss Ireland, Miss Tutwiler, follow me.” This went on wherever I was. So, that was a little different. Especially when we landed at the airport or train station. So, I knew they knew exactly who we were. I thought, “Why are they spending their time worrying about two kids?” It was again make-up work. It was make-up work when we would go to museums and ladies would sit in the four corners of the room in wooden chairs. There was a woman at the top and bottom of the escalators. I just thought this was nuts. And the rhetoric I had grown up with - everyone in communist countries has a job - was technically true, but once I saw first hand what kind of jobs, I didn’t buy the rhetoric. These were not real productive jobs.

I should back up to tell you one other thing, which will tell you something about me. When I was sixteen, Kacy and I, two teachers, Mr. Borborning and Mrs. Flowers, and two other girls my age, Ann Shaw and Murry Self, went on a summer through Europe. One of the things we did was to go into East Berlin and I can remember standing at Checkpoint Charlie knowing that I could not walk those 50 or 100 yards to the American flag flying in the U.S. sector. I wrote home to my parents that night that I actually knew firsthand what it meant to be free. My father forever said that was worth every dime of the cost of the trip because the meaning of freedom and love of our country was so ingrained in me, it was so real.

To go forward a little bit, I was at the ceremony as a State Department employee when Secretary Baker represented our country and Checkpoint Charlie was dismantled and I freely walked at the end of that ceremony over into what had been then the East side of Berlin. I thought this was absolutely amazing because I had experienced as a sixteen year old standing in the East looking over at the American flag on the West side and knowing I couldn’t walk over there. There were men with machine guns around the bus putting a mirror under the bus, etc. For a sixteen year old it made a big impression and was a very sobering experience. That visit to Berlin made such a strong impression on me.

Q: These impressions, I think, affected so many of us during the Cold War. We saw how terrible the system was both in efficiency and in human dignity.

TUTWILER: To jump ahead again, when you mention the Cold War, during another trip outside of Ekaterinburg, we went to Chelyabinsk-70, a nuclear facility, which was formerly a totally closed city. We did it for symbolic reasons, etc. We actually went
inside, met the scientists, looked at the nuclear reactors, looked at the plutonium, and I thought, here we are, an American delegation with all the scientists and employees up in their windows waving and welcoming us. It was just incredible. And, from having grown up, as you say, in the Cold War and walking around in a place that no American had ever, ever seen except from satellites and spies. It was just unbelievable and very moving to see and meet all of these people who basically had worked on the bombs that were to be used against my country. The day we were there, there was nothing but warmth and curiosity on both sides - us and them.

Q: This was with Secretary of State Baker in the 1980s?

TUTWILER: Correct. So, I have had the best of both worlds. Personal experiences with travel and then clearly traveling while working in the State Department, Treasury and the White House.

Q: After you returned from Europe, what?

TUTWILER: When I came back home there never was a discussion about whether I was going to work or not. It was just known. There was never a discussion even though my father had the influence to do so, of his finding me a job. So, I went down and applied at the bank, which was pretty amusing because when my father came home that night – I had taken the math test, the verbal test and not told a living soul I was there – our family was one of the largest stockholders in what was then called the First National Bank. My uncle was on the board and the chairman of the board at the time was a man named Mr. Woodrow. He called my father at the office and said, “I have Margaret’s test in front of me and she did pretty well on the verbal and not very well in the math. What do you want us to do with this?” My father said, “I want her to be treated like anybody else. I don’t want her to be given special treatment, etc.” Well, my father comes home that night and I am absolutely mortified that the chairman of the board has that stupid test that I had written all my figuring in the margins and taken that day down in the basement with everybody else like a normal person. But, I think it says something about the way I was raised also. The woman I had talked to, I guess, called Mr. Woodrow, because she didn’t know what to do with my application. Apparently people who had connections did not just go to the bank employment office and apply. It never would have occurred to me to ask my father to make a call on my behalf.

So, the bank gave me a job. I worked in bookkeeping, which was a joke, since math is clearly not my crestline, at the branch office which was out in the suburbs where we lived. I don’t remember how many months I worked there. Then the mother of a classmate of mine called me, and I don’t really know why, other than she probably knew I was interested in politics, and said that the chairman of the Alabama Republican Party was looking for a secretary /office manager. I had never affiliated with any political party. In fact I had prided myself on being an independent. I was never a Young Republican. I was not a Teenage Republican. I wasn’t anything. The first time I voted was for President Nixon in 1972’s presidential election.
I really thought about it, as I recall, for two or three days because it would be a big
decision for me to affiliate with one party. I basically decided that generally speaking I
was probably more Republican than I was Democrat. I have in my entire life never pulled
a straight lever. To this day in local races I vote for Democrats that share my political
views if the Republican clearly does not. It does not happen often but it has in the past. If
the Democratic National Party put up a candidate that I felt expressed my views better
than the Republican, I would vote for the Democrat. Now, that sent some of my partisan
friends crazy, but I believe in loyalty to the country first, not to a political party above
country. As it has turned out I have spent 20 something years in the Republican Party and
the people I have supported for President have all been people that I respect and I have
not yet regretted one of my votes or any of the activities in the work that I have done on
behalf of those people.

So, I go down and they give me the job at the Republican Party headquarters on 7th
Avenue South in Birmingham. That is where it comes in if I had not been able to type a
letter, the chairman, Dick Bennett, wouldn’t have hired me nor should he. I was not great
at typing. I don’t remember how long I worked there. I learned a lot. I learned local
politics, grass root politics which was very beneficial. I learned what it was like to be in
an office. I saw some things, this was when Nixon was resigning...

Q: This was during the Watergate period, a very difficult time.

TUTWILER: Horrible. I was 23 years old and I can remember grown men calling me
who were very loyal to President Nixon and would cry on the phone – What is the press
doing to our President? What is the country doing to our President? I had real anger at
President Nixon, not because of Watergate and what he had done, because to this day I
think most of it was mickey mouse nonsense, but a breach of faith and that people who
had believed in him were so hurt and let down. Everyday Americans were so hurt. I feel
similarly what we have just gone through with this administration, only in the Clinton
case I obviously was not a supporter. He broke a huge trust with his supporters.

Q: We are talking about the Clinton impeachment.

TUTWILER: Yes. People who believed in President Clinton were hurt. Honest, good,
hard working Americans were disillusioned. Years later after Nixon’s resignation when I
was assistant secretary for public affairs at the Treasury Department, then Secretary of
Treasury Baker and I were invited by a friend of ours, Roger Stone, who is very close to
President Nixon, to go to President Nixon’s home in Saddlebrook, New Jersey and have
dinner, just the four of us. It was fascinating. President Nixon was one of the warmest
men I had ever met. He was gracious and not at all like his caricatures or what I had read
for 20 something years and I got over the anger that I had felt because many people who
had believed in him had been hurt. He was a fascinating person even at that age. He was
so on top of the news and genuinely interested in the news. It was just absolutely
amazing. I came away from there with a very different personal view of a man that I had
never known. He was very gracious - in fact, when we were leaving, Mr. Baker
mentioned I had a birthday coming up or something and President Nixon sent someone to
his wine cellar to get me a bottle of red Bordeaux wine.

Q: And I think he was also a different man, too.

TUTWILER: Probably.

Q: The White House, as you know, can be a very difficult place. I think it played to his lesser instincts.

TUTWILER: There is an annual dinner here in Washington, DC called the Gridiron Dinner. Secretary Baker, I believe again at Treasury, was going to be the Republican speaker. We came up with the idea of having me fly to New York, which I did, and tape President Nixon in his federal office in downtown Manhattan. He was a real sport about it. You can imagine how weird I felt going up with a tape recorder which was part of the joke, but it was also the first time that President Nixon’s voice had been heard at the Gridiron Dinner here in Washington, DC. To show you how gracious he was, when we visited taping this gag joke he asked me if I was staying in Manhattan or going back to Treasury. I said I was going straight back and would catch the shuttle. He said, “Well, I’m on my way home, I will give you a ride back to the airport.” I am in the back seat, he had a driver with President Nixon from downtown Manhattan out to La Guardia and it was absolutely unbelievable. I kept thinking, because I went to college in New York City, that never before or after will I have such a ride to La Guardia airport to get the shuttle with a former President of the United States.

Q: Tell me, what was your impression of the Republican Party in Alabama in 1973, etc.?

TUTWILER: It didn’t exist really. One of my big interests was that I thought it was unfair. There was at the time no Republican statewide official. There was, I think, one Republican member in the State House. I don’t think there was a single state senator. So, we had a one party state and I thought then and still think today that that is not healthy. I think you need the back and forth and the tension and the positive pull. So, one of my very sincere interests was increasing by whatever small amount a two party system in our state. I felt it mattered.

Q: Did you find people incredulous that you were working for the Republican Party of Alabama?

TUTWILER: No, because most of my friends and their parents were Republican. At least in my personal circle it wasn’t any big deal. It was a job. I was totally immersed in it. I got to know our congressman, John Buchanan, who was a moderate liberal Republican in Birmingham. I think I worked on our mayor’s race, Mayor Seibels, who many years before had been the king when my mother was the queen of something (the Christmas Carnival, a big social ball type thing). I was a kid totally enthused about it. One gentleman that I know that ran for some office, I can’t remember what, lost by five votes and I used that in speeches to young people that their vote does matter and makes a difference and for every voter not voting there will be ten voting against your interests.
I worked at the Republican Party headquarters for about a year.

**Q: Did you get hooked on politics?**

TUTWILER: Not local politics. What I really had an interest in was the big picture. What was national and international. I wasn’t pursuing a career at all. At Treasury, Secretary Baker spent about 80 percent of his time on international issues and then at State obviously 100 percent. So years after majoring in international relations, I was lucky enough to be very involved in it.

**Q: After you left that job where did you go?**

TUTWILER: I decided that what I really was interested in was national, so I moved to Washington, DC. John Buchanan’s administrative assistant, Terry Apple, got me a job with a friend of his downtown on K street working at a mutual fund. It was a job and got me here. One of my best friends, Meredith Wilson, moved up here also and I think was working for our congressman when John Buchanan first got here. We lived out on Seminary Road off 395 in Alexandria, Virginia and I worked at this mutual fund for six or seven months. I wasn’t the least bit interested in it but I had an obligation to show up every day and to do what they needed me to do.

I started reading in *The Washington Post* about President Ford’s kitchen cabinet. As it turns out Red Blount was in that Cabinet and he was a family friend of ours from Montgomery, Alabama. John Grenier, a family friend of ours in Birmingham who had been Goldwater’s campaign manager, was also close to the kitchen cabinet, especially Mr. Dean Burch. I started writing to these gentlemen saying I really wanted to work for President Ford’s reelection campaign in Washington. As it turned out President Ford appointed a gentleman named Bo Calloway and Mr. Calloway knew my parents. He had so many letters about me from different people that he had his secretary call me and offered me a job as the first person on the payroll for the reelection of President Ford. I stayed on the payroll until President Ford lost the election.

**Q: Now, this would be the election of ’76. What were you doing?**

TUTWILER: Bo Calloway hired me and we started off in offices in the Ring Building which is right down here on Connecticut avenue. They were in Dean Burch’s law firm. Dean Burch was very close to President Ford. After a time we moved to 1828 L street and that is where we stayed throughout the whole election cycle. When I first got there I did everything. I answered the phone. I typed Mr. Calloway’s letters. There was just him and me and his secretary at first and then it grew. I ended up in a division that is called surrogate scheduling where we scheduled Ford’s Cabinet members and others. Alan Greenspan was one of my surrogates. It was myself and two other women who are still very good friends of mine (Grace Moe and Kathy Plowman Super) and who were a little older and had more experience than I. I am by nature an organized person. I also have very good organizational skills. It was a great spot to be in because you make a lot of contacts. You don’t necessarily get to know the Cabinet officers but you get to know their
chiefs of staff and key staff. I was in surrogate scheduling until I went to the convention in Kansas City.

At the convention a gentleman by the name of Stu Spencer, who was the political director of the President’s campaign asked me if I would go home to Alabama to be the executive director of President Ford’s campaign for the state of Alabama. I said yes and went ahead and did it. I was 26 and I believe I was the youngest person in the nation doing this and if not the only female, one of a very few females doing this. So, I moved back to Alabama and did what I could to help President Ford in my home state.

Q: What does a state executive director do?

TUTWILER: Well, you have a budget given you by national headquarters which you have to manage. You have to get surrogates around the state you manage. You deal with the Republican officials in the State.

Q: You say surrogate, is that a word for speakers?

TUTWILER: Yes, it is. I remember dealing with the congressmen. At that time we had three in the state of Alabama, Republicans -- Jack Edwards of Mobile, Bill Dickinson from Montgomery, and John Buchanan from Birmingham. You had to open a headquarters, get the furniture. You had to do everything. It was a learning experience, but in all candor, Alabama was not a state they realistically believed they were going to win. It is next door to Georgia, is the deep South and was basically a Democratic state at that time. So, this was not a key state. They would have never sent me to California for example. But, they knew I knew a lot of people and for whatever reasons asked me to do it. Well, Ford lost, which was a terrible disappointment.

Q: How did Alabama go?

TUTWILER: Alabama was announced on the blue NBC map in about the first three seconds. I remember going outside and bursting out crying because they didn’t even give us a minute before they declared our state of Alabama for Carter.

Q: What was your impression of this first time you were really involved in a campaign? How did it work in Alabama?

TUTWILER: One of the things I remember is that during the campaign, President Carter had done an interview in Playboy magazine where he said he lusted in his heart. I have a great deal of respect for President Carter. But at that time I was a kid and someone in national headquarters told me that they were shipping down hundreds of these magazines.

Playboy’s lawyers had called one of the top law firms in Birmingham to say they were going to sue if these things were distributed, etc. Well, whoever they called was one of my father’s friends. I’m down working 12, 14, 16 hour days and my father comes down dressed in black tie with my mother around 8:00 at night. He basically says to me, “What
are you doing?” I didn’t know what he was talking about. When he told me I was horrified. After he left we spent the night tracking down every one of those boxes of Playboy which were on buses going all over the state of Alabama. I think we succeeded in finding all of them. I think we were distributing them to ministers, but I just can’t remember.

The other part I remember is there were a lot of tugs and pulls. Grown men who had a lot more experience than I did would put a lot of pressure on me. Like we need to spend $10,000 on bumper stickers. Or we need to spend $500 on yard signs. Or, can’t you get more money out of Washington? I don’t remember it necessarily as an experience that I thoroughly enjoyed. Again, it was another learning experience and I was really sad when Ford lost. I was young, got totally emotionally caught up in it and to this day think he is a thoroughly decent person whom I respect and like a great deal.

Q: It was a very close election.

TUTWILER: Extremely. If around 8,000 more people had voted differently in Ohio and Hawaii, he would have won.

Q: So, it was not one of these foreordained things.

TUTWILER: It wasn’t like the Reagan election that I was involved in in 1984 with the 49 state win.

Q: Once the person you are supporting loses, you realize that this is not going to lead to a political appointment.

TUTWILER: I don’t think that way. I have never had a career path. I have difficulty thinking a year down the road, much less ten. I have been very fortunate that one door always opens another door. I have been very fortunate that I have had very interesting, challenging things to do that I have a natural interest in and an emotional connection to and that I believed in. So, I didn’t know what I was going to do next.

Mr. Stockham, I believe, called me. He was on the board of something called the NAM, the National Association of Manufacturers. He was a family friend of my father’s and owned a very large steel company in Birmingham. They were looking for a public affairs representative for the state of Mississippi and Alabama. I went over to Atlanta, interviewed and got the job. I was the first woman they had ever hired to do this and was probably the youngest. My job was basically grass roots local organizing with the companies who are members of NAM, through the whole state of Alabama and Mississippi. Part of my job was the recruitment of new members and to get current members to increase their dues. So, I went to parts of my state I had never been to in my entire life. It was practically living in a car and out on the road. It was interesting for the first nine or ten months. I learned a lot and saw parts of my state and the state of Mississippi that I had never seen before. I listened to businessmen talk about OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), which was the big problem at that
time.

Q: This is the office of occupational safety and health in the Labor Department.

TUTWILER: OSHA was in its hay day. I went into one gentleman’s office in Tuscaloosa where the CEO had a one way mirror and kept a rifle in his office. He didn’t want the OSHA people on his property. I went to one plant somewhere in Mississippi and those people all had shotguns. Again, there is a balance in life. They would show me where they had had to spend their money to paint in this one place a huge yellow line showing men how to get to the men’s room and women to the ladies room. That was just silly and ridiculous. So, you could understand why these people hated the OSHA types who came in and said, “I think your roof is going to have a leak in six years, replace it now.” On the other hand, I know that there is a legitimate need for OSHA. Today, OSHA is not as big an issue, their jets have totally been cooled and they are doing those things which are important.

Q: We are moving into 1978. Then what?

TUTWILER: I was in New Orleans with a friend of mine and he said to me, he had worked for President Ford, “You know your friend George Bush is thinking about running for president.” That was all I needed to hear. In the Ford days one of my dearest friends, Cathy Super, had taken me to hear then CIA director, George H. W. Bush give a speech. This man had an entire room of people enthusiastically applauding a director of CIA. It made a great impression on me. I was very impressed with his charm, his warmth, his commitment to his job and our country.

When I came back from New Orleans, I knew a number of people who were very good friends to then Ambassador Bush. I started another letter writing campaign saying I really, really wanted to work for him, etc. Then, my father was going to host a dinner to raise money for the Alabama Republican Party and was trying to think of who to get as a guest. I was in his office and said he should try to get Ambassador George Bush. He really had not heard of him, didn’t know who he was and thought I was crazy. I talked him into it and Ambassador Bush agreed to come. When we were riding to the dinner, I said to him that I really wanted to move to Houston and be his scheduler. Karl Rove at the time was the one employee on Bush’s PAC (political action committee) because you can’t be actively under our laws running for president. Karl and I talked about my desire to move to Houston and work for Bush. At some point Jim Baker called me back and offered me the job. Jim Baker was Ambassador Bush’s unofficial chairman at that point because Baker was running for Attorney General in the state of Texas. He offered me less money and I took almost a $10,000 cut to work for Ambassador Bush. My father told me I should not have nicked and dimed over the money, but it was important to me as I was earning a living. On March 1, 1978, I walked into George Bush’s office in Houston, Texas. Jim Baker knew me from the Ford 1976 campaign.

Q: How did you know Jim Baker?
TUTWILER: Jim Baker was either the Deputy or Under Secretary of Commerce and was asked to resign from that job and come over to the Ford reelection headquarters as Ford’s chief delegate hunter. He knew me because I had to work with him a lot concerning surrogate scheduling. He had observed my work habits and made a judgment as to whether I was competent or incompetent based on those observations he hired me in 1978 for Bush’s presidential efforts.

So, I moved across the country. George Bush’s office at that time was in his bank office building in downtown Houston. He sat on the board of some bank, I don’t remember which. Karl Rove and I were the two employees of the PAC and were right down the hall because you legally had to have separate offices. I went to work as the second employee of the PAC [political action committee] which at some point became the presidential campaign. On March 1, 1978, I went to work.

Q: What did scheduler mean?

TUTWILER: It meant I coordinated all of his schedule. Believe me, it is a lot more than hotels and airplanes; he then flew commercially. In August, one of his good friends, David Bates, came on board and traveled with him, but at first it was just Ambassador Bush. For the boards he was on, like the Eli Lilly board, they would pick him up in their own plane. As the scheduler, you have to deal with people. You have to deal with the state chairmen of fifty states. You have to deal with a senator or congressman who wants him to come to do x, y, or z. It is very involved. It is logistical. It takes organizational skills and political instincts. It is how to gracefully say no and not have someone furious with Ambassador Bush. It is a very important part of a campaign organization. It is no different than at the State Department when they want to know what the secretary’s schedule is. It is key and a central place where you get to know everyone. If the lawyers have to have a meeting with him they have to deal with you. If foreigners were in town they have to deal with you. We grew it from just myself to a total of seven people by the time he went on the ticket with President Reagan. We went from scheduling one man to our own chartered airplane with probably 70 something people on it.

Q: When you started out in this obviously you had to look at the...

TUTWILER: George Bush did not even register in any single solitary poll when I went to work for him. Most of my friends in Birmingham hadn’t heard of him. They thought I was crazy to move across the country to go work for a man who was running for President of the United States they had never heard of. In fact, I still have the 3 percent button. When George Bush finally registered in a national Gallup poll at 3 percent name recognition, we all had the 3 percent little button indicating that we had finally arrived and gotten his name ID up to 3 percent in a national ball.

Q: Were you looking at name recognition in country terms or were you looking at places like New Hampshire and other key states?

TUTWILER: Everywhere. He was just not known. He had had an incredible career, but
most people couldn’t tell you who is our ambassador to China. They don’t know and don’t care. Most people today couldn’t tell you he was our ambassador to the United Nations. So, he had served his country with incredible honor and dignity but it just wasn’t really known. As I would argue, today, most Americans couldn’t name the current Cabinet.

Q: Some presidential candidates are more difficult to schedule than others. Did he understand the name of the game?

TUTWILER: Oh sure. He had run for the senate and been a congressman. He had been in partisan politics in addition to political appointments and government. He loves people and has untiring energy. I just saw him recently at the CIA dedication the other day. He is 75 years old and is going to jump out of an airplane again this summer for his 75th birthday. He is an incredibly thoughtful and kind man. He has a terrific sense of humor. He has more friends than anyone I have ever known, of all ages. He is terrific to work for. Does he have his bad days? Did I have my bad days? Sure. Did things get goofed up? Of course. If you are traveling hundreds of thousands of miles a year visiting many, many cities and doing even more events, things happen. But, by and large he knew I was honest and worked very hard. I was never replaced and that was one of my goals secretly. A woman had never before held for a national candidate the job of head of scheduling. I was determined to the best of my ability for professional reasons they were not going to replace me or layer me with a man. They may not like me, etc., but I worked very hard to try to ensure that that did not happen and it did not. I had gained and earned their confidence.

Q: What was Jim Baker’s role at this time?

TUTWILER: He wasn’t there at first. I used to go over and pick George Bush up at his home and drive him to work. There were two people in his bank office. He had his secretary there and his accountant, Don Roads. Don is like an adopted son and is still with him. And then Karl and I down the hall in the PAC office. It was a low key operation at first. Jim Baker was very involved in running for Attorney General of the state of Texas and did not get that involved until he lost the Attorney General race which would have been in November. We were putting out newsletters, raising money, etc. All the things that political action committees do. Identifying supporters - building an organization of Bush supporters.

Q: You pointed towards Ronald Reagan as being the one to beat at that time?

TUTWILER: Yes. I had worked twice against Ronald Reagan. First with Ford and then with Ambassador Bush. And, then I ended up serving Reagan very loyally for eight years and working down the hall from him for four years in the White House.

Q: This might be a good place to stop. Next time we will pick it up in 1978 when you are working on the campaign with George Bush.
Q: Today is May 19, 1999. You went to work for Ambassador Bush’s presidential campaign in March 1978. What sort of piece of the action did you have to begin with?

TUTWILER: To begin with, at that time former Ambassador Bush was on the executive committee of a bank in Houston and had an office there at the bank. A gentleman named Karl Rove, who today is running his son’s campaign, and I were housed one door down the hall so we had a separate entrance and door so all would be totally legal under federal election rules. In Bush’s bank office was his accountant, Don Roads, who has been with him forever, and his personal bank secretary. Her name was Darlene. So, when you say what were my responsibilities we all did a little of everything because there were so few of us. I had moved to Texas and the job I wanted was to be his scheduler. That is the job that I had all through the general election until we won not as President but as Vice President.

Q: How did you work being a scheduler two years before the election?

TUTWILER: At the time, former Ambassador Bush, we called him Ambassador Bush at the time, was on a number of boards. He was on the Ely Lilly board, the Purelator board, the bank board, so he had a lot of business activities. In between that he was a popular speaker for the Republican Party throughout the country. He had friends who were interested in promoting him to run for president. He had events that he went to and did for other members of the Republican Party who were running for the Senate, House or governorships. He has more energy than any human I have almost ever known in my life even today at age 75. He was rarely not on the road. It was constant either with business or helping other colleagues or working for his own exposure. At the time;. George Bush didn’t even register on any Gallup poll as a serious contender for the presidency. He had had an illustrious career but most Americans do not follow who is the ambassador to the United Nations, the first envoy to China, Director of the CIA or chairman of the Republican Party under President Nixon and former congressman. So, to get the general public knowing him we never lacked for anything to do. He was constantly traveling.

Q: As the scheduler did you have a plan in mind?

TUTWILER: Some of it was reactive. Some of it was preordained. You knew the key states to go to. He knew who his personal friends were from his time in Congress and other jobs that he had had. So, there is a rhyme and reason. You wouldn’t just go to Hawaii because it takes three days of travel out of your life. So, it is common sense, political sense and a little bit at that point of going where people wanted you. We were very busy. We had a newsletter that we put out. There was correspondence to answer, etc. It was everything. That goes with building a national organization from scratch.

Q: Was Ronald Reagan the person to beat on the Republican side?
TUTWILER: As I recall, yes.

Q: What other candidates were there?

TUTWILER: I believe that Bob Dole, Howard Baker, and John Connally ran that year among others. I have been involved in so many general elections and Republican primaries that the candidates kind of run together. As I remember, there was a pack and Reagan was the frontrunner.

Q: Jim Baker; where did he fit in at the time?

TUTWILER: At this time he was in his law firm, where he had been practicing law for 22 years. He resigned from the law firm during the Ford administration to come to Washington as the Deputy Secretary of Commerce. He returned to that law firm after Ford lost the election but at the time I moved to Houston, he was running for Attorney General for the state of Texas and was fully occupied, as he should be, with his campaign. He talked on the phone with George Bush, and would come by the office at times to see him, but he was very busy on his own campaign and it was always understood that if he did not win the Attorney General race, George Bush wanted him to run his campaign for President. As it turns out he did lose the race for Attorney General, although he did get 47 percent of the vote, which was the largest percentage any Republican had gotten in a statewide race in Texas. After losing the race he almost immediately joined Bush’s campaign as its chairman in charge of all aspects of the effort.

Q: As you get closer to the campaign were all your efforts beginning to pick up points in the polls for Bush?

TUTWILER: I don’t remember at what point we actually got to 3 percent in the Gallup poll, but we had little buttons made, and I still have one, that just had the 3 percent on it. I can remember that we did not register in any poll as a viable candidate and then got 3 percent which was a great accomplishment. We were all really excited to have made it to the 3 percent mark.

Q: By early 1980 New Hampshire came up. Before that, how were the caucuses doing?

TUTWILER: It will be really hard for me to remember the specifics because it is a fair distance in the past, it is so rapid it goes so fast, and as I said since that election I have been involved in three additional campaigns. I do remember that there was a huge upset that propelled us into New Hampshire, which was George Bush winning the Iowa caucuses and that focused the national attention and the media and the political establishment took note. It was a major deal. A very good friend, Rich Bond, is credited with doing that in Iowa. He then went on to become, under George Bush, the chairman of the Republican Party. We went on into New Hampshire. Reagan at this time, I believe this is the right campaign, fired a number of his staff and things were not going very well for him. As I recall he won New Hampshire by a very slim majority. I don’t remember
when the other candidates got out. John Connally ended up spending $13 million and got one delegate, I believe in South Carolina and withdrew. But, Ambassador Bush, since Iowa as I can recall, was either a strong number two or strong three in every one of the states. In fact, we stayed in the election until the night of the Michigan primary which was probably some time in May. Because Jim Baker had been able to husband our campaign resources and not overspend at the beginning – everybody rode in coach including the candidate – it allowed us to be able to keep life in the organization and keep going. After the Michigan primary it was clear that we were not going to make it all the way, that Reagan was going to be the party’s nominee. So, Ambassador Bush came home to Houston off the road to have a meeting with Jim Baker, his family over the entire weekend to discuss whether he should withdraw and accept that he was not going to be his party’s nomination. At the end of that weekend, that is what he had decided and it was over. It was heartbreaking for all of us. A very sad, down day and period.

Q: There you are doing this for two and a half years or more and all of a sudden it is over. What do you do?

TUTWILER: By that time we had moved the headquarters to Washington, DC. Jim Baker had moved up here. The political staff basically had come up here. A lot of the admin staff and accounting staff had stayed in Houston. I had a one room efficiency in Old Town. After Bush’s withdrawal as a candidate, I packed up and moved home, back to Birmingham, Alabama.

Sometime that summer I got a phone call, I think from Jim Baker, asking if I would come work on the scheduling operation, the caucus operation, as a sign of unity at the convention in Detroit. I would be with him and some other of my colleagues. It was symbolic clearly for him to go, I actually did some real work. I had had some experience doing similar work at the Ford Kansas City convention. So, I ended up going to Detroit. At one point Gerald Ford was going to be the vice president nominee. As you know it turns out that President Reagan after too much tooing and froing over the whole Ford exercise called Ambassador Bush in his suite and offered him the vice presidency. On the floor at Detroit we had about 300 Bush delegates. It was a roller coaster convention over the VP selection. I remember calling home to my father saying I wanted a plane ticket home - I was so frustrated when I thought Ambassador Bush might not be Reagan’s selection.

Q: During any of this time, including during the campaign and all, did you have any contact with the Reagan staff?

TUTWILER: You mean me personally?

Q: Yes.

TUTWILER: I had a ton of contact once Bush was put on the ticket because I was one of the 20 or so people who were chosen to move to the Arlington general election headquarters and work. About 11 of us Bush former staff who were put on the payroll of
the general election working for the Reagan/Bush ticket at the Arlington headquarters. The other nine of us were on the airplane with Bush. Again, I went back to my scheduling role. I had five people working with me to implement every single day the VP nominee’s airplane with all the press and staff and everything that went with that. There were tons of Reagan people compared to the small group of Bush people and I had a great deal of contact with them. Many of them I had known before.

Q: I would imagine that relations between the two groups would have been oil and water to begin with or did it work fairly well?

TUTWILER: It worked fairly well to tell you the truth. People wanted to win and I don’t remember a great deal of unpleasantness or divisiveness at all. There were some bumps in the road. What large organization does not have them? There was one gentleman that was an irritant to me and I’m sure I was an irritant to him, but we made it work. He ended up being in the NSC (National Security Council) and I in the Chief of Staff’s office. A general election is only ten weeks and there is so much that comes at you every day from the other candidate and the media. The organization is built overnight because by law it is at midnight of the night of your party’s nomination that you get federal funds. You can’t spend a dime before that and you have to stay within the budget. There are a lot of components to this. It is a very large, fast paced operation. The only analogy I can give you is a huge corporation you have erected in 50 states in ten weeks with the goal in mind of staying within the law, keeping your troops happy, not making mistakes, preparing for the national debate on the candidate’s issues. It is a lot of pressure, extremely long hours seven days a week, ups and downs, pressure, etc. Your guy can have a bad day and you spend two days cleaning up bad headlines with everyone pounding on him. After all, these men are human beings. Yes, they are bigger than life because you see them on TV all the time, but behind the scenes they are human beings. You have so many constituencies in our country and our culture that you must not only be politically correct about but must not alienate. You have to be careful what you say because the American people are listening and they are going to hold you to what you say on the campaign trail. If you say you are not going to bomb X country, you sure better be able to explain that once you are elected and you announce you are getting ready to bomb that country, why did you change your policy? It is not a thoughtless process for the candidate. He has to know his core beliefs, be up on all the issues and be aware that politics after all is the art of compromise and being able to form a coalition large enough and deep enough of a diversified number of Americans to pass legislation that supports his policies.

Q: Talking about the staff. Was George Bush used in some ways to represent the foreign policy side of the campaign?

TUTWILER: I think they had going into it different elements within the Republican Party. George Bush was viewed as a moderate and his father was viewed as somewhat of a liberal, so he had the establishment east coast moderate wing within the Republican Party. Ronald Reagan was stereotyped as a very conservative wing of the party, the wing of the party that cared a great deal about social issues. To tell you the truth, between the
two of them there wasn’t a party problem. I know, for instance, when Gerald Ford got the nomination in the first campaign I ever worked in, there were Reagan Republicans in leadership positions who told me they were not going to help. With George Bush on the ticket you did not get that feeling within the Republican Party. The reason that is important is where are you going to get the worker bees to put up the yard signs, to put bumper stickers on people's cars, and go to the shopping malls in all 50 states. I don’t recall a lot of foreign policy. We had the hostage situation. I don’t remember that President Reagan misspoke on that issue.

Q: No, he didn’t.

TUTWILER: I think that for the opinion leaders on the east coast there was a comfort level in that George Bush was more of a known entity, a stable person, a person who had handled large portfolios. Governor Reagan had been Governor twice of a large state but was less known and I think there was a genuine concern over who was this person. So, reaching out and putting George Bush on the ticket I think put if there were doubt, and there were people who were trying to defeat Reagan saying he was a war monger and was going to drop the nuclear bomb, etc. George Bush I think lent to President Reagan a lot of knowledge, a lot of experience that President Reagan had not necessarily had. He had had different types of experiences. So, I felt that the two men complimented each other. Other than the hostage situation, I don’t remember that foreign policy was a big part of it, but my memory may be serving me wrong.

Q: There was some disgruntlement over the Panama Canal but these things were sort of done anyway.

TUTWILER: Yes, it could be said he inherited them. I think there was a sense in the country, fairly or unfairly, I happened to think it was unfairly, that President Carter no more had responsibility for the hostage situation than you or I did. But, American politics being what it is, in my opinion, it did enormous harm to his ability of being reelected. Reagan, for the luck of the draw, benefitted from it just as it was very hard for those of us in the Bush administration to sit on the lawn of the Clinton White House for the Rabin-Arafat handshake. President Clinton hadn’t done a thing to make that happen. But that is the luck of American peaceful politics and the change of power.

Q: I would think as a scheduler, particularly as this goes on, sitting there and looking at the polls and trying to figure out the next place to go to try to capture...

TUTWILER: I don’t want to mislead you that I was making that type of decision. When you are in a general election there are people way above what I was doing. I was an important implementation wheel. I would be able to say, “We have been to Illinois seven times in the last month,” but I was not determining, nor was any one person, what states you are going to. Yes, you are driven by your own pollsters in many instances and if you see a huge swing in your three day or overnight tracking, you may be forced to call the place already on the schedule and apologize stating the candidate has to go to another state instead. So, the scheduling operation is a nerve center. Every train has to come to
your station. If the finance people want a fundraiser they have to come to you. If the political people want him to do something. If the Spanish group or Greek group want him. If his family does. If his wife does. It is not that you are the decision maker, but you have to maintain the moving parts of his schedule or manage them. You are a responsible implementation division, the center of a bicycle wheel. If you with your staff cannot coordinate the schedule, it is just a massive undertaking and you have to have your head screwed on. You cannot forget that there are three hours difference from California to here. You have to figure out flying times. You have to figure out crew times on the airplane. There are FAA rules against flying more than 15 hours. Well, the candidates will keep flying for 24 hours. So, you have to work out with your vendors that there has to be a crew change in Dallas in order to get to Chicago, to Charleston, to Miami, etc. It is just constant. And, you are not scheduling one person. There were up to 72 people on that airplane. So, when you look at overnights, you have to have 72 hotel rooms, a motorcade that can haul these people to the hotel. There is just a lot that goes with it. So, you have a core group at the headquarters and then you have your advance staff out in the field and your local officials you are working with. Just the politics of who greets the candidate at the end of the runway when he comes off the steps - the state chairman, the national committee man, the senator, the congressman - and, what is the proper protocol seating at dinner, who gets a private meeting with him, is there time for a photo-op, etc. There are just a million details that come at you and it is every day. But, I was not deciding which states he would be going to next.

Q: What about coordination with the Reagan side of this? I assume there were times when you would want to go jointly and other times when you were spreading people all over the place.

TUTWILER: But, again we were the Vice President’s staff. Ronald Reagan won the nomination and his staff were in charge. Jim Baker was on the third floor and I was on the second floor. So, in the strategy meetings, he was asked to attend for his input, and especially because he had run Gerald Ford’s campaign and came from behind 33 points in the general election, his expertise was appreciated and valued. But, the Reagan team was in charge. When it got to be 1988 and we were the candidate I can tell you a different story. It wasn’t unpleasant but the Reagan staff would determine, as they should, where it is most effective first and foremost to send the candidate and where the vice president nominee should go. I don’t know who did this but somehow I would be told. It was probably Dean Birch, who was a lawyer here in town and very close to George Bush, and who I knew from the Ford days. Dean, I guess would go to these meetings and say, “We have to be in Illinois on Saturday or Tuesday.” Sometimes I would say, “No can do. You all aren’t thinking here, so we have to unravel” or, “We will do our dead level best to make it work.” There are also hundreds of invitations that are coming in by phone or by letter and there are must dos. Let’s say every general election the Hispanic club in Florida has an annual dinner. Well, somebody has to go and you have only four that you can send. First and foremost everybody wants the candidate, then the VP candidate, then they want the spouses. Then you start with the adult children and after that with other famous Republicans. So, there is a whole operation that schedules all those people all over the country. Some form of this goes on every four years. It is a big undertaking.
Q: At a certain point did you realize you all were going to win?

TUTWILER: I will tell you a true story. I don’t remember which debate it was but I know it was in Ohio. This was with Ronald Reagan. Keep in mind, I personally had worked pretty much against Ronald Reagan for seven years for Gerald Ford and for George Bush. I think Ronald Reagan’s staff had done him a disservice. I had bought into that all Ronald Reagan could do was talk using a 5 x 7 card. The night of the debate I was in my little efficiency on South Alfred Street in Alexandria, Virginia watching it all by myself. I knew there were no 5 x 7 cards because it was against the rules. At the end of the debate, Jim Baker, who was with the candidate, called me and said, “What did you think?” I had already voted absentee in Alabama. I had obviously voted for Ronald Reagan. I told him that I no longer questioned my vote. He said to me, “Are you serious?” I said that I was dead serious. He said, “We have won this election.” Reagan in that debate performance blew me away all the nonsense that somehow had gotten put out there that this guy really was just a 5 x 7 card. That wasn’t true. Since then, for the eight years I worked for him, I was as ardent a Reagan supporter and as loyal as I knew how to be. I have the utmost and honest true respect for him. He is larger than life. I was wrong about him before. I have said this many times. I don’t regret working for President Ford and President Bush at all. But, I had been very wrong about Ronald Reagan. It is funny how life works. I ended up working in his first four years of his White House 25 feet down the hall from the Oval Office and traveling all over the world with this gentleman. Probably the greatest President in my lifetime. He was just magical and, like I said, larger than life.

This truly did happen because Baker knew that I was skeptical or just wasn’t there, so he called that night. And when I told him my honest impression and reaction to the debate, he felt like we would win.

Q: Do you have a feeling that as sometimes happens some of the people around the candidate, although they want the candidate to win, try to diminish them to enhance the feeling that they are in control?

TUTWILER: I was a kid and you get emotionally caught up in this. I had never really paid attention or seen a different Reagan.

Q: When he won what did you hope to get or feel might be your role?

TUTWILER: The only thing I was ever interested in was what goes on in the West Wing of the White House and how does a President make a decision. As it turned out, when we won, I don’t know what I did in the transition. Transitions are extremely difficult also. I was in Baker’s operation but transitions are just a nightmare. It was a good group of people. It was Richard Darman, David Gergen, John Rogers, others and me in our little group. I had a little experience through scheduling of dealing with the national press, especially when we were a small operation and had gotten to know my dear friend, who has recently died, Ann Devroy of The Washington Post. Another good friend of mine, Doug Brew of Time magazine, who died while we were working in the White House. I
had to work with them because we didn’t have a White House press advance. So, when Baker was named by Reagan, a huge surprise as Reagan’s Chief of Staff, I went to Jim Baker and said what I really want, and I don’t exactly know what the job will be, is exposure on the President’s side of the ledger, not the Vice President’s, possibly handling all of your press if there is a role for that. Be your executive assistant, whatever, and then we will figure it out. I had a reputation as a good worker and he had observed my work, so he was delighted. I went and met with Vice President Bush at Jackson Place and had a one-on-one meeting with him. I said, “You know how much I love you and am devoted to you and your family. But, what I personally was interested in was the President’s side of the aisle.” He said that it would be great, Jimmy’s office would be right next to his in the West Wing. I saw George Bush all the time whenever he was in his West Wing office. So I had the best of both worlds still getting to see him and working with the Chief of Staff, Jim Baker.

The first day of the Reagan White House, I can remember driving up West Executive Avenue, which is inside the White House compound, pulling up at whatever time we were allowed in, we had done all this preparation work which was just unbelievable, and parking at space number 77. I was thinking that this was absolutely unbelievable. And walking into the White House, the first floor of the West Wing where my office was, a little bitty cubbyhole, was overwhelming. I will tell you that by the end of the day, I never thought about that again because it is a job that you are immersed in. I remember that the phone consoles were blinking with all these lights and the people who had had a problem the day before spoke to President Carter’s people who were answering those phones, but today they still had the same problems. They didn’t care if they were talking to Betty the day before they still wanted the Chief of Staff’s office and they were talking to Margaret on this day. A peaceful transition of power from one administration to the next. It is a hard and tiring process on the incoming staff.

It is true we have the most peaceful transition of power in the world, the way it should be, but we had hardly put our briefcases down when real Americans had real things they wanted their government to do for them. I remember after being there for hours, going up to the woman sitting at the front lobby receptionist desk to ask where the ladies room was. Point being, a new administration has so much to deal with in the early days, everything big and small, like finding one’s way around the West Wing. The woman was Nell Yates, a careerist who had sat outside of President Ford’s office and other presidents, a wonderful, wonderful lady, who is now deceased. I knew who she was but I can’t remember if I had met her before or not in the Ford days. You just walked in the West Wing and it all started. I meant what I said that by the time I drove out of the West Executive Avenue gates I didn’t have the same feeling that I had when I walked in that morning. It was “I’m exhausted, this is real, this is a lot of work, a lot of chaos, which was typical of a new job,” but this one was incredibly fast paced and constant.

I rarely had that pinch yourself type of experience. I think it would be uncomfortable for the people who work inside a White House because if every time a President, Cabinet member, or Vice President steps out of his office and it is “Golly gee,” it is not helpful to them. They should be able to walk up and down those halls without being interrupted for
autographs or “May I take your picture, Sir?” It is an office in there. Yes, of course, you are aware when the President or Vice President is in the hall and it is a thrill. But, on the other hand you kind of get used to it and you are totally always respectful of the office and the man. If he walks into a room, of course you stand up. When you get out of that cocoon and you see the thrill, as you do, of screaming Americans on rope lines, in ballrooms and who are just so excited to meet a President or see a President, it reminds you. You don’t get jaded in there but there is a decorum that is appropriate and it is understandable so that those two gentlemen, especially, are in an environment as much as possible where they are not on stage.

Q: After the first short period, how did your job sort out?

TUTWILER: What it sorted out to was predominately dealing with the White House press corps that covers the President and the Executive Branch for the Chief of Staff, Jim Baker. Talking to them in the background, rarely ever was on the record or wanted to be quoted. Scheduling meetings with him, spending time with them, getting them answers from Jim Baker, appointments with Jim Baker. On his immediate staff he had two secretaries, a research gentleman and me. The way the hierarchy in the White House is set up, all people answered through the Chief of Staff to the President. I also oversaw pretty much his schedule and the coordination of that. I helped him on staff personnel matters. The White House is full of a lot of egos. It is a very exhausting place for the staff. It is all consuming. There is a lot at stake for your President, for his legislation, for his place in history. The Chief of Staff’s office is the nerve center. In the Reagan White House they had set up three nerve centers. There was Mike Deaver, Ed Meese and Jim Baker. Even though Jim Baker had the title of Chief of Staff, Deaver and Meese had clearly been with Reagan since he was Governor. There were frictions from time to time between Baker’s staff and Meese’s. Meese had policy development. Mike and Jim Baker hit it off beautifully. There was rarely any tension at all between those two.

Q: He was more on the political side, wasn’t he?

TUTWILER: He was more the person who knew the body and who knew President Reagan and most important was very close to Mrs. Reagan. So, Mike really was a good barometer, a good loyal person who always had Reagan’s interests at heart and foremost in his mind. He wasn’t consumed by policy debates or administrative matters. He was the president’s man. He served a very important function. Mrs. Reagan trusted him. He made sure that her wants, desires and programs that she was involved in were always taken care of. Jim Baker really didn’t have to spend much time on that at all, which was a huge help to Baker.

Q: That can be a very difficult situation. When you came in as Baker’s assistant was the example of Jody Powell sort of in your mind? He had a very bad reputation of not returning calls particularly from Congress.

TUTWILER: Well, number one I was not the President’s press secretary. That’s the job that Jody had. Number two, my title at first was executive assistant to the Chief of Staff’
and at the end of one year I had graduated to being a special assistant to the President, which is a commissioned officer, and then up to a deputy assistant to the President for political operations running the political office of the White House. Jody Powell is someone I have always admired and liked. He has been in both private and government and been very successful in both areas.

As far as returning phone calls in a timely manner, that pretty much comes naturally to me and it came naturally to Jim Baker. Jim Baker never left the office with calls unanswered. If he had been unable to return an elected official’s call or important press call, someone on his staff had called and said, “He had been in a meeting for six hours, do you need me to pull him out of the meeting?” He tried by the end of the day to complete every phone call but some days it was simply impossible. A lot of what I did for him was hand holding and making sure that people knew that he really wanted to return their phone calls but had been in back to back meetings or his mother was in the hospital or he was traveling, whatever. In my mind, I was somewhat his eyes and ears in protecting him from a lot of long arrows and hatchets in the back. The Chief of Staff position is a very tough job. It was especially tough when he was viewed with some resentment by some in the Reagan camp and suspicion by others since he was clearly a Bush man and had a friendship with George Bush at the time of over 35 years. It was pretty extraordinary for Ronald Reagan to reach out to his opposition campaign manager and ask him to be Chief of Staff. I personally think that it was the smartest thing that Mrs. Reagan and Mike Deaver ever did, because it was their idea, because Jim Baker is such a capable manager and negotiator and I believe contributed enormously to Ronald Reagan’s success in a smooth and orderly fashion. He is just an extremely talented man. But, it was not a big love in. He made mistakes, everybody does. So, a lot of what I did was to look out for him and if I could make his life run smoother, or less turbulent, or whatever, and contribute to freeing him up from having to spend time on other types of things and allowing him to concentrate on doing big picture things for the President. Then I tried to.

Q: There is always a problem with a new administration because the people who run the campaigns often aren’t the people who should be in the jobs and there is a sorting out.

TUTWILER: It was very hard because people who got the elected officials where they are in some instances do not fit into a governmental job. I was lucky. The press corps which I had had some exposure to and had to work with during the two years of the campaign are definitely part and parcel of governing. So, I had already developed some knowledge and skills of dealing with the national press corps which meant there was a way for me to fit into a governmental job and have the opportunity to grow and either make it or not make it. Some of our really good friends did not get jobs in government and they had been very instrumental and worked their brains out to get George Bush where he was. I’m sure the same was true on the Reagan side. Transitions are difficult. You walk into a government building and you have hundreds or thousands in some cases of careerists who “are looking for direction.” What is the President’s policy going to be? What is the President’s legislative agenda? It is a lot coming at basically a handful of people in the early going. You feel terrible over some really good friends who are my age
and we all worked together in the campaign and some do not get the jobs they would like or a few people have no job offer. It is really hard and sad.

**Q: But, you had some experience.**

**TUTWILER:** I had some experience but I also have very good organizational skills and memory skills and chose an implementation area that exposed me to a wide range of individuals. So, I was lucky. It worked based on what I earlier had carved out as what I wanted to do.

**Q: What about the White House press corps? This is more of a doubter beast than any other one. What was your impression of it seeing it up close?**

**TUTWILER:** I lived with it. The people that you know by name I would talk to every single solitary day. It is part of their job and part of my job. Sometimes it would be ten times a day. To this day, some of them are still very good friends of mine. Some of them are not what their TV personas are. By and large the ones that I spent the most time with were the people I respected. I could and would have enormous arguments with them. They could hurt my feelings and write ugly things about me, my friends, Jim Baker, etc. But, they also wrote very nice and fair things. I have to be candid and say when you are living it, it’s irritating, frustrating, maddening and you have a real love/hate relationship. Away from it, that tends to fade. I have been screamed at by many of them who were a lot older than I and nationally known people over nothing. But, they were under competitive pressures to be first from presidential appointments to policy.

The White House press corps is a hard beat. The quarters in the White House are small, cramped and it is unpleasant. They really are dependent on shouting at the President to get information. They spend all day from their booths in the back of a press room calling people like myself begging to talk to a principal, Jim Baker, or for me to go ask Jim, or I don’t understand this, can’t you get clarification for that, I’m getting ready to write tomorrow the following. You learned all their tricks. But, I found dealing with the press was part and parcel of governing and if you sincerely treated them with respect and if you listened you could learn a lot about what their editors or what they were thinking which means that is what they are probably going to be writing about. So, if you wanted to get your side into that story, I don’t know how else you would do that if you are not dealing with them. Getting up and having a piece in the paper that is factually incorrect or sends you ballistic, if you refuse to take their phone calls, it is not their problem because you would not talk to them.

I also believe that they can wear you down, drive you mad, ask the same question 150 different ways, but I made some very, very good friends in that White House press corps. I liked them. I personally enjoyed the intellectual argument. I fundamentally enjoy the back and forth of arguing. I like matching wits. I like being challenged and they are very challenging on a whole number of fronts from an adult care and feeding when you are traveling with them and then saying they don’t like their room to writing about the Chief of Staff’s initiative in a way I never thought of and think how could you possibly have
interpreted this this way, this is not at all what was intended. There were members of the press corps that I did not have a great deal of respect for, primarily because all they did was whine and complain. But, by and large, I liked them and enjoyed my job because it was very demanding and challenging and I learned a lot by having that job.

I will say in fairness to the White House press corps, the nature of the job forces them to be pretty much generalists because they have to deal with the political portfolio and the domestic and foreign. When I went to the Treasury Department and to the State Department, the individuals there had as diversified portfolios but they are deep and you are dealing with only one basket of issues and those reporters in many respects were tougher to deal with because they knew their substance deeper because they had the time to do so. I am not denigrating the White House correspondents. They work hard, too. I could get asked the Ford administration, Secretary Kissinger said... Well, I’m standing here in 1992 and what do I know? So, they could also tie you in knots over you just changing one word of Middle East peace policy. The Department briefings are just more detailed in the specifics of the policy.

I enjoyed working with the Treasury and State press corps more because there was no politics and by and large they were a very intelligent group of men and women who knew their portfolios very well. In many instances, they had spent years working on those issues before the Department.

Q: What about trust? There are some people you can talk to on background and they won’t break your confidence and others who will listen to what you say and completely warp it around.

TUTWILER: You learn. They are human beings and it is just like any other large group in any large organization, some are great, some okay, and some not so good. You know who is professional, who gets in gray areas, who is sloppy, who is lazy and talk to those people accordingly. For instance, again at State, foreign accredited press at the State Department in many instances, especially from, let’s say, Middle Eastern countries, are not necessarily reporters at all. They are representing a political party or are on the government payroll. So, they are not our concept in the United States of true independent press here. So, talking on background to foreign reporters when they have a different cultural definition of that word I just did not do. I did not even do off the record unless I had really developed a friendship with the reporter because there is a totally different understanding. In Washington you will learn really fast if there was a reporter from The Washington Post that didn’t work out because one of our colleagues came downstairs in the West Wing and said that the gentleman had just put what he had done off the record in an article in The Washington Post. Well, from then on I was polite and would return the gentleman’s phone calls but would no longer have a candid conversation because I was scared to. That is how that would happen. You would know or soon learn who you could trust in the press corps. If they burn you, they are not out of business, that is nonsense, but they know they will never get a candid conversation out of you again and I would not lift a finger to help them on principle.
You get a feel for these people as they get a feel for you. As I said, the core group, The New York Times, The Washington Post, the three networks at the time, The Chicago Tribune, The Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal, you deal with every day. Sometimes four or five times a day you deal with the same person. So, they know my strengths and weaknesses and I learn theirs. You also learn deadlines. I learned that The New York Times goes to bed earlier than any publication on the east coast and that the first broadcasts are really at 6:30 on the east coast. You know if they are calling at 5:35 saying it is urgent, it is real. Newsweek is calling me Monday night at 5:30 and leaves an urgent message. I know they don’t go to print until Friday at noon and don’t really jump through a hoop there. The press corps learns if I tell the truth or not. There are a lot of people who serve who do not really level with the press. If you don’t tell the truth then I was not doing the job I was paid for because then they will stop using me, stop calling me and I get out of the information loop on what they are thinking and getting ready to write and that is a disservice to the man I work for.

Q: How did you know what Jim Baker was up to and doing during your Chief of Staff period?

TUTWILER: The first floor of the White House is very small and compact. It is hard not to know who was seeing who. I could tell you most of the appointments Ed Meese was making because I could see his office straight down the hall. George Bush’s vice presidential office was literally right next door to the Chief of Staff’s. It was a very tiny area. It is hard for people to imagine. It is like living on top of each other. A lot of time that is how rumors get started. It was hard to hide much. If Shirley Temple was on the first floor of the West Wing, it would be hard not to know that. Yes, I could be buried in my little cubbyhole on the phone with my back to the door, but you just kind of know what is happening.

Q: So, chances were you knew what Baker knew?

TUTWILER: Not really. It depended on national security issues that I usually wouldn’t know and didn’t want to know. He protected me. Let’s say the Grenada invasion. He was accused in this administration as being a big leaker by some. I don’t think that he was. I don’t recall ever, and I would sit in on most of his press interviews, of his just coughing up information. I don’t buy into that, but because Baker was so successful, that was what the enemies tagged him with. At times my curiosity would be killing me but I would never ask him, for instance, “Are we going to invade Grenada tonight?” Why? Because he knew he would be suspect if it leaked, I would be suspect, which would be a reflection of him, and I then would also be able to continue taking press calls for him saying that I didn’t have any idea of what was happening. One of those press calls could have been from a network (before CNN) that says “We have people stationed at Fort Bragg and we know these airplanes are taking off and we are going on air saying this won’t you tell us something?” I was considered one of Baker’s inner circle. I wasn’t a Cabinet officer, I wasn’t a full assistant to the President, but to the degree that it was appropriate, I was there in his office and listened to discussions and debates and would be part of them if it was appropriate for me to throw in my own two cents. We were all a team.
Q: One last question before we stop at this point. How did Baker deal with members of the Cabinet? This is always tricky. You have a Chief of Staff and you have Cabinet secretaries and this can get a little sticky.

TUTWILER: Very well. Again, I go back to an earlier statement that I made, Jim Baker has exceptional skills. He is very good at dealing with people. He understood completely his role, even though the Chief of Staff is the most powerful job next to the President of the United States. He could have on behalf of the president policy debates with different Cabinet officers. It would be unusual if he didn’t. He was never anything other than a gentleman, which he is. He was raised that way. He is not a shoot from the hip type guy. He is not a flamboyant guy. He does not have an explosive type personality at all. He dealt with Cabinet members the same way he dealt with ambassadors or heads of state, etc. He would work with them on their needs and concerns. I don’t remember any serious trouble. I’m sure there were bumps here and there. Look at what he did when he swapped jobs with Don Regan. He gladly gave up all that power to go to another department and be more his own boss.

Q: We shall stop at this point and pick it up next time talking about your overseas trips with Reagan.

TUTWILER: Okay, if I can remember them.

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Q: Today is August 24, 1999. You were in the Reagan White House from when to when?

TUTWILER: For the first term of Reagan’s presidency.

Q: That would be from 1981-85.

TUTWILER: Yes.

Q: And Jim Baker was Chief of Staff. I think we have covered most of that haven’t we? No, I don’t think we have, let’s go back a bit. Your principal job was doing what?

TUTWILER: When we first went into the White House, I was the executive assistant to the Chief of Staff. Basically I was kind of a jack of all trades with my principal responsibility being the handling of the press for the Chief of Staff. I then at some point, I think it was the first of the year, was promoted to a special assistant to the President, a commissioned officer, still assigned in the Chief of Staff’s office and with still basically the same responsibilities. Sometime before the 1984 reelection campaign I was promoted to deputy assistant to the President which is also a commissioned officer in the White House. I inherited the political shop when Ed Rawlins resigned and Lee Atwater went over and got on the President’s campaign payroll. So, I basically was the liaison with the Republican Senatorial Committee, the Republican House Committee, the Republican
National Committee, the campaign and the White House for the presidential election cycle.

Q: You mentioned being a commissioned officer. What does that mean?

TUTWILER: It is a tradition in the White House. There are three levels of commissioned officers. There is the assistant to the President, which is the highest ranking commissioned officer. Then there is the deputy assistant to the President and special assistant to the President. Your pay is determined by Congress. It is a tradition to have a commission. I have kept all of my commissions. I don’t really know when the tradition started or why, but it determines your seating at events, it is a protocol ranking, and it determines your salary.

Q: Does Congress have to approve these?

TUTWILER: Not in the White House. At the Treasury Department I was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The same was true at the State Department. Those are also commissioned officers. But, at the White House you do not have to go before the Senate. In the departments at the assistant secretary level and above, the Congress determines your salary.

Q: It varies with administrations but in the 1981-85 period, what was the rule of the Chief of Staff, Jim Baker?

TUTWILER: I would disagree a little bit with your premise of your question, I don’t think fundamentally it does differ. I think that a Chief of Staff to a President is surely the most powerful position in our government. That person represents the President in such a wide array of issues and is the President’s eyes and ears and is the chief person to implement the President’s legislative initiative. I believe that a President’s power is really derived from his legislative successes. The person is at the right hand side of the President in all matters, whether political, domestic or foreign. It is an extremely powerful position. However, it is staff and a Cabinet member who runs a department and has a little more autonomy and is number one at the head of the pile. So, when Jim Baker and Don Regan switched jobs, Don Regan wanted the power, Jim Baker wanted to be out on his own and run his own department, the number two department in our government.

Q: You say you worked for the press corps for the Chief of Staff. What were your instructions on how to handle the press and the role of Jim Baker in the administration?

TUTWILER: I really didn’t have any instructions as I recall. It was something I had an instinct for, had a handle on having worked with the press during my campaign experience. After all, I worked in the Bush campaign for over two years. I knew many of the reporters from that experience. I happen to believe that the majority of press relations, at least in that time, were based on personal relationships that were built up. The Chief of Staff office on any given day, depending on whether there was a crisis or not, could get tons of press calls. Almost every day I would talk to The Washington Post, The New...
York Times, the networks correspondents that were covering the White House. Again, the reason they wanted to talk to the Chief of Staff is that the Chief of Staff in many instances on behalf of the President is putting together strategy, the game plan, implementing on how it is that you are going to get what the President has enunciated as his policies or his legislative initiatives. I would say almost 100 percent of the time because I prefer it, and I thought it was more appropriate professionally, I was only on background, which means there is no attribution to my name. I was not interested in promoting myself, plus I felt that it was inappropriate. But, they knew that I knew Baker’s thinking and had a reputation for being candid and honest and not misleading or playing cute games with the press. I have never, while serving, coughed up cold a piece of information that would have been in my mind a straight out leak to someone. When they have misinformation I have guided them off of it. I have worked very hard in instances to shape the story or shape what was going on the evening news that night, etc. It was very demanding and wearing work. But, I enjoyed basically the give and take back and forth. I viewed it as my job to try to get Mr. Baker thinking correctly in the press articles.

Q: I would have thought, particularly initially, you would have had a press which more or less represents the eastern establishment that was looking with a certain amount of questioning on the new Reagan administration. Here was a former actor coming out of California and his seriousness was questioned.

TUTWILER: I think your actions solve that problem, I don’t think that words do. I think that the President’s initiatives and conduct once sworn in send signals that the press interprets whichever way they want. There was enormous scepticism about whether Reagan was a warmonger and all of that junk. Through his administration, people came to see that he was anything but a warmonger. He gets high marks in my mind for surrounding himself by and large with a good Cabinet, a strong staff. He did not come to town and blow up the city or do all these things that had been associated with him. The serious press corps prints by and large “here is what’s happening” for their readers. They may not have ever voted for him, I am quite sure they did not, or support some of his policies, but if the President came out and said we are going to do x, they can question it, etc., but they have to write what are his initiatives, what is he doing.

Q: You said serious press corps. Did you sort of divide the corps up in your own mind?

TUTWILER: When I was in the White House I believe there were about 2600 journalists accredited to the White House. Many of those you would never see. The most press that ever come to the White House are for instance a huge event on the south lawn. For instance, when President Sadat visited, the place was packed. For Queen Elizabeth’s visit it was packed. But, day in and day out the working press corps at the White House is probably, I’m guessing now, about 200 people. And, of that 200 people you didn’t play favorites but you knew the importance of the opinion leaders who read everyday The New York Times, The Washington Post. You knew the public, because it was the largest outlet, watched the evening news. Yes, you tried to make sure that your message is accurately getting to multiple audiences, opinion leaders and the public. So, you would
be foolish to not take those gentlemen’s or women’s phone calls every day to find out what is on their minds, what are they following, what are they tracking and what is their interpretation of it. It would just be dumb in my opinion.

Q: The president had a spokesperson already. How did that work?

TUTWILER: There was no problem whatsoever. First there was Jim Brady and then when Jim was unfortunately shot, Larry Speakes took his job and for a while there was a co-job with David Gergen. Larry, Jim or Dave were speaking on behalf of the President. The press corps there was sometimes totally in sync and sometimes it wasn’t. The Chief of Staff has under him the congressional shop and people would call to find out what he was doing to implement such-and-such. Many times you would be answering the same questions over and over again. It could get very tiring.

Q: I know when you were the spokeswoman for the State Department you would get little snippets from the various bureaus every day to tell you what’s up and the appropriate response on a subject that you might not be familiar with. Did you have the equivalent in the White House?

TUTWILER: That is the press secretary’s job, not mine. He is out there enunciating on behalf of the President the President’s policy on interest rates today, on U.S.-Russia policy, etc. He is answering those types of questions and yes, there is a process through the NSC and through the departments where he is given the exact same type of guidance that the various spokespersons, predominantly in the Pentagon and State, are given. If he anticipated that morning that he was going to have a question on a Japanese economic issue, his staff would call Treasury and find out what the guidance says. If something flares up in East Timor, then somebody on the NSC staff relates what’s going on.

Q: Early on in the Reagan administration there was talk about a triumvirate of Meese, Deaver and Baker. Did you have the feeling there was and how did you deal within this if it existed?

TUTWILER: I dealt very well within it. Mike Deaver and I developed a very good strong friendship. He developed an extremely strong friendship with Jim Baker. Deaver’s office was two doors down from mine and there was absolutely no problem whatsoever. With Ed Meese I had a very warm cordial relationship. The press stirred up a lot of Meese/Baker stories from time to time. I was very sensitive that Ed Meese, after all, had been with Governor Reagan for years and years and that it was highly unusual that Reagan reached out and asked someone who had worked against him, for President Ford and President Bush, to be his Chief of Staff. Baker was very sensitive to that also. Prior to the transition he and Ed Meese sat down and agreed upon and initialed a piece of paper of here is what your responsibilities are going to be and here is what mine are going to be. They kept pretty much within those guidelines. Baker really had all of what I call the functioning arms of the White House and Meese had “the policy shop.” Baker surrounded himself with people who had had previous White House or executive branch experience. Meese, at first, surrounded himself with people who had all come from
California. I think there is a steep learning curve in Washington, DC and it was a difficult nine months for Ed Meese and his team. And, yes, from time to time he and Baker in a gentlemanly and professional way disagreed over policy initiatives that the President should or should not do. That would spill over into the press many times, but as far as the relationship inside it always was cordial and professional. Deaver served an enormous function for Jim Baker since he had a very close relationship with Mrs. Reagan and worked very closely with her. In addition to all of the things that he knew about President Reagan and what settings to put him in, etc., an enormous amount of his time was spent in the east wing with Mrs. Reagan.

Q: What role did Judge Clark play? He was a personal friend of the President’s and was in the State Department part time and then came over as National Security Advisor I believe at this time.

TUTWILER: I think he was the second or third national security advisor. He was a very nice gentleman and goes way back, as you know, with the Reagans in California, but I would say that he was not universally respected as a strong NSC advisor. That may be fair or unfair. The foreign policy community made that judgement.

Q: That is the impression I got. Maybe he wasn’t that informed or interested really in foreign affairs. Did you have to work with the NSC in general?

TUTWILER: No, there was a gentleman who was the NSC press person. I rarely, nor did the Chief of Staff, ever get foreign policy questions. I don’t remember that being on my radar screen a lot, until President Reagan invaded Grenada or there was some huge big deal. Basically, Baker stayed out of foreign policy deferring to the NSC and the State Department. To some degree, of course, Jim Baker was definitely involved in foreign policy. He was a member of the National Security Council and attended all of those meetings.

Q: How about the problems of leaks, one of the age old traditions in Washington? People within the government if they are advocating a policy will often leak something to the press to gain some momentum. The White House is often one of the major sources.

TUTWILER: Leaks are irritants to all Presidents and some leaks are very damaging. I think that leaks are irritants to all senior administration officials. But, Baker’s attitude, and I concur with it, is that you don’t spend a whole lot of time on it. You are disappointed that someone leaks. You are disappointed that someone preempts the President’s announcement. You are disappointed that someone spoils the President’s policy initiative. But, it is part and parcel of governing. When Presidents have tried once in a while, when they have really had it, to track down a leaker it has never worked. Sometimes innocent people get accused of doing things they didn’t do. Leaking is just part and parcel of the drill as far as I am concerned.

Q: Did you feel that your staff and people around Baker were pretty disciplined about this?
TUTWILER: It depends upon your definition of discipline. Someone could accuse me of leaking but I don’t see it as leaking at all. If I was talking to a reporter and trying to put my opinion or my interpretation of whatever they were asking me about, I don’t see that as leaking, but someone else down the hall could scream that I was leaking on the phone to The New York Times or to NBC News. So, I think leaking is a matter of what shoes you are walking in. Other than a pure leak in my mind is if you knew who the president wants to appoint to the Supreme Court and you called up your pal who works for The Washington Post and just dumped it out, I think you should be fired for something like that. That is why appointments normally have to be held so closely so that there are no leaks and it is next to virtually impossible to pull any kind of surprises regardless of whether it is a Democratic White House or a Republican White House. It is just very, very difficult to do. Too many people get involved in carrying out a President’s agenda.

Q: Did you get involved in the appointment process?

TUTWILER: A little bit sometimes. I knew about Sandra Day O’Connor. Baker trusted me and I had her file in my desk drawer. So, I knew that she was going to be the President’s nominee to the Supreme Court.

Q: For the record this is the first woman to be appointed to the Supreme Court.

TUTWILER: Right. He sent a guy named Pete Rousell, who worked in our press office, who I had known from Houston and so had Baker, out to Arizona. Pete had been Vice President Bush’s press secretary when Mr. Bush was chairman of the RNC. Pete and I used to talk every day. But, this was all totally, totally in secret. I can’t remember but I don’t think that one leaked until the president announced it. There was speculation that she was one of the people being considered. But, I think all of us collectively were successful in keeping that appointment a secret until the President announced it.

Q: Did you go on any trips with Baker?

TUTWILER: Again I go back to my statement that the Chief of Staff’s schedule is dictated by the President because he is staff. So, Baker went on the vast majority of every domestic or international trip that the President went on. I in turn then as a member of Baker’s staff went on them. He did work out with Meese and Deaver trips where they could rotate and take different duties. In the summer when Reagan would go to his California ranch, Baker, Meese and Deaver, and thus their staffs, would alternate weeks. So, I was honored and privileged and lucky enough to go on an enormous number of domestic and international travels with the President.

Q: What would Baker and obviously you be doing on an international trip?

TUTWILER: A whole host of things. Our government doesn’t stop nor did Baker’s role in it. All kinds of things come up for Presidents whether you are out in California or in Japan. It was just a traveling office. The only difference is that you are in a hotel or an
airplane, but it’s a work day and in many cases a very long one.

Q: This would be true on domestic travel, too?

TUTWILER: Yes.

Q: When you were traveling with the President say to Denver to make a speech, would you be involved in the local politics?

TUTWILER: That would have already been pre-cooked. A President normally doesn’t just pop into a city. It is usually on his calendar weeks in advance. The White House has an entire political shop that talks to the local mayor, governor, congressmen, senators, etc. There is a whole rigamarole that goes with a President traveling, or at least when I was in the White House. Do the two senators want to travel with him? Do they want to be at the event? Do congressmen want to be at the event? Does the state party chairman need to be at the event? Does the finance chairman need to be at the event? There are offices in the White House who handle all of that. A President gets many, many invitations a week to speak to the annual cattlemen show, annual rose growers show, the AMA, etc. It is never ending. He could do nothing but travel. A lot goes into it and Deaver was responsible for figuring out what is the President’s message, what may need to be coordinated with Congress, what is it that lends itself to him going and giving a major substantive speech before this audience on that.

Some of the President’s schedule is done years in advance. Economic summits, for instance, are set way in advance. So, there is a lot that is put on a President’s schedule that are just the demands of the office. Whoever the President of the United States is, he is expected to be at the economic summits unless the seven nations decide to do away with those summits. You just don’t pop down somewhere. You have to work out all of the financing of it. The secret service has to be in on an advance. An advance team goes in and determines which routes the President is going to go, who he is going to meet, who is going to be on the dais with him. Who the President should acknowledge goes back to the speech writer. It is a multifaceted machine with a very deep dedicated staff that executes presidential travel.

Q: Was there a cadre of staff that sort of stays in the White House when the presidency changes? People arrive with empty filing cabinets and have to start almost from the beginning, but I would think that there would be a professional group of people to remain at the White House.

TUTWILER: That is the career side of the White House and they out number the political appointees of the White House by law when we were in government. I think the President could have 331 political people inside the White House complex. Now, the White House complex is the main house, the East Wing, the West Wing, the Old Executive Office Building, and the New Executive Office Building and it covers 18 acres. There are well over a thousand people, everyone from the Park Service who takes care of the grounds to the curator’s office who takes care of the priceless paintings, rugs, etc. Those people are
careerists and always stay with the house. The political appointees come and go depending on elections. In the West Wing, for instance, the majority are political appointees. But the guards, the ushers, the mess stewards, are all careerists.

Q: I can understand that and those are what we call support personnel. But, how about people who know how to get things done within Washington? The equivalent to office managers and secretaries who have been around through a number of administrations and know whom to call.

TUTWILER: That is determined by your Chief of Staff. Most Presidents come to town and bring their campaign employees who have never been to Washington, DC. I maintain that they have a rougher go of it and it takes a longer time for them to adjust. During the transition when Jim Baker prepared for going into the White House, for each of the spokes of the wheel that he had responsibility for he chose people who had previous, preferably White House executive branch experience. He, in my opinion, left the others in the dust because his people just had the experience. It wasn’t that the people who came from California were bad people, they weren’t. But, they had never been in the federal government and there is some advantage to having had that previous experience.

Q: Turning back to being a spokesperson for Jim Baker, did he make it clear that he did not want to be somebody who stood out very much in the press?

TUTWILER: He did stand out in the press just by his job. All Chiefs of Staff are put under a microscope or in the spotlight whether they want to or not. At the time, one or more journalists wrote him up as the most successful Chief of Staff since Sherman Adams for Eisenhower. So, that just added to more and more press coverage. He was very articulate on TV and represented the administration and the President extremely well. He got very, very high marks and was in reality extremely powerful and very capable.

Q: Was there any concern when the administration came in that you didn’t want to see a sort of Henry Kissinger come in who was power grabbing and interested in making an independent name for himself?

TUTWILER: I don’t remember that at all. After all, I was young and not at the Cabinet level, etc. I don’t remember any of that. The only sensitivity was clearly the sensitivity over myself, Jim Baker and some others, who had clearly worked against President Reagan for George Bush for two years. I had also worked for Gerald Ford. You could understand on the staff level a feeling of who are these people who have these jobs, who are traveling around the world with our President. I was very sensitive to that. We were the outsiders and in some people’s minds we were the enemy. We were not pure Reaganites. That was something I was sensitive to. It was not like that every day, in fact, I made friends with lifelong Reagan people who today are still my friends. However, there are still some today who view us as the enemy. I believe and have a totally clear conscience that I was 101 percent loyal to President Reagan. I had the utmost respect for him and I worked as hard as I could in my job as working for the Chief of Staff which
was indirectly working on behalf of the President and his policies.

*Q: From your perspective, how did Vice President George Bush fit into the White House operations?*

TUTWILER: I think that generically speaking, the Vice President of the United States can be one of the worst job in America because there is no constitutional line of authority. The Vice President and his staff, regardless who is President, are at the mercy of the President and the President’s staff to delegate, “Here is what I want you to go do.” Having said that, it is also the most powerful job in the world because you are one heartbeat away from becoming President of the United States. But, Vice Presidents are expected to be the chief political fundraisers for their parties. They spend a lot of time out with the party people. That in turn helps them in their own desires to be President because they are staying in touch with the state chairmen, the country chairmen, the committee man or woman. But in recent administrations, the Vice President has played a larger and larger role across the board.

Specifically going to Vice President Bush it was the best of both worlds for me because his office in the West Wing was right next door to Jim Baker’s so I got to see him all the time. I absolutely adore him, I am wild about him and his family. I have worked very, very hard for him. But, I was more personally interested in, the only selfish thing I was really interested in, was what goes on in the West Wing and how does the President make decisions. That was what I was curious about. I had never been curious about what a Vice President did. That is just a peculiar quirk of mine. So, I got to see him all the time. His staff were obviously a majority of my friends from the campaign. It was perfect.

*Q: How about keeping the Vice President informed?*

TUTWILER: Jim Baker did a very good job of that. He looked out for his friend and made sure that even if by accident, there was never a slight. If the Vice President had been left out of a meeting, not included in a meeting, he was right there to make sure that the Vice President was, and that it was appropriate that he was.

*Q: Did you find, particularly initially, that there was a certain amount of maneuvering among the people within the White House to exclude the Vice President?*

TUTWILER: No. Not at all. George Bush is an extremely likable person. He had conducted himself in the campaign in such a way that he had not antagonized the Reagan people and they clearly saw how much President Reagan liked him and welcomed him. After all George Bush had had more federal government experience than Ronald Reagan and was not someone who just rode a pony into town. He had been CIA director, UN ambassador, envoy to China, and congressman. Enormous experience. He knew in his mind exactly how he wanted to conduct himself as Vice President and obviously how Washington worked. I do not remember any petty games going on at all. He was treated with respect by everyone.
Q: Did you get involved with dealing with Congress? I should imagine congressional staff would be calling to ask what was going on and what they should be getting ready for.

TUTWILER: No, I did not. Jim Baker conducted a daily staff meeting, I think at 7:00 am or 7:30 am and he asked Max Freedisdorf, the assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, someone he had known previously in the Ford days, and Max was the point person on his staff with Congress on behalf of the President and the Chief of Staff. Jim Baker also hosted in his office every day a legislative strategy meeting. So, he was intimately involved in mapping out, determining legislative strategy and in working the Hill personally himself.

Q: So, you wouldn’t be getting the calls they would go through Freedisdorf?

TUTWILER: Absolutely.

Q: One of the things I have heard is that the foreign press obviously is terribly interested in what these Americans are doing because it impacts on them, yet the staff around the president is particularly interested in getting the story to The New York Times and The Washington Post because they influence votes. Were you aware of the importance of getting the story out to the foreign press and dealing with the foreign press, particularly the main opinion makers?

TUTWILER: Was it a high priority? No, it was not. There is a limited number of hours in the day and there are other people in government who had that responsibility. USIA, U.S. Information Agency, comes to mind. The State Department comes to mind. The Treasury Department if it is an economic issue. The Pentagon. I do not remember, but I’m sure from time to time I would get calls from British reporters with requests for doing an article on Baker and I’m sure the majority of the time he cooperated. But, I do not remember on a daily basis getting calls from foreign reporters. I can’t talk for the press office, but I’m fairly confident that the majority of their time was not spent with foreign reporters either.

Q: You had the other end when you were over at the State Department.

TUTWILER: At State there were more foreign reporters but the priorities were such that the majority of reporters who come for the daily briefings are Americans and the majority of my time was spent with the American press.

Q: Donald Regan, Treasury Secretary, who later became Chief of Staff with mixed results, you might say, was a very strong person and you might also say self-centered. How were your dealings with him or did that come up at all?

TUTWILER: Because I worked in the Chief of Staff office I got to know all of the Cabinet officers who were frequently in the Chief of Staff’s office. I got to know them because of my location, where I sat, the job I had. I liked Regan very much. He is a
charismatic guy and clearly was successful in business and in Wall Street. His experience in Washington was not as successful. That happens from time to time. Some people just do not easily transition from the business world or the medical world to the government and government people in many instances are not successful when they get out into the business world. As Chief of Staff, it just didn’t work for Donald Regan.

Q: How about Alexander Haig? Was there a problem almost from the beginning as Secretary of State? He didn’t last very long.

TUTWILER: No, he didn’t. The impressions I can remember are that he got awfully concerned with what he viewed as slights and what the White House staff viewed as pettiness. There was a time when we went to Windsor Castle in England when President Reagan was visiting Queen Elizabeth, and Secretary of State Haig got very upset that he and his wife were not in the President’s lead helicopter. There was a time when we were in Barbados over Christmas and President Reagan was staying at Claudette Boqette’s home and a call came in from Secretary of State Haig, I believe he was at Andrews. At the time two airplanes in the presidential fleet don’t have windows, and one of those airplanes was the one he had been assigned by somebody to use on an important mission to South America and he felt that it was insulting for the Secretary of State to land wherever he was going in South America in this plane without windows. So, there were little irritants like that. I want to be fair, from his moccasins he felt that certain individuals in the White House were playing games, maybe they were, I don’t know, but he blew up quite a lot.

Q: What was the relationship between Chief of Staff Baker and Alexander Haig from your perspective?

TUTWILER: Professional. I don’t think anyone inside the White House on the President’s staff was sorry that Secretary of State Haig resigned. It had been a rocky rough road. It just didn’t work out.

Q: How about George Shultz when he came in?

TUTWILER: George Shultz was welcomed by everyone with open arms. He was calm. He was not an explosive personality. He was well respected and regarded and well though of. He did a good job for President Reagan.

Q: Let’s move on to the Treasury time. There was this major switch between Donald Regan, Secretary of Treasury and Chief of Staff, Jim Baker. Were you privy to this coming up and how did it happen?

TUTWILER: I knew all about it because at this point I was one of Jim Baker’s trusted advisors. It was no secret that Jim Baker felt that as Chief of Staff had basically worn out his welcome and used all of his quivers in his backpack by two years. Every Chief of Staff has said that. There are just so many times that you can use your chips, etc. He had said that to President Reagan when President Reagan asked him in California to take the
job. So, in his mind he had stayed two years longer than he felt was good for the President and was healthy for himself and he wanted out. There was no secret about that. In fact, there had been an attempt to make him the NSC advisor and that fell apart when U.S. ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Meese, Bill Casey, CIA and Bill Clark told the President that they would basically all resign if he appointed Baker. They were not pleased at all.

**Q: What was the problem as you saw it?**

TUTWILER: That Baker is not conservative enough nor steeped enough in foreign policy and they just blocked it making it very difficult for President Reagan so the whole thing fell apart and Baker graciously told the President he understood why it was not going to work. That was an Oval Office meeting after the NSC meeting.

**Q: I would have thought that Judge Clark was clearly not qualified as national security advisor.**

TUTWILER: But, this is part of palace intrigue and he is not a fan of Baker’s. So they just blocked it and it was all over. One day Baker went to lunch at Treasury with Don Regan in his private dining room and Regan suggested a job switch knowing that Baker wanted out after four years. Baker said, “Great. Let’s do it. And are you serious?” He came back and had Deaver discuss it with Mrs. Reagan and I think she was fine with it. I believe either Baker or Deaver discussed it with President Reagan and he said fine and it was announced. It happened relatively fast.

**Q: It happened when?**

TUTWILER: I think we showed up at Treasury in January, 1985.

**Q: So, it was essentially another administration.**

TUTWILER: It was after the election, yes. And the election was fabulous. I was one of the people who was on the airplane with President Reagan for the entire 1984 campaign. To-date it was the most popular campaign I had ever been in. The country was in love with Reagan and the crowds were unbelievable. We traveled all over the country. In fact, we did make a stop in Minnesota one morning, which was an unexpected stop, and they started announcing it on the local radio saying that President Reagan was coming and people were literally getting out of their cars and running across these fields to see the President. It was the first time because we went on such a spur of the moment that Air Force One landed and used a jetway and we did not use the traditional steps that you always see on Air Force One. The secret service didn’t have any choice. They had been told the night before that we were going to land in Minnesota, I don’t remember which city, and they couldn’t find steps and we had to land at a jetway. The President of the United States got off the plane just like every other normal American using a jetway. But, it was the greatest to date win for a President winning all 49 states. It was a terrific experience. It was a time for whatever criticism there may be about its commercials on
It’s Morning Again in America, and was a very exciting, positive, upbeat, wonderful experience.

Q: What was your role on all these trips? Was it still sort of keeping the business of the country going?

TUTWILER: I had become Deputy Assistant to the President for the political office, so I was the liaison to the President’s campaign staff. There are very strict rules about what you can and cannot do of a purely partisan political nature on government federal property. I can’t remember what I did on these trips but I was the overall liaison person with the campaign. I don’t remember any specific function, there are a thousand different things that go on during a general election. I have been involved in six in my lifetime and it is a compressed building of a major corporation in basically ten weeks of a general election. There are not enough hours in the day for the amount of things that are coming over the transom at you from small and insignificant to the large. It is practically a 24 hour, 7 days a week job. The campaign staff, and in this instance we were inside the White House, do everything it possibly can to assure the guy wins. I did what Baker wanted done at the campaign headquarters and would try and get things done at the White House that the campaign needed.

Q: You were no longer part of the Chief of Staff office?

TUTWILER: I was both.

Q: I would think that the business of the government goes on, who was minding the store?

TUTWILER: Jim Baker. The store goes wherever you are. The President has, as you know, the most sophisticated infrastructure as far as communications of probably any person on the face of the earth. So, it doesn’t matter if the President is at the Bethesda Naval Hospital, or in downtown Istanbul. His infrastructure, secure communications, cable, secure phones, go wherever the President is. All of that exists on Air Force One. So the President is never out of communication with the nerve centers of the United States government.

Q: After the election was there a time when you were wondering what you were going to be doing?

TUTWILER: At some point the switch came up and it happened quickly. I personally had no interest in going to Treasury. I didn’t know what I was going to do but wasn’t interested in what I perceived to be the subject matter before that department. Dick Darman, who was going over to Treasury as the number two person, came to my office one day or I went down to his office, and talked me into going. He said to me that I cared about taxes and the number one issue we were going to be wrestling with was tax reform. That rang a bell with me as something I could get my hands around, believe in and get emotionally attached to, so I went to Treasury. As it turns out I adored it, I loved it and it
is a wonderful department. I had no idea that the Treasury Department’s portfolio had such a large international component. I found that fascinating. I think in the first year that Secretary Baker was there, he launched at the Plaza, the Plaza Accord. He founded and formed the G-7. He was a very activist Secretary of the Treasury. I found that in my day to day work I was not involved in esoteric, technical, economic issues which had been my perception and is not my strong suit or something I’m really interested in. It was much more the international side which were issues I could definitely get up to speed on, understand, internalize and articulate. It was a fascinating experience. In fact, I found life out in a department, granted this is the second or third most powerful department in the government, much more interesting in many respects than life in the fishbowl of the West Wing of the White House.

Q: Why?

TUTWILER: Because you have an opportunity out in a department to set your own priorities to some extent and to learn in depth issues. Inside the White House you are more of a generalist. As I said earlier you have international issues, domestic and political issues. If you get into a department that basket is narrowed so you have an opportunity to learn more. The Cabinet officer clearly has the opportunity to set the priorities and to formulate, massage and determine policy and then go over to get or not get the president’s approval. It was just an exciting place to work. I thoroughly enjoyed it. It is one of the second oldest buildings in Washington, DC architecturally. It is very similar to the Old Executive Office building on the White House compound. In fact, the Treasury Department is now part of the White House compound because of security reasons. I looked out my windows at the east wing of the White House and south lawn. I had a gorgeous, huge, huge office with an old traditional marble fireplace, huge gold leaf mirrors, etc. It was just a stunning office and really large.

The careerists there were very knowledgeable and by and large very helpful. I thoroughly enjoyed the international aspects of it. I can’t remember all the trips I took but for instance, it was my first exposure to Saudi Arabia. The United States government and the Saudi government have a Joint Economic Commission so you alternate each year back and forth with the finance ministers. The Secretary of Treasury overseas is called the finance minister.

We would meet the President at the economic summits because at these summits you had the finance minister, Secretary of State and the President. So we would fly in for most of those and I can’t remember whether we flew with the President or not.

Q: Could you describe how a day would go with Secretary Baker? How did he operate within the Treasury Department?

TUTWILER: It had some of the same components as the White House. You have a congressional shop, policy shop, press shop. I don’t remember a typical day, in fact I would argue there are no typical days in government at the level he was serving. He normally, as I recall, was in his office, as we all were, between 7:00 and 7:30 am. I don’t
recall the time of his first staff meeting at Treasury. To be honest with you I don’t recall if he had one every day. Across from the Secretary of Treasury’s office is a private conference room that he used a lot for staff meetings. He also had a private dining room as part of his complex as well as a private elevator entrance where he comes in every morning. I don’t want to miss-speak, but I think there was a gentleman from one of the finance divisions in Treasury who every morning would give him a briefing on the overnight markets. I cannot remember at this point if he had a CIA overnight briefing. His day was full of appointments. He had to testify quite a lot during a year before various committees both in the Senate and the House, finance committees predominantly and the oversight committees for the budget of the Treasury Department. Meetings with foreign ministers who were in town. Meetings with American CEOs who have problems either overseas or domestically. He had a weekly lunch with the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Paul Volcker.

Because State, the Pentagon, the Attorney General and CIA have a gentlemen’s agreement not to ever do partisan activities, Treasury is the number one Cabinet post that is called upon to go out and do fundraisers for various candidates who are running for governor, senator or congressman. Jim Baker certainly did a fair amount of that, after all he had come up through politics so he followed that tradition and kept it up. He was most interested in the international side of the Treasury Department, in my mind, secretly so he could enhance his credentials for possibly being Secretary of State, a job that I thought he would be interested in. So, he devoted a large part of his time to the international side of the portfolio within the Treasury Department. He had meetings with his top people at the Treasury Department. I believe there are eight assistant secretaries. I just don’t remember a typical day, that was 15 years ago.

Q: Your role was?

TUTWILER: My title was Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Public Relations. The press office came under my preview, as well as the public liaison office. I had a number of shops that traditionally go with that job, but I can’t remember them all.

Q: Were you dealing with a different type of newspaper person?

TUTWILER: Definitely.

Q: All the major newspapers would have a financial treasury type.

TUTWILER: Sure, it is different. To mention it again, the individual reporters were not generalists. They had by and large spent years on that beat covering some form of that beat. Once you get to Treasury they could care less about who is up, who is down, policy intrigue. All of that went away. It was delightful. They cared about the fine nuance and the specifics of individual policy changes, policy initiatives, implications of x, y, or z. Their basket is narrower and they have the ability to concentrate on the subject matter before that department.
Q: I would imagine that they would have professionals with whom they had been dealing with for a long time in the Treasury Department as contacts. Was this a problem for you?

TUTWILER: No, I never viewed it as a problem because Baker was such a powerful individual. If someone on the third floor of the Treasury Department felt that they knew what the policy was they were sadly mistaken. The reporters quickly learned that if they really wanted to know what the policy was they better deal with Baker’s or one of his close aides. That was true also at State. Many careerists had very strongly held preconceived ideas based on their experiences of what the policy should be. And that is fine. But, if it wasn’t what the President’s policy was or the Secretary of State’s, it wasn’t going to go very far. The President and his Cabinet and senior staff set policy. Baker was very aggressive on developing good policies for the President.

Q: Were there any restrictions on press members wandering the halls of Treasury?

TUTWILER: As I recall, at Treasury all the press wear press badges, as do all the Treasury Department personnel. It is a secure building so everyone wears a badge of some kind. I think they could walk into anyone’s office and talk with the receptionist if so-and-so was available. That was true also at State. You did not find that happening very often though to be honest with you. We were all busy people and so were they. It was much more efficient to make appointments.

Q: From a Treasury perspective, how did Donald Regan work with Secretary Baker?

TUTWILER: He works very well with Secretary Baker. I don’t remember any major policy disagreements. Once Regan became Chief of Staff he had an entirely different portfolio that he and his staff had to learn. I don’t ever recall that Secretary Baker felt that he was second guessing him at all. In fact, on a number of issues, Baker would get him brought in as Chief of Staff to whatever it was he was trying to do. They clearly had a good understanding of the other’s portfolio.

Q: The Cabinet triumvirate was always Treasury, State and Defense. These were the most powerful departments.

TUTWILER: They still are.

Q: You had a situation when you had Casper Weinberger as secretary of defense and George Shultz as Secretary of State who had worked together, knew each other very well and didn’t like each other from all accounts. In your observation did Baker sort of act as mediator between the two?

TUTWILER: No. He was aware of what the situation was when he was Chief of Staff and tried always to conduct himself as an honest broker and to do whatever needed to be done to help get the President’s policy done. I don’t recall him ever being a mediator between the two or ever being asked by either one of those gentlemen asking him to. But my memory is probably wrong. I know he was close to George Shultz and tried to help
Q: On international affairs, how did Treasury interface with the Department of State, particularly the Economic Bureau?

TUTWILER: The Economic Bureau at State, in my mind, has never really been front line, nor should it be. Treasury is the front line. Treasury sets the policy on behalf of the President and his initiatives. Alan Wallace was one of Shultz’ people who he brought in as the economic person at State. But, I don’t think there was ever any question of who was in charge, since that gentleman as I recall was at the Under Secretary level and Baker, of course, was at the Secretary level. There may have been irritants at the staff level, but I don’t recall any. There was just no question of who was in charge of United States economic policy on behalf of the President.

Q: George Shultz had an extensive background in economics.

TUTWILER: It was not a problem. He and Jim Baker were very close allies on a number of fronts and George Shultz having served in I think three previous Cabinet positions did not try to micromanage someone else’s portfolio. He had enough to manage at State. He was very good, as I recall, about not trying to have two Cabinet posts at all. He and Jim Baker collaborated on numerous things and worked very, very well together.

Q: How about trade negotiations? These, of course, have a strong economic side but also have a diplomatic side to them. How did this work out during this time?

TUTWILER: At Treasury, I don’t remember. Clearly those things that are the province of the USTR (U.S. Trade Representative) are USTR’s. I think there were some joint meetings. I think the USTR representative does come to the annual OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) meeting in Paris. Treasury again is in the lead. Treasury is the honcho. So in the interagency process, staffs would have already coordinated whatever the United States’s intervention was going to be or the United States’ position. Treasury is not the chief trade negotiator, USTR is.

Q: On the international side, what were some of the major things that you were involved with at Treasury?

TUTWILER: The creation of the G-7 was a Baker initiative. It was launched at the Plaza Hotel in New York during our first year. We also had the greatest stock market crash that had ever happened since the great crash, while Baker was Secretary of the Treasury. There were others but I’m blacking out at the moment.

Q: What was the purpose of the G-7 as Jim Baker saw it?

TUTWILER: I don’t remember the details of why he decided to do this or where he got the idea. I just can’t recall. I definitely remember being at the Plaza Hotel press conference and the mob scene of reporters.
Q: The G-7 is a major deal which continues to this day and there is no reason to believe it won’t continue on.

TUTWILER: It was really exciting. It was great fun being at the Plaza Hotel. It was on a Sunday, as I recall, and there was so much press we were overwhelmed. You couldn’t even get into the room, it was unbelievable the amount of press. So, it was a major deal I’m well aware of, but I don’t want to freelance with you over why he took this initiative. For the record it is all in his book. For my part, I misjudged the amount of press interest in this meeting and announcement. I just way underestimated the impact.

Q: Your role with international meetings was what?

TUTWILER: Again, talking to the press predominantly. I had under me all of Baker’s scheduling and under advance operations I had all of the liaison shop and the press shop. So, again I had a little bit of many aspects of what went into his operation. I was one spoke in the wheel of a handful of people who did what we could to support him in his efforts to be a successful Secretary of the Treasury on behalf of the President and our country.

Q: Jim Baker’s method of organization was to have a relatively small group of people who he trusted and dealt with and then they operated according to his orders. Is this correct?

TUTWILER: Yes and it worked very well. We were a handful of people who had worked together at that point, some of us for five or six years. We knew each other's weaknesses and strengths. We were in many respects like brothers and sisters. We could yell at each other or congratulate each other and nothing was taken personally. But, he did not cut himself off from the building. That was vastly exaggerated. You could go today to the Treasury Department and talk to a number of professional careerists and I think they will tell you that they had the utmost respect for him. They had access to him. But, working with a handful of people was the way he preferred to work and it worked for him. There was resistance to it also at the State Department, but I think in all candor there is resistance at first to whoever comes in. The careerists want to run policy and think they know more than the political appointee, and in some instances I am sure they did. In many instances I used to laugh and say they don’t recognize elections and a President who is entitled to have policies that are proven wrong and then the people will throw him out of office. There were some careerists at that building who he definitely depended on and had access with, they were part and parcel of his planning whether he was going to go to Sierra Leone or not? No, they would put in a recommendation and our job was to weigh the merits of their recommendation with other things and what was in the best interest of Jim Baker - wear and tear on him, should he go to this forum or go to that forum, etc. That was not their thing but was our thing. Our jobs were different with respect to accountability, responsibility, and management.

Q: You say, as a Cabinet member, he was sort of given permission to be the principal
Cabinet member to go out and do the political hustings. Was the scheduling of such activities part of your duties?

TUTWILER: I had people who would do that. The Secretary of the Treasury, because he is the highest ranking official who under the current system that has been in operation for years can go do purely partisan political fundraising. You get enormous pressure from your party’s chairman, friends in the Congress, people who are friends. The Secretary of the Treasury, if he is a powerful Secretary of the Treasury, is a big draw. So, all scheduling requests for the Secretary of the Treasury came not to my office but to people who worked with me. It was just part of the job.

Q: What about congressional relations? Was there someone who handled that?

TUTWILER: Yes, a whole shop.

Q: Under your office or elsewhere?

TUTWILER: It was under the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations at the Treasury Department.

Q: Taxes, etc. depend absolutely on congressional support.

TUTWILER: Yes. The tax reform bill of 1986 was a major, major overhaul of the tax system. It was a fascinating time to be at Treasury on the domestic front for the different constituencies whether they were the churches, the unions, the car manufactures, etc. they were getting affected because our tax code is so convoluted to begin with and there was no one who didn’t have a view over how this should be changed. Believe me. And so it was fascinating. It was very, very interesting. Jim Baker was the point person on that, working very closely with Congressman Dan Rostenkowski and Senator Bob Packwood, both who were chairmen on the Finance Committee from the Senate and the House.

Q: Did you get involved much in this?

TUTWILER: Yes, because I had the public liaison office and the press office. An individual who worked for me was responsible for babysitting and taking requests from American constituencies and businesses. There were many times the Secretary would have meetings with coalitions that had formed over specific issues. Don’t you dare touch this part of the tax package and here is why. That is part of his job to listen and understand the implications and ramifications if you go forward in the administration on passing this small part of this bill, here is what it is going to do to this entire sector of the American industry. So, yes, I was involved.

Q: The consequences are horrendous if you change it. How did this work with the President’s office?

TUTWILER: Well, the President was totally for it or else we wouldn’t be doing it. It was
one of the President’s initiatives. I don’t remember when the President announced it, but lowering tax rates and in order to do that closing some loopholes in the law was a priority in the second term. Jim Baker was the point person to get that done. Nobody claimed that he did it single handedly. Lots and lots of individuals helped on the legislature side and the executive side. But he was the point person and I can remember being at Treasury ‘til midnight sometimes when he was on the phone with Congressman Dan Rostenkowski or other congressmen arguing back and forth trying to figure out this and that and how to make the whole puzzle fit together. It was a trying time for the administration and for him. Long hours and a lot of stress. Pressure from so many interest groups and industries.

Q: I can’t think of anything more complicated.

TUTWILER: It was but he is a very smart and capable man. He handled it and got it done.

Q: How did you bring yourself up to speed on taxes?

TUTWILER: I learned that if you wanted an expert who is steeped in the five thousand plus pages of our tax code, that wasn’t me and that wasn’t why the press called me. There are experts in the building or in IRS which is part of Treasury to deal with those kinds of questions. Why they would call me was an overall general direction or a specific on lets say a special carve out or carve in. I probably would have been at that meeting. I was able to answer questions correctly because I had the access and was in the meetings over where the administration was or where Jim Baker was if it were a specific question. If it was an overall general question, I worked there 12 to 14 hours a day, part of his team and clearly knew in every instance, and if I didn’t I would ask where his head was, what was going on. That is why reporters call press secretaries. They are not calling them for the fine nuances. They know who they can call in the building for that. They are calling for what is going on with the Cabinet officer who after all is in charge of the issue for the President. My job was basically reporting, defending, and clarifying things about Secretary Baker and the issues he was working on for the administration.

Q: I think this would be a good place to stop. I will put at the end here that we have covered pretty much your time at Treasury unless there are some other issues that you want to make notes of to talk about. We will pick up how you moved into the Bush campaign and all that. We haven’t talked about that at all.

TUTWILER: Perfect.

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Q: Today is September 30, 1999. The Bush campaign. I think it was a foregone conclusion that you would be in the Bush campaign, wasn’t it?

TUTWILER: I think the decision was whether Jim Baker would resign as Secretary of the Treasury. That was an easier decision for him, to be quite candid, then when he
resigned as Secretary of State. He very much wanted his friend to become President and I think in the back of his mind, if he ever was going to become Secretary of State, it wasn’t going to happen unless George Bush became President. But, it was not something that he and President Bush had ever discussed because that was not allowed under our federal laws. But, he also more than what would happen to him wanted to see his friend President. After all he had given over two years of his life earlier towards this goal. It was not a big deal emotionally or any other way to quit and go over to the campaign. The campaign needed his leadership. It had been run by a committee through the primary season and committee work always has pluses and minuses to go along with that. Baker was unquestionably a big foot who came in and instilled discipline and order. He also had more experience running a national campaign than any other Republican around.

Q: You mentioned it was illegal to offer the Secretary of Stateship. I am not familiar with that. You can’t say if I am elected I will appoint you such-and-such?

TUTWILER: No one can offer a federal job in advance of an election. It is 100 percent not acceptable and not done even today.

Q: Well, there must be a certain amount of people saying if I’m elected I would like to have you on my team or something like that?

TUTWILER: Not people who were experienced in Washington, which George Bush certainly was, having served as the UN ambassador and director of CIA. He knew what the rules were. Jim Baker had been at the Commerce Department and at the White House so he knew what the rules were. It was a discussion that they had not had.

Q: I was just asking because people working on campaigns are considered to be prime candidates for political appointment.

TUTWILER: But, they don’t always get those jobs.

Q: I know. Very often they don’t. When you came on board the campaign, what responsibilities did you have?

TUTWILER: I’m pretty much a jack of all trades. After all, we were only going to be there for ten weeks, win or lose. To be honest with you I don’t even remember what my title was. Whatever Baker needed doing I did. After all, many of these people I had known and worked with for years. The President’s pollster, Bob Teeter, I had known since the Ford days. Lee Atwater I had known for years and worked with. So they weren’t strangers. Some of the people I did not know, but they were very few. So, it was going back into a family of colleagues and friends that I had known and worked with in previous instances. We all were there just to lend a hand wherever we could. Baker instilled the discipline as I said earlier. I did whatever needed to be done and there really wasn’t a defined role because people were already there doing specific jobs. I was a troubleshooter and implementer for Baker.
General elections are chaos. Basically it is erecting a U.S. corporation and building it and having it function for ten weeks and it is all over at the stroke of midnight. It is a massive undertaking. You are at the central headquarters but you are operating in 50 states simultaneously. You are dealing every day with whatever the opposition sends your way over the transom or unforeseen events that happen domestically like a hurricane, stock market crash or statement some senator says on the Hill. Those things are just constant. Everything for those ten weeks in our country is pretty much seen through a political microscope and a political prism. So, it is a very reactive and fast paced environment. And, then there is the whole international side of events. Country x invades country y. As a candidate you are immediately asked your reaction to that. Both candidates are. So, it is constant.

Q: What was your impression when you first came on board that you were getting about Michael Dukakis’ strengths and weaknesses?

TUTWILER: I honestly don’t remember what my impressions were. I know that some people at the campaign who had never worked with Jim Baker were leery and apprehensive and somewhat resented why do we need this person, we have gotten Bush this far without him. They soon saw Baker’s management style and very much respected him and were very glad he was there and relaxed. I don’t really remember what my personal impressions were of Dukakis. As the campaign evolved I increasingly felt that he was not in step with middle America and I think the public voted that way. Our job, of course, was to paint him into positions that were not probably acceptable to the majority of Americans and their job was to do the same to us. But, did I really have a personal impression before that of Dukakis, I don’t remember having one to be honest with you. I cared deeply about George Bush and his winning, but I had a full time job at the Treasury Department and day in and day out inside the department it is a different environment. Whereas the campaign people’s job day in and day out is to know every nuance and every small wrinkle about not only your guy but also the opposition. So, I don’t know whether I came there with strong feelings other than I clearly wanted George Bush to win. After all, I had spent over two years of my life earlier working very, very hard for him.

As the campaign progressed I can tell you that I thought Dukakis’ response to his wife getting raped pretty much crystalized in my mind that it can happen to anybody but after all campaigns are instant moments and that was a poor moment for him. I thought the picture of him riding around in a tank was frozen in people’s minds and that he had poor staff advice or however that picture happened. Bad pictures happen but those become impressions that sear into people’s minds. In my mind, in that picture he did not translate into a commander in chief with the American public.

Q: More like Mickey Mouse.

TUTWILER: It just didn’t work. It is the small things that you cannot anticipate when the public is paying attention and they usually are during those ten weeks, which can make or break a candidate.
Q: What about the Reagan staff? Did you find there was a distancing between the new Bush campaign and the retiring Reagan people?

TUTWILER: I think there are always tensions between a Vice President’s staff and a President’s staff. I think that the mature people who are involved in this effort both on the President’s staff and the Vice President’s staff understood there was a passing of the baton. President Reagan very much wanted to see George Bush win because that after all was a confirmation of President Reagan’s policies. At that time Ken Duberstein was Reagan’s Chief of Staff. I think he was his fourth Chief of Staff. They all knew that the President is still President, of course, but that the baton was going to be passed to somebody whether Governor Dukakis or President Bush. Ken Duberstein, I thought, did everything he could as did President Reagan and Reagan’s staff to try not to call on unnecessary policy problems for the candidate and then Vice President and also to campaign for him. President Reagan came to a number of joint events. I don’t remember whether he actually signed fundraising letters, but I never sensed that President Reagan wanted anything but for George Bush to win. Duberstein was the person who was our conduit and I knew that he did. There really wasn’t a problem.

There were larger problems during the primaries of the Vice President’s governmental staff having to have a whole other layer of the Vice President’s campaign staff. That always is difficult and creates tensions and awkwardness because the government people have to be very careful not to be using government personnel, facilities and infrastructure for purely political purposes and they have in some respects two different agendas. Campaign staff want the Vice President to be giving x, y or z events and the governmental people in some instances are saying no, no, he needs to be a Vice President at this event or that event. That is a very awkward type of relationship over many, many months. You see it today with Vice President Gore and his campaign staff.

Q: Once the campaign was in full swing, could George Bush essentially abdicate his vice presidency and go out and do things?

TUTWILER: Oh, sure. During the ten weeks of the general election, absolutely. Now, clearly constitutionally the Vice President does not have any line responsibility, it is all delegated through the President. Should something unforeseen happen to President Reagan, then Vice President George Bush would have to assume the mantle of President. But, other than unbelievable circumstances, the country accepts the Vice President as a candidate who will be out campaigning for those 10 weeks.

Q: Were you headquartered here in Washington?

TUTWILER: Yes. Over by the Riggs National Bank about one block from the Treasury Department. I think the building was called the Woodward building. It was a really crummy, rundown building.

Q: Just across the street.
TUTWILER: The Vice President will also have a foreign policy team and will have a domestic team. You have to of course be loyal to the President that asked you to be Vice President and you served, but at the same time you have to pick out your own position on issues. There is a sensitivity to it and a Vice President is going to be held accountable for the promises he makes in his campaign, not what his predecessor’s campaign was. You could have instances where Vice President candidate Bush could have said here is my views on our policy towards China and there may have been a fine nuance difference from the Reagan administration one. I don’t remember anything about that, but that is the type of sensitivity when you are an elected office holder serving at the pleasure of someone else. It is much, much easier to run a national campaign from outside of government than from inside the government.

Q: You were saying even though George Bush was a candidate- (End of tape)

TUTWILER: -he was still representing the President of the United States. So, he is in some respects not as free as a candidate who has no governmental role, no governmental responsibility. They are much freer to over promise, to make irresponsible statements, in my mind especially on the foreign policy side, than a Vice President is.

Q: There is always the primary one of saying Jerusalem should be the capital of Israel. That one has come up since 1967.

TUTWILER: I would have to go back to look, but I bet you would not see anyone who served as Vice President saying that. They would be people from outside government.

Q: Yes, they couldn’t.

TUTWILER: And then when they get in they change their mind and find a way not to say that again. I would be surprised if Vice President Gore would go out and say that today. He wouldn’t. Could Senator Bradley say it? Sure. And then when he gets into office he finds a way to gracefully say well they need to work this out and find a settlement, etc.

Q: Did your political apparatus get involved with congressional campaigns?

TUTWILER: To a certain degree a candidate does when you go into a state. If you are a thoroughly popular candidate then the governor candidate, senatorial and congressional candidates will all be at your events. They want the exposure with you hoping that some of your glow flows off on them. During the general election, everyone is pretty much on their own to run their race. And it goes the other way. If you are in a state and that governor is extremely popular you want him on the podium with you, on the train or bus with you because the voters of that state see that. But do you spend a lot of time during those ten weeks doing a lot of congressional or senatorial events? In all the ones I have worked in that really is not a big component of it. But, do you want their help especially the popular ones and want them in your photos and endorsing you? Of course.
Q: What was your impression during this campaign that we are talking about of the media? Was it in general for you, against you, independent?

TUTWILER: I don’t really recall. I deal with the press so much that I don’t recall noticing, to be honest with you, a big difference. It is one of the things that I did for many, many years for Jim Baker. I continued to do that when we went to the campaign. I think generically speaking it is a well known secret that the media is more liberal and Democratic then not. But, the professional media, and that I mean as a compliment, I don’t have a clue how they vote and I don’t want to know. That is mainly the older generation, the ones I really respect. I don’t recall that they made it any more difficult for us than say for Governor Dukakis. You have to remember also Vice President Bush was down 19 points and clearly the underdog. I don’t remember having some feeling about that, but my feeling about the media is pretty much that they have been consistent over the last 20 years.

Q: While you were in this campaign did you sense a feeling of moving up after Baker came on board? Were there issues or styles that were working better than others?

TUTWILER: I don’t remember when our numbers began moving up. I couldn’t even tell you what campaign trips I went on or how often Baker went out on trips. It is all a blur to me. I remember a very effective environmental commercial that we did about Boston harbor and how polluted it was just because of what Dukakis was saying. I don’t think I ever saw the Willy Horton ad that was so controversial.

Q: Could you explain what that was?

TUTWILER: That was a commercial that was done by an independent group in the primary season that was extremely controversial. Governor Dukakis had furloughed some type of prisoners and one who had been released, Willy Horton, had gone out and killed someone. So we had a black and white commercial of evolving doors of prisoners getting out of prison. That was effective. I remember what I called our warm and fuzzy commercials which were George Bush surrounded by Barbara Bush and all the grandchildren up at Kennebunkport, Maine. I don’t honestly remember when the numbers started to move or what the numbers were the morning of the election.

Q: From your observation, how did Baker work with Bush? Were they in close contact?

TUTWILER: Sure. They had at that time a 35 plus year friendship. The then Vice President Bush trusts Jim Baker. This is the second time he has asked him to come on his campaign. They had a very open, frank, candid, trustful, wonderful friendship. When there is bad news, Jim Baker doesn’t hesitate and when there is good news he doesn’t hesitate. When he thought it was in the best interest of the candidate to do x, y or z he would say so recognizing that the Vice President could take his advice or not take it. They communicated by phone. I don’t recall going out and traveling a lot on the plane. They talked all the time many times during the day.
Q: After the election was won in early November, what did you all do?

TUTWILER: I’m pretty sure we were all in Houston at that time. The next morning President elect Bush held a conference in Houston and announced two appointments. He announced Thomas Pickering as the UN ambassador, a career foreign service officer to send a signal in my opinion to the foreign service who had not in my opinion necessarily felt they had gotten a fair shake from the Reagan administration, meaning that the Reagan administration had appointed too many political appointees to ambassadorships. The second statement he made was that he had asked Jim Baker to be Secretary of State. So, from that moment forward we were in the business of transitioning into the State Department. Baker never wanted to be in charge of the transition, transitions are brutal and for about two weeks he had asked me to come with him to State, along with Bob Zoellick, who had worked with us at Treasury, as the executive secretariat. I don’t remember at what point Dennis Roth got into this. He had been Bush’s foreign policy guy and previously at the NSC. At some point he asked Janet Mullins, who had been in the Bush campaign and had previously worked in the Senate. At some point he asked Bob Kimmit to come back, who had been the general counsel at the Treasury Department and had also worked at the NSC in the Reagan days. I think in about ten days we moved to the basement of the State Department. He wanted out of the transition, and I’m pretty sure it was not very long at all. There was just a handful of us who moved over literally to some office in the basement of the State Department that they had already set up as a transition for whoever was transferring in as Secretary of State. Through the entire transition period, which as you know lasts until Inaugural Day, we worked out of the basement of the State Department.

Q: I recall, I wasn’t personally involved, but when the Reagan group came in in 1981, that it was almost a hostile takeover in the State Department, particularly for people who had anything to do with Latin America. But, when Bush came in he was a friend in a way having served as an ambassador, so it was not the trauma that seemed to come with the Reagan group.

TUTWILER: While you were at State during the Reagan transition at State I was going into the Reagan White House so I don’t know. But, I can tell you that the Baker transition into the State Department met with resistance, as with any department, but I think more so at State, where you are dealing with three layers. You had the political layer which is very small, about 92 political appointees, who go in with the Secretary of State out of a building that has 8,000 employees. Then you had the career foreign service layer and the career civil service layer. Previously at the White House and the Treasury Department you had two layers, political appointees, again a very small group except in the White House, and the career civil servant. That was a learning curve for us operationally as we now had an extra layer to deal with. That layer, with all due respect, sometimes seems to believe that they are the keeper of the keys to American foreign policy and elections were something that happened on a different planet so there is resistance. It had really nothing to do, in my opinion, with us as individuals. It’s like here is this new crowd, we know how to do this better than they do, they are novices and have to learn all this stuff, etc. You have to work really hard to gain the respect in my opinion generically speaking of
the foreign service. There are some absolutely, first class, terrific foreign service officers, many of whom were incredibly sincerely helpful to us, who would come up not in a patronizing way or in a way to ingratiate themselves to us, to say we actually were doing okay. One of those gentlemen is Jim Collins who is today our ambassador to Russia. I will never forget after weeks of a very difficult transition him saying that to me and I knew he was being sincere and it meant a great deal. And there were others.

But, what went on in the basement over there which was like one big conference room and reams and reams and reams of briefing books and papers, it was almost laughable. The guy who was in charge, I don’t know if he was an ambassador or not, Mel Levitsky, wheeled in the first day we were there a cart that out did any poundage that I have ever seen in DC. Having lived at State for four years I now know what happened. Secretary Shultz put out a memorandum asking everybody in the building to send to this new team all their policy papers, everything in the world. And all this was literally wheeled in. A fantastic foreign service officer, Pat Kennedy, was also helping us and he is an absolutely outstanding individual. But they did not intimidate Jim Baker and I don’t think it was intended to do so. I think it was an honest response to Secretary Shultz’s memorandum. Everyone was just trying to be helpful.

Baker methodically used this time in this small conference room in the basement of State to have briefings with the various components throughout State- The European Bureau, the Asian Bureau, the Middle Eastern Bureau, Consular Affairs, etc. At the same time, he worked with the President’s incoming foreign policy team, which consisted of General Powell at Joint Chief of Staff, Secretary Cheney at Defense, General Scowcroft at the NSC, obviously the President and State. So, it was a briefing in for Secretary Baker’s own confirmation hearing and also settling in. Each department in our government has its own rhythms, operating systems, yet we had had eight years of federal governmental experience which serve us very well. Everything wasn’t totally new. The building was new, where the front door was, how the security there worked, etc. those kinds of things that make transition work long and tiring, but fundamentally it served our country well, in my opinion that you did not have someone in Jim Baker not coming in off the street who didn’t even know acronyms. Having served President Ford and more importantly Reagan and Bush, he had been on every single foreign trip, knew many of the career foreign service officers at the very senior levels and a solid working knowledge of many of the issues and people. I think that was an advantage. The one thing the press really hammered him on, and I think it was overly exaggerated and a lot of it was leaked from the building because of insecurity, was this tight group of people around him.

Q: I heard this. It was something that was repeated all the time. Could you explain what it was?

TUTWILER: The tightest circle of people he depended on for doing everything were really Bob Zoellick, Dennis Roth and myself. The other tight people were Bob Kimmit, who he brought back as P, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, clearly Larry Eagleburger, who Secretary Baker has said in his book the best deputy he has ever had, Janet Mullins who did congressional and others. But, I always maintain that that noise
level is pretty much generated about every new Secretary of State. It was viewed unfairly that George Shultz had basically let the building run the program. Jim Baker had no intention of doing that. In fact, at his first press conference he said, “I intend to be the President’s man at State, not State’s man at the White House.”

That sent a huge signal through the building and that was intentional. It put down a marker saying I respect this building, I respect what you do but I am here as the President’s man. I think that was very important. You used to have reporters who would say, “Well, we used to go to the seventh floor and the sixth floor to get our policy directives and all of a sudden we really are having to deal with the Secretary’s staff.” Interesting.

*Q: Seventh floor is the Secretary’s floor and the sixth floor is the geographic bureaus floor.*

TUTWILER: Right. And I would say to reporters, “Well, you can keep talking to people downstairs all you want, but I am telling you that policy is being set by the Secretary of State. They are clearly being consulted and having their input but you better be careful where you are getting your information from.” There was a lot of give and take at first. It went on for months. But, I would have to tell you that at the end of Jim Baker’s tenure State was on the map. State was the premier number one foreign policy spot. No one got in Baker’s turf. You did not have the relationship you had in previous administrations with the Pentagon the lead on this and CIA on the lead on that. The building, I feel, was very proud of their Secretary of State. After months of this getting to know each other Baker started having substantive successes and they knew the relationship he had with this President, I believe that he left there with the building very much recognizing he was a player. That is key inside Washington. You don’t want your turf ceded to other departments. I maintain that in the Clinton administration that a lot of State’s turf has been ceded to the NSC.

*Q: I think this is a very accurate account. Warren Christopher was a lawyer and acted as one. He really was very unsupportive of the foreign service. I don’t like to say the foreign service is so wonderful that it has to be supported, but the problem is that in order to do the job of the premier country of the world you have to have a corps to deal with it and it better be supported. For one thing, you are trained to figure out where the power is in another country and that is where you apply pressure and that is what you do, but if you don’t feel you have power in your own country because of the lack of force by the Secretary of State you lose confidence.*

TUTWILER: Now, I would agree with you and you would see it because again I personally think that Secretary Baker is an extremely talented and capable individual and he and President Bush had a very activist foreign policy. They had an incredible amount that went on and some maintain more changes seen since World War II and they managed it peacefully and in a way that was respected by individuals around the world. When the Secretary of State’s plane landed in capitals that ambassador had more clout because the foreign minister and the head of state knew somebody real, with real clout, a serious
person representing the United States was getting ready to have a bilateral with them. I do think there was clearly an incredible difference after you get through the transition in some of the accomplishments. The first thing was the bipartisan Accord on Central America. That was huge with the State Department. It was bold of President Bush to support it. It was bold of the congressional leaders to say let’s put this eight years of fighting behind us in the Reagan administration and have a clean bipartisan accord. That was in the first three months of the new administration. It was a new policy and a new realistic way of looking at that previous situation. So, I maintain, while they may never have voted for President Bush, nor supported his policy, they enjoyed the tenure of those four years because State was clearly a player and on the field.

Q: Also, too, I think the great majority feel that the dissolution of the Soviet empire, which was a very tricky thing, and the Gulf War were monumental programs which were handled beautifully. As you went in were you at all looking over your shoulder at the dinosaurs of the Republican right who saw communists everywhere in Central America? Were they a problem for you or did the election take care of them?

TUTWILER: Jim Baker has never been admired by that group, much less liked. So, it is not something he spends a lot of time on. But, he also is one of the most brilliant strategists and negotiators that I will ever know in my life. He is not going to do anything to antagonize them. I think their power is an exaggeration. I have always thought that. I think he will tell you the same thing. He clearly is a pragmatic man, a principled moderate man, so I don’t remember him ever...because politics is really other than getting congressional support, budgetarily and for initiatives, is really not a part of the departments other than you clearly have to work with your committees of jurisdiction and your appropriators, etc. Bush clearly wanted to get behind them all the animosity that had built up for eight years over the Central American situation. They did that. One of the first things we did was to reach out to the Democrats. I don’t know if there was any yelling from the right but I view the right, and I don’t want this to be taken wrongly, as I view the Israeli lobby. By that I mean that no one until the Bush administration had actually frontally taken on the Israeli lobby on the Hill over the loan guarantee situation. Not only did they take them on honorably and straightforwardly, they won. To me it translated into they are not as powerful as the fear had been. I have the same feeling about the Republican right. I think the perception is that this monolithic army of people should be feared, and I am not positive that they exist. I felt the same way when former Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming took on the AARP.

Q: The AARP is the American Association of Retired People. A major lobby.

TUTWILER: Correct. But, he certainly got their attention when he took them on over what are your executives paid, how is the money being spent, etc. AARP had never been questioned before. I just don’t remember, to be perfectly honest, the right has never liked George Bush. Other than the committee and the relationships Baker had and the relationships that he cultivated, I don’t remember that the right was a big part of the puzzle.
Q: But, this is your story. When you arrived you were sitting down and doing the briefing papers, was an agenda being drawn up? Obviously one was let’s get this Central American thing off the front pages and settle it because it had become a nasty partisan thing for no real purpose. Were there other issues that you can remember when you first came on board saying this is something we want to get done?

TUTWILER: I don’t remember. At State I did keep a journal and I would have to go back and read it. I remember me personally being not intimidated but overwhelmed and apprehensive about the depth of the portfolio before us. I had a pretty good idea that Baker wanted me to be the State Department’s spokesman which was not something I was seeking. The more people briefed at his level on things that I had never thought about I realized it was just a much more complex and diverse basket than the issues that had been before the Treasury Department. But, each step for me personally had been a real challenge and a real growth. And, I maintain, if I had not had the White House experience and the Treasury experience there was no way I could have done that State Department job. I can remember in addition to thinking in the back of my mind that I have to pay attention here and start learning all this substance, I also continued to handle all of Baker’s press. I had overall responsibility for all of his scheduling. I was definitely involved in appointments that he made or recommended to the President as the key people he wanted. So, again, I had a lot that I was dealing with. And, again, we were just a handful of people. A lot of it was personnel matters, who are you going to bring in, where people are going to sit, what offices people are going to be in. There are just a million things coming at you at once.

Q: You had been in the White House and now you are in the State Department. The State Department, as you said, doesn’t have a huge number of political appointees, but you get your ambassadors which are sort of equivalent to knighthood or something like that in the American context. How did you all work with the White House to come up with the right appointees?

TUTWILER: Well, again, I go back to Jim Baker and George Bush’s friendship over many decades. Posts that were substantively important. Those were the ones they would talk about. They didn’t personally care who was the ambassador to some places. I don’t mean that as disrespect to small places, but how many times was he going to be dealing with that ambassador. He was not and small planes usually do not have a portfolio that needs a lot of attention. He had not been involved in this campaign through the primary and some of the people who had really worked hard for President Bush he wasn’t aware of. On the posts that he really cared about and felt were important, he weighed in personally with the President. Everyone at White House personnel knew that. There wasn’t a problem to be perfectly honest. Sometimes, Chase Undermeyer, who we have known and Baker had known much longer than I, who was head of White House personnel, would call and ask us to take x, y or z individual because so-and-so wanted it done. To be candid, if it was in a post somewhere within the State Department like consular affairs which he wasn’t going to spend much time on, fine. He didn’t care. But, on the key posts, clearly his own deputy he chose. President Bush had known Larry Eagleburger forever and was totally supportive. He clearly chose P, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs. The five regional bureaus he was 100 percent involved in. He put in Bernie Aronson. I can’t remember who some of these people were. The Bush administration made a policy that ambassadors serve for three years, rotation. They didn’t start ripping ambassadors out. I think Armacost was in Japan. Baker had known him. So, that part of it wasn’t a big problem. It really truly was not. I can’t think of a single person that was shoved down his throat by the White House and that is saying a lot. Other Cabinet officers, as we all know, do not have that luxury.

Q: Baker being the president’s man in State, I assume he would be spending a good part of his time talking with Bush at the White House on foreign affairs issues.

TUTWILER: Whenever that was necessary, but he also was taking on an enormous portfolio himself. On behalf of the President he had to the best of his ability give a good impression at his confirmation hearing. That was the first time that he really stepped out as Secretary of State, and Bush expected all of his Cabinet offices to get up to snuff on their briefs and get confirmed. Baker had a very short time, about three months, to get his hands around his enormous portfolio and at the same time you are taking over this huge bureaucracy that is open 24 hours a day in over 200 nations in the world. Clearly Bush was having meetings as well. There wasn’t a daily meeting that I remember.

Q: You were taking over in early 1989 and it turned out to be one of the major years in history. Was there a feeling that things were really changing with the Cold War and relations with the Soviet Union as you were getting ready?

TUTWILER: Baker and Bush purposely moved that ball forward and if you go back and look at the phraseology, a lot of this is contained in his book. Moving the relationship from confrontation to partnership was a clear move forward from the Reagan administration. Baker and Bush really felt, and I think correctly, supporting Gorbachev and his moves towards reform and encouraging him and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was the way to go. By not castrating them in public, not, as Bush said, dancing on top of the Berlin Wall which would be totally inappropriate. They nurtured those relationships for the national security interests of our nation and for world order. These changes were not foreseen and anybody who told you they could would be a liar, including Gorbachev.

Q: I talked to people who served in the Soviet Union at the time and it all went very fast. Decisions were made that you couldn’t predict.

TUTWILER: But, not when we first got in it. I mean the two countries were still in the arms control theology battles and the negotiations were very tedious between arms control in the then Soviet Union and the United States of America. It was in some instances, in my opinion, theology hell. It was unbelievable. It was hours and hours and days and days tying up the foreign ministers, but it was part of the deal. If you have a Pentagon representative in the bilateral, you have an NSC representative in the bilateral, all of which have their own brief that they have to have. There were times I honestly felt very sorry for Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze having to sit there and let individuals put their portfolios forward hour upon hour upon hour. But, they also
knew that they would also get boxed in and you could not have the Pentagon undercutting the United States’ negotiating. So, you had to bring them in which meant a lot of the negotiating behind the scenes is getting your own bureaucracy on board with you when you sit in a negotiation and a coordinated interagency approach.

Q: On the professional side of both the State Department and the Pentagon, were you getting any indication of a sigh of relief that you no longer had the Shultz/Weinberger acid relationship which seemed to have caused a certain deadlock there?

TUTWILER: Again we were lucky because Baker had since the Ford days, over a 20 year close relationship with Dick Cheney, who became Secretary of Defense. The same was true with Colin Powell and Scowcroft. As I said earlier it served George Bush extremely well that you had people who had had very big titles before, that had been very close to the President and power. That was why these men were in there. They knew how the system worked and it served in my mind the President and our nation well. There was no petty back and forth. There were no individuals making names for themselves, they already each had names. I think that is healthy. They didn’t come to town to make a name for themselves. They communicated beautifully. You really cannot find an instant where the media were able to say publicly that the Pentagon is for this and the Department of State is for that. It just wasn’t going to happen. All of them had seen that that didn’t work before.

On our negotiating trips, for instance, Colin Powell sent, we always had a representative from the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, who later became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cheney would usually send Steve Hadley, his political person who is a wonderful gentleman, General Haley Grave, who then went on to become commandant at West Point, and Paul Wolfowitz, a political appointee from the State Department who was a former ambassador, was at the Pentagon. So we had people who were not really careerists and were very, very close to their principal. You had people on our airplane and in these negotiations that could get on the phone with their Cabinet officer or General Powell and had total access so that Baker could get answers or if needed Baker could obviously call Cheney or Powell or the President himself and did many times. You had a working environment and situation where all of us knew what the working relationships were. So, if Baker turned to General Grave and said, “Can the Pentagon support this? I need two more millimeters of this in some arms control bill. Can I get it? Are you going to support me?” he knew that General Grave would not say yes if the Pentagon would not support it. So we were fortunate in the people that were designated to always travel with him. It just worked very, very well.

Q: Why don’t we stop at this point? We haven’t gone into the time of the major issues or your move into the spokesperson job. We will continue from there on.

TUTWILER: Fine.
Q: Before we pick up the great issues, of which there are plenty, let's talk a little bit about the spokesman's job. Was this the place where policy was articulated?

TUTWILER: The job has a number of facets to it. Clearly there is the public daily routine on the podium where you in my opinion are articulating, defending and enunciating the president’s foreign policy and a whole host of subjects. A second part of the job is the care and feeding of the press that are assigned to cover the State Department. A third part of the job is as facilitator. If you know, for instance, that The New York Times is on a very serious piece or deadline, I would be a facilitator calling on whoever the appropriate official was who dealt with it and knew that particular issue and would defend and articulate the President’s policy on that subject. So, to some respect part of the job was also railroad conductor knowing when to call in those chips with your colleagues, when to use those individuals. So, it is a multifaceted job. The part that people see is clearly the daily briefing. You also spend an enormous amount of time on background where you can have a much freer dialogue with a reporter than when you are on the record. For me, I never ever, except when I was off the record with a reporter that I had known for years, did I ever totally feel free. So, even on background I knew there was a certain discipline that I maintained in what I was saying.

Q: Did you work hard to make sure that you weren’t surprised? So often one picks up The Washington Post or New York Times and says, “Oh, my God, what happened?” and you know you are going to get a flurry of questions about the topic of the moment. Did you feel that you had pretty good intelligence anticipation so even before it appeared you knew what was going to be printed?

TUTWILER: If it was something that Secretary Baker was working on then I would not be blind sided because I was involved in what he was doing. For instance, there was an attempted coup in Peru and I was woken up around 4:30 in the morning and told about it. Well, I knew absolutely nothing about Peru or how many Americans were there, but I knew the types of questions that I would be asked and in all candor those elements in our country that either had business in Peru or had loved ones in Peru would want to hear. I had had enough experience by that time to anticipate what I would be asked and also what was really expected from the State Department publicly about the situation, what we were doing, how many Americans were there, etc. Concerning surprises with Secretary Baker, not really to be honest because I was fortunate enough to be at most all of his meetings, except for those one-on-one, and knew what policy debates were internally being part of them. I also knew what was said in all the bilaterals that were not one on ones because I was sitting there.

The surprises were overnight developments either in countries day in and day out that were not on your radar screen, or in all candor in countries that were one of the priorities the Secretary was intimately involved in. Take German unification. It went a whole lot faster than anyone had anticipated and I would argue that no one at the beginning of the administration would never have dreamt that you would be dealing with German unification or the fall of the Soviet Union. But those types of things that were priorities on his agenda by outside events should they evolve were surprises but not something that
knocked everybody off their kilter or didn’t know what to do.

Another important point, probably the most important, which I alluded to earlier, the individuals who were serving by and large at the White House, Pentagon and State Department were people who had known each other, in the case of Baker, Cheney, Colin Powell, and Brent Scowcroft for 30 something years. I for instance had known Marlin Fitzwater for years. In the Reagan administration there had been a lot of back and forth between the State Department and the Pentagon publicly in the press. In the Bush administration I don’t think you really have an example. A disagreement publicly aired in the newspapers by members of President Bush’s foreign policy just did not happen and that then flowed on down to my level. It just worked differently and in my opinion it worked better for the country. The press didn’t like it because you didn’t have all of this to and fro in the newspapers. Foggy bottom says, the Pentagon says, etc. all that back and forth. You had a united public voice the majority of the time concerning the foreign policy front that served the president well.

Q: Some of it had to do with personalities, too. You didn’t have George Shultz or Cap Weinberger who couldn’t stand each other. Once you get friction at the top the people down below don’t feel they are on the same team.

TUTWILER: I agree these gentlemen, Secretary Cheney, Secretary Baker, Colin Powell, Bret Scowcroft and President Bush were either personal friends in the case of George Bush and Jim Baker and all had previously served in big time government jobs and were not looking to make a name for themselves. They understood how the game was played and how it worked best to the President’s advantage and to air their differences on policy in private, which they did. But, such airings were not really that often, to be honest with you. So you had a temperament, trust, and maturity in that senior level of the President’s foreign policy team that you really had not had to the same degree in previous administrations.

Q: Let’s turn to some of the issues. I was interviewing somebody who was acting as chargé in Costa Rica part of the time you were at the State Department and he was of the opinion that President Bush and James Baker had basically decided to get rid of this as a problem and settled it right away. Was this the idea?

TUTWILER: Secretary Baker had this idea himself, I think. He had served for eight years in the Reagan administration and there had been a very partisan public to and fro with Congress and it was a drag as far as emotionally people were committed to one side or the other. Secretary Baker in order to find something immediately to distinguish the Bush administration from the Reagan administration wanted to cut a deal that would be acceptable to everyone and get the issue off the table and behind them. President Bush liked the idea. Secretary Baker worked closely with our assistant secretary for Latin America, Bernie Aronson, who had expertise in this area, a Democrat that we had reached out to and brought in. They got it done and pretty fast. Baker established himself in this city over the eight years he has been here as a man whose word is his word and the Democrats on the Hill knew that having worked with him while he was at Treasury and
the White House. They also knew of his friendship with the President. So, when he went to the Hill and said “Here is what we are going to do,” they knew they could take that to the bank. Somehow, and I can’t remember all the details, he got the Republicans and the Democrats to buy into the plan and he got it done.

Q: This issue had really seized what you call the right wing of the Republican Party. I would have thought that some people had become so partisan on this and you also had the left wing of the Democratic Party. I would have thought it to be hard to change things around.

TUTWILER: But he did. He is a very effective person and negotiating is probably his strongest field. He has an ability to understand what each side needs including face saving. Everyone had to compromise but didn’t have to give up everything. I think people were weary, tired of the issue. There was a new administration and a chance for a fresh start. People didn’t give up their principles, the President certainly didn’t. But it was an idea of here is a long festering, long simmering issue within our government and let's find a way for everyone to get a little of what they have to have, meet in the middle and move on down the trail. And they did.

Q: Moving to what really became the outstanding event of this time, the Soviet Union all of a sudden sort of lost its will to be the Soviet Union. When you all arrived on the scene at State in January 1989, was there the feeling that this was the year we were really going to do something?

TUTWILER: No, nobody at State including Jim Baker had a crystal ball indicating there wasn’t going to be a Soviet Union, but they did come with an attitude as did President Bush of continuing the type of U.S.-Soviet Union relationship that President Reagan had begun. I attended the first meeting between Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna at our ambassador’s residence. As that relationship grew over time it moved into different levels. Some of this was symbolic. For instance, one symbolic thing we did was to stop meetings in capitals. In capitals you have all the bureaucracy. We took them to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, which was a first. At the time in our country Soviet diplomats could not travel 25 miles outside their residence in Washington, DC or New York City, so we had to blow that bureaucratic world away. We took over a lodge at Jackson Hole and met in an entirely different kind of setting. They in turn a year later took us to Lake Baykal in Irkutsk, Siberia. Those are symbolic things, but symbolic things at the time made news and enhanced the relationships.

I remember the CIA was very interested and we got word from our people that they were moving in vans with all this electronic equipment all over Jackson Hole, and we said, no, no, no. We said they would have to do things differently because we were not going to have all those people in eyesight of everyone. It was not that we didn’t want them there or that they couldn’t do their job but they had to back off some.

We actually flew the foreign minister of the Soviet Union in our U.S. military airplane and his staff. That had never been done before. This was symbolic, but also symbols
translate into trust.

On the substance side, yes, Secretary Baker was constantly pushing and probing as was President Bush with this team of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to get as much as they could possibly get which was in the United States best self-interest. Whether it was in the arms control field or the Nicaragua situation, El Salvador or Afghanistan, the moment was right for pushing to get as much as they could that was in our country’s self-interest.

There were many different stages doing this moving from confrontation to cooperation. We also developed a fifth basket. Traditionally it used to be that in bilateral meetings between the two countries you would only discuss four areas and I can’t remember the exact terminology. We added a fifth basket putting in things like the environment, things that the two countries had never discussed before. They were issues that in one respect moved the relationship to a more cooperative one and you found areas of commonality that you had never thought about before.

Having said all that, I think the culmination of that relationship and the foreign policy set out by President Bush and Secretary Baker was most manifest in the Soviet Union’s joint press conference with Jim Baker at the Moscow airport after Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait and you had the Soviet foreign minister basically against the desires of his bureaucracy and his foreign ministry and the United States Secretary of State jointly standing in Moscow’s airport publicly reading a joint communique denouncing this invasion. It was quite extraordinary.

Q: Did you find a counterpart on the Soviet side? Your group was very close.

TUTWILER: So was Shevardnadze’s.

Q: So you found the same thing?

TUTWILER: Yes. He had two people, Teranskeo and Stephaneof. They in my mind had a similar relationship with Shevardnadze as Dennis Ross, Bob Zoellick and myself had with Jim Baker. Now there were lots of other invaluable people in our delegation as well as on the Soviet side. Both of those guys went with Shevardnadze to Tbilisi when he took on the presidency of Georgia. You also, in a formal bilateral meeting, you had the whole nine yards, but it was the same players in most every meeting.

Q: Were you both working together to say we want to get some symbolism in here, too?

TUTWILER: No, you don’t talk that way. We have an idea and they have an idea and you try to sell it.

Q: Part of the substance of these meetings was to show something.

TUTWILER: I may have mentioned this before but for instance we were at a bilateral meeting with Gorbachev at the Kremlin and he said in part of his presentation to Baker
that the Soviet Union was pulling all of its troops out of Cuba. I was sitting right there and knew that was big news. So, when we were leaving the meeting, I said to Baker who was walking alongside Gorbachev on their way to do a joint press conference in St. George Hall, “It would be really fabulous if he could say publicly about the Cuban troops what he just said in the meeting.” Baker said to Gorbachev that this would be terrific and they would make a lot of news. Gorbachev decided to do it and when he was standing in front of the microphones he made the statement about Soviet troops being pulled out of Cuba. Clearly that made huge news. I remember him at the time after he had finished talking, turning around and winking at me to say, “Okay I just did that.” It was unusual, here I am a United States person suggesting to the President of the Soviet Union that this would be a great thing. It was a great thing but I also knew that unless something is really said publicly it is like a tree falling in a forest, who knows, and why shouldn’t he put this in the public domain. Once it is out it is awfully hard to walk away from it.

Q: Was there a genuine affection between Baker and Shevardnadze?

TUTWILER: Yes, definitely. There was, I think, for all of us. He was a tough negotiator on behalf of his country, but he was also a man who had enormous courage, a soul, in a flattering sense, and a real sense of what is right and wrong. He was a communist but their system of government was broken. I think if you had an honest conversation with anyone of these people they are not fools. Why would anybody advocate less freedom for themselves or for their people? So, Shevardnadze as Gorbachev, as we all observed starting with the Reagan administration, thought differently. Russians are no different than Americans or Japanese, all of us are basically the same. They just had a system that was a horror show as far as I am concerned but while they were living through it they all defended it. I have to believe that in the privacy of their own home. They knew perfectly well what the situation was. They all had icons hidden away. Religion didn’t die in Russia but publicly it did.

So, I think with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze the timing was just right for them to be more open, to more clearly let more freedoms into their nation and had the courage to let that happen. I also have read in their memories that it was a very difficult road. Gorbachev in the end lost his job and Shevardnadze resigned. Things took on a life of their own. They didn’t have a crystal ball either that there was going to be German unified in NATO. They didn’t have a desire that there would be an end of the Soviet Union. But, in numerous meetings leading up to that, Shevardnadze would say to Jim Baker in private or in very, very small meetings, “You understand what we are talking about.”

We the United States as you know had been pushing on the Soviet Union for decades about the situation in the Baltic states. One of the things for various sundry reasons we had to do and did. From their moccasins, their questions would be, “Well, what next? Why not Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan? Well, then we don’t have a nation.” You understood the fits and starts of this and the repercussions involved. But they let things happen that in my opinion are for the better of the people who live there. Yes, this is not all settled out and has been a horrendous struggle for those people who are elderly and on fixed
incomes and all the graft and corruption going on over there still is sorting itself out. But, I give enormous credit to those two Soviets. Baker trusted Edvard Shevardnadze and Shevardnadze has written that he trusted Baker. Clearly their first obligations were always to their nations and presidents, but they worked very, very well together. I think they were two mature individuals who history put in the right place at the right time.

I have the same views of President Gorbachev and President Bush. After all this was a major peaceful revolution and I give enormous credit to the leadership in the world at that time starting with the United States and the Soviet Union. For instance, President Bush, as you know, was severely criticized here at home the day the Berlin Wall fell for not getting up from his desk and basically as he would say dance on the wall. Well, he was self-confident and mature enough not to rub salt in Gorbachev’s wounds. I happen to think he was exactly right. I understand that our public probably did not understand that and he was criticized for it. From their moccasins I can see why they felt he should be out popping champagne, this was wonderful, something the West had been waiting for forty years. But, he did the right thing at the right time. Gorbachev knew what he was doing when President Bush did that. So, again, this cements the relationship that builds the trust. I think we all were lucky that these men on both sides were in those positions and those jobs at this time of enormous change.

Q: On the unification of Germany.

TUTWILER: That was rough.

Q: Were there plans a, b and c for this?

TUTWILER: No. Not that I know of. The Germans had Chancellor Kohl who clearly was in a raging hurry to get this done. The French were also part of the two by four process as well as the British. Really it was left to the United States and to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was the German foreign minister at the time, to bring along Germany united in NATO with the Soviets agreeing. NATO was the toughest part in my opinion for Gorbachev and Shevardnadze and the Russian population. They really hate NATO. I think that they really saw it was going to be faster than anybody could control, this German unification.

The NATO part had to be handled extremely delicately. As you remember the Warsaw Pact had completely disbanded by this time. It was really tough for Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to sell to their own bureaucracy and to their own people. That was hard. I can’t remember how many two plus four meetings we had but they were for Secretary Baker, and I think also for Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Shevardnadze, very long, very tedious, very difficult negotiations. At the same time outside of these rooms where these men are, masses are just moving. Things were going on. So, all of those men were pretty much dealt a situation that was going to resolve itself one way or another. They were trying to navigate it. President Bush and Secretary Baker felt it was critically important that a united Germany be in NATO. That was just really important. They found a way, threaded the needle and got it done.
Q: What was your impression and the impression of your group of Hans-Dietrich Genscher? I’m told he is a difficult person and had his own agenda.

TUTWILER: He was the dean of the foreign ministers at that time, meaning he had served the longest. He is a very formidable person, a big man. He was definitely respected by Secretary Baker. Baker was not in the least intimidated by him. I don’t know anybody that Baker was intimidated by, to be honest. I think Han-Dietrich Genscher, again, felt that Jim Baker was a man of honor, a tough negotiator, tenacious and nobody’s fool. There was mutual respect. I felt that he was very tough in meetings but had a great sense of humor and a pleasant smile. He was from a city in then East Germany called Halle and it was very important that he take Baker out there. It is my understanding that he took other foreign ministers there also. So we did a whole tour day with him of Halle. Several times we would meet at his home for meetings. He and Baker had a very, very good relationship. But, as I recall, unless I am mistaken, he speaks fluent English so when they met one-on-one they would speak in English, the rest of the time Genscher would obviously speak German and use interpreters. He was clearly one of the NATO leaders. I liked him. He was personable, smart, thoughtful and was not some hotdog. There were very few that were hotdogs, shoot from the hip types.

Q: Was there any point during this that you recall that there was concern that Germany would unify and end up neutral?

TUTWILER: I think Germany knew how important this was to the United States and in order to have United States support, which they couldn’t do without. I believe Chancellor Kohl also wanted Germany in NATO. The Germans at the government level have a very positive view of NATO and what NATO has done to keep the peace, etc. I don’t remember that not coming into NATO was ever part of the deal with Chancellor Kohl or Hans-Dietrich Genscher. They knew they had to be united in NATO.

Q: I just wondered if the possibility of not being in NATO after unification was ever talked about at government levels or whether it was just understood that NATO membership had to be the way to go?

TUTWILER: Yes, it was understood that NATO membership was a must.

Q: How did you work with Marlin Fitzwater on this?

TUTWILER: Very well. Marlin and I had known each other for years. He is a real affable person. We communicated on a daily basis on important things. He might call me and say he was going to answer questions on Afghanistan, what is the line, what is it we are saying. He would call me because in those days the White House traditionally briefed around 10 or 10:30 and he would either say I sent some questions over your way or you are really going to get hammered on this. It was very collegial. I had the same relationship with Pete Williams, the spokesman for Dick Cheney, although I had not known him before. He was fabulous. So there was just never any problem.
Q: That was a very strong team. How about the Gulf War? Did it come out of the blue more or less?

TUTWILER: I can remember several weeks before the invasion being asked the question about troops moving around, but it was not on anybody’s radar screen. As you got closer to August 2, yes, I remember somewhat. We were on one of our trips with Shevardnadze when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. One of our people, Karen Groomes, got an urgent radio message from I think Pat Kennedy at the State Department saying that Saddam Hussein had just gone over the border and invaded Kuwait. I remember making Karen repeat it to me and writing it down. Baker and Shevardnadze were having a one-on-one meeting bilateral. It was Teranskeo, and Dennis, and Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I took the note into Baker. He turns to Minister Shevardnadze who says that could not be correct information. He had Teranskeo go out and call his foreign ministry and on his return he told the foreign minister that it was true. Shevardnadze just couldn’t comprehend how stupid this was of Saddam Hussein. That invasion led up to the beginning of the war in January.

Q: What was your role as this coalition was put together. Did you find yourself doing anything particularly differently?

TUTWILER: The 54 nation coalition?

Q: Yes.

TUTWILER: No, I still attended Secretary Baker’s bilateral meetings. I still was part of his team inside the State Department. I went on all the trips as always. No, nothing really changed, we just had a different brief that in many instances had the same players and in some instances different players. Baker worked, in my opinion, brilliantly on putting together the 12 UN resolutions authorizing the use of force, getting everybody to buy into it, building the coalition, and meeting with the Arab nations saying if Israel is attacked will you stand down. It was just an unbelievable effort.

Q: I was wondering if you got involved with the Israelis?

TUTWILER: Never enough time. One of the things that I found and I think all State Department spokesmen find is that there isn’t enough time in the day to deal with the foreign press corps. There really is not. From time to time I would go over to the foreign press center and do a little dog and pony show. From time to time I would see foreign journalists who are stationed here, but in my mind my first responsibility is to the American press and American public. So, I didn’t have a lot of interaction with them. I did probably more so with the counterpart of the Soviet foreign minister because we were together so much or the German with whom we were with all the time. It depended on what the issue was and what we were doing. But, rarely did I ever once in my State office call overseas and say what is this or what is that. Many times from the podium I would have to respond to wire copy – The Soviet Union foreign ministry spokesman has just
say... What do you have to say? But, that wasn’t a daily occurrence. I would say that probably in previous administrations that it had been more of an occurrence than in ours. Out on the road we would try to coordinate some things. I would think that the ministers ought to have a press availability after this and my counterpart would say no they shouldn’t. I think part of it also is because we are Americans and that is an arrogant statement but it is a fact. The world really cares what America is saying first and foremost at least in the 20th century they did. The other people within their nations that care what they are saying are probably not on as big a playing field as with us. I don’t know if I am making sense or not and it sounds terribly arrogant but that is just the way it is.

*Q:* After the Gulf War it did present an opening for the Middle East. I would have thought having gone through this very difficult six months or more of the Gulf War that it would be an incredible time to pick it up and going.

TUTWILER: Baker and President Bush saw an opportunity that was in the United States self-interest and took advantage of it. The number of trips we made to that region, as every Secretary of State has, between Damascus, Oman, Jerusalem, Cairo were unbelievable. It culminated in an historic first which was the Madrid peace conference. For the first time in over 40 years sitting at the same table in the same room in that palace in Madrid were the leaders of the entrenched antagonistic nations in a region where stability is important to the world. So, Baker’s efforts with full support from President Bush, paid off with at least a very visible symbolic step and many real substantive steps. For that reason, it is better for all of us if there is some type of resolution there and “lasting peace.”

*Q:* Israel had so many friends, allies, etc. within the American media and have been masters at playing this. Did this cause you problems?

TUTWILER: No, because there are many members of that same media who also wanted to see progress. I won’t name them but they are very influential members of the media who also wanted to see progress and no more just symbols, words and killing. The Israeli lobby is incredibly powerful in this country, an open secret, but Secretary Baker and President Bush conducted themselves in a tough but balanced and fair way on both parties. This gained them additional respect in my mind in the Arab community and total frustration in some elements of the Israeli community and to others enormous respect for these people who were not playing favorites, not playing games. The way they went about this was viewed by all, whether they liked the outcome or not, as fair and balanced. That was a new page for some of the entities that were involved in this. I don’t know any other way it should have been done. They were not the enemies of Israel. In my opinion it was only the hardliners who peddled that. They sincerely wanted to assist the parties to make progress on the peace front.

(Gap in recording)

-see them in my office, but the majority of the time I was on the phone practically all
afternoon talking on background with them when I wasn’t attending meetings with Secretary Baker.

Q: When you say “talking on background?”

TUTWILER: The source of the information is not attributable. They could say senior administration official, or I could say, “I will talk to you only if it is a State Department official.” You come to an agreement on how they are going to attribute what you are saying, but it is not to be Margaret Tutwiler. It is called “on background.”

Q: What was your impression about the reports that would come out, because often the press just gets the story wrong? Not that the slant was wrong but that they just didn’t understand or got it wrong.

TUTWILER: There were times when they did get it wrong. I would have Secretary Baker personally talk to the reporter or, depending on what the subject was, Bob Zoellick or Dennis Roth would or some other official with expertise on the subject. I was very open and willing to putting other experts in front of the press. They clearly knew a lot more about whatever the subject matter may be than I did. That wasn’t a hangup of mine. At night out on the road we would do briefings or we did them first thing in the morning, usually on background to set up the day type of thing. Many times on the airplane Secretary Baker would go to the back of the plane where the press all rode together and do an interview either off the record, on the record, or on background. Sometimes he used those as ways to drop a signal to a country we were headed to because he knew they would read about it. Sometimes he would use them to leave a signal or message as we were taking off back to the country we left. He was very adroit at using the press. Using it in a professional and healthy sense. He was very accessible to them. He may not say a lot but he was accessible. They couldn’t complain that they hadn’t seen him or they hadn’t had a chance to ask him questions. The wire people did not like that on the airplane, often we wanted to be on background but it was take it or leave it, this was how it was going to be.

Q: I was interviewing a man this morning, he was USIA, and I mentioned that I was going to interview you this afternoon and he said, “Oh!” He was ticked off because he said at a NATO meeting, he was a public affairs officer, you had insisted that the Americans all be in the front row of the auditorium where the secretary was going to answer questions, rather than being a NATO mixed seating. Does this ring a bell with you at all?

TUTWILER: No. But, it is natural that our press, whose news organizations, ABC, New York Times, Washington Post, have paid a lot of money to have their correspondents travel with us, would be the people that would be there when we walked in and out of NATO, and that may have been the only shots they had that day. I don’t know that we had anything to do with prearranging them. They would all be there when Baker would get out of his limo and expect to walk through a gaggle of press and whichever one of ours got up front or shouted a question, he could either stop and respond to their questions or
keep walking which was perfectly acceptable and they would just shout questions. I don’t know if our office would have dealt with whoever the public affairs officer was at NATO and would have said we were traveling with such-and-such a number of press and Secretary Baker is scheduled to meet with the Secretary General of NATO at such-and-such a time. But, he always walked in the front door and the press was either there or they weren’t.

Q: Let’s say you are going to Japan where the local press is very important. Would there be accommodations saying all right we have a policy with Japan and we want to make sure the Japanese get the story correctly so you put the Asahi Shimbun reporters in the front row?

TUTWILER: That would be the embassy’s job, not our job. If Secretary Baker would do his press conference with the foreign minister or with the prime minister, that is open to all the Japanese press and all the American press and they write whatever they are going to write. As far as their calling or talking to me or my talking to them, it was so rare in any country that we ever went in. That was what the local embassy public affairs officer did, not us.

Q: I am just trying to get the modality of this. When you arrive in a country...

TUTWILER: Let’s say Secretary Baker was going to do a press statement on arrival at the airport. The embassy would have notified the local press. That is their job. They had their own local press list, we didn’t at State. Those people either showed up or didn’t. We would hold Baker at the top of the stairs while our American press went off the back of the plane and pre-position themselves near the stairs by the time I got the signal from one of our staff that Secretary Baker should start down the steps. The press would film him and use it or not, ask questions, whatever. I had nothing to do with generating any foreign press there, but the embassy press officer did.

Q: I would imagine the embassy would always be badgering you about having Secretary Baker talk to so-and-so?

TUTWILER: Not really. The Secretary gets lots of requests for Q&As, which you know and I know, the building writes. I’m trying to think of a major foreign interview that he ever did. He certainly answered foreign press questions. They came to the State Department. So, when we were out on the road there was no lack of Soviet reporters, for example, asking questions. There isn’t enough manpower for us to have done a major foreign interview. But, State was supposed to be covering it through the embassy. I’m sure there were instances where foreign film crew came in and asked to do an interview with Baker and he did it. But the vast majority of the time that he spent on press was spent with U.S. press. A very small percentage was spent with special interviews with foreign press either overseas or here at State.

Q: Did you have a problem with this new team of yours, your pack of cubs, concerning a lot of speculation in the press saying that this was a group and they are so close it is hard
to break through and they are not really talking to people other than just within themselves?

TUTWILER: That was reported but it wasn’t true in the real world.

Q: This was the story, particularly early on. The press is always trying to characterize, etc. Did you at some point make a determined effort to try to break this up and say listen this is how it really is?

TUTWILER: Yes, because it wasn’t true. It was vastly exaggerated. For instance, we couldn’t have gotten the plane up without Pat Kennedy, who is a career foreign service officer. There was Lyn Dent and a whole host of people that we were working with. So, it was greatly embellished, greatly exaggerated. It was a way to knock Baker. Eventually it all went away. Please keep in mind again that this team of people had been serving in government for eight years. We knew who to call out at Andrews Air Force Base because as Secretary of the Treasury, Baker had had an airplane for official trips. So we knew all of the people out of Andrews and knew what the routine was. We knew where you park your car and where the VIP lounge was located. We were not a group of people who needed to be taught a lot of the mechanics and the underbelly of how it works because we had been living it for eight years in some fashion or other. We were not inexperienced on working in the Executive Branch of the federal government. Those things unique to State we clearly had to learn and adapt to or modify to fit Baker’s style of management.

But there was a ton we had to learn that was unique and different to State. There were people, Jim Collins, for instance, who is our current ambassador to Moscow and a terrific gentleman. He was extremely helpful to us. Yes, there was an enormous curve over what was unique bureaucratically to the State Department process wise. To put it in perspective for your readers, the State Department when I worked there had over 8,000 employees every day in a two and a half city block building. Political appointees at any one time, including the Secretary of State, are 92 people. So, it is ludicrous to assume that 92 people are running 8,000 people a day plus over 150 posts around the world. It’s just ridiculous.

Q: One other thing that has been said by those of this particular administration is the pack of cubs were overly protective of Jim Baker as far as his reputation was concerned. After all, the Secretary of State has to deal with a very unruly world. All of a sudden something goes out of kilter in Afghanistan or someplace and the Secretary of State is considered responsible for whatever happens. Was there concern that you were being overly protective of Jim Baker or did you feel he could handle himself?

TUTWILER: Of course he could handle himself. There was never any doubt about that. He cares a great deal about his reputation and I think that anyone in any of these high level visible jobs who doesn’t is a fool. When you say we were protective of his reputation I would characterize it as we were part of trying to insure that he was successful. That is a different way of putting it. We each had something at stake in that and I argue that the foreign service and civil service did also. So, if he was successful, we
in turn all got the glow effect from whatever sprinkle dust shown on us. So, we were intent on doing whatever we could to support him in his efforts to be successful? You bet. But, that we were overly concerned about his reputation, his reputation was well known by the time he got to the building and I think that State clearly only enhanced it. To this day it has been almost eight years and Jim Baker still speaks all over the world. Today as we speak he is in Amman, Jordan. He just got back last week from Germany. So, his shelf life certainly has held up for the eight years we have been out of office. That to me speaks to how he was viewed not only as honorable but successful. So, whatever our part of the puzzle was to contribute, we all worked very hard towards that effort.

The majority of us who had known him liked him and respected him and it wasn’t an unpleasant task. I just had lunch the other day with a colleague who worked with us in the White House and is now a huge, huge corporate entity. He said, “You know we never knew how lucky we were to have worked for Jim. He is a terrific manager and a terrific mentor, etc.” I said, “Yes, I know. At the time we were just doing our job.” Baker cares a great deal about his reputation but I don’t know any successful person that doesn’t. But, as far as what we were after, yes, part of it was protecting him and contributing to his successes. Each of us worked very hard and also argued strenuously with him on many numerous occasions. There are not many managers who welcomed and embraced vigorous debate. He did. That speaks volumes to his maturity, self-assuredness, and management style.

Q: Margaret I thought we would stop at this point and next time I thought we would concentrate on the issues.

TUTWILER: Perfect.

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Q: Today is January 14, 2000. Let’s talk first about the fall of the Soviet Union. This was not a really long drawn out thing and Secretary Baker, by all accounts, deserves tremendous credit for helping this go its way allowing dignity as much as could happen for the Russian people and not turning this into an event for immediate political gain. It was done with dignity and skill. As you came to State what was your appraisal of Gorbachev, for example?

TUTWILER: When we first came into the State Department I believe that President Reagan and the West had already seen that Gorbachev was a different type of Soviet leader. We were on a different track and things had changed. On President Bush’s watch, he set the tone and policy where President Reagan had been pretty much trust but verify. Prime Minister Thatcher said we can work with this man. I think that was the view pretty much of the administration. There was not any wild embrace. I do remember that Secretary Baker’s first meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union was in Vienna. Shevardnadze had been foreign minister for a number of years and had been dealing with Secretary George Shultz and they definitely had a very warm relationship. Over the four years that Baker was Secretary of State he and Edvard
Shevardnadze developed a real friendship and mutual trust. Baker’s skill in my mind was in being able to anticipate and understand your adversary’s political constraints. To understand how far the person sitting across the table you are negotiating with can go within his own political universe I think is very important. Baker was very good at that.

He was also very good, in my opinion, at supporting and bringing Shevardnadze along into policies that were not harmful to the Soviet Union but certainly were beneficial to the United States.

The biggest one in my mind was the German reunification, the two plus four process that was launched letting Germany remain in NATO. At the time it was monumental in the world that they had lived in, certainly the East/West, for the last 40 something years. Along the way, there were little things such as specific arms control measures that were negotiated. When we first came in there was an issue with Germany, that was obviously divided at the time, on the S&F missiles. I’m not sure Baker had a really clear size-up of Shevardnadze at that Vienna meeting. It was a more formal meeting, more in the way that they had been evolving where you had so many people in the room, so many people at the table, and I don’t remember where the second meeting was.

Over the years meetings became so frequent that it felt like we were seeing Edvard Shevardnadze every month either here in the United States or in Europe or other places around the world. They had a bilateral meeting when we were in Namibia for its independence celebration. They were meeting a lot. It got to where their preferred way of meeting was one-on-one with just interpreters or sometimes with a principal aide depending on what the issue was. They accomplished more in those meetings. However, both bureaucracies were not pleased with that type of arrangement. If Shevardnadze in a bilateral with Baker made an arms control agreement their military would just go apoplectic and cause him all types of trouble which would also cause Gorbachev trouble. So, in many meetings both foreign ministers would sit there and let their bureaucracies vet their spleens and fight what I would call in many instances, theological wars. This would go on for hours.

Both Shevardnadze and Baker really learned to a level of detail that I have been told most foreign ministers had not, the ins and outs and the nuances of arms control. Arms control, I would say, for both of those men was not the predominant issue it had once been. They were very interested in solving regional conflicts. Nicaragua and Afghanistan come to mind. Baker looked for ways of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. For instance, one of the very first things we did, I believe in the first year, was to stop meeting formally in capitals. We invited, which had never been done before, the foreign minister and his Soviet delegation to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, spending three days there. Now, you will remember at the time there was a 25 mile radius where officials of the Soviet Union could travel. We were taking leaps to go so far. I can say that our building was not ecstatic over it because they were used to doing this here in Washington where it is easier. Shevardnadze has written that many of the Soviets who were on the trip felt that it was an absolutely spectacular setting. It was a smart thing to do, to get away from capitals, to get away from the norm and to sit out there in our beautiful, wide open
West and still negotiate, the issues were still tough. Months later they reciprocated and we went to Siberia to Irkutsk with them.

There were many little things involved in this diplomacy. When we were in Wyoming, Baker took Shevardnadze fishing, he had never been fishing before. When we were in Irkutsk, Shevardnadze took Baker fishing on Lake Baikal. Shevardnadze had Baker to eat in his apartment in Moscow many times. Baker had Shevardnadze to his home here in DC. Edvard Shevardnadze was a man who seemed to have integrity and enormous personal courage, similarly in my mind to Gorbachev. I am not one of the people who buy into the trashing of Gorbachev. I don’t understand that. He was different and did basically write himself out of a job and behaved incredibly the night that the Berlin Wall fell by basically telling the 375,000 Russian troops stationed in East Germany to stand down. He let it happen. Now, when he and Shevardnadze started, maybe that wasn’t the original idea to break up the empire and have no more Soviet Union, but they certainly planted the first seeds. They certainly either couldn’t put the genie back in the bottle or they let the genie go. I have a great deal of admiration for both of them and I know Jim Baker does and George Bush does.

Q: When there were these meetings, you are the spokesperson, was there a Soviet counterpart?

TUTWILER: Yes. Gennady, who was known in foreign policy circles during the Reagan administration. He started out as the press spokesman for Gorbachev and then for the foreign ministry also. I was never very clear how that worked. He came to the house where we would meet in Moscow and we would pass notes back and forth to each other. He was a big flirt, but very nice and spoke very good English. He would show up at a number of our meetings even though he was a Gorbachev person. He then retired and was made ambassador to Portugal about two years into this. Then we got a man - Schataley Churkin, I think, who I did not trust. He was younger and wasn’t really one of Shevardnadze’s people either. Shevardnadze’s policy person was just terrific. He was very smart and spoke fluent English, but he would sometimes tell our press things that I just didn’t understand. He and I had words once, I have forgotten what the incident was, but other than that we got along fine. But, I did not fundamentally trust him, nor did our press corps.

Q: After the meeting it would be time to meet the press. Did you and the Soviet press person get together...?

TUTWILER: No, because usually I got together with the ministers. There were many times when Shevardnadze, through his interpreter, or Baker would ask me what did I think, what should we say, etc. I even had Gorbachev once in the Kremlin ask, which was kind of interesting and it was on Cuba.

Now, my idea always was whenever they could, a principal should speak. After all he is the foreign minister or Secretary of State. I was never for putting myself out front. I very much was for my principal to be out front. So, when we were in Moscow- (End of tape)
-Say we had a contentious meeting and you couldn’t come to closure on some arms control issue. The minister would have a photo op instead of coming out and speaking to the press, or shaking hands, that in itself sent a signal both to the bureaucracies and the public. Obviously when we would get back to our hotel or airplane, depending on what the situation was, either one of our experts who traveled with us would do a backgrounder briefing in the back of a plane or more than likely it would be the Secretary of State many times on background or off the record or even on the record.

Q: Just to get a feeling while you did this. It was pretty obvious that the arms control issues were no longer the only issue we had to work with.

TUTWILER: Secretary Baker and especially Dennis Roth and Bob Zoellick on his staff, and obviously with the President’s support, looked for new areas of cooperation. New areas where you could get some of the contentious issues off the map. Like supplying the guerrillas in Nicaragua. When Baker would go and show evidence to Edvard Shevardnadze who would say they were no longer doing this, well, our apparatus over here would say, “Well, here is some evidence.” Then they would go back and go look at that. I think we had some satellite cooperation issues. But, anything you could look at that strengthened in a weird sort of way the relationship.

To get back to your original question about the fall of the Soviet Union. My most vivid of every single solitary memory that I have is in, I guess 1991, when Gorbachev actually stepped down. Secretary Baker was the last highest ranking American official to meet with Gorbachev as a president of the Soviet Union. We met in the Kremlin in the hall we had always met in, the Catherine the Great Hall, and it was snowing and a dark day outside. We drove up and went inside the Kremlin, using the same steps we always did. At the top of the stairs was this huge painting of Lenin. We went through the St. George Hall. This was a smaller delegation than normally. I was fortunate enough and lucky enough to be in the delegation. There may have been only six of us. You knew the end was really in sight. So, it was very poignant. It was history to me. What we were forced to do as the American delegation was when Secretary Baker finished his meeting with President Gorbachev we left and went out the same way we had always gone out, etc. We had to go drive around for 30 minutes. It was snowing like crazy. Then we came back in the exact same entrance, the same chief of protocol for the Kremlin met us, and we went up the same steps and walked into the same hall and had a bilateral with President Yeltsin. That was pretty dramatic. Yeltsin refused to meet with Baker unless it was in the Kremlin in that room. So, it was a huge humiliation to Gorbachev. We felt like we were being used. But, Baker turned out to be the highest ranking American official at the last meeting that Gorbachev had before he announced his stepping down. We felt that was a very rude scenario. It happened in 30 minutes. Yeltsin sat down in the chair Gorbachev always used. That to me was my most crystalized moment, realizing it was over. On a personal side it was kind of sad and on the historical side overwhelming to realize there was just not going to be a Soviet Union.

Q: I can recall early on, and I think this was done during the Bush period, I may be
wrong, in the White House there seemed to be an effort made to sort of denigrate Yeltsin at the beginning as a buffoon, a drunk, etc., because Gorbachev was our man. Did you observe that?

TUTWILER: There was a definite tight rope that any administration who had been in power then would have had to walk. After all, the Soviet Union was powerful, had 40,000 nuclear weapons, and their head of state was Mikhail Gorbachev. You had to be very careful and prudent in how you dealt with a popular individual. As you recall he wasn’t dead at that time. The situation didn’t exactly exude stability. Yes, there were symbols of this feeling. As I recall President Bush came down the hall in the West Wing of the White House and met with Yeltsin in Brent’s office. He didn’t have a meeting with him in the Oval Office. Secretary Baker had a meeting with Yeltsin at the State Department in his formal Secretary of State’s office. I was there. I know that President Bush handled the situation right. It was similar to President Bush being criticized in the American press “for not showing any emotion when the Berlin Wall fell.” Well, he made a judgment call, which I think was an accurate one, to not go and dance. The Soviet Union, even though it was crumbling from within, was still an incredibly powerful place with an enormous nuclear arsenal and a proud people. Gorbachev was someone he had been able to work with and there was more that they wanted to get. Parading around and thumping your chest like a gorilla was not going to do anything but exasperate a deteriorating situation internally in the Soviet Union and who knew what was going to happen. So, when Yeltsin visited Washington, it was very delicate and hard because we have such an open society here, but President Bush’s policy and judgment in my mind was exactly correct. Gorbachev wasn’t humiliated. They knew that we had to deal with Yeltsin and have the meetings, but it was done appropriately. He wasn’t treated like a head of state.

Q: Did you have problems at a lower level, I am thinking of the White House, State Department and all, of people picking up the signals and saying they were going to play down Yeltsin and play up Gorbachev? Did you have the feeling that you had to step on people from time to time to get them in line?

TUTWILER: Throughout the Bush administration because George Bush and Jim Baker had known each other for 35 or 40 years, because Dick Cheney, Jim Baker and Colin Powell had worked with each other for 20 years, any disagreement in strategies or disagreement in the implementation of the President’s policy was handled privately by those two individuals, the four individuals or five individuals and that flowed down stream. So, you really did not have a situation when an NSC staffer could get any traction carping at something that State was doing or the Pentagon. They could make their voices known in interagency circles. I don’t mean that it was a big love in but any public airing of differences or any of that game playing that had existed in previous administrations really was not a large part of the Bush administration. I credit that with the friendship that had been sown over 20 years and that every single person that had one of those enormously responsible jobs had already made a name for himself. They were not in there to make a name for themselves, they had had that. They had had the titles, the big government job. So, in my opinion, it served our country well at that moment of time that
you had mature, seasoned men who had played on the national scene. Sure, there were times when there were disagreements with the Pentagon or the NSC, but if there were and it got to such a level Baker would call Colin Powell on the phone. Or Baker and Cheney would talk on the phone. Or Baker and Brent would talk. Or they would all go meet over in Brent’s office and hash it out. They set the tone and that was carried down to my level and to the assistant secretary level. There was just a very little of that. When there were big policy push and shove, they were in the Oval Office or in the residence with the President and the principals and the President would decide.

Q: When you first arrived on the scene at State, obviously you had been dealing with all the issues before, but where was the principal reading on what was happening in the Soviet Union coming from, because this was the name of the game and things were changing there? Was it Dennis Roth or Zoellick?

TUTWILER: It was a combination of people. President Bush definitely had his own opinion. He had met with Gorbachev before. Secretary Baker had his opinion. It wasn’t like these people hadn’t been serving for the last eight years. They had opinions. At State, the portfolios that Dennis wanted to have say over was the Middle East and Russia. So, he was our point person on it. That doesn’t mean that he determined policy, but he was the one who would pull together for Baker whatever needed to be pulled together. The NSC had Condi Rice on Soviet and Richard Haas on the Middle East. The Pentagon had Steve Hadley and Paul Wolfowitz. There were a bunch of people. So, it was first and foremost the President and then it was the principals and then it was the inner circles of the principals and then whoever they talked to.

Q: During the various discussions that were going on concerning the Soviet Union, was the subject of whether the Soviet Union would hold together voiced?

TUTWILER: Not at first. Well, that is not true. I think if you go read Secretary Baker’s book when, as I mentioned earlier, we took the Soviet delegation at the foreign minister level to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, up in the forward cabin Secretary Baker and Shevardnadze actually did talk about “Well, what if?” I can remember a meeting in Moscow when we had all this trouble with the Baltic states, particularly Lithuania and its new president, Vytautas Landsbergis. They were causing unmitigated trouble for Gorbachev. I remember Shevardnadze, in more than one meeting, saying, “Do you know where this ends?” I was never with Baker at a one-on-one meeting between Baker and Gorbachev or with Shevardnadze, but I don’t remember Gorbachev ever saying that, but do remember Shevardnadze saying, “Well, look Jim, what you are asking us to do could be unraveling our country.” Now that I think about it, I remember Gorbachev saying this to Baker as well. They were not stupid men.

Specifically concerning letting the Baltics go, that was a huge political issue here in the United States and I do remember obviously “Well, we let three of our countries go, why don’t you let your states go and let’s see what happens here. What is going to keep Uzbekistan, or Kazakhstan or the rest of them in line?” So, yes, there was talk along those lines.
Q: Of course, we had a pretty solid record on the Baltic countries. We recognized them in the twenties and never derecognized them, they still had embassies here.

TUTWILER: That didn’t make it any easier from sitting inside the Kremlin.

Q: Was there any sitting around that you recall and saying, “Well, you know if this happens the Soviet Union may split apart and won’t that be great (or awful)?”

TUTWILER: The only time I remember it really getting on the radar screen was when the Baltics started pushing for their freedom and the massive demonstrations and shootings. You understood that in the Soviet Union domestic situation it would be like Hawaii and Alaska saying tomorrow, “We are out of here.” Well, President Bush, or whoever was President, would resist that. So, it wasn’t just that we were totally supportive of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as a long standing U.S. policy, but you also had a dynamic here that, yes, Baker was very confident in negotiating in those meetings but he also understood and knew that they did have legitimate... He had many private meetings with Gorbachev up at his dacha and in Moscow inside the Kremlin. This man was dealing with a lot. He tried, and I believe his book articulates this, honorably to get as much pocketed in that type of environment that was in the United States best interest and that he could get.

Q: When the Berlin Wall crisis came and you had huge mobs going to the American embassy in Prague, Hungary opening up its borders, and the whole thing was coming apart, were things happening so fast that you were having sort of catchup meetings? Was it sort of the feeling that you were dealing with things that were beyond the control of those in high positions in the United States?

TUTWILER: I don’t think that anybody in a high position in the United States wanted control of that situation. I think what they wanted to ensure through the best of our influence at a distance was that they were peacefully handled. That you did not have war breaking out. That you did not have nuclear proliferation with people who were desperate selling weapons to horrible people such as Saddam Hussein. I think that you did not want the same Tiananmen Square masses and having people crushed. You wanted to make sure that the Soviet Union could stay stable. So, I think that wherever they could be an influence or voice of stability and calm, President Bush and Secretary Baker certainly were. Again I give Gorbachev enormous credit for not sending out his troops to shoot down these people. And each inch these people got encouraged them to try for another inch. So, they got to the wall and they tore down the wall. It was an incredible western event that a lot of forces came together to produce. Forty years of America in my opinion on strength and a Soviet leadership that for whatever reason either couldn’t stop it or decided to conduct themselves differently, let them go. Now, 10 or 20 years or whatever later, we all sit here and talk about the very importance of democracy and freedom. And I 100 percent believe that. But then you also go look at some of these little new “countries.” Are they better off trying to establish their own currency? When you really got into the nuts and bolts of it, when the confederation was at first going on and
Gorbachev was trying to save the Soviet Union, all of their gas lines intertwined, all of their electric lines intertwined, all of their railroads intertwined, and all of their airplanes intertwined. They had been one huge, large what we called an empire but it was a country full of different ethnic groups. So, when somebody in the country says we are out of here I understand the freedom march and the enthusiasm and the getting rid of a tyrant. But, then where is your post office? How are you going to get your goods? Where are you going to get your coal from? Where are you going to get your vegetables? It was really a monumental undertaking, which is still going on, for these new governments that had been so dependent and so centralized in the communist system that the euphoria was off the bud pretty quickly down on a people level. And, again it was the concern of the administration that you keep the stability, keep the peace and we tried to get as much aid as we could raise for them. We sent in airlifts similar to the Berlin Airlift to just show that the West is supportive and to get in just some of the basics in these places to keep things calm.

Q: How about Afghanistan? At that point the Soviets were pulling out?

TUTWILER: It was always on Secretary Baker’s agenda and it was always on Shevardnadze’s agenda. I think basically for political reasons and their bureaucracies and past history pretty much pushed that it had to be. They knew we had to raise it. It didn’t mean that anybody wasn’t sincere about it, but those were very difficult subjects that for political reasons you had to mention at every meeting because you were going to be asked by your public if you had raised this. There was a fair amount of time spent on Afghanistan at first and basically the United States’ position was that nothing was going to work out there as long as Najibullah is there. The Soviets had a very, very hard time walking away from him but they eventually did. I don’t remember it as being terribly contentious, I just remember the United States, I can’t remember the specifics, asking for certain things they wanted done and Shevardnadze would say they couldn’t get that thing done, what you are asking is unreasonable and those types of things.

Central America, arms control, Afghanistan, the Baltics, for instance, were always on the agenda. There was a sameness to some of these meetings. I found it absolutely fascinating. I can’t believe that I was lucky enough to be seated at the table and able to listen and learn.

Q: Let’s talk a bit about the Soviet Union and the United States and their interest in Nicaragua? We were trying to defuse the situation there and keep arms essentially out. El Salvador was also included in this. Particularly at the beginning of the Bush administration, did we see the Soviet Union as being the main supplier instigating this or was it being done mainly from Cuba and they had lost some control?

TUTWILER: I don’t remember and I don’t want to guess. I do remember one of the first initiatives of the Bush administration was the bipartisan Central American accords which we talked about earlier. I do remember Secretary Baker bringing up in bilateral meetings that it was a problem and they had to stop supplying these two countries. Shevardnadze would say, “Our military tells us that we are not.” Then, as I said, we would go back and
show him the evidence and they pretty much shut it down. That was again a very visible signal that things were going to be different and things were different. I don’t remember how many months that took, but I do remember at some point we had no evidence that there were any more supplies. It was over.

Q: How about Cuba?

TUTWILER: This was later in the administration. We were in the Kremlin when Gorbachev told Baker he was pulling out 90,000 (or whatever it was) Soviet troops from Cuba. He just dropped that in one of these meetings. I remember walking down the halls in the Kremlin with Secretary Baker and President Gorbachev on our way to the St. George Hall for a joint press conference. I said to President Gorbachev that it would be great if he could say to our American press corps what he just said to Secretary Baker in the bilateral. It would make big news. He did and it did make huge news. This was right before the Berlin Wall fell down.

Q: Were you picking up vibes that Cuba was more of a problem to the Soviets than a staunch ally?

TUTWILER: Nothing pops into my mind except that Gorbachev was clearly willing to change the relationship. Cuba was always on Baker’s agenda and he used to tease Gorbachev about how expensive his sugar was in bilateral meetings. The removal of Soviet troops from Cuba was a total surprise when Gorbachev dropped that in that meeting. Nobody was expecting that. It was big news.

Q: Moving to some other things. Panama was an isolated incident but we eventually moved in and overthrew Noriega. Did that come up?

TUTWILER: My most vivid memory of that was early in the administration and I remember coming in, I always got in early, to Baker’s office one day and Bernie Aronson, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America and others were there. Bernie had these maps all over Baker’s coffee table. They had moved all the books off. I remember thinking what’s going on. Bernie was describing to Secretary Baker a plan that was called operation blue spoon that sounded like some kind of invasion. That was the first time I remember knowing anything about it. Then it all went to what it went to. I know we upped the rhetoric on the U.S. military couple that got mistreated. I remember we were not pleased with the press because they were filming our fighter planes leaving out of Fort Campbell, North Carolina on the 6:00 news. And then we were into it. The night we were into the invasion was the first time I had ever sat in the State Department’s situation room. I remember sitting in there plugged into the Pentagon and other places and thinking that maybe some Americans had been killed or been hurt and that was a very, very sobering briefing. We went in there early in the morning. I just remember sitting in the situation room and getting these raw reports that were coming from the Pentagon, the NSC, etc. Kimmit ran the meeting. It went on for hours. We left about 4:00 or 4:30 in the morning and decided to reconvene at 8:00. So, we basically went home had a shower and came back.
Q: On that type of thing did you find the focus moved away from the State Department and went to the Pentagon?

TUTWILER: Oh, sure. As it appropriately should. State does not really handle questions concerning any type of military hardware, movements, assessments, etc., although the State Department is still briefed. The focus does turn to more detail work during a military invasion, war action because they are the ones who answer those types of questions. But, if you have at the same time Americans held hostage, an ambassador trapped in the embassy, etc. then State answers both types of questions. So, you can have both podiums doing a full load or you can luck out and have the Pentagon having the bulk of it. But, you still had to brief that day.

Q: I watched the first time they showed the briefings and questions during the Gulf War, particularly at the Pentagon. The Department of State press corps seemed to be a pretty professional group, however during the Gulf War there were some pretty stupid questions and I had the feeling that there was not as much depth of reporters with military knowledge.

TUTWILER: Maybe not. I don’t remember watching the briefings. Pete Williams I thought was fantastic.

Q: Oh, he was very good, but I am talking about the reporters.

TUTWILER: I can tell you from the network perspective I think that John McWethey of ABC News is second to none. There are a number of reporters that cover the Pentagon that certainly know their material. David Martin of CBS News. Walt Mosberg of The Wall Street Journal. Maybe in a huge big press briefing they have more people that go there that don’t know the material. I don’t know. The ones I dealt with I have a great deal of respect for and they knew their subject material and were responsible journalists.

Q: Was Haiti sort of a running sore at this time?

TUTWILER: Haiti wasn’t a big deal at first. It came on the radar screen sometime in the third year when all these economic refugees were coming over here and the Bush administration policy was to try to stop them at sea. Visually that is a very tough policy. It happens to be the correct policy. What Americans didn’t seem to realize was that every one of these individuals that managed to land on our shore were not coming here because they had been persecuted predominantly over freedom and fundamental democracy, they were coming here for economic freedom. Well, that is wonderful. But, are we supposed to take in every single solitary person in the world who wants to be an economic refugee and have a better way of life? We cannot support that. There were very tough briefings because you were juxtaposed against pictures of people in life rafts out at sea that were very compelling. But, I didn’t have any trouble doing those briefings because I absolutely believed it. I had trouble in being asked over and over again really, really tough questions. But, I really believed that President Bush’s policy was the right one. There was
no answer to that. If you let in 10,000 you are going to let in 100,000. Who is going to house, feed and get jobs for them? They all get instant health insurance. There never would be an end to it. And, we have a policy that the Congress and everyone has agreed to for years and years and years that for every country if you qualify it is about 20,000 people a year. Well, 20,000 do not assimilate from every country in the world in the United States. So, there were long tough briefings but fundamentally I just totally agreed with President Bush.

Q: It is fine if you believe in something, but sometimes as a foreign service officer we have problems with a policy and think it is wrong, wrong, wrong, although we publically support it. Were there any issues where you really didn’t agree with a policy?

TUTWILER: Tiananmen Square. In hindsight I was wrong and President Bush was absolutely right. But, at the time, reading the raw intelligence in the morning from INR, and maybe it is because I am female, maybe it is I have never been exposed to this type of an ugly world, but to read the slaughter that went on of basically college kids and kids was almost incomprehensible. These were embassy reports by people who had been out in the square, etc. I don’t know what I thought President Bush at the time should be doing more of, but I know that those were the most difficult briefings for me. I have said before, and I firmly believe it, that podium was not my podium, I was not elected to anything, I am staff and serve at the President’s pleasure as a political appointee and the Secretary of State. So, what I basically did was to figure out those parts of his policy that I 100 percent agreed with and subscribed to emotionally because I believed that part of the spokesman’s job is how you come through that TV screen. If you don’t look convincing and are just mouthing words, then you are not doing your job.

There were one or two parts of his policy that I agreed with. One, which he enunciated many times, was that his intention was not to hurt the Chinese people. I thought that made sense and agreed with it completely. So, I would always, no matter how difficult, and believe me the questioning was horrible because the press was pushing the envelope as far as they could. That you should do more and more and more, retreat into those two or three things that the President had articulated that I knew also would resonate with normal Americans. So, those were personally tricky briefings for me for a while. I had no problems with Haiti, the Gulf War, Panama. I did have a little problem with Yugoslavia at first but fundamentally agreed with President Bush’s feelings that it wasn’t our job to lead a war into Yugoslavia.

Q: Let’s talk about Bosnia and Yugoslavia.

TUTWILER: I don’t remember how many days before the war broke out that there was a lot of back and forth inside the State Department, the NSC and White House about whether Secretary Baker should go to Yugoslavia or not. It was finally determined that he should and he would meet with the presidents of the six republics within Yugoslavia. He met with each one in different parts of a building like our Congress building, including Milosevic. At the end of that day, we had a dinner in the same building, I believe. I remember sitting there at this beautiful formal dinner and thinking, “These people are
getting ready to go to war and we are sitting here at a very elegant, formal governmental dinner.” I just found it surreal. I also found each one of those leaders incredibly stubborn. They were all rigidly locked into whatever their positions were. Baker was criticized for even going or not doing more. His message basically to all of them was whatever you are going to do make sure that your transition, if that is what you want, is handled peacefully. You don’t go out taking other peoples’ borders or post offices and doing things that are going to precipitate war. These people, as far as I was concerned, were no more ready to listen then fly to the moon. I disagree with the criticism of his going there. I thought it was the right thing to do. The United States went in there in the person of Jim Baker and said, “Here is how you should handle this. We don’t need a war in the heart of Europe, etc.” But they were not going to listen. Then we sat down to this really very elegant eight course meal with crystal and chandeliers and I remember thinking this was not the picture I would have pictured before going to war. Entertaining as if nothing was going on. And, that is how all of them acted.

Q: You say you came away realizing what the problem was, that these guys were nuts. I have to say I served five years in Belgrade way back and when you are talking about the Balkans this is a mindset that you need a lot of exposure to.

TUTWILER: It is unbelievable.

Q: Yes, it really is.

TUTWILER: But the Bush administration also had the advantage of having Secretary Baker’s deputy, Larry Eagleburger. Larry knew these people. He had firsthand knowledge of Yugoslav politics. So, it wasn’t as if we didn’t have any working knowledge of this. But, it was President Bush’s view, and I think a correct view, that we just led a world coalition in a very successful military operation of 54 nations to do what we said we were going to do, eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Europe, this is in your backyard, you all get your act together and you lead on this one. And, of course, they are incapable of doing it.

Q: Was there the feeling that maybe the Europeans- (End of tape)

TUTWILER: Look at all the different people who make up NATO or make up the CSCE. They all have hundreds of years old histories that they today still have loyalties to. That would manifest itself in bilateral meetings and it would manifest itself in multilateral meetings. You sit there and think the Yugoslavs are crazy. I would sit there as someone who is not steeped in foreign policy and listen, for instance, to the new foreign minister in Germany, or the foreign minister in France or the foreign minister in Greece and I couldn’t believe what I was hearing. It was just bizarre to me. Here we have a people slaughtering each other but yet you are still protecting whatever allegiance you historically, traditionally had in your country. Why? I get back to domestic politics. That is what their track record has been. So, all the Croats were horrible or all the Serbs were horrible. It was bizarre to me.
Q: The Croats and the Germans and the Greeks and the Serbs.

TUTWILER: But, they are still locked into those molds. Even the “civilized” powerful western countries were still in many respects locked in those 400 year-old things that happened. You wonder why these Yugoslavs couldn’t get it together. Larry Eagleburger used to say there are no boy scouts here, inside Yugoslavia. And there weren’t.

Q: In Kosovo we got the Serbs out but now the Kosovans are killing the Serbs.

TUTWILER: It is really bizarre. The only reason I believe that Western Europe and the United States honestly ever got involved is for the fear of history repeating itself, the last two world wars were started in the Balkans. If there had not been that equation in people's minds on the table, I don’t think anybody would be there. I really don’t. Just let them finish it off and whoever wins, wins. That sounds cold hearted, but there are places in the world today where wars are going on where there is no national U.S. vital security interest. There is not a trigger that is in our minds, in our memories, of what happened if you didn’t get in there and somehow they got tired of killing each other. Larry used to say when they get tired of killing each other that is when this is going to stop.

Q: Probably that is what happened in Bosnia. We came in but after things were pretty well settled. Talking about nations, how about the French? The French have always been the burr under the American foreign policy saddle on just about everything, although when the chips are down they are usually with us in important events. Did you have people who never referred to the French as the French but as those God damn French?

TUTWILER: Yes, the French were very difficult especially on Secretary Baker in multilateral meetings and on some very contentious issues. But, I will also say in the buildup to the Gulf War, the last person we needed was President Mitterrand, to get his support. It was very critical at that time that France in the person of Mitterrand say yes we will be there. Secretary Baker met with Mitterrand in a very small meeting in Mitterrand’s office. Tom Niles, Kimmitt, was there but I don’t remember the other Americans who were present. Baker did his brief from President Bush and Mitterrand did his little speech. He had one sentence in there in the translation when we heard it which basically said, “I’m there.” His efforts had extended over months. I remember the relief of Secretary Baker and the U.S. delegation. Mitterrand did the right thing. He had been saying give peace a chance and all the other stuff, but when it got to crunch time he was there. It was a real turning point, not in the war or anything else, but it was very important. Yes, they were difficult but Baker and Roland Dumas, who was the foreign minister at the time, got along fine. They would definitely have their disagreements, and I can’t remember what they were. But on really, really important things, yes, the French were there.

Q: What about Somalia?

TUTWILER: Somalia I really wasn’t involved with. We were pretty much gone at that time, we were over at the White House.
Q: Next time we will cover the Gulf War and then the time when James Baker moved over during the campaign and then pick up a bit about what you have been doing sense.

TUTWILER: Okay.

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Q: So much was happening during those exciting four years. I can’t think of another such period except maybe during World War II where so much was coming at you. What about the far right wing of the Republican Party which usually is led, as it still is, by Senator Helms? Was he pretty much on board?

TUTWILER: As I remember Secretary Baker-

Q: So much was happening during these four years I can’t think of a busier period except maybe during World War II where so much was coming at you. What about the far-right wing of the Republican Party which is led by Senator Helms? Was he pretty much on board?

TUTWILER: As I remember, Secretary Baker has excellent congressional relations, he works at them. He started working at them when he was President Reagan’s Chief of Staff in the White House. He had an ironclad rule that he would never leave his office before returning every congressional phone call or if he could not he would have a senior person on his staff do it for him. He had a very healthy relationship with Senator Helms as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright does today. When he had disagreements with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or whatever, everybody knew where everybody stood on things. Sure, generically speaking Congress is always hard when the administration is trying to pass something, whether domestic or foreign policy, even within your own party. However, for the important things, like the vote on the Gulf War, the middle govern in our country and a middle ground will be found supporting the President by and large.

Q: You mention the vote on the Gulf War. This in a way was closer than one might have wished for. To me it seems like our vital interests were really threatened by this. Yet, you had people who wanted to play for time.

TUTWILER: So did former Prime Minister Primakov in the then Soviet Union. Just one more trip for peace. President Gorbachev had called President Bush and sometimes Secretary Baker saying you just got to let Primakov go back there one more time. Well, at some point, the United States had to say, “Do what you have to and we will do as we have to.” There is more at stake here. If you have said that the President of the United States has drawn a line in the sand and said we will not let this aggression stand, at some point for your country’s credibility in the world, you really do have to follow through on those words. Words, as you know, mean something. What President Bush and Secretary Baker’s thinking was that if Ethiopia, who was on the Security Council, can support a use
of all necessary means resolution in the United Nations, how can senators of the United States say we don’t support this? So, that is why they went the UN route first. That in a way boxed in a lot of people making them uncomfortable in our senate. If all of these other nations are voting for this how can we not support this.

Q: Did you find you were cranking up your office for this crucial vote?

TUTWILER: Not particularly, no. I don’t remember anything different than the daily drill. Secretary Baker obviously had an entire congressional staff, that was not my responsibility. They were constantly briefing him on what needed to be done. My job was not congressional. My job was to articulate what was going on.

Q: But there has to be a synergy. Secretary Baker is going to testify and I’m sure he spent a great deal of time doing so. You were part of the team...

TUTWILER: The way that would work is the congressional staff would prepare participatory questions and senators and their staff tell you in advance here are the areas I want to get into. If you have a good congressional shop you know because your staff has been up there and has either pulled out the people or gotten and come back and Secretary Baker has hours of preparation in advance of testimony. I would attend those sessions because I would just be listening to it not for the substance or whether it was right on the Hill, but to suggest the way something should be said. I was not the lead person. There would be a huge book that he would meticulously work through –“ if I am asked about this my response will be the following.” So, you had the congressional office in there, Bob Zoellick, Dennis Roth, myself. I viewed that my job there was to listen and if I felt, “if you say that you are going to call up the following news stories” or “can’t you say it this way which would be better,” I might interject my thoughts.

Q: After this very intense period, you began to move toward the next election. Was Secretary Baker looking forward to leaving?

TUTWILER: No, his speech to the employees at the State Department was a very difficult speech. Baker is a very controlled person and it is the only time that he almost publicly has lost composure. He was very much torn between a job that he loved and felt he had unfinished business on behalf of the President, and a 40-year friendship. Because there really wasn’t anybody else who had this relationship with the President and the political experience, etc. he decided to resign. How many Secretaries of State do you know who have resigned? Not many. And, to go back to a job that they had eight years ago.

We were on our way home from some trip and had stopped in Shannon, Ireland for refueling. I remember getting the New Hampshire election results and taking them back into the airplane. Baker had not gotten off since it was just a refueling stop, and thinking, “This does not look good for President Bush.” And then of course things just kept getting worse and worse. Basically there was enormous pressure for Secretary Baker to resign. President Bush resisted it for a long time as he did not want to ask his friend to do this.
He also wanted him at State. But, there really wasn’t another candidate to come and try to help. President Bush actually asked Secretary Baker. They went hunting at Secretary Baker’s ranch in Wyoming, I believe in July. This became effective in August at the Republican National Convention and Secretary Baker resigned as Secretary of State. Legally that was the way that you had to do it. He couldn’t take a leave of absence. We went over to the White House and President Bush did not win the election as it turned out and we were all out of jobs on January 20.

Q: You moved to the White House with Baker. What were you doing?

TUTWILER: I had worked in George Bush’s first campaign back in 1978. I had also resigned from the Treasury Department and worked in Vice President Bush’s general election in 1988. So, this would be the third time I have worked in President Bush’s campaign. When I went back in there my title was assistant to the president for communications and basically was a jack of all trades. My job was not well defined because you had basically only ten weeks of a general election. As I recall I worked on overall scheduling dealing with the campaign - whether the President should go or not, why he was going, etc. Really just a hodge podge of a million different things. We were parachuted in there but we were not unknown entities to the President’s staff at all, they were friends of ours, to try to see if we could help.

Q: Did you feel a difference in this particular campaign because it really is interesting? Here is a President who came out of a particularly successful foreign affairs event which really doesn’t get you elected. Did you feel that the foreign affairs side of the presidency was way down the list of things of most interest to the American public?

TUTWILER: I think there were a whole host of reasons why President Bush lost that election, some of which were mistakes made by the administration and some were beyond his control. You are absolutely right that except in times of war Americans do not vote for presidents based on foreign policy. I would say the exception to that when it wasn’t a war was President Reagan’s election. President Carter had been humiliated with the hostage situation for 400 plus days and along comes this new person that says he won’t tolerate such a situation, is tough on the Soviets, etc.

When we got there so much of the general election cake should have already been baked or the ingredients identified. It was different from the other campaigns. I have worked for the Reagan reelection campaign from inside the White House from the same office that I moved back to. So, I had done a campaign from the inside. But, to come over with really only ten weeks to go in 20/20 hindsight of eight years back, it was too late. I agree with Secretary Baker’s decision. It was the right decision and maybe the only decision he could have made. After all, he served at the President’s pleasure and the President needed him, but it was too late. By that I mean things that should have been done for the President, on behalf of the President, somehow hadn’t gotten done. To pole vault in Jim Baker, who again was a well known entity to the campaign staff and those people, it was different. For me it was different from any of the other campaigns I had been a participant in.
Q: At the time did you feel that things were beyond you?

TUTWILER: We had been dealing entirely with foreign policy issues for four years and suddenly we had to switch hats. We never really put on a governmental hat because it was ten weeks and people knew why we were there, etc. Other than clearly governmental decisions were continuing to be made and Baker had to have responsibility for those as Chief of Staff. But, when you ask questions - Was X money raised? Was Y done? – you kept getting, “No, that hasn’t been done yet.” That was a concern of mine and I thought “What the hell have you people been doing?” In my mind, President Bush had not been well served. He had had very loyal, very well-meaning people but there had just been no leadership at certain levels within the White House.

Q: After this was over, whither Margaret Tutwiler?

TUTWILER: January 20th we were out of work, as all political appointees were, and at some point during that year Marlin Fitzwater and I started a small consulting business. We did that for almost two years. Then Marlin decided that it really wasn’t for him. He really wanted to just give speeches and move to his river home in Deal, Maryland, which he did. I then went to work in Alexandria, Virginia as president of a company that was called Direct Impact Communications that basically does grassroot operations for clients. Then I ended up at the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association where I have been for the last three years as their senior vice president for communications and public affairs.

Q: We are in the year 2000, any plans for this election year?

TUTWILER: I’m definitely a strong supporter of President Bush’s son George. I have raised some money for him. Any time the campaign has called me and asked me to do something or for any advice, I certainly am supportive and would do anything to help them. I have no desire to go do another campaign. That is not just protective talk, I don’t want a job in this administration, etc. I am fully vet in the place where I am in one more year so I have every intention of staying here.

Q: Today is July 17, 2017. We are resuming our interview with Ambassador Margaret Tutwiler starting with her tour in Morocco. I’m Mark Tauber for ADST. Ambassador, how did this appointment come to you?

TUTWILER: Yes. So, how it came about was, on the night of the presidential election in 2000 I got calls from Don Evans, Karen Hughes, Jim Baker, Bob Zoellick, a lot of people related to the campaign, all asking me to go down to Tallahassee, Florida where the George W. Bush campaign team was located during the final recounts.

So, I went down to Tallahassee with Baker and the group for what turned into 33 days. And while there I got to know Don Evans, who was one of President Bush’s lifelong best friends, and Karen Hughes, obviously, and they both kept saying you have to come back
in and serve. Now, at this point, I had already done 12 years of government service. There were four years in the Reagan White House, four years at Treasury, and four years at the State Department. I actually had zero interest in doing any more. Don’t get me wrong -- I believe in public service; it’s a passion of mine. But I did not go down to Tallahassee thinking oh, I’m going down to get a job.

But after the encouragement from Don and Karen and others I thought, well, the only thing I have not experienced is observing our government, participating in our government from a foreign country. I obviously knew what ambassadors did. I had four years at State with Jim Baker. I had observed what ambassadors do, but observing it and living it are two different things. So, I had zero interest in going back into government in D.C. Not from arrogance, but I just thought, I had a fantastic time with Jim Baker and Ronald Reagan and thought that this is the new people’s time.

So, what happened was Evans said, you know, you’d really be great as an ambassador. And so I asked Baker and he said that I would be perfect. He actually said, and I do not mean this to be arrogant, you’re actually overqualified in some respects because of your previous experience. And for me, why Morocco? Well, I was lucky. I got to ask for what I wanted -- within reason -- as the new administration was entering office. I didn’t ask for something that was unrealistic. For me, when I was the Assistant Secretary of State for Public and the State Department Spokesperson for four years with Baker, the basket of issues I spent the most time on were those associated with the Middle East. It is the most frustrating subjects, the most intractable of subjects, the most exasperating of subjects but it was a basket of issues that I found the most interesting. And so, I knew I did not want, even if I had the opportunity, to go to Israel or Egypt, what I considered to be the frontlines.

That’s why I said Morocco. I’d been there once when Baker was secretary of state when King Hassan was the head of the country [ED: Secretary Baker visited Morocco on August 3-4, 1991 as part of a five nation Middle East trip]. I even remember why we went there; it was to get his vote on something, and we were there for something like 24 hours. And so, I didn’t really know the country. But I thought it was close enough for my family to get to. And to be perfectly candid, this may sound spoiled, but I’m not an adventurous eater. And on all of the trips we’d done in so many countries I was like oh, gosh, I’m not sure I can eat this. But I was raised to have good manners, to understand that you eat what’s put in front of you. So, actually food was something that was in the back of my mind because I knew I’d be thrown into any number of official meals and I just didn’t want to have to go through that all the time. That sounds terribly spoiled but it can be a real problem.

George Herbert Walker Bush, Jim Baker, they will eat anything. My brother will. I’m just not as adventurous that way. And I had been on enough foreign trips with President Reagan or President George Herbert Walker Bush, and you get in these official events where it was expected that you would be part of the formal meal. So, as I considered countries, it was just something that was in the back of my mind. I didn’t want to put myself in a situation that would not be good for somebody representing America. So,
although I didn’t know that much about Moroccan food, I figured it was okay, I could do it. So, I said Morocco for those reasons.

I accepted and completed the confirmation process and as it turned out I had been in Morocco only about three weeks when 9/11 happened. [ED: Ambassador Tutwiler presented her credentials on August 7, 2001.] So I got an education in what it was like to live in a Muslim nation of 32 million people just as 9/11 hit. Although it was unique, I did have the experience of living through the first Iraq war with George Herbert Walker Bush and Jim Baker as the State Department spokesperson. This meant I didn’t have to get up to speed on the substance of most Middle East issues. So, as events transpired, I also had the background of having done, you know, a lot of U.S. media in the Treasury job and at the State Department. So, I was comfortable with discussing the subject matter. There was nothing they could ask me about the first Iraq war pretty much that I didn’t know. I didn’t have to study or ask anybody. And so, as it turned out, as the second Iraq war approached and took place, I spent the majority of my time on messaging and representing the U.S. government related to that.

As an aside, as I think back, it’s interesting how I came into the field of public diplomacy. If I had not had eight years of executive branch experience prior to my stint as state department spokesperson I would have never accepted that job. By nature, I don’t seek the limelight, I’m not a talking head, I have never sought any of that. But as I was considering the spokesperson job, Hodding Carter, who had the job when President Carter was president, had a friend on the Washington Post friend -- Meg Greenfield -- who was also a real good friend of mine. Meg called me at home and said I hear you’re not going to do it, the State Department job, with Baker. And I said yes, that’s true. I have zero interest: I’m not doing it. And so, she had Hodding Carter call me. He called me at home one night. He’s from Mississippi, I’m from Alabama, and he told me, look, you have a commodity that I didn’t have. He said he had never met Cyrus Vance before he became spokesman. But you have worked with Jim Baker for years, decades, so you’re going to have credibility when you say you know what he thinks and because you’re also going to be in on the meetings. And so, they’re not expecting you to know the nuances of the, you know, Treaty of Versailles but they will know that you are speaking with knowledge and credibility of what went on in a meeting or whatever. Hodding Carter was right; he turned out to be right. So, actually because of Hodding I ended up going in and telling Baker alright, I’ll do this.

But I digress. So, there I am in Morocco as these world events take place and I knew what the Treasury Department was doing, I knew what the Pentagon was doing, I knew what other entities of our government were doing. And I sat there and I thought, okay, what are we doing as civilians, what are we doing here? I know what every other part of our government, Americans, are doing at this post. We’re in a war and so what are we doing?

I was fortunate in that I had a terrific public affairs officer; she spoke fluent Arabic; her name was Magda Siekert. She’s phenomenal. So, I went home to the ambassador’s residence. Now the residence staff and its upkeep is actually run by my management
office, so I had nothing to do with who took care of the grounds, but I noticed that they were at work and started thinking. So, I took Magda with me, and I asked her to translate as I asked the grounds staff a basic question: If they read news media, what did they read. Okay? So, she writes it down and I go back to the embassy, and I said unless these publications were pornographic, I want to do an interview with every one of them. There were five. And Magda asked me, are you serious? I said I couldn’t be more serious because this is what the street must be reading and we are not communicating, in my personal opinion, with the street. We’re doing interviews with “Le Monde,” we’re doing interviews with “Le Figaro,” we’re dealing with the intelligentsia. Well, that’s great but that is a narrow slice. So, what are we doing as Americans to show up in the publications of average Moroccans? I asked her if we would somehow be creating an embarrassment for the U.S. She said, no it wouldn’t. So, I did an interview in every one of them; it was very interesting.

Afterwards, I was at some cocktail reception or something, and the then-finance minister of Morocco was there, and he was a really tough gentleman. I got along with him beautifully, but he was tough, meaning he was a serious, serious man, gentleman. I actually liked him very much. And he said to me, I read your interview today in, I forget which, but one of the five Arab street publications. Well, I was very happy because, here is the finance minister who is reading this street publication and he said to me, they wrote an editorial saying that they did not agree with a single thing I said but they gave me great credit for having the courage to show up. And I thought to myself, win one for America.

Q: That was a great start. What next?

TUTWILER: That was my view. So, then I said okay, well, let’s show up in neighborhoods where Americans had probably never shown up before. I want every American in the embassy, not the Foreign Service nationals, who is willing to go to classrooms. You can wear whatever you want and all you’re going to do is talk three minutes on your state. Where did you come from, in your own, no scripted remarks. It’s more important to describe the values that you got that the students don’t know we have. That’s what you actually will articulate. I don’t mean this to be just the senior people; I’m talking up and down this food chain here. And we’re going to mix it all up; it could be the deputy chief of mission and the secretary; it could be the admin guy and the political officer. I don’t care. I purposely want it mixed up.

So, most of them signed up. The deputy USAID mission director rode his motorcycle to the school. And to a person, Foreign Service officers and a civil servant who was serving there, told me it was the most meaningful thing they’d done. Moroccan government authorities shut it down more than once, oh yes. I had to go to the Minister of Islamic Affairs to overcome his objections. Which I did since I didn’t want anybody to get in trouble. But I just knew, instinctively, if we show up in a non-policy lecture mode and actually let these people who’d never met an American ask us questions about anything, it would be a positive experience.
One woman in particular was really scared, nervous about doing it, but she did it. And I said they’re only questions and chances are they’re going to ask you what’s your hometown like and you know the answer to that in whatever words you want to describe it. But it’s an opportunity for people who my guess is have never met an American and it’s farther than the school because if the Americans show up in this neighborhood the community’s going to hear about it, the grandparents are going to hear about it, the friends are going to hear about it. The people are going to be talking about it at the medina hopefully in a positive way. And again, they might not agree with anything we have to say but they’re going to know we showed up. And my view was why is Hezbollah winning? Because they show up. They show up with -- if you break your leg -- they show up with a cart and donkey. You’re sick, they show up with chicken noodle soup. So, we’re not showing up. We’re in the universities and we’re in the ministries. We are obviously dealing with the government; that is part of our job. We have all these things going on but actually there’s a huge swath that is not educated about us, all our good things, all our best values, who we are. And so-

Q: Was this outreach to average citizens part of your country plan, or was it your innovation?

It was mostly innovation. Remember, I’d had four years in the State Department on the seventh floor with Jim Baker so it was from that perspective. No, I would argue that America’s public diplomacy needed some updating and rethinking. After my tour as Ambassador, when I became Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I used to testify before congress about this. I actually believe that our government-funded public diplomacy efforts, it’s not that they’re bad, but a percentage of them certainly need to be massaged because I found that much of what did exist reflected the World War II era or 1950s.

For instance, in Morocco there are five universities, okay. They’re not building a new university every day, right? So, our public affairs department has a book program? The embassy had locations in Morocco in three different cities, with a total of nine different venues at the time I was there. So, I went over to see one of the women in charge of one of our book programs. I go into the American Corner and I find that all of the books are by Henry Kissinger, Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft. And so, I said okay. Our taxpayers are paying for these books. They’ve been translated into Arabic. But I don’t know a 12-year-old in America in any state who would read one of these. So, where are the books -- I know it sounds crazy but again I was fighting an old mindset -- where are the books like “Little Women,” “Charlotte’s Web”? Something that paints a picture, tells a story of America through a story that a 12-year-old or an eight-year-old would choose to read. And I said I do not understand this budget because these universities are not new so how many books by Henry Kissinger, if I go to these universities, are given to the same university every single year? I don’t understand.

Then I learned how new books for the public diplomacy donation series are added. Basically, we get them translated and printed in regional hubs like Egypt or Lebanon. It takes about 2 years to go from approved book to printing. I didn’t have time to fool with
that. So, when I went home to the U.S. and gave speeches in Alabama or other places -- I’m not making this up -- people would say what can we do; we want to help, and so on. I’d say here’s what I want you to do. I want you to send me picture books of the United States because my instincts were the first time I saw the Eiffel Tower I was not standing in Paris. It was a visual. Same thing for the first time I saw Niagara Falls. So, visuals do not need translation. I said I could care less if these books are in English. And I went out and focus grouped it. And I said and you have to pay for the postage to get it to me. So, people started shipping me books like you cannot believe.

Next step. There was a young man, Rasheed, who was assigned to the residence, and at the time we were there, I don’t know, maybe he was 24, 25 maybe, so I handed him one of these books and I said I want you to go look at this and then you come back and I’m curious, I want to know what you think. He comes back and his exact words to me were oh, madam, I had no idea. I said you had no idea about what? He said the diversity in your country, these beautiful lakes, these beautiful mountains. And I went, Hurray!

So, everywhere I went in Morocco I would hand out a picture book in English, I could have cared less because I was- it was the pictures I was interested in. And furthermore, I also had -- we made them ourselves -- like a bookplate made that said not the U.S. Government because that was an irritant because our policies are an irritant and are something that they use to flog people and get them whipped up about. So, I had designed these simple things that we would stick in every book, for everything we gave away, that said “in friendship with the American people” in Arabic. Because they do not hate us; it’s our policies that can get them all twirled around. So, that was another, you know, observation is the little sticker, USAID, as far as I was concerned means nothing. It could be a Nike symbol. The important thing was to give them something they could have an emotional connection with.

And the other thing that drove me completely crazy, the way our government is set up, as you know, less than one percent of the entire federal budget is allocated for any kind of aid and the largest recipients are Israel and Egypt so everybody else gets what’s left. Okay. And the way we distribute this, certainly in Morocco and other places, is through these in-country NGOs or local third-party NGOs.

Q: Right.

TUTWILER: Okay. That’s wonderful but it drove me nuts because I go back to the fact that we were in a war; what were we doing as civilians? Here’s an example of what I’m talking about. As ambassador, I go out for ribbon-cuttings of new projects or activities that the U.S. has helped fund. I went one day to a small town far away from any major population center. We had given, the United States government had given three hundred-and-something thousand dollars to build this cinder block, concrete school for girls, okay? So, I’m there, the United States ambassador, and I gave every girl a book, of course, and this woman, I don’t remember what the NGO name was, but it was a local Moroccan NGO, she’s standing there pretty much taking all the credit for building the school. She wasn’t doing anything wrong or bad, but no one in that room, those young
girls or their mothers or their fathers really knew about the U.S. funding support. It seemed like I was just there as a guest. It wasn’t my money but it was the American taxpayers’ money and so I actually kind of preempted her and said I just want, before we all depart this lovely ceremony, whatever I said was gracious, I want you to know that the people of the United States of America have contributed whatever the equivalent was, $300,000 to help build this wonderful school for you girls. Had I not done that I’m fairly confident they wouldn’t have known. And this went on- the more I got educated it went on everywhere. It is the system.

So, here’s another interesting story. I got to know an American, a former Peace Corps volunteer in Morocco. He was Jewish, now living in Arizona, but he still ran a small but visible program in Morocco where he would donate fruit trees to towns and families. This was something average Moroccans could immediately appreciate because once the trees grew and bore fruit, they could be a small source of income or an added source of food for a family. It wasn’t easy at first for him to get a message to me about the program. I’d get letters from him, but the State Department bureaucracy couldn’t or didn’t want to consider his program. So finally, I said I want to see him. And I was convinced. I said we’re going to do this.

Nevertheless, I had to fight tooth and nail, of course, because he’s not one of the approved people who’s been in the system for 700 years. So, anyway I got it done. I said however, every tree, every tree because it’s going to be delivered by a known Moroccan contractor -- they know the system, I know the system -- I want a paper tag that we will make that shows the American and Morocco flags and that says, “In friendship with the American people.” in their language. Every tree. I’m positive 25 percent of them will throw it in a bonfire in the middle of the town. That’s fine. But I want to take it one step further. I want these small certificates framed in the medina, which will cost 30 cents a frame. Just like Americans, we hang things on our walls. And so, I want for the beneficiaries of this project to have something memorable to put them in their home. I want it to last and so that’s why we framed them in the medina. And we literally made them ourselves on a copier in the embassy. I had to trust that the organization that was delivering all these trees that America was paying for, would actually include the little signs. And they did. How do I know?

Trust but verify. I had embassy officers, whenever they’d be out in whatever village, look around and more often than not they’d come back and say they saw one of our certificates hanging in, you know, some hut. So, although this was a small contribution, it was visible and made a practical improvement in the lives of people who received it. And we made sure that they knew that our U.S. citizens made it possible.

And so, I feel that with the materials and staff we had, we did something that was meaningful and helped counter the Hezbollah message, or whatever terrorist group message was out there against the U.S. We might be civilians in this struggle, but now, when terrorists try to recruit some young Moroccan, I hope that the counter example of how the U.S. knew what they needed and provided it will give them some hesitation in joining a group so inimical to the U.S. and its basic values. And I did it by demonstrating,
in a tangible way, what American values are. That was my basic strategy.

And I had another program, seriously, where, long story short, we gave away wheelchairs. And what do you think I had stamped on the back of the wheelchairs? “In friendship with the American people.” Okay? My deal, and I worked with this wonderful man in California who had this wheelchair program, Mr. Berrington, and I thought okay, if this makes a difference for your brother, your sister, your parents, your grandparents, you’re rolling around the neighborhood, wherever you live, you’ve got this thing, not obnoxiously but just embossed back on that leather, that says, in Arabic “Provided in friendship with the American people.” Well, okay. How do I know what kind of influence it’s going to have? And I know this sounds sophomoric, but you know, all politics is local and I use my example of Hezbollah; why were they popular? Because they got out in the neighborhoods. They did. And we didn’t.

Q: Yes. The frustration you’re expressing is something that a lot of ambassadors face. The ability to innovate in areas that are unexpected but that offer a fresh and direct way of communicating to host country nationals. That’s what a public diplomacy campaign should be able to do.

TUTWILER: It’s crazy. And I was lucky in that I’d known Colin Powell for, you know, 20 years. I had worked on the fourth floor- seventh floor of the State Department for four years. So, there were instances where, you know, an officer would come to me, there’s one I really remember, that senior political officer came to me one day and said you’ve got to go to the foreign ministry and deliver this demarche. And I said I’m not doing that. And, because he looked shocked, I said I’m not being arrogant but I’m not doing that. You want to spend your political capital on that, have at it; I’m not. And he said to me, but this is from Secretary Powell. I said actually, it’s not. I said every single thing that comes with the Secretary’s name at the bottom does not necessarily mean that the Secretary is personally invested in it. I could say that because I know the system.

Q: Right. And that’s certainly true. No secretary can be personally invested in every single issue.

TUTWILER: And so, I thought well, for political ambassadors, Democrat or Republican, it makes no difference. They don’t know. It’s not that they’re dumb at all; they just don’t know the system.

Q: Right.

TUTWILER: And so, I was lucky because I could do things, because I knew, one, if it’s important enough Powell would call me or Armitage (Deputy Secretary) would call me. I knew both of them. I did not believe anything I was doing was going to cause them to call and pull my chain. Bill Burns, whom I’ve worked really closely with, and with Jim Baker, he was one of the people who traveled with us constantly, I knew Bill wasn’t going to call me and say what are you doing. I mean, it just wasn’t going to happen. So, I had an advantage over having served at State and knew these people and they knew me.
And my biggest thing was, as I told you, okay, we’re sitting out here, we’re being paid to be here. And it’s not just about going to national days and running over to the foreign ministry. What are all of us doing? I knew what, as I said, the others in the embassy were doing in their specific departmental spheres; what was State doing? And so, I just came up with alternatives so that we didn’t just sit here in the embassy.

And one time I was in the ambassador’s residence and a gentleman said to me, it’s really interesting, he was not being confrontational and I’ve never forgotten it, that I needed to ponder why the United States was the only embassy in town out of 157 that was an armed fortress. And it was true. And I had just recently gone through a security upgrade visit led by the director of the State Department Office of Overseas Buildings, General Charles Williams (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Ret.) in which we hardened the buildings and moved out the perimeter. So, it was very real to me. The British were not living that way, they lived down the street, the French weren’t, nobody else was but us. And when I went to Paris shortly after that, the road to the embassy had been completely shut down. It’s the same in Tokyo. And it just made me so sad because it was really very accurate and we were the only ones living that way and it wasn’t because I was in an Arab country. And it really bothered me a lot. Like, this is just horrible. My father jumped on D-Day and was shot and then, you know, jumped behind enemy lines in Germany again and was shot and was a prisoner and so I just thought, you know, how has this gotten off the skids somehow. It was very depressing.

And then the other thing for your reader that really struck a nerve with me was -- you know what a focus group is?

Q: Oh, sure.

TUTWILER: Okay. So, somehow I heard about somebody who was having one and I said I wanted to go. And it was down in Casablanca and I was behind the wall so they had no idea I was here. None. The kids. And they were interviewing young males. And one of the young males, I’m guessing 17, 18, 19, without being belligerent at all, had no idea I was there or any American, asked the moderator why is it that every afternoon American mothers sleep with different men while their husbands are at work. So, I heard that and I was like okay, this has nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli situation, this has nothing to do with us bombing a Muslim nation, this has absolutely nothing to do with policy. Where is this coming from? So, I became pretty intent on figuring it out. Because the young man was sincere. And everywhere I went then, whether I was with doctors, whether I was with lawyers, whether I was with poor people, it didn’t matter, I would say if you know anything about my country what is the vehicle from which you’ve learned about it? Is it a teacher, is it TV, is it the radio, is it movies? What is it? And long story short, I figured out it’s free satellite TV. And the number one thing they watched at the time was “Baywatch” and “Friends.” So, then it all made sense because we have not been there, I go back to we have not been there, we have not shown up to explain -- we’re not telling you not to watch this but it’s a cartoon. It is not real. It is a caricature. We as Americans know how to process it but we weren’t there when the poorest of the poor in the slums in Morocco would take their car radio batteries out, hook up a coat hanger, and
it was free and they are sponges to learn about us. And so, then I got on a tear about well, okay, I know, again, this sounds crazy but where is Disney? Where is Sesame Street? Where is something wholesome? Well, it was in Egypt at that time but it’s pay-per-view.

Q: Of course.

TUTWILER: So, that’s discretionary spending.

Q: Right.

TUTWILER: And it was about, as I’m pulling out of my memory, $3.25 or something. Well, that’s a lot for the poorest of the poor.

Q: Sure, sure.

TUTWILER: And so, it was very frustrating because when the United States, when Baker was secretary of state those countries still controlled access to information. Large numbers of countries did. Okay, in the intervening time when I’d been out that battle of the governments all lost and they could get cable and they could get satellite and they could get it for free. Okay? Well, unfortunately where all the Americans serving all over these countries, ding ding, these people are sitting because they are curious about us, they want to learn about us. And I used to say there are parts of the United States that you and I could go to, we could put some people in front of a TV screen, which is the most powerful thing ever, or a computer screen and if their parents have never traveled, their grandparents have never traveled, and we put some purple things on TV and we say these are Eskimos and nobody’s there to question and say well, wait a minute, no they’re not, they leave that episode and they think all Eskimos are purple. And so, it was the same principle to me. It’s like in the intervening time and I’m not blaming anybody, it just happened, if we didn’t show up and say it’s great you’ve got free satellite TV, you can get CNN, you get all these things. However, it was teaching them values about us which they believed. And we know, I mean your reaction, you know it’s not, we all know it’s not, but we know how to process that, we know how to process our own product and they didn’t. And so, they were sponges and that’s why that young man asked me that -- didn’t ask me, asked the moderator. He was sincere.

Q: Sure, sure.

TUTWILER: And I thought, when I heard that, I’ll never forget it, I was like where in the world is this coming from? And so, I got about the business of trying to figure it out.

Q: Were you successful at all? Because-

TUTWILER: I think any of us contribute. You served. Success is something I don’t know how to measure.

Q: No, no, I mean at least in trying to get some of those more reasonable, you know,
everyday kinds of TV into Morocco?

TUTWILER: No.

Q: Because it was very hard to organize?

TUTWILER: Well, it’s because we’re, I’m a capitalist, we live in a capitalist country.

Q: Right.

TUTWILER: So, I mean “Sesame Street” and the others, they are wonderful, wonderful companies but this isn’t their mission.

Q: Right.

TUTWILER: And so, I go back to somebody looking at our foreign dollars, how are they spent? And if we’re still publishing -- and again, I am not knocking Kissinger, Brzezinski, Scowcroft, any of these people at all. Well, maybe they’ve got enough of those books at the libraries and maybe we can take those dollars and put them toward a deal with “Sesame Street” and then hand out the “Sesame Street.” I don’t know what kind of equipment these people have but videos or books or something. But it’s going to take a recalibration of our limited dollars, in my personal opinion. And you know, you’re a career FSO, I read you were there 30 years, so you know. There’s no bureau that’s going to give up a dollar. When I became Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy, I tried to change a program that gave a lot of money to Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, etcetera. These countries really didn’t need that much public diplomacy investment, but there was a senator, and I knew these were his favorite PD programs, and I wanted to cut them in half because I thought wait a minute, the Soviet Union’s over, they’re all free countries, why are we spending this money? It was a lot of money when you look at a limited budget. But, basically I wasn’t going to fall on my sword because I knew I would lose the battle and I did.

And so, we kept spending at the same levels we were during the Cold War in countries that were now free. That did not make sense to me. I didn’t want to cut them off to zero but it’s like ridiculous where you have Indonesia or Malaysia or some of these other places, where we need to do more and a modest increase in PD budgets could do a whole lot more. I wanted to put resources in places where we could make a visible change in people’s lives. And when you ask if programs survive, I didn’t know, but nevertheless I thought it was worth trying.

So, back in Morocco I asked, I don’t remember when, could we increase scholarships, at least for English language training? How about teaching English for a year out in neighborhoods where we’ve never been. Let’s put some funding into that. The children who benefit will know it’s from America, like the little fruit tree certificates with U.S. and Moroccan flags. And there was an existing program for English language training but it had so many rules. You had to apply, wait for such a long time… I said we don’t have
time for this. Eventually, I don’t remember how we got it done, but somehow a program called English Access Micro Scholarships began and we started handing out these scholarships of $1,000 for a year’s worth of English to both males and females. I can’t remember the age groups we used -- probably high school or immediate post-high school. And my thinking was okay, so Johnny or Susie can use even a modest increase in English fluency to at least get a job in a hotel or a restaurant, because even a little bit of English is going to give them a leg up in the job market. Again, their whole neighborhood will know, their friends and family, etc.

So, fast forward to today. I literally just received an email the other day from the officer who was my DCM at the time. She is now ambassador in Angola. And actually said I just want you to know that the program you started -- English language micro scholarships -- is still going strong all these years later. She had just attended a graduation ceremony and sent me some of the letters the graduates wrote. They were from little 12-year olds and 14-year olds, who won the scholarships or whatever and that it’s still here, it’s still making a difference. And she told me that in her graduation remarks she mentioned that she served with the ambassador who came up with this idea. So, that was actually an unbelievable feel-good moment. I had no idea. And it’s been so many years and so it’s still going. But when I first had the idea the existing bureaucracy just found ways to say no. In my eight years in the State Department under different administrations, it is my observation that the system just does not reward innovation. And there are some incredibly talented, creative people in the State Department, career and Foreign Service, but you’re not encouraged or rewarded professionally for bucking the system, is my observation.

Q: Sure.

TUTWILER: And getting support for innovative ideas. And maybe 20 of them don’t work but what if one does? And so, I just, I feel badly for people because they’re good people. It’s everybody’s fault and nobody’s fault. But so many times I would be told when I just have an idea or somebody at the embassy would and I’d say well, that’s a great idea; let’s go do that. Oh, well, it would just take, you know, forever to implement it.

Q: About your English training idea, just a little bit of background and you may have already heard this as ambassador. We used to do a lot of English language training through the Public Diplomacy programs and cultural centers. Then we realized that, in a lot of places, we were competing with private sector English language training, Berlitz, others less reliable, that could charge less and claim to offer more.

TUTWILER: But were they paying for it, the students I mean, paying for our English language training?

Q: Oh, yes, students were definitely paying. But the payment covered state-qualified teachers and certificates of completion that were recognized by the government. This meant it could be used for college credits. So anyone who took our courses would have a
leg up not only in the job market, but also in applying to universities.

But just one more thing. Another problem for our more serious and highly qualified programs was that they gave homework and really made students earn their grade. A lot of the private places just took your fee, conducted a few classes, and gave a certificate that was worth the paper it was printed on.

As a Public Affairs Officer, I had to monitor the effectiveness of English teaching programs we supported. We found that even scholarship students who could attend tuition free were bored with the teaching methods and were not motivated to learn. We started seeing a fall-off in subscription. Now if you ask me, they’re just cussed lazy. If you want to learn a foreign language you have to work. But the problem of keeping students’ attention in the age of cell phones is nearly worldwide. We were constantly prodding our local English language teaching partners to try out new ways of interactive learning, of integrating laptops or cell phones into their teaching methods, anything to raise attendance and attention. Otherwise, you lost business and eventually the question becomes whether you should continue at all.

TUTWILER: But again, my deal, these were not normal times. We’re not living in normal times.

Q: Yes, you are right.

TUTWILER: Think about it. Fifty years ago we were in the immediate post-WWII world. Morocco’s 78-year-old gentleman prime minister once remembered with me how Moroccans came out after the Nazi defeat and waved American flags. Now we are living in the post-9/11 world and he told me that his citizens no longer know what American values are. And he was being totally candid with me and totally sincere. And his words, and those of other responsible leaders, influenced my thinking. And so, I go back to the question of “Baywatch” and “Friends.” Again, I am not a right-wing nutcase, at all. I could care less if they’re watching it. But if that was the only thing they were watching, then they are getting a skewed vision of America. And so, it got back to what the prime minister said to me. And so, to me, you know, you said measuring success. In my personal opinion, it’s no different than a year or if we’re living in New Zealand or Australia or wherever, some of the public diplomacy stuff we were doing, in my mind, it wasn’t a cop out; but it’s not easily measurable. For example, how do you measure what goes through a person’s mind, especially a young person’s mind, when they make a choice. Hopefully it is an informed and thoughtful choice. That was what I wanted to influence -- not with guns, not with bombs, not with weapons, not with any of that, but with concrete examples of American values, I just want to try, you know.

Q: Sometimes in some of these countries comic books can be effective and it varies with country. It depends-

TUTWILER: Sure, I totally agree.
Q: I learned that, at least in Sub-Saharan African countries, it turns out comic books are a very effective means of getting to younger, poorer groups.

TUTWILER: Right. But then here is my deal. We know that comic books are popular in, you know, Mali. Do it. It may not be perfect. And that was my thing with the picture books. I’m not waiting around for translation. I do not have two years to waste while this book goes through being translated in Lebanon and put into Egypt and all the rules that exist. That is two years gone so let’s just hand it to them in English because all I’m really interested in is the beautiful pictures of our prairies, of our lakes, of our people. You can’t believe; I personally bought a ton of books. There was one book that was actually published in Australia. Some man had come here and it had it all; barns, everybody wasn’t living in a mansion. I mean, it just painted a really great, honest picture of us. I didn’t care if it was in Arabic. I could care less. But to get State Department dollars to do that? Forget it.

Q: Yes, I found the same thing to be true in other posts. Books of beautiful photos, even older photos of Native Americans and frontiersmen... they were very popular.

TUTWILER: And so, Charlotte Beers, who had the undersecretary job before me, started a publication, I can’t remember what it was called, in the US, either State or USAID, I can’t remember. They found that because it was free -- this was in the streets of Egypt -- it was completely devalued.

Q: Yes.

TUTWILER: So, they went back and then they charged a minimum fee for it to try to get it- their ideas were fabulous. But Charlotte was terrific and she was nimble and she came and had years and years of experience in New York in marketing and so she was able with Powell’s support, you know, to change on a dime. But a lot of people, you know, it’s our government I guess for good reasons in most instances moves slowly. And you know, you could be sitting in Peru and have an idea that’s applicable regardless of what region in the world you’re in and it’s going to take a while, you know, to get the DAS’s (Deputy Assistant Secretary) attention, to get the assistant secretary’s, to get the Under Secretary’s attention; I mean, it just takes forever.

Q: Yes. And then there’s always the question of resourcing it.

TUTWILER: Allocation of funds.

Q: Right.

TUTWILER: Who’s going to do it?

Q: Right, right.

TUTWILER: Because I’ll tell you, they’re not. They’re not.
Q: Yes. One of the things we did was to get in touch with every state’s tourism marketing office, you know, for tourism materials.

TUTWILER: I did the same thing.

Q: -Louisiana and so on, and just said please send us anything free, you know. And because those marketing offices that words are not going to be most of what they’re going to send. It’s going to be images -

TUTWILER: Totally. I did the same thing. In Morocco, again, when I got there pretty much if you came to the embassy there was nothing on the walls that told a story about America. I mean nothing. And if things were on the wall, as I recall, they’re Moroccan. So, I said I don’t understand this.

Q: Yes.

TUTWILER: So, I wrote to every U.S. governor and said if your state has a poster, I do not care what it is, please send it to the embassy and then I had them framed in the medinas, the souks, for nothing. Every single solitary U.S. governor sent them to me and New York’s were phenomenal. But it also kicked up American morale in the embassy because they’d go find their home state. It might be Pennsylvania or Alabama or New York. And these things didn’t all come in on one day so if you’re from Oregon you’re going all over the embassy looking for Oregon until it arrived. And when visitors came in you could see them looking at these things. And it was nearly free. And then you had America all over the walls.

Q: Yes. It’s clear you are being active and looking for every opportunity.

TUTWILER: I don’t view the sole job of the ambassador as interacting with the elites in the government. That isn’t 100 percent part of the job. You have to know them, have those relationships and develop the relationships, and it’s not just for the ambassador. Everyone at post should be doing it, but there is a percentage of Americans who never really get out.

Q: Yes, I encountered that myself as a supervisor. Sometimes it can take some effort to get people motivated to get out and explore. But then there are lots of administrative tasks that weigh people down as well.

TUTWILER: I mean seriously. They work in the compound and now they’re fortresses. They send their children to an American school. And they go to, what was it called, the American Club, American Center, something. And that’s their experience.

Q: Yes. It always varies with country because sometimes there are more opportunities than others depending on the country but you’re right. I mean, energizing your whole embassy is a big job.
TUTWILER: I mean, there were some people I was like, wow. Why are you in the Foreign Service? You know? I just didn’t understand. It was just an observation. It wasn’t everybody, it certainly was not but there were some who did their jobs and they could have been in any country.

Q: Looking back on that time, what did you find to be the most effective things for your mission goals? How did you manage or organize your work that made it as effective as it could be?

TUTWILER: I never wrote down goals. I mean, we were thrown into a goal. I told you I’d been there like three weeks and 9/11 happened so our goal was everything I’ve just talked about, is, you know, other than those people in the embassy who had specific duties in the financial area and other areas what were the rest of us doing? So, overriding? Yes, absolutely. It wasn’t a normal time to be serving.

Q: No, I understand, sure.

TUTWILER: And, well, as I told you, I, again, based on previous experience, I was out there. And I did not hesitate to do media. And because- again, my attitude was, one, I had the confidence from having dealt with the basket of issues associated with the area, the broad area and the first Iraq war. I was in the meeting with Tariq Aziz so I mean I would be able to answer these questions. And actually, something really bad started to happen in the Israel-Palestine relations. [Note: During the spring of 2002, Israeli-Palestinian fighting increased significantly. Israel launched a major military operation in the West Bank, and by June, Israel started building the barrier wall.] And recall that I was the first female ambassador to Morocco in 228 years; there’d never been one. Number two is, I think it was when the Israelis were really hammering Arafat and that was when the streets were actually more so, than us bombing Iraq were really pulsating. And I had agreed, I can’t remember the dates now but no U.S. ambassador had addressed the Moroccan press club in decades as I recall. So, I said well, I’ll go do it. So, this had been on the schedule and if something, you know, stressful was going on with the Israelis and the Palestinians or with Arafat, I had to expect there would be questions on it.

Q: And did you do a murder board to prepare yourself?

TUTWILER: No.

Q: Oh, wow, that’s impressive.

TUTWILER: And so, I didn’t cancel.

Q: Okay.

TUTWILER: And I went and it was somewhere downtown Rabat. There were 264 in attendance, mostly journalists, and I sat there and answered questions as I recall for over
two hours because I had to have a translator. And a Palestinian guy was there screaming in my face. And a lot of it was explaining U.S. policy, and I got the same reaction -- we don’t agree with a word you say, but we respect you for showing up and not canceling. And for me, my interpretation of that was win one for America. I didn’t duck it. I didn’t cancel when I could have. And I stood there- sat there, as I recall, on a stage and I answered. And you know, some of them were those- it was like doing a State Department briefing, to be honest with you. So, it wasn’t arrogant when you said did you do murder boards; I’d done four years of this so I- there wasn’t really- there was not an angle that they were going to come at that I had not been forced on camera in the United States to have done before. So, again, it’s not from arrogance at all.

Q: No, I get it, I get it.

TUTWILER: It’s not. But I just, yes, I did it. I mean, it wasn’t fun, I’ll be honest, and it was a lot of, you know, angry people but I thought no, I’m not going to cancel. And yes, I was nervous; you’d be a fool not to be nervous.

Q: Oh, of course.

TUTWILER: But it was like that because it’s not about me. If I screw up it’s a reflection on the country. So, I don’t view this as about me at all. We’re all serving overseas; it’s symbols and vessels. And so, I didn’t want to do a bad job and my view was canceling was being a chicken and that’s what they’ll remember, the American didn’t show up.

Q: Right.

TUTWILER: So this was some 15 years ago, and in saying that I didn’t want to cancel, I don’t want to diminish other ambassadors who might decide to do so in their position. If I did not have the experience I did in working with public affairs on Middle East issues, I would have never scheduled myself into the press club would be my guess. Or I would have done the full prep like you mentioned. But I had four years under my belt.

Q: Yes. I get it. I mean, honestly, with your experience I can totally understand why you felt as prepared as you did.

TUTWILER: They weren’t there to ask me about the local farm issues.

Q: [Laughter]

TUTWILER: I knew that because of what was dominating the news.

Q: Sure.

TUTWILER: Now, if I put myself in a position where I was going into a farm forum, I don’t know anything, I would 100 percent get myself up to speed on at least what is the United States’ positioning on this, what are we doing in this country, etcetera. But this-
because of what was going on -- which is even why I would consider canceling -- in Israel with the Palestinians and Arafat -- I mean, streets were pulsing -- is I was fairly confident this is going to be a one issue briefing, that they're not going to be asking me about why did we cancel a shipload of cars into Casablanca.

Q: Right, right.

TUTWILER: And I’ve got to tap dance through, you know, defending, articulating and hopefully, you know, explaining, whatever U.S. policy was at the time. That’s why I was ready when the guy in second row, who identified himself as Palestinian, got up and started questions that had a good deal of rant attached. And yes, I was exhausted when it was over, I remember, but I thought okay, you know. It’s only questions.

Q: Fair enough. So, alright, so looking back on that period what would you advise someone else to do who would be going into a situation like that?

TUTWILER: Like what? Being ambassador?

Q: Yes. In particular in a conflict- in a period of time during conflict.

TUTWILER: To think about what you can do as a civilian. You’re being paid by the United States government to be there so, you know, if you’re not in the Treasury Department and tracking financial things, if you’re not in the military dealing with cooperation on military things, if you’re not in intelligence cooperating on that, what are you doing? And so, isn’t there more you can do than what’s expected which is to have relationships with the foreign ministry, with the, you know, king or the- whatever the government is you are in, and the opinion leaders in that community, perhaps it will be NGOs, the head media people, etcetera. What else are you doing? Because there’s this huge swath in every country that may have, you know, false impressions of us.

I mean, actually when I came back as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, one of the things I did, you know, when the ambassadors come back for their periodic Washington consultations, I’d meet with them. And one of the points I’d always make was please just take a percentage of your time -- I remember there was a gentleman who was serving in Italy -- and I said to him, well, I’ve actually learned there’s a huge Muslim population in Northern Italy. Do we have anything going with these people? Seriously. And many ambassadors, I would say, you know, the majority of them in posts around the world where there are Muslim populations we’ve not traditionally engaged with. But most of these ambassadors were either looking for innovative programs or were already conducting outreach programs. It was very encouraging, to be honest with you. They got it.

Q: Now, so, speaking of that, do you want now to move to the period of time when you were undersecretary or should we save that?

TUTWILER: Charlotte Beers, who was the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs got ill and had to step down. Again, this is not an arrogant statement, but I was the White House’s candidate and I was Powell’s candidate. So it’s 2003, I’m assigned to Morocco courtesy of the elected president of the United States, George W. Bush, and then Secretary Powell asks about the job as Under Secretary. And how do you say “no” to Colin Powell? My only hesitation was, again, having served four years in the Reagan White House, four years at Treasury as assistant secretary, in an election year nothing really gets done.

*Q:* Fair enough.

TUTWILER: It doesn’t. The career government, which is the largest part of the Federal Government, knows there’s going to be a change. Either you have current people on the Hill which are staying or new people are walking in here.

*Q:* Right.

TUTWILER: So, we know how to slow roll everything. It’s true. Democrat or Republican.

*Q:* Absolutely. I’ve lived through those moments as well.

TUTWILER: I kept thinking, asking me to come back to Washington, obviously it was flattering, it’s a huge job… But I was thinking practically nothing gets done, and every month you get closer to November, fewer and fewer new initiatives are possible, fewer decisions can be taken, etcetera.

*Q:* Right.

TUTWILER: Makes no difference if it’s Republican or Democrat.

*Q:* Absolutely.

TUTWILER: So, before that, though, Karen Hughes called me and asked me as a sitting ambassador would I go to Iraq. I said yes. Because to be perfectly honest I wanted to avoid coming back to do the under secretary thing, not because I’m a jerk but because I thought I was actually making a difference in Morocco and because I wasn’t thrilled about entering a job where, the closer we get to the upcoming election, the less things can get done. So, anyway, I went to Iraq. And I was one of, I think it was 10 civilians who’d flown in with General Garner. It was still a live war. Oh yes, it was unbelievable.

*Q:* I didn’t know that.

TUTWILER: Yes.

*Q:* Interesting. Okay.
TUTWILER: So, I flew in with Jay Garner. So, I told Karen when she called- I was to set up the communications stuff. And so, here’s an example. The local communist party in Iraq got a newspaper up and printed bashing the United States of America.

Q: Incredible.

TUTWILER: True story.

Q: Wow.

TUTWILER: True story. Unfortunately, we weren’t quite as nimble. We’re entering a war zone, General Garner actually taught me how to eat the MREs (meals ready to eat) and how to heat up dinner. There was no electricity. We lived in a palace with the windows blown out, there’s no air conditioning, no electricity, and it had to be over 100 degrees every day and every night. I was just a soldier. And increasingly, you know, we kept setting things up as the first civilians who went in. General Garner was in charge. Everything was military. I lived as a soldier. And you learn a lot about yourself. You learn when you take everything away what kind of person at your core you are. Are you a fall apart spoiled whiner? Or can you dig pretty deep and deal with it?

And one night I just can’t tell you how hot it was. And there are no sheets, there’s no pillows; there is nothing. So, that sounds like a spoiled statement. I’m just trying to paint a picture. There is nothing. Zero. And so, the military had dug some outhouses so you had to walk at night with a flashlight the length of this huge palace we were in if you had to go to the bathroom at night. You tried never to do that. And, what was I going to tell you? Oh. So, I got up one morning and I had this just caked red dust all over me from sweat and a sandstorm had come through. You couldn’t put your feet on the floor because there was so much blown out glass. And I remember sitting on my cot and putting my hands to my head and saying oh gosh, I’ve got to dig really deep here. And I can put on my game face, get my -- you never went anywhere without water -- a bottle of water and get downstairs to this staff meeting that General Garner was having or I can sit here and cry and fall apart. Because I’m filthy. There is no shower. It was just a real moment and I’m very thankful for whatever genes my parents gave me. I chose digging really deep and got myself downstairs to that meeting, poured water, you know, all over to get rid of the dust. But it was, yes, there were bombs going off, fire going off. You got used to it.

Q: I interviewed Lew Luck, who was there for USAID, talking about the same situation where, you know, everybody was in the old palace having to deal with the situation you describe.

TUTWILER: It did get better. And the only reason I left is they had a bombing in Casablanca, which was their 9/11, the worst single act of terrorism in modern Morocco. It was indigenous groups so 33 victims and 12 suicide bombers died. I arrived in Iraq in April and the bombings took place in May. I had to go back and demonstrate the U.S. had an ambassador to represent us in the immediate aftermath. And then once back there, after things calmed down, there was no way I could say no to the under-secretary job.
Q: Okay, okay. Wow. How long were you in Iraq?

TUTWILER: Five weeks. So, then I get back to Washington and -- it had nothing to do with me -- some senators placed a hold on over 140 appointees, myself included, so I sat in the State Department basement waiting for confirmation for four months. And every month we’re getting closer to an election. And it wasn’t anybody’s fault, I understood the game, but there was a part of me that was like, you know, this is so frustrating. But it was a great honor. I don’t want to come across in any way not appreciative of the confidence all these leaders had in me.

Q: And you wanted to get started.

TUTWILER: Correct. I was antsy.

Q: Okay. But finally, you got confirmed.

TUTWILER: Correct. And then I didn’t stay long. Which was not intended. A really good friend of mine called me, who I’d worked with in the Reagan White House. He is a very high-level person at Goldman Sachs -- and said a gentleman named John Thain, who had been president of Goldman Sachs, resigned and was going to be head of the New York Stock Exchange and you know, I should go work for him. I said well, this is crazy -- this was in December -- I am just now, it was my fourth confirmation, I’d just now gotten confirmed, no way, Jose. I’m not breaking this china, this is crazy. And I know Powell, I know Cheney, I know Bush. I’d worked for Bush’s father for years. I said forget it, it’s not going to happen.

So, he called me back in January and said Thain really wants to meet with you. And so, I agree to go meet with him. I knew the rules and I knew that you can have one meeting with a private sector individual but if you want to pursue it further you have to let the general counsel know at a minimum, in this case Powell. So, I told Powell I was going to go meet with this person because I wanted to be straight with him. I didn’t have to do that. And I usually do things based on gut and what John Thain said to me -- we met at the Four Seasons -- just spoke volumes about the gentleman’s character and that the New York Stock Exchange was an American institution that mattered, it was a different way of service, and so on. So, it made it more difficult because I genuinely liked the man on first briefing and his character.

So, I came back and told Powell that I was going to meet with him again and listen. And then I told Will Taft, who was the general counsel. And long story short, it turned out at one point whenever Thain called I just said I can’t break this china, I can’t do this. And so, he kept me on the phone and there was a part of me that was ready to experience a new challenge. And I had a suspicion, it was not confirmed for me, that Thain would take the New York Stock Exchange public, and actually it did happen. Actually, we bought a company called Euronext in Europe and took it global. So, it was an exciting time to be at an institution that actually does matter. And so, then we went to Merrill Lynch and so
lived through the financial meltdown there and selling Merrill Lynch over the weekend. And then I went to this company called CIT that we helped get out of trouble. So, I ended up spending 10 years commuting back and forth to New York and New Jersey and had a really interesting, again, unique experience of the perspective of really smart people in New York. So it was interesting because of the historical times in the jobs I was doing, certainly the first two. But I also believe strongly that it’s more important how you exit a place than how you enter.

I’d known these people. I did not want to disappoint them. I know how long it takes to get somebody confirmed. This was not what they wanted to hear. Whether you’re in the government or in private sector, and somebody that you’re counting on says oh, by the way, I’m leaving, it’s disruptive. And so, I didn’t want to do that. I stayed six months or so. I did not start at the New York Stock Exchange when Thain did. I stayed at State because I wanted to do what was right in my mind by Secretary Powell and by President George W. Bush. I had a lot of friends in the State Department, so I stayed until June or July, which isn’t all that long a time. And it got to where people completely forgot that I was leaving because I was there every day in the senior staff meetings, participating. So, it was just the way I wanted to handle it.

Q: So, a question about the six months that you were there, how well had the integration of USIA and State gone from your point of view. It had been about three years at that point since the integration had begun.

TUTWILER: Well, I don’t know what it’s like now. And, going back, USIA was still separate when I worked at State for Secretary Baker. But to answer your question, during my tenure as under secretary, in a way it all gets back to budgets. Congress can put things on paper because they create the number of funded slots. When I was the first female Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Spokesperson; that job was created by Congress in 1944. So, there had to be a budget that goes with it. Moving forward, Charlotte Beers was the first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs under the integration. I was the second one. It really was a giant title but kind of hollow because whoever was the undersecretary for public diplomacy did not have the lion’s share of the funds, those went to the bureaus. The actual under secretary’s office had a small staff, as I remember. I can’t remember how many people. And maybe I just don’t remember correctly, maybe there was some money that Congress had allocated for that office but money is also staff, the infrastructure and a budget to work with.

Now, I did understand how bureaus work from my earlier time as Spokesperson. So, I could sit and talk to for example, the head of the EUR about objectives. But if I got a call from the field, say my public affairs officer in Morocco, Magda, called and said the Middle East Bureau is taking $100,000 away, as Under Secretary I did have the power to say, in essence, oh no you’re not. So I may not have possessed the funds, but I did get some power over where they went.

I remember spending a fair amount of time meeting with ambassadors back on consultation, listening to them; what are you doing in your countries that you have found
effective? Two examples stick out in my mind. One was the ambassador in Indonesia who had started a sewing machine initiative not only with the machines themselves, run by foot pedal so they didn’t rely on electricity, but with the fabric as well. And that was becoming a going concern. And the ambassador in Italy at the time told me how he was engaging new, underserved populations. That was great.

And these kinds of examples helped me prepare testimony for congress in which I kept underlining how important it was for us to recalibrate along these lines, to spend a larger percentage of our time as American representatives in neighborhoods or populations where we just haven’t been.

Also, there were some in the administration who had a view that USG reps should not go on Al Jazeera. I had the absolute opposite view. I had Al Jazeera at every one of my events. For example, when I was in Morocco, if the U.S. Trade Representative came for a working visit, -- at that time it was Bob Zoellick -- or for that matter any cabinet secretary -- I would allow the Al Jazeera rep to cover it. The Al Jazeera rep in Morocco was a female correspondent. Now, my thinking was that people who were against giving access to Al Jazeera were hung up on what was said on Al Jazeera. My thinking was, if an American is on for 22 minutes that’s 22 minutes that the bad voice is not on so let’s crowd their space. Let’s participate. And so, I had a different view. This had nothing to do with the substance or policy, I just thought that we could play the game smarter. And if Al Jazeera is what everybody’s watching, then don’t let the people who hate us articulate our policy. Let Americans articulate it even with translation. So, it was not only Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera was the code word for, you know, the terrible coverage of America. There were others among Arabic broadcasting as well.

But my view was: participate. There’s a limited number of hours in a TV day plus if it’s a big enough person they’ll tape it and play it more than once and you’re having an ability to at least let people without a filter hear what a real American says about whatever it is, the policy in Chile or anywhere.

Q: And did they as far as you know? Did Al Jazeera and the others actually, you know, show the American speaking? They didn’t edit it?

TUTWILER: Well, they didn’t edit it any more than the U.S. media edit video or audio interviews.

Q: Ah, I see what you’re saying. I retract the question.

TUTWILER: I mean, it’s gotten worse here. Many years later. There is not a person I know, liberal, moderate, conservative who is not furious right now with American media and what we’ve turned into. It’s sad. It’s opinion news. And if you turn on your TV, I don’t care if you’re a liberal, conservative, hate Trump, like Trump, it doesn’t matter, it’s all these talking heads now, nobody even knows who most of them are, and that’s all they do. And it’s really, it’s a bad situation because we grew up in a world of, you know, three networks. I was at the White House in the Reagan Administration when CNN threatened
to sue to get into the press pool for a Rose Garden event that Reagan was doing. So, we’ve taken that and now, I mean really, it’s faces; you don’t even know who these people are. And it’s all their opinions. Where, when we grew up my model was Tom Brokaw.

Q: Oh yes, that was my standard as well.

TUTWILER: I don’t know if he is Republican, Democrat, Independent. I could care less. But that’s the model that I like. You can say I’m old-fashioned, but I prefer just the news. Let me make my own decisions. I know there’s bias, there’s always been bias. But today it’s off the charts. And it’s like I don’t know how they’re going to get it back because if you’re liberal you’re going to be on MSNBC, if you’re conservative you’re going to be on Fox. Okay. So, I have members of my family who, you know, will only watch Fox and I go but then you are losing at least being exposed to other questions, other thoughts, other ways of looking at something because you’re just reinforcing what you already think. And all these studies show that people, whether it’s social media, etcetera, doing it more and more and more; they’re just isolating themselves in these silos. Well, then you don’t get - you don’t challenge your own thinking.

For instance, I still watch the Sunday news shows. If there is, you know, a Muslim leader, an Arabic leader, I’d listen because I know they know their brief, their life experience in some way I can never know. So, it’s the same principle. I actually pause and listen even more intently because they have credibility, they live in the neighborhood. So, I have the same view regarding Arabic broadcasters. If an American is showing up in an Arabic-language news show in an average person’s living room in, you know, in one of the 57 Muslim countries in the world, maybe somebody will stop and listen because they realize that the American obviously has a different life experience from them and maybe they can learn something. So, that was my view. But no, did I think Al Jazeera was out there saying America’s great? No. But so what?

Q: Turning to your time as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, did you feel you still needed to do a lot of education in Congress and what did you need to tell Congress?

TUTWILER: Sadly, everything I’ve been telling you now is what I told congress in my testimony. And I remember them being very receptive. Whether they were liberal or conservative. They wanted us to do a better job, all of us collectively as Americans. It wasn’t partisan at all.

Now, when you move from program planning to the brass tacks of budgeting, that’s where I had a lot of work with congress. For one, if senator so-and-so or congressman so-and-so had a pet project, whether it was for China or for, you know, South Africa, it didn’t matter. Whoa, you can’t touch those dollars. And OK, so that’s a little bit of human nature; I understand it.

But at the time, as I remember it, the lion’s share of public diplomacy funds as
appropriated by congress went directly to the regional bureaus. That gave them power to
divvy up funds among their posts as they saw fit to carry out policy. Naturally, they
didn’t want this structure to change.

Now Karen Hughes succeeded me, so you might also talk to her about whether the
funding issues changed, but during my tenure, I spent a lot of time trying to exert control
in that area. But while we’re on the subject of integrating foreign affairs agencies into
State, I actually agree with (former) Secretary of State Tillerson: I say bring USAID
inside the State Department. This would be a brilliant move provided they really shake
that place up bureaucratically. I don’t mean individuals. Because in my limited
experience, you talk about being set in your ways and you talk about the process. In
USAID, if you’ve been using vendor X for 40 years, you are very hesitant to go with
vendor Y. So, it just perpetuates itself, these contracts, every single year with whoever the
vendor is. It doesn’t mean they’re all bad but some of them actually are a little fat. But
you try to go out and do a new one as I did with the project in Morocco with the fruit
trees, and it’s like oh, my lord. So, I think bringing that development assistance back in
the State Department because I think it really needs some work. You talk about
innovation. Really needs it. But, of course, Congress has its own relationships with the
USAID posts. And then there is the F Bureau process, where the State Department keeps
track of where development funds go... It would just be nice if you could just have like an
off-campus meeting for three days and have all these people say okay, we’re not here to
blow everything up but let’s just take a percentage, an allocation of resources to do the
following three things or two things or one thing. And we’re not going to - it’s not going
to take 24 months to get it off the ground.

Q: One other question from the point of view of the Under Secretary. What was your
approach to demonstrate to congress, or OMB, or anyone the value of public diplomacy?

TUTWILER: I think it’s a complete waste of time to try to prove that public diplomacy is
valuable in any conventional, bottom-line way. I understand that you’re trying to hold
somebody accountable, okay. I got that. But I don’t think that it’s applicable to public
diplomacy, to be honest with you. And I think if you’re measuring, maybe you move the
needle a fraction of an inch but then what percentage of your time have you spent
figuring out how to show management upstream that I moved the needle? In my personal
opinion, I don’t know how to measure it, but I know it’s factually true. For example, how
do you measure giving some needy kids a scholarship to learn English, what do we
expect them to say in a poll? Thank you? Okay, great. But, we don’t ask them hey, when
you were down in the souk or the medina and somebody tried to recruit you to join a
terrorist group, what did you say? I don’t mean to be defensive about it, I understand the
desire for some kind of metric, but public diplomacy as a craft does not lend itself to
mathematical measurement. It’s actually emotion, it’s actually influencing somebody’s
thinking to refrain from doing something harmful to America. That’s what it’s about in
my mind.

Here is a good example from my time in Morocco:
Immediately after 9/11 we wanted to demonstrate solidarity with the victims and their loved ones and a gentleman I knew had an idea, as I recall, of let’s do a non-denominational service. Because in Rabat, in Morocco, which has a very long history of Christians, Jews, Muslims all living very well side by side. So, long story short, there is a Catholic cathedral in downtown Rabat. We took all the religious things off the altar. The head rabbi for the country, the head of the Catholic Church for the country, there was another Protestant head, I just don’t remember the denomination, and the king sent his personal imam. That is the first time in the history of Morocco that the king’s personal imam has ever spoken anywhere outside of a mosque. And the king actually got criticized for it in some of the local press. I’d been there only three weeks -- the entire government, the prime minister, the entire cabinet, obviously not the king or the royal family -- I mean all these people I was meeting for the first time, they all came. And I had a really good friend at CNN back here in America and I called her over there because I wanted exposure for this, it was an example to show that Muslims do not hate us at all and here is a genuine outpouring in a Catholic cathedral with all these denominations. Every denomination spoke as a remembrance of their positive experiences of recollections of America, and expressed empathy and solidarity with the United States after 9/11. It was really quite something.

**Q:** Beautiful.

**TUTWILER:** It’s true. So, that’s something you really can’t measure. It was in all the Moroccan news, obviously, and even with the criticism, a little bit of the king’s imam speaking outside of a mosque, it was a visual picture with sound of total religious tolerance of all religions and respect for all religions and all people. I mean, it was a really, really unbelievable thing. And our tradition, America, is as you know for funerals to dress in black. So, I was like thank god, my clothes got to Morocco, and I had something black to wear even though the Moroccan tradition and the Arab tradition is white.

**Q:** Yes.

**TUTWILER:** So, in the pictures of the front row I’m sitting there in black beside the prime minister and the king’s entire cabinet all in white, long robes and the other side were the Americans and other Moroccans. And of course, Americans were all in black and the Moroccans were all in white. It’s really pretty amazing. And we pulled that off, I think it was in like in 24 hours. Everybody was moving at lightning speed. And no, I did not call the Department. But I’m sure I told them. And CNN actually broadcast it; they put it on TV.

**Q:** That is an outstanding example of how you can use your standing as ambassador to convene a high quality, compelling public diplomacy activity that really shows U.S. values and political resolve. But based on your experience, is the U.S. Government good at public diplomacy on the day-to-day level? Should we be doing public diplomacy at all?
TUTWILER: Well then, why would you have all the expense of all of these posts, all of
the personnel overseas, for what? Maybe we need to change the terms of the discussion.
Because public diplomacy may mean one thing to you, it may mean another to me but it’s
the vernacular that we use. So, it could mean - if people are critical of it as just some
airy-fairy junk that we don’t even know what these PAOs and people do in these
countries. And what difference do they make? I would argue that the really effective good
ones, they do make a difference. I lived it, I saw it. I didn’t run around using the
phraseology “public diplomacy” when I was an ambassador. I prefer some kind of
terminology that is more practical, that captures the idea that we are contributing to a
positive, healthy understanding of Americans and America. You might call that public
diplomacy, you might call it strategic communication, the important thing is that people
understand that it is a hearts and mind campaign. To go back to my experience in
Morocco, I never called my public affairs officer a public diplomacy officer. She was the
press officer first and foremost. She was phenomenal. And all of her accomplishments
were not immediately measurable at all. So, I didn’t waste time on terminology, I looked
for how we could make a difference. The same thing was true while I was under
secretary. We can work at it, but we have to know that there’s no way we can make the
whole world love us.

And so, it’s an impossible job. You might say, if we just did this, or changed our policy
like that then everyone would love us. But it’s much more complicated than that. And
it’s not just the State Department; it is private sector America to some degree. For
example, the first time I went to a Moroccan-American Chamber of Commerce meeting I
realized that almost everyone there was Moroccan. Very skilled, very competent, men
and women both, but few American citizens. And that is probably as it should be.
McDonald’s franchises were owned by Moroccans. That didn’t save them from having
their windows broken as symbols of American culture when demonstrators wanted to
express antipathy to the U.S. Same thing with Hilton hotels, or Pepsi bottling and
distribution. How do you claim that these are tools of American culture or examples of
American culture when they are owned by locals? And now, literally fast forward to
today and we have the whole social media thing that moves people so fast and with
unreliable or even fraudulent web material… In the end I think we need to look at our
public diplomacy assets as tools, but not the only tools in the complex of bilateral
relations.

Another aspect that makes the job of public diplomacy difficult is that there are multiple
reporting/evaluation/funding sources. Some funding comes from the regional bureaus. A
lot of funding comes from the regional bureaus. But various other programs that run
several bureaucratic levels away from the under secretary and have their own set systems
like international visitors, Fulbright, specialty training, and the English micro
scholarships. Funding for American Corners comes from yet another office with more
criteria for success. But overarching it all is the ambassador at your post and how he or
she wants to use PD funds. And what if the ambassador gets a call from the NSC or
another office close to the president who tells the ambassador, in essence, forget your
plans, forget the State Department plans, the president’s office on thus-and-such wants
you to do a big public diplomacy campaign on issue X. Maybe, if the ambassador is well
and favorably to the president he or she can resist, or say that the program will be done, but in a small-scale way. So when you ask me if I tried to demonstrate how public diplomacy is valuable, you have to keep in mind that I knew what real public diplomacy officers went through on the ground and that made creating a single evaluation criteria very difficult.

Q: Returning to your experience as ambassador, how do you build cohesion, are there any insights you would offer now looking back?

TUTWILER: I think for an embassy, anywhere actually, you set a tone by your own actions. Are you the first one in and the last one out? You don’t have to be. Some ambassadors work at home early in the morning. But I wanted to show that I was present so I usually followed the first-in last-out example.

Next, do you treat people with respect regardless of their position in the food chain? Do you actually listen? I used to conduct exit interviews with all officers before they departed. I told them, look, I’m a political appointee, when I leave, I don’t have a career I need to manage. Give it to me straight. How can I do better? Where can there be improvements? Are there trends you want to alert me to? And so on. It would be different depending on the expertise and experience of the officer, but you see where I’m going.

I’ll admit that some would be too nervous to provide anything. And I get it. There are a lot of people in government, both political and career, who unfortunately misuse temporary power and can be very disrespectful downstream while they temporarily have this power. And I find that can be the worst of the worst behavior because it’s temporary. And too many times you just see people abuse it because this hierarchical system is set up where they can. So you need to establish yourself as someone who is approachable. So you can’t just stay in your office and only deal with the senior people.

Speaking of which, since I was ambassador immediately after 9/11 and the host government gave me something like a dozen local bodyguards, I started talking with them. And then I would have meetings with 25 of the locally employed staff at a time -- bear in mind we had some 450 total with guards. I said no notes, just two to three hours listening to where they come from and what they had to say. And of course I wanted to know what people in their neighborhoods were saying about the U.S. And I remember it was hard, because many were scared.

Q: Of course.

TUTWILER: So, I had to work overtime in the meetings to make them feel comfortable and then there were some, human nature, who were hot dogs and wanted to monopolize the conversation. The best example of this was a local employee in our consulate in Casablanca. She spoke up and said my family is really afraid for me working here. And that was the first time I had such a statement made so candidly. I should have expected it, and I did explain that things got really dicey. I would send everyone home because I did
not want anyone to get hurt. This employee’s reminder also caused me to add remarks to
my introduction that made clear I understand that it’s not easy for you to come serve in
the American embassy every day, we sincerely appreciate it. So, because of that woman’s
comments I learned something and it made me a more sensitive person, more aware of
our employees’ concerns.

And there were a number of demonstrations while I was there. Again, it was not about us
bombing Iraq; it was about the American-Israeli policy. Over a million people. And I
actually sent all the resident staff home and I said, I chose this job, you all have families,
I don’t want anybody hurt, I want you all to go home. And now, granted, that sounds like
I’m being brave, but I should add that the ambassador’s residence was surrounded by
Moroccan military and Moroccan police, which is great. So, I wasn’t scared I was going
to get hurt. But in case it went crazy, there were a million people demonstrating, I didn’t
want employees hurt.

Q: That’s about the end of the questions that I have for you. Are there reflections or other
considerations that I haven’t thought of that you’d like to share before we close?

TUTWILER: I think the biggest thing for whoever’s serving at whatever time, whether
political or career, Democrat or Republican, is to ask yourself: Am I isolated in whatever
country I’m in? If the answer to that is yes then how do you make opportunities to listen
to the locals. If it’s too dangerous to get out you’ve got locals who are serving in your
embassy. Are the existing programs contributing to a more realistic and positive view of
our country? And don’t get hung up, if you can avoid it, on measuring it. Because some
of this stuff is, it’s just not measurable in my mind. I understand upstream reporting and
evaluation and it’s how they allocate dollars and the fights over the dollars. I explained it
this way to a friend who is from New York and considering a period of service at State.
In my opinion, at its essence, the State Department is an opportunity to make a
difference in people’s lives, the majority of whom you’ll never meet. That to me is what
public service at its essence is about.

And I would say to my friends on Wall Street when I was up there, I would say they’re
similar sandboxes. They’re both under microscopes, they both require making enormous,
important decisions. That is what public service is about. And so, we’re all just
individuals. No one person is going to, you know, go out and change everything because
they’re serving in New Zealand or whatever; it’s just not realistic. But each of us can
contribute. Just take a moment, despite all the incoming every day, and ask yourself: Is
what I’m doing out here making a difference or contributing? It’s not idealistic, it’s not
quixotic, it’s a simple reality check. And if I’m working on 14 programs that C Street is
telling me is important and I know full well they’re not as committed to it as they claim,
well I’ll figure a way to do it. No one wants to get fired. But that kind of direction is
frustrating. How do I navigate this, you know? It’s true. And you can’t be a troublemaker
and I understand that every program is not really necessarily a priority, at least when I
was there.

Q: Well, you’re absolutely right. When I was a PAO in Costa Rica it felt like we were
getting a cable a week with a new high priority initiative. The ambassador would say okay, how are you doing to fulfill this initiative? And eventually I got it. If the ambassador wasn’t behind it, I’d put the talking points out and refer interested groups to available resources, but I would not spend my limited personnel or financial assets on every “nice to have” initiative.

TUTWILER: I love Costa Rica. That’s where we went for my fiftieth birthday. My whole entire family. I did the ziplining through those trees. Wonderful time. But your answer, to use social media, was not yet available when I was ambassador in Morocco.

Q: True. But by 2009, 2010, we did have a substantial web presence and the ambassador was happy because we were fulfilling a Washington instruction in the way our limited time and resources allowed and according to her priorities.

TUTWILER: Well, we did not have that choice in 2001-03 in Morocco. Social media had not yet gone viral, so to speak. Instead, my press officer and I conducted that outreach to all the major news outlets and dailies I mentioned earlier. And my press officer was thrilled. She and I were a great team. She never came to me with the priority, well-meaning initiatives that didn’t really fit with the work or the environment we were doing business in. Now, obviously, this was a delicate balance. I didn’t want her angering the Middle East bureau by ignoring its instructions, but I also did not want to be captive to every instruction churned out of the Department. Especially for a political appointee. And to some extent, because I knew the ropes, I could get away with it. But if you’re new, and have no previous experience with the State Department bureaucracy... There are plenty of talented people running those initiatives. Someone had me talk to a woman the other day. She is being asked to become an ambassador. She’s never been in government. So I tried to be as helpful as possible, but I just thought, oh, lord, she would have to depend entirely on the Foreign Service and they could pretty much control you. It’s true. If you didn’t have previous experience, you know what I’m saying? You’re just plucked in off the street; you’re very successful at whatever your career is and you’re put in these posts. I just can’t imagine myself arriving in Rabat with zero previous government experience. It would be hard.

It’s different if you are career Foreign Service because you have to depend on people at posts, they are your vessels for information. They are literally the people you’re there serving with and many of them are fabulous and will, like we’ve said, give you information without bias. But there are also times, such as when I was spokesperson, the public affairs officer from a given bureau would brief me on the bureau’s views. I would say no, I want the president’s views, the administration’s views, whether the bureau agrees with them or not, that’s what I have to enunciate.

Again, as an example. I had guidance, written and oral, from the Yugoslav desk officer, this was when Yugoslavia was starting to fall apart. And every day he sent me up what his policy was. I mean, it was just hilarious. And every morning we’d start laughing; I’d put a big X through it and I’d say the elected president’s policy is... Yes. I mean, it was fun, it was not mean. But I had to pay attention, or I would have gone out there and said
those words, you know, the White House would have every right to say Margaret, what in the world are you doing? So, it’s, you know, for a new person just popping in from a successful whatever career they’ve had in their lives, yes, I think it would be hard. Yes, they can master it, they can do good jobs. But I think it would be hard.

Q: We will conclude here with our thanks for updating your oral history and the experience and insights you shared in light of your service in the Department and as an ambassador. You’ve provided a unique view of the Foreign Service both as practitioner and observer.

End of interview