

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

MARTEN VAN HEUVEN

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is January 31, 2003. This is an interview with Marten van Heuven. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Do you go by Marten?

VAN HEUVEN: Yes.

Q: Can we start at the beginning? Could you tell me when and where you were born?

VAN HEUVEN: I was born in Europe in the Netherlands in a city called Utrecht, best known for the Peace of Utrecht of 1713. I was the first child of parents who both came from Utrecht. My father was an eye surgeon. My mother studied law but never practiced.

Q: In what year were you born?

VAN HEUVEN: In 1932 Utrecht was a university city. Since both my father and mother had degrees from the University, my family was part of the Utrecht nomenklatura. On my father's side my ancestors for several centuries were teachers. On my mother's side, my grandfather was also a doctor. His parents were farmers. So mine was a very Dutch

family. We were comfortable at the time I was born, the crash of '29 had not affected my parents. But at that time - and I wasn't aware of it then - the Nazi threat in Germany was already evident. In due course, my father thought he saw the war coming. He was British oriented because he used to go to ophthalmological congresses in Oxford and had many English friends. He considered leaving the Netherlands, but in the end the settledness of our situation simply trumped the desire to go. So we stayed, something my father regretted ever after. We went through World War II in Utrecht. I never saw any fighting. Both in 1940 and 1945, fighting stopped just short of Utrecht. In May of 1940, we avoided being hit by German bombardments. After the Germans destroyed Rotterdam, Utrecht was next on the target list. We had been evacuated to the center of the city, to a building used by Louis Napoleon. Two hours before sunset the Dutch armed forces capitulated and so Utrecht was spared. Otherwise, I probably wouldn't be here to tell you this story.

By 1947, my father had been back to England, and also to the United States. There, he received several offers to teach and practice ophthalmology. He took up the offer to go to the Yale medical school. On my 15th birthday, November 25, 1947, my mother, my brother, and I set sail for New York on the New Amsterdam. My father had preceded us to the United States. A week later, we settled in our new home in New Haven, Connecticut.

Q: I'd like to stop you and go back. What was life like in Utrecht during the German occupation?

VAN HEUVEN: At first it was not all that noticeable. I was 8 at the time, so my memory is that of a boy. What I remember most was the last year. The Allies attempted to liberate all of Holland in September 1944 with an airborne attack involving the 101st, the 82nd, and the 1st British airborne. The attempt to take the bridge at Arnhem failed. The other landings succeeded. The result was that the south of the Netherlands was liberated and we were not. At that point, things really turned bad. They had already become bad for the Jewish population in the Netherlands, who had experienced roundups starting in 1942. And they had become bad for others, such as the young men who had been in the army, who had been shipped off to work camps. But these events did not affect me directly, nor did they affect my father's practice directly. But in September of 1944, the Germans requisitioned all able-bodied men. Schools closed because there were no more teachers. Then, from all 1944 to May 1945, we went through a cold winter. There were no more cars on the road. Bicycles were also requisitioned by the Germans. The trains had stopped running. People stayed in place. Some of them had a very bad time, both with the cold and lack of food. Because my father was a doctor and had patients from the countryside, there was a supply of food that kept us going. Not everybody was that fortunate. I remember times when we would get a couple of sacks of potatoes from a farmer patient and then redistributed them to people whom we knew and who needed them. There was also a pervasive element of fear, because at that point not only the German military occupation but basically the exercise of civilian authority by the Germans had come to rest on informants. The whole atmosphere was extremely hostile. The risk of doing a

whole lot of things was enormous - listening to the BBC, picking up the leaflets that the allied bombers would drop overnight. The exercise of German authority was arbitrary. We lived from hand to mouth. You really couldn't trust anybody.

Q: I would think particularly for a boy around 12 it would be a trial for the parents to keep somebody like that from not doing something that could really cause problems. Kids are very adventurous and all that.

VAN HEUVEN: That's a very American way of looking at the situation. But let me assure you there was no adventurism whatsoever. Since 1940 we had experienced all sorts of restraints and we knew from family experience just how bad things could get. An uncle of mine was picked up by the Germans when hiding in my grandfather's country house. The Dutch word was "onderduiker." He was an "onderduiker." He had basically disappeared from view. But they tracked him down and he spent the rest of the war in a camp. His wife, a schoolteacher, later on used an unflattering word about the Germans. One of the kids in her school told the parents, and she ended up for a year in jail in the city of Groningen. So, right in the family, we knew that risks were all around you. Authority was capricious, arbitrary, and potentially lethal. It was lethal right until the end of the war, when my mother's nephew, who was active in the resistance at the time when the Germans were capitulating, incautiously decided he would reveal himself, put on the orange armband, and start trying to carry a message across town to allied lines. He was captured and summarily executed. Had he waited 24 hours, he would be alive. Those things made you very cautious. You knew even as a 12-year-old boy that this was not a game, that what you did could cost your parents' life. It could basically disrupt everything. So, caution absolutely impregnated everything I did.

Q: One knows of the retribution given to Nazi sympathizers in France. Right after the German surrender, what happened in the Netherlands with the Nazi sympathizers?

VAN HEUVEN: It was a very local issue. In Utrecht, there was an interregnum of about two days between the German capitulation and the arrival of the Canadian 1st Army. The underground came out into the open. The Germans were still there. The Dutch uniformed NSB, the Dutch Nazi party, were still out there in their black shirts. Everybody was armed. There were firefights in some of the squares, with casualties. After the war, there were trials and the Dutch quisling, Mussert, was convicted and executed at the end of his trial. There was not a lot of kangaroo justice. I think people were just simply too worn out by their ordeal. It was not in the Dutch nature to practice kangaroo justice, although the Dutch can harbor deep grudges. That was not the way you do things. But I cannot sit here and tell you that kangaroo justice didn't happen.

Q: No, but it gives a feel for things.

It must have been quite an adventure for you to arrive in the United States, wasn't it, in '47?

VAN HEUVEN: The idea of leaving war-torn Europe and going to America was an amazing prospect. It was not just the British, but also the Canadians and the Americans who had come into Europe to chase the Nazi Germans out. The army side of the liberation was Canadian, General Foulkes' 1st Army. But it was the British Royal Air Force that flew the sorties. During the last year of the war we witnessed every 24 hours huge overflights of bombers heading for Germany. They dropped leaflets. So you were very aware of the war because it was being waged in the air. You associated with those men who were flying those aircraft. I remember watching from the back of the garden when one of them got hit, burst into flames, and then crashed. Near our country place there were graves of some British fliers who had been shot down and were buried pretty much where they fell. You associated heavily with the Allies. So the notion of going to America was a liberating prospect and a profoundly liberating experience. By coincidence, I came upon an article in a newspaper published in Yakima, Washington, in 1946. My father was taking a tour of medical schools in the United States at that time. He had been invited on a lecture tour in his field, ophthalmology. He was in Yakima visiting a distant cousin of my mother's. The interviewer for the "Yakima News" asked him how he felt about being an American. What struck me was my father's emphasis on the word "freedom." He said, "Even after the war, we don't really have it. People are still too afraid to talk to each other because of what they have just been through. But here things are free." When a year and a half after arriving in the U.S. I graduated from Hopkins Grammar School in New Haven, there was an article in the New Haven Register about me because I was the valedictorian. In that article, my English teacher, Victor Reid, is quoted as saying: "When Marten came here, he mistook our freedom for license and didn't understand that." But what I realized again, as I went through these two articles just a few weeks ago, is that the basic theme of freedom must have run very deep in my father's mind and my mother's. It certainly was part of my own makeup.

Q: New Haven. Where did you go to school in New Haven?

VAN HEUVEN: First, I went to Hopkins Grammar School, the second oldest secondary school in the United States, founded in 1667. It was a boys school then. It was also a day school. The fact that my younger brother and I went there was entirely thanks to the headmaster, Dr. George Lovell. My family had been unable in 1947 to take any money out of the Netherlands. There were still currency restrictions of all sorts. So basically we had little money. My father was just beginning a medical career in a new environment. George Lovell took my brother and me on faith. We, of course, repaid that generosity subsequently, but at the time it was just an extraordinary thing for Headmaster Lovell to do. Hopkins then was a small school. There were probably no more than 50 students in my class, four classes, 200 students.

Q: Had you studied any English before you came?

VAN HEUVEN: During the occupation, English was verboten. My father was British oriented, so we had English books in the house. We also belonged to the Anglican Church in Utrecht. After the war I had a little English in school. We also spent six weeks

in Torquay in the south of England in the summer of 1946 when my father was ill and needed to recover. Torquay is a fairly bucolic place.

Q: There are palm trees even.

VAN HEUVEN: There are palm trees in Torquay, that's right. So I had some English. But from one week to the next in 1947, I had to switch from translating Latin into Dutch to translating Latin into English. That actually was a helpful crutch for learning English. But, as you can hear even today, though my command of English is not something that gives me any concern, my accent is still there.

Q: Here you are in an American school. Granted, it was more of a traditional older prep-school-type school, did you find it different than Dutch education?

VAN HEUVEN: It was a very different experience. My last year of French class consisted of four students. We had advanced French, with Mr. De Noyon. Classes in the Netherlands were 30-35. The whole atmosphere was totally different.

Q: American students are encouraged generally to speak out rather than to absorb. Was this true in this case?

VAN HEUVEN: Yes, it was. Having small classes made it inevitable that you had plenty of opportunities to participate in class discussion. This was certainly the case in the language classes and in English class; less so, perhaps, in chemistry, physics, or math. Hopkins was an old-fashioned boys school of the New England variety, and the school system I came from was basically a continental gymnasium, where there was a lot of rote learning. In some respects, this served me well. The reason that my German and my French later became as good as they did is because I had excellent basics, which I acquired before I came to the United States. But my facility with these languages came much later.

Q: How about the social life? How did you find that?

VAN HEUVEN: Well, certainly in retrospect, but I think even then, my aim was to do well in school. I was making lots of transitions - social, cultural, and also educational. I spent all my energy on making these transitions. I had actually jumped ahead a year, going from what would have been the sophomore class into the junior class. Sixteen months later, I ended up with the highest grades in my class. That was not something I was aiming for. This result was due to a coefficient of grades. I just happened to edge out the others. I worked extremely hard. I also did not have much social life. I did not go to school dances. I wouldn't have known how to do that anyway. I did do sports as a member of the Hopkins fencing team. But mostly I was just studying as hard as I could. Only when I was admitted both to Dartmouth and Yale, and decided on Yale, things changed because I did not stay home. I lived at Yale for the next four years in College and three years at Yale Law School.

Q: The four years in Yale were from when to when?

VAN HEUVEN: They were from 1949 to 1953.

Q: What was Yale like then?

VAN HEUVEN: Male. Today you would say somewhat paternalistic. It was a situation I was very comfortable with because in my way of thinking it was still very open and elastic and free flowing. By today's standards, that would not be the case. It was extremely stimulating because there were nothing but icons around. The venerated president Charles Seymour, later Whit Griswold; Dean Buck; the Yale chaplain, Uncle Sid Lovell; my thesis adviser, Archie Foord, Master of Calhoun College. Most were fabulous New Englanders, who were role models not just in their subject but in their citizenry. They dressed and they lived the role of New England gentlemen. There were obviously women there, too, but except for Mrs. Denison, the secretary to the master of my college, Timothy Dwight, Mr. Charles Sawyer, I cannot recall any woman at college whom I remember particularly, because all my teachers were male. With the other members of the Class of 1953, I remember an iron-willed lady by the name of Nancy, who oversaw the Freshmen Commons dining hall. She brooked no nonsense from any of us and insisted on decorum.

Q: Was William Buckley doing his thing at that time?

VAN HEUVEN: Buckley did. He was three years ahead of me, Class of '50, author of *God and Man* at Yale. It caused a bit of a campus stir. It may have caused more of a stir among the graduates in New York. At school we sort of took it in stride. The "Yale Daily News," of course, gave it editorial and other attention. But it was not one of the things that roiled the university.

Q: I was the Class of '50 at Williams. "God, Man, and Yale" caused quite a stir.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes, but from my point of view it was a limited stir.

Q: As you got into Yale, what were you concentrating on?

VAN HEUVEN: That question gives me occasion to note that I already knew when I went to Yale pretty much what I wanted to do, though in my first year I maintained the option of doing what my father and my uncles had done, namely to become doctors. So I took premed courses as a freshman. But after freshman year, I took the decision not to study medicine but to go in another direction. What was that direction? The evidence for that direction is in the title of my valedictory address in '49 at Hopkins, which was "Diplomacy Tomorrow." I was 16 at the time. I just reread that speech this year. I would not agree with any of the observations I made in that address about diplomacy. I admire the Hopkins trustees and school faculty for sitting through the drivel that I fed up at the

time. It was pretty awful. But my interest was clear and that was my direction: Diplomacy. At that time, it didn't mean the U.S. Foreign Service but it did mean becoming a diplomat. By inference, I suppose I had to think of myself as an American diplomat, although at that time I was still a Dutch national.

Q: I was going to ask about citizenship. How fare thee citizenshipwise?

VAN HEUVEN: I became an American as soon as that was possible - that is to say, five years plus a couple of months after my arrival. That turned out to be in the spring of my senior year, in April 1953. My mother and brother and I were naturalized in the District Court in New Haven, Connecticut. My father, who had arrived in the U.S. earlier, had already become a citizen. In that process, I also lost my Dutch citizenship. I mention that specifically because, against all my expectations, the Department of State sent me back to The Hague years later.

Q: Let's go back to the Hopkins School. What had inspired you to talk on diplomacy? This is not a field that most young people think about.

VAN HEUVEN: It had to do with growing up in a world at war, living in a country under occupation, and being increasingly aware of the deplorable condition of Europe and the world at that time. I gained the conviction - at that time it was tantamount to a belief - that when all of this was over, the world had to learn how to cooperate and, through multilateral institutions, and properly trained people, avoid having another world war. So, it was my own view, or vision, limited as it was, that what was needed now was to focus on how to put the world back together again after World War II. That led to my interest in diplomacy.

Q: When I was in college, from '46 to '50, there was a great deal of emphasis and hope about the United Nations. The UN has waxed and waned in feeling of value. At that time, it was very high. Did you get enthusiastic about the United Nations?

VAN HEUVEN: I did, and the enthusiasm became a lot more concrete shortly afterwards when, in 1955, as a law student, I spent the summer as an intern at the United Nations in the Office of the Legal Adviser. I was there with about 60 other young people from all over the world, all of whom had been allocated for the summer to different parts of the UN Secretariat. Since I was a law student, I was assigned to the General Legal Division, run by Oscar Schachter. Dag Hammarskjold was Secretary General. He came to talk to our group, and I remember meeting him at that time. By then, I was a firm supporter of, and believer in, the United Nations.

Q: I'm told that for many years the Dutch held the greatest resentment of any of the surrounding countries toward the Germans. Did that permeate your family and yourself at all?

VAN HEUVEN: The resentment was an element of Dutch attitudes for many years

following the war. It did not affect me so much because, by crossing the Atlantic, I left the Germans behind. Among my parents' generation, the distaste of the Germans, if not stronger, remained. A Dutch colleague of mine in the 1955 program told me that he never wanted ever to set foot in Germany. Later, I watched the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the Dutch and the Germans. I knew personally the first two German ambassadors in The Hague, particularly Otto von der Gablenz, a wonderful man and a superb diplomat, whom I got to know when I was at the embassy in Bonn and he worked in the office of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Both were extraordinarily talented men who did a great deal to alleviate the ill feelings that still existed. In the '90s, there was a poll that showed how resentful the Dutch still felt about the Germans. This deeply concerned Chancellor Kohl. He and the then Dutch prime minister Wim Kok arranged for Kohl to visit Rotterdam. During that visit, Kohl performed an act of propitiation which, as far as the Dutch government was concerned, drew the line under this issue. Meanwhile, Dutch business life had adjusted rapidly to the fact that, for all practical purposes, the Netherlands is an extension of the German economy. Rotterdam is the transshipment point for goods going in and out of Germany. The Dutch business world had little compunctions about dealing with Germans. So there was some ambivalence on that issue.

Today, dislikes remain, but I suspect you could find as many Dutchmen who don't like Belgians as Dutchmen who don't like Germans. The economic connection between Germany and the Netherlands now is extraordinarily tight. So I conclude that this issue is now mostly history.

Q: While you were in Yale before you went to law school, had you done any study of diplomacy of any nature? Was this something you were looking at?

VAN HEUVEN: I was a history major at Yale. I had taken history at Hopkins. I did not take any courses in diplomacy. In fact, I doubt any were offered then. Even in the one year at the Columbia School of International Affairs, following law school, I did not take any courses in diplomacy as such. I took courses in international economics, European history, and Chinese history. I was an intensive major in history in college. My thesis focused on the French Communist Party during the 14-month period from 1946 until they left the government in 1947. I wasn't reading memoirs of Metternich or Talleyrand. But I was certainly focused on the diplomatic interactions of my day. I already had my own Rolodex of international contacts. I spent the summer of 1951 at Sciences Po in Paris and the summer of '52 at the Sorbonne. In '55, I was at the United Nations. I spent the summer of 1956 at the Academy of International Law in The Hague. That was not a very serious program, but it showed my interest. I did take international law at Yale Law School with Myres McDougal. But McDougal was such a theorist that it took those few of us who took his courses almost as much time to understand his vocabulary than to really learn a lot about international law, though I did plow through the standard international textbooks of the day.

Q: You say you studied the French Communist Party. The Cold War had well developed by this time. What was your attitude toward the Soviet Union and communism and

particularly European communism?

VAN HEUVEN: I have to think for a moment to check myself on this. The communist threat to the established order in Western Europe came to a crescendo the very fall that we left for the United States, in 1947. There was the possibility of electoral victory of the communists in Italy. There was the possibility that France might turn because of the size of the communist party there. There were ominous rumblings in Czechoslovakia. I must have sensed that there was a big danger. To me, that underlined the importance of Europe for the United States. But my feelings about communism were different than they were about Nazis, because I had direct experience with them. There were no good sources of information about the Soviet Union. During the war, the Nazis disseminated propaganda that one tended to distrust. I don't think I knew a lot about the Soviet Union and communism at the time. But I'm pretty sure that I regarded communism as an undesirable danger, and I know that then I was aware that leaders like Churchill felt that this was the next danger that had to be confronted. But to me the threat had to do more with what communism could do to Western Europe than what it could do within the realm of the Soviets.

Q: You say you went to France and did some studying during the summer. Was this connected with your thesis?

VAN HEUVEN: It was not. I was 15 on the day I left the Netherlands. I was 20 when I came back. It was time to see family in the Netherlands. But the main reason was to go to France. You will remember that those were the days when it was popular on every campus to go and study in France. I followed suit. It was a program run by Yale Reid Hall, organized at Yale by Professor Anderson. I lived in Reid Hall on the Rue de Chevreuse. During the school year, it was reserved for women. For the summer, it was also for men. The Reid Hall program consisted of students mostly from the East Coast, who took courses in French at the Sorbonne for eight weeks and at Sciences Po. I remember Professor Jean Bernard Duroselle. He was one of my teachers and became one of France's great names at Sciences Po. It also helped me with my French.

The next year I went to the Sorbonne. That was much less serious because the Sorbonne is just like a big American university. I was not there with a program. There were "cours pour des etrangers" (classes for foreigners) to which I subscribed. I lived in the Cinquieme. I don't remember anything in particular about course work. There were huge lecture halls. It was not nearly as intimate as Sciences Po. There was no exam. So it was in that sense pretty much of a lark, but it gave me another summer in Paris, which certainly helped my sense of the city. In those two summers, I covered all of the arrondissements on foot, and I got to know Paris very well. I had some contacts there. A family who had a son my age were hospitable and I got to know some other young French. I got around a little bit beyond Paris and felt extremely at home in Paris in those days.

Q: Why law school? What attracted you to Yale Law?

VAN HEUVEN: I did want to go on studying. The choice was simple. Either a Ph.D. or law school. The Ph.D. would have restricted my options. Law school would have enlarged them. Wanting to be a practitioner rather than a teacher, I chose law school not because I liked law as such - I didn't really know whether I would like it - but because it seemed to me that if you wanted to do international law you had to do law and that would lead to the sort of things that I might want to do. At law school, I discovered very quickly that you don't just do international law, you do bread and butter law - contracts, torts, negotiable instruments. In your spare time you can add an elective and that can be international law. So I did all of that. I took the bar exam, was admitted in Connecticut and later on, by motion, in the District of Columbia to the various courts here. It was a superb education. Yale Law was probably as good a law school as any in the world in those days. Did I like it as much as college? No. What kept me sane was that I was a freshman counselor and I lived on the Old Campus. I had 18 freshmen under my charge. Their antics gave me the sort of lifeblood that I needed to be normal. But otherwise law school was pretty much of a grind. And I was very young. I did not take any time off. I was the youngest member of my class at Yale. I was the youngest member of my law class. In retrospect, there are not a lot of things that I would do differently, but I would have waited a year or two and then gone to law school. I would have got more out of it at the time.

Q: Sometimes this age factor.... There is nothing like a good small war or a draft for taking people out for a couple of years and then putting them back in. They usually are more serious students.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, the draft did come along, but I was classified 4F. I also applied for ROTC, first with the Navy and then the Air Force. But they turned me down because of asthma and the draft didn't want me either for the same reason. So, I never did any military service. I would have liked to. Military service would also have validated my new Americanness.

Q: Was the Yale Law School system different from the Harvard system?

VAN HEUVEN: It was different and much was made of the difference. Harvard was much larger. You could fit the entire Yale Law School into the freshman class at Harvard. Secondly, Harvard had no exams until the end of your first year. Your entire legal career was determined in just a few days; because you either made law review or you didn't, your ranking in the class was determined, and hiring practices started kicking in right in your sophomore year. Yale had exams in January and in June. Harvard was a so-called "bread and butter" law school. Yale was interested in the social implications of law as a tool to remake society. The teaching method at Yale was exclusively case method. At Harvard, it was a mix of case method and lectures. Interestingly, I find that both schools have now gone back to lectures more than used to be the case. But the saying in New Haven was that in three years at law school we never got an answer to a single question. We always got a question in return.

Q: I've noted by observation that there seem to be more Yale than Harvard law graduates involved in politics and social policy.

VAN HEUVEN: Since Harvard turns out many good lawyers, there are plenty of Harvard lawyers in government. Abe Chayes was a Harvard professor who became the Legal Adviser of the State Department. But Yale focused on training people to be active in the policy world. Perhaps, the focus was not on the international policy world, and more on the domestic policy world, but the one went with the other. And so I don't know what that did to the numbers in the end, but certainly that was the emphasis.

Q: I take it at that point that there weren't many or any women.

VAN HEUVEN: There were four women in my class of 102. They all graduated and all went on to careers. But it was a male-dominated class. If you go to New Haven now, the ratio is 50/50.

Q: As you were going to Yale Law, what were you pointed toward?

VAN HEUVEN: I was interested in an international career. I saw law as an implement in the tool box of international affairs. But I faced several problems. One of them was the requirement that, to apply for the Foreign Service, one had to have been a citizen for ten years. I was naturalized in '53. I wouldn't be eligible until '63. I was coming out of law school in '56. So that presented a conundrum. It was solved to a very large extent by one individual named Jack Tate. He had been Acting Legal Adviser at the State Department and had a doctrine named after him. Jack was the Associate Dean in charge of placement. He was a courteous and smart Southerner, a Virginian, who stood out in the New England surroundings by his soft-spoken manner. He took an interest in me. We talked several times. He got in touch with Loftus Becker, who was Legal Adviser at the State Department. He urged me to apply for a position in the Office of the Legal Adviser.

That is what happened in the end, but there was a year in between graduating from Yale Law and joining L. Not knowing where I would go, I still followed the notion of doing more international law. I had opted for a year at Cambridge. In the spring of my last year, I was all set to go to Cambridge, but it was sort of an iffy track and I don't think my dad was too enthusiastic about it. But then, all of a sudden, Myres McDougal, for whom I had worked and whose courses I had taken, said, "There is a fellowship at Columbia," where there was another great figure in international law, Philip Jessup, who later became the American judge on the International Court of Justice and who was a product of Columbia Law School. Would I be interested? I said, "Yes," because at Cambridge I had no name that I could attach myself to, but at Columbia I could study with Jessup. Within a week, I had a cable to the effect that I had been granted the fellowship. I don't think I ever really applied. Mac must have arranged it. Basically, Columbia offered me \$2000 and the ability to spend a year there and get a master's degree. They had a program which made it possible to do law and a master's degree. Their sequence was two years law, one year

master's, and the last year of law. But in my case, the sequence was reversed, since I already had my law degree. So I was offered this money which basically covered my tuition and a chance to be with Professor Jessup. So that's what I did.

Q: You were there from when to when?

VAN HEUVEN: '56 to '57.

Q: Could you tell me about Philip Jessup?

VAN HEUVEN: Phil Jessup was a tall, lanky gentleman, a very approachable sort of a person. He carried no aura of importance around him. He was a seemingly ordinary man with a dignified manner and an encyclopedic knowledge of the subject. Gradually, I became aware that he was a man who had played important roles with respect to some key policy issues, such as the lifting of the Berlin blockade.

Q: The Berlin airlift rings a bell. I may be wrong on that.

VAN HEUVEN: I think you and I are reaching for the same thing, but I cannot be precise about it.

Q: He was used as a troubleshooter by some presidents.

VAN HEUVEN: You are right. He had at one time been Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He wore Uncle Sam's robes in that job. Phil had a direct role. He knew the UN system well. At the time that he and I crossed paths, he was back in academia. This was before he became a judge in The Hague. At Columbia, he presided over a marvelous seminar that met once a week. About two years later, he had me back to talk to postgraduate students about the law of the sea. I had been working on this subject in the Department and in Geneva. He kept track of his students and what they did, and gave me the opportunity to come back and share my experience. I did go and see him in The Hague once or twice later on. He always had time to see me. He and Mrs. Jessup were wonderful hosts, very simple, and genuine. No folderol. I deeply respected Phil Jessup.

Q: His son, Peter, has done a long oral history for us with Sam Lewis, who was in Israel for a long time. Peter worked for him. He was a station chief in Tel Aviv.

VAN HEUVEN: I remember meeting Peter once at the French Embassy and telling him I knew his dad.

Q: By this time, had you solidified your international credentials? Was the Jessup seminar international?

VAN HEUVEN: Yes, it was international law. I forget exactly what he had us do. We

must have used some textbooks. But much of our contributions was based on case materials. I don't have any papers that I wrote for him at the time, but that course was the crown of my time at Columbia, which in other respects I did not particularly enjoy.

Q: What was the state of international law at this time? When I was at Williams, our class was to do a problem and the idea was international relations, to do some research on international law regarding overflight. All we could find were references to balloons. In other words, it wasn't a very well-developed set of legal principles for some modern things. This must have been an evolving thing.

VAN HEUVEN: I should go back for a minute to Harvard and Yale law schools. When I came out of Yale college, I was admitted to both. My choice to remain at Yale had to do with the fact that I could get this job as a freshman counselor. That gave me free lodgings and some money, which I wouldn't have had at Harvard. That made the decision for me. Quite a few of my Yale classmates went on to Harvard Law and survived. As to your question, maybe international law was being formed on the fringes of technology. I saw that directly a few years later when I was in the Office of the Legal Adviser and my boss, Leonard Meeker, sat down one hot summer day at his desk and wrote out in pen on a yellow pad the first draft of what is now the Outer Space Treaty. That was law being made. My first experience in making treaty law was the first year and a half in the Office of the Legal Adviser when I did nothing but law of the sea. I spent three months in Geneva at the first Law of the Sea Conference, which turned a lot of customary into conventional law. That was an example of codification. But even at the time of Jessup and McDougal you could fill a bookshelf with the established and accepted international law in the world. For one thing, all treaties are international law. The Department of State was publishing Treaties in Force, and also the U.S. Treaty Series. These took a lot of shelf space. Going back to the Barbary pirates, there was established law having to do with admiralty. The Geneva conventions governing the laws of war were in force. There was an immense body of practice that had become generally accepted by the civilized world as binding law. Much of that was codified subsequently. An example is human rights law. I had a hand in New York in that process. I say a hand, because I served in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly for six years. We were drafting the Conventions on Political and Economic Rights. This was lawmaking. So, you're right; the turning of customary into conventional law has been going on. I was fortunate to be around when this was happening.

Q: We'll pick up your role in this later.

You got out of Columbia in '57. Then what?

VAN HEUVEN: By that time, Mr. Becker had decided that he would take me on as an Attorney-Adviser, GS-7. In August 1957, I started in the Office of the Legal Adviser.

Q: How was it constituted at that time? What was the atmosphere when you went in?

VAN HEUVEN: It took me a while to find out because, within 24 hours after my arrival and reporting for duty, I was detailed to work for a gentleman by the name of William Sanders, a Foreign Service officer with long experience in Latin America, who later became Deputy Secretary General of the OAS. He had the job of special assistant to the Under Secretary of State to prepare for the first Law of the Sea Conference. Bill Sanders needed an assistant.

We were orchestrating the preparation of a large number of position and of background papers for a conference in which a special UN conference would codify customary law in a number of areas - the Law of the High Seas, the Law of Fisheries, the Law of the Continental Shelf, the Law of Landlocked Countries, and the Law of the Territorial Sea. This enterprise encompassed the whole body of customary rules that were not in treaty form. The objective was to put them into treaty form. The International Law Commission had worked for years on drafts to do this and the conference was going to use these drafts as a basic working document and turn that into five conventions. Given the scope of this enterprise, it involved a lot of different parts of the government. It involved Agriculture because of the fisheries element, the Defense Department because of territorial sea, the Coast Guard, the Department of Commerce, State - and, in particular, the lawyers in all of them - but it also involved political constituencies in towns and states that depended on fishing. These were highly political issues.

Q: All one has to do is look at Peru and Ecuador and Nova Scotia. We've been having fishing problems with Canada since time immemorial or at least in '76. But I can see that you immediately have two groups that would be watching with eagle eyes. One is the Navy, the right of free passage and free miles. That was the holy writ as far as they were concerned. And the fishing industry, which wanted to get as much as they could wherever they could get it.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes. And our big issue was with the Canadians, mostly on the East Coast.

Q: Were you aware that you were going into such a political minefield?

VAN HEUVEN: Not right away. You asked me what was the atmosphere. I can't describe the atmosphere of the Office of the Legal Adviser because I wasn't located there. I was in an office with Bill Sanders. We were located in quonset huts at the foot of the Washington Memorial. It was August. It was hot. My periscope on the world could not have been narrower, because I knew nothing about Washington and here I sat in an office opposite Bill Sanders and his secretary. All I was fed was paperwork having to do with these preparations. I had no idea how the Office of the Legal Adviser was operating. I had no idea how the rest of the government was operating. Only gradually through the paper and as we got closer to the conference, going to meetings, I acquired some sense of what was happening in town. There were several contemporaries of mine in the Office of the Legal Adviser, who were also involved in the preparation of position papers and who attended the conference. One was Frank Boas, who left later on to become a prominent

attorney in Brussels. Another was Ben Read, who later became a Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management. Both of them were fine fellows and we became friends. Another was Bernie Hines. I don't know what happened to him. There were Ernest Kerley, Warren Hewitt, and Alan Neidle. I got to know them gradually. Physically, I was separated. Eventually, Bill Sanders and I moved out of these quonset huts to a building that was just north of Virginia Avenue, on the eastern side of 23rd Street. I think that building is still there. The visa office was located there. We got two rooms on the first floor. So we were a little closer to Old State. This made it easier for Bill to interface with the many individuals in Main State who were also involved. All of this was taking place between August '57, to the time the conference began, in late spring of '58. Thus, we labored nine months in the vineyards and we ended up with a humongous set of briefing books and background papers that would cover this entire table. All these had to be cleared throughout the government. That was the underpinning that we took with us to Geneva. This procedure wasn't different from the preparation for any conference. Background papers and position papers had to be drafted, cleared, and approved. The volume was staggering. But by the time I went to Geneva, I really hadn't spent any time in L.

Q: By this time, did you have a significant other? Were you married?

VAN HEUVEN: Not then. I was not married. That didn't happen until 1964. Washington was full of young people. There was a very active social life in Washington, probably like today, although I'm not aware of it today the way I was then. There were wonderful opportunities for young people like myself. There was the Bachelors and Spinsters, a dance that was organized by some Washington hostesses at the Sulgrave Club. There was also a series called the Dancing Class, a white tie affair. Mrs. Thoron was one of the sponsors. That was not for bachelors and spinsters, but rather for the nomenclatura of Washington. The recipe was to have at least twice as many men as women, and to invite the well-known couples, and then make sure there was a lively stable of young men so that the women could dance all the time. If you were somehow deemed acceptable to the hostesses, you had three occasions in the winter to put on white tie and go to the Dancing Class. It was great fun. Chip Bohlen was there. He preferred the bar to dancing. I danced with the wife of the Chief Justice. It was great for us youngsters. Many of the people whom you read about in the press were there. The habit was to move into the dancing crowd and just cut in. That's what you were supposed to do if you were living up to the expectations of the hostesses. Apart from these specific events, there was a tradition of entertainment by many young people in Georgetown. Many were new to the Foreign Service. Some were military. Some were young foreign diplomats. It was just a constant life of parties. It was easy to make new contacts. All this made Washington an enjoyable place. There were free concerts. But Washington was very different then from now. There were virtually no good restaurants. There was no Kennedy Center, only the National Theater. It was, as Kennedy once said, a southern town and a little sleepy town. But for us it was lively enough.

Q: Kennedy also described Washington of having attributes of southern efficiency with

northern charm.

VAN HEUVEN: It wasn't that efficient. I don't remember how Washington was run in those days. Charm? Yes. It was a very open town. For a stranger catapulted out of New England schools, it was totally open.

Q: Well, it was a great gene pool, too. The mating went on there. These were bright young people meeting bright young people.

Before you went to the Law of the Sea Conference, did you get a feel of the political pressures that were coming in on you?

VAN HEUVEN: I became very much aware of the more than academic interest of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce in fisheries. It was driven home to me that the Navy and DOD were totally committed to the three-mile limit. At the same time, before setting out for Geneva, we felt a sense of invincibility about the exercise. We expected that, when we got there, our views would carry the day. We would be by far the largest, one of the best led (Arthur Dean of Sullivan and Cromwell was head of the delegation), best supported, best prepared delegations ever. We, of course, knew from the International Law Commission what was in the drafts that we were going to be working on. So we already sort of knew the direction of the outcome. It was just a matter of making that transition from a draft to a UN convention. It wasn't until Geneva that, on the issue of territorial sea, we found out that we couldn't necessarily have our way. Indeed, we failed to get our way.

Q: You went to the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva. How long did that last?

VAN HEUVEN: Several months, a long time.

Q: Arriving on this thing and carrying someone's portfolio behind them, what was the atmosphere?

VAN HEUVEN: First of all, my role changed. In Washington I had worked for Bill Sanders, who became the deputy head of the delegation. But the minute we got converted to a delegation, we had to split up according to the committees of the conference, which would be dealing with, respectively, the law of the territorial sea, the law of the high seas, fisheries, the continental shelf, and landlocked countries. I was allocated to the continental shelf Fourth Committee. My new boss in that function was Marjorie Whiteman, the assistant legal adviser for Latin American affairs, herself a Yale Law graduate and one of the earliest women to graduate from Yale Law School. She was an experienced, studious lady with a razor sharp mind, an incisive tongue, and a solid reputation in the ARA bureau. She was extremely knowledgeable about maritime matters and the continental shelf. So, those of us who made up the U.S. delegation to that particular committee were Marjorie and myself, a naval officer, another person from Commerce, and a representative of Interior. So five of us basically did the continental

shelf. After the conference opened, it quickly broke down into committees and then labored through the draft convention on the continental shelf, article by article until, two months later, the completed draft came back for approval in plenary. So, my perspective of the conference at that point was not as central as it had been with Bill Sanders, but far more operational because we were actually negotiating a text.

Q: You might explain what the continental shelf meant and what the issues were.

VAN HEUVEN: As to the continental shelf, the issue was what was below it. Oil was key. But there were also minerals, like manganese, that could be mined. The interesting thing was that the technology in those days did not really permit the extraction of natural resources much beyond about 200 meters. In the end, that became the definition of the continental shelf. The first thing the committee did was to address issues of continental shelf boundaries as part of offshore land, part of the mainland. Where did the continental shelf begin? It begins at the water's edge. But how far does it extend and become the deep seabed? Where were the dividing lines? There were a whole lot of proposals. But in the end, the definition that was adopted was 600 feet or beyond that where exploration and exploitation were feasible. This was an indefinite definition, but it was good enough and it was the only one that got majority vote. All other proposed definitions failed to get a majority. So logically this looks like an odd outcome but politically it was the only possible outcome. By the time, some years later, when there was another Law of the Sea conference, technology had overtaken our definition and the definition was amended. You can now exploit at huge depths. Thus, the old definition of 1958 is only of historical interest. But that was one big issue, and it turned out to be the key issue. The committee also discussed the nature of the rights on the continental shelf, and the consequences of ownership or at least proprietary rights with respect to the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf. But it was the definition of the shelf that took the most time.

Q: Did we have any major concerns on this that may have run into opposition from other groups? What was in it for the United States?

VAN HEUVEN: That's a good question. I'd have to go back to the record to give you a solid answer. I would say that oil was never far from our minds, although at the time I don't recall that we had industry oil people with us. We did have officials from the Department of the Interior.

Q: But I think we had been drilling in the sea by this time.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes, we had. And so had others. For that matter, there were a number of countries that were of the same mind as we were, not because they had their own companies who were extracting but because they were lending concessions to western oil concerns and wanted to have that pattern continue.

Q: Were we seeing eye-to-eye... Did we have our own group that was pushing for the same thing? Were there other groups that were pushing for something else?

VAN HEUVEN: There was a sharp divide between the western maritime countries that wanted freedom of passage, freedom of the seas, and a narrow territorial sea on the one hand, and on the other hand, the Soviet bloc countries that, interestingly at that time, wanted a broader territorial sea. They saw the issues more as land mass countries. Today, they wouldn't. But then they did. Canada explicitly wanted a wider territorial sea. The Canadian view was that that would help protect them and their fisheries. That was a big thorn in our side because Canada was part of the west, and they opposed us on this issue. Britain, France, and the West Europeans were all with us. I don't think China played a major role. But we ran into considerable opposition in Latin America. The Soviet bloc commanded a cluster of votes, as did Latin America. There weren't that many African countries at the time. So, in the end the biggest fight was about the three-mile limit. In the end, the lobbying extended into capitals, via Washington. President Eisenhower was involved directly with India and with Canada. He spoke to their leaders. The choice was three or six miles. In the end, predictably, the Indians went for a larger territorial sea. The Canadians, unpredictably, went against us, too. We lost by one vote. So, we did not get a definition of the territorial sea at that time and we didn't get a convention on the territorial sea. The other conventions did receive a majority support, were voted out, and eventually signed and ratified. In 1960, there was another conference to deal with that territorial sea issue. That time the Canadians were with us but India wasn't. We lost again by one vote. By then, I was no longer involved. A different set of officials were. But it was rough going. Washington was deeply disappointed. It had invested political capital at the highest level. The paradox was that Arthur Dean, the head of our delegation, was facing a Mr. George Drew, the Canadian negotiator. Drew was Canadian High Commissioner in London. He got ill and was hospitalized in Geneva. As behooves civilian behavior, Dean and Loftus Becker went to pay a sickbed call on George Drew. I'm sure they didn't talk about his illness and the weather. Drew still voted against us.

At the end of the conference, the draft conventions prepared by the committees had to go through a vetting process called the Drafting Committee. The task of this committee was to homogenize the text of these various draft treaties and do the basic housecleaning you do prepublication. However, some of these texts carried enough substantive meaning below the surface of the words that it became important just how the language was formulated. At that point, the conference was running toward its conclusion and the territorial sea issue was still in heavy dispute. It wholly occupied Arthur Dean. Thus, Marjorie Whiteman was deputized to represent the U.S. in the plenary session and deal with the draft conventions as they were coming out of the various committees. Through some quirk of fate, I was designated to be the U.S. representative on the Drafting Committee. There, I found myself sitting with Andre Gros, the legal adviser of the French foreign ministry, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the legal adviser of the British Foreign Office, of the United Kingdom, and Ali Bhutto Khan, who was then the foreign minister, later prime minister, of Pakistan. I had been told by Dean that he was extremely keen on one particular word change. So here I was, toward 9:00 p.m., a GS-7 surrounded by the greats of the international legal world. In such August company, I would have remained silent. But I had my orders. So, when it came to that particular paragraph, I did some lobbying. I

got out of my seat, tapped various people whose votes I needed on the shoulder, and said that I was going to propose a change and would like their support. Ali Bhutto said to me, "I don't know what it means, but I'll vote for you." I got the change, and Arthur Dean was pleased. (Bhutto was later hanged and his daughter became prime minister.) That was my first experience of lobbying. I did a lot later on, in New York. And it was my first example of a politico saying "Yes" for political reasons, having little to do with the merits of the case, which is what my whole training had been all about. (end of tape)

I also recall from that evening a friendly remark by the Soviet legal adviser, a venerable gentleman seated to my left by name of Boris Krylov. He turned to me and said, "Mon jeune homme, moi je parle francais pas comme it est parle a Paris mais comme il etait parle a St. Petersburg dans ma jeunesse." ("Young man, I speak French not the way they speak it in Paris but the way they used to speak it in St. Petersburg when I was a young man.") He was a holdover from the old czarist regime and had somehow survived in this legal capacity. It was a reminder that there was another hidden face of a Russia long ago.

Q: What did the countries do, just go back to where they were on the continental shelf issue?

VAN HEUVEN: The ratification and entry into force of the conventions that were adopted made them conventional law. They had been customary law already, so there was no great change in practice. And there was no change in practice when it came to the territorial sea. The U.S. Navy continued to regard three miles as the law. When a coastal state challenged that, the U.S. Navy basically pointed its nose at them. In other words, we could say, "We thought we could send submarines in as close as three miles and not have to ask for permission." In any event, we had the right of innocent passage, so practice didn't really change. But after the conference, there was growing uncertainty about what was "legal" and what wasn't. The United States Navy is doing okay today even with 12 miles because its capacities have changed. So that issue today is less important to the Navy.

Q: I think this is a good place to stop for now.

Today is February 6, 2003. You wanted to add a couple of things.

VAN HEUVEN: The point I wanted to make in retrospect about the significance to me of the Law of the Sea Conference was that, miraculously, it took only a period of four years between my first course in international law with McDougal and spending months in the company of the very top people in the profession. The key legal officials of all members of the UN were in Geneva. The group included Constantin Havropoulos, the Legal Adviser of the UN. I mentioned Sir Reginald Manningham Buller, the titular head of the British delegation. He was a hulk of a man. In Plenary, it was his custom to close his eyes and nap after lunch. His assistant, Joyce Gutteridge, would pass notes to Marjorie

Whiteman. One said: "My delegate is asleep. What should I do?" Marjorie passed back a note (through me, as I was positioned between Joyce and Marjorie): "Applaud." The real head of the UK delegation was the legal adviser of the British foreign office, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. Our delegation had Loftus Becker, the Legal Adviser of the State Department. Andre Gros was the Legal Adviser of the French Foreign Ministry. So I had the privilege of being part of an exercise at top level and watching these prominent international lawyers trying to make international law in a political setting.

Q: In a way the Law of the Sea allowed top minds to work on it compared to some other things which are sort of intractable, land-based things. You could try to bring some order out of the sea, couldn't you?

VAN HEUVEN: I wouldn't make too much distinction between land and sea. They all had their problems. Thus, we had fishery problems with Canada, Chile, and Peru. We faced continental shelf problems in terms of the exploitation of the resources of the subsoil. There were problems with landlocked countries. We tried to tackle the issue of the width of the territorial sea. The Law of the Sea presented as much of a challenge as the problems on land. But the process of codification of customary law was reaching its culmination and I just happened to arrive to see it become treaty law.

Q: In 1958 at the end of this conference, what happened to you?

VAN HEUVEN: I went back to Washington. For the first time, I found myself in the Office of the Legal Adviser which hired me a year earlier. I was assigned to the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs. That was a great assignment. I couldn't have realized it at the time. My boss was a wonderful man named Leonard Meeker. He later became Legal Adviser and subsequently ambassador to Romania. Meeker was a Harvard College and Law graduate and a man of consummate patience and great intellectual imagination and probity. I remember once, in a hot Washington summer in the building on 23rd Street where we were located, Leonard Meeker getting out a yellow pad and starting to write the first draft of the Outer Space Treaty. The function of my new office was basically to provide legal advice to the International Organizations Bureau, but also to be operational with them. We were supposed to know the charters, constitutions, and procedures of the organization to which the U.S. was a party. Our role ranged from that of advisers on procedure to drafting and reporting. I found myself on the road much of the time, going from one conference to the next, or backstopping the effort in the Department to produce instructions for American delegations, principally in the Security Council. This provided me my first opportunity to work closely with Foreign Service officers. They were part of the so-called UNP Office of the IO Bureau. Joe Sisco headed that office. Bill Buffum was his deputy. Then there were others, such as Bob Oakley and Mike Newlin. They were a fine bunch. They were savvy. Over my five years working with them, I gradually became like them. Sometimes I even worked right out of their offices, particularly when we were in a crisis mode, such as with emergency sessions of the UN Security Council. Those connections, acquaintances, and friendships have lasted a long time.

Q: You were doing this with the Legal Adviser's Office in the UN Affairs from when to when?

VAN HEUVEN: 1958 to 1963.

Q: What were some of the issues that you got involved in?

VAN HEUVEN: Given my assignment, the main issue at the General Assembly of the UN in New York was the drafting of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and later the Covenant on Economic Rights. This UN effort began with the UN Declaration on Human Rights. Mrs. Roosevelt's name was closely associated with its creation. Our job was to turn that declaration, which was a statement of policy, into treaty text. That job had been taken on by the General Assembly of the United Nations and was assigned to the Third Committee. The Third was also known as the Ladies Committee because it dealt with all the social issues on the UN agenda and delegations often assigned their women delegates to the Third. So I found myself at first helping to put together, and clear through the Department, the instructions to our delegation in New York. But then I also went to New York as part of the delegation in 1958 and five more times in my course of service in L. That gave me another and a very different taste of conference life than Geneva had been. The General Assembly was not so much an atmosphere of lawyers. It was an atmosphere of politicians and policy issues. Initially, my role was to be the legal adviser to the U.S. delegation on the Third and the Fourth Committees. The Fourth Committee handled trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing territories. There were still quite a few in existence at the time. They were all heading toward independence. Many of them presented both political and legal issues so that a lawyer on the delegation was a useful thing to have. Over time, however, it was the lawyers - and in my case it was through my work in the Third Committee - I got so wrapped up in this work and had such continuity that, when after two years the assignments for New York came out, not only was I part of the delegation but I became the Executive officer for the Third Committee. In that role I was basically the team leader, or chief of staff for the U.S. delegation on the Third Committee. Being the team leader did not mean that I was the U.S. representative. Under the UN rules, each delegation was entitled to five representatives and five alternates. Often these alternates were taken from all phases of political and corporate life. Earl Cocke, then with Delta Airlines, was on the delegation. It was also a way for Washington and the administration to make their bow to various racial groups. You had Jewish persons of standing who were on the delegation, or blacks. They were the figureheads and they got their committee assignments like the rest of us. Then basically we, the staff, were added to them and we had to operate together to carry out the U.S. agenda in the Committees.

The political person whom I found myself with upon arrival in '58 was Mrs. Roosevelt's successor on the Human Rights Commission, Mary Lord. Mary was a Pillsbury from Minneapolis. She was married to Charles Lord, a New Englander with a Yale pedigree. Their son, Winston, later had a major career in the Foreign Service. Mary was not only

the U.S. delegate on the Third Committee but also the U.S. Representative on the Human Rights Commission, another body of the UN. I worked closely with her and with two or three staffers and had a wonderful relationship with her. With the change in administration to the Kennedy years, I found myself assigned with another person, namely Marietta Tree. She was from New York and had been a strong supporter of Kennedy. She was particularly fond of Adlai Stevenson. When Stevenson became the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Marietta became the U.S. Representative on the Human Rights Commission and also the Third Committee. So I worked for those years for Mary Lord and for Marietta Tree in the UN. When the Human Rights Commission met in the spring, alternately in New York and Geneva, I would go along and function basically as their number two.

Q: Let's talk a bit about the delegation. Let's start with Mary Lord. What was Mrs. Lord's outlook? And also the delegation, what were we particularly interested in and how did it go?

VAN HEUVEN: Mary Lord was part of a Republican delegation headed by Henry Cabot Lodge. They were the Rockefeller Republicans. The Lodges had a strong sense of patriotism. I saw that later, when I was in Geneva and John Davis Lodge was ambassador in Bern. The Lodges believed in a sense of duty to their country. They believed in the UN and in international organizations. They knew they had the country behind them. U.S. public opinion regarded the UN highly. The delegation was large. It included James Wadsworth, who later succeeded Lodge. Jim Barco, a Washington lawyer, was the Deputy U.S. Representative on the Security Council. The political section was fantastic. It was headed by Chuck Cook, and included Frank Mewshaw, Chauncey Parker, Peter Thatcher, and Tom Bartlett. Most of them were not Foreign Service officers. Some of them were probably intelligence officers. Others were there because of personal connections to the Lodges, the Lords, or some of the other political figures. Max Finger, a Foreign Service officer, was doing economic work. He was backstopped by an equally interesting crew in Washington, including Department of State officials Walter Kotschnik and Kathleen Bell. I came to see all of them as a very large family. Kotschnik and Bell were familiar figures in the Economic and Social Council. I was part of the human rights group. There was also a group of competent legal officers whose work centered on the Legal Committee. It included Herbert Reis and, later, Bob Rosenstock. And then there were clusters of officers who handled political issues in the First and Special Political Committees. The whole backdrop was very political. I personally experienced that when it was my turn one morning to do a brief presentation at a delegation meeting on the work of the Third Committee. I spoke very highly of Mrs. Roosevelt, not paying attention to the fact that Mrs. Roosevelt was a Democrat and that I was addressing Henry Cabot Lodge, who was a Republican. When we broke, Mrs. Lord had another appointment and could not go immediately to take the U.S. seat in the Third Committee, so I was in that seat. While the meeting was under way, somebody tapped me on the shoulder and said, "Ambassador Lodge wants to see you." Lodge, as a Vice President of the General Assembly, had an office in the Secretariat building. That's where I went. The view of the East River was great. Lodge took me to task for having spoken the way I had about

Eleanor Roosevelt, neglecting President Eisenhower. He asked where I had gone to school. When I told him Yale, it didn't improve matters because he, of course, went to Harvard College and Harvard Law School. But then, as a sort of *deus ex machina*, a yacht came into sight on the East River way below us; the conversation took a turn toward sailing; and we discovered our common interest. I never became close to Lodge, but he gave us a lovely wedding present when a few years later I was married.

Q: You mentioned the Third Committee was known on the side as a women's committee. Did you find this one dominated by women and women's issues or not at the time?

VAN HEUVEN: It was known as the Ladies Committee and it was dominated by social issues, which in many countries were traditionally handled by ministers for social affairs. Many of them were women. With the example of Mrs. Roosevelt, human rights were regarded as in good hands with her and her successors. We worked on things like the Declaration of the Rights of the Child. One of the perennial items on the agenda was the Report of the High Commissioner for Refugees. We had maybe 10-12 items each fall on the agenda. But the largest chunk of time went into the drafting of the Covenants on political and economic rights. That gave the ladies the chance to show their potential skills. And they were as good as the best of their male colleagues.

Q: In the Eisenhower cabinet, Mrs. Hobby was about the only woman on it. This was still pretty much a male-dominated government.

VAN HEUVEN: It was and it was a male-dominated United Nations. If you looked at the composition of the top level of the UN Secretariat, I can't remember a single woman at high levels. That's different now.

Q: What about other nations? Were we in the forefront of human rights? There was a declaration, which is a nice thing to say, but when you're trying to put teeth into it, were we ahead of most of the rest in trying to do something about this?

VAN HEUVEN: That would be one way of putting it correctly. We saw our role concretizing something which we assumed had already been universally accepted, namely, the rights spelled out in the Declaration of Human Rights. It was our job, with our skills and experience and background, to try and make that relevant and useful for other countries as well. We had major problems. We also enjoyed some successes. One of the successes was that this was a time when a lot of African countries became independent. They were all writing their constitutions. Many of them adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights lock, stock, and barrel into their constitution, and adopted these highly as their standard. That was the plus. The minus was that when we got to the fine print, on issues of freedom of the press or individual rights, Bill of Rights type of things, the representatives of many countries were extremely uncomfortable with some of these notions. Representatives from the Soviet bloc countries, for example, were not exactly looking for legal commitments to human liberty, while their governments practiced state oppression. The issue of the balance of human freedom versus collective

authority was the focus of many speeches and many votes - change a word here, or delete a paragraph there. The paradox was personified by a perennial Saudi delegate named Jamil Baroody. He was a permanent fixture at the UN. It was said that he had a particular responsibility for the King to look after some of the King's sons. Baroody would go around, making interminable speeches, basically being a difficult gadfly. We knew perfectly well that the last thing he was interested in was to advance the cause of human rights. His country had little practice and less standing in this respect. Another delegate was Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic. The man who put her there was her close friend, Trujillo. So the Third Committee presented an interesting mix of people and interests. But the trend, the future, was clearly the way Mrs. Roosevelt had seen it originally. Working it out was the hard slogging.

Q: I was talking to Sally Cowal, who much later worked in the UN under Jeanne Kirkpatrick. She was saying that the United Nations is very much like Congress, that votes were traded. Each country had its own particular issues it wanted votes for. These votes would be sort of traded. Did you find yourself involved in watching the political process going around?

VAN HEUVEN: We saw plenty of that. I experienced the practice in an ever more acute form later, when I was back at the UN in a different capacity. To get a resolution through, you needed cosponsors. And you traded. New Zealand might have something. You might have something. And the result was I'll cosponsor you; you cosponsor me. It was a live type of diplomacy. You were out of your seat all the time. As the debate went on, it was normal to cruise around the Committee room to lobby. The loudspeakers were on, so you could hear what was going on regardless of where in the room you were. But we were constantly marketing texts, checking other people's texts, suggesting changes, and then when it got close to voting time, counting votes. You wanted to know how you were going to do before the vote. I don't recall that we did that on every vote for every article of the Covenants on political rights. But we were constantly horse trading. That was part of the process. You got to know your colleagues well, since you were negotiating on a whole range of issues for a period of three months. You knew that you would have to live with these colleagues on a different issue the next day. That created a political fabric. It served everybody.

Q: On the Eisenhower administration, how strongly were they committed to the cause of human rights?

VAN HEUVEN: I had little insight in the level of commitment of the White House. Most of the instructions for the USUN delegation, as it related to the Third Committee, were either written in my office in L/UNA or cleared by L/UNA. We were familiar with our marching orders: To complete the Covenants. That's what we did.

Q: How about Mrs. Tree? What was her background? Didn't she come from a theatrical family?

VAN HEUVEN: She came from a clergy family. Her father had been an Episcopal bishop of Massachusetts and a Groton graduate. His name was Endicott. Marietta was different from Mary Lord, but they shared the same traits of openness and enthusiasm. They were also easy to work with. Marietta was well off. She had a townhouse on 79th Street. Her husband, Ronnie Tree, was mostly in Barbados. So she was often by herself in their 79th Street townhouse, which she shared with her two daughters, Frankie and Penelope. She entertained a great deal. I was often her opposite man at the many black tie dinner parties that she used to give. They were done in the traditional style. After dinner, the ladies would go upstairs. On one occasion, when the Russian representative in the Third Committee, Madame Miranova, a Russian deputy minister, headed for the library after dinner with the men and sat down, Marietta stood on the staircase and beckoned to me, "Get her up here." I went to Miranova and said, "Madame Miranova, Mrs. Tree would like you to go upstairs," pointing. She smiled. Marietta was impatient and gave me another signal, turned her back, and disappeared with the other ladies. I was left with the job of getting La Miranova upstairs, so I went back to her and I repeated my request. She looked at me, smiled, and said, "But I like it with the men." That was the end of that. She stayed in the library amidst men, brandy, and cigars. On another occasion, a sit-down dinner, black tie, an African representative arrived with two wives. I reported this to Marietta in a flustered state. She coolly said, "Set another place." And that was it. She was very generous. She had many contacts and never hesitated to share them. One time Andrew Heiskell of "Time" magazine and she had a lunch at some fancy restaurant in midtown. He wanted to know something about the UN. She took me along. So here I was, in the Rolls Royce, going to lunch with Marietta and Andrew Heiskell, who was a big name in New York. She didn't mind having an assistant along, because I might help deal with any difficult questions. In Geneva she was equally generous, sharing what she knew about people and having fun, doing what we asked her to do, coming up with her own ideas. In a sense, Marietta was more of a little girl than Mary Lord. Mary Lord knew what she wanted. She had been in the job long before I joined her. She had a huge stable of friends from all over the world. My presence didn't really make much of a difference. Mary Lord also knew exactly what she wanted to do. The fact that we were around helped her; she would ask us to draft her speeches. But she also trusted us. She would go to the hairdressers and we would just move up to sit in the delegates' seat. She was perfectly happy to let us do that. Once, Committee proceedings went faster than expected. The issue was freedom of the press. It was the U.S. turn to speak, but Mary was still not there. So I delivered the remarks. This was the one and only time that I made "Time" and "Newsweek" all in the same week because the press was very interested in what the United States representative said in the Third Committee on that subject. Mary never conveyed any sense that I trumped her, or that we should have warned her, or brought her back, or anything like that. It was all perfectly okay. She was absolutely comfortable in her own skin.

Q: Did you know the difference between the support that Cabot Lodge was giving to your work and that of Adlai Stevenson? Was there a difference in style or tone?

VAN HEUVEN: Considerable. I don't think Henry Cabot Lodge ever came to the Third

Committee. He left it to Mary Lord and the staff. Adlai, however, was interested, and would show up on occasion. I recall his remarks when Mrs. Roosevelt died and he gave the eulogy. That took place not in the Third Committee, but in Plenary. Adlai was interested in human rights. Also, the relationship between Adlai and Marietta Tree was close. It was Marietta who was with him when he died in Grosvenor Square. Marietta arranged for me to come along once to a Georgetown dinner for Adlai by Polly Fritchey. Then we went to Constitution Hall for the Human Rights Day celebration Adlai cared a lot about that. But Adlai had other concerns. His principal job was in the Security Council, dealing with the major political issues of the day. He biggest one during his tenure was the Cuban Missile Crisis. I felt closer to Stevenson than to Lodge. But I think that sense on my part is due to the fact that when I worked with Lodge I was a newcomer. When I had the chance to work with Adlai, I knew the ropes. The General Assembly once extended into January and February. I went back to New York as the delegation's legal adviser. In that capacity I wrote a speech for him that he gave without changing a word. This gave me a sense of loyalty to him that I never had with Ambassador Lodge.

Q: Let's talk about the Western European delegations. Were you all singing out of the same hymnbook? I always think of the French taking exception to things. How did you find support from our traditional allies?

VAN HEUVEN: I have a narrow answer to your broad question. My perspective was from within the confines of the Human Rights Commission and the Third Committee. We worked well with the French. At one time France was represented in the Commission by a Nobel Prize winner, Rene Cassin, a famous man and a distinguished French professor. However, the Quai d'Orsay staff that supported him was mostly second rank. When Cassin was in the room, the Commission listened attentively. When his deputies were there, they didn't make that much of a difference. They were not rivals to us. They cooperated. The Western caucus was a pretty comfortable brotherhood. One steady ally and friend was the British representative, Sir Samuel Hoare. In Geneva, he joined some of us on a ski trip to Saas Fee. He wasn't a great skier, and slid down the Kanenenrohr on the seat of his pants.

Q: Did we have any delegations that we kind of followed? Did you feel that we were out ahead or were others real team players?

VAN HEUVEN: Persons got to prominent positions in the UN system not by being wallflowers. The UN family was a collection of varied and strong personalities. People stood out. Once in my early days, the British representative was Sir Pierson Dixon, and the Indian representative was Krishna Menon. I watched the delegates' lounge when Menon gave Sir Pierson Dixon a tap on the shoulder, but in this case he did this with a cane that he always carried. The tap of the cane hit Sir Pierson on both shoulder blades. He always stood up straight but he stood up even straighter when he got hit that way. So we were witnesses to a lot of personal idiosyncracies. We kept a distant eye on the Soviet delegation. We did not work very well with them. We could count on solid opposition at almost every turn in our continuing human rights discussion. Those were the days when

the Soviets used their veto in the Security Council, and the Security Council was lamed. There were talented individual Soviets, to be sure, and they could speak very well. But we were never close to them the way we were years later, when I was doing arms control in Geneva and we were cooperating with them.

Q: There you were both after the same thing in a way.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes.

Q: Were you there when the Third Nonaligned Movement got going?

VAN HEUVEN: It existed, but it was not until years later that we saw the excesses of voting blocs, including the nonaligned voting bloc. The Yugoslavs in my days did not play the role that they played later on. There were regional and other caucuses, but at the time I don't think we were talking about blocs. Each country could and did reach out to its own regional constituency. In the Third Committee I dealt with Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico as much as I did with the Europeans, although, for a variety of reasons - in my case not being able to speak Spanish - I probably spent more time with the Europeans. Remember that the UN in those days consisted of only some 80 members. It is now double that number. It was a manageable UN. It was a UN in which the United States was the principal western member and where the United States mostly could get its way. The excesses came later, with the Zionism equals racism resolution, and things of that sort.

Q: You were backed up by Joseph Sisco, quite a name in bureaucracy.

VAN HEUVEN: Joe was a slam-bang operator of the best sort. Irrepressible, energetic, vivacious, tough. In some of his expressions he could be pretty crude. I will not put some of those remarks on the record here. He was a fabulous bureaucratic operator. He understood politics. When I first knew him he was the Director of the office of UN political affairs at State. He was powerful. We used his name to refer to a certain style of reporting: Make sure you record what Sisco said; what the diplomat on the other side said was of secondary importance.

Q: How did the system work in the Third Committee trying out famous ethnic people or famous people for being famous? A lot of the glitterati would come out as delegates. How did this work?

VAN HEUVEN: For a while the Belgians had an author as their representative in the Third Committee. His pen name was Marnix Gijssen. He wrote in Flemish and in French. He was a thoughtful man. He carried out his instructions with elegance, but kept a relatively low profile. Belgium did not have a major role. I started to read his works and found he was a marvelous author. It was fun to know the man that was writing the books that I was reading. He once gave me a little inscription on the front page of a short story. The inscription said, "I notice that you've read this." The short story was entitled "Liever heimwee den Holland," which meant "Rather homesick than Holland." I still pick up his

writings to enjoy his exquisite use of the Flemish language.

Another one was the Dutch representative who was a Franciscan priest. His name was Father Beaufort. He had signed the charter for the Netherlands in San Francisco. Whenever he invited you for lunch in the delegates' dining room, he ritually went through the entire wine list, but all of us knew in advance that, after long perusal, it would be Chateau neuf du Pape.

Q: You mentioned Belgium. Were we doing anything of leaning on the Belgians as the Congo got ready to be independent? What were we doing on this tremendous surge of independence?

VAN HEUVEN: The man who was trying to manage the transition of the Congo was Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium I have a picture of Spaak in the Fourth Committee with Adlai sitting in the American seat. We weren't leaning on the Belgians particularly hard. Congo was not at that point yet a major issue for the U.S. administration, although it became so somewhat later. I recall that my colleague in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Alan Ford, who was doing African Affairs, and Mac Godley, who was an office director in AF, ran U.S. Congo policy when the country was coming apart and we had to deal with Lumumba. The Belgians also had to deal with the push from a lot of the underdeveloped countries who wanted the Congo to become independent and who saw this as another desirable step in the process of decolonization. But I don't think that we were at that time leaning on the Belgians. The process was already well under way. My view of that issue, however, was limited at that time.

Q: I'm just trying to capture the spirit. For many people in the U.S., this whole period of the very late '50s and early '60s regarding Africa was "This is going to be a very exciting place. These countries are going to become independent. All sorts of wonderful things are going to happen." What was the feeling on your part and the delegates'?

VAN HEUVEN: It started to happen at the beginning of the '60s. The Kennedy administration in particular had to deal with it, through the person of Soapie Williams, who was Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. We saw as inevitable the evolution toward independence of what had been dependent territories. We knew that they would eventually be joining the United Nations. We understood that in some cases a bad transition might leave the people in these countries worse off. But there was simply no stopping the political impetus on that continent and indeed throughout the world. We ourselves had a record of supporting decolonization. We leaned on the Dutch with respect to Indonesia, and later New Guinea. We approved of the British transfer of authority to India and Pakistan. Our druthers as a country were that this was a process that not only was happening, but was a good thing, since it would bring more democracy. This was consistent with the American view of how the world should be.

Q: Did the arrival of delegates from these newly independent countries change the UN?

VAN HEUVEN: Over time, yes. The flood of new countries changed the UN simply because it added to the numbers. It also added to the complexity of multilateral diplomacy. It led from caucuses to blocs. It led to fairly rigid procedures for dividing up positions. For instance, the recent election of Libya as chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission is a direct result of a system that had its origin in UN enlargement. A growing membership of the UN also drove the larger countries to create caucuses and smaller groups. The last time I was on the delegation was '95. I bet that now, eight years later, I would have to learn again what the new alignments are. You have to know this terrain if you're going to be effective in this multilateral world.

Q: You left this job in '63?

VAN HEUVEN: That is right.

Q: And then where?

VAN HEUVEN: Before we go on, I should mention that I had an interlude of almost a year in L when I was the special assistant of the legal adviser, Eric Hager. I don't remember much about that period except that Mr. Hager was a very nice person. He unfortunately died very early after leaving that job. He came out of a large New York firm, Shearman and Sterling. He was a lawyer's lawyer. He did not believe in lawyers taking political positions or playing political roles. He was interested in the cases we had before the international court. He argued some of them himself. He wanted L to take a fairly restrained approach to the business of legal advising. This was in contrast to later legal advisers like Abe Chayes, who wanted L to be involved in policy. This is an eternal conundrum that every lawyer has to solve for himself. There is no right answer or wrong answer. But there are two very different styles and Eric Hager was the lawyer's lawyer style.

One day I was asked by Dick Kearney, a longtime German hand who eventually became Deputy Legal Adviser, whether I would be interested in going to Berlin. There was a position that L staffed. It was that of legal adviser to the U.S. Mission in Berlin. The U.S. Mission was basically the equivalent of what the British and the French still called military government. We didn't call it that, but it was. We had occupation rights in Berlin. In fact, they lasted right until the unification of Germany. And we exercised these rights. That accounted for the requirement of a lawyer. So Dick's question was, would I wish to go there? When I indicated interest, I also had to be vetted by Elwood Williams of the Office of German Affairs. Elwood was in a wheelchair because of a medical disability. He had been a Foreign Service officer.

Q: I think multiple sclerosis.

VAN HEUVEN: He was confined and could not have a Foreign Service career. But he was a permanent and key presence in GER. No one went to Germany or Austria unless you were personally approved by Elwood. Never mind Personnel or the Director General.

It was Elwood's decision. He interviewed me and asked whether, given my experience in occupied Netherlands, I thought I could do this job. After some thought, I told him I thought I could. That assignment was the start of an involvement with the German question, which eventually became a major theme of my career. As I look back, I have had longer experience with Germany than with any other country or issue, going back to the day that Nazi forces invaded The Netherlands on May 10, 1940. I remember this day very well. I still follow German affairs closely and I still know a lot of Germans. And Germany has changed totally during this period of my involvement. I have made a sea change myself in my views of that country and its people, from a hostile view about Germany and Germans to the view that I hold now. Today I am a strong supporter of the democratic and free Federal Republic of Germany that we have today and the democracy that Germany practices.

Q: You went to Berlin when?

VAN HEUVEN: In the summer of 1963.

Q: You mentioned a wedding. Did you get married before this?

VAN HEUVEN: I got married in my first year in Berlin.

Q: You were in Berlin from '63 to when?

VAN HEUVEN: '67.

Q: What was the political situation when you arrived in '63? What was American presence and how were we dealing with it?

VAN HEUVEN: The political situation was that everybody still vividly remembered the recent blockade and the airlift, and also the visit of President Kennedy.

Q: '48.

VAN HEUVEN: Everybody remembered the "Ich bin ein Berliner" phrase spoken by Kennedy at the Rathaus. Two-thirds of Berlin was under western allied administration and the remaining one-third under Soviet administration. The western part was surrounded by the wall, not just dividing the city, but around the whole city.

Q: And the wall was a new phenomenon.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes. It had gone up in '61. But it extended entirely around West Berlin. We were sitting in the middle of a large number of well-trained and –equipped Soviet divisions, 100 miles from Helmstedt and the border with West Germany; we were exposed. Even though there was an American, French, and British military presence in Berlin, the total allied garrison was less than 10,000. Our part of it was probably 6,000.

We had four battalions and a tank unit. We were basically there as hostages. But you could also look at us as guarantors of Berlin's freedom. That's how the Berliners saw us. The threat was a Soviet threat. The East Germans were a nuisance factor. It could be considerable. It was not a threat to us. But the Soviets were. The city was cut off from western Germany. Berliners could not get in or out except with permission. They could fly in and out on one of the allied airlines. With a lot of hassle some of them could go on the ground. But it meant submission to all sorts of controls. So for all practical purposes, most Berliners were trapped in the town. The saying at the time was that one out of every third Berliner was a widow over 65. Berlin continued to exist because of heavy financial support by Bonn. So Bonn paid for Berlin and the allies defended it. That was how Berlin lived.

In a strategic sense, Berlin was the crucible of the Cold War. It was the point where the Soviets exercised pressure. They had done it with the blockade. They did it on more than one occasion later on. I went through several mini blockades. Within months after my arrival, an American military column was denied entry into Berlin at Babelsberg. The U.S. Army Berlin command sent a support column out. The Soviets permitted it to go through but we held the column in place. I have aerial photographs, taken by an Army helicopter, of these two allied columns, and of Soviet APCs blocking the way. Meanwhile, the U.S. command and the rest of us were down in a bunker. We were in direct contact with the White House. A Berlin crisis in those days meant potential war. Everybody was conscious of that. That's probably one of the reasons it never happened. But you could never be sure. The Soviets had imposed the notorious Berlin blockade. Something like that could happen again. You really felt that you were in the eye of the storm. It created strong bonds of kinship among the officers who were assigned to the U.S. Mission. That is particularly true for the State personnel who were my colleagues. When you have an external enemy you depend on each other. And we had the interesting challenge of administering an occupied city. We ran the American sector. The French and British ran theirs. Obviously, we weren't staffing every administrative position with allied personnel. In that sense the city was really run by Germans. But it ran under allied authority. So the public safety officer, a mid-level Foreign Service officer, directed the police in the U.S. sector. The Senator for Justice was subject to my direction. It was an exotic situation, but it worked.

Q: I've talked to somebody who was in Berlin in '61 when the Kennedy administration came in. They were very nervous because people on the Kennedy staff were talking about, "Well, maybe we can work something out here" and the feeling was they might give away more than was justified trying to make a deal with this. But I think their spine got stiffened after a while. Did you pick up any of that initial concern about the Kennedy administration?

VAN HEUVEN: No, I did not. I arrived after the "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech. With that, the President squarely put himself behind the freedom of the city. Every Berliner understood it that way. The whole world had heard it. The issue of unconditional American support for the city was settled in as black and white as you can settle anything.

For any of us to have done anything to undercut this understanding would have affected our strategic position in the world.

Q: From what I gather, the legal side of things was extremely important because you had the Soviets trying to change the rules and get us to give away a little here. How far do you let down the back of your truck? All sorts of things. All of this was based on a legal code or at least a code of practice. It was almost a theology.

VAN HEUVEN: These issues were my day-to-day bread and butter. It wasn't just tailgates. Every procedure had been worked out and agreed, either tacitly or through accepted custom. The Quadripartite Agreements of 1944 provided the basic legal framework. They were embellished later on by other agreements. When the Soviets took East Berlin out of the Quadripartite administration machinery run by the Kommandatura, the Kommandatura remained as just a western operation. But everything - crossing into East Berlin and letting the Russian soldiers into West Berlin, the process of running the military trains, the procedures for road access through Helmstedt, the administration of air access through the air corridors, the operation of Spandau prison - was governed by an intricate system of habits that had solidified into accepted practice. Any change, no matter how small, always raised the question "What is the other side up to?"

Q: What were you doing? Were you screening everything? Was this your responsibility?

VAN HEUVEN: My responsibility ran in a different direction from that of my political colleagues. One of them dealt full time with the group of issues relating to the air corridors. They were our lifeline. There were notification procedures for each flight. Permission would be granted for each flight, but with conditions. One had to do with the altitude at which we could fly. These flights were bumpy because we couldn't go over 10,000 feet. The weather in northern Germany below 10,000 feet is often lousy, with much wind and no visibility. The Soviets wouldn't guarantee flight safety above 10,000 feet. Another political officer handled Autobahn access issues and military train issues. My role had to do with the fact that we were in authority, and that anything that the Berlin authorities did had to have our imprimatur. This involved several activities. First of all, in the most routine way, the Berliners liked to think of themselves as part of the Federal Republic. That was not part of the allied legal way of thinking. To us Berlin was occupied territory, and whatever transpired in the Federal Republic did not apply to Berlin. Thus, Berliners wanted legislation identical to what was valid in the Federal Republic. What they would do, and what we allowed them to do, was to adopt by a Berlin law verbatim whatever the federal law was. But before that could go into effect in Berlin the allies had to give their approval by formal letter or order. The legal advisers of three western missions exercised that authority. We reviewed every piece of legislation of the Berlin House of Representatives that was taking over federal legislation. And when we did not like parts of that, we excluded those parts from application in Berlin. For instance, we allowed Berlin to take over only a small part of the federal air traffic law, because only the allies had air traffic rights in Berlin, and the Germans had none. We were not about to let them have any authority in an area that touched security. So Berliners could not fly

helicopters in Berlin, nor fixed wing aircraft. That would have been too dicey anyway. The allied lawyers had staffs that went over proposed legislation, each in our own missions. I had two German lawyers working for me. But I was the person who would then caucus with my two allied colleagues, and we would agree on the text of a Berlin Kommandatura letter or a Berlin Kommandatura order that would approve or disapprove the adoption of legislation equivalent to the federal legislation. In addition, the allies could and did issue their own legislation, Berlin Kommandatura Orders or BKOs, thus exercising legislative authority. I also had to sign off on every request by the Berlin judiciary to handle any case involving allied property or personnel. That was about 30 a day. I would sign my name that often every working day, giving the Senator of Justice permission for the German authorities to proceed or not. So the lawyers administered a whole routine administration. I worked very closely with two British and two French legal colleagues in the course of my four years. Going through an intensive process like that made us close. There was another role that legal advisers in each mission had, although I can't speak for the British and French. This was the role of advising the minister, who was the top State Department officer, and the Commandant as to the limits of their authority in the U.S. sector. On occasion, I had to remind them that the Constitution applied, that there were certain things that they could not do, such as taking people into custody without representation, or closing off areas, or exercising allied authority on the Reichsbahn railway tracks in the U.S. sector. That was a dicey role. Here I was, an FSR-4, equivalent to lieutenant colonel, and I was basically telling two-star superiors that they could not legally take action they wanted to take for political reasons. To exercise the function of legal advice initially required an enormous amount of work to understand in detail the entire allied legal structure and content. It required a fair amount of political judgment as to what laws to apply and not. The French, British, and U.S. legal activities had a large degree of autonomy. I cannot recall any case where the minister or the commandant overrode me on a major matter on which I had given advice.

Q: A tricky place. I think all of us felt if World War III was going to start, it was going to start there. Who were the ministers, American civilians, and the commandants?

VAN HEUVEN: The top U.S. representative in Berlin was George McGhee. He was the ambassador in the Federal Republic of Germany. He resided in Bonn, though there was a residence for his use in Berlin. You remember, John McCloy went out with the title of High Commissioner, not as ambassador.

Q: I was in Frankfurt and we had the HICOG building there.

VAN HEUVEN: Precisely. I remember the building. The second in command in Berlin was a U.S. major general. In my time there were two - Major General James Polk and Major General Franklin. Each sector had its general. Third in line was the deputy commandant, who was also the resident top diplomat. That was the minister in each sector. In my time, the post was held by Arch Calhoun and Brewster Morris. I don't remember all the names of the French and British sides, but I do recall the British commandant, Major General Peel Yates, who was always accompanied by his cocker

spaniel. Some of the generals would tend to read into politics a lot. Others stuck to military matters. There were different styles in which the three sectors were run. The French maintained by far the most reserved and hostile attitude toward the Germans. We probably were at the other end of the spectrum. The British were somewhere in between, but the British took no nonsense from the Germans. We had a slot in the political section occupied by an officer whose job it was to do the liaison at the Rathaus, where the elected representatives of Berlin were located, and which was headquarters of the mayor, Willy Brandt. In my time, the slot was filled, first, by Lucian Heichler and then, by Brandon Grove. That is how we interfaced with the German political process in Berlin. When I came to Berlin in '63, the sense of allied dominance was still pervasive. In our minds, we still lived in the wake of the world war. We were there because we defeated the Germans and occupied Berlin. In my role that was the kernel of the situation. We had occupation rights. They were pretty absolute. But 20 years later, the balance had swung and we were no longer exercising those rights the way we had before. We were letting the Germans do far more than we did in the early '60s or in the late '50s. But when I was there in the '60s I was, unlike Lucian and Brandon, who were part of the vanguard of officers who were already learning to do the political interface with the German democratic process.

Just recently I became aware of the fact that, in the classified part of his efficiency report, which the rated officer could not see at the time, a colleague of mine, who was the labor officer in Berlin and who therefore had to deal with the labor unions, found that his supervisor had put in there as a criticism that he had too much contact with the Germans. In retrospect, this was an astonishing comment to make. But this is illustrative of the fact that the mindset in the U.S. Mission was that you had to keep your reserve with the Germans and keep them in check. When I returned to Germany 15 years later, this attitude had wholly changed.

Q: Who was the mayor when you arrived in '63?

VAN HEUVEN: It was Willy Brandt, who was even then already well known, though he had not yet made an international mark in terms of his efforts to reach across the line that divided Germany and to build bridges.

Q: Ostpolitik.

VAN HEUVEN: Brandt started a process of what was called "Passierscheine." He worked out with the East German authorities a process whereby West Berlin citizens could make Christmas visits across the wall. My memory is not good on the details. We didn't recognize the East German authorities in East Berlin and stuck to the theory that the Soviets were responsible for their Sector. So if anything happened to us or our personnel in East Berlin, we would talk only to the Soviets. We would cross Checkpoint Charlie and refuse to show our documents to East German guards. We kept the windows of our cars up. Eventually, we would just open the passport and show the East Germans the title page, but we would not hand them any document. We would absolutely refuse to have them touch our documents or put any markings in it. Of course, they tried very hard

to do so because that would then be represented as constituting legitimization of their regime. Our view was that the Soviets were responsible for the Soviet Sector of Berlin, just as we were responsible for our part of it.

We could go to East Berlin under the Quadripartite Agreements and we were never denied access to do so. We had to run this gauntlet of administrative obstacles and basically keep a stiff upper lip and stick to our procedures. Every time the East Germans did something to us, a complaint would go to the Soviets. Conversely, the Soviets had the right to come into West Berlin and they did so. They drove their vehicles and their soldiers around West Berlin. Of course, they had to come to West Berlin because of their role at Spandau, which was in the British Sector. Spandau is another story because that was another one of my responsibilities.

Q: Talk about it. What was Spandau and who was there? What were our problems?

VAN HEUVEN: Spandau was a huge prison complex built in the mid-nineteenth century that housed three prisoners: Speer, von Schirach, and Hess. It was one of the two remaining Quadripartite operations after the Soviets walked out of the Kommandatura. One was the allied air control system. The other was the prison. There were four governors of the prison. They ran the place, each with their set of wardens who pulled duty the way wardens do in a prison. The exterior guard was mounted each month by allied and Russian troops in a determined succession. The U.S. always had December. We always took it from the Russians, who had it in November. We handed it over to the British, who always had it in January. They had to devote pretty much of a company of soldiers to man all the watchtowers and the exterior guard. They basically stood guard. In a way there wasn't much to do about these prisoners because there was a certain routine. But on occasion there were issues. One was when von Schirach developed eye problems and needed surgery which could not be performed in the prison. So he had to be taken out of prison. That required Moscow's approval, which eventually was forthcoming. There were repeated allied attempts, in my days and subsequently, by the allies to close the place and let Hess out after the other two were released. That always ran into a Soviet roadblock. But the whole business of running that prison and agreeing on the regime had plenty of administrative angles that did require the attention of the U.S. prison governor, who was a lieutenant colonel and who reported to me. My role was not to get involved in those details, but to be aware of them. But I did get involved directly as the action officer whenever something unusual had to happen, like taking von Schirach out, or when the time came to release the other two and leaving Hess in there. It was a midnight operation. It was sort of eerie.

Q: Could you talk about that? Why was it done in that manner?

VAN HEUVEN: Well, the expiration of the sentence was at midnight. I believe on September 30, 1966. It became a major press event. Spandau prison was in the British sector, so the British had the chore of maintaining the law and order there. They kept tight control. The Soviets refused to let the two prisoners out a minute earlier. But there was

the whole issue of how do you let these men walk out? Hand them their stuff back, put them in transportation, and get them out of Berlin. When Hess was there, his uniform and other artifacts were kept in the prison. There was also still an old guillotine in the prison, from the Nazi days. There was always the risk that wardens or somebody would make off with stuff in the prison and sell it as souvenirs. In my time, I dealt with two U.S. prison directors there, Lieutenant Colonel Blake and another lieutenant colonel who later sold his story for publication, against the rules. The Army never went after him for that. His name was Eugene Bird. It was on Gene Bird's watch, in American month, that Hess committed suicide, something that should never have been allowed to happen. There was always a risk that someone would make private gain out of this very odd relic of the war. I would go into the prison every American month to go along with the American doctor. We had that responsibility for our month. I would not talk with the prisoners but I would know where they were, see their condition, inspect their cell. I was never tempted to conduct conversations with any of them. Hess was pretty much of a recluse and probably wouldn't have talked anyway. Von Schirach was a cantankerous man. Speer, on the other hand, was a nice person, but I didn't see it as my role to engage Speer in historical discussion. He was a prisoner. My role was to see that the prison was run right. There was an officers mess in the building next to the prison. The directors, who met daily, ate there. Once a week, they would invite guests. I think it was on Thursdays. I could always come out and have lunch. But it was the prison director's prerogative and mine to invite guests to come out on Thursdays. So in American months we would have chicken or steak. In Russian months we would have the Russian food and in the French months the French would come up with French food. It was all cooked by the same German cooks. It was not haute cuisine but it was pretty different from month to month. It was also the only place where allied personnel could meet with live Russians in Berlin. Outside of Berlin, on the other side of the Glienecke Bridge in Karlshorst, was located the headquarters of a Group Soviet Forces in Germany. The allied military missions had their headquarters there. That was the other place where we had a military interface with the Russians. We had contact also at the air control center, but this was basically an air controller operation. But there was always the possibility that someone could use Spandau as a place to have a political discussion with the Soviets. Typically, they would bring out uniformed folks from Karlshorst. On occasion there would be a civilian and then the puzzle was, who is he, why is he here, what does he want? Most of the time guests would just come out and meet 20 or so people at lunch and for some quadripartite conviviality in a rather forced atmosphere. There was always plenty to drink on those occasions. I guess nearly 10% of my time in my four Berlin years went into the issues related to the administration of Spandau.

Q: You say toward the end we were trying to close it down. What was the Soviet attitude and why?

VAN HEUVEN: Ours was very simple. We thought that a lifelong sentence for Hess was no longer realistic given the way the world had moved. (end of tape)

I have to guess at why the Soviets would never agree to release Hess. What they said was

that they suffered so many casualties during World War II at the hand of the Germans that this type of action was simply out of the question. Moscow stuck to this position right until the end. We tried to revive this issue from time to time, but it never got anywhere. It was not going to be a major point on any Soviet-western agenda such as it was in those days. If there was an agenda, it had more important issues than that. No U.S. administration was going to spend political capital on it. But it seemed the right thing to do, so there was never any opposition in London, Paris, or Washington. We did not consult the Germans in Bonn beforehand, though we kept them informed.. So they were aware of what was going on. But the German government was not in a position to even express an opinion about what the allies did with Hess.

Q: You were there when Kennedy was assassinated?

VAN HEUVEN: Yes.

Q: How did that play?

VAN HEUVEN: I remember it vividly. The Berlin Bar Association had their annual dinner. I was an honored guest. It was an idiosyncratic situation, because here were all these senior lawyers, judges, magistrates, and prosecutors, and here I was, the U.S. legal adviser half the age of most of them, but still in a way for them the key person in the room. We had just started. There was music and it was going to be a nice evening, although I have to say that even nice evenings in Berlin in those days could be pretty dour and heavy. This was a town that was still pockmarked by the war. A lot of destroyed buildings had not been reconstructed. Berlin suffered from a fairly heavy climate, both physical climate and a psychological climate. Levity was not part of the Berlin life in those days at all. It was mostly serious stuff all around. But a good party meant at least adequate food, although it was not by today's standards very good, and plenty to drink if you wanted. Well, the news came. The music stopped. The dinner did not take place. Then there was an eerie silence that night when the candles appeared all through town. It was a horrible weekend - because then there was Oswald and his assassination. It was a surreal thing. And then came the burial, and it was just at Thanksgiving time. It was an awful period for everybody.

Q: I was on leave in Graz when it happened and I went rushing back with my wife to Belgrade. It was the same. For a communist country, it was something none of us will forget.

What were you getting about the atmosphere and the spirit of the people? A third of them were widows over 65. This meant that young people were getting the hell out, weren't they?

VAN HEUVEN: They were, and businesses had left already. No major company had its headquarters in Berlin. It was just too hard to get to Berlin and out. Moreover, it wasn't all that safe to do so. So Berlin consisted of a lot of people who in their business activities

were appendages to things going on in the Federal Republic. The Berlin official apparatus was totally dependent on financial influx from the treasury in Bonn. It couldn't do anything for Berlin security. Of course there was the police, but the police were under allied and not German command.

Q: Did you get involved in the spy-counterspy type thing in Berlin? Did Berlin being a spy center play any role in what you were doing?

VAN HEUVEN: Only peripherally. Of course, there was a station and I knew some of the officers. I was only vaguely acquainted with most of those folks. They kept very much to themselves. But they were probably outnumbered by military intelligence because the Army must have been there in huge force. Until the day when we relinquished our wartime powers in Germany, this remained a problem. There was a stable of Army contacts that existed alongside the Agency contacts. This situation didn't always work synchronously or even in harmony. I became particularly aware of this later, when we were engaged in efforts to secure the release of some of these German citizens who had been working for the Army. Many were just poor devils caught up in the web of intrigue that was not of their making. But in those days, there was the Teufelsberg, the heap of rubble, on top of which was a large electronic facility that could do a great many things. In my work I didn't need intelligence. I went by my daily in-box of telegrams from all the posts around us that were repeated to Berlin. I didn't need to know, with occasional exceptions, if an individual case in which the Germans wanted jurisdiction and U.S. authorities might not want to grant it. Then somebody would come and talk to me. I also had to deal with the Berlin Judge Advocate on some of those issues. But I don't remember any major incidents or set-tos and it certainly was not part of my daily routing to get involved in intelligence, somewhat unlike my later experience in Bonn.

Q: How did you meet your wife?

VAN HEUVEN: There are two answers: hers and mine. Hers is that we met in Washington. Mine is that we met in Rome. Both happened in the course of 1963. We did go to the same party in Washington just before my departure. She was on her way to Rome as vice consul. In December of '64, I had been in Berlin for a little over a half year. I went to visit a Foreign Service colleague, Frazier Draper, and his wife. He was an ambassador's staff aide in Rome. Their oldest daughter, Sallie, was my godchild. My wife, Ruth, had a dinner arranged. Someone dropped out and the Drapers said, "But we have an extra man at home. Can we bring him?" So I was taken along to this small dinner party on the Piazza Navona and met my wife there. Not quite a year later, we were married in New York.

Q: How did this work for her? Did she have to resign?

VAN HEUVEN: She did. The rules were clear about that. Or I could resign, although that was never really part of our discussion. She did resign. At that point she was on her way to Laos. It was the summer of '64. She told me later that she had looked into possibilities

not just of working in Berlin but for me working in Laos. But the fact of the matter is that she did resign. Later, just to run that story out, the rules changed. Meanwhile, our children were born and it became possible for people who had had to resign for reasons of marriage to apply for reentry. In the '70s, when I was in The Hague, she sought that reentry and was asked to take the oral exam again in Washington at her expense, which we thought was somewhat unfair. But she was readmitted. It wasn't until my next assignment in Bonn as Political Counselor that there was a position for her as well, as head of the consular section of the embassy. From that time on, we worked alongside and, later on, separately on occasion.

Q: During this '63-'67 period, were there any major occurrences that you'd like to mention?

VAN HEUVEN: For me, getting married was a big change. Rather than being a bachelor in Berlin with a pretty intense job, having a wife facilitated and broadened my existence, because most of my colleagues were also married and we were very much part of each other's familiar. There were the Nagys and the Gleysteens, the Days, the Polanskys, the Brogans, the Woessners, the Meehans, and the Ryersons. We also had a few other bachelors: George Jaeger, Dick Smyser, and Bill Allen. We were all a pretty close group.

Q: Which Gleysteens?

VAN HEUVEN: Dirk Gleysteen and Oobi Gleysteen. Also Lucien and Muriel Heichler. The strange thing is that even today this group of old Berlin hands is as tight a clan as you can imagine, as we were at that time. We really got to know each other. We were all under the same pressures. We all lived the same life. We were dependent upon each other. Generally, the tougher the hardship post, the better the friends you make. Berlin certainly made that true for us. Ruth came out to join me. She did some teaching at the Kennedy School. Our first child was born in Berlin.

Q: Obviously the ambassador was number one in your hierarchy. Did the hand of Bonn, the legal adviser in Bonn, do much with you?

VAN HEUVEN: The legal adviser in Bonn was an exceptional man named Joachim von Elbe. Joe, who of course was originally German, had come to the United States in the '30s, obtained a graduate degree at Yale, and then went back with military government after the war, and ended up as legal adviser to the embassy. He was a courtly, learned, wise presence in Bonn, a man very much of the old school and the opposite of a slam-bang operator. I was far more operational in Berlin than he was in Bonn. He belonged to the generation of Bill Tyler. At the time that I got to know him, he worked on strictly legal things, consulting and advising on all sorts of issues. There were always plenty of them, because of the presence of our forces in the Federal Republic and the fact that we still had the special status in the Federal Republic. But he was not an operational part of the political show in the embassy. While Joe could give me a lot of wisdom, he never sought to give me direction. I welcomed his wisdom, but on operational things in Berlin

he could not. Because of the distance and the different milieu, he was not in a position to be of much use to me. He later wrote a book in German with the title translated "Under the Prussian Eagle and the American Stars and Stripes." I have an inscribed copy at home. It is a conventional but fascinating account of his career as a German civil servant and later as an American civil servant.

Did Bonn sit on me in other ways? There were too many layers that insulated me. I generally operated in a realm away from the political counselor in Bonn. The higher level in Bonn was above my pay grade. My direct experience with ambassadorial visits to Berlin was also limited. I was the control officer for the Ambassador once or twice, but I don't think that I ever briefed Ambassador McGhee or had much to do with him substantively. It was always a hassle handling the McGhees. They were demanding visitors. It usually threw the front office in a tizzy when they came. Of course, the ambassador had a residence in Berlin as he had his residence in Bonn. But he didn't spend much time there.

Q: I think this is a good place to stop. We'll pick this up the next time in '67 when you left Berlin. Where did you go?

VAN HEUVEN: NATO.

Q: Today is March 7, 2003. You're off to NATO in 1967. You were there from when to when?

VAN HEUVEN: 1967 to 1970.

Q: What was your job?

VAN HEUVEN: Let me back up for one second. I mentioned earlier that I was a civil servant in the Office of the Legal Adviser. I had a GS rank. When I went to Berlin, I became a Foreign Service Reserve officer. The reason was that at the time I entered the Department of State, I could not have become a Foreign Service officer because under the law and regulations one needed to have been a U.S. citizen for ten years. I had been naturalized in 1953. I came into Washington in 1957. Direct entry into the Foreign Service was not an option for me, so I didn't consider that. But by the time I got to Berlin as an FSR, it was 1963, and this restriction no longer existed in law. Knowing I didn't wish to go back to L - or to law for that matter - I wanted to stick with the Foreign Service. I applied for lateral entry into the Foreign Service officer corps. I thought that being a Foreign Service Reserve officer would make that a little easier. Indeed, during the last inspection we had in Berlin, the inspectors very kindly picked up what had been an application that hadn't been moving forward. When they went back to Washington, it did move forward and I was invited to take the oral. This happened at Embassy Rome. It was conducted by a panel of three, chaired by the then DCM in Rome, Frank Meloy, who as

later assassinated in Lebanon. It was a short trip to Rome. The interview was easy. The results were positive. By the time I went to USNATO, I was an FSO. However, going to NATO didn't happen in the normal assignment process either. In my time as a lawyer for the IO bureau, the assistant secretary at the time was Harlan Cleveland. Since I often attended the IO staff meetings, I had somehow come to his attention. In 1967, Harlan was ambassador at NATO. The NATO organization had just gone through the traumatic experience of having been kicked out of France, which meant that the NATO military headquarters moved away from Fontainebleau to Mons, in Belgium, and the NATO diplomatic establishment moved from Paris to Brussels. In the course of that upheaval, the French action gave rise to a claim for compensation to the other members of the alliance and to the organization for the costs it had to incur in order to be able to make the move. Therefore, there was a process that involved both a NATO claim against France and also a bilateral U.S. claim since there were a lot of U.S. forces involved. Harlan obviously was involved in that issue at a high level, and he needed a lawyer. He knew me because I had performed for him before as a lawyer. So, he was interested in having me join the delegation in Brussels in a legal capacity at least for the purpose of handling such legal issues as would obviously have to be dealt with by him and by the Council in connection with the claim. When I arrived at NATO, Bill Cargo, the DCM, took me aside and asked me whether I knew what Harlan intended to do with me. I had to tell him honestly I wasn't sure. It transpired that the NATO organization had also obtained the services of a lawyer, an American by the name of Peider Kunz, who was born and raised in a little village in eastern Switzerland, but who was an American. I know that some ambassadors on the Council wanted Harlan to assure them that he was not really a CIA employee and I know we gave that assurance. So NATO as an organization had this American lawyer and Harlan had me. In the event, I never did a great deal of legal work. The issues were handled elsewhere and eventually settled.

Q: Did the French ante up or not?

VAN HEUVEN: There was an anteing up. But there were complicated issues involving such concepts as negative residual value. In other words, the French would regain the use of an airstrip that had been used and maintained by American forces. So the demand on our part for compensation for the lack of use of such airstrip was met by a counterclaim for alleged French costs it would take to convert that airstrip back into normal pasture land. I don't recall the sums that eventually were involved, but some money did pass. But to a large degree, these claims and counterclaims in the end offset each other.

Q: What did you end up doing?

VAN HEUVEN: My initial assignment was civil emergency planning. NATO had a lot of committees. Some of them were main committees. Civil Emergency Planning was one of the main committees but it was outside of the mainstream of NATO work. But civil emergency planning was a set of procedures that had been codified into an entire body of existing structures and organizations that had to do with anything from provisioning of energy in terms of crisis, to providing transport in terms of crisis, to taking care of

civilian populations, and calamities of any sort. This big structure of committees was handled under the broad hat of a Civil Emergency Planning Committee on which the representative from Washington, who came from the Office of Civil Emergency Preparedness, filled the U.S. chair at high-level meetings. During normal times that chair was taken by me, sitting in for my ambassador. The ambassador could always take the American seat whenever he wanted to. But there were at the time over 200 committees in NATO and the ambassadors didn't do that. So I operated with a bunch of colleagues, mostly at the second secretary level. Under the chairmanship of an Italian by the name of Devegilia, who was a NATO civil servant, we did our civil emergency planning work. I did this from a position in the political section, which was at the time headed by Ray Garthoff, and later by Ed Streater. I spent a year and a half learning something that was totally new to me but which did involve quite a few committee meetings and a lot of negotiations. At one point, we took the initiative - it was Ed Streater's idea - to organize a symposium. Basically, it was an unstructured meeting at high level to kick a lot of these issues around. I'll just give one more example of what civil emergency planning involved. Our whole CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] alert system was part of a wider NATO system that would have done the same thing for the civilian NATO aircraft in other countries.

Q: The French were in and out of NATO. Were the French in this particular area?

VAN HEUVEN: The French were in the Civil Emergency Planning Committee. The French role was handled by a schoolmasterish but nice civil servant, not from the ministry of foreign affairs, who had the advantage of having been there a long time and the disadvantage of having been there a long time. He also sat on some other committees. He fancied he knew English better than he did. One of my colleagues from DOD, a civilian by the name of Joe Loveland, an enormous guy who was himself married to a very tiny Frenchwoman, amused us one evening when Ruth and I were at dinner at the Lovelands and our French civil servant colleague was there. Joe would affectionately address him as "Old Fart," a word which the Frenchman didn't understand. He thought it was a compliment. Of course, it caused us all sorts of problems in having to keep our faces straight during dinner.

Q: Were there any disasters or things that you had to mobilize for?

VAN HEUVEN: No, but it was all planning for what if. The planning was quite advanced and the structure was a good one, and it still exists today. It involved a whole pipeline system for petroleum in Europe because it would have had to provide for the energy for the tanks and trucks of the armed forces. It involved everything having to do with transportation and taking care of civilians. It did interface with a lot of different parts of the Washington bureaucracy. So it was quite bureaucratic. But it was important because this would have had to function had it become necessary.

I recall one other amusing thing. Occasionally, Washington would provide political input not just in terms of direction but also in terms of people. At one time I found myself

having to deal with the then lieutenant governor of Texas, Ben Barnes, who somehow came over as a senior representative on the meeting of the Civil Emergency Planning Committee. Barnes was full of stories. The one I remember is the description of his mother-in-law as a “bad, long ride on a rainy road.” Barnes later got into ethical difficulties back in Texas. They effectively curtailed his political career.

Q: What role did the Germans play in this? I would imagine that they would be right in the center of everything.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, yes, but so did the French, because the pipelines ran through France and the fighting would be in Germany. In fact, Germany was important. I don't particularly recall the German representative on the committee. But I do recall vividly the British representative, Tony Morgan, who many years later turned out to become the opposite number of my wife in Zurich where he was the British consul general. I also remember the Norwegian, Kris Prebensen, who later became head of administration in the NATO Secretariat, taking the place once occupied by Lord Coleridge. And I remember Marino Devegilia, our chairman, who had all the strengths and weaknesses of the caricature of an Italian. The Germans would have been the beneficiary of a lot of the work of the Civil Emergency Planning but not exclusively, since the assumption was that, if the balloon went up, all of Europe would be affected and all European populations would have to be looked after and that would have to be done by governments.

Q: What was your impression of this segment of the NATO apparatus? I've talked with people who worked with the UN and particularly during an earlier period you had mentioned that at that time after the Cold War the UN officials had to show results but during the Cold War it was better to keep your head down and be a bureaucrat. How did you find the NATO organization?

VAN HEUVEN: The NATO organization was impressive, not because of the building we were in, which is the building they are still in, although there is a decision now to construct something new. It was an advanced temporary building. It was big, with a lot of wings off the main corridor at three levels. We occupied an entire wing at all three levels on the western side. The U.S. delegation for the Military Committee was right across the main corridor, on the other side.

The quality of the NATO staff, many of whom were seconded at senior levels from the national services of the members, was pretty good. NATO was important and countries saw to it that they sent good people to these jobs. So the various assistant secretaries - general were usually top-notch people, as were those working directly for them. I mentioned Lord Coleridge. I should also mention the NATO Secretary General at the time, who was an Italian by the name of Manlio Brosio, a diplomat of consummate skill whom I had a chance to observe a lot, because my role as a notetaker behind Ambassador Cleveland meant that every Wednesday I would be watching Brosio perform as chairman of the NATO Council. He did that with enormous skill. He was an old-fashioned diplomat. No raised voices. He knew his brief, he did his homework, and he managed

wisely to sum up every discussion, so that the creation of the so-called decision sheet, which was in effect the decision of the meeting, would not be too difficult. I don't recall his making any mistake, although I'm sure he made some. It was really wonderful to see such a man in action, and to see the style with which he could manage this very difficult job. Of course, the NATO ambassadors were all prima donnas. They did, however, know their place. NATO never voted. In theory everybody was equal. The reality, however, was that each ambassador knew roughly what his country brought to the table and would tailor his role accordingly. Iceland or Luxembourg, for instance, would not speak on many issues, or if they did, would make their remarks very short. The major countries, on the other hand, were quite different. Occasionally, you would have an exception, but the discipline of the group - and it was quite a tight group; there were 15 ambassadors - usually had a salutary effect on any diplomats with tendencies to be outside of the norm. There was the Dean, Andre DeStaercke, Belgian, a bachelor and a man who never could get over the fact that he had to move from Paris back to his hometown of Brussels because he had a wonderful apartment in the Cinquieme in Paris from which later on he could watch from his windows the student revolt in '68. But DeStaercke also played a role in dealing with this issue of how the NATO Council should use Peider Kunz on the claims issues. I remember accompanying Mr. Kunz to lunch once at DeStaercke's apartment. He was an erudite man. Because he was Dean and because he represented the host country, he could afford to take as much time as he wanted and no one in the Council really ever cut him short.

Q: How did Harlan Cleveland work within the Council?

VAN HEUVEN: Cleveland, in my view, was a prince and was seen as such by his colleagues. He was not a professional diplomat. He was seen as more than that, as an intellectual of extraordinary imagination and drive, and a capacity of turning ideas into concrete action. As a result, he commanded huge influence with his colleagues, who listened very carefully to everything he had to say. Working with Harlan did have occasional downsides, not because it wasn't exciting - it certainly always was - but Harlan was so devoted to his job and so cerebral about all the issues that it never mattered to him which day of the week it was. I recall his calling a staff meeting once for 3:00 p.m. Sunday. Tommy Wilson, his personal choice as political counselor and also a political appointee, said to him, "Harlan, it's going to be Sunday" and Harlan in effect said, "So what?" We did spend a lot of time in the office with Harlan. I mean that literally. The hours at NATO were extremely long. We typically would find ourselves on Saturday mornings saddled with instructions - I'm slightly ahead of myself because this was not in Civil Emergency Planning, but on arms control issues - which Washington would have managed to disgorge late Friday afternoon and which would land in Brussels on our doorstep for execution Saturday morning. Our job was then to turn the cable into an actionable paper and get it around. Of course, we ran into the difficulty that about half of the delegations simply didn't staff on Saturday mornings, which meant that we often had to get ahold of their duty officers, or in some cases just slip the envelope under the door. I think that today they probably have a similar problem because there are five more countries and some of them are thinly staffed and they simply cannot afford to be there all

weekend. It was damned hard work. But it was hard work with really terrific people. I have mentioned Garthoff, who was involved with Ambassador Gerard Smith in the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and then START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) negotiations. I mentioned Ed Streater, who was a powerhouse and also very inventive. Bill Cargo and later, George Vest, were strong DCMs. Harlan had two right-hand men. One was Tommy Wilson, who was the POLAD, a job later held in my time by Larry Eagleburger. Tommy came from the outside. He was an author and a longtime friend of Harlan's. Tim Stanley was the personal representative of the Secretary of Defense. That meant that Tim basically commanded all the folks who were on the U.S. Mission staff from the Pentagon, on the third floor. Tommy handled the political work. Bruno Luzatto, another academic pal of Harlan's from World War II days in Italy, was the economic counselor. It was a tremendously talented team of erudite and worldly people who were quite comfortable in the very important roles that they had and who, by and large, worked very well together, something that is not always the case. There have been times at NATO when I've watched these relationships go pretty sour, but in those days they worked really well.

Q: The secretaries of defense from all these countries, minister and secretaries of defense have semiannual or quarterly meetings.

VAN HEUVEN: Twice a year.

Q: During your time, did this change the dynamics? They're a different breed of cat in a way.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, I remember Secretary Rusk coming for one of the meetings at ministerial level. In those days, we would always begin on a Thursday night with a non-NATO issue, namely, the Berlin group, which was traditionally convened in rotation by the bilateral embassies of the four members of the Berlin group in Brussels. These ambassadors normally had to do only with Belgium, but when the Berlin group met they had to throw a dinner which very often they did not attend themselves. On that occasion when somebody asked Secretary Rusk the next morning how the dinner had been - it had been at the German residence - he said, "Well, they served rabbit and the rabbit is still running around in my stomach." There was, of course, always a tremendous bureaucratic run-up for these defense and foreign ministers meetings because there was the natural drive that they should produce some result. So there was always a premium on coming up with yet another idea. One of those ideas in the Cleveland days was the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, also known as the CCMS, not really directly related to NATO work, but Harlan made it so. The organization followed. We got a new committee called CCMS. I think it's still there. So, by accretion, the organization tended to grow as a result of this habit of periodic meetings. Nothing was ever subtracted. There was the usual frenzy of briefing papers and of course the exchanges with Washington to get all the ducks in a row. The meetings themselves would be the typical high-level visit with all the hassles that went with it. But it became so routine, and it is so routine today, that the admin staff in Brussels, which is actually located mostly in the embassy downtown, is

completely at home dealing with those things. Things become different when the President comes. Then the magnitude of the complexity increases exponentially. But there's been plenty of experience with handling presidents at NATO as well. It just makes for hard admin work. Over time potential problems, like which ambassador gets to shake the President's hand first at the airport, got sorted out. Once the pattern was settled, that was it.

Q: While you were there, were there any civil emergencies or things such as earthquakes, floods, or things of this nature that challenged the organization?

VAN HEUVEN: Not that I recall. There must have been some. I did have to handle an emergency almost within a month after my arrival. It had nothing to do with civil emergency planning but it had to do with the fact that I was duty officer. It had to do with a potential outbreak of Greek-Turkish hostilities in November 1967. There was a very real possibility of war. On the evening of November 25, 1967, at Brussels airport, my job was to come up with 400 gallons of JP4 to fuel an aircraft to get Secretary General Brosio into the theater as soon as possible. The thought being that if he were there it would perhaps prevent war. War didn't break out and his timely arrival may have had something to do with it. Within 24 hours, Washington also provided Cyrus Vance to back up Brosio in the Aegean theater. The rest is history. But I remember being at the airport, not really knowing my way around, and knowing nothing about what JP4 looked like or how much it cost. But I did get it and we got the plane off.

Q: What was your observation of the Greek and Turkish delegations?

VAN HEUVEN: I draw a blank on that. In civil emergency planning they didn't really count, although maybe they should have. They didn't attend all the time. My other year and a half at NATO, I was taken off civil emergency planning and was asked to do arms control work. So I had a very different life. Even in that life I don't remember much about what was a virtually constant standoff. This was long before Turkey occupied Northern Cyprus. Greece was coming out of the colonels' period. Neither country had strong governments. Turkey was still pretty far away in everybody's mind, and simply not regarded as part of Europe. It was a NATO member, to be sure, and it was an important NATO member, but I'm generalizing now. The specific answer to your question is that I had no direct experience with either of them.

Q: How were the Soviets viewed by the NATO members? Were they going to do something? Had we learned to live with it?

VAN HEUVEN: The Soviet Union was what NATO was all about. That was clear. By the time I got there, it had already been four years since the assassination of Kennedy and longer since his American University speech in which he held out the prospect of a better relationship with Moscow. Consequently, the mood was different from the mood that I recall from my time earlier at the General Assembly, where the Russians were always vetoing, and there was really no common ground that we had with them at all, and in

Berlin. That is not to say that anybody felt sanguine about the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet threat, the threat of mass destruction, the threat of nuclear weapons, but also very much the threat caused by the huge conventional preponderance of the Soviet forces that absolutely riveted the attention of the NATO countries. Everything that was done was related to that. During my time at NATO, there was an attempt to beef up the individual military efforts of the NATO countries. It was the first of a number of such American initiatives over time to increase national defense budgets. The Mansfield Amendment was out there as a constant reminder that, if the Europeans didn't pull up their socks, the Americans might not necessarily stay. There was a lot of talk about burdensharing. At that time, NATO also was addressing nuclear defense. But by the time I got to do arms control, the doctrine of flexible response was in place. Member countries were becoming used - or reconciled - to the new doctrine, and became gradually more comfortable with the new NATO strategy. My occasional visits to SHAPE certainly reinforced the impression that this was about balance of power, that this was about readiness, that this was about a major political threat to the European continent and to the United States because of the nature of the Soviet weapons. There was a great feeling of solidarity within the Council, created not just by the common enemy but also by being together in one building for long, long hours on all these strategic and operational issues. Even though you might be hassling about individual details, being together and going through the same grinder produced very strong friendships. France was always a little bit on the sidelines of these things, not because it viewed Moscow differently but because the French were in an ambivalent situation. They were part of the political NATO but not part of the military NATO. So they were not part of the Defense Planning Committee but they sat on the Council. So they were either half in or half out. But everybody else was fully aboard and lived with that situation. Neither Harlan Cleveland nor his successor, Bob Ellsworth, worried overly about the French. Another PremRep, Will Taft, did years later. He made it his mission to see if he could really work with his French counterpart. But in the late sixties, most delegations had absorbed the shock of the move from Paris to Brussels.

Q: Speaking of the French, during May-June of '68, there was a lot of unrest in France, student revolt and all that. DeGaulle made a very famous visit to the troops stationed in Germany. Did that have any repercussions within NATO?

VAN HEUVEN: Not directly, although everybody in Brussels, certainly those who had just moved from Paris, were fascinated by this popular explosion on the streets of Paris that seemed to have taken its cue from Berkeley, but had domestic roots. The French traditionally like to go to the streets whenever they feel strongly about something. French society in those days was still sufficiently inflexible so that the young people could feel that their only way out was to hit the streets and build barricades in the old tradition. But it was also a more basic challenge to the constitutional order of France at that time. Indeed it was the harbinger of the end of the Fourth Republic and the coming of the Fifth Republic. It made it easier for DeGaulle to institute the Fifth Republic. But the event as such did not produce direct political effects on other countries. There had already been in Berlin - and I had witnesses that in 1966-67 - a very vocal student presence around the Universitat. The students liked to demonstrate and some of these demonstrations turned

violent. In one case after the visit of the Shah of Iran, a student by the name of Benny Ohnesorg was killed during a demonstration. For about 24 hours, Berlin was on the edge of serious instability. So, street riots were already a feature of Europe at the time and '68 in Paris was not anything new. It certainly was not an issue that the Council discussed in Brussels. But at NATO one could hardly not be aware of it.

Q: Was Vietnam a burr under our saddle while you were there?

VAN HEUVEN: It was one of these things that everybody knew about. Everybody had views about it. And the governments of NATO had strong views about it. It was not on the agenda. That is not to say that there was no discussion of Vietnam in the Council. I'm pretty sure there was because the conflict went on a long time and it was part of the established NATO meeting habit to have various committees deal with various issues affecting almost anything in the world. So we had at least yearly meetings of East European experts and of African experts and of Near Eastern experts. These meetings would bring deputy assistant secretary-level officials from capitals for a couple of days to talk together. Southeast Asia experts must have had their go at it as well. After the meetings of foreign ministers, there would have been a paragraph about Vietnam in it. But it was not an action item for the NATO Council. There was simply no question about NATO being involved. This was not in the NATO area and it was the other side of the world. There was little point in dwelling too much on an issue that was at the root of such disagreement, because it would be at the cost of disagreeing on European issues. So that was not done.

Q: When did you arrive in NATO?

VAN HEUVEN: I arrived the day the organization opened shop in Brussels. We entered the building through muddy fields. When we left that day, Belgian workmen had covered these areas with squares of grass.

Q: What month was that of '67?

VAN HEUVEN: In the early fall, in September 1967.

Q: So the Six Day War in Israel had been over. So that wasn't a factor? All these wars have a repercussion of NATO supplies and that sort of thing.

VAN HEUVEN: Again I have to plead ignorance on that also, because of the sort of stuff that I had to do right away.

Q: And I imagine the issue had worked itself out.

VAN HEUVEN: You have to understand the delegation that Harlan and, later, Bob Ellsworth presided over consisted of three floors of people, It became even bigger later on. And then across the main corridor, there was a four-star general with the U.S.

delegation to the Military Committee. There were no large staff meetings the way other embassies have staff meetings. There were lots of meetings all the time, but it was always the ambassador and the DCM or the defense adviser or the political adviser with a few and that's how the work got done. You would see what was happening if you followed the cable traffic, which was voluminous. For one thing, NATO cables went to American embassies at all NATO capitals. And much of the traffic wasn't particularly restricted within the delegation unless it was EXDIS or NODIS. So if you just read your in-box in the morning you would be up to date on what the other parts of your very large group was up to. But that didn't mean that you were in on the discussions or necessarily knew much about the substance. NATO had over 200 committees. They were at different levels of expertise. The detail was staggering. So, if you were a generalist, it was impossible to keep track of that and there was no time to do it anyway. You had to do your own homework. But this absence of large staff meetings certainly meant that the delegation was a little stovepiped. There was also not as much contact as you might imagine across that corridor separating the ambassador from the U.S. Milrep. The U.S. Milrep took his instructions from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The ambassador took his instructions from State. The Defense adviser took his instructions from the Secretary of Defense. There was an interesting protocolary point. The Defense adviser being the personal rep of the Secretary of Defense outranked every military person in Europe and was entitled to his own aircraft, which the ambassador was not. When we came to Brussels, one of the odd jobs that I was asked to do was to do the protocol list. We had Foreign Service officers, uniformed military, DOD civilians, and a few others as well. All of them had different pay scales and rank scales and got promoted at different times. No matter how you drew up your list on January 1, by February 1 it would be OBE, because one group had gone through the promotion cycle and the other one had not. Consequently, the list was a moving target. The interesting question for me came at the top. Obviously, the ambassador headed the list. Bill Cargo, the DCM, was two. But who was three? Was it going to be Tim Stanley, the DEFAD, or was it going to be Tommy Wilson, the POLAD? Well, the pay they drew happened to be identical. And the arrival at post was the same day. The traditional tests to rank-order didn't work. And there was no good index by which you could say, "Well, Tim goes first" or "Tommy goes first." So, I did the whole list, about five or six pages, single-spaced, because we had a lot of personnel, and left that one with a big question mark and sent it up to Harlan with a memo that he ought to decide it on the basis of looks. Shortly thereafter, someone else took over responsibility for the USNATO protocol list.

Q: Halfway through you moved over to arms control.

VAN HEUVEN: I did.

Q: What was the status of arms control when you arrived on that scene?

VAN HEUVEN: The U.S. was just beginning a long discussion with the Soviets on arms control. It was then called SALT. Gerard Smith was the U.S. rep. The negotiations were in different places but eventually there was a pattern where most of it happened in

Helsinki. It was staffed by a complex delegation representing State, DOD, the Joint Chiefs, the White House, and people from Energy. Since what was at stake were nuclear weapons, each of these demands of the delegation had individual channels back to their principals in Washington, not an unusual pattern for large and sensitive undertakings of this sort. Ray Garthoff, my immediate boss, became the exec of that delegation. He came from State. His druthers were strongly in favor of the route that SALT eventually took toward START and agreed reductions by treaty. There were also bodies of opinion in Washington that were opposed to this whole idea. And so it was a tough and pretty contentious field to be working in. The big problems were generally your own people, not so much the Soviets. For the first few years the discussions did not much more than establish a basic common vocabulary between the Soviets and the Americans. This was necessary because there had never been such a discussion, nor was there a vocabulary with commonly understood terms. Each bureaucracy had produced its own thinking about nuclear weapons and its nomenclature. It was necessary to start merging these terms so that when you used a term everybody would understand what was meant by it. This became a highly esoteric exercise. In the end it was also of course a political thing. It meant a major step toward working things out with the Soviets even though they were still regarded as our enemy number one. I was the junior man on the totem pole in the group of three at NATO who worked these issues. It meant that I carried Smith's briefcase when he came to brief the Council. I once crossed the Atlantic in military aircraft sent to pick him up in Brussels. In due course we established a pattern of briefings to keep our allies in NATO informed of these discussions. The reward for that effort always came in the form of the NATO communique at the meeting of the foreign ministers, when there would be a paragraph about these negotiations. You can go back to the NATO communiqués and, if you string them together, you can get a picture of how these talks were going. At the same time, we were negotiating in Geneva in the so-called CCD, the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament, which at that time I think was an 18-country body, on a number of other issues. One was CW [chemical warfare]. Another was biological warfare. Still another was nuclear test ban. There were other subjects like cutoff of the production of fissile materials, but no treaty ever came out of that. But the kernel for later treaties were already there, and there was activity. Not all NATO countries were involved in the CCD, but representatives from allied countries at the CCD would come to Brussels and brief the NATO Council. And the NATO Council would also express views other than talks in the communiqués. The process worked in terms of getting the whole West used to the notion that the way to deal with these issues was through negotiation and treaties. That indeed was what was going on. It meant that I had to pay a great deal of attention to the cable traffic from all capitals on these issues. I had to read through the extremely lengthy reports of all the sessions in Geneva and be familiar with them. And it meant that I became part of a coterie of diplomatic colleagues on other delegations whose job was identical to mine. So I became part of a new fraternity - totally different from the civil emergency planning fraternity - and one that was very busy with major issues between East and West.

Q: You were there at pretty much the beginning of this whole process. Was there a feeling that something was going to happen? Did you feel that this was a political maneuver to

keep talking while the old standoff continued

VAN HEUVEN: Pretty much the former and not the latter. I think those of us at NATO who were involved in it, right up to the ambassador Harlan Cleveland and, later, Ambassador Bob Ellsworth, who succeeded Harlan when Nixon became president - felt that this was the future. This was the way to go. We could deal with these issues in this way. We were not yet at the point at which we arrived many years later, and are in a way still now, at which people say agreements aren't worth the paper they're written on, that you can't verify them anyway, so what's the use? We operated with a sophisticated sense that verification would not always be foolproof. In fact, it was usually one of the last things we discussed when the treaty started taking form. But to get the basic principles down in treaty form and blessed by the United Nations was a long step forward toward setting rules that provided a yardstick for behavior by major nuclear weapons states and other states. That was regarded as a good thing, just as earlier my experience with human rights had been that converting the Declaration of Human Rights into treaty form didn't mean that people would all of a sudden stop torturing or stop misbehaving, but at least there would be a global standard that conduct could be measured against and a statement of what that conduct ought to be. That was a basic philosophy behind arms control. On a narrower but strategic level, the discussion with the Russians on nuclear weapons was thought to be a promising way to mitigating the danger of nuclear war.

Q: How did you find the Soviet delegation to these talks?

VAN HEUVEN: I was not at Helsinki and I was not in Geneva and there were no Russians at NATO, so I can't answer that question.

Q: Speaking of Soviets, you were with NATO in August of '68 when the Warsaw Pact moved in on Czechoslovakia. Did that send shockwaves into NATO?

VAN HEUVEN: It certainly did. It happened in the summer, in August, the way all European crises seem to happen in Europe in summer. We had been conducting a simulation exercise in the Situation Center with those of the staff who were not on holiday. Then this event occurred. I remember Harlan sending a cable - Harlan was at post - referring to the fact that the NATO ambassadors were on the beaches. Then for about a day and a half, we ran the exercise in the mornings and the real thing in the afternoon. Then we dropped the exercise and concentrated on the real thing. It was a traumatic event. It required strong U.S. leadership, which Washington provided and was executed masterfully by Cleveland with his colleagues. Those of us who watched it had a sense - was at that point still in Emergency Planning, but obviously I could watch - that here was somebody running the show at NATO who knew how to do it with a sense of confidence. On the other hand, it raised the old question that had been around ever since John Foster Dulles, namely, at what point does the West do something about these horrible situations that are within reach? The answer was nothing, but to express this outrage and take care of the refugees.

Q: The last time was '56 in Hungary.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes, and so it was in '68 in the Czech Republic. It reinforced the sense that the Soviets were a dictatorship. I don't recall any real discussion about "Let's go out and send NATO troops."

Q: Did this change the thinking at all in that maybe the Soviets... Was this considered a Soviet defensive thing or were the Soviets considered more of an offensive threat after that?

VAN HEUVEN: At NATO, the Soviets were always regarded as a potentially offensive threat. The whole strategy of NATO was built on concepts of defense, of absorbing the first shocks as much as possible, although it was realized that much of western Germany would be overrun at first. It would be the task of the Fifth CAV and the other army units to slow the Soviets down until the West could marshal a response. This is where nuclear weapons were a major part of the equation, because the Soviet conventional preponderance was enormous and the balance came from the fact that there was an American guarantee - backed by nuclear weapons - that was meant to keep this conventional preponderance in check. In conventional weapons, there was simply no question that the Soviets were preponderant. NATO really didn't have enough conventional forces nor territory to fall back upon. Even if you counted the Turkish forces, which were numerous but ill-equipped and not in the right place, the target would be Germany and Berlin. In that sense the good thing was that Berlin being a target would automatically trigger a serious American response. In retrospect, one might argue that perhaps that balance assured stability of sorts and peace in Europe for all those years.

Q: When you left NATO in '70, what was your impression of whether the SALT/START-type negotiations were going?

VAN HEUVEN: I became progressively more detached from them as I got more involved at NATO in the Geneva issues. But I think the widespread assumption in capitals and at NATO was that they were on track, although it was by no means clear what they would lead to in the end. This went very slowly. In a way, the agreement which the Senate approved just yesterday, March 6, 2003, is in line of direct succession to what was started way back then by Gerry Smith in the '60s, namely, an agreement with the Russians governing the size of the stockpiles and their use. A lot of things have changed, but SALT, and then START I and START II, was seen by the arms control community as the most promising way to deal with this issue among the superpowers. Today, it seems that, with the new thinking, all of these assumptions are being questioned again and have lost some of the certainty that surrounded them for so many years.

Q: Shall we move on to 1970?

VAN HEUVEN: I was transferred from Brussels because Jim Leonard, our ambassador to the CCD in Geneva and with whom I had been dealing, had tried to peel me away from

USNATO. I resisted that and the Department was not particularly anxious to move me. The NATO delegation didn't want to lose me because my departure would have triggered the immediate problems of replacing me off-cycle. So in the first instance that effort failed. But Jim Leonard doesn't give up easily; In the summer of '70, he got the bureaucracy to decide that I ought to be moved to ACDA. So Ruth and I left a year before we thought we would be leaving and went back to Washington, where I came back as an FSO on loan to another organization, namely, ACDA, although it was located in the old State Department building. I became part of an office, headed by Jim Leonard. The office had two branches. One dealt with the CCD in Geneva. The other dealt with the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations in Vienna. The MBFR office included a young officer by the name of David Aaron, who is still around in a much different capacity. I was part of the CCD branch. It was the more active part. We were backstopping the Geneva delegation at their two annual long sessions in Geneva (one in the spring and one in the summer). These sessions would last for about three months. Then the delegation would return home. We would take our leaves in August, and then all the CCD delegations would head for New York, where the CCD work was on the agenda of the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. We would spend 6-8 weeks in New York. So it was a fairly peripatetic life for somebody based in Washington. And I became part of that merry-go-round. We divided up the office so that half of us would go to Geneva for one session and the other half would stay home. Then for the other session, we reversed roles. The only one who went all the time was Jim Leonard, the ambassador. His deputy in Geneva was either Pete Day in the spring or Alan Neidle in the summer. Neidle was head of the branch that I was a part of. There were about five or six of us. Half of us went with Day, and the other half with Neidle. It was a very different kettle of fish from NATO. First of all, we were Washington-based. I don't have to explain to an FSO the difference between being overseas and being in Washington. Our life at NATO was totally dedicated to the job 24 hours a day seven days a week. We were on call all the time, and in meetings much of the time. Our families were part of the active social round that went with it. Washington duty, in contrast, provided a dichotomy between work and home. The only problem with Leonard, Day, and Neidle was that they equated their notion of solid work with long hours in the office. It was the habit of Jim, and particularly Alan Neidle not to recognize weekends too much, although Sundays typically we were not in. But you would not want to be caught not coming in for a good bit of time on Saturdays. That would have been all right if there had been stuff to be done. But the style of Alan - and I'm dwelling on it because it illustrates a larger point - was that he liked endless discussions, and he liked to start them around 6:00 pm. For those with small children, that was not a good time. But we had no way of escaping. So getting home at 9:00 was the rule, and it was not appreciated often. I mention that because it was still possible in those days to exercise a sort of a style of leadership which in today's Foreign Service would not be sustainable. This is probably one of the better things about the new Foreign Service. Eventually, I learned that if you put your foot down you could get your way on the issue of office hours. I should have learned it even earlier. Anyway, it was a good lesson to remember not to ever do that to your own people. That said, the company of Jim Leonard and Pete Day and Neidle was extraordinarily stimulating because they were exceptionally experienced, thoughtful, and

brainy. Alan was different from the others. The other two were FSOs. Jim had been the man who had come up with a solution to the capture by the North Koreans of the American spy ship. Later on, he became the deputy to the Egyptian-Israeli peace effort. Pete Day, later on, was Consul General in Jerusalem. I knew him from my Berlin days, where he had been head of the political section. They were accomplished FSOs. Neidle was an arms control expert and buff. So, it was a solid crowd. We were backed up in Geneva by other people who were good. Our delegation even had the old problem that different people had different channels back to Washington. The JCS representative was therefore not really under Jim's control; neither was the DOD representative. The Agency had their own people. One of the junior officers was John Negroponete, now U.S. PermRep in New York. So the work in Washington was a grind. Geneva was also a grind, but of a very different sort. The CCD would meet only twice in the week, Tuesdays and Thursdays.

Q: This was meeting with the Soviets?

VAN HEUVEN: No, meeting with the 18 countries of the CCD. This was not bilateral. These were morning sessions. They would last for 2-3 hours. They consisted of speeches which were basically long expositions of policy but often with people holding their cards. Many didn't really move the negotiations further. The drivers of the process were typically the Russians and the Americans, although on occasion Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden or the Mexicans, Robledo or Jorge Castaneda, father of the man who recently resigned as foreign minister, who would play a major role. But basically we had the goods because we had the expertise. The British were always strong, too. Other countries, elected to the CCD by the General Assembly just because of the luck of the draw or regional rotation, had little to contribute to these fairly complex issues of arms control. Typically, we'd go to the Palais on Tuesday and Thursday and mill around for about 45 minutes just to get the scuttlebutt. It was just an elaborate dance of queen bees around each other. Then you'd sit down for the long speeches and you'd take notes. Then you'd spend all afternoon doing the reporting cables which were of Kissingerian proportions in the sense that the habit was to report in immense detail. The frustrating thing was that the officer who was always the editor was an FSO who had got stuck in that position and had done it for a long time. Walter Givan had been an English professor at one time in his life. He felt that whatever drafts we gave him needed to be entirely rewritten. Then we would get it back around 6:00 p.m. or later. So, Tuesdays and Thursdays, dinner was always late. After a while, we reporting officers knew that whatever we did, and no matter how well we did, Walter would redo the draft his way and then kick it back. The motivation to do a really good job the first time around evaporated because it really didn't matter what we put down because we knew it was going to be changed. Thinking back in my later jobs to that type of reporting, it was pretty pointless to do it that way. Obviously, there were other cables that Jim or Pete or Alan would send that would take one little- (end of tape)

So there were ways in which the delegation could speak to Washington meaningfully in more typical shorter messages. But the extensive style of basic reporting, which I saw replicated later by Jock Dean out of Vienna on MBFR, and also by the Kissinger staff,

which also was required to do virtually verbatim reporting, produced unmanageable stuff for the consumer. I suppose the only thing that could be said for it was that it would all be there and that no one in Washington could take offense that emphasis had been given to something at the expense of something else. But for the months that I was back here and had to read through that stuff, I can't say that it really taught me much. It didn't really advance anything, my understanding least of all. And so I found the whole thing a fairly wasteful-

Q: What were these speeches about? Were these just to get things off people's chests?

VAN HEUVEN: Let's take the BW Convention as an example. The first round, which might take an entire session of three months, might go no further than people recounting historical tales about the possible use of BW, usually referring to the parallel with CW which, of course, had been used in the first world war. These speeches were basically moodsetters. Of course, it wouldn't lead to anything, because there was no draft on the table. But the mood was set. Then, maybe the next year, the delegations would return to Geneva with instructions that would instruct us to explore the possibility of a text. That might take another three months of very carefully feeling each other out. At that point, the nature of the speeches would change somewhat. And then, when a draft text finally appeared, the speeches would focus immediately on that text. The BW Convention had to do with defining what these weapons were, defining the prohibition, and defining monitoring, if not verification, systems. We would go through endless possible permutations of a text. The human mind being inventive, it was extraordinary what some of the delegations would want to add or come up with. Ultimately, as in the negotiations that I had gone through on human rights treaties, when it came to writing arms control treaties, every country's main interest was to ensure that the text would not adversely affect anything that country either had done, was doing, might want to do in the future or, better yet, justify what they might want to do in the future. There were hidden motives galore. A class of schoolchildren might see the CCD as a straightforward exercise saying, "Let's get rid of BW and let's write a treaty to prohibit it and let's go home and be happy." This was hardly the way it worked in the real world. It was sensitive. National security was at stake. I recall one occasion when I was back in Washington. We had completed the BW Convention in Geneva. We needed one more signature from Henry Kissinger himself. He was still in the White House. I sat around for three weeks every night waiting for the phone call saying that Henry had signed off on the approval cable. The paperwork was in his in-box and it was emerging to the top of his in-box. For three weeks, that call never came. For three weeks, everybody in Geneva was treading water. The United States had not actually said, "Yes" and we couldn't say "Yes" because we hadn't got a Washington position cleared. The Russians had the same problem getting their stuff cleared in Moscow. It was a snail's pace affair. The nature of the speeches therefore would go in all directions. Some of them were extraordinarily boring. Some of them were extraordinarily interesting. Some of them were highly technical, and above my capacity to understand precursors, and agents, and a combination of agents, and what they could do, and how you could measure the effect and what the lethality would be, and so forth and so on. The BW treaty was noteworthy in retrospect because it did not have a

verification set of provisions at the end and that was regarded by later administrations and political critics as failure. The CW Convention had more robust verification measures built into it.

Q: Why would there be a difference?

VAN HEUVEN: Because there are differences between cows and horses. They were different things.

Q: I was just wondering about verification. You would think if you had robust verification procedures in one, you would have robust verification procedures in the other.

VAN HEUVEN: Verification had to do with where inspectors might have to go, which industries had to open up, whether government would agree that certain industries might be opened up, or what parts of its territory might want to be opened for inspection. The Russians were unwilling to allow access for verification purposes to those areas where they had their BW program. Of course, our aim was to do so. So there would be an elaborate fencing match on just how to word the treaty. You could achieve only what was the minimum common denominator, what 18 countries would be willing to sign on to.

Q: Did you find that there were strong elements in the American defense industry, the Pentagon, of saying, "Hell, no, we're not going to let somebody go into our areas?"

VAN HEUVEN: As with START and SALT, some of the most difficult negotiations were in-house. Later on, after Paul Nitze's Walk in the Woods episode, Nitze's challenge was not his Soviet opposite number - although he eventually walked out - but it was the Washington bureaucracy. This was not a field in which you had a lot of do-gooders and high motivations and everything was easy. These issues were handled by people who were extraordinarily conscious of not doing anything would inhibit them or would be politically possible. If you multiplied that by the number of countries that would eventually have to approve, it was a miracle that we did get a CW treaty and the BW Convention not only through the CCD in Geneva, but through the General Assembly of the UN in New York later on.

Q: I would think that this would be something that... How did this fit your personality? "Let's get on with this. This is screwing up my family life and everything else." I am not talking about just you, but the others.

VAN HEUVEN: That element was certainly part of all of those who were involved in the CCD. I'm sure it was also part of all of those involved in those years of START and SALT. In arms control, the system produced its experts. They got not only so hooked on the subject but also became so indispensable that they ended up spending the rest of their lives doing that subject in some form or another. The pattern of their professional lives meant that they were living apart from their families for months on end most of the year. This has all sorts of side effects. Some people could handle that easily. But I did see some

marrriages go on the rocks. I did see cases of misbehavior of the sort you see on an oceanliner. The minute the boat throws off the hawsers, everybody gets drunk and misbehaves. The minute they get to shore, everybody resumes behaving. The arms control world had an element of this. The attraction to me was Geneva. I loved that city and I felt much at home. I had been there for Law of the Sea and here L was again, for months on end. We lived in hotels. If we could rent rooms somewhere that's what we did, or we doubled up. Sometimes you could escape into the mountains. New York in the fall was always exciting. The atmosphere of the General Assembly in the First Committee was heady. Occasionally, in the evening, you could see something of New York. On the other hand, families were in Washington - and there wasn't enough time on the weekends to go home very often. And when we were in Geneva we couldn't go home. Occasionally, wives or couples without children would come over and join. In the MBFR case, ultimately the United States decided that we would assign families to Vienna. For the CCD, that was always an issue. We never did it. Other countries, such as the British,, did. The U.S. ambassador to the CCD was Washington-based. The British ambassador had a house in Geneva. This made more sense, because he was there 7-8 months of the year anyway. We didn't do that. We could have done that differently. SALT was in Helsinki. MBFR was in Vienna. CSCE, later on, convened in many places. People did take long-term leases. These were not 9:00 to 5:00 jobs. They absorbed your whole existence in a way that was sometimes hard to explain to anybody who was not a part of it.

Q: You were working with ACDA. You went there in '70. How long did you do this?

VAN HEUVEN: I spent two years in ACDA. Then the question was, where can I go next? Because of the way I came into the Service, I did not have the recognition quotient in any particular bureau except the IO Bureau. I didn't want to stay in ACDA. But what to do next? What happened was that John Baker, an East European hand, was director for Eastern Europe. My wife had worked with John in Rome. She mentioned my availability to him. He needed a Romanian desk officer, and he took me sight unseen. So I found myself paneled to become the Romanian and Albanian desk officer in EUR in the summer of 1972.

Q: This is a good place to stop.

Today is March 11, 2003. You were doing Romania and Albania from '73 to when?

VAN HEUVEN: For two years, '73 and '74.

Q: What were relations with Albania and what were our concerns with Albania during this period?

VAN HEUVEN: The answer is very simple. We had no relations with Albania. We hadn't had relations since 1945. Of course, there had been no effective relations even

earlier, during World War II. But it was a country that was aligned mostly with communist China. It was an outcast in the European Communist bloc. It was a closed country. There was very little news coming out of it. There were few people going into it, certainly not Americans. There was an Albanian diaspora in the United States in Brooklyn and in Worcester, Mass., and somewhere in the middle west as well, but they didn't constitute any significant presence in domestic political terms. There was nobody on the Hill of Albanian extraction, nor was there any particular interest in Albania in Congress.

Q: All this is terribly important in the American context of things. All you need is one congressperson or chief of staff in an important committee who's got an Albanian connection and you've got a policy.

VAN HEUVEN: We did have the occasional appearance in Washington of the son of King Zog, a gentleman of enormous length and stature named Leka. I think his nationality was Australian. He had some property here in Virginia and from time to time he appeared and sought recognition on the Hill, without much success. I never met him and he was never a factor in our relationship with Albania.

Q: Was there any talk during your time about opening relations with Albania? We hadn't had relations with China and all of a sudden this was a period we were beginning to start to do that.

VAN HEUVEN: It was generally recognized that any opening to Eastern Europe was far off, and that in that process Albania would be at the bottom of the list. The country had no strategic significance for us, except perhaps as a political outpost for Chinese communism in contradistinction to Soviet communism. In that sense, it was of interest to us, since Albania was a thorn in the Soviet communist side. That is about as far as it went. I did address the issue of relations with Albania in an article I wrote at the time. It got approved for publication. It was a minor thing. It was a speculative piece, making the point that resumption of relations would be a slow process. But there was no basis for believing that this was going to happen anytime soon.

Q: Let's go to Romania. This was really your work, wasn't it?

VAN HEUVEN: Romania was really my work. It was a full-time job. Desk officers catch all sorts of stray cats and dogs, so they're never lost for things to do. Romania was clearly in the lower tier of those countries that the European Bureau was looking after. For me it was a complete change of pace. I had been in high pressure, high visibility posts as a junior officer. Here I was basically in charge of a very minor slice of the pie. It just gave me a different role. Compared to the two immediately preceding years in ACDA, working conditions were much better, because at least they were sort of 8:30 to 5:30 and not on the weekends. I was at that point 30 years old and this job gave me my first experience in bilateral diplomacy. So a whole lot of things were new to me. For instance, the role of the care and feeding of the needs of the post, which would extend from personnel matters to

matters having to do with guidance and policy. A lot of them were pretty pedestrian issues, the typical management of how to keep a post going in a difficult climate overseas. Given the communications and unlike the posts I had been used to, where we did everything by cable, the guts of my office's exchanges with Embassy Bucharest consisted of an exchange by letters via pouch, which I would produce every Friday and which the DCM, my opposite number at the embassy, would produce every Thursday. And so each week there was mail crossing in the pouch. That kept me and the post apprized as to what was going on and what we did. Looking back it was a strange way of operating. Today, this would all be done by cable traffic or classified e-mail. But we were still relying very much on the pouch in those days.

Q: When you arrived on the desk, what were you getting from your colleagues of how we looked upon Ceausescu?

VAN HEUVEN: That was a subject that did not take a long time getting used to. There were two things about Ceausescu. One was that he was a dictator of a particularly unpleasant and virulent kind. The other was that he had been kind to Richard Nixon when Nixon had been out of office. Consequently, as president Nixon had residual good feelings away from the fact that he had been treated well by Ceausescu during his years in the political wilderness. So there was a paradox. My two visits to the post certainly underlined the first of these two observations. I saw a very repressive regime in action, this time not an East German one but in a way an even nastier one. At least it wasn't directly dependent on Moscow. It was something of its own and it was a pity to see a country with rich cultural history and an elegant language, and made up of interesting and nice people, suppressed by a person of the type of Ceausescu. But we did deal with Ceausescu. In fact, Ceausescu came to the United States on a state visit during my time on the desk. All the stops were pulled out. He was in fact the last state visitor to the Nixon White House. I remember the sunny day, the band on the lawn of the White House. As the desk officer, Ruth and I were at the tail end of the receiving line. I still have a picture of that. Both Ceausescus were there. After the visit, we had lots of stories to tell about how difficult the retinue were that the Ceausescus brought along, and how paranoid they were about themselves and their security. They were also socially ill at ease and maladroit. The Nixons also looked uncomfortable. So, it was an interesting sight to see those four on the White House lawn, not knowing how to deal with one another in a nice way. It was really like a stage set of Japanese puppets.

Q: I've heard that the Ceausescus were not a fun couple to entertain for those who were trying to make their visit a pleasant one.

VAN HEUVEN: She was a pill and he was something slightly less than a pill. There were no smiles, no laughs. It was all seriousness. Of course, in that environment they were on strange territory and would have been ill at ease even under normal circumstances. But they were not fun. Some of the other Romanians I dealt with were of a different sort. The Romanian ambassador in Washington, Corneliu Bogdan, was a wise and considerate diplomat. He was one of the few Jews in the Romanian service. After the turn of events in

Europe, he played a major role, but only very briefly because he had a heart attack and died. This was a pity for his country and for him. Some of the embassy personnel were cultivated, I had good relations with them, and I saw them fairly regularly. I discovered later that one of them had already been turned by my colleagues in the Agency, eventually received political asylum, and disappeared into the woodwork of American society.

That said, Romania posed problems for us. They targeted our people, sometimes successfully. The Romanian security services were excellent. We had difficulties in that respect. The methods were the traditional ones, basically operating with knowledge of personal behavior that could lead to-

Q: Compromising pictures?

VAN HEUVEN: Those were compromising conversations, pictures, other situations. We had to be very careful. On my first visit there, I was put up in a hotel. Within half an hour they changed my room. Then, the embassy decided that I'd better go and stay with the DCM. So it was just like East Germany. I knew I was being bugged, being watched. I took a trip with John Baker and Jonathan Rickert, our control officer, through Romania, visiting the German-speaking part of the country. I was surprised and pleased to find that German was the predominant language in some areas. Many left before the events of 1990 and managed to emigrate back to Germany. Still there is a good German residue in Romania, a Lutheran German minority. It is a beautiful country. It was very poor. And very poorly run.

Q: Were we looking at the country as being itself poor? Romania had oil, not a lot, but solid oil. It had what must have been terribly fertile country at the mouth of the Danube and the delta and all that. Or maybe it wasn't as rich as it would seem.

VAN HEUVEN: It wasn't as rich as it would seem. The oil was there and it was a source of income. The facilities, however, were antiquated and the industry was in bad shape. I don't recall the agricultural situation except that there was no hunger. This suggested to me that the Romanians produced enough to feed themselves. But the Securitate was everywhere and it was a society that was deathly afraid of their neighbors, or anyone else. There were many informers. The penalties for being caught as a nonconformist were severe. They would not get shot, but life could be made very unpleasant if you did not conform.

Q: Were there some of these social things that one heard about later on, about promoting children, the production of children without really taking care of them and social engineering? Or did that come later?

VAN HEUVEN: We found out about that later. At the time, we didn't really know about that simply because we didn't have that sort of access. None of the western diplomats in Romania did. The embassies did a lot of talking to each other. There was one diplomatic club, where everybody went for entertainment - tennis, swimming. You needed

permission to go on a trip. There was tight control over what the foreign diplomatic establishment could do, observe, and help with.

I ought to mention Harry Barnes. My time on the desk spanned two ambassadors. One was Leonard Meeker, for whom I worked before in L. At that time he was assistant legal adviser. He became deputy legal adviser and eventually Legal Adviser. Following that, he became ambassador to Romania. On my first visit, he and his wife, Beverley, were in residence in Bucharest. I remember the visit because, ahead of their times, Beverley had put up “no smoking” signs in the residence. This was a shocking thing, because every Romanian smoked. A lot of the Westerners did, too. But she was an environmentally conscious person and insisted on her way. Barnes was an activist ambassador. I went through getting him prepped in Washington before he went out, and got a measure of him. A marvelous man full of energy, imagination, and boundless ideas. It turned out that he was so good at reaching out to Romanians - the few that he could reach out to in his time as chief of mission - that when the time came for him to leave, the reaction of the people he had befriended was one of bitter disappointment. Here was a case of an ambassador who, in a way, had overdone it, leaving impressions and creating hopes that he could not possibly fulfill. He did what came naturally to him, but it came at a price of the feelings of a lot of his Romanian friends who saw in him the promise of a better future which at the time did not materialize.

Q: Romania was touted as being sort of like Yugoslavia. Were we able to use Romania in reaching the Eastern bloc, the eastern communist world?

VAN HEUVEN: If the president or then Secretary of State Kissinger had any grand designs among these lines, they were carefully hidden from the desk officer. I did have to bear in mind that the president had a soft spot for Ceausescu and therefore for Romania. That was what permitted the state visit to go forward, even though it seemed rather incongruous at the time. Romania, however, saw itself as a broker on a number of global issues. Perhaps its imagination as to what it might do exceeded its actual ability to do so. But it was not unusual to come upon Romanian diplomatic activity, whether in arms control, in East-West relations, or in relations with China. This made Romania interesting to watch. At the time, we had to assess how much was smoke and how much was fire and whether this would be useful to us, or not useful to us. So Romania was not a passive country. The Romanians stirred themselves without having behind them an entire nonaligned movement, as did Yugoslavia. They played a role in the nonaligned movement, but not a leadership role. They carved out their role as an individual country. This reflected Ceausescu's vision of himself and of his country in Europe and in the world. In my opinion, this vision never really amounted to much. In retrospect, I don't think that there is much left of any Romanian footprints on the course of history of those years. But for me it did mean following the cable traffic carefully, because you never know. Some report from somewhere in the world might come in indicating that the Romanians were up to something. In that sense, it was an interesting assignment.

Q: I would think that with Romania meddling in the policies of the big boys and thinking

that it was a much greater player than not, you as a desk officer would find yourself... You had to run around and clear things and check on things. The people who were representing the more serious countries like the Soviets or the Chinese or something like that would sort of say, "Go away. Don't bother us." Did you find yourself having to intrude in this?

VAN HEUVEN: Because of the known interest of the president, if there was something for me to say about Romania, it was not that difficult to bring something to a person's attention. We had a pretty good system in the European Bureau for sifting information and making sure that what was important got to the top and what wasn't was put aside. I don't recall being stiffed on anything in particular. I was supported by the fact that I had two articulate ambassadors at post who could speak up for themselves, and often did. But Romania was not a friend. Romania was on the other side of the East-West divide. And while it may have been up to its own game, it was not a country that we could in any respect count on. The sum total for me of the experience was to learn how to deal with American colleagues who were behind the Iron Curtain rather than right on the border or on the western side of it, and to be able to watch the evolution of events with a certain degree of patience. Certainly, the eventual evolution of what happened, and the death of Ceausescu, were not possible to foretell at that point.

Q: I served a little before this in Yugoslavia. There all of us who served in the embassy had a certain respect for Tito. We weren't 100% for him but we had a respect for him. Did you find any respect for Ceausescu

VAN HEUVEN: No. If there was any respect, it was respect for the way in which the man exercised power. We saw Ceausescu as he was. Obviously, I didn't see him in Bucharest. I did observe Ceausescu in Washington - and on the trip that the United States offered him after the visit to Washington. I was part of the group that traveled along with him on the same plane. He was a dour person; no sense of humor. But he had his country's interests at mind. We went to the White Company in Cleveland, which made huge tractor machinery. We went to General Electric outside of Hartford, Connecticut. He was interested in putting Romania on the map and making connections with big industry. American industry, of course, was interested in the possibilities of doing business. So on that trip, Ceausescu got a pretty nice reception. The trip was fast. We spent two and a half days hopping around the Northeast before I saw him off at Kennedy airport.

Q: Mrs. Ceausescu had pretensions to being a scientific marvel. She had fake degrees in science, didn't she? Did you have to play the game of saying, "You must be interested in seeing the science labs?"

VAN HEUVEN: We did not have a special program for Mrs. C. In Washington she went right along with her husband. This was a state visit and a state visit is a set bit of pieces, many of which are social. She was on the same plane, she went to the same factories. She didn't really have a role of her own. I think she sort of kept behind him as they were touring the plants and making conversation and doing the visits. But she was a pill and

she looked the part. She was no fun.

Q: In late '74, you had reinserted yourself into the mainstream of the European Bureau. Had that taken?

VAN HEUVEN: I think I was by then really a part of EUR. I had had three assignments in Europe. Two of them had been pretty visible. The Romanian job was not, but at least I was in the Bureau. That provided a special type of visibility within that tight and close society all of its own called the European Bureau.

I ought to digress and tell an anecdote which we can cut from the record later on if you want. Many years later when we had the problem with one of our colleagues in Vienna, Felix Bloch, and the difficulties he was in-

Q: He was sort of an unresolved case, but it looks that he was a spy for the Soviet Union.

VAN HEUVEN: There were two things about him. One was personal behavior unbecoming of an officer of the United States., which is documented and was never contested. The other, mainly of spying, was never proven. Under the rule that you were innocent until proven guilty, the United States government never established that case. But it was all over the newspapers. My anecdote is about the European Bureau and how the people from within view it. I recall talking with Avis Bohlen about the case. I said, "It's pretty bad, isn't it?" She said, "Yes, it's terrible for the Bureau." She could have said it was terrible for the United States or for the Foreign Service or for the State Department. But to her it was terrible for EUR. It was the Bureau that mattered.

Q: It was sort of the premier bureau of the State Department.

VAN HEUVEN: That's certainly how the members of the Bureau saw themselves, much to the annoyance of many colleagues outside of EUR.

Q: People used to more activity, particularly the Near Eastern people, who were fast on their feet and were used to dealing with wars and not the marble halls of Europe...

VAN HEUVEN: EUR had a self-image that was special.

In any event, what happened then was that I was sent for a year of training. There was a choice of the various defense colleges - NDU, the Imperial Defence College in London, Harvard, Princeton. I was sent to Princeton. That was a very fortunate turn of events. First of all, the programs at each of these schools were different. Harvard required a fairly steady dose of course work followed by some sort of certificate; now it's a degree. Princeton traditionally had had a system where the mid-career officials - typically including two State officers and a whole bunch from other parts in the federal government and someone from the New Jersey state government - were all on campus for a year without any specific requirements. That is to say, we could spend the time any way

we wanted. The only requirement was a custom to lunch together in Woodrow Wilson's old house on Wednesdays, sometimes with a speaker. Informally, the group did some social things together. But we were left to our own devices. The Department treated it like a posting. We got orders. We rented out our house in Bethesda. We moved to Princeton, put our children in school. And then came the moment of panic, because here are over 700 courses open to you and what are you going to do without anybody telling you what to do? But once that moment of panic had passed and decisions had been taken, the rest of the year was marvelous. It was a way of being away from State and from the Foreign Service, back in a university environment of which I could imagine none better - and I say to as somebody with two Yale and one Columbia degrees. The year at Princeton was fabulous. A very nice physical environment. A good school for the children. And the chance- (end of tape)

Q: What type of courses did you take? Was it a focused one or an eclectic?

VAN HEUVEN: Eclectic more or less. I took only two courses for credit, one in the fall with Klaus Knorr, a political scientist who was good about military forces and force planning and MBFR was a major issue in those days. Klaus was a big name on the academic circuit. The other course was with Fred Greenstein, who is still there today, who taught a course on the presidency. In the class we divided up presidents. Each member of the class took one president and one key presidential adviser and did a major paper on how that White House functioned with that particular adviser. I picked or was assigned Kennedy and did my paper on Mac Bundy. Fred and I actually went up to New York and had an interview with Bundy. I had some other sources at Yale as to what he had done as an undergraduate. So I had a chance to really think, then write about what Mac had done during his time. That paper is still kicking around the halls of the Woodrow Wilson School Library, now called the Stokes Library. Fred was a wonderful teacher. He not only had us go through the literature on the subject, which is considerable, but also had us talk through how particular White Houses worked. Our individual papers brought that out even more clearly. So, for a Foreign Service officer to spend some four months thinking about how the White House operates, how decisions get made, what influences a president, how presidential style matters, how the organization of the White House can influence the outcome, all of those things were extremely useful for an FSO who until then had looked at the Washington machinery of decisionmaking through the optic of the State Department. The longer I was in Washington and the longer I am there even today, I see this was a false optic. I'm not sure quite what the right optic is to observe Washington decisionmaking. Perhaps the best source for that would be a foreign ambassador. But to look at it from the inside of a particular department is not going to give you a very good or useful overview. So the Princeton experience helped in that respect. And it gave Ruth and me a chance to let our hair down a little bit and have a normal family life, and have a social life only of our own making, which was very modest, in a very pleasant surrounding. It was a break that came at the right time. In retrospect, I'm very strongly in favor of that sort of-

Q: This was '74 to '75?

VAN HEUVEN: Yes.

Q: Watergate was going on. How was Watergate viewed? This was probably the greatest crisis of the presidency.

VAN HEUVEN: It was all around us, but Princeton isn't Washington. There was a lot more distance between me and that issue as seen from Princeton than had I been in Washington. Before Princeton, my Washington carpool consisted of nothing but FSOs. The morning issue of "The Washington Post" and its daily reporting on Watergate was the main subject of discussion. It was our bread and butter. It was our breakfast, lunch, and dinner for the hour that we were in the car together. On the way home, often the same thing. In Princeton, that sort of sense of immediacy wasn't there for me. Obviously, the campus was aware of Watergate but I don't recall any major demonstrations or anything of that sort. This was happening in Washington and Washington was pretty far away.

Q: In '75, whither?

VAN HEUVEN: While at Princeton, my personnel officer was Don Norland. Don, both of whose sons later went into the Foreign Service, had at one time been political counselor in The Hague. He came to the idea that I should pick up the job that he had once held in The Hague. So, even before bidding time, which was much simpler in those days, it was Norland who was on to me with the thought that I ought to go to The Hague. I considered that for a moment, because that was the one assignment that I knew I would never get in the Foreign Service. I never even considered it and certainly not aimed for it. I came from the Netherlands, so it struck me as wholly unlikely that the Department would ever want to send me back there. So this idea was totally out of the box as far as I was concerned. I must have expressed sentiments to that effect at the time, but Norland was not easily dissuaded. Eventually, after thinking about it, I said, "certainly." If that's what the Department wants to do with me, I'll give it my best shot. The more I thought about it, the more interesting the whole idea became. With that green light, Norland took it from there. I never had to campaign for that particular position and I never had anybody else pull for me. Ambassador Kingdon Gould didn't know me from Adam. Neither did Charlie Tanguy, the DCM. So, this was a case where Personnel made the decision. So in the summer of 1975, I set off for The Hague.

Q: You were there until when?

VAN HEUVEN: For three years, '75-'78.

Q: Who was our ambassador when you went out there?

VAN HEUVEN: Kingdon Gould, a political appointee and a very successful businessman from Maryland. In manners and pedigree, Ambassador Gould was a man of the old school. He was a Yale graduate. Mrs. Gould was a spirited ambassador's wife. She had

wonderful taste. Her manner of speaking reminded me of Katharine Hepburn. But I didn't know Kingdon and he didn't know me. There was no ambassadorial input in my selection as political counselor. The Hague was not a large embassy. The political section consisted of two officers and a local assistant. The economic section consisted of three American officers. Two were Americans in the public affairs section. The DAO had its usual complement. So did agriculture. So all together we were maybe 30 Americans, with the usual complement of local employees. There were consulates in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The U.S. Air Force had a wing in Soesterberg. The Netherlands is a western country, a member of NATO and of the UN, and a large investor

In the United States. So there were many contact points between the United States and the Netherlands. Earlier, Gould had been ambassador in Luxembourg. The Hague was his second ambassadorial post. There was some Dutch feeling that he had gotten the job only because he was a contributor to the Republican Party. In essence, that was probably true. In any event, Gould was a great representative of the United States. Being a businessman, he sought out businessmen. He had a winning way about him. He was also a keen sportsman. When the time came to celebrate our 200th anniversary as a country, Kingdon had the idea of organizing a huge bash, renting the entire Hague conference center, and putting on a five-day show of speeches, lectures, visits, exhibits, and what have you. All of us in the embassy were dubious about doing this. We thought this could never be pulled off. Kingdon said we were going ahead. He set up an independent legal entity, cleared it through the Office of the Legal Adviser. Then he scheduled golf games with his unsuspecting Dutch business friends. So as he played golf with friends from Unilever, Shell, and Phillips, he got them to contribute to our national birthday party. He got the funds together and under his leadership, we put together one hell of a fine program. Even as it was happening, some of us had doubts that this would succeed, but Kingdon had no doubts, and he was right and we were not. This was a case where the ambassador was way ahead of his troops. He pulled off something that we did not have the imagination nor the clout to do ourselves. So, that is a sample of where Kingdon made a difference.

He played hockey and became a member of a senior hockey team. He was also a good rider. He had been doing a lot of riding in Maryland. In fact, he had actually ridden in the Maryland Hunt Cup, which is a very difficult race. He was a fox hunter and he responded to repeated invitations to join fox hunts in the south of Holland, and took me along. He was a marvelous host. He was extraordinarily gracious. He had good relations with Foreign Minister Van Der Stoel and with pretty much the entire top level of the Dutch government. Many came to appreciate him. He did spend a fair amount of time in the office. Sometimes he felt that he had to answer his own mail, until we advised him that he had a staff to help him do that. His consistent instinct was to help out people who were in trouble. So, even right up until this year, my wife and I have been getting unexpected telephone calls from Kingdon to help out, say, some Nigerian whose widow's son needed help getting him into school here. These often were far-out good causes, but Kingdon always engaged for good causes. He put his own money behind a lot of them. The Goulds became, and have remained, dear friends of Ruth and myself.

Q: During the time you were there, what was the state of Dutch-American relations?

VAN HEUVEN: The state of Dutch-American relations is almost always good. My period in The Hague was no exception. The Dutch were the third largest investor in the United States. Americans were the third largest investors in the Netherlands. A lot of enterprises were Dutch-American. So, in that large realm, things took care of themselves without intervention by the United States government or the American Embassy in The Hague.

The issues that we did face had to do with how to deal with the threat of Soviet communism and in particular the nuclear threat of the Soviet SS20s. I witnessed the beginning of the discussion on what eventually became the issue of stationing UN middle-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Q: The Pershing.

VAN HEUVEN: Cruise and Pershing. The Dutch popular attitude on that issue was strongly anti-nuclear. There is a long history in the Netherlands, visible right up to today, of neutrality and antiwar feelings. The basic distaste for anything that wears a uniform was a constant element in Dutch political life. So the Dutch armed forces also were not held in high regard. The Dutch armed services had been unable to perform effectively in 1940 against the Germans, nor, after the war, in Indonesia. The Dutch tradition was anti-militaristic. The job of defense minister was generally viewed as a liability to the political career of the officeholder like the way it is in Germany today. So, the question of putting nuclear weapons in the Netherlands was a lightning rod. In my time there were one million signatures out of a population of about 14 million on a petition opposing the steps that the U.S. and NATO were proposing to take. The Dutch government was led by a social democrat, Joop den Uijl. The defense minister, Vredeling, was also a social democrat. From their party point of view and their whole upbringing they were instinctively not in favor of deployment. They were supporters of NATO, but their notion of NATO was of a comfortable organization under whose umbrella the Dutch could live safely. Who took care of the repair of the umbrella, and its use, wasn't really up to the Dutch. That was up to the Americans, and the Dutch trusted the Americans well enough to be comfortable with that situation. The notion of stepping up to the nuclear plate themselves was a politically unsellable proposition. In the end, it was the efforts of initially Gould, and later, Bob McCloskey, and eventually, Jerry Bremer that helped bring the Dutch government - and by that time it was a different Dutch government - around to agree to join the NATO decision and participate in this program, thereby making it possible for Germany not to be the only country with Italy to station the allied nuclear response to the SS20 threat, to go ahead with the program. The rest, as they say, is history.

Q: The issue essentially was, the Soviets had threatened Europe with the SS20 and our idea was to have a counterpart which would then allow both to-

VAN HEUVEN: To create a balance. That was the idea. But it did involve the introduction of new weapons, and that was not regarded as...

Q: Was there any aftermath to what turned into a running sore with our demonstrations of quite rowdy young people against our consulate general in Amsterdam during the Vietnam War? This was not particularly benign. This was kind of a nasty confrontation. Was that over with completely? Or were they picking up something else?

VAN HEUVEN: Anti-U.S. feelings on the score of Vietnam had been strong in the Netherlands. In typical Dutch fashion, those who felt that way were allowed to vent their views and the rest of the population stood on the sidelines, many of them silently agreeing, but basically letting them go ahead. Police attitude toward protection was always mild, far milder than I later saw it in Germany. Just incidentally, just two weeks ago, when I happened to be in the Netherlands, there was a demonstration about Iraq. The demonstrators took down the fence that is now around the embassy, and daubed it with paint. The police, according to the account that I read, gently removed the demonstrators. I'm sure that nobody spent any time in detention for what they did, although the Dutch government, of course, will pay for the damage that was done, which means removing the paint. That is a typical Dutch way of doing these things.

Q: When you arrived there, this wasn't that long after these things. Was that sort of a burr under the saddle of at least our embassy and consulate people in the Netherlands? You don't like to be demonstrated against when the police don't give you adequate protection.

VAN HEUVEN: I think there were two phases and maybe the one you're referring to happened later. The first phase was the Vietnam phase. In Amsterdam, typically, the crowd would go to the Vondel Park and the Museum Pein, and try to get at our consulate. The nasty demonstrations came later, when Jerry Bremer was ambassador. Jerry later told me that he put the choice to the Dutch foreign ministry. He told him, "Either you give us good protection or we close the place." That was more than the Dutch government was willing to stomach, so they provided better protection. Now, the place is surrounded by a huge fence which is an eyesore and is not viewed kindly because it doesn't really fit the surroundings. However, when the point was made to me the other week by a Dutch acquaintance, I said, "It's too bad. If you don't control your crowds, we can't sit there and let some of our Dutch employees be the target of mob fury." So, the Dutch don't like to be too tough on demonstrators. They never have been. They have never been tough on drug users. They just don't like to be tough on anyone or anything. Some Dutch are now beginning to rebel against this set of attitudes. The politician Pim Fortuijn, who ran for office just this last summer and was murdered just before his party got 23 percent of the vote, had been taking the line that it's time to call a spade a spade.

Q: Were there splits in the Dutch body politic that concerned us during the time you were there?

VAN HEUVEN: Let me mention two issues. One had to do with reprocessing nuclear fuel, an esoteric subject. The government had the greatest difficulty with the notion that Dutch plants in the eastern part of the country would engage in reprocessing material which, when returned to its sources - mainly the countries and the plants that were providing this spent fuel for reprocessing - might be used for nuclear weapons. Reprocessing of spent Brazilian fuel caused an immense raucous in parliament. Particularly on the left side of the political spectrum, the feeling was that the Dutch shouldn't be involved in this sort of thing. Elsewhere in the political spectrum, it was pointed out that this was a major industry that brought considerable revenue and could be handled well by the Dutch under appropriate safeguards and should therefore be something the Dutch ought to do. I was obliged to get an education, the second time in my life, into the nuclear reprocessing cycle. It also forced the foreign minister, van der Klauw, a former diplomat, also to learn this lesson. Unfortunately for him, he never seemed to do the amount of homework on these esoteric things that was required if he were to look good in parliament. So van der Klauw ran into difficulties in parliament because he was not on top of his brief. Eventually, he had a short tenure in that position. The experiment of a foreign service officer as foreign minister was the last time the Dutch did it, until recently. The issue also involved us, also because the United States has nuclear weapons. We had our own reprocessing facilities. This was the time the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was in force. We had our ideas about nuclear non-proliferation. The Dutch struggle to find their way through this issue was of considerable interest to us. But it was something that we could watch only from the sidelines.

Q: How were we viewing the European Union and whither it and the role of the Netherlands in the European Union?

VAN HEUVEN: The U.S. view of the European Community (EC, as it was called at the time) was positive. It was regarded as a good thing, as structure to which we contributed building blocks in the form of the Marshall Plan. In 1975, it functioned as a common market. There was an incipient attempt to coordinate positions on foreign policy issues. There was no talk of a common EU foreign policy, but the EU chairmanship country did have the job of putting together the agenda for monthly meetings of the EU representatives - the level lower than the foreign ministers - where positions on issues such as Cyprus or apartheid or whatever else on the fringe of Europe might be discussed. Thus, EU countries could arrive at a common view which, in turn, might be reflected at the General Assembly in New York, where an EC country would speak for them all. It was a process in which we had a role, and a significant one. The agreed operating procedure required that the chairmanship country would furnish to Washington the agenda of the next meeting and allow input. I remember an event when Bob McCloskey was our ambassador. The Dutch were in the EU chair. We got the agenda; we sent it into Washington. But we didn't get any guidance. The meeting was going to be over the weekend. Friday afternoon, there was no guidance. Saturday morning, there was no guidance. The meeting had started and we had provided no input. The Dutch called us and said, "Do you have any input?" We responded "No." Bob was livid. He sent in a rocket to the Department. The punch line of the message was that it was undignified for

an American ambassador to be left in a position where he had no guidance. By Sunday, the meeting came to an end. Sunday passed in silence. On Monday, there were two cables. One said, "When I gave you liberty, I did not promise you dignity," signed "Kissinger." Of course, Bob had been Kissinger's press spokesman. The second one was from Assistant Secretary Art Hartman. It said, "Bob, you must be kidding." It caused a good laugh on the part of McCloskey and all of us. He never complained again. But it illustrates that at that time in the mid-'70s, the EC attempt to begin coordinating foreign policy was open to us and that we were invited and our views were considered. It was, in a way, a golden age of consultation, with few rules, but when our importance was recognized and our voice mattered.

Q: How was the Carter administration viewed there? We were taking moralistic stances on human rights and things of this nature.

VAN HEUVEN: Holland was probably the country in Europe that understood moralism better than anyone else. The Dutch themselves are prone to take moralistic positions. The political discourse is a constant mix of those factors. So that sounded quite familiar. The Carter approach may at times have led to some raised eyebrows in the ministry of foreign affairs, but Carter was not viewed critically as he was in Germany, for instance.

Q: With Helmut Schmidt and Carter...

VAN HEUVEN: Schmidt had no use for Carter because he didn't trust Carter to stick to his views.

Q: Which is proof...

VAN HEUVEN: But that never particularly hurt the Dutch.

Going back to the nuclear issue, I want to mention two events. One that caused a lot of problems was our request for a port visit for the USS California to the port of Rotterdam. California is a nuclear-powered cruiser. It may or may not carry any nuclear weapons. In any event, getting permission for the cruiser to come all the way into Rotterdam took forever, and we exercised polite pressure of all sorts. I must have been in the foreign ministry a dozen times to argue for it. Eventually, we got permission, despite a mix of environmental concerns and anti-nuclear feelings. It was a dicey thing to do for the government to say, "Okay, Rotterdam is not on the coast. You get this big, visible ship all the way up the Maas river, about 15 miles inland. Rotterdam harbor is the aorta of Dutch commerce. The Dutch message to us was "We don't want anything to go wrong." So, finally, the California came into Rotterdam harbor, but on the way in, its engines encountered trouble. I remember that phone call and it was not good news. But what was the problem? The ship was using river water for its cooling system - and quality of the water of the port of Rotterdam was so bad that it was fouling up the cooling system of the California. So we had the reverse of what the Dutch had feared - the river polluted the ship and not the other way around. In any event, the ship came in. It got a certain amount

of publicity. I took a couple of colleagues from the foreign ministry for lunch aboard. Afterwards, the DCM's car swayed so badly on the Belgian cobblestones on the pier that all of a sudden the engine caught behind one of these cobblestones and we were brought to a prompt halt, sending me through the front windshield and my guests from the back to the front seat. So, having just left the California, where we had had lunch, I found myself back in the sick bay of the California, having many pieces of glass pulled out of my forehead. I also had the unfortunate distinction of having totaled the DCM's car. Luckily, I wasn't the driver, but that was the end of Elizabeth Brown's official car.

Q: How old were you when you originally left Holland

VAN HEUVEN: I was 15 on the day I left.

Q: Did you find that, as often happens, you still had almost a kid's vocabulary? Did you have to bring your vocabulary up to speed?

VAN HEUVEN: That question gives me the chance not only to answer that but to get into another major theme of my three years at the American Embassy at The Hague. Sure, language had changed. In fact, the official spelling by law had changed somewhat so that a lot of "sch's" became just "s's." But the way in which you said things was different, just as you find that to be the case here in the United States. A typical salutation here is, "Take care." Twenty years ago, nobody would have known what that meant. And so, in 1975, the Dutch spoke a language full of those expressions that I had to reacquaint myself with. But that process went pretty fast because I still read and spoke it at the 5/5 level. When you're political counselor, you have every reason to look at the press and look at television and talk with people all the time, so that was a matter of very rapid acclimatization. I had been back in Holland a few times, mostly a couple of days, sometimes as much as 3-5 days. But basically all my other time in Europe had been elsewhere, in school in Paris, and in Germany. But I can't say that those very quick visits made much difference in my ability to handle the language. But I adjusted fairly well.

What *was* a challenge was to try and explain to myself, and then to Washington, the ways the country was different from the country that I had left. This was the first major test of my ability to deal with the question of societal change. In The Hague I was in a position where I saw a country that was obviously very different from what I had left. I had to explain what had happened, why it had happened, and what were the implications. Of course, you see change all around you. You see it in your family, in where you live, and so forth. Much of the time, you don't pay attention to it. But when you deal with estimative analysis, as I did later on, you have to ask yourself what are the patterns of change, what are the trends, and what do they mean? The Hague provided my first frontal encounter with major societal change.

What was the change? The Netherlands that I had left - and probably what I say is true generally of Europe, but I certainly saw it through the Dutch prism - was a country with a fairly long history in which the regents governed and the people accepted their

governance passively on the assumption that the regents knew what they were doing. They deserved and got respect. The regents, moreover, were few. The university population in the Netherlands before the war and right after it was only a small percentage of the population. Big business was also a very small percentage of the population. Therefore, the clan that ran Holland was identifiable, small, and interconnected. You knew not only the people, you knew who they were married to, you knew the family relationships. That was the accepted order of things. All sorts of societal patterns that went with it, including in the Netherlands the social phenomenon of so-called “zuilen” or pillars, and the system of student clubs at the main universities. Since the war against Spain in the 16th century, there had been a protestant pillar and a catholic pillar. The two never interfaced. In 1975, when I returned, there was also a social democratic pillar and a liberal pillar. So, Dutch society was a bunch of stovepipes. You would find a situation in a particular town in which, if you were Dutch reformed, so would be your baker, your clothier, your milkman, the club you belonged to. You didn't go outside of that stovepipe for anything. You watched the other stovepipes and at a certain point in politics in The Hague these stovepipes came together in some carefully balanced way, and constituted the government that governed the country.

When I returned to the Netherlands the population was larger. The university population had expanded exponentially. The regents had lost authority. Everybody wanted what they called “inspraak,” which means they wanted an opportunity to have their say. And the people who wanted to have the most say were the ones who were on government salaries, particularly at universities. They had few fixed hours, so they could go to meetings all night and outstay the people who had to leave and go to bed. That left them alone to vote through their particular hobby horses. This led to situations, such as in Rotterdam, when governance of the University of Rotterdam was in the hands of equal groups of teachers, students, and non-academic employees. The janitors had a vote on how the university was running, including university appointments. This was an unheard of situation. The social rebellion had started in Amsterdam in the sixties. At first, it consisted of innocent manifestation, such as by the so-called “kabouters,” the dwarfs, who did funny things, wore funny costumes, had exotic ideas like “Let's solve our transportation problem by having 10,000 white bicycles all over town and when you need a bike you pick one up and you go to where you want and you leave it again.” It didn't work. They were stolen. Societal change happened gradually after the war. It started in '53 with the big floods, when several thousand people drowned, many of them through perceived incompetence of the authorities who were looking after the dykes. It turned out they had their jobs because they belonged to certain pillars in society, not because of their competence. That started the erosion of respect for authority. Not to make too long a story of this, I did seek advice from political scientists at Leiden, some of whom are now in California, Arend Lijphard in particular. There was also an academic by the name of Daalder, whose son, Ivo, is now on the news because he's at Brookings and he was in the NSC in the Clinton administration. I also went with the ambassador to see the cardinal in Utrecht. He helped me understand best how to think about the process. He said, “You have to think of this process as a molecule, consisting of atoms and electrons. They all are in relation to each other. They're subject to outside forces, but they hang together. But the outside forces

increase. Still, the molecules hang together. Eventually, however, those outside forces are so huge that the molecule breaks. Then everything flies off in different directions. The electrons spin off. The atom splits. And they all take on a new form, and that is the new pattern that you have.” That was an image that I kept. I committed all of these impressions and analysis to a very long airgram, as my effort to explain to myself and everybody at home what the nature of Dutch society was. Back in Washington, most people were living with the myth of the Dutchman with the finger in the dyke and the wooden shoes. That was nice but not reflecting reality. Kingdon Gould read the airgram with visible reservation. But he signed it, with the comment that this might be the first case in recorded history of an ambassador going in through the dissent channel. But I had the backing of Elizabeth Ann Brown, the DCM, and many others on the staff of the embassy. It took six months to put that airgram together. It was like a small term paper. Ever since, I have applied the lessons learned in that exercise.

Q: Dutch society being a changing but ordered society, did you notice that the young people were getting the hell out and going off to the University of California or elsewhere to do their thing because they didn't have the right family or they felt stultified?

VAN HEUVEN: That was true right after the war, from '46 to maybe '55. Those were years when conditions were still not good and the temptation to leave was strong. After that, things improved. The Netherlands is an extremely prosperous country with a high degree of well-being. In the seventies, the emigration pattern was much weaker than it had been earlier. Most of the Dutch who had emigrated were farmers who felt they were running out of farmland and they could go to Canada or Australia and resume their careers there as farmers. The outflow of Dutch to other places was not significant. There were no long lines in front of the consulates for the visas. We didn't issue visas in The Hague, so there were no lines. But I know that was not the case in Rotterdam or Amsterdam. No, not a push to leave in those days and not afterwards either.

Q: What about the role of the royals? Was there any role really?

VAN HEUVEN: Yes. The House of Orange played and still plays an important part in Dutch life. In my time in The Hague, it was Queen Juliana and her husband, Prince Bernhard. She was universally loved. He was appreciated. Some of his capers, some of them extramarital, were known, but they didn't much affect people's views of him. He was implicated in those years in something called the Lockheed scandal. It was a question whether he had been more active than he ought to have been in getting the Dutch government to procure aircraft from Lockheed. He probably did more than he should have but in the event it only led to a government decision that he would no longer be allowed to wear his air force uniform. The queen had a constitutional role and still does today. She selects the person who, after an election, puts together the next cabinet, and then appoints the prime minister. While there are certain rules that would be hard to violate and get away with, that is her decision. She is the key figure who consults with all the parties after an election. In between elections, she has the opportunity to keep informed on all issues of state. Other than that, the queen or the king is a figurehead, whose many social

and representational duties are, generally, deeply appreciated at all levels of Dutch society. While the Dutch instinct about the nature of their country is republican, they feel good about the House of Orange. I speculated at the time with one of the journalists who was an expert on the royals about how this would go in the future. Our conclusion was that then princess Beatrix would have to earn that same respect that her mother and her grandmother had had, that this would not come automatically. I left that as a question. Now we know that Beatrix, in her own systematic, rigorous way, earned deep respect, being a hard worker and by immersing herself in her briefings. At times, she has exercised prerogatives that have raised eyebrows, like questioning whether an ambassador who had just divorced and was living with somebody was a suitable ambassador in a country to which he was about to pay a state visit, and by raising the question with the prime minister whether the ambassador shouldn't be replaced. That caused a howl because that was not seen to be her function or role. There are probably a number of other stories that can be told along this line; Beatrix has tended to push the envelope in that respect. Now the question is, of course, what will her son, who has just last year married a young Argentine woman, manage to earn his respect. But there are no indications that the House of Orange is in danger. There are a lot of princes now, and a lot of members of the family, and when you have a large family some of them are bound to get into trouble. The boulevard press will pick that up very happily. And in my time I heard stories about some of the younger members of the royal family who tended to assume prerogatives that weren't really there. The royal household handled those issues with delicacy and skill. I came away with respect for Juliana. Beatrix was not on the political scene yet.

Q: What about relations with Germany?

VAN HEUVEN: Let me back up for one anecdote on Juliana. Once a year the diplomatic corps troops to the palace in Amsterdam for the New Year's reception. The rule was that the ambassadors could bring five members of the staff. We would all enter the main gate of the palace and be assigned to pens in order of precedence. And in order of precedence each national group were ushered in. The ambassador would be greeted by the queen, and shake hands. He would then introduce the staff. The queen would say a few things. And then we would proceed out and the next ambassador and his group would come in. When we went out, ambassadors went one way and the staff were sent the other way. Ambassadors were given champagne. We got pea soup. This was a typical Dutch dish. Particularly in January, it could be a warm antidote to the cold outside. But pea soup was not champagne. It triggered amused comment about the proverbial frugality of the House of Orange. The queen was not going to spend any more on these events than she absolutely had to.

Q: How did you find relations with Germany during this time?

VAN HEUVEN: They were still uneasy. A considerable residue of sentiment remained anti-German. That exhibited itself in childish stuff, such as putting graffiti on German cars at the sea resorts. A few people on principle didn't want to go to Germany. But the

Dutch business world knew that they were part of the German DM area, that most of their business was with Germany, and that the port of Rotterdam was the port through which German goods came out and goods headed for Germany came in. The Dutch made money on that. In that respect, relations were pretty normal. The reconciliation between the Netherlands and Germany did not come until many years later, when Chancellor Kohl was persuaded by Prime Minister Kok in the early '90s to visit Rotterdam, following a poll - which upset both the Germans and the Dutch governments - which showed that there was still a lot of resentment in the Netherlands. Kok persuaded Kohl, who was not easy to persuade on these matters, that he ought to come. But Kohl came, laid a wreath, and said the appropriate things. That was sort of the formal end of the World War II. Meanwhile, the Germans had done a magnificent job in sending outstanding ambassadors to The Hague. I knew two of them personally. They learned Dutch fluently and they worked very hard to improve relations. I think that helped a great deal in smoothing the relationship and eventually making the Kohl visit the success that it was.

Q: Did the Battle of Arnhem... Was that an annual celebration?

VAN HEUVEN: The annual celebration in those days was still the 8th of May, which was the date of the liberation in 1945. It was marked by processions to the spots where Dutchmen had been executed; it was a sober type of commemoration. This practice is now losing force, although I'm sure that the commemoration continues. The Battle of Arnhem, I don't think, is commemorated in any particular way, unless by the locality.

Q: Not even by the British?

VAN HEUVEN: It might be, but it would be very small. One of the particular things that I remember was that as a child I had seen those planes and gliders come over in September 1944. They landed 35 miles from where I was living in Utrecht. I couldn't see them come down but I saw them come over. There was no anti-aircraft and no German Luftwaffe to keep them from doing so. It was a huge fleet. It was spectacular and we didn't know where they were going, but they were low enough so we knew something was happening close by. In '77, when the ambassador and the DCM were prevented by their schedules from doing so, it fell to me to represent the United States at the opening of the Arnhem Battle Museum in the castle named Hartestein. This was where General Urquhart and the 1st British Airborne made their last stand. I found myself with a Polish general, and many Dutch authorities. There were also many British. General Urquhart himself turned up for the event. He was in his 80s. The British flew a Dakota over.

Q: A DC-3.

VAN HEUVEN: Out jumped two parachutists in uniform. They landed on the front lawn. We were deployed on the steps in front. The lead parachutist undid his parachute, walked up to General Urquhart, saluted, and handed him the key to the building. General Urquhart then opened the building and we all went in and signed the book. What General Urquhart said in his speech about the surrender was, "In the end, it wasn't the gerries. It

was the lack of water.” So the British forces ran out of water and they surrendered. For all of us who hoped for success, it was a huge disappointment.

Q: Oh, yes. It was known by a book and a movie called “A Bridge Too Far” by Cornelius Ryan. Is there anything else we should cover during this period?

VAN HEUVEN: No.

Q: In '78, what did you do?

VAN HEUVEN: My next assignment was just up the Rhine, in Bonn at the American Embassy as the deputy two in the political section. I was number two for one year and then I succeeded Dick Smyser for another two years as political counselor.

Q: So this would be '78 to '81.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes. And all that time, except for the last few months, my ambassador was Walter Stoessel, a prince of a man whom I came to respect enormously. In the spring of 1981, Arthur Burns succeeded Stoessel, and I accompanied him with others when he presented his credentials. I overlapped with Mr. Burns for only two months.

Q: In Germany in '78-'81, this had to be a period of high intensity. The SS-Pershing issue must have been very strong.

VAN HEUVEN: It was one of the most raucous of many issues that we dealt with at the time. In the end, we got the support of Chancellor Schmidt and the Social Democratic Party, under Schmidt’s leadership. But it did cost him his job and it led to a new government with Kohl. I’m not saying that the issue led directly to his outcome, but since this issue roiled public opinion more than any other, there was some sort of causal relationship. Perhaps Schmidt was at the end of his domestic political tether anyway. But we did get full support from Schmidt, who was not an easy man to talk to or persuade. The German government came through on this in an important way.

Q: Could you talk about the American-German relationship when you arrived in '78? This is the Carter period still.

VAN HEUVEN: Going from The Hague to Bonn entailed a radical shifting of gears on my part. A little over a hundred miles is not a great distance, but the difference between the political worlds of The Hague and Bonn were vast. The optic in The Hague was narrow, somewhat inward looking. You could discuss till the cows came home the ins and outs of Dutch politics. Bonn brought me back to major issues of Europe on peace and security. From The Hague, the Soviet Union was light years away. In Bonn, the Soviet Union was almost in your living room. In Bonn, you were thinking about divided Germany, about European peace and security, and about how to deal with Soviet communism in Germany and beyond. Bonn was a wholly different setting and required a

wholly different way of thinking. The American role in Germany and the American equities in Germany were comparable to the ones that I was familiar with in the Netherlands, though on a different scale. Most of the U.S. forces in Europe were stationed in Germany. We had to worry about Berlin. We needed to keep a close eye on whether the German SPD would continue on the track of full support of the Atlantic alliance and partnership with the U.S. - although at the time partnership was not the word - or whether the latent tendency represented by certain people in the SPD to strike a deal with the East and neutralize Germany in exchange for reunification would gain the upper hand. It was not in our interest to see such an evolution. Later on, Dick Smyser and I spent a good bit of our time as political counselors watching carefully for indications that perhaps German policy might again go in a fundamentally different direction from the one that we had come to expect and rely on. Such a turn of policy was an option at the end of the war, until Adenauer made the choice between being neutral in the middle or being part of the West. That was the strategic backdrop against which virtually all our activities in Bonn, certainly mine, were taking place.

Q: The introduction of the SS20 was really designed to foster getting Germany to say "Let's stop being a target and get out of the whole thing by being neutral," wasn't it? Wasn't this where the whole SS20 pressure was put?

VAN HEUVEN: The SS20 issue brought to life again the old argument as to where Germany ought to be. We could anticipate that the Germans would do the right thing, but you could not be sure about that. So, whenever Egan Bahr, a foreign policy adviser to Brandt-

Q: He was sort of a Kissinger.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, he was Kissingerian in the sense that he was a realpolitiker and he understood how Germany might get what it wanted for itself in terms of dealing with this giant of the East, and also somehow with the Western powers, and the United States in particular. But the issue of the basic orientation of Germany was not seen in the same way by all Germans. On the side of the Christian Democrats, who were not in power at the time that I was in Bonn, there would have been little danger of Germany sliding away from the Western alliance. The combination of the Free Democrats and the Social Democrats looked reasonably sure. Certainly, with a man like Genscher from the Free Democrats as foreign minister, there seemed to be little danger of Germany going "neutral." But with people like Bahr around, you could never be sure who was whispering what into whose ear. I don't think Bahr had much influence on Schmidt. But he had a considerable influence on Brandt. Brandt was still alive. He had won a Nobel Peace Prize. These people had influence. They had their own contacts with the Soviets, the ability to make things happen. So, there were a lot of balls to keep your eye on in our embassy. Besides this and the nuclear defense issues, we were coping with the issue of the conditions under which U.S. forces were stationed in Germany. We felt that they needed better conditions, better barracks. The German barracks were better than ours. We were looking to the Germans for a large amount of the money to sustain our forces. I was

personally saddled with a lot of those issues that involved difficult negotiations with the Defense Department and the German defense ministry, as well as with German politicians. Klaus von Dohnanyi, an SPD politician, had been put in charge of this whole issue by the chancellor's office. His people were not always very helpful. They needed to interface with the Bundestag. In the end, it didn't matter that much, but at the time this was a big ticket item and it was a big money ticket item.

Q: What were some of the political developments between the U.S. and Germany?

VAN HEUVEN: We faced the issue of Afghanistan. The Soviets had invaded Afghanistan. The Carter administration's reaction, among other things, was to take the United States out of the Olympics scheduled for Moscow. We campaigned to persuade our friends to do likewise. We leaned heavily on the Germans to stay out of Moscow. We also leaned heavily on virtually everybody else. We were only partially successful. But it caused a gnashing of teeth that the U.S. was politicizing the Olympics. Our stock answer was that it wasn't we who started politicizing it; if the Soviets had behaved themselves this problem would not exist. It was an unsatisfactory discussion. In the end, the American position, while I'm sure morally correct in the view of many, was not a very useful one as a matter of practical politics. It led to disappointment on the part of a great many athletes who had hoped to compete and, because of the inevitable passage of time, before the next Olympics, saw their last chance disappear.

Q: Where did the Germans fall on this? Did they go?

VAN HEUVEN: They did not. Schmidt felt that Germany had to support its American ally. This was a tough decision, because the British and French sent their athletes to Moscow.

Q: Was Germany beginning to assert itself within the European Community? Did you sense a change in Germany as far as here is this big power which has been keeping quite quiet over the years? Did you see a development there of beginning to play a bigger role on the world's stage? Those are things that we might pick up next time.

Today is March 14, 2003. We laid out a few things that you might want to comment on.

VAN HEUVEN: I've had a chance to collect my memory in a somewhat more organized fashion. First, a personal observation about coming to the job in Bonn. At that point, it was clear to me that Germany had moved a long way, from the position of a defeated power, as I saw it from my vantage point in Berlin in the mid-'60s, to a major European country that was playing a growing role inside Europe and was beginning to make itself felt. The change was personified in the personality of Chancellor Schmidt, a knowledgeable, articulate, proud, and at times acerbic man who did not tolerate fools gladly and who, though he spoke perfect English, made it a habit of speaking to his

visitors in German, which caused no problem for Ambassador Stoessel or those of us who were there around him. But I recall one day where the then relatively junior Senator Biden came to call and insisted on an appointment, and Schmidt played hard to get because he was chancellor and this was just one of many senators. When Biden did get the appointment there had to be an interpreter because Schmidt used German.

Before we get into details, I want to sketch the setting for the exercise of my job as political counselor. In 1978, there had been under way, for a decade or more, a process of detente, not just between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This rapprochement was set in motion by the American University speech of Kennedy in 1963. The governing mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt, was also focused on improving relations. So we were at the beginning of some sort of coming together, in spite of the division of Germany. In the decade that followed, German attempts - particularly with mostly West German initiatives - to straddle the divide and pick up contacts and start to try and repair, despite the division, the fabric of relationships were well under way. The detente process took place both on a global scale as well as an inter-German scale. Washington officially favored the inter-German discourse, but at the same time it was mistrustful that perhaps too much might be given away. The process also was not entirely transparent to us. So a considerable amount of activity and interest on our part was directed at being sure that we knew, if not all the details, then at least the main lines of what the West Germans were up to with the East Germans, and what the West Germans were up to with Moscow. This process of detente when I arrived in Bonn in '78 was actually about to run its course. It was coming to an end because of the Soviet plan to deploy SS20s, which would change the nuclear balance of power within Europe that deeply concerned Schmidt.

The Carter administration was slow in picking up this change in German attitude. The Carter administration, in fact, was somewhat bifurcated. Secretary Vance was in favor of detente and easier relations with the Soviet Union. The national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was mistrustful of the Soviet Union and he was not initially a friend of detente. He saw its downside. And his suspicions of anything that the Germans and the Russians might do were greater. These two views, existing within the administration, posed a problem for Schmidt. In the event, not getting much of a hearing in official Washington, Schmidt went public with his concerns in a speech in the middle of the Carter administration. From then on, the issue also became one for the Carter White House, namely, how to respond to this new threat by the Soviets. I might say, parenthetically, that it seemed that at the time even the Soviets had several views. Brezhnev was probably softer on Germany and on U.S. relations than Gromyko, who had been a hardliner throughout. But at that point Brezhnev was physically and in other respects close to the end of his tenure, so we were dealing with a Moscow that was speaking several voices and presenting different faces. Be that as it may, the SS20 issue was a difficult one. It brought into play the desire of those who were still interested in detente, both in Washington and in Bonn, against those who thought that this was upsetting the balance of power and needed a response. Ultimately, the NATO alliance managed with U.S. leadership and the participation of the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Britain, to adopt a plan for the stationing of Pershings and GLCMs, which were

cruise missiles with a shorter range which could put Moscow at risk. That in turn scared the Russians and that in turn led - way beyond my time in Bonn - to the deal that eliminated the Soviet threat. The SS20 issue was a difficult one for Schmidt. In the end, it produced a lot of domestic opposition to this decision on the part of his own party and the Greens, who were growing at the time. Ultimately, it was one of the reasons that led to his unseating by Helmut Kohl.

Q: Were you in Germany when the SS20s were introduced?

VAN HEUVEN: The SS20s were introduced on the other side by the Russians and they were being deployed.

Q: It was seen from our embassy in Bonn and throughout Europe as, this was a change in the whole thing. As soon as the SS20s were introduced, was this portrayed by the Soviets and others as changing the balance of power in Europe?

VAN HEUVEN: It was more of a gradual process. There is still speculation on what might have been the Soviet motives. It may have had less to do with specific policy with respect to the balance with Germany. It might have been viewed by them as just a regular weapons upgrade. It might have been seen by them as a general beefing up of the nuclear part of their forces. Whatever it was, the arrival of these weapons threatened to change the strategic balance within Europe. The global balance of power of course had already changed somewhat and everybody had got used to it. The Soviets had a major intercontinental nuclear capacity, as did we. Of course, on the ground the Soviets had huge superiority in conventional forces. Western strategy was that our nuclear forces would offset that conventional superiority and produce certain balance. But when the Soviets started introducing nuclear weapons that pretty much could cover all of Western Europe, and we did not have all that much in our arsenal in Europe to respond; it was regarded as a change in the balance. The Schmidt speech at the IISS triggered the debate on that.

Q: How about the neutron bomb episode and Carter-Schmidt on that?

VAN HEUVEN: The neutron bomb decision was another event that caused difficulties between Carter and Schmidt. The idea of the bomb had been around for a while. The wish of the U.S. Army to proceed with it became controversial after the documents that treated this subject were leaked to the press. A number of Europeans, including some Americans, also recoiled in horror at what some in Europe called "the capitalist weapon," because it killed people and did not damage things. It was regarded by a lot of people as something basically dangerous and unsettling, and so it was controversial. Schmidt put his political equities on the line to support the Carter White House in favor of the neutron bomb. So, when the President suddenly, and without warning, canceled the weapon, Schmidt felt that he had been stabbed in the back. The episode confirmed his view of Carter as an unreliable person. So, the relationship between those two deteriorated further.

There was another issue that was at play in those days. It involved the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Schmidt had had a hand in establishing CSCE. Kissinger at the time had been unenthusiastic about it. But the Carter administration acquired a quick appetite for using the human rights provisions of CSCE as something to rub the Soviet noses into. Schmidt, wishing to preserve both his equities with Moscow as well as with Washington, was more cautious in using CSCE as a bludgeon against the Russians. So there was another difference in approach between the two administrations.

All in all, the wind down of detente with Moscow was capped in December of '79, a couple of weeks after the double-track decision on the SS20s, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q: What was the double track?

VAN HEUVEN: The NATO decision had two elements. One was to station Pershings and the GLCMs. The other track was a promise for diplomatic negotiations, to try to negotiate a way both with respect to the SS20s and the western response to it. It was that other track, the second track, that made the deployment decision acceptable to the Europeans. The second track provided the outcome to this entire episode. So we had the double-track decision. But then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan drew a line under the detente with Moscow. Both Bonn and Washington took strong positions, and there was a feeling that detente had run its course.

Q: The SS20 episode seemed to have been the last gasp of the Soviet Union as far as organizing the Communist Party in Western Europe and the peacelovers and all this into trying to use this mass opinion and marches and protests to stop our responding to the SS20s. Then when the invasion of Afghanistan came, that just cut the feet out from under the peace movement. Did you see it that way?

VAN HEUVEN: Yes. I think that's a fair portrayal of what went on. I might add that in my opinion the impetus for the demonstrations in opposition to the western response to the SS20s was not driven by a hidden Soviet hand. It was a native German phenomenon. The Soviets did what they could to encourage it. But they didn't have to, since much of the anti-nuclear sentiment was already present in Germany and it was pretty strong. The Soviets saw domestic German opposition as to their advantage. At that time, there was still a bifurcated view in Moscow about this whole situation. Brezhnev was dubious; Gromyko was hardline.

So, on the SS20, on CSCE, on the neutron bomb, and then also eventually on the way to react to the Afghan invasion, there were- (end of tape) differences between the chancellery in Bonn and the Carter administration. The United States very strongly urged a lot of countries, including Germany, not to send their team to the Olympics. The Germans agreed to do that. The Germans never agreed to the whole series of economic boycotts that we proposed and carried out ourselves. In the end, Carter had little trust in Schmidt and Schmidt did not think much of Carter. So, my three years in Bonn

essentially took place in a field of tension that affected the very top layers of government. The management of the specific issues that I've just been talking about took a great deal of time and attention at senior levels in the embassy. I was pretty closely involved as political counselor in all of them. I should reiterate that we operated against the backdrop of constant suspicion, particularly on the part of some NSC officials, of what the Germans were up to. Whenever Schmidt verbalized his views about Carter, they tended to be picked up by elements of the embassy and reported without varnish up the line to their backstoppers in Washington. This information would be fed straight to the NSC and the President. This did not help matters. Whatever the ambassador and we could do to put things in a better light was often a process of chasing our tails.

Q: The problem is that if you have a particularly pungent expression on the part of a chief of state, that's so sexy, that it goes right back and resonates much stronger than trying to put this into context.

VAN HEUVEN: That was exactly our problem but the guts of the problem was that there were real differences of view about the direction of policy and the way it ought to be executed.

Q: When you have two leaders who don't like each other of two allied countries, Germany and the United States, as there a certain rallying around of the Americans in our embassy in Bonn and the foreign ministry in Bonn of saying, "Let's keep these quarreling schoolboys from screwing up our relations" and working almost undercover to make sure that things didn't get out of hand?

VAN HEUVEN: In the later part of my tenure, I had got to know well my opposite numbers in the foreign ministry and the chancellery, but also a lot of the political class, press, academia, and opinion makers. They were good acquaintances and good sources. They also saw and understood the process that was taking place. We saw our interests in the same terms. That is to say we had to stick together. We were facing problems. It was a difficult matter of deciding what the policy ought to be. But when it came to execution, it ought to be possible to work together. So we spent a fair amount of time just throwing oil on the troubled waters when we could. The role of the foreign minister, Genscher, was not exactly that of a lily. He was a very active man. He had an entire political party behind him, the Free Democrats. So he had his own political standing. He was indefatigable, always traveling and making it his business to improve relations and open doors and so forth. So, while we had other reasons to be interested in and sometimes concerned about Mr. Genscher because he had his own agenda that might not necessarily square with ours, the motivation of that agenda was different from those in the left wing of the Social Democratic Party, which basically wanted to continue the track that Willy Brandt had started in Berlin. Some Social Democrats never let go, at least in theory, of the option of a neutral Germany if unification could be purchased at that price. So, we were constantly interested in what both groups did, and kept a close eye on this situation by talking to friends, seeing politicians, talking to diplomatic colleagues, reading the press, and by talking to these individuals themselves. It's not that these were beyond our

reach. My predecessor had contacts with Bahr and with Wehner and with Brandt. I had occasion to observe them all, too. I saw Genscher regularly in the company of others. From time to time, I'd see the chancellor as well, again in the company of others. I talked to their staffs a lot and I had a pretty good picture of what was going on. It was a hand in glove operation. My interlocutors in the chancellery, both diplomatic and military, were excellent contacts. That was not because of me. I think it just came with the position because they, too, saw it very much in their interest to maintain that sort of contact with an official American. I should mention one particular contact among the many with German political figures, with Richard von Weizsaecker. I picked up from my predecessor, Dick Smyser, a pattern of occasional late-afternoon meetings, often in his house in Bad Bodesberg. He was a distinguished leader and president at that time of the German Kirchentag - a sort of large Christian organization that interested itself also in political themes. We would sit in the garden and sip scotch. Von Weizsaecker went on to become mayor of Berlin and president of his country.

Q: At this time, was Genscher using the German foreign service? Were they on the same track or was he proceeding on his own and the German foreign service was being more German than Genscherites?

VAN HEUVEN: Genscher was foreign minister for such a long time that in the end it was his foreign service. If you didn't agree with Genscher, you really had no future in the German foreign service. There were other places you could go. You could get out-of-office assignments. You might be assigned, as some of them were, to the chancellery. But there were less bureaucratic devices available than we have in Washington to park officials who either didn't fit or felt they might not fit the prevailing mode. No, the foreign ministry was highly responsive to Genscher. He drove them hard. He had tough work methods. He had abominable personal work habits: Early morning, late night, constant travel, heavy eating, a lot of smoking. I remember seeing him with Ambassador Stoessel once and reporting - this was after he had been in the hospital with heart surgery - that he looked bad. I speculated that, if he kept at the pace that I was witnessing during that particular conversation, he wouldn't last very long. I couldn't have been wrong. He was around Bonn much longer than me and he is still alive today, although he no longer plays a role.

Q: How seriously did we consider... Did the Afghan invasion by the Soviets sort of put to an end within Germany the idea of a neutral Germany on the part of the left wing of the socialists at least for the time?

VAN HEUVEN: I think the answer is no. Wehner and Bahr held a long view. They knew that the Afghan caper, bad as it was and long though it eventually lasted, would not last forever and that the German question was forever. So, I don't think that really put a dent in their overall estimate of what the geostrategic possibilities were for Germany. But, smart as they were, they did realize that the invasion set back the possibility of making quick progress on detente or on unification.

Q: Was there concern that the Afghan invasion might augur something of the same nature within Europe or were we looking for heightened signs of Soviet military activity?

VAN HEUVEN: Two things. One was that we had been watching the SS20 saga unfold, and that was seen by the West as an intentional threat and a serious one. But there was something else that was afoot at the end of my tenure, and that was the Solidarity Movement in Poland. That showed heavy Soviet hands behind a tough Polish government approach to the baby steps of Solidarity. This uncompromising attitude led us to wonder for many months whether we would be seeing in Poland a repeat of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. There wasn't a great deal we could do about it because it really depended on how the regime in Moscow saw its equities and how dangerous the Soviets would feel these developments were. But the precedent of Soviet military intervention was established, and none of us had any illusion that it could not be repeated. So, we were also living under the threat that, even as the SS20s were being introduced, Moscow would show an extremely heavy hand in Poland. For American diplomacy, anything that would happen in Poland would have created a much more acute dilemma than the Czech Republic or Czechoslovakia had been, given the domestic element of our relationship with Poland.

Q: Chicago is the second largest Polish city in the world.

VAN HEUVEN: Soviet military action in Poland in 1978 or 1979 would have roiled the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow. Afghanistan was not regarded as a direct threat by anybody in Europe. But the evolution of Solidarity and the Soviet reaction and the play-out of the SS20 issue certainly were.

Q: On your German counterparts, all of this put together, were they seeing this as a pretty tense and crucial time?

VAN HEUVEN: The SS20 was high stakes poker both in terms of strategy as well as domestic politics in Germany and in Europe, and it was a major challenge to American diplomacy in Europe. There were heroes such as Mike Glitman, who backed up Paul Nitze, who negotiated the end game to this and who were called upon not just to do that but also to give a persuasive public face to an extremely complex situation so as to get public support for the position.

Q: How about the CSCE? This turned out to be the opening for all sorts of things, one of the factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union. How did we see it at the time? Was this seen as one of those things, a stick with which to beat the Soviets over the head?

VAN HEUVEN: From my perspective, and that of my people in the political section in Bonn, this was one of a number of negotiations that were ongoing for a very long time. There were others. There was the whole SALT/START process that was going on at the time. There were the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, eventually heading into the Conventional Forces in Europe agreements later. There was the CSCE negotiating

process that Max Kampleman was heavily involved in. These were long running shows. We monitored the cable traffic as these agreements were negotiated, and we were privy to the considerations as to how we should use the arms control system once it was in place. All of this was a very gradual process and the lead usually came from those who dealt with it directly in Washington and in the field, which often provided the lead to Washington. It was one of those things that would typically be on the agenda for any major review of all the issues with the Germans. On occasion, there might be an American from the MBFR or the OSCE delegation coming in for bilateral discussions with the Germans. Jack Dean, one of my predecessors in Bonn, and now head of our MBFR delegation, came regularly. It tended to be on the agenda of the NATO ministers every time they met. It was not something that we handled directly in Bonn. It was not our job to consider how that might be used in more global relationships but I think the sense that we had was that this was a good thing. Perhaps the German view of this was always a little bit ahead of ours.

Q: How did you see the French-German alliance? Was this a different game than our game or was it all part of a web or not?

VAN HEUVEN: The French were among the four countries that took responsibility for occupation zones in western Germany and occupation sectors in Berlin, with all the rights that went with that status in those sectors. The headquarters of the French 1st Army were in Baden- Baden. Our 5th and 7th Corps were headquartered in Heidelberg and Munich. EUCOM was in Stuttgart. The British army on the Rhine was headquartered at Munchen- Gladbach. We worked with the French both in Berlin in the allied Kommandatura and in the so-called Bonn Group in Bonn. On occasion the Four Powers together dealt with all of Germany. This happened in the German treaties of the early '70s which relaxed the regime in Berlin somewhat. Our negotiator was Kenneth Rush. Their position in Germany gave the French leverage, and they participated in all considerations of the Bonn Group. In the Bonn Group section of the political section of the embassy a couple of officers were doing nothing but Berlin. Though the French were equal participants in the Bonn Group, they did not necessarily pull equal weight. In those days, we did not think much about the Germany-France relationship because that concept had not evolved yet between those countries. Schmidt and Giscard could get along easily, and did so in English. But it was still a situation of unequals. The French occupied part of Berlin, and the French military were present in part of Germany. France had a permanent seat on the Security Council with veto rights. Germany had none of these attributes. But at that time Germany had no pretensions yet to have a profile in terms of European policy. Germany was focused on itself, in particular on improving the situation of Germans on the other side of the iron curtain line, through a policy of *Kleine Schritte* of Brandt, a policy of "small steps." Bonn was occupied with the potential of Soviet power to derail this entire process. Bonn was also preoccupied with the importance of keeping the United States in Europe. So Bonn was quite prepared to take the American lead on all sorts of issues in order to maximize its objectives. France provided little by way of security, guarantees, money, or openings for German policy at that time. I don't want to belittle the French, but at that time we were not talking about a Germany-France relationship the way we do

today.

Q: Berlin in this manifestation, how was it?

VAN HEUVEN: When I was in Bonn?

Q: Yes.

VAN HEUVEN: Berlin had become a very different place. The mood in the '60s, when we felt and acted as occupiers, had been replaced by a mood in which we Americans saw ourselves as facilitators to help the Germans in that city do what they wanted to do. The funding was German. Military security was principally provided by us. Increasingly, we exercised the powers that we legally had in a more and more restricted way. Formally speaking, things didn't change. In reality, they did. Formally, we still controlled the Berlin police force. The reality was that we were increasingly inclined to let them make their own decisions. We did maintain the Spandau function right until the end. The German government also was not involved in the function of the quadripartite Berlin Air Safety Center, where the allies dealt with the Soviets on the flight safety of each flight to and from Berlin. Berlin was also increasingly becoming of age. It was reviving economically. It was seen as a city with a future. Young people were no longer leaving; they were coming back. It had always been the capital, but it was not the seat of government. That issue was decided years later. But Berlin as a city was coming back.

I did have occasion to go to Berlin. Of course, I went to other parts of Germany as well as part of my job. But I had special reasons for a while to go to Berlin because I fell into a job that was regarded as sensitive and so few people knew about it. It involved the prisoner exchanges. For a long time the United States had maintained a channel, both with Moscow and the East Germans, through which we were able to make deals involving the exchange of people. Some of these people were famous, like Sharansky. Many of them were nameless. The West Germans had their own fairly elaborate system of buying out people from the East. But we had our own equities. Often they were Germans who had been working for us and who ended up in custody and whom we were interested in getting back. The East Germans, of course, had occasional interest in some of their people who were in the West. So there were negotiating points that existed to facilitate this running negotiation. For two years I was the American prisoner exchange negotiating point. It required a number of visits to East Berlin and occasional meetings in West Germany.

Q: How did these things work out? You'd come up and say, "Okay, you've got this in your stable. We've got these in ours?" Was it a horse trade?

VAN HEUVEN: It depended on a lot of factors, many of them extraneous to the individuals involved. My interlocutor was an East German civilian named Wolfgang Vogel. He had no official position in East Germany. He was an attorney with a law practice. But he was a confidant of Honecker and he was allowed to do things that no

other East German was allowed to do, like driving a Mercedes and going to the West whenever he wanted to and using hard currency. We knew that he spoke for the regime. Of course, Vogel knew that his American interlocutor spoke for the United States. So everybody knew exactly with whom he was dealing. But unlike a typical negotiation between states, which involves office buildings and press attention, there was none of that. This was all pretty much hidden from view. It was even hidden from view of my colleagues in the embassy.

Q: Would money be exchanged or deals made?

VAN HEUVEN: I never exchanged money. I could have been authorized or at least made a deal that would have involved the transfer of money. During my time, I don't think I had a great deal of luck getting people released. These things went up and down. But the discussions continued. Once every three or four months, or more frequently sometimes, it was not always in East Berlin. Sometimes Vogel would come west and I would meet him in the west. They had very specific interests in people and they certainly were willing to trade. It was a very carefully orchestrated dance on the part of these negotiators around some very fundamental principles of "You can give me what I want and I can give you what you want." But just how that worked out and which particular person the regime would see fit to let go, sometimes with the publicity of that person then turning up on the other side, depended very much on the political circumstances of the moment.

Q: I would think that the West German side was just riddled with agents. You might negotiate something but by the next day two more would have been picked up.

VAN HEUVEN: The discussion that I was part of was not part of the inter-German exchange process, which was mostly money one way and people the other. The West Germans were aware that we were engaged with the East Germans. But to a large degree what my predecessors and I and my successors were doing was not briefed to the Germans.

Q: While you were there the SS20s and other things were happening but Berlin was not being used as a way of ratcheting up tension?

VAN HEUVEN: No, but the geographic position of Berlin continued to make it vulnerable. We were still in the situation in which any physical move by the Soviets against Berlin would have triggered major consequences. The anticipation that this would happen was less high than it had been earlier, when Khrushchev made his threats. In the time I was posted there in the '60s, I went through some miniblockades. But the reality was that Berlin remained a hostage and a touchstone of East-West relations.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover on your Bonn time?

VAN HEUVEN: I have a couple of things that I should like to mention. One is that I spent a good deal of time with the political/military section on the issue of the conditions

in which the U.S. forces lived in Germany at the time. The Germans, being systematic and relatively well funded, were providing excellent new barracks for their forces. We typically used World War II facilities that had been cobbled together and were kept together by continued cobbling. There was a constant refrain of the old saw that our mechanics were lying on their back in the mud and snow to repair the trucks and the Germans had these wonderful new facilities with clean pits, and that the living conditions in the German barracks were superior to the ones we were occupying. To a large degree, that was a reflection of the factual situation. There was considerable pressure on the part of the U.S. military to improve the quality of service to the servicemen in Germany. The embassy became the vehicle through which that concern was brought to bear on the German government at the political level and over a long period of time. For a while, I was the point man as political counselor on that offensive. We were dealing with a politician named Dohnanyi, brother of the famous conductor, who was the special negotiator of the chancellor on this matter. There were a number of exchanges between the ambassador and Dohnanyi, the foreign minister, and every politician we could get our hands on. It all had to do with getting German resources in order to improve the barracks situation for us. It was a tough issue. It was not one that got people mad at each other but it did not go very smoothly.

Another issue was that within the embassy we had, I recall, 13 different offices that were run by military personnel. That may seem like an extraordinarily large number. We had three attaches. The large Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) dealt with the defense ministry on procurement issues. There were a number of intelligence offices which interfaced with different parts of the German intelligence system. We had military running all over the place, with their agenda, their own marching orders, and their own home offices in Washington or at European headquarters. At times it was a little difficult to keep that all together. Frank Meehan, the DCM, had the brilliant idea that he would hand over this function to me and that I would coordinate all this. I was then an FSO-2, which gave me star rank. My job was to try and pull together the O-6s at the colonel or captain level. Most were personally friendly to me, but not about to shed too much of their autonomy, even when faced with a direct ambassadorial order that they accept my coordinating role. So I found myself practicing the skills of diplomacy within the walls of the embassy. I still think back to this episode with a mix of amazement and disbelief. We kicked around the idea that maybe we ought to get a one star in there and make him the head of all the military. But DOD would have none of that. The attaches came from DIA. The procurement folks came from the Pentagon. They didn't have the same bosses, so the idea of having a one star simply didn't fit the uniformed forces' notion of how to do these things. So we muddled along, continuing to deal with all of these military staffers individually as best we could. This happens in every embassy except that the number of different billets in Bonn, some of them behind sets of locked doors, were not easy to penetrate.

I finally should say a word about the Holocaust. When I got to Bonn in 1978, the Holocaust was not a subject that anyone discussed or cared to discuss. It was taboo. Most Germans were aware at our initial attempts at denazification, which we had quickly given

up. Basically, Germans were content to leave things the way they were. And then came the American movie about the Holocaust.

Q: "The Holocaust." It was a TV serial. This was the first one that had really come out that had spelled things out.

VAN HEUVEN: It was for TV. It made its way onto German TV in serial form. It had a profound effect on German opinion. Not that it affected U.S.-German relations. Neither did it affect the German position in Europe. Nor did it affect where Germany stood with respect to the Soviets. But it broke a logjam in the German public psyche. It was present and had to be broken at some point, but it needed a trigger. That TV series was the trigger. On the evening after the showing of the first segment, Ruth and I had been invited by several couples as part of the process of being vetted for membership in a local Rotary Club. We found ourselves in the company of people who were older than we were. They had all been through the war as adults. That TV show was the order of conversation that evening. As I listened to everybody talk about it, what emerged was that, yes, they had known about it; no, they had no part of it, and they were, of course, opposed to it. So, in a way, it was an unsatisfactory discussion to listen to that night. But at least there was a discussion. I also remember shortly thereafter having one of my periodic lunches with an official in the chancellery, Hannes Braeutigam. He later became UN PermRep in New York and subsequently justice minister in the state of Brandenburg. Hannes was a good friend, a calm, considerate, thoughtful individual. We discussed the Holocaust show, and he cried. I don't recall any other occasion in the course of my many business lunches with diplomatic colleagues when I found myself talking to a man who was crying. But he was. This outing of the Holocaust had a deep effect. It made possible a public discussion by people of my age, between parents and children, and among children, and in schools, that was all a part of the western part of Germany coming to terms with its past.

Q: Was the feeling that this was probably a good thing or that this was going to screw up our relationships?

VAN HEUVEN: It was neither. It was a process of people all of a sudden looking at themselves and letting go of what was inside them but had remained suppressed. This was not seen in terms of how it would affect Germany's standing. What I was watching on those two occasions that I just mentioned was the emergence all of a sudden of a personal realization of something that deeply affected them. That evening with the Rotarians, there was no need for me or for Ruth to say anything. We just listened. This was not an American-German discussion. This was a German discussion. It was a discussion of Germans who had never talked to each other about this but all of whom had been through it.

Q: You left Germany when?

VAN HEUVEN: In '81 and went on home leave. I had no assignment until the first week in September, when I got a call that I was going to the Senior Seminar. That's where I

spent the next year.

Q: This would be '81-'82.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes.

Q: How did you find it?

VAN HEUVEN: It was wonderful. It was just as wonderful as my year at Princeton but in a different way because it was a different program. First of all, it was Washington-based. Secondly, the interaction of the members of the class was tighter than my interaction had been with the other members of the group at Princeton. In the Seminar we were together all the time, basically teaching each other, and interfacing with each other in different settings, in different places, for eight months. It was a mind-stretching experience in many ways. It was good to get out of all the issues that I had been dealing with for six years in northern European embassies and to focus on something entirely different, such as the fishing industry in New England, the status of Puerto Rico, the future of IBM in San Jose, California, the output of the Boeing Company, oil extraction in Colorado- (end of tape)

Through the Seminar, I also made very good friends with people of different backgrounds from the Foreign Service. The group was a good one. The military were okay, but I don't think the military sees the Seminar as a choice assignment for its officers.

Q: The War College was what got their top people.

VAN HEUVEN: That's right. Later on, my wife was a member of the War College at Fort McNair. She had an equally positive experience there. Of course, they had a far greater number of military officers than we had in the Seminar. The Agency and the Department of Agriculture sent solid people. But I think the Agency was parking someone they couldn't otherwise place, and he didn't contribute much, partly because of the culture he came from, which was the DO. But it was a good group of Foreign Service officers, a rich group, and a diversified group.

Q: In '82, whither?

VAN HEUVEN: By the late spring, I had been paneled to go to Geneva as DCM. I regarded this as a dream post, having been to Geneva as a student, having served there for long periods at conferences - the Law of the Sea, Human Rights - speaking good French, knowing people there, liking Switzerland, loving Geneva, and having basically walked every street on foot in Geneva during my eight months of TDY, and returning to the UN environment that I had cut my teeth on in the beginning when I was in L in New York and in Geneva.

The ambassador was Geoffrey Swaebe, a senior businessman from California. He had

been head of the May Company. He was a personal friend of Nancy Reagan's. He and Mrs. Swaebe were self-assured, approachable people. Geoff had a very good sense for people and situations. He could not have reached that stage in business life without those qualities. I had one interview with him in Washington, at the end of which I was informed that he had chosen me as his DCM. So I was looking forward to an ambassador I didn't know but whom I thought I could work with. So, in fact, in my last month of the Seminar, I clocked out for about a week and went to Geneva and got briefed there and returned, finished the Seminar, took my summer vacation, and went to post.

I went there in early July in 1982. I left in November of 1984.

Q: What mission was this?

VAN HEUVEN: This was the United States Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations. I have never had a visiting card with such a long title before or after. I was the DCM. Our offices were located in a spanking new building overlooking the lake and the United Nations, on the west side of the lake. I was parked for a couple of weeks in the apartment that had been occupied by my predecessor, Don Eller. But the mission had located a residence across the lake in Chene Bourg, north of Old Town. It was a brand new villa surrounded by a wall which I'm sure our security officer liked for that reason. It was a spacious and elegant house with a nice garden. By the time Ruth joined me, I was already installed. Like the residence that we enjoyed in Bonn, this one was spanking new. We put it to good use. I had to, because the entertainment responsibilities of the job were enormous. But I can come back to that later.

What was the post like? It is a post that handles the U.S. relations with a large number of organizations. These included the UN proper (with the Office of Human Rights), plus UNCTAD [UN Committee on Trade and Development], the International Telecommunications Union, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, the UN High Commission for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, the International Wildlife Association and others.. We were also doing business with the International Committee on Migration [ICM]. There are a lot of other UN-associated organizations in Geneva. There were also many NGOs. We dealt with them all. When I got there, the U.S. Mission was in a heavy operational relationship with ICM and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is a Swiss organization that implements the Geneva Conventions. There had been incidents and many deaths in the refugee camps in Lebanon, Sabra, and Shatila. There was an immediate need for moving refugees. I found myself involved in the logistics of those operations. Typically, when things like that happen in the world, NGOs get involved. You don't see much about this operational side in the press, but things have to be done and paid for, and the systems management is often in U.S. hands. That is where the U.S. Mission in Geneva came in.

There were other negotiations in Geneva that involved the U.S. but that were not part of the U.S. Mission. The START negotiation was independent of the U.S. Mission. It had its own ambassadors. The CCD, where I had served in my earlier days, was operating independently with its own ambassador. The GATT and everything that later became the World Trade Organization was handled by yet another American ambassador. They were all independent and we had no direct policy relationship with them, except that the Mission did provide the logistics for all of these operations in terms of the housing, offices, and transportation.

Q: It seems like you should have gone through the Conrad Hilton School of Hotelierie.

VAN HEUVEN: We had a lot of visitors. All these organizations attracted many delegations throughout the year, some of them quite large. The WHO would draw the presence of an Assistant Secretary of Health and Education, but also of the Surgeon General, Dr. "Chick" Koop. The annual meeting and the meeting of the board of the International Labor Organization would also bring in large delegations. The officers in the political session in the Mission followed the WHO, the IPU, the ILO, the WMO, and WIPO. I deliberately mention these acronyms because Geneva is a town of acronyms. We had to keep track of what was going on in the bureaucracies of these organizations because, typically, up to one-third of the funding was American. We had major equities in many of the programs of these organizations. So we were heavily involved in watching and influencing the operations and the policies of these organizations. This meant that the ambassador and I had direct dealings with the directors general of the WHO and the ILO, Dr. Mahler and Monsieur Blanchard, and their colleagues in other organizations. We also entertained them and other senior staffs, and they entertained us. I already mentioned that the entertainment level at Geneva was intense. It wasn't just all a matter of eating and drinking. It was affording opportunities all day long to work with contacts and to get our job done.

The role of Ambassador Swaebe was unusual. He had no questions about the fact that he was the boss. But he had his own notion of how a DCM ought to operate. An example of that approach was that we had a daily staff meeting which he attended, but which I chaired. At some point in the proceedings, I would of course call on the ambassador, as I did on the others. But he never interfered. The other element of his approach to dealing with me was that he wanted to spend a lot of time with me. Typically, I would be in early to read the cable traffic. A little later, we would have our staff meeting. Then I was ready to get to my desk. But after staff meeting, Geoff Swaebe wanted to sit down for a nice long chat. It made me uneasy because I could just visualize the in-box growing by the minute. In retrospect, however, Geoff Swaebe's approach was a fine way of operating. It served him, because he heard a lot from me. And it served me, because I had his support. His approach was to give me full authority. He backed me up in public even though he might tell me later in private that I might have done something differently. So I knew that I did not have to worry about the ambassador. As a result, I had a lot of authority in the Mission, since everybody knew that the relationship was solid. Ruth and I got along well with the Swaebes. We shared some very amusing and funny incidents. Swaebe did not

like to go to bed late, so by the time it was 10:30 at dinner parties at the residence, he would tell me, "I'm going up stairs now. You say 'Goodbye' to my guests." At another time, we got instructions to make the residence available for a dinner for four people. The ambassador was not to attend the dinner. It was a mystery to us what was going on. We proceeded as ordered, and the staff set the table for four. The ambassador arranged to be out of the house. Four men showed up, had dinner and left. Geoff had told me earlier, "I want you to come to the house when they're gone and we'll just chew the fat for a bit." So around 10:30 in the evening I turned up at the residence and then, just by chance, as I was leaving, we looked at the guest book. Like perfect gentlemen, all four guests had signed their name in the guest book. So we knew what was going on.

Q: What was it?

VAN HEUVEN: The visitors were there to discuss the Israel/Palestine issue. It was arranged out of Washington. It was on U.S. ground.

Geoff also had an original approach to efficiency reports. He explained to me that in the May Company, when they hired somebody, he would have that person tell the board what he proposed to do for the company. That was then committed to writing. Then, at the end of the year, that same person had to take that checklist back to the board with a notation as to what he had accomplished. So the board could see the difference, if any. Operating on that principle, he said, "You write your efficiency report and I will cut out all the cr-p." In the Foreign Service at that time, it was already customary to ask officers to provide at least raw input for efficiency reports. It was then the rater's job to put it all together. But Geoff took the process one step further. He said the only person who can really know what he's doing is the person himself, and the only person who is the best judge of saying whether the job he has done is the person himself. It made sense to me and I found it helpful. It cut through the mythical notion that efficiency reports are somehow magically written by raters who spend an entire year thinking about their subordinate's performance. Swaabe's introduction of real world practices seemed to make sense to me. I did of course run into the fact that my predecessor, Don Eller, being a nice guy, had been giving top ratings to everybody he rated for several years. It fell to me to ratchet that down a little bit. The practice of overinflated reports was widely known to be common in the Foreign Service, but the situation in Geneva was out of bounds. My new approach, of course, was not all that welcome. But with the ambassador's authority, I did make it stick.

The issues. One issue that I dealt with directly was as cochairman - with the British DCM - of the Geneva Group. This was the group of countries that contributed the most money to the United Nations system. So,, Switzerland was on this group even though it was not a member of the UN. Our job was to keep UN budgets in check. These were the Reagan years and there was administration and congressional pressure to keep the exponential expansion of the expenditures of these organizations in check. We had an Assistant Secretary of State by the name of Newell, a young man. He had come in as a worker bee with the Reagan election and had been rewarded with the job. He tried to carry out this zero growth budget idea, which caused all sorts of difficulties, given the fact that even

inflation would cause a certain increase every year in these already large budgets. Nonetheless, the two officers who were working with me on this, and my cochairman, the British deputy chief of mission, David Moss, spent a lot of time not only jawboning the Directors General of the organizations, but also going into detailed budgetary review of the budgets of these organizations. That was a complex and difficult undertaking, because these financial directors held high UN rank and did not take kindly to having outsiders come in and look over their shoulders, because they had been used to doing business for many years without that sort of supervision. So we found ourselves in an uphill fight all the way. While we claimed some success, it was never enough to satisfy our masters in Washington.

Q: I would have thought that Geneva would have been a hotbed or a softbed of time servers, bureaucrats, of other nations, a good place to put people who were the relatives of the powers that be in their country and that this would have meant a heavily padded bureaucracy there.

VAN HEUVEN: It really wasn't. At my level I was dealing with top-level people, who were bright, motivated, turf conscious, and mission conscious. The Director General of the World Health Organization had programs that any reasonable person would say were good, to eradicate disease, tackle HIV, and go after all sorts of smaller diseases that could be handled effectively by the WHO, and were. He had around him a group of lieutenants who were excellent in their field, good doctors, good administrators, and a lot of loyal others who spent many days and months in unattractive countries trying to implement those programs. As to the work of the UNHCR, most of the staff was in the worst parts of the world trying to deal with immense refugee problems in camps. If you wanted to have a soft life, you would not want to be engaged in these activities. You wouldn't want to work for UNHCR. The International Committee of the Red Cross was always active, in dangerous places where there was conflict. At every level, people were risking their lives to do their job implementing the Geneva Conventions. Sure, there was always the odd loafer, the odd obviously misassigned person. But in my time I found more chaff and misplaced patronage at the Secretariat in New York than I did in Geneva.

Now, Geneva is, of course, a pleasant place to be. Some of the sinecures, like the staff of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which droned on year after year after year, got bored and became a bit of a bore. But to a large degree, Geneva was doing the things that the world wanted, like delivering the mail, forecasting the weather, and protecting patents. The international staffs were smart folk who knew what they wanted and who were willing to fight for their budgets and argue for their programs.

Q: What other points should we cover in this period?

VAN HEUVEN: I was often confronted by questions from my colleagues who were posted in Geneva for the first time. They would call on me and ask: "Well, what do I do,?" because this is not a bilateral post. There is not a government to talk to. There is not a country to observe and report on. And my answer was that all they needed to do was get

involved in the operation of the international organizations that the diplomatic missions had relationships with. Most of my colleagues took that advice, and had happy assignments, though I was surprised to see how ill-prepared many diplomats, including some of our own, were for this multilateral work. It was not something that they were used to. Certainly, a lot of Europeans were not, although many Europeans, once they got used to it, were very good at it. It involved giving direction to large bureaucracies, focusing on the politics and policy issues in the Executive Committee or the Board or the General Conference of a certain organization, exercising advisory roles of some sensitivity to visiting delegations on all sorts of issues, whether they had to deal with the Israeli-Palestine conflict or the China issue or the Cuba issue. I should mention another realm of activity, namely human rights. The human rights part of the UN Secretariat was located in Geneva. In the old days, I had been a member of our delegation to the Human Rights Commission, working for Mary Lord and then Marietta Tree. So I knew how that operated. This time, I was watching Dick Schifter, who arrived as the new representative to the Human Rights Commission. Dick sought me out because it was clear that I needed his help and he needed mine. He needed mine to do his business, to meet people, to lobby, to have access to people, and to entertain. Ruth and I frequently did so at our house. We would have a large number of people for dinner - Dick and his human rights crowd. Dick also needed advice on how to operate within the Human Rights Commission. That was a sensitive thing because Dick, who became a very good friend and has remained a good friend ever since, came from a school of thought - lawyer that he was - that held that if somebody said "I will do this," then that would happen. But, as he assiduously lobbied over dinners, drinks, and otherwise, with beautiful argumentation for a particular position or a particular vote, he discovered that, when the vote occurred, those colleagues whom he thought had told him they would vote one way, did not. And he would come to me and say, "Well, wasn't he supposed to vote with us? They told me they would." I had to say, "That's the way the world works. This is not a legal setting that you're in. You're in a political setting, where you have to realize that maybe they accepted your dinner invitation because they felt no way out, but their reaction to the dinner may have been to get as far away from the U.S. as they could as soon as they went home. You're just seeing the effect of that." Anyhow, something like that was always going on and Dick soon learned the ropes, and he became a superb head of delegation. I was not a member of the delegation myself, although I think there were times when my name was on the list. At any given time, there might be 20-50 delegations in town for all sorts of meetings. Some of them were one-man shows; they didn't need our care or input or help. Others needed it all the time. One issue which always drew the Mission staff and us in was that of Israeli representation. We had to be ever watchful for efforts to throw Israel out of meetings. That's where the political section and I did get involved a lot. We would pull the strings of the resident network in Geneva in order to keep that from occurring.

But how do you control all these loose horses? Ambassador Swaebe made it very clear that he wanted every U.S. head of delegation, no matter how small the delegation or insignificant the meeting, to call on him on his first day in town. With his authority he could pretty well make this requirement stick. When he wasn't there, they called on me.

When they called on him, I sat in. So at least he and I had an idea as to why the people were there, who sent them, what they were supposed to achieve. Then we would tell them about any problems that we saw for them. Some of them were very happy to get advice. Others felt that this was just an intrusion on their prerogatives to operate on their own. So an awful lot of diplomacy was required in dealing with our countrymen, who all felt that they had been chosen by God to come to Geneva to do the Lord's work and who were miffed if they felt we were trying to keep them from doing so.

I should also mention the fact that we were backstopping the logistics of all the other permanent delegations. This took quite an amount of my time. The afternoon of my arrival, on my first day at post, I went to a reception. Kitty Fields, the wife of Ambassador Lou Fields, then ambassador to the CCD, came up to me and said, pointing her finger at my tie and grabbing it, "You have my garden furniture." From that point on I knew that I was going to have to deal with a lot of goods - furniture, china, official cars - and that I better be tough. We had a lot of ambassadors in town. Ed Rowney was doing START, with his deputy, Jim Goodby. Both had the rank of ambassador. Paul Nitze was doing the intermediate range missile negotiations. He and his deputy, Mike Glitman, both ranked ambassador. Ambassador Lou Fields was at CCD. There was an ambassador of GATT. So there were just six resident ambassadors right there, not to mention the one that was dealing with UNCTAD. At one time, I counted 13 persons in town with the rank of ambassador, not all of whom were resident, but seven of whom were. They all needed housing, official cars, drivers, and something to show like china and garden furniture. Guess on whose door they came knocking? They didn't want to bother Ambassador Swaebe with those things but they sure as hell wanted them from me. So I had to be judicious, polite, nice, and tough. I had only so much to give out. The problem was that each of them was funded in different ways, not always by the State Department. So, in some cases, we controlled the funds and sometimes they came with their own funds, and they handled these funds themselves. So there was lots of material on which to exercise diplomacy right in-house.

Q: Do you have any stories about prima donnas?

VAN HEUVEN: John Davis Lodge comes to mind. Though quite old, he was alive, almost miraculously, in those days and he was the ambassador in Bern. When he tried to stand, he had on occasion to be literally supported by his staff. Despite all of this, John Lodge added a certain cachet to that position and gave it a class that only a Lodge could. I had worked on the UN delegation headed by his younger brother, so I was familiar with the Lodge style. Lodge saw himself as the prime American in Switzerland. Since he was the bilateral ambassador, he was right. But when people came to Geneva they came not to Switzerland; they came for UN business. In many cases, Lodge couldn't have cared less. But when he thought about the personage who was coming was within his realm, he did get interested and he would come down. Once, George Bush, who was then Vice President, came to introduce a new American position at the CCD. That made Lou Fields the ambassador he was dealing with. Geoff was not in town. I was Charge. Lodge was coming down. So I had Fields and Lodge, and myself. Every other ambassador in town

also wanted a piece of the Vice President. Bush came alone without Mrs. Bush. So we agreed that there would be no spouses at the airport. But as I arrived at the airport, there was Mrs. Kitty Fields. And there was John Lodge, who was almost literally steaming because, as he put it, “The Vice President will come off this plane and he will see you and he will immediately say, “Where is Francesca (Mrs. Lodge)?” He was hot under the collar about the fact that Lou had broken ranks. But what Lou had done was what you would expect Lou to do. He had broken the rules. “I’m going to get Kitty in there.” Well, what then happened was that Bush came off the plane. Lodge was the first to greet him. Then the rest of us greeted him. Then Lodge, who suspected the worst, thought that Fields would play another dirty trick on him, and usurp his place in the motorcade. So he quickly moved away and got into the Vice President’s car, just to be sure that he would be riding with the Vice President, which he was supposed to do anyway, but he just wanted to be sure. At that point, my wife, who was handling the press, released the press and they came with all their photo apparatus. The next day, on the front page of the “International Herald Tribune,” there was a picture of Kitty Fields with her arms open as if to embrace Mr. Bush, and Lou Fields standing behind her, and me right in the middle of the picture, but no Lodge. I called the DCM in Bern at once and said, “Brace yourself when the ambassador reads the press tomorrow.” He handled it as best he could.

Some of the ambassadors were hard to handle. Ed Rowney was modest. With Paul Nitze I never had any problems. Others were more difficult sometimes.

The entertainment part of the job was huge. The count for one year in our house was 4,000 guests for food and drink. One reception was for the executive board of the World Health Organization - all the surgeons general of the world. They all came. I don’t think they had any idea who I was. To them, the reception was just the Americans giving the party in somebody’s house. But I noticed one thing. Nobody smoked. But they drank like fish.

Q: Maybe this is a good time to quit. Let’s pick this up next time in ’84.

VAN HEUVEN: There is a story of my departure from Geneva because I was kicked out by the next ambassador, a political appointee who had been head of GSA. He was uncomfortable in Geneva and had difficulty adjusting to a life that he didn’t know and a role he had trouble grasping. He treated the Mission officers and me roughly, though in the end he gave me a courteous send-off. For a while he tried to do without a DCM. Eventually, the system reasserted itself.

Q: Today is April 8, 2003. You’re dealing with Western Europe from when to when?

VAN HEUVEN: I’m director of the Office of Western European Affairs from December 1984 to the summer of 1987.

Q: When you're talking about Western European affairs, what does that mean?

VAN HEUVEN: The office's responsibility included six countries: France, Spain, Portugal, Malta, the Vatican, and Italy. That is less than Western Europe but that was the way the European Bureau was organized.

Q: Germany sort of stood alone.

VAN HEUVEN: Germany was part of an office called EUR/AGS, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Northern Europe was Britain and the Nordics. That's the way the EUR was structured in those days.

Q: Let's look at our relations with the various countries in this.

VAN HEUVEN: The relations with the French were on the whole good, though with all the irritations that usually accompanied it, mostly on political-military issues - a bottom factor was French annoyance at the American role in Europe. So the French attempted to make their own views felt, and perhaps cut down the American influence. The Spanish relationship in my time was influenced by the base negotiations. The treaty was up and had to be renegotiated. I was part of that team. Two ambassadors, in Madrid, Tom Enders and Reggie Bartholomew, were the leaders of the team in succession. I worked closely with George Bader from the Defense Department. He was a very knowledgeable man with a huge amount of NATO experience and a respected and senior figure. He represented DOD on the delegation.

Relations with Portugal were uneventful during that time. The Azores Base Agreement was in effect and there were no major issues.

Q: It seems like with Portugal, all rest upon the Azores base schedule. That's always a very busy time.

VAN HEUVEN: I remember being quite interested in Portuguese politics. The embassy was interested, too. Portugal had become a democracy through a peaceful coup, moving away from a long dictatorship into a democracy. So, the internal political situation was of interest. Portugal was a recent member of NATO. And we had a domestic Portuguese element, mostly in Rhode Island and Massachusetts, which was personified by Senator Claiborne Pell, who was at that time chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So there was a domestic Portuguese dimension. There were some Portuguese elected members of the House of Representatives from the West Coast as well. So, the Portuguese did have a few oars into American politics.

Q: We'll just touch on these and we'll go back to some of them. Italy?

VAN HEUVEN: Italy was a firm NATO ally. The country had allowed the stationing of intermediate nuclear range weapons systems as part of the NATO double track decision.

Italy was also increasingly the place where U.S. forces were based, not just at SOUTHCOM, the NATO headquarters at Naples. We had an air presence up at Aviano in northern Italy and an army unit in Vicenza. So even though it wasn't apparent at that time, we were already seeing the precursor of what turned out to be the case about a decade later, when Italy was the home station for more U.S. forces than Germany. With a huge emigrant Italian population spread all over the important states in the United States, Italy was a major factor in domestic U.S. politics. Many prominent Americans of Italian extraction were interested and involved in that relationship. So was the Congress. The American-Italian Association was powerful, to the point that its leaders felt it was their right to designate the next American ambassador to Italy. The government of Italy (end of tape)

-Craxi and Andreotti, a government well disposed toward the United States but chafing under the image of being less than a prime power in Europe, always wanting to be regarded by us as one of the big countries, and frequently displaying an inferiority complex about itself.

Malta was a thorn, but a minor one, in our flesh. It had a socialist government that had its own ideas about policy between Libya and Europe, and exaggerated notions about the role it could play. One constant about Maltese politics was that the island needed money. The Maltese saw us as a likely source of that money. So they would cause more of a stir than their size would suggest.

[Portion of interview not recorded]

-and a capacity for acting that really was astonishing. The EUR Bureau had a strong front office. It set the tone for the rest of the Bureau which gave the Bureau the sense of itself that elsewhere in the Department earned it the reputation of being exceptionalist and stuffy. I don't know whether I've already put on tape the story about Alex Bloch, the EUR officer who was thought to have passed information to a Soviet agent and made news by being arrested by the FBI in Washington. As press coverage about Alex unfolded, Avis Bohlen, a veteran EUR hand, concluded a conversation with me on the subject with the words: "It is terrible for the Bureau." Maybe it was terrible for the United States. Maybe it was terrible for the Foreign Service. But for Avis, it was terrible for the Bureau. That was a reflection of the Bureau's views of where it stood in the universe. It stood pretty high.

Q: Let's go back to France. In '84-'87, Ronald Reagan was President. How did France fit into the NATO framework? Technically, they were out but they were kind of in. How did they work?

VAN HEUVEN: France was a full member of NATO. But France did not take its seat in the DPC, the Defense Planning Committee. So at the meeting of defense ministers, there was no French defense minister. There was a French foreign minister at the meeting of foreign ministers. At summit, of course, France was represented by the French president,

often accompanied by the French prime minister. So France was both in and out, but it was far more in than out. As far as the French military were concerned, they just as soon would have liked to be fully in. In fact, SACEUR had working arrangements with his French opposite number, the French chief of staff, that were not widely publicized, although they were not exactly secret, under which French units of battalion strength were going to the U.S. ranges in Germany to train and exercise with U.S. forces. The then French chief of staff, Admiral Lanxade, told me a few years later, when I had a conversation with him in his office, that this was of high value for the French army. That characterized the feeling also of the French navy. The French Naval Attache told me once that the French navy found it easier to cooperate with the U.S. Navy in Europe than with the French army.

Q: Slightly before this, I was consul general in Naples. Admiral Crowe, then CINCSOUTH, was saying the French navy was fine. They would participate in maneuvers and found a very effective course.

VAN HEUVEN: The French military saw it much to their advantage to be part of the larger framework where they could interface with and cooperate with and work with other NATO forces and learn from them, and leverage their own power by being part of that game. What Admiral Crowe said at the time was true then. It was true in my time. It is true today. The French military would just as soon be part of the show than be on the sidelines.

So, the problems were not with the military. They were occasionally with the French defense minister, although I don't recall any particular incidents. Ever present was the neuralgic issue of nuclear policy, with the French keeping their national say over their own national nuclear forces, unlike the British, who had put them under NATO command. But the questions remained how they would ever be used, and what the theory for their use would be.

The problems we had with the French often had to do with style. Many diplomats from the Quai d'Orsay were trained at the Ecole Normale Superieure. They were part of a corps of civilian-trained experts. They thought highly of themselves, and with reason. But they also had an attitude that they always knew best. I do recall that, when taking the job, I made my rounds here in Washington, and went to the French embassy to call on the charge because the ambassador wasn't there that week. It was late in the afternoon, in early December. The charge, Fred Sieffert-Gaillardin, received me in a dark office which reminded me of the opening acts of Gounod's Faust - a desk, a dim lamp, and a person sitting, and barely illuminated. The entire conversation was in French. He opened by saying "Welcome, Mr. van Heuven. There are three things I want to say to you." This was without any preliminaries. "First of all, our countries have never fought each other. Secondly, I'm delighted that there is somebody in your job who speaks French." This was a dig at my predecessor, Ed Peck, who didn't. "And thirdly, I'm a very busy man, so if you'll please excuse me," whereupon I left. So that's how we met. Later, we cooperated effectively on the Chirac and Mitterrand visits to the United States. He later became

ambassador to Canada. But he did reflect an attitude, and the attitude showed in my first meeting with him. But I could get over this obstacle, because I put myself on his terrain and could speak his language. I also knew his country. I had also learned, while a student and later visitor in Paris, to cope with this sort of rudeness. Eventually, he regarded me as up to the mark. But if I had been another Peck, who didn't speak French, I think I would have had a problem.

Q: The relation between the Americans and the French has always been a difficult one and it's showing in 2003. The gap is probably as bad as it's ever been. I'm surprised that the French didn't want to make a friend of somebody in the State Department who was dealing with their affairs. It strikes me as being counterproductive.

VAN HEUVEN: With me, it wasn't counterproductive. I had enough experience in Paris, with the French language, and with Frenchmen, to understand what I was seeing and not be upset by it. I worked well with Fred later on. But the people like Fred, and there were quite a few, didn't really see it as their job to make friends the way diplomats are expected to do. They sometimes felt that it was their duty to tell you what the rules were. That would come to the fore on occasion. My experience earlier and subsequently, both with younger French diplomats and also at a later stint as a Board member of an industrial company in the United States that was wholly owned by SNECNA, was far different. The young diplomats, some of whom are in the service now, are doing a wonderful job with American colleagues. They don't seem to have those hang-ups. They understand the United States. They have no hang-ups about preserving the French language. They are comfortable using English. The businessmen even more so. They couldn't care less, as long as the business ran right. They worked happily with Americans. So the attitude comes from a particular set in the French upper class. French foreign policy is still run by an upper class far more than the United States is. That elite, which is specially trained, educated, and well interconnected, operates with an air of authority and a sense of self that is reflected in their dealings with the outside. Paradoxically, it doesn't always serve the French cause.

Q: It's sort of unique in that their top educated people go into government and often into the finance ministry.

VAN HEUVEN: That's right.

Q: This is a squandering of resources to my mind.

VAN HEUVEN: The *inspecteur de finances* does more than either a customs agent or an IRS official here. An *inspecteur de finances* can fulfill a wide variety of functions, including the diplomatic. In any event, my colleagues in EUR and L had to suffer through these problems in dealing with the French. Sometimes we had excellent personal friendships or good working relationships, but still we could have tremendous rows about details.

Q: Were you there when the disco was bombed in Berlin and we attacked Libya and the French balked?

VAN HEUVEN: The disco was at the time not thought to be connected to Libya. That connection was established only later. The overflight issue arose in connection with our air strike out of the blue, so the overflight was not on the front page of the newspapers. Of course, we requested permission. We got it from the British and we didn't get it from the French. Later, I thought that, had history repeated itself, the British would probably have refused takeoff rights, and the French would have let us overfly. But that's the way it worked out at the time. The air force flew around France. It made the mission longer and trickier. But it didn't affect the result.

Q: These things are also singular. Did our military bear a grudge?

VAN HEUVEN: No, because we never had overflight rights over France. I don't think even our regular military traffic to Frankfurt went over France. I think it went over the Netherlands and Belgium. By the same token, we never had overflight rights over Switzerland either, although there were occasional exceptions. I remember being on a Luftwaffe plane once, taking a German defense ministry official from Bonn to the Sixth Fleet for a visit. The Swiss gave overflight permission. But that was a German military plane. They asked for permission and it was granted.

Q: Let's talk about the state visits or the visits of higher ups.

VAN HEUVEN: There was a visit of Chirac, who was then prime minister, to Washington which I had a hand in. There was also a visit of President Mitterrand to Governors Island on the Fourth of July of 1987.

Q: This was the 100th anniversary of the inauguration of the Statue of Liberty, wasn't it?

VAN HEUVEN: Right. It was a full-blown visit. I spent a lot of time on that with Fred Sieffert-Gaillardin. I also happened to be with Secretary Shultz in Paris on the day that Chirac became prime minister for the first time. Chirac wanted to see Shultz, so that afternoon at 4:00, two hours after Chirac had been installed in office, we were in his office for a business call.

Chirac was a robust man in manner, appearance, behavior, talk, and thinking. He was also impetuous, the Lyndon Johnson of French politics. I remember another occasion when I was the notetaker accompanying Secretary Shultz in the fall of 1986 in New York for lunch with Chirac. There were four people in the room: Chirac, the French notetaker, Shultz, and me. Since Chirac was the host, he led off with a litany of complaints about American policy. He had a thing about our behavior in Chad. He had other beefs about what we were doing in Africa. As he was talking, I noticed the danger sign that all of us who had been around Secretary Shultz were aware of. When Shultz was angry, the color of his neck would get red. As Chirac continued with his tirade, I watched the color of

Shultz's neck get red. Meanwhile, Chirac was intemperate not only in the points he made but in the way he made them. Shultz held back and waited until his turn came. Then he let go. That was useful. But the ensuing conversation got so bad that the French notetaker and I looked at each other, and we both put down our pens. We just stopped writing. In that conversation between Chirac and Shultz in Paris on the first day of his being prime minister, he was also feeling his oats. He was expansive. He was not so much seeking Shultz's advice. He was there to let Shultz know what he was thinking about a whole variety of issues. There was a small group of four or five on his side. I was the only one of a couple with the Secretary. That was my first impression of Chirac as a robust character. Later on, on his official visit to Washington, he was more of a regular guy. He made jokes and he was earthy. Asked what sort of entertainment he wanted at the White House dinner in his honor, he came up with some rock star's name. We wondered "Where did he get that?" Well, it was his daughter who had been advising him. His daughter was familiar with that scene, being a generation younger. And Chirac was listening to his daughter. So in that sense he was with it. He was a little rough on details, in the sense that he was inattentive to details. But he had his eye on the big picture. And he had a politician's instinct of moving in the right direction, of not trying to swim against the current. What I've seen of Chirac later on bears out the impressions I had of him at the time.

I never experienced Mitterrand directly, although I had a lot to do with the arrangements for his visit to Governors Island. I was on the island on July 4. We had engaged in interminable negotiations with the French on details, like whether President Reagan's helicopter would land first on the island or President Mitterrand's helicopter would land first. The French argued that, because he had already arrived in the United States, as honored guest he should get precedence. And the White House, having its own sense about who had precedence within the United States, held a different view. There was a long argument about the minor matter of where to place the French aircraft carrier in New York Harbor. This Fourth of July featured a long parade of warships from friendly countries down the Hudson, led by the Iowa with the U.S. President aboard. The French said that "We'll have the French president on the French carrier, the carrier will not be at anchor, and then the Iowa will salute the French carrier." The U.S. Navy and the White House were not about to have that happen in full view of American television cameras. Finally, after a lot of tos and fros, a Coast Guard captain in the room - all these planning meetings took place in New York - said, "Gentlemen, it is time for some plain sailor's talk. There will be a current of about 6.5 knots. There will be 50,000 vessels at anchor watching this parade. If you don't anchor the aircraft carrier under those conditions, there will be accidents. That disposed of the argument. But the French, not to be outdone, arranged at the last minute for Mitterrand not to be aboard when the Iowa passed. He went into the City, to the French consulate to visit with the French community of New York City. So they got around that. But we spent literally hours on that issue and similar issues. So the French were very prickly and very difficult.

That said, there were some other comparisons where we didn't look too good. I remember going to Paris with Secretary Shultz. We had an aircraft full of people, including press.

We arrived at Le Bourget, north of Paris, and we had a 50-car motorcade into town that mixed in with the rush hour. You can imagine what that did to traffic. Conversely, when Foreign Minister Dumas visited Washington shortly thereafter, he had two people with him. Because of some security threat having nothing to do with the French, but with the Israeli situation, we had blocked off D Street in front of the State Department. This meant that Dumas had to get out of his car on 21st Street and walk all the way to the main entrance. They arrived on foot without any escort, just three people. I greeted them at the door and took them up. Compared with our 50-car motorcade, they looked good in comparison.

Q: Were we concerned about the French doing things like selling frigates to Taiwan, dealing with the Soviets? Were there any issues that came up?

VAN HEUVEN: There probably were, but I have no present recollection that they were anything more than the ordinary raft of issues. Typically, any briefing paper for a meeting with the French would have 10-12 issues. They changed somewhat with time. But they never in my time peaked to the proportions of an international crisis.

On the subject of Paris, I should say a word about the American embassy there. During my time, we had two ambassadors, Evan Galbraith and then Joe Rogers. Galbraith was a Yale and a friend of Bill Buckley. Evan was a nice man. I'd met him before in Gstaad. Then I met him again in Paris. The Yale connection made it easy to deal with him. He was not much older. He was a conservative businessman. He had excellent relations with the French business community and spent a lot of time on that. The French business community was by that time already firmly of the view that American methods had to be adopted if France were to compete successfully. So in a way, Evan was with the tide, if not ahead of the tide. He didn't have much use for socialists and he spent very little time with them. So when it came to an overall understanding and view of France, he was an uneven barometer. What I remember most about Galbraith is his departure. When he left Paris, Mrs. Galbraith stayed on a little bit in the residence. She had trouble separating herself from Paris. He didn't balk at his being recalled, but evidently she did. So she stayed on. There was a month or six weeks before Joe and Honey Rogers were arriving to take up their new position. But the six weeks got to be four weeks and then it got to be two weeks and Mrs. Galbraith was still in residence on the Rue St. Honore. We knew she had to get out before the new ambassador arrived. But then Mrs. Galbraith came up with the notion that it would be useful for her to stay on and help Joe and Honey to find their way around in their new environment. She saw herself as the Girl Scout in this whole affair. We were literally less than a week away from the arrival of the new ambassador, and Mrs. Galbraith was still in the residence, showing no signs of departing. Messages from the DG, incidentally, had no effect, because Mrs. Galbraith felt no loyalty whatsoever to the DG, who was George Vest. George was not in her chain of command. So who was going to actually move her out of the residence? The task fell to Jack Maresca, the DCM, to do this somehow. I called Jack and said, "Jack, I've got an interesting assignment for you." Of course he was well aware of the problem. He didn't quite want to become the designated hitter, but I think he felt it coming. In the event, Mrs.

Galbraith left about a day before the arrival of the Rogers. It was a close call. Ambassador Galbraith was nowhere to be seen on this whole issue. He left it to us to persuade his wife.

A word about Spain. The main issue in my three years was the renegotiation of the base agreement. The most neuralgic part of that base agreement involved our use of Torrejon, near Madrid. We had the use of two other bases: Rota and Zaragoza. The 16th Air Wing was based at Torrejon. The old agreement had expired. The two men under whose leadership I worked on this issue made that new agreement happen. The first was Tom Enders, a classmate of mine at Yale, whom I knew well. When Tom left, Reggie Bartholomew took over. I had also known him for a long time in the service. Both provided exceptional leadership in achieving a base agreement that Washington could live with. In the end we gave up the use of Torrejon, but we maintained rights in the other bases. Rota was particularly important to us because it had one of the longest runways in Europe and was a key route to the Middle East. But to get this agreement, we had to start from scratch in explaining to the Spanish military, many of whom had cut their teeth in the Franco years, that there were alliance requirements to deal with the Soviet threat to Western Europe, and that these requirements necessitated an American military presence. What was very much in the Spanish mind, however, was the residue of their servility that they felt had accompanied the earlier base agreements. There was a sense that the U.S. had imposed itself on Spain and this sense did not square with the growing consciousness of self that accompanied the fact that Spain had now not only become a democracy, and got rid of Franco, but had become a member of NATO. So we were faced with an attitudinal problem, if nothing else.

Enders and Bartholomew approached this issue differently. Enders, who graduated first in my class at Yale, was an intellect's intellect and he was determined. He explained to the Spanish in the toughest possible terms, without much of a hint of give, why a new agreement was required. In doing so, he reinforced the feelings of servility that our Spanish interlocutors wished to shed. Bartholomew was more adept at constructing a persuasive argument that was not so much "we against you" as "we with you." Not only did he do that with the Spanish, but he also managed to strike a tough deal in Washington, on which both Air Force, DOD, the NSC, and State could all sign off, and eventually also was acceptable to the Committee chairmen on the Hill. So Reggie earned his spurs as much in Washington as he did in Madrid. It was interesting to see how differently these very capable ambassadors handled that situation.

Q: Did you get involved in dealing with our toughest negotiating opponent, the Pentagon?

VAN HEUVEN: Reggie handled that pretty closely. He had his contacts from his previous Pol/Mil assignments. He knew a lot of people who could make decisions. The times I was mostly involved with DOD were when I was actually on the delegation and we were in Madrid. George Bader was there representing the DOD views. Of course, the Joint Staff had their persons, and the Air Force had its representatives. I had a lot more

interaction with those men than I did back here. The deal that was struck in Washington was struck by Reggie pretty much operating by himself, using his established network with DOD, and doing so effectively.

I would like to say a word about Italy where I had two ambassadors to think about. One was Max Rabb at the bilateral embassy. The other was Ambassador Bill Wilson at the Vatican. Every time you have two American ambassadors resident in the same city you're like to have troubles. Rome was no exception. The oddity was that they should have been fast friends, but they weren't. Max had been the man who introduced Reagan to the East Coast and to New York, in particular, long before Mr. Reagan became a successful presidential candidate. Max's reward was going to be the embassy in Switzerland, but then he said, "I don't want Switzerland. I want Rome." So he got Rome. He stayed in Rome for eight years. Wilson and Mrs. Wilson were personal friends of the Reagans in California. He, too, was directly beholden to President Reagan for his position at the Vatican. But despite the fact that their allegiance ran to the same person and ran without intermediaries, the two didn't mix. They didn't mix to such a degree that, when I went to visit as Office Director, I would visit one, leave Italy and go, say, to Malta, which was also part of my territory, come back, and then visit the other. So I avoided mixing of apples and oranges. Every once in a while, Wilson appeared on the social scene in areas that Max regarded as his. Of course, Max was not above turning up on Vatican territory every once and again, because he had friends there, too, even though he was Jewish. So I was a dicey sort of thing. Each embassy had its own administrative operation so one didn't depend on the other. But obviously, the bilateral embassy was large and the Vatican embassy was small, so there was a disproportion.

A word about Max. Max to me was an illustration of the proposition that there are certain things in an embassy that only an ambassador can do. Oddly, it is not so much what the ambassador does in the capital to which he's assigned, but what that ambassador can do for the country to which he is assigned in Washington. What the five Italian political parties making up the government needed most was a sense that they mattered in Washington. Thus, each party had a delegation of "prominenza" that would go to Washington once a year to make the rounds and have their picture taken. Of course, they all wanted to visit the White House. But the Reagan White House was pretty parsimonious in agreeing to appointments. So it was difficult to get appointments for all these Italian visitors. This is where Max earned his spurs. He could get them into the Oval Office and he often did. It would take a phone call from Max to the White House Chief of Staff, going around almost everyone in the bureaucracy. Obviously, not all the appointment requests were honored. Vice President Bush always took up the slack. So the Italians had very good reception at the top in Washington in those days, largely thanks to Ambassador Max Rabb. Max was a little deaf. He didn't speak Italian. I can't imagine that he knew the details of the ins and outs of the Italian politics. But he had a good sense of the importance to Italy to U.S. interests, not the least of which were the U.S. military units stationed in Italy and the strategic geographic location of the country. Max was assisted by a very capable DCM, John Holmes. He basically ran the embassy and never got any trouble from Max Rabb for that. So it was a good combination, though on paper

Max would have been a typical caricature of a political ambassador. But he wasn't. He gave valuable service to his country.

Q: With Wilson, did you get involved in the Wilson escapade?

VAN HEUVEN: One Saturday morning, Peter Murphy, the DCM, with whom I shared many little battles and a few major ones, called and said, "The ambassador is gone and he's off the screen." He had left town without telling anybody. Of course, ambassadors are supposed to let at least somebody at the embassy know where they are going to be. It's not just a matter of politeness. It's a matter of good operating procedure. Certainly, the DCM is supposed to know, if only so that the DCM knows that he's in charge. Anyway, Peter told me that Ambassador Wilson had been driven to the airport that morning. He had direct evidence from the driver that Wilson had then boarded a plane. Peter had been able to find out that the flight plan of this private aircraft was to Tripoli. Within 24 hours, Wilson was back in town. Well, I did pass that information up the line. Not that Washington did anything about it. But it was something that Secretary Shultz remembered. Months later, we were about to arrive in Rome and I had to brief him. The Secretary well remembered that Wilson had been off on his own. Wilson was a challenge in other ways, too. The Wilsons lived in a rented villa. President Reagan was going to visit Italy, so the Wilsons assumed that the Reagans would come and have a meal with them. That in itself was controversial, because so did Max Rabb. Mrs. Wilson thought that their dining room wasn't big enough, so they added a dining room to the residence, overlooking the fact that theirs was a rented, historic building to which no changes could be made without express permission of the minister of culture. But the Wilsons went ahead anyway and paid for it. So, what were we supposed to do? The dining room was being constructed, finished, and furnished by Mrs. Wilson. Mrs. Wilson, incidentally, was not just the wife of Mr. Wilson. She was herself a director of Penzoil and a wealthy businesswoman in her own right. She brooked little interference if she had her mind set, and her mind was set on having a lunch for Nancy Reagan. And she did. As far as I know, the dining room is still there, and there's a plaque commemorating the occasion. But the plaque does not record in the footnote what the reaction of the GSO was to all of this.

The Wilsons also enjoyed the perks that went with the job - the security, the car, the driver, the escorts. And they were all over town. It was rather a show when the Wilsons moved around Rome.

The Wilsons treated me with the utmost courtesy and great hospitality. They were extremely nice to me. I fancy that on some subjects, at least, I had the opportunity to put my views on the table. Whether they made much difference, it's hard to tell. I'm sure, though, that I could not have talked him out of the Libyan trip, if that was his intent.

Q: Wasn't there a lot of flack about Wilson talking to Qadhafi?

VAN HEUVEN: Not a lot of people knew about this. It was not public. Nor was it ever clear just how long he saw Qadhafi, or exactly what was said. Wilson did not report his

meeting through any channels that I was privy to. I know that the Secretary of State was appalled. Eventually, but a long time later, he managed to convey this into a presidential request for the Wilsons to return to California. But more than a year elapsed before Shultz got that far, because he was dealing with a personal friend of the President's and the President probably couldn't have cared less. This was a tough thing.

Q: With relations with the Vatican, the Vatican is supposed to have a superb diplomatic corps with very good intelligence. Were we getting much from them? Was this contributing to much?

VAN HEUVEN: About every two months or so, I would have lunch with the Nuncio, Pio Laghi, then an archbishop, now a cardinal. In fact, he was the cardinal who was sent just last month to dissuade President George Bush II from starting a war in Iraq.

Cardinal Laghi had been Nuncio in the Middle East. He was in Haiti when the country became unstable and we sent military forces. The ME was a constant bone of contention. There was a regime change under way, with American political support, in the Philippines. The Vatican also played a role, as did the cardinal in the Philippines, whose name, amusingly, was Sin. Cardinal Sin saw there was a need for a regime change. That was the view of a lot of Filipinos as well.

Q: We're talking about the Marcos regime.

VAN HEUVEN: That's right. It was not the view of Mr. Marcos, of course. But Pio Laghi was knowledgeable. I remember our lunches and I remember writing substantive memcons on those issues and sharing them with the affected bureaus in State. So I was drawing on a person with personal experience in the Caribbean and in the ME and the Philippines, and who was part of a network that produced information and views of interest to the U.S. In turn, I would share with him relevant U.S. views and policies. They presumably made their way into the Vatican diplomatic network.

Q: I was wondering whether you were getting involved in the Central American issues.

VAN HEUVEN: The short answer to your question is, yes. The Vatican was a source of information, often of a rather broadly based nature. It had good insight. It had a good network. It had good instincts as to what ought to happen. But the Vatican's yardstick as to what ought to happen was of course always different from ours. Their yardstick, ultimately, was what is good for the Church, what would allow the Church to prosper. American interests might or might not dovetail with that. Our yardstick was the American interest. But we constituted a valuable link, which the U.S. maintains, although in the recent past the Pope has caused things to be said that don't square well with American policy. I remember that, in the case of the stationing of intermediate range nuclear missiles, the Pope's position was not very helpful. In the Church hierarchy, if the Pope has a particular view, the cardinals can think what they like, but they're not going to get their way, because it's such a one-man show. The Pope's Polish origins were very useful

to us in terms of the change in Eastern Europe. He had a good press in the United States. So the White House handled the Pope with kid gloves. I think any administration would do that. In my time, there were no real questions within our country about the appropriateness of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. I never discussed Church matters with Pio Laghi, although he did once tell me that one of his functions was to make suggestions about the nomination of candidates to become bishop, indicating that his batting average was about 95%.

Q: Going back to the Italian government, you were there during the Achille Lauro incident.

VAN HEUVEN: I was, but I played no role in that at all. I was on a trip so I wasn't even in town when this occurred. By the time the incident had occurred, we had located and forced to land in Sicily an aircraft with the perpetrators. The Italians had surrounded the plane. We had surrounded the Italians. There was the issue as to who does what next. This was handled directly by the White House. My desk officer, Tom Longo, managed to worm his way in there. It was late at night. There was a conversation from the White House with Craxi. Longo functioned as the interpreter on the phone. The situation was complicated further by the presence of Mike Ledeen. He was not in government, but he had good Republican connections with the White House, saw himself as sort of a guru, and for some reason found himself not only on the scene but got himself into the conversation. It was at this very unstructured level, without briefing papers, under crisis circumstances, that the issue of how to deal with the Achille Lauro hijackers at Sigonella was resolved. It showed a breakdown of procedures at Sigonella and in Washington. The interests of the Italians and our interests pretty much dovetailed. We didn't want hijackings. We wanted to catch the hijackers. So the Italians and we ought to have seen this issue in the same way. But how to handle it? American intelligence located the hijackers. The U.S. military forced them down on an Italian base that was mostly used by the U.S. Navy. Then there's the question of who takes over. That hadn't been worked out very well.

That spat could recur if history repeated itself, but I tend to think that normal coordinating procedures would probably make it less of an issue than it was in this case. The issue flamed out fast.

Q: I was wondering, did you find yourself trying to work to unruffle feathers?

VAN HEUVEN: Max Rabb did a lot along that front and successfully so. Because our basic interests didn't diverge from that of the Italians, it was more an annoyance on the Italian side about how high-handed we were and annoyance on our part that the Italians were in the way of an efficient operation. I've seen that happen in other cases. Left to our own devices, we can be more efficient. But we forget sometimes that, when we're operating on other people's territory, we have to keep the long view in mind. Such an issue may happen again. Do we want the opportunity to do this successfully once again, or are we going to exclude ourselves from the possibility of doing so? The Italians were

relatively pliant on these issues and don't bear grudges. They know on which side their bread is buttered. So, Craxi never made this a sticking point. Neither did anybody else in the government. The Achille Lauro incident did not affect the overall relationship.

I might just say something about one of the functions exercised by my deputy, Tony Kochanek and me in WE. It involved the selection of people. This was not just the function of Personnel. It was an elaborate choreography, in which the candidates were a factor, but so were the posts to which they were aspiring. So was Personnel. And so was EUR. Very often, the brokers in this process were the directors or, more often, the deputy directors of the geographic office. Typically, early in the assignment cycle, Tony and I would run through the lists of all openings that were coming up and all the candidates available. In due course, we would find ourselves targeted by many of these candidates for our support for their particular candidacies. One lesson that we learned over and over again was that, as between the objective of efficiency - taking somebody with language and area experience and putting them in a job where they could be put to immediate use - and the objective of equality or equal opportunity - let's take the guy from a hardship post in Africa and put him in Rome because it's his turn for something that's a little better - equality always won. That was the way the system worked. Rarely did the European Bureau get its way when it came down to the choice of efficiency versus equality. The argument can be made that, in the long run, we were training a broader cadre of people with experience in more than a particular country. In the short run, however, it meant that, for example, when you put a political counselor into Rome who doesn't know Italian and has not served in Italy before, he needs a year before he or she can be effective. In some cases, I've seen those assignments work out in the end, because most FSOs are flexible and motivated to learn. But at the more senior level, particularly in the political and economic counselor area, you are not looking for neophytes. Tony and I were looking for people who knew their stuff and whom the Bureau could trust. But we often found ourselves at odds with Personnel and the DG. This was particularly true in cases in which the DG adopted the practice of directed assignments, where a specific person was nominated to a specific job regardless of experience, language and, occasionally, rank. Thus, we saw stretch assignments, or even double stretch assignments, for reasons that only the DG would know. They were probably pretty good from the DG's point of view. For the geographic bureau, on the other hand, it didn't make much sense. Sometimes ambassadors weighed in. Not all of them got their way. In the end, the assignment of officers was a Washington decision. The 7th floor seldom got involved.

Q: Still talking about Italy, did you find that there was an overconcentration on reporting about the political minuet that went on in Rome? In my time in Italy, I found that the same people were taking different offices and nothing much changed. We seemed to get into the intricacies of the Italian party system or party appointment system which had little interest for the U.S.

VAN HEUVEN: The issue of what reporting was useful for Washington was on full display during my time in WE. Most of the large embassies pretty much knew what the traffic would bear. But Italy was probably the best test tube. The intricacies of Italian

party politics would be of interest only to an analyst at the Agency, a watcher in INR, and the desk. The desk usually didn't have enough time, because of the press of ordinary business, to go beyond what the embassy or the consulates would send in.

However, historically, there was much interest in the intricacies of Italian politics. It was for good reason. In the late 1940s, there had been a good possibility that the ordinary working of Italian democracy would have produced a communist government. Indeed, even in my time, the communist party in Italy was huge. In the Cold War, to have a country like Italy turn communist would be a strategic defeat. Therefore, a major American interest was in not having that happen. How do you do that in a country where the largest party are communists? How do you keep them out of government all the time? It means that you have to have coalitions, which together have more votes than the communists. Even so, you have to swallow hard to make that formula work and have the people accept it.

We put a huge amount of effort into making it work that way. Anybody who thinks that it was the Italians who on their own produced this result is forgetting something: America was always there to make sure that the process didn't produce the wrong result. We were there with influence, with favors, and with lots of money. Speaking now in 2003, with the recent benefit of three more years in Milan as the spouse of the consul general, I have the impression that Italian politics became used to functioning with the influx of a large amount of cash to produce certain results. In other words, we reinforced a measure of corruption into the Italian political system at all levels. While the American influence in domestic Italian politics is now pretty much gone, the pattern of corruption is not. This feature of Italian politics, which depends largely on favors - as in the cases of Craxi, Andreotti - and on kickbacks, is unfortunate. The U.S. bears a share in responsibility for creating the current situation.

Going back again to the reporting, details of Italian politics don't interest a great many people in Washington as long as Italy was with us on important questions. The military forces we had in Italy were an important U.S. interest. With the fall of soviet communism, the threat of the communist party taking over Italy disappeared, though Italian politics today, with Berlusconi, presents more issues of fairness and undue influence than at almost any other time. I don't think anybody in Washington really cares very much about them. What Washington does care about today is that the Berlusconi government has signed on with the Bush administration on issues of importance to the Bush administration. Back in the eighties, reporting from Italy probably provided greater detail than I found necessary for myself. But there were always consumers who did enjoy the details. The top officers in embassies Madrid, Paris, Rome kept their eye on the ball and didn't get off the track with detail. There was a constant calibration as to what type of reporting was necessary and what wasn't. But we had no major difficulties. A typical difficulty that arose in some of these larger countries was the degree to which the embassies tried to control the reporting from the consulates. Some chiefs of mission wanted to get a single view out of the country. Others were willing to let a thousand flowers bloom. Each ambassador and each embassy handled that issue in its own way.

Washington lived with the results.

Q: have we covered all the countries now?

VAN HEUVEN: I did spend time on Malta because the socialist government and its requests for money required attention. Malta was of interest to us because of Libya. Malta maintained diplomatic relations with Libya and had air connections with Libya. There was a flow of people to and from Libya through Malta. The islands were strategically of importance, far beyond the size of the country. That is true today, as long as Libya is where it is with Qadhafi. But Malta has had to change governments, back and forth. They cannot hold up Europe the way they once did in Madrid, when for six months the CSCE had to wait for Malta to come on board after everybody else had already gone on board. That's not likely to repeat itself.

I have pretty well covered the issues I meant to cover. This leaves my four years in the National Intelligence Council.

Q: Why don't we do that another time?

You were at the Intelligence Council for four years. Then what?

VAN HEUVEN: Then I retired from government. I was back for three months in 1995 as Senior European liaison officer for Ambassador Madeleine Albright at the 50th UN General Assembly in New York.

Q: From '87 to '91... What were you doing in this period?

VAN HEUVEN: The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is a body which is not well known to many Foreign Service officers. The NIC is an intelligence community organization. This means that it is headed by the director of Central Intelligence. This same person is the head of the CIA. In my time, the NIC consisted of 12 individual National Intelligence officers, six of them with geographic responsibilities and six with substantive responsibilities, such as strategic forces, conventional forces, science, global issues, terrorism and warning. I was the NIO for Europe. My principal task was to oversee the production by the intelligence community of national intelligence estimates (NIEs), and other pieces of community intelligence covering the European continent. The area of my responsibilities included Eastern Europe, but not the Soviet Union. The NIEs were our workhorses and also the crowns of our activity. They are estimative documents put together by the intelligence community for a small clientele, including the President and a small number of senior offices, including the Vice President, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the National Security Adviser. That was our target audience. Once approved, an NIE would be briefed the next morning to these individuals and distributed to another small group. Eventually, it became accessible also to a larger group of people. The NIEs tended to be classified. They were based on all-purpose intelligence, not only from CIA, but also from State, NSA, and DIA. They could also be based on information

from newspapers, magazines, personal conversations, academics, or other sources, open and classified. The process is more open today than it was in my time. We published NIEs without any names on them. It would list the functions of the officials who had approved them. Over ten agencies and departments were represented in the estimative process. Only CIA was a pure intelligence organization that was not appended to an operational agency.

The NIC had two offices, one at Langley and one downtown. For the approval of the NIEs, we used the downtown office. For everything else, we sat at Langley. We were the senior link between the policy world and the intelligence world. It was my job to interface with the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA, and the NSC officer in charge of Europe. My task was to determine what intelligence support they needed. Mostly, they were too busy with their jobs to figure out what intelligence support they needed. So it fell to me to make suggestions. Mine was an active role. I could tap drafting officers for the NIE process. I had no line authority, but I was usually successful in getting officers detailed to help do the estimates. NIOs had to understand what was going on in their worlds and understand what the U.S. was trying to do within their worlds. They had to figure out what information the government needed, and what analysis the government needed. We could not advocate policy, but we could say, "If you do A, then B. If you do C, then D. If you do X, then you have to watch out for the following." So, we could - and often did - put things in the alternative. We could do a study that said, "Here are the drivers. Here are the indicators. Here are the possible outcomes. Here are things to keep an eye on." We had to package it in a way so that the consumer could use it. We had to tailor the NIEs to the tastes of our consumers. In my case, the President was Bush. He had been DCI himself. So he had a good understanding of the process. He knew what an NIE was and he knew what intelligence could do for him. He was one of our knowledgeable consumers. But each president handles his information flow in his own way.

At interagency meetings one level below the so-called Deputies, the person representing the intelligence community - often me or my deputy - would usually be given the floor first. This gave us the opportunity to shape agendas in a way that few others could, and thus influence the outcome. Of course, we were not supposed to drive the agenda, but if we had views based on analysis - based on facts and information available to us - we could say, "We're heading in a direction which is likely to evolve toward the following results."

We would do between six and eight NIEs a year. Many of them came, went, and were forgotten with the rest. Some of them didn't. In my case, the NIE that caught the most attention and notoriety - but in retrospect was probably one of the least influential - was the NIE we did in the fall of 1990 on the subject of Yugoslavia. The NIE said that Yugoslavia would come apart, that it would be a violent process, and that the country would no longer exist in six months. Unfortunately, these key judgments happened to be right on the mark, including the timing. Meanwhile, the policy world downtown was busy keeping the Soviet Union together and getting ready for Desert Storm. The message that

Yugoslavia would come apart was not welcome. It did not fit U.S. Yugoslav policy. This policy was, as it had been for years, to support the territorial integrity and political independence of the country. The administration did not want to hear about federal states coming apart. The U.S. government was trying to keep Gorbachev in power in a federal state. Washington was also busy getting ready to liberate Kuwait. The notion that there might be violence in the Balkans was not part of its script. So the NIE was widely noted but was basically ignored, even by the old Yugo hands, such as Tom Niles, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Larry Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State, and Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser. All had served in Belgrade. All had grown up with the canonical policy of supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. In fairness, Larry was probably well aware that things in Yugoslavia were probably going to change. But he didn't want to advance that change. If anything, he probably wanted to retard it. Warren Zimmerman, who was our ambassador, had also served in Belgrade before. Larry had sent him out with orders that Warren has described in his book, "The Last Ambassador." But the policy was still, "Let's see if we can keep Humpty Dumpty together," and here we came along and said, "You can't do it and it's going to blow up."

So the NIE became an example of intelligence making the right call and the government basically saying, "No, thank you very much."

Q: We tried to duck it.

VAN HEUVEN: In the words of Secretary of State Baker, we didn't have a dog in that fight. His line to the Yugoslavs was: "Whatever you do, don't fight about it." That was too late.

Q: Even before that, you went there in '87. Probably the biggest event in a way in the last century was that the Soviet Union was falling apart. It was going down. Everybody knew there were problems but nobody from the outside really could see what was happening. How about this group?

VAN HEUVEN: Russia wasn't part of my beat. I had two colleagues who successively held the position of NIO for the Soviet Union, George Kolt and Bob Blackwell. Kolt was a Cold War guy. Blackwell was more nuanced. There was a running discussion among Soviet analysts about the Soviet Union. Bob Gates was the DDCI, and then later on DCI. In his confirmation hearings there was the question of whether he had cooked the books on the Soviet Union. He denied that charge and would deny it today. There was an academic debate afterwards as to who saw it wrong, and whether the Agency shouldn't have seen the signs coming of the Soviet breakup. But the fact was that the Estimates on the Soviet Union recognized the many problems but did not draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union would disappear.

From my vantage point, I looked at the Soviet Union through the prism of Germany. Germany was divided. Europe was divided. My territory was divided because of soviet

communism. I went along, in September 1989, with the director of Central Intelligence on a trip to Europe. We spent a day in Germany and visited our German intelligence colleagues. The German intelligence establishment was wholly preoccupied by the upcoming visit of Gorbachev to East Berlin. What they were looking for was whether Moscow would continue to support the East Berlin regime. That event was scheduled for the first week of October.

Q: This was the 40th anniversary of the GDR.

VAN HEUVEN: Something like that. In any event, there would be a Soviet-German meeting and the question was, “What are going to be the signals coming out of that meeting?” That was what preoccupied the thinking of German intelligence. There was no discussion of the wall, nor the breaching of the wall, nor anything like that. It wasn’t on the agenda. It wasn’t in anybody’s thought. Elsewhere in Europe, there was also no inkling of the fact that things might come to a head within weeks. Of course, there had been large peaceful demonstrations in major East German cities, in Leipzig, in Dresden. We already had seen Hungary opening its borders.

Q: This was a real hemorrhage.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes. It was significant because East Germans for the first time could get out. They could go to Hungary and then go through East Germany, in closed trains, to the West. So there were plenty of signs that things were changing in Eastern Europe, none that they would change the Soviet Union, and none about the breaching of the wall in November of that year. So, as for my territory, my colleagues and the people with whom I dealt - I could tap into a huge amount of resources, all the way from analysts to clandestine reporting of whatever type - there was no real indicator that all these big things were about to come to a head. There was a trend, but we felt it was a gradual trend. Nobody felt that the earthquake was about to happen. So when it happened - by some quirky decisions and sequences of events in November - the wall opened up, and there was a cascade of events that was out of control. It was a period of about three months. We were all thinking hard about where this could all lead. The *dramatis personae* in East Germany were changing almost weekly. It was hard to get a grip on that. I do remember writing a little memo to myself in February that said, “There’s a possibility of two Germanies with the same president, Richard von Weizsaecker. Many formulas for a future Germany were being kicked around. But we had little idea whether the events would make things flow in that direction. And then to go back to the Soviet Union and your original question, it wasn’t until the end of 1991, late in December, that the Soviet Union ceased to exist. So all of a sudden, a Europe that had been divided was no longer that divided. It was still very different, but the dividing line had been breached. So the opportunities for a “Europe whole and free,” - the phrase of President Bush in Germany later on - came closer to realization. We had to start rethinking what this whole of Europe would look like. Certainly in those days, in my own thinking about enlargement, the key issue was whether we should enlarge NATO and whether the EU should also be enlarged. I was strongly in favor of enlargement, if only for the fact that the people to the East had

not had the ability to make true what they always felt, namely, that they, too, were Europeans. You ask a Pole if he's European; he's going to say, "Of course I am. I'm from the most European country in the world. I'm catholic." But seen from the Western Europe perspective, Poland was outside. The major driver was the will of the people, the popular marches in Germany, and then in the successful revolutions in Romania and the Czech Republic. People were driving this change. So it was my feeling that, if that is what the people want, don't stand in the way. What do they want? They want to be part of the West, part of these organizations. Therefore, NATO enlargement and EU enlargement is not only a good thing, it is a strategic necessity. Not to do so will create another division of another type that will cause all sorts of problems. My policy views were shaped by my experience as an analyst.

Q: You mentioned that the man who originally you were dealing with, who belonged to the hard-line school that the Soviet Union was a threat that was always going to be there... How much did you all represent your own outlook?

VAN HEUVEN: We did not. We tried very hard not.... Our role was not to advocate policy. What we could say was something like "If the United States government does this, then the German reaction is likely to be the following." If that were an obviously undesirable reaction, then working that equation backwards would give a message to the policymakers that maybe they'd better think about it again. But we could not say what ought to be U.S. policy and we didn't.

Q: In the institutional mindset, the Soviet Union is so powerful that it's almost inconceivable that it will break up because the system is rotten.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, I want to avoid talking about the Soviet Union because during my four years I didn't deal with the Soviet Union. I stood outside of the debate as to whether the CIA and the intelligence community missed the boat on that one.

But I can tell you something about the process of putting together national intelligence estimates. The process can take up to nine months. First comes the definition of the question or questions you want answered, and running those issues through the interagency process. Then comes the process of answering these questions and running through that same process again. We could have ten institutions around the table, all with an intelligence input and their own perspective. It is possible, of course, that even with ten different agencies, you're going to get a particular mindset, and end up wrong. You cannot predict the future. But NIEs were not so much attempts to predict the future as an attempt to analyze what is there, what people think about it, what are the possibilities, what are the drivers, and what are the limitations. In other words we tried to lay out all the analytical factors. A good NIE might come up with alternative outcomes. I found that consumers often liked this better than a single-view NIE.

Let me illustrate this point with another NIE that we got approved the same day as the Yugoslav NIE. That was one on Canada. It had been taboo to do intelligence on Canada

ever since World War II because we didn't do intelligence on allies.

Q: Also because it would leak.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, intelligence at that level didn't necessarily leak.

Q: But I would think that the fact that we were even thinking about the splitting up of Canada if it ever got back to the Canadians would have such repercussions that it's almost better not to even think about it.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, that is the essence of my story. The NIC hadn't ever touched Canada. The station in Ottawa was not reporting on Canada. It was there as a liaison function with the Canadian intelligence services. But we had exchanges with the Canadians, and as I worked with the Canadians I became interested in Canada. It was obvious to me that Canada was of major interest for precisely the reason you've just articulated. Not only would almost any expression of American views about Canadian unity rile the Canadians one way or the other, but Canada is our biggest trading partner, our biggest border, and from any point of view - political, economic, trade - it is the single most important country to us bar none. Here is a country where the talk was about splitting. U.S. officials kept saying, "Well, this is purely a matter for the Canadians. This is a Canadian issue. It doesn't concern us." Baloney! It concerned us greatly. Imagine for a minute what would have happened if Quebec had voted, as it nearly did a couple of times, for separation. The next morning, Quebec representatives would have been knocking on the door of the State Department asking for recognition. We could not say, "Well, this is a Canadian matter. We leave it to you guys." They'd say, "We want recognition." Then we could say "Yes" or we could say "No". Or, we could say, "Well, we've got to think about this." We could not avoid making enemies; even, perhaps, we might be making some friends. So, the issue struck me as a crucial question for the United States, and it seemed to me that our policy was inadequate. Therefore, I suggested to Director Bill Webster that we do an NIE on Canada. Broad-minded as he was, he agreed. Some of my colleagues in the system gagged. They said, "We haven't done this. We don't touch World War II allies. We don't target Britain, Australia, New Zealand, or Canada"; I said, "Yes, but here are reasons to think about Canada." So, we did an NIE on Canada. I recall, it was entitled "Two or Three Canadas." Had Quebec voted for separation, the west of Canada might have walked, too, leaving Ottawa and Ontario in the middle. So the NIE introduced the notion of not just two countries but three countries up north, and the implications of such an eventuality. I gather that President Bush took all of this aboard and adjusted his public remarks away from the myth that this was just a matter for the Canadians and toward the notion that the USG had an interest in maintaining Canadian unity. President Clinton also took this notion abroad. He expressed support for a particular political outcome in Canada. You could argue that he was mixing into Canadian affairs, but his approach was largely welcome in Canada, though perhaps not in Quebec. But Quebec had no choice but to keep currying our favor. They had their representatives in Washington. They have them now. They act basically as a shadow foreign office. Remember de Gaulle's phrase of "*Vive le Quebec libre*" when he visited

Canada? The French were always ready to play the Quebec card. So, in a way, the Canadian Estimate was more of an attempt to energize the policy world than the Yugoslav Estimate, although it was the Yugoslav Estimate that got all the notoriety. My work in that NIE got my colleagues and me the Intelligence Medal of Merit, but the NIE had absolutely no effect on U.S. policy.

Q: It's interesting that you can come up with the correct estimate that Yugoslavia was going to fall apart. There are an awful lot of forces and people there who just didn't want it to happen.

VAN HEUVEN: That's right.

Q: Even those that knew the country well... How did this come out?

VAN HEUVEN: How did we come up with it then?

Q: Yes.

VAN HEUVEN: The remarkable fact about this Estimate was that it was unanimous. Typically, an estimate states it was done with the participation of a list of agencies. Any agency that disagreed would append its own views. From the consumer's point of view, it was interesting to get different views. But this one was unanimous on the key judgments. It covered the intellectual brouhaha that had started with a speech on the day of Kosovo Polje by Milosevic. It covered the statement by the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences, and the intellectual underpinnings of the breakup. Of course you can have a lot of intellectual underpinnings, as you always do with the intelligentsia of France, and this still won't translate into policy. But in this case, there was a handmaiden, and his name was Milosevic.. Yugoslavia had kept going through the Cold War years by positioning itself as a leader of the nonaligned. It had been able to command American and Western attention as a lever on the Soviet Union. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the lever function lost significance. So Yugoslavia became a backwater. We were no longer interested, because Yugoslavia didn't mean much anymore in the grand scheme of things. Markovic needed help from the INF. But the financial institutions and, for that matter, the U.S. government, were niggardly. Susan Woodward, who wrote a book about the breakup, sees this niggardliness and narrow-mindedness as the basic cause of the downfall of Yugoslavia. There are other books, each with different theories as to why it happened. We didn't delve into these theories in the NIE. Those books hadn't been written at the time. But we did know that Markovic couldn't hold things together. We also knew that things were getting tight. When things get tight and the pie gets smaller, people may start fighting about the crumbs. The fighting among the provinces, the different constituent parts of Yugoslavia, had a sharp tone to it. As the pie kept shrinking, that tone sharpened further by the introduction of nationalist elements. "It's the fault of those Croats that we Serbs suffer" or "It's the fault of those Serbs that we Croats suffer." This mood eventually led to a feeling of "Well, look at what the Germans in Leipzig have just done. They have managed to detach themselves from the Warsaw Pact." So, when

Slovenia and Croatia broke away, there was a brief war about Slovenia, which the Serbs lost. Slovenia seceded successfully. Then it was just a matter of time before the other provinces tried and ran. Some of them split off successfully. Croatia had great difficulty. So did Bosnia. Macedonia was unsuccessful. So was Kosovo, until the Kosovo war. So the unraveling of Yugoslavia was gradual but rapid. Western inattention was a contributing factor, as was the misplaced hope that, somehow or other, Yugoslavia would stay together. It had been held together by a special set of forces for a long time, including Tito. These forces were no longer present. The outside pressures then did work. The real kicker was Milosevic and his nationalism. That is what tore Yugoslavia apart.

Q: And Tudjman, too, in Croatia.

VAN HEUVEN: All the regional leaders turned out to be bad guys, the whole lot of them: Izetbegovic, Milosevic, and Tudjman. They were all on a nationalist and personal kick, at the expense of each other. There were no leaders who said, "We have things in common that we ought to build on." It wasn't the role of intelligence to shape a new policy for Yugoslavia, but it was our role to say "Here is the situation" and note that the existing U.S. policy simply was going to be irrelevant. The policy was forced to change. It did, of course, about 13 months later. And then the USG didn't touch the ensuing mayhem, until Srebrenica. Then the situation became a threat to Clinton's reelection. Tony Lake reportedly said to the President, "This is a problem that can cost you the election." Then Clinton became involved. In the summer of 1995, Lake went to Europe, Holbrooke was appointed and negotiated Dayton. So we pulled the Yugoslavia issue up by its own bootstraps. Had we accepted the Vance-Owen proposals, the outcome would have been a better deal for the Bosnians. But the USG killed Vance-Owen through inattention. This is a long story about a single Estimate.

I was professionally content in this world of estimates. I lived in a world where it was my job to continually guess "What does Ray Seitz (EUR) need? What does Bob Blackwell (NSC) need? What does David Gompert need in the NSC?" I would try to get them that information, and volunteer pieces on an IC basis, using Agency personnel. There was rivalry between the NIC and the Agency as to who would get there first. In a way, that made for better intelligence. The Agency had to stick to its own system, but I could roam all over. Agency analysts were basically in-house people. My mandate was to get out of the office, to know what academia was thinking, what was going on in the NGOs. I used to do off-sites. My job was well funded, so I could get the best heads in the United States together on an unclassified basis, in some agreeable site within 50 miles of Washington, spend a day or so, and do a report. Those conference reports were not national estimates, but they were wonderful devices. These products generally got good readership and stood up to the test of time. I could live in the unclassified world as well as in the classified world. I could bring to bear all sorts of talent that I could hire, for comment and advice. CIA did little of that in those days. They saw themselves as good enough without being able to go outside. But their views, as a result, were narrower. Today, the situation is different, because all these offices have been vandalized. The former European experts have been put to work on antiterrorism instead of on Europe. In short, I felt I had a great

assignment. It gave me visibility. With three exceptions, I visited every country in Europe; a number of them more than once. I was on the road almost every month. I could see people in other governments at policy level. I knew most of the U.S. ambassadors in Europe, and what they were thinking. When I traveled, I was handled by the stations, so I could get a glimpse into their world and what they thought. Often, the thinking would be different. Some of the station chiefs used their ability to input their views into Washington through their own channels. In my travels, I gained greater appreciation of the fact that many FSOs are not attuned to the fact - and to the extent that they are, don't want to accept - that there is a lot more than State and DOD to official U.S. activity overseas. In some cases, particularly where money talks, the station chief could be a key player. So, a visit to an embassy was always an experience. On a visit to Poland, I found that part of the Embassy had come to regard the Poles as our friends, while other parts of the Embassy still saw them through Cold War lenses. So, being the NIO was a heady assignment and it gave me a lot of exposure. Moreover, I think I was the first NIO/EUR who went to Eastern Europe as NIO rather than under State cover. I insisted on that. Milt Bearden at the DDO, agreed. I'd spent half my life and half my professional life in Europe. My identity was well known in many countries. To pretend that I was a State Department officer in some fictional job when, in fact, I was a senior intelligence officer in the United States government, made no sense. So, when I went to Belgrade, Warsaw, and Budapest, I went as NIO Europe. The stations didn't take easily to the idea but they got used to it. It worked out fine. Right now, NIOs are identified by name on the NIEs. They travel as NIOs. It's all above board. But I was at the cusp of that change, and I was one of the very first NIOs to do that.

So, Yugoslavia kept me busy, but so did the issue of German reunification, and the issue of how the U.S. interfaced with the European Union. We did estimates on that as well. It was an intellectually heady time. We had to think widely and we could tap into all possible resources.

Q: Europe was reorganizing itself.

VAN HEUVEN: Just beginning to. Certainly by '91 it had reformed itself, but the question is, what have we got now? I can't pretend that we in the NIC were the star that appeared over Bethlehem, but I think that we illuminated thinking about Europe in a way that was generally helpful. I found the experience ultimately enjoyable. It made for a natural transition to what I did after the government, at the RAND Corporation and the Atlantic Council, and what I continue to do today, which is to think and write about Europe.

I'd like to say two more things about the NIC. One is about the culture of the intelligence world. When I came to Langley, I found an organization that reminded me of the State Department 30 years earlier. There was, in effect, an Assistant Secretary's dining room. Only GS-16 and above could eat there, and cheaply at that. It was also one of the best restaurants in town. It was like the old Assistant Secretary's dining room at State in 1957. It was a male culture. It was also a white shirt culture. And it was a Virginia culture, a

southern culture, all of it different from the State Department in '87, but reminiscent of the old boy school network that characterized the situation in the late '50s and early '60s at State. I encountered a time warp. Langley simply was way behind State. And State was closer to the country than Langley ever was. I have to be a little careful because when I say "Virginia," I really meant Virginia. You know this area. There is a difference between Georgetown and Old Town, Alexandria. That distinction was palpable. There were a lot of Southerners, particularly in the DO, just like in the Army. They had their own ways. Women who had important jobs were the exception and not the rule. That is now beginning to change. But Langley in 1991 was still quite starchy.

The other has to do with the product. Most FSOs, to the extent that they deal with intelligence products at all, tend to find them unilluminating, boring, even wrong. In my time at State, I got briefed every day. The briefer would walk in and show the book of folders. My reaction often was "This is drivel and I know it already." The unfortunate fact was that, since the policy world is never very good at asking the intelligence world what it should need, the intelligence world is left to figure out what the policy world needs. So the briefers piled it on, and the daily briefing book tended to become junk. A lot of it came from NSA. At one point, when I was in the NIC, I asked the director of NSA if he couldn't do something about this problem. I said, "I've got all this stuff coming in by the reams and there is nothing I can do with it." He said, "Okay, we'll make you a package." Every two weeks, somebody would come from Fort Meade and hand me a selected package tailored for me, let me see it, and then take it back. I don't think I ever changed my view on any major issue because of that type of input. Yes, I did care what Mr. A was saying to Mr. B or sometimes, more interestingly, Mrs. B. You might learn what new job somebody might be angling for, or what somebody thought of somebody else. But in the cosmic scheme of things, that type of intelligence was not very useful for my purposes. If I had been in the Biographic Division, it would have been useful. But for what I was doing, that wasn't the case.

Most of the information that I needed to operate at the NIC was easily available. I just had to find it, select it, and put it together in a meaningful way. Secret sources were not key in drafting NIEs. If you're in a military campaign, it's nice to have an informant who tells you where the artillery is hidden. That can save lives. But I wasn't in that sort of a business.

However, when I got to see how the intelligence community was producing the product which, as an FSO, I had thumbed my nose at, I came to take it more seriously. Sure, it would be no great loss to put aside the incidental, anecdotal stuff. But it was worthwhile to watch for the side comment, or the insight from people who thought and who were well connected, and to look for indicators. I had to learn this as I went. If I didn't, I might miss something. Had we done more of it, we might have been more imaginative in our NIEs about the way Europe was evolving. I also came to view the value of competitive intelligence. The suggestions for having an intelligence czar, and centralizing functions in one particular place, will, I think, not lead to a better product. Decentralization is more useful, because it is more directed to the needs of the policymaker, as long as intelligence

doesn't become the excuse for the policymaker. Intelligence can also be highly politicized. When I was testifying on Yugoslavia before the Senate Intelligence Committee in a secret hearing, Senator Bradley asked, "Now, Mr. van Heuven, what would you do?" I said, "Senator, that's a question I cannot answer." He said, "I'm asking you: what should we do?" I said, "Senator, it is not my job to give a policy recommendation." Then he said, "Turn off the microphones. I want you to tell me." So the microphones were turned off. I had a discussion with him. There is no record. I had to hold my ground. No senator can make you say something you don't want to say. You have to stay on the right side of that fence and stick to the analytical line and don't get into policy. Theoretically, I could have had a very different conversation with the Senator over lunch. But in a formal hearing, policy issues were out of the question. Let me just conclude with a word about tandem couples. This has to do with life in the Foreign Service.

Q: You might explain what a tandem couple is.

VAN HEUVEN: In this case, my wife was a Foreign Service officer and I was a Foreign Service Reserve Officer when we met and we got engaged. The rule was very simple. If I was going to become an FSO, which I was on track of becoming, either I had to resign or she had to resign. She resigned. Then, for a while, she was unemployed and our children were born. Then the rules changed and she was allowed back in again, but not until after she had retaken the oral at her expense, which meant coming from Europe, for which she was not reimbursed. Then she was readmitted but there was the question of a job. It was only in Bonn where this finally worked. I was head of the political section; she became head of the consular section. So we were both section heads at the same embassy. That was the first of four assignments - two abroad and two in Washington - where we were together. Then our paths separated. At that time, luckily, our children were already in boarding school. She was CG in Zurich. I was in the National Intelligence Council. Then she was in a Washington job. Then she went to Surinam. I was still in Washington. Then she was an inspector, which meant she was not here much of the time. So we had about eight years when we were not in the same place. It worked out for us in the end, because when she was out of the Service our children were growing up. But today, it is a common phenomenon to have tandem couples. They all face the same dilemmas that we had to face. How do we square a marriage with the requirement of serving wherever you're sent? This dilemma is not just characteristic of the Foreign Service. Today, you encounter it everywhere, with two career marriages, in academic and in business life. It makes things more complicated. At the same time, it provides more professional opportunity, for the spouse - the female spouse in most cases. It is harder to juggle family. It is easier because there are two incomes. It requires more imagination to handle these situations. None of them is similar. In a talk I gave to a high school a few months ago about NATO, I started by telling them, "You high school kids are all going to face a world in which you will meet the same issue that my wife and I had to deal with. You'll both be working when you're married. How do you square that?" These 14- and 15- and 16-year olds probably have long forgotten whatever I said about NATO, but they will not have forgotten the point I made about the fact that they at some point are very likely to be part of a tandem

couple, if not in the Foreign Service, then in life in general. As I looked around the cafeteria there that afternoon after talking to a class, I saw as many women as men. Everybody is adjusting to these new situations as best they can. I have no prescriptions or lessons to draw from it, except that it is a good thing that there is equal opportunity... Most people are capable enough to deal with the difficulties that that situation entails.

Q: Your wife was consul general in Milano?

VAN HEUVEN: She was consul general in Zurich and in Milan. Milan was her last post. Earlier, she was also DCM in Surinam. She had a number of other assignments. She retired at exactly the same grade as I did.

Q: Did you find yourself acting as a spouse in a post abroad?

VAN HEUVEN: Milan was the only post where I accompanied my wife. When she was in Surinam, I stayed in Washington. There would have been nothing to do for me in Paramaribo. Moreover, I had work to do at RAND. When we went to Milan, I was conscious that this time the shoe was on the other foot. In Geneva, I had been DCM and, for nearly a year, Charge. My wife was the press officer. During the day, she played that role. At night, she was the Charge's wife. This meant that her whole social life was like mine, but her professional life was with different people doing different things. She knew well how to maintain that distinction. So in Milan, it was up to me to also make that distinction. Even though I had been director of Western European Affairs and had often been to Italy officially, I resolved that I would stay totally out of renewing or making new contacts. So, I looked up nobody that I could have looked up. I excused myself from all working breakfasts and working lunches, even though I was in the residence. I would have my meals in another room. I did not sit in on any working meetings at the residence. I did attend the dinners that we gave because these were dinners with spouses. When we went out in the evening, I went along. But as I went along, I found myself with all these people that she knew, and I knew only vaguely, if at all. I kept myself out of any conversation on matters having to do with Italy, or Milan, or northern Italian politics. I made one exception. USIA arranged for me to speak at the University of Trieste and so I gave a RAND-type lecture there, but I was advertised as somebody from RAND, not as the husband of the CG. When we traveled around northern Italy, we were treated like royalty. There was plenty of protocol. For me, it was a matter of keeping my head down. That was the right way to go. It worked well for us in Geneva. It worked well for us in Milan. It did require discipline on my part because my appetite for what was going on was always there. But the best compliment I got in the end was from the Admin Officer, Dan Piccuta. When we left, he said, "Thanks. You could have been a real pain in the ass and you weren't."

Q: Well, I think this is a good place to stop.

Epilogue

Reading this account a year after it was recorded, four themes emerge.

One is the preoccupation during my career - indeed my life - with Germany. My first encounter was on May 10, 1940, when German troops attacked the Netherlands and I spent the first hours that day in a bomb shelter on our country property in Huis ter Heide. Then followed five years of occupation, with its progressively ugly, dangerous and, in one case, lethal effect on my extended family, and on me. My direct interface with Germany continued in the sixties, when for four years I functioned as the lawyer of the U.S. military government in West Berlin. Subsequently, I worked cooperatively with German officials at NATO, at the CCD in Geneva, and at the UN General Assembly. Then came another three years of intensive involvement as Political Counselor at the Embassy in Bonn, followed by frequent visits to Germany in an official capacity or as a USIA-sponsored speaker, and ongoing contact with German officials and foundations in Washington.

During this lifetime of exposure to the German Question - the role of Germany in Europe - in its many manifestations, my sentiments and opinions underwent a full reversal, from instinctive animosity to support of - indeed admiration for - German achievements. The Germany of today - whole, united, democratic, and free - is the result of much effort and of the work of many hands. I feel good to have been a part of that effort.

The second theme is my exposure to the issue of world order. A product of the Second World War, I have been an instinctive supporter of the United Nations Charter and of the Organization. This international structure - including the Specialized Agencies - seemed to me the way for the world to tackle the many common tasks that lay ahead. Though the proceedings in the UN system produce constant reminders of human imperfection, it has managed its way forward with the help of many energetic men and women of goodwill, devoted to the common good. The process did steadily define and establish standards of human behavior, particularly in the field of human rights, often taking the U.S. Bill of Rights as model. While violations do occur - occasionally even on a massive scale - the world community has by and large adopted the new standards and seeks to implement them. I look back on my involvement in this process at the General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission with satisfaction.

More problematic has been the issue of the maintenance of international peace and security. Over time, events tempered my early idealistic confidence in the efficacy of international law. However, the U.S.-led NATO effort to achieve security, peace, freedom, and prosperity in Europe was a striking success and validated the enormous effort that it required. I feel proud to have been part of that effort. It fortified my belief in the imagination, largesse, and strength of my adopted country and made me proud to be an American. But now new dangers are taking the place of the old ones, and the world is faced again with the challenge of security. It is my hope that, once again, the United States - motivated by enlightened self-interest and characteristic energy and generosity - can provide the global leadership to meet this new challenge.

The third theme is my lifelong fascination with Europe, the continent where I was born and where I spent almost half of my personal and professional life. In my lifetime, I have seen the dramatic and, to all evidence, permanent change from a centuries-long pattern in which differences were settled by force of arms to one of peaceful cooperation - albeit not without lively competition. The experiments of the European Union and the common currency seem to have taken hold. The EU will serve as the vehicle for bringing to bear the huge pool of talent and energy of Europe's peoples to shape the continent and its role in the world. But despite the successful drive to unity, I am ever more mindful that Europe's diversity is the key to understanding Europe. So the question remains how Europe will organize itself to draw strength from this diversity.

The last theme is about the United States. Throughout my schooling and foreign service career, I have benefited tremendously from the company of motivated and loyal colleagues. My years at the National Intelligence Council and at RAND also brought me closer to the questions of how the Americans see the world, what role they see for their country in shaping the future, and what matters to them. I have become more aware of the inherent American tendencies over the last century not to act abroad, or to act alone. But circumstances have forced the United States to face challenges together with other peoples and other countries on an enormous scale; and the U.S. has earned its spurs as a global leader. Globalization will require the United States to continue to work with others. Myths about American ignorance notwithstanding, Americans are comfortable with and in the world. Their inherent optimism, organizational talents, and pragmatism, properly led and forged in open debate, will be key tools for the global tasks ahead.

End of interview