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Q: Today is May 26, 1988. This is an interview with Ambassador John Edwin Upston concerning his career with the Department of State. This interview is being done on behalf of the Foreign Service History Center and the Association for Diplomatic Studies. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Mr. Ambassador, how did you become interested in the field of foreign affairs?

UPSTON: I graduated from Stanford University in 1958, and during the 1950s at Stanford there was a great emphasis on the United States involvement in foreign affairs. I was influenced very greatly by that emphasis at Stanford, and also I had grown up in the military service. My father was a World War II Air Force General, and so I had grown up in a tradition of service. So my interest in foreign affairs and the State Department and the Foreign Service really goes back to my early life.

Q: Had you in the Air Force been with your father abroad at any point?

UPSTON: He was stationed mostly in Washington in senior positions, and his service abroad was all during the Second World War and, of course, we didn't go with him. But I had an opportunity as a young man to visit General Norstad when he was Supreme Commander of the Allied powers in Europe. And my first job in life was with a venture capital firm in California--Draper, Gaither and Anderson. William Draper had been the first Ambassador to NATO, and Frederick Anderson had been his deputy. And I learned a great deal as a young man from them about international relations. Incidentally Bill Draper's son and namesake is now head of UNDP having distinguished himself as Chairman of the Ex-Im Bank.

Q: What you were doing then was the equivalent of risk analyses and that kind of thing?

UPSTON: No, it was a venture capital firm. The late Bill Draper had been a pioneer in calling attention to the population problem. He was the head of something called the Draper Commission which was established by President Harry Truman that looked into worldwide economic problems, and Draper concluded that in terms of foreign assistance,
foreign aid, economic development around the world that it was all going to be counter-
productive unless at the same time there was attention given to the population problem in
the developing world. So it was really the Draper report and Draper's emphasis that led to
the establishment of the United Nations population program. Draper helped bring
respectability and government focus worldwide to population issues, and I worked with
him on that while at the same time I was junior person in the business, venture capital
side of the firm of Draper, Gaither and Anderson.

_Q: Your first sort of State Department incarnation was 1966 when you were in
something--_

UPSTON: ’64. It was a very interesting situation. One of the things that I learned as a
student at Stanford was the desirability of a bipartisan foreign policy. This is
unfortunately something we've gotten away from in recent years. I was a young
Republican in California. I had been very active as a young person in Republican
activities. The President at that time was John Kennedy, and John Kennedy felt very
deeply about the need for a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs. He instructed his White
House personnel office to look for some young Republicans with credentials in business
and academic background in foreign affairs to actually be recruited by his administration
to come into the State Department.

_Q: That sounds like a unique program.

UPSTON: Which he referred to the State Department as the "fudge factory." So I was
recommended during this process by Senator William Knowland, who was then United
States Senator from the State of California, and also by Earl Warren, who had been, as
you know, Governor of California and was at that time Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. The overall program that President Kennedy had in mind never was really
implemented because he was assassinated. However, my name was still around in this
whole process. So out of the blue I received a telephone call from somebody who you
may remember named Mel Spector.

_Q: I know Mel. Mel is working on our history program right now.

UPSTON: The call came from Melbourne Spector, and I responded and I came to
Washington as a member of what was called the Management Planning Staff. The person
who occupied the position of Under Secretary for Management, which in those days was
called the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, was William J. Crockett.

_Q: He was considered quite an innovator and controversial at that point.

UPSTON: He was probably the most dynamic and creative and innovative person who
has ever served in a management position in the State Department. I'll never forget my
first meeting with Bill Crockett. He said that he wanted innovators. He wanted creativity.
He wanted to rock the boat. And I thought to myself, "Am I sitting here in the State Department?" But that was Bill Crockett's whole approach.

The Management Planning Staff was a small entrepreneurial group of people reporting directly to Bill Crockett with the full support of Dean Rusk who was then the Secretary of State. The Staff Director was Richard Barrett, an innovator and foreign affairs manager. His deputy was Bob Cox. Perhaps the officer with the most wisdom was Jack Harr who later distinguished himself as a close aide to John D. Rockefeller III. So it was a rather unique opportunity for me as a young man in 1964 to be in a situation where I actually through Bill Crockett had a chain of communication to the Secretary of State, as we all did. The whole idea of the Management Planning Staff was to try to strengthen management both in Washington and the field.

In those days Walt Rostow had the national policy papers, which we called NPPs that were being ground out for virtually every country in the world where the United States had a direct strategic interest. These national policy papers were truly national policy papers in that they were approved and signed off on by all relevant agencies of the United States government.

Q: This would be basically which agencies?

UPSTON: This would be Defense, the Intelligence--

Q: CIA.

UPSTON: CIA, Commerce, in some cases Agriculture--

Q: Treasury.

UPSTON: Yes indeed, Treasury. So they were truly national policy papers, but the initiative and leadership came from within the Department of State. You could go to the Policy Planning Office and pull out a document which was the U.S. Government approved policy. It would be a profile of the country. There would be short, medium and long-range policy objectives spelled out. There would be some sort of evaluation in terms of contingencies, what might happen in the short, medium and long range, and it was a policy, a document that was consistently updated in a review process.

Years later Steve Bosworth, who had been Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Interamerican Affairs as the principal Deputy to Thomas O. Enders, went on to be the head of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, and I can remember saying to Steve Bosworth that I regretted that this whole policy planning process, the national policy paper idea that Walt Rostow had been implementing years ago, didn't exist anymore. And Steve said, "Well, today we make policy from cables, or we make policy from speeches that are made by the President or the Secretary of State, and these are the
policy documents that we use." And I just sort of shook my head and said, "What a shame."

But Bill Crockett's idea, which seems sort of old fashioned at the moment but at that time was really quite innovative, was the whole idea of the Ambassador being the chief of the country team. The concept of the country team with AID, Defense if it was there, Peace Corps, other elements of the U.S. government all working together with the State Department being in the lead and the Ambassador being the chief executive. Bill Crockett also had a great interest in trying to provide people in the Foreign Service who were going to be eventually ambassadors with management experience so that they knew how to actually run something, and he put a great deal of emphasis on the need for management training and management orientation, particularly for people who were going up into the higher echelons of the State Department.

The relevance of the national policy papers is that he felt that there should be some operating mechanism so that the national policy paper objectives could be tied to resource allocation within the management and administrative side of the State Department, and for the national policy paper objectives to be actually implemented by embassies and by the ambassadors abroad and for there to be some sort of a monitoring of that implementation so that the policy papers were not just theoretical, not academic but actually operating instruments of policy objective.

Q: To go back just one step. When you arrived, you had been in an outward-looking firm in venture capital. You had also been caught with the enthusiasm of the Kennedy years and with a background of service to your country. You came to the State Department. How did you view your job? This is before you sort of got the indoctrination or whatever. How did you view what you thought you might do when you got to the State Department at that time?

UPSTON: I got caught up in the internal enthusiasm of what Bill Crockett was directing. I felt that there was a very real opportunity to do something that would strengthen the institution of the Foreign Service, and since the program that Bill Crockett was developing was worldwide, it gave me as a young person a unique sort of global overview because we all had access to these national policy papers and to information that was really a unique opportunity to get a perspective on the world.

This was in the early part of the Johnson administration, because although the process of my appointment had started, as I mentioned earlier, through the interest of President Kennedy in a bipartisan foreign policy, there was a much more open feeling in those days within the Foreign Service and I did not feel as though I was looked upon as an outsider or as an interloper or an irritant within the career service. I felt as though I was really welcomed by the career service, and I felt that I was really a young Foreign Service officer, although I came in through the political process.
Q: I was going to ask, how were your relations—I mean Crockett was really shaking things up. I recall this. I'm speaking as a Foreign Service officer abroad. And you were one of his boys. Was this a problem? I mean not speaking about coming in from a Republican side or non-Foreign Service side but just being with Crockett. Was this as you wandered the hall, did people sort of look cross-eyed at you or say, oh, my God, here's another innovator who's going to upset things or not?

UPSTON: Bill Crockett, based on my recollection, was personally well-liked. There were a number of people within the career Foreign Service who didn't particularly like all of this rattling around and this innovation, but everybody knew that Bill Crockett had the complete confidence of the Secretary of State and nobody really wanted to get on the wrong side, although there were a number of people, as you probably remember, who felt what's going on? And also, there was a certain bias in the traditional Foreign Service, not universal bias but some bias, about people who were admin officers. And this was a situation where the admin and management people were getting more responsibility and power than a lot of the more traditional Foreign Service officers felt was appropriate.

Ellis Briggs, Ambassador Ted Briggs' father, who I think was probably an ambassador to more places than any career Foreign Service officer wrote a book, which you probably remember, called Farewell to Foggy Bottom, and he referred to administrative officers as pant pressers. And he referred to Bill Crockett's program as a group of termites that were eating their way into the foundations of the Foreign Service. So, yes, there was a feeling, but on the other hand, much that has happened over the years in terms of management of Foreign Affairs which continues to this day goes back to the innovations that were taking place in that early period. Also, remember in those days State was the lead agency. USAID was a line operation of State. So was the Information and Cultural Program. Commercial Officers were State. All of that has changed in many ways. I think the Department and the Foreign Service were stronger and more efficient in those days as institutions.

Q: What was your particular bailiwick? What were you doing?

UPSTON: There was something called the Comprehensive Country Programming System, which was respected by some and ridiculed by others. They called it CCPS. Now, the part of the Comprehensive Country Programming System that I thought made sense and I found really quite fascinating was the element of it which I mentioned earlier of the concept of the country team giving the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission the tools that they needed to manage in an operating sense, particularly larger embassies and larger missions that had a substantial number of elements. And I also found very interesting and worthwhile the mechanism to actually focus on the objectives in Walt Rostow's national policy papers and to have a linkage between these national policy objectives and the actual conduct of foreign affairs and implementation of those objectives within embassies.
The things that I was involved with in those days—I'm trying to think back, because it was a long time ago. First of all, Bill Crockett looked upon this Management Planning Staff as his baby. He felt that we all should be given as much experience as possible, so we were involved in everything.

Q: You were about how large? I mean speaking of the--

UPSTON: In those days it was, oh, I guess as small as about 15 people and then it got larger after I left. But my specific beat was West Africa, and I spent a considerable amount of time, although I was not stationed there, in Ghana and Liberia and throughout West Africa in terms of this Comprehensive Country Programming System and the implementation of the national policy papers. Bob Lamb who later became Assistant Secretary for Administration, Nuel Pazdral another young FSO - and I were all together on the African projects.

One side story, which you will find amusing that I hadn't thought about for years, I was in Ghana at the time that Nkrumah was the Chief of State, and the anti-Americanism that existed in Ghana at that time was ferocious. Nkrumah was violent in his public statements about the United States and the West, and on every newsstand you'd see anti-U.S. type of propaganda, and Nkrumah was an atheist who looked upon himself as the only god. Within this context there was a young Ghanaian who was coming to the United States on a Fulbright program, and we gave a little farewell party for him at the airport in Accra. This young man's paramount chief had come from up-country to the airport to participate in this going away party. And there were a number of Ghanaians there at this party.

We had champagne in little paper cups, and the paramount chief raised his cup and said, "God bless the United States of America." And then all the Ghanaians who were there joined and said "God bless the United States of America." And I thought to myself that this was a very real lesson, because the Nkrumah attitude was so violently opposed to the United States that some political administrations would have broken off diplomatic relations with the country. And I thought to myself that we can never lose sight of the fact that the politicians come and go and what one must address themselves to is how fundamentally strong the relationship is with the cross section of the people regardless of what the leadership at any particular time might be espousing.

Q: We need to hang on.

UPSTON: To hang on, yes. Never lose sight of the Big Picture, and the people.

Q: I'd like to return as this is a dialogue just to tell you when that--what is it the Comprehensive--

UPSTON: Country Programming System.

Q: --System was instituted, I was in Belgrade and I was delegated to take charge of this.
UPSTON: And you probably thought, "My Lord."

Q: But I took one look at this and said, "Oh, my God." Because basically it was sort of a matrix that you filled in. You figured out what your goals were and how much money and time you were allocating to this, and the unfortunate thing is, of course, when you get into something like this, it's very good for making one take a look at what are we doing. But when it comes to turning out a piece of paper, it very much resembles what I later was to see in Vietnam, you know, particularly if you are handed--to juggle statistics around and explain what you're doing. You figure what is wanted at the other end. But the country team aspect and the other things were fine, but as I say, there is this problem, yes, we should be looking at what we're doing but then when it comes implementation in the field, the spirit is not always quite a with it as I think as the general idea when it's formulated.

UPSTON: I agree with you, and I mentioned earlier that the elements of this which stimulated me, and I was going to address what you've just said. I think the weakness in it is that it was too structured and matrix oriented, and in fact, a large part of it was the invention of computer experts. And that was the period when the computer was just starting to become really an "in" thing, and the whole thing became too computerized. But the exercise of taking a look at goals and objectives and so on did seem to be a worthwhile exercise. And it also for the first time in many cases was an instrument for Foreign Service people who were principally interested in political reporting or economic reporting in the traditional diplomatic role. It gave them an intellectual exercise in terms of focusing on management.

Crockett did the same thing within the State Department, and it drove a lot of people crazy because every office had the responsibility of providing and it went through us but to him a statement in terms of management by objectives and programs. And it was extraordinary to see in Washington in the State Department the number of people in what would be considered to be management and direction type of programs, office directors and so on, their inability to actually sit down and write what they felt their own personal goals and objectives were within the context of whatever job they had and what they felt the goals and objectives should be for their office and for their staffs. And I had in those days some people who moaned and groaned and complained a bit about the whole process, but I also remember a number of others who once they had gone through this process and once they had actually produced the document within the framework of management by goals and objectives and once these papers had been approved by the office of the then Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, they would say either privately or some of them publicly that they felt it had been a very helpful thing, that it had been agony for them going through the process but that once it was completed they felt that it was helpful.

Q: I was asked by someone who had worked with you, Tom Stern, to ask you about your dealings on the management side with Frances Knight, the Director of the Passport
Office. This is sort of a peculiar institution within--really not even within the State Department--almost outside the State Department.

UPSTON: Yes, I know Tom Stern. He is a fine officer with a distinguished career in management, political/military and DCM in Korea. His critics used to refer to him as the head of the "Stern Gang! He evoked more fear than Crockett. I moved on from the Management Planning Staff to spend a few years as a member of the permanent U.S. delegation to the United Nations in New York. In those days the U.S. representative was Arthur Goldberg, and once again within the framework of this idea that John Kennedy had institutionalized I was assigned there as a young Republican. And then in 1968 I resigned and was out of government for a bit. President Nixon was as you remember elected--


UPSTON: Yes, and not long into his administration I received a telephone call from Bill Macomber, Ambassador William B. Macomber, Jr., who was the new Nixon administration Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the old Crockett position. And Bill Macomber asked me if I would come to Washington and see him. And in those days the head of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs was a very distinguished black lady named Barbara Watson. Barbara Watson was retained by the Nixon administration even though she was a Democrat and had come to government as a political appointee in the Johnson administration.

The head of the Passport Agency, Frances Knight, reported to Barbara Watson. Frances Knight was and is a very conservative, arch conservative individual who had very close ties to J. Edgar Hoover, and she looked upon the Passport Agency as her own bailiwick that she had a proprietary responsibility for. She conceived herself to be somewhat of the czarina, the czar of the Passport Agency, and she wanted absolutely nothing to do with Barbara Watson and the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. She felt that if she needed to report to anybody it should be to the President or perhaps to the Secretary of State but that she had a higher calling which was primarily based on security, national security motivations and her feeling that there were a number of people within Washington and within the system who were really working against the national security of the United States and that she was the protector of that national security.

So, there was a very real management problem, and Frances Knight, since she had been in that position for some many years, had a lock on the conservatives in the House and in the Senate.

Q: I think she came in around 1955.

UPSTON: Yes, I think so. So she had stronger relationships with the conservatives in the House and the Senate than anybody in the State Department, including the Secretary of State, and her congressional relations was stronger in many respects than the bureau that
dealt with congressional relations in the State Department. So she was a very real power
to be reckoned with.

So Elliot Richardson who was then the Under Secretary of State and Bill Macomber did a
rather Machiavellian thing. They created something called the Secretary of State's
Committee to Facilitate International Travel. They placed as the Chairman of that
committee, Leverett Saltonstall, who had been for many years, as you remember, a very
highly regarded United States Senator from the state of Massachusetts, a person who was
universally respected upon the Hill and truly a gentleman of the old school. He was the
Chairman. In order to satisfy the security concerns, another member of the Secretary of
State's Committee to Facilitate International Travel was John McCone, who had been
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Another highly regarded individual in
Washington who was on that committee was Mr. Justice Tom Clark, who had retired
from the Supreme Court at the time that his son had been named Attorney General.

Q: Ramsey Clark.

UPSTON: Yes, because Mr. Justice Tom Clark didn't think it was appropriate for him to
be on the bench while his son was Attorney General, and so Mr. Justice Clark was doing
the kinds of things that a former Supreme Court Justice does, but he was no longer on the
bench. And then Charles Tillinghast, who was at that time the Chairman of TWA, Trans
World Airlines, and the other person I remember was John Haynes, who had been Special
Assistant to John Foster Dulles and had been the head of the Bureau of Security and
Consular Affairs during the period when John Foster Dulles was Secretary. So it was a
fairly high powered group, and Bill Macomber asked me if I would be the Executive
Director of it.

Q: That's good. Could you just raise your voice just one minute.

UPSTON: Yes, is it working?

Q: Yes, this is Side B of Tape 1 of an interview with Ambassador John Upston on May

UPSTON: There were two major problems. One was the bureaucratic internal problem
between Frances Knight as the Director of the Passport Office and her bureaucratic
superior Barbara Watson as Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular
Affairs. And that was an internal bureaucratic problem.

So what Elliot Richardson and Bill Macomber did was to basically put this very
prestigious committee of distinguished Americans and me as the sacrificial lamb in the
middle of this bureaucratic battle between these two ladies. And the title seemed very
glamorous, Secretary of State's Committee to Facilitate International Travel, but it was
basically a way to get this problem off their backs.
But there was another problem in that the volume of passports was increasing. People were not getting their passports on time. They would write letters to the Congress, to their Congressmen, with all sorts of horror stories of how they had to cancel trips and this, that and the other thing. Other problems were arising because of the heavy volume. And Frances Knight said basically, yes, there is a problem and it's the State Department's fault, and if they would just leave me alone, I would solve this problem. What she wanted was for the Passport Agency to be based on a revolving fund so that she would have complete control over the money and that the appropriation would not come through the State Department. She basically wanted to have complete autonomy.

I was given an office and a secretary and a deputy, and I selected a Foreign Service officer named Dave Betts, who went on to hold a number of important positions in the consular field. The committee, as one would suspect because of the distinction of the people who were on it, was fairly passive, and it was very clear to me as the sacrificial lamb that I was going to have to come up with some sort of solution to this. I remember having lunch with John McConé, who had been head of the CIA, at the Metropolitan Club, and at lunch I remember saying, "Why don't we work out an arrangement so that American citizens can apply for passports at U.S. post offices?" That way we're not creating new government facilities, and rather than people coming in to New York City and standing as they were at that time in line for hours and hours and hours, they could go to their post office in Long Island or in Connecticut or where have you and apply for a passport.

It also seemed to me to be a little absurd for the actual passports to be 'manufactured' at passport offices in very expensive real estate. The passport office in New York at that time--and I think still is--was right on Fifth Avenue in very expensive space. So I advanced the idea of having passport manufacturing plants that would be close to airports in non-expensive real estate, and so the passports would be applied for at post offices throughout the United States and then the applications sent to these passport manufacturing plants and the actual passport prepared and issued. That was it seemed to me a good solution to the problem of these long lines at passport agencies and a way to utilize existing U.S. government facilities without creating any more.

This recommendation was actually made to the Secretary of State though the Secretary's Committee and was adopted. Frances Knight was terribly upset because she wanted to have autonomy and wanted to have her own revolving fund and this recommendation went against her grain. She reported me to the White House and said there were very serious national security risks in this whole idea. And I was called over to the Executive Office Building, a meeting presided over by Egil "Bud" Krogh, who was then Assistant to President Nixon. The room was filled with very stern security type people, and it was clear when I walked in that there was a chill in the room and that I was on the carpet. And they were very forthright in saying that it had come to their attention that perhaps there were some national security issues in terms of what I had been doing with this committee. So I outlined the whole thing to this group of people, and of course they came to the same conclusion that we had that in fact it helped national security because it made the whole
process far more efficient and there simply were no adverse national security issues here at all.

Because of the fact that this involved a new approach, it required legislation. Wayne Hayes, who was then in the Congress and a Democrat, represented the administration in support of this legislation. And H.R. Gross of Iowa, Congressman Gross, represented Frances Knight in opposition to the legislation. The legislation passed the Senate with a voice vote with no opposition or no difficulty. In fact, I don't believe there were even any hearings. The situation in the House was much different because Frances Knight was actively lobbying against the legislation. H.R. Gross of Iowa was mobilizing all of the conservative support, and there was a debate, a long debate in the Congress over this.

There was one rather amusing thing which I recall when a liberal or moderate very distinguished Republican Peter Freylinghausen rose on the floor of the House of Representatives and said that he was associating himself with H.R. Gross because he did not feel that it was appropriate for somebody to take the oath of allegiance to the United States in a post office.

But in any event the legislation passed, and it's been a certain satisfaction to me because although it was no major contribution to public service, literally millions and millions of Americans have benefited and have had a convenience as a result of what we--

Q: I wouldn't belittle what you accomplished. Let me ask did you ever talk face to face with Frances Knight?

UPSTON: Oh, yes.

Q: How did this work?

UPSTON: We used to get together for Mai Tais over at Trader Vic's, and she liked me and she felt that I was a good solid Republican, and she felt that in the final analysis that she could manipulate me so that I would make whatever recommendation she would like. After I came up with this rather independent and unique solution to the problem that did not fit into her scheme of things, there was a very decided chill. And in fact, after the legislation was passed and the agreement was signed in the Secretary of State's office by Secretary William P. Rogers and by Red Blunt, who was then the Postmaster General of the United States, Frances Knight refused to attend that meeting. The bureaucratic problem between Frances Knight and Barbara Watson was never resolved until Barbara Watson left the post and Frances Knight retired.

Q: Forcibly retired.

UPSTON: Yes, right, although I'm not sure. Despite everything, Francis Knight was a patriot. She had the strength of her convictions. Francis was a loyal American who served
for many years. However she was not a company officer. Not a team player. A free spirit which made her a "pain in the neck" to the system.

Q: We're trying to present to the researcher in later years how things work. You came in as a Republican, but from what you're saying—and I think this is true in many cases—the Republican side was mainly, you were basically a manager working on a problem, but whatever credentials you had was really handy in dealing with maybe whatever administration was in or out of power and in Congress. It was really dealing—you didn't come in with Republican set and you were going to do things the Republican way as opposed to the Democratic way, but it helped you be a manager by warding off attacks in a way. Or not?

UPSTON: Yes, I think that's accurate. And it's interesting. Remember this was the Nixon administration. It was obviously a Republican administration. There was a management problem, and the person who represented the Nixon administration's point of view because this approach to things was approved obviously by the White House and by the Secretary of State, but the person who represented the administration in the legislation was a Democrat—Wayne Hayes of Ohio, Congressman Hayes.

There was still in those days more of a feeling of bipartisan foreign policy and Republicans and Democrats working together in order to achieve objectives. I do not think there is that kind of feeling today to the extent that there was at that time and particularly in the Kennedy and the early part of the Johnson administration. Of course, there was deterioration in terms of bipartisan foreign policy directly related, as you remember, to Vietnam.

Q: So this actually cut across—

UPSTON: Cut across, right.

Q: --party lines. We do want to move on to when you were Ambassador to Rwanda, but you had some interesting assignments. You were with the United Nations. I wonder in brief what sort of things you were doing with the United Nations.

UPSTON: I occupied this Republican slot for a couple of years as a member of the permanent U.S. delegation to the United Nations in New York with the title of Adviser, International Organization Affairs. I was still a young man, but the U.S. delegation to the United Nations was relatively small, operated as an Embassy. In fact, it's a unique Embassy because of its proximity to Washington.

It was a fascinating experience for me because when I walked across the street to the United Nations I was entering the world and had an opportunity to work with and to relate to other people from all over the world, and unlike an Embassy where the cable traffic relates to the specific country, the cable take that we all got as members of the U.S. delegation was worldwide. I worked on host country relations, which gave me an
opportunity to help in terms of diplomatic problem solving with virtually the entire diplomatic community within the United Nations. Then I was given responsibility for covering the specialized agencies. I covered the Fifth Committee, which dealt with management problems. Then, also, I conducted almost daily a briefing for the public. There was a conference room on the first floor and a constant stream of people, business people, women's groups, college students, just a whole variety, and I think that probably with the exception of Jack Cates, who you may remember, who was there at the time, I think that probably I was called into give these briefings as much as anyone.

The problem for me was that there were two policies of the Johnson administration which every morning I was called upon to defend, and one was the exclusion of China from the United Nations. And two was to defend a U.S. escalation in the Vietnam War. And I found this after a while intellectually very draining to have to day in and day out defend these two issues. And that basically led to my resignation, because although I had great fondness for Hubert Humphrey and in fact knew him, he used to come to the--as Vice President, he used to come to the U.S. mission to the United Nations from time to time. And when he did come he would make it a point to sit down on an individual basis with everybody, and I had great, great fondness for him as a person.

But I felt that he was inexorably tied to the policy of the Johnson administration and if we were going to extricate ourselves from Vietnam we needed a new administration, and I felt that probably the shrewdest person around and the most knowledgeable person around who was also feared and respected by the communist forces was Richard Nixon, and that in terms of the kinds of things that needed to be done, that Richard Nixon would be a stronger candidate. It was that feeling that really led to my resignation. As it turned out, I was correct because as we all know it was the Nixon administration that opened up relations with China and it was the Nixon administration that brought about the end of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam situation after it had just gone down the drain.

Q: Ambassador Upston, do you recall any particularly unusual experience during your UNESCO years?

UPSTON: Yes - the letter bomb attempt during the Israeli controversy. And I was told by the FBI that I was on Squeaky Fromme's hit list. [Fromme was one of the infamous Charles Manson cult in Southern California in the 1970s.] But, on a lighter side, when the U.S. Congress cut off money to UNESCO - I wanted to maintain influence within UNESCO - realizing the Soviets were trying to fill this vacuum. To do this I needed to reach out to the public. I did a Sammy Davis concert in San Francisco to raise money for books for the blind. A world literacy concert at Radio City and another at the Capital Center [Washington, DC] with the late Marvin Gage. That sort of thing. Mo Ostin - president of Warner Brothers Records - said that George Harrison, the Beatle, was coming to Washington for the day and could I think of something exciting. I said, "Why not meet with the Secretary of State?" I called Jackie Hill in the Secretary's office. Henry Kissinger would be delighted. We went to the 7th Floor at 4 PM. In his familiar voice the Secretary said, "Mr. Harrison, you are a very famous man. It is my understanding you are
in Washington for one day and of all the people I am the one you wanted to meet." George Harrison responded in his own characteristic voice, "I didn't want to see you, it was Upston's idea." "Vell", said Henry, "Let's have a picture, I need to go to the White House."

Bill Buffum called me in--he was then Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs--and he was livid. He had a copy of staff work I had apparently authorized filled with typos and in general a bad piece of work. This was accompanied with a blast memo initialed by H.K. Bill and I had worked together at USUN. He asked for an explanation. I suggested the staff assistant come in. "Please call SS [the Secretariat] and find if or what communications came from the Secretary to Ambassador Buffum on that day. He came back in a few minutes. "There were none, Sir."

Buffum turned to me. I said, "Bill ask Marv Gentile to come up. Marv was head of Security. We asked him to check all the typewriters in the Bureau against the bogus memo. It turned out to be the typewriter of someone who wanted my job - and was promoted later to be a Foreign Service inspector. So - that's another bit of insight as to how this system works.

**Q:** Then there was sort of an hiatus there before you came back to the State Department working in management again.

**UPSTON:** Yes, that's correct.

**Q:** Who was head of management at that time?

**UPSTON:** That was William B. Macomber.

**Q:** Macomber was. I see. I don't want to move too rapidly, but I think probably we might-let's move to the time of the Reagan administration. Were you involved in his campaign on the foreign affairs side at all?

**UPSTON:** During the Carter administration there were a number of people who recommended that I stay on. I had been at that time during the last part of the Nixon administration Executive Director of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, which at that time was a Deputy Assistant Secretary level job within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. And we did a number of things which were rather interesting in terms of the UN context and UNESCO, which I would be glad to discuss.

**Q:** I'd like a little because of our disenchantment with UNESCO. Was that taking place at the time you were there?

**UPSTON:** What happened was that at the same time that I was in charge of this Secretary of State's Committee to Facilitate International Travel, I also had the title of Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Management, who was Macomber, and so I
participated in meetings. In one of the meetings Macomber said that there was
disenchantment with UNESCO in certain quarters of the White House and the U.S.
National Commission for UNESCO was not doing anything and that perhaps it would be
a good idea to abolish the U.S. National Commission. And Macomber turned to me and
asked me for my views on that because he knew that I had been a member of the
permanent delegation to the United Nations in New York covering the specialized
agencies.

I said that I thought that that would be a great mistake. That, first of all, you couldn't
abolish the U.S. National Commission because it was established by public law and had a
congressional mandate and that there was a support for UNESCO up on the Hill and that
the U.S. National Commission was a unique vehicle for the Department of State to have a
vehicle for outreach and communication to the education, scientific and cultural
community and the private sector in the United States. Apart from everything else that it
served a very useful purpose.

So Macomber said, well, we'll make this thing a Deputy Assistant Secretary level job and
I won't abolish it or recommend abolishing it if you go over and run it, which I did. It was
an absolutely fascinating experience. We made the whole thing operational in developing
programs in the whole area of education, science, culture and communications relating to
UNESCO in Paris, which was then under the leadership of a Frenchman who was quite
moderate. And everything was going along just fine. We restored confidence within those
elements of the White House that had been skeptical of U.S. involvement with
UNESCO. I worked "hand in glove" with a fine gentleman - Dr. Miller Upton - who was
Chairman and President of Beloit College.

Then the General Conference of UNESCO in Paris, which was held every two years, took
certain actions which were contrary to the interests of Israel and the Jewish community in
the United States. There was something called the Western Group of countries and Israel
had wanted to be a member of the Western Group, and the United States was supporting
Israel being elected to this group and the General Conference did not approve Israel being
elected to the Western Group. So the Jewish community in the United States and the
press picked up on this and said Israel excluded from UNESCO, which was not the case
at all, because Israel was a member of UNESCO and had a mission there and was
participating. It was simply a bureaucratic thing. And then there were certain actions that
were taken by the General Conference relating to some cultural issues.

The result of all of this was that Congress cut off aid to UNESCO. This was during the
Nixon administration. I took the position that there really were some national security
issues here, because UNESCO is after all that part of the United Nations that deals with
education, science, culture and communications, and it is that part of the United Nations
that does the most really relating to the developing world in educational matters as well as
a number of good humanitarian programs. I took the position that if we cut off our links
to UNESCO we simply were going to be creating a vacuum which the Soviets and more
leftist elements would then move in and try to occupy.
So we held the line and kept the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO going, raised funds privately, because the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO had a tax exempt status since it had been established by the Congress and I was able to raise money privately. So I received money from the Rockefeller Foundation and from a number of other foundations for operating programs in the area of the environment, the man in the biosphere programs, programs for young people and environmental education which were international. We published something called World Population Year, a news service which was translated into a number of languages and distributed worldwide--a number of programs that kept the U.S. involvement with UNESCO active even during this time when there was a strain over the Israeli issue.

Then the United States restored its interest and support of UNESCO and everything got back on track, but during the Carter administration René Maheu, the Frenchman resigned or retired and was replaced by Moktar M'Bow who had been Minister of Education in Senegal who was very, very leftist and anti-West in a number of ways and a terrible administrator, and the result of his leadership was that once again the United States withdrew from UNESCO. And now recently late last fall a man named Mayor, M-A-Y-O-R, who is a very distinguished Spanish gentleman has been elected the new Director General of UNESCO, and it is my hope that with his new leadership that the U.S. will again become a member, an active member of UNESCO. But it has been over all of these years an on again, off again kind of a relationship which really needs to be stabilized.

Q: Let's move now to sort of your involvement after the Carter period. You were on something--what was it--the GOP National Security--

UPSTON: The Carter administration came in and there was an across the board liquidation of anybody who had served in the Nixon administration. Hamilton Jordan, who was then one of the special assistants or counselor to President Carter, basically said that he wanted everybody who was in the so-called plum book, which as you know is the book of--

Q: Yes, p-l-u-m.

UPSTON: Yes, the so-called plum book. He wanted everybody out, and this was the end of any kind of feeling of bipartisan foreign policy.

Q: The plum book I might say for the record was a listing of those positions open in the government for presidential appointment.

UPSTON: That's correct. And so there was a clean, clean sweep. I started a private voluntary organization called the Caribbeana--C-A-R-I-B-B-E-A-N-A-- Council to do developmental work in the Caribbean with an office in Barbados and in Washington. We had something called the Caribbean Center, which was in Washington, and engaged in a number of projects, developmental type of projects principally in the eastern Caribbean.
from the office in Barbados. Although the Caribbeana Council was private and non-governmental we had linkages with State which seconded John Eddy, a fine Foreign Service Officer, to head the Caribbean Center. In the best traditions of bipartisan cooperation Michael Finley and Sally Shelton - two key Carter political appointees were a great help. As a new organization we rubbed a lot of bureaucrats in USAID the wrong way and they tried to put us down. However, we survived and did a number of important things for a free and more economically viable Caribbean.

During that time I became a part of the government in exile, and the Republican National Committee had working advisory groups that were active for virtually every element of the U.S. government interests. I was a member of the National Security and International Relations Council of the Republican National Committee, but then there were similar groups for health, education, trade, national security, just across the board. The Chairman of the Republican National Committee at that time was Bill Brock, and there was an Executive Secretariat, so this was a very, very active government in exile.

So obviously because of my interests in the Caribbean and the fact that I was the President of the Caribbeana Council, I became somewhat of a spokesman within this 'government in exile' for the Caribbean. This was at a time when U.S. interests were deteriorating. Michael Manley was then the Prime Minister in Jamaica. There was a lot of political problems in Jamaica. Maurice Bishop was starting to rumble around in Granada in the eastern Caribbean. And there was basically a very unhealthy trend that was starting to develop throughout the Caribbean which had been pretty much ignored as a focal point of U.S. interests.

So as we got near the election period, Senator Tower, who was then United States Senator from Texas, asked me to come down and testify before the Republican platform in St. Petersburg, Florida, and it was that testimony in part at least that put the Caribbean in the Republican platform of 1980, and it was that policy that was established in the Republican platform of 1980 which then led to the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin initiative. In fact the private initiatives of the Caribbeana Council and other private groups 'paved the way' for the Caribbean Basin Initiative - a government program. So when President Reagan was elected, Tom Enders, who was then the Assistant Secretary for Interamerican Affairs, asked me if I would come back as the Reagan administration coordinator for the Caribbean in the State Department.

Q: What was the attitude? Here was a bunch of new people coming in, and at the top at least with maybe the exception of Alexander Haig not ones that had been part of the in and out of government and all in dealing with foreign affairs. You had had a lot of experience especially with things like the United Nations, which the Reagan administration was very dubious about. Did you find you had difficulty with this particular crew at the top in explaining, you might say, the facts of the international world?
UPSTON: I didn't have any problem basically with people at the top. One of the reasons for that is that I reported directly to Tom Enders, and Tom Enders, of course, was well regarded within the administration, had the full confidence of Secretary of State Haig. But he was a career Foreign Service officer whose interest and work had been primarily in the economic side of things in addition to his having been Ambassador to Canada, but he respected my years of experience and my knowledge of Caribbean issues and I didn't have any problem at all. I did detect as time went on a certain subtle resistance and subtle animosity within the State Department building toward political appointments and political appointees.

Q: More than you had noted before?

UPSTON: Far more than I had noted before, and I think that one of the reasons for that is because of certain inherent insecurities that were developing within the career service itself. No, I felt in my particular area, which was specialized in the Caribbean, that the people at the top were very receptive. But - Stu - I think that what hurt me was that a 'few' in the building resented my position and considered me an 'outsider' - although I had spent most of my adult life in service at State. These few labeled me as a Helms (Senator Jesse Helms) agent. This did not make life easy or pleasant.

Q: I speak as a non-Latin American person, but looking at it, it seemed that in the transition, whereas in the other areas of the globe, regional bureaus, it was a normal transition. Ambassadors went in, people went in, people went out. There was change in personnel. But in Interamerican affairs, known as ARA, it was a very bloody affair practically. I mean it seems like there was real animosity about one group replacing the other group more than anywhere else. Did you find that? Or was Caribbean affairs sort of not involved in that?

UPSTON: First of all, the Assistant Secretary in those days was Tom Enders, who was a career Foreign Service officer. He abolished the traditional idea of having regional deputies, so in the past there had been a Deputy Assistant Secretary for this part of the ARA region and a Deputy Assistant Secretary for the other part and so on. He abolished all those and had the Office Directors reporting directly to him. He had a Senior Deputy, who was across the board, Steve Bosworth who I had mentioned earlier who then went on to be head of the Policy Planning Staff, and was Ambassador to the Philippines. A very, very talented career Foreign Service officer. And then the other person in the so-called front office was Ted Briggs, once again a Foreign Service officer and the son of Ellis Briggs, who we had talked about in an earlier context.

So these were all career people. A position of Coordinator for Caribbean Affairs, which I occupied was a Deputy Assistant Secretary level, but it was not Deputy Assistant Secretary because he didn't have them. Enders didn't have regional deputies. The only other political appointees in ARA were General Gordon Sumner, who was a consultant and who was sort of in and out on special assignments, and Bill Middendorf, who was the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States. So there was not a
large number of Reagan administration political appointees who descended on ARA at least in Washington, in fact, just Bill, Gordon and me.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, as you look back on your period of service as Coordinator of Caribbean Affairs, what is your greatest satisfaction?

UPSTON: The tradition particularly of the Commonwealth Caribbean - the former British colonies, in personal freedom, a free press, a parliamentary tradition of government, free enterprise. These institutions which were in danger, have been protected and in many ways strengthened in countries like Jamaica, Grenada, Barbados, Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica. Castro's political influence has been dramatically reduced. Economically the Caribbean is stronger today. Puerto Rico is a much stronger 'Caribbean partner' in the region. Also, the satisfaction of working with colleagues in ARA like Don Bouchard, the Bureau's executive director - Bob Ryan and others. Also and important. Andy Antippas while he was Chargé in the Bahamas, and I helped to start 'Operation Bat' the first really successful drug interdiction program in the Bahamas and out islands. I flew several Bat missions going after the drug running. It was great!

At the same time most of the U.S. ambassadors in the Caribbean had no previous Caribbean experience. And the Caribbean was an Administrative priority. You figure it out! It is interesting as to how the system works - that Bob Ryan, Myles Frechette, Brandon Grove and I - all Caribbean experts - ended up in Africa as ambassadors.

Q: What are your disappointments as you look back?

UPSTON: The tragic plight of the poor people of Haiti. That's one. On a broader note I think we could have given greater strength to the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Politically, I think we could have handled Maurice Bishop (Prime Minister of Grenada), better. But Stu, these are all involved subjects. Let's move on.

Q: This is Tape 2, Side 1 of an interview with Ambassador Upston on May 26.

Mr. Ambassador, We'd better move to your time as appointment to Rwanda. How did this come about?

UPSTON: To be perfectly frank with you, I had always hoped that I could close out my State Department career as a United States Ambassador to one of the Caribbean countries which I knew so well. So it was a bit of a surprise when I received a telephone call and asked to come over to White House personnel and offered the job of United States Ambassador to Rwanda. I made the point that I was not an African expert, although early in my career as I had mentioned to you, I had covered West Africa on the Management Planning Staff. But my name was well known as a architect of the Reagan administration Caribbean Basin initiative. I had worked throughout the Caribbean with my private organization, the Caribbeana Council, and I don't speak French and going to a Francophone country in the middle of Africa didn't seem to make any sense to me. I have
worked actively with commonwealth countries, and I said that if I was going to go to Africa it seemed to me to make the most sense to go to a former commonwealth country where English is the language and where I could use my knowledge of independent former members of the British Commonwealth.

But they took the position that, you know, this was something they'd been able to get the State Department to agree to and that this was it and that maybe down the road there might be other opportunities but they couldn't promise anything. I remember going back and talking to Bill Middendorf, Ambassador Middendorf, who was then the U.S. representative to the Organization of American States. And he said, "John, there's one bit of advice I can give you having been in this business for a long time." He said, "On these ambassadorial appointments, they are all very competitive and the elevator only stops once."

Now, I was in a bit of a difficult kind of a position because the White House and the political people didn't view me as a--as they call it--a pol. They viewed me as a State Department type. They looked at my resume and they said, "This isn't a politician. We don't really owe him anything. He hasn't delivered any precincts or votes. He's not a major contributor. There's no payoff here. And look at his resume. He's a State Department type. They've given him the Superior Honor Award." And so that was the general way in which I was perceived.

The State Department said, "Well, he's been around here since 1964 off and on, but he's a political. Jesse Helms takes his telephone calls." And there was a very real resistance. So I took the position which I continue to take, not for myself anymore because I'm retired from this process but for others, is we need to have a cadre of people with in and out experience, who can not be a threat to the Foreign Service but who can strengthen the Foreign Service. And rather than bringing in people who are really neophytes in the international field, we need more people who have a combination of experience in the private sector as well as within the State Department.

Q: There's a sort of a feeling of looking back with some nostalgia to the 40s, the 50s--

UPSTON: That's correct.

Q: --early 60s when people were coming in and out and their political coloration was not really very important.

UPSTON: That's true, and this has all changed. This has all changed dramatically.

So I analyzed the whole situation and came to the conclusion that if I wanted to end my State Department experience with the rank and title of Ambassador that I'd better grab this thing while I could. So that's an honest answer to how I became--
Q: I wanted to see how this appointment process works. But now when you went out there, did you go out with any goal, instructions? All of a sudden Rwanda appears on your radar. What are you going to do about Rwanda before, sort of your mind set before you went out?

UPSTON: First of all, Rwanda is a very, very friendly country as far as the United States is concerned. There are no big political issues. Rwanda is strategically important to the United States because it is right next to Zaire. It's right next to Uganda where there has been a war going on. It's next to Tanzania, and it is also a neighbor of Burundi. The President of Rwanda, Habyarimana, is a very moderate person with a great deal of influence within Francophone Africa and the Organization of African Unity. As you know there is tribal tension between the Hutu and the Tutsi. In Burundi this could be a real problem with a Tutsi government and a Hutu majority. In Rwanda - Habyarimana has worked successfully toward tribal reconciliation.

So even though there aren't any really burning political issues there, it is strategically important because of its location and because of the influence of the Chief of State with other Francophone countries and in general within Africa. There are a number of Ambassadors there I think for the same reason. The Soviets have a substantial embassy. The Libyans, Cubans, North Koreans, and then, of course, as one would suspect the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium. There's a Canadian Ambassador and then, of course, the African countries, Kenya and Uganda and Tanzania. So there is a substantial diplomatic community.

My objectives were, number one, to maintain the good relations that have traditionally existed between our two countries, to use this rather large diplomatic community to try to get a feeling of how other countries viewed that part of Africa, not just Rwanda but a regional nature. I wanted, which I did, to strengthen the USAID program and private voluntary organizations, particularly AFRICARE which is there and also CARE and appropriate technology, international and other private sector development-oriented things.

I had as an objective when I first got there to establish a viable Peace Corps program, which I did. But it was a bit constrained and confining, because there was just so much that one could do. It's the type of a posting really which should be no more than a year and a half or two years because you simply run out of things that you can accomplish in an innovative way.

Q: How big was your staff?

UPSTON: Staff was very good. I recruited my own DCM, which is something that I think all ambassadors should do. I was given a whole list of people and I basically rejected them all and then went out and found Jan DeWilde, who interestingly enough had been in charge of the UNESCO liaison office at the American Embassy in Paris. And I had a very fine young economic-political officer, Karl Hoffman, who I built up and moved along.
It was a very, very small embassy which didn't provide many management challenges, but on the other hand in an isolated hardship post everybody pulls together and sort of functions as a team and as a family. And then there was a substantial AID mission with an AID mission director named Emerson Maleuan who was of the old school in terms of the country team in that he did everything through the Ambassador and wasn't going off independently and doing things on his own. And then, of course, as ambassadors do in developing countries, I had the ambassador's fund which enabled me to do some creative things to help at the community level.

Q: How did you deal with the government of Rwanda? I mean you as the Ambassador. How would you--

UPSTON: The President is a rather aloof person in some respects, and so most of the work of ambassadors was through the foreign ministry. We did see the President frequently at ceremonial events. He invited my wife Christina and me for cocktails a couple of times. He invited us to attend a family, a private family celebration marking their 20th wedding anniversary. And we were invited really not as the American Ambassador and his wife but in our personal capacity.

But most of the day to day work was through the Foreign Minister or a former Rwandan ambassador and sort of the foreign policy person within the presidency. He would be analogous to the head of the National Security Council staff. So even though it was a small country, there was not the day to day kind of communication with the President. We did have a very good, in addition to some of the things I have mentioned, we did have a very good military assistance program which was largely in the area of military education and training, which we did in cooperation with the European command in Stuttgart. And they came down with some frequency for educational types of training exercise.

Q: Did we leave matters pretty much in the hands of the Belgians for many of the--give them the initiative because of their role there for so long?

UPSTON: Yes, and I think that's still the case, because with the problems that the United States has had in recent years and the cut backs in terms of USAID programs the emphasis has been on countries of a very real strategic nature so that you see a lot of attention being given to places like Chad where there has actually been a war, where there's been some Libyan influence. You see a great deal of attention given to countries like Liberia where we have the Voice of America facility and where there are some national security interests and then, of course, the countries down toward the south that are closer to South Africa. But countries in Africa where everything is going along fairly well there has not been a desire to raise expectations because there just is not the strategic justification for heavy expenditures of money.
So for a country like Rwanda we really have done pretty well in attracting private voluntary organizations and have a good AID program, a good USIA program and holding the line. It's a place to practice what I've always called preventive diplomacy.

*Q: Finally, Mr. Ambassador, what was the most unusual thing that happened to you in Rwanda?*

UPSTON: One Sunday night the bells went off and we knew an immediate urgent communication had come in from the Department. Jan DeWilde woke up the communications officer and they went to the Embassy to find out what it was. While they were gone the Operations Center called from the Department. In those day it was hard to get overseas calls in or out. The Ops Center asked me to "take the matter seriously" and keep in close touch. I had been targeted to be kidnapped by a Libyan terrorist group. In fact the U.S. Ambassador in Africa who was to be kidnapped mentioned by President Reagan as one of the justifications for the raid on Libya. That was me. It was an exciting week and a saga of intrigue. I'm here to tell the story. This is a job not without danger. My great friend Cleo Noel did not come back from Khartoum, Sudan. Believe me, I thought about that a lot.

Also the whole Dian Fossey (American naturalist who lived with the mountain gorillas in Rwanda) - her life and murder is a story unto itself.

*Q: What was your greatest memory you would like to forget?*

UPSTON: The trouble - beyond solution - health problems. Aids - polio - malaria - TB; giving burial money to members of the Residence staff for young children who had died from malaria and other illnesses. Going as I did so many times to schools in isolated - upcountry - parts of Rwanda and seeing smiling faces of young people who will not live to maturity.

*Q: Positive memory?*

UPSTON: The physical beauty of the country of Rwanda and its people. The dignity in poverty. Hard work. Effective subsistence farming. The effectiveness of the Government in a national spirit and development. The way these people and government cope with problems with great grace.

*Q: Greatest satisfaction?*

UPSTON: Holding the line. Establishing a Peace Corps. Hopefully strengthening the U.S. programs and influence. Meeting with people at all levels all over the country in even the most remote areas. Helping to advance the careers of those who worked with me. Pride in the great work my wife Cristina did. Coming home!

*Q: You left after a relatively short time there. Was this just enough was enough of--*
UPSTON: It was enough is enough, over a year and a half is a long time to be in a hardship post away from children and family. I had done everything that I could do. I'm not interested in basically biding my time. I could have stayed there another six months or another year and not really done anything more than I had already accomplished. I'd achieved my goals. I frankly was not comfortable in a Francophone country. It was just not my bailiwick. It's very isolated, insulated, and I just felt that I looked upon my career as culminating with being Ambassador to Rwanda but I felt that after a total of 16, 17, or whatever it was, years that now was the time for me to get back into private life and to really start doing things for my family and for my future. It wasn't simply Rwanda. I just felt that this was a time for me to leave government service, and I felt and I am finding this to be true that as an Ambassador there are opportunities to serve in a private capacity perhaps more creatively than one can within the constraints of a bureaucracy.

Q: Just very briefly, what are you doing now?

UPSTON: This is an old cliché, but I'm doing some consulting projects and looking at establishing either a new enterprise or getting a position within some sort of a business context.

Q: This is a question that we try to ask everyone that we interview, but you've looked at the Foreign Service over a period of time. How do you evaluate it? It's undergone some changes, but looking at it today. We're talking about 1988. How do you see the Foreign Service as a career and as an instrument of American foreign policy?

UPSTON: I will be a little bit reflective and frank, and I may be wrong in my perception. But as I look back over the years, there used to be a much greater feeling of service in my opinion. It was not looked upon as a job as much as it was looked upon as a dedication. It was an institution that all of us associated with were proud, and although you were correct in saying when we were talking informally that there is a lack of history and such things as museums and archives and records and all of that sort of thing, there was a certain sense of history.

Now it seems to me that it's far more of a job rather than a service, too much of a dog eat dog. It once was much more of a group of talented gentlemen who related to each other as such. People like Bob Murphy, Tommy Thompson, David Bruce, John Burns, I could go on and on, Loy Henderson. I had the honor of knowing these pillars of the Foreign Service. It's always been an intellectually competitive service, and that's good. But now the intellectual competitiveness I think has been replaced by an almost visceral type of competitiveness. The life of the Foreign Service and the life of the State Department by its very nature is a mobile type of life, but I detect more lack of security, lack of feeling of security within the Foreign Service today that manifests itself in sometimes very negative ways. There used to be far more of a feeling of camaraderie and respect for one's colleagues. Although you might be intellectually competing against them, it wasn't a dog-eat-dog kind of situation. You have situations today I think to a much greater extent than
ever before of people trying to discredit other people, leaking information which sometimes is false to politically undermine the leaks that go out of the building which usually have a political motivation. Things like that didn't used to go on.

Now, having said all of that I think as you and I would both agree some of the most outstanding, talented people that we have ever met in any context exist today within the career Foreign Service, and there is some just absolutely extraordinary talent and there are people including those who have worked with me or for me who fall within the framework of the old idea of service and dedication. But there are an awful lot of the others.

I think the State Department in my opinion has always been underfunded in comparison with its role, but the amount of nitpicking of a budgetary nature that goes on today is greater than I've ever seen. There also is micro management in that Washington tries to run everything as opposed to the old days which you and I remember when embassies really were given--

Q: Even Congress gets into the act too!

UPSTON: Yes. So there is an awful lot of micro management which I think is counterproductive. In many ways the bureaucracy has just gotten too large, and the whole thing has become more of a system than a service and the way to survive is to beat the system. And I think all these things are unfortunate.

Having said that, I am terribly, terribly proud of having the opportunity to have participated over the years in the, you know, even though not a career Foreign Service officer, and some of the most satisfying and enriching experiences that I have had has been because of this institution which we call the Foreign Service. And the thing for us all to do, as you're doing in your job now and as I can plan on doing, is to be critical when necessary but in a constructive way and to work toward doing what we can to strengthen the great traditions and the history of a fine, fine Foreign Service.

Q: Thank you very much. I really appreciate that.

End of interview