The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project
Labor Series

ROBERT WALKINSHAW

Interviewed by: Morris Weisz
Initial interview date: March 2, 1993

INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Walkinshaw.]

Q: This is Morris Weisz interviewing an old friend, Bob Walkinshaw, who served in a number of posts and is here for the Labor Department Oral History Project. We are seated in his beautiful home near Ormond Beach in Florida. Today is the second day of March, 1993. Two days before the 60th anniversary of Roosevelt's coming in, which I remember well. Bob, why don't you give the introductory material I told you about, where you were born, what you did, the circumstances, whether you came from a trade union family, etc.

WALKINSHAW: I was born in Glasgow, Scotland on January 22, 1916, which makes me currently 77 years of age.

Q: Bob, we share something. January 22 was my birthday, but I'm 79.

WALKINSHAW: My family either came to America in '20 or '21 or '22; I can't recall which. We situated ourselves in a place called Ansonia, Connecticut. From that, I went to the primary and secondary schools in Ansonia. I left Pine High School; I got out of there in 1931.

Q: Was this public education?

WALKINSHAW: Yes. Shortly thereafter, I got a job in a bank in Ansonia, Connecticut. I was taking extension courses in economics. I was always interested in labor because I came from a labor family. My dad at that time was president of the Brass Workers Union in Ansonia, so we always had these conversations at the dinner table about the labor movement, its goals, its aims, and its weaknesses.

Q: Which union was the Brass Workers?

WALKINSHAW: At that time it was the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. That was the infamous mine, mill, and smelter workers union. From that point of view, I got interested in labor. Then my dad arranged to get me employment in the

American Brass Company. I started there as a crane operator. I continued to take these extension courses out of the University of Connecticut in Ansonia. Then I became a shop steward of the crane operators. Subsequently I was elected as the chief steward of the uptown branch of the American Brass Company. The company at that time allowed us to have full-time chief stewards. Although we represented the union, we were paid for our work by the company. They gave me a job as a die setter for which I was trained by the American Brass Company, but I must confess I spent very little time at die setting and more time fulfilling my obligations to the trade union movement.

Q: Under the contract though entirely appropriate.

WALKINSHAW: Exactly. There was nothing wrong with it. Then we had this communist anti-communist fight in the mine, mill, and smelter workers union, and I was elected because of my background, to join the anti-communist forces. Eventually we seceded from the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers Union and set up our own organization called the Progressive Metal Workers Council, of which I was elected vice-president representing Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey. We had a vice-president for Connecticut and upper New England. Subsequently we negotiated with the Automobile Workers Union to affiliate with them. Both of our people in the Progressive Metal Workers Council became staff members of the auto-workers union. I was assigned at that time to the state of Connecticut. I was on the organizing and contract staff.

Q: Would you put an approximate time when you affiliated with them?

WALKINSHAW: I went to work for the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union in 1940, '39 or '40, and we affiliated with the Automobile Workers Union in '46. At that time there was a little conflict about timing because we were also attached at one time to the shipyard workers union, if you recall John Green.

Q: Johnny Green and van Gelder.

WALKINSHAW: Van Gelder was the organizational director. They assigned me to the railroad workers. I negotiated the first railroad workers contract with the Pennsylvania Railroad under the aegis of the shipyard workers. I had that relationship, so I had to do a lot of studying. I talked about my extension courses; I also took a course from the Bureau of National Affairs, which had labor and economics. I took Labor Law as a matter of fact.

Following my experience with the railroad workers, I was made the sub-regional director of the automobile workers with offices in Boston, Massachusetts. My jurisdiction extended to Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island, so I had that upper New England area in my jurisdiction. I must say that the autoworkers at that time had relatively little in the way of membership in that area. I had a staff of five people. We concentrated primarily in the Massachusetts area at the outset. We built up from just the General Motors plant in Framingham, Massachusetts, to a membership relating to about 150,000. That was in a short period of time; I would say within two or three years.

Q: Whom did you report to?

WALKINSHAW: I reported to Walter Reuther directly. I was put there by Walter. I shouldn't say this but at that time over the head of a director named Kelly Carrigan.

Q: He was an old timer. How did you manage that relationship?

WALKINSHAW: Very well. As a matter of fact, I had excellent relations with Charlie. I reported to keep my skirts clean; I did talk with Charlie quite often, especially about staff problems. I don't think I mentioned any organizational problems we had because I dealt with Detroit. I'm trying to think of the vice president's name at that time, Gosser. He was the vice president of the autoworkers in charge of organization, Charlie Gosser. Anyway, in 1959 Victor Reuther who at that time---

Q: Excuse me. Before you begin leaving the UAW (Union of Automobile Workers), *let me ask you from the beginning of your employment by the UAW was Walter the president?*

WALKINSHAW: Oh yes, always Walter. In 1959 Victor and I had a meeting in Washington. He always felt that I had a flair for international work. He mentioned that to me several times. I had done a lot of reading in the international field. He said, "I would like to recommend you as a member for the Foreign Service Selection Boards, the labor member. How do you feel about that?" I said OK. So, in 1959 in the fall, I served as a member of the State Department Selection Board.

Q: Public member.

WALKINSHAW: Public member, no, labor member. They had public members, labor members and then Foreign Service people. I was the labor member representing the labor movement. I served in that capacity for a period of four months. I must say that gave me a wonderful insight into the machinations of the Foreign Service and the weaknesses and strengths of the various officers' files that I have read.

Q: These were not only labor officers.

WALKINSHAW: Oh no. These were economic officers who at that time had a grade four. I found myself looking at the Foreign Service individual as a person with weaknesses, with strengths, with different personalities. There wasn't a perfect animal in the Foreign Service, which was my belief after reading hundreds of files. I read every one of them, because I wanted to make a conscious judgment.

Q: You were there full time for four months paid by the State Department.

WALKINSHAW: Paid by the State Department on what they called a WAE, When Actually Employed.

Q: You were off the payroll of the UAW?

WALKINSHAW: Oh yes. They gave me a per diem. During that period I made some excellent friends in the Foreign Service who served with me as members of that panel. In the course of that time, Victor invited me to lunch and asked me if I were interested in the Foreign Service as a full time relationship. I said I can't give my answer now because I have to talk it over with my wife. After all, I have a wife and two children. Anyway, while I was there he asked me if I would meet with some people. I said I would, and I met with George Lodge, who at that time was Assistant Secretary of Labor.

Q: It may interest you to know that the day before I came down here to Florida, I interviewed him in a wonderful interview.

WALKINSHAW: The Labor Department specialist at that time was Jim Taylor. We had lunch and they asked me a lot of questions that you are asking me today. I left them; I wasn't very sanguine about my future, because I felt at that time not animosity, but there wasn't that chemistry.

Q: There was a reserve.

WALKINSHAW: Yeah, there wasn't that chemistry. I don't know if it had to do with the UAW or me personally. I left there convinced I should forget about it. In the meantime, I get another call from Victor asking me to have lunch with another man. The other man was John Dillon who at that time was in charge of the labor operations for AID (Agency for International Development).

Q: From the IUE (International Union of Electrical Workers).

WALKINSHAW: That's right. I had lunch with him, and there, there was chemistry immediately, I could see.

Q: Let's get into this chemistry question. It is important later on in terms of relations between labor people and others. Can you relate the lack of chemistry to a political factor between Lodge and Taylor on the one hand and you because Lodge was a Republican and similarly between John Dillon because he was a labor guy?

WALKINSHAW: No, I wouldn't go that far. I would say the lack of chemistry, I can't say it was political because I don't know, but I did feel the kinds of questions that were being posed by Jim Taylor in particular were designed to, I think, make me look bad. They were kind of provocative questions that you wouldn't normally ask in the course of trying to find out if this man can become a lay labor officer. That was my feeling at that time. Lodge, on the other hand, was relatively reserved during the whole lunch and merely made some remarks that he thought highly of the autoworkers or something like that. With Dillon, I think Dillon was impressed with the fact that I was able to engage him in a dialog that he understood. He had the feeling then that I had some intelligence. Now,

whether or not Taylor had that, I don't know.

Q: Didn't he come from New England also, John?

WALKINSHAW: New York City. I went back to my assignment with the Foreign Service panel. One of the fellows there whom I liked very much, a man named Harlan Clark, was one of the better Foreign Service people I ever met. He heard me talking about these interviews. Now, unbeknown to me, he and the other three Foreign Service people on the panel drafted a letter of commendation for me, a copy of which was sent to the AID people. I didn't see that letter until I was being employed by AID.

Q: Didn't they tell you about it? It was a nice, generous thing to do.

WALKINSHAW: Yes. I thought it was great. I must have made some kind of impression.

Q: Were they political officers, economic officers?

WALKINSHAW: Two economic officers and one political; I can't remember what the fourth one was. I saw that letter later when I was employed by AID. So, to get the story back to AID, I went home, and they sent me a form to fill out. I filled out the form two ways: one for the Labor Attaché and one for the Labor Division Chief in India. I sent them both back.

Q: The Labor Division Chief in India, the AID guy?

WALKINSHAW: I was part of the country team, oh yes. Labor Division Chief that was the title.

Q: Now what you say is not clear for the record. You say you filled out two applications.

WALKINSHAW: One for the Labor Attaché Position.

Q: Any place in particular or just the Labor Attaché Service?

WALKINSHAW: Just the Service. The other was for AID.

Q: It was an application to become the head of the Labor Division in AID in India; I get it.

WALKINSHAW: It was a three-man operation, me and two others. I sent the applications in and received a letter and a phone call from a retired Ambassador who came to our house to interview me. I can't think of his name now. It so happened that he came the night that my mother and dad were visiting us, which obviously impressed them.

Q: They came without an appointment or you made the appointment?

WALKINSHAW: They called on the phone and asked if they could come over, so I invited them to dinner. I thought it was a nice thing to do. They came and met my mother and dad and my family. We sat around and talked for a while. I must say, Murray, the report that this man sent, if I could take that and show it to my children, I would be the proudest father.

Q: Why do you say if? Can't you get it?

WALKINSHAW: I never asked for it. I've seen it; it is in my file.

Q: Why don't you write to the freedom of information people.

WALKINSHAW: This was in the AID files.

Q: Believe me they've got it. They will dig it up if you just send a letter.

WALKINSHAW: The interviewer already called. He said that if he were still in the Foreign Service, he would want me assigned to his embassy. I was very impressed with that. It was a very positive report as you might imagine. I got the call; they told me to come down to Washington. I went down to Washington. I got my leave of absence from the UAW (Union of Automobile Workers).

Q: Excuse me. I'm trying to refresh your recollection about the name of this guy. Was it Nathaniel Davis?

WALKINSHAW: Yes. That's it.

Q: He was a famous wonderful guy.

WALKINSHAW: Nathaniel Davis. This must have been in January or February of '60, because I was in Washington in April and May of '60. I was processed, and I had to spend some time over at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), you remember, 21 days or something going through a regular course.

Q: Was it the labor course or another one?

WALKINSHAW: The regular one. The A-100 course. I made my calls on the Labor Department, and the AFL CIO (American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations).

Q: Do you want to give some names there? Whom did you meet at the Labor Department? Did you meet Lodge and Taylor again?

WALKINSHAW: I didn't meet Lodge; I met Taylor. I must say when I met him that

time, I don't want to use the term sheepish, but he was uncomfortable without question. In later years I had some excellent correspondence from Jim Taylor applauding my reporting and so on. Anyway I made my calls and settled in and was assigned to India.

Q: Who did you see at State before you left? Do you remember?

WALKINSHAW: It was some of the Near East people. I talked to Gilman a lot. He gave me some background material. Then I met some incoming officers of AID; I can't remember their names. This is way back; you are talking over 30 years ago. I left for India. I think we arrived there May 20, 1960. Dave Burgess and Christian were at the airport to meet us and put us into the Claris hotel. I remember that so vividly. I got my feet rather wet. There was an ex-businessman who was in charge of the AID mission, C. Tyler Wood. You remember him; he was the Director. I called him a rather aloof Director as far as AID was concerned. They had this businessman out of New Jersey as Assistant Director. The first meeting I attended, he was berating some of the staff people for not being able to produce some of the material he wanted. What he wanted was some documentation from the Indian government. I was only on the job for three weeks, and I went over to see Dave Burgess, and I told Dave my story. I said who are my contacts in the Indian government for this material?

Q: This had nothing to do with Labor?

WALKINSHAW: No, this was stuff that this man wanted, and nobody in his operation would provide it for him.

Q: It wasn't labor; it was other economic material.

WALKINSHAW: It was concerning the AID operation. Dave told me some names. I go over to the government building to find it myself, and I met this Minister. I explained to him; he spoke English, so I explained to him precisely what I wanted. Within 20 minutes, I had a cup of tea, and he delivers all of these documents.

Q: What ministry was it?

WALKINSHAW: The Ministry of Economic Affairs. It wasn't Shastri. I don't remember his name. Anyway, I got four or five documents and took them in to this Assistant Director, Thompson was his name. God, he exploded. He went wild. He couldn't believe it.

Q: Had he asked for them himself? Had he gone to the ministry himself?

WALKINSHAW: He was trying to get the staff to do it, and they didn't know where to go. I had the good fortune of knowing Dave Burgess, so I asked Dave where to go. As I explained, I got the documents, and I turned them over to this fellow Thompson. Well, you should have heard him at the next staff meeting. I was a little bit embarrassed at the way he phrased his language, all flowers and sugar about Bob Walkinshaw. The end

result was everyone at that table was mad at me; he was the only one who was glad for me because I had produced in three weeks what they hadn't produced in six or seven months.

Q: I'm curious about that because it does reflect well on the Foreign Service. I don't care who the names are, but did you feel that they hadn't gone over to the Ministry or telephoned?

WALKINSHAW: I had the feeling that they didn't take this man seriously. He was a political appointee, a very bright man, but he never seemed to fit in with the professionals so to speak. As a matter of fact, I recall one situation where the administrative officer had a party and never even invited the Director. He heard about it. I was there, and he showed up with his wife uninvited. He made them all look rather small, but this is the way the system works. When I tell you I became disenchanted with the AID Mission and the AID operations and the role, which it played in that country, that's an example. It is kind of a built in institution, and if you are part of that institution, you are all right. I never had any political problems other than that one example that I cited because I delivered. The trouble was that after that, I became very friendly with this man, Thompson.

Q: What did you do in the labor field?

WALKINSHAW: We set out to set up some kind of a worker's education program because I felt that was where it was lacking. I did talk to the ITUC (International Trade Confederation) people. That was the Congress Party labor arm. I also spoke to the Socialist Party labor arm. I spoke to the independent unions, the railroad workers. I remember Peter Alvarez and don't forget Wild George Fernandez. I spoke to all those.

Q: Did you meet Maniben Kari?

WALKINSHAW: Oh yes. I met all those people. We set up a workers education project. The leader of that project was a fellow named Bert McNamera who came out of the steelworkers union. We set up a program that could be conducted in three days, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. We subsequently learned about the Friday problems so we said Saturday, Sunday, and Monday. We had success. We had a pilot project in Delhi. I was able to get Ambassador Bunker to attend the first session. This gave us prestige. So, we did get response, although I think there was a certain amount of suspicion on the part of some of the Indian trade union leaders.

Q: Especially INTUC (Indian National Trade Union Congress)

WALKINSHAW: INTUC. They felt that we were assuming a responsibility that belonged to them although they didn't fulfill it. We had to be very careful in not incurring the wrath of the leadership.

Q: To give them credit due.

WALKINSHAW: I invited them to open up the session with Ambassador Bunker, so I gave them the prestige and the head table. That kind of allayed some of the fear.

Q: Who was the head of the INTUC?

WALKINSHAW: I can't remember his name. He was a first class operator.

Q: Ramanujam?

WALKINSHAW: Yes.

Q: Aren't you lucky that I am interviewing you.

WALKINSHAW: I can recall some of the names.

Q: I have been in touch with him since.

WALKINSHAW: I can even go back as far as Nutphi [sp?] of the Democratic Socialists in India, who married a beautiful Swiss lady. Anyway, we set that up and did rather well, but most of my time was spent establishing rapport with the leadership. We did have a few grants to hand out. Here again we had to be careful on how those grants were handed out, that we didn't offend the leadership of the movement. I set up a little committee. I had INTUC (Indian National Trade Union Congress), and one of the independent unions; I can't recall. We had them sitting around. We would give them veto power so to speak. We would bring them in nicely and later on say we were contemplating sending "X" for three months to the Philippines or something. That worked out very well.

My role, I felt, was to give a certain amount of leadership, and I did establish some good relations in that movement. If I accomplished anything in India that I can look back on, you recall that there was an organization called the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) that was a communist arm, and INTUC being a Socialist Party, they were not close, not far away. I always felt they had a little bit of affinity for the relationship, which proved later to be wrong. That's what I am going to tell you now. I had worked with some of the leadership including the father of the INTUC, Ashoka Mehta.

Q: He was a party man but he was the godfather of the INTUC.

WALKINSHAW: I worked with Ashoka Mehta for a long period of time laying the groundwork for an official statement from INTUC condemning the AITUC. I recall having meetings with some of the leadership and Ashoka Mehta would be at some of them.

Q: Can I interrupt and ask you whether this was before or after the year that Ashoka spent in the East-West Center.

WALKINSHAW: It was before because---no it was after. This happened in Christmas of

1962. I remember being away from my family, and I didn't want to go. I went to Ambassador Bunker, and he said this was very important. We've got this thing laid out, and I think we can pull it off. The British Labor Attaché at that time went with me, and he was working from the other end. We went down to Calcutta to the international convention of the INTUC, and lo and behold, a resolution came out condemning the AITUC. That was the first time, and people will tell you this, that the unions have ever attacked the AITUC. I went back to New Delhi very pleased that it happened. I worked on that thing for over a year. The results are there.

Q: That's interesting. Ashoka Mehta was really a great guy. Let me ask you, you had a staff of one or two Americans?

WALKINSHAW: There were two Americans plus two Indians. I remember McNamera but I can't remember the other one.

Q: McNamera was a staff member, wasn't he?

WALKINSHAW: McNamera worked for me.

Q: Was this a temporary assignment? He was an employee.

WALKINSHAW: He took a leave of absence from the Steelworkers Union. He was Director in Milwaukee. He came there for the purpose of the education program.

Q: Yes. He went back many times, and you had another American there?

WALKINSHAW: I can't remember his name. He stayed about; he didn't work out. He came out of the IUE (International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers - Communications Workers of America) or something. He only spent about six months with us. We got rid of him; we had to because he was involved in everything but the labor movement. He wasn't caring about what he did, how he looked, or where he went. He took no leadership, and so even I didn't do the pushing. We ended up there when I went back; we only had Bert McNamera and the two Indians.

Q: You don't remember the two Indians' names. You did have relations with Burgess and with Christian.

WALKINSHAW: Our relations with Dave Burgess were like brothers. Whenever I would travel, he would go. Whenever he would travel, I would go, so we always had a unified American team. This was very important because there were stories about the AID Mission not having good relations with the Embassy and the Embassy not having good relations with the AID Mission; so we set the example. We thought it would continue; our relations were excellent. We did accomplish many other things together, some of which I won't even discuss, but we were able to make some impact policy-wise.

Q: You don't want to discuss them because of modesty or because of person?

WALKINSHAW: The personalities involved.

Q: You seemed to have gotten along better with Bunker than you did with the head of the AID Mission.

WALKINSHAW: Oh yes. Ambassador Bunker was a very genteel man. He was the epitome of niceness, so you couldn't help but have good relations with him if you had the intelligence to understand the man. I understood him; I felt he was one of the great assets of the American embassy.

Q: He is well known as a great political ambassador.

WALKINSHAW: I'll bring you into Vietnam because I worked in Vietnam a few years later.

Q: Let me ask you about that. Did he have to leave when Kennedy was elected or did he stay on?

WALKINSHAW: He stayed on. It was a voluntary separation. Then they brought in J. Kenneth Galbraith. I worked during his stay there for a short period of time, but I recall that as far as the Indian community was concerned, the intellectuals, you can recall how the Indians viewed education. The greatest example was this fellow in Calcutta who had a name card, B.A., M.A., Ph.D.

Q: Phail..[sp?] Oh, how I remember that.

WALKINSHAW: So Kenneth Galbraith in that light went along very well with the Indians, but he didn't make as much impact with the American community. It was just the opposite, so I left.

Q: Was he particularly friendly or unfriendly with the labor program?

WALKINSHAW: I served on the country team. I attended the country team meetings. No, I can't identify for myself any problem that might relate to Galbraith.

Q: You were a member of the country team. How many people from AID were on the country team?

WALKINSHAW: The Director and myself.

Q: Only those two. Who instituted that?

WALKINSHAW: The Director, Thompson.

Q: I thought Tyler Wood was the Director. There was something that I don't understand.

WALKINSHAW: I'll give you an example of C. Tyler Wood. He was a great personality, a handshaker, and an institution as far as AID was concerned, but I recall at one gathering that we had at a hotel. C. Tyler Wood had me stand next to him to identify the AID people. This is the truth. As you know, he had his office at the Embassy, not at the AID Mission. Thompson was at the AID Mission.

Q: Like at the receptions on labor day, the Ambassador would have you standing there to identify the foreign labor people, not his own staff. You seemed to have had a very good time.

WALKINSHAW: I enjoyed India, but I must tell you I did become disenchanted. I think the disenchantment was compounded by my relationship with Dan Horowitz. Dan came there, and I have to be appreciative of his position. He came there to follow Dave Burgess. Dave Burgess was a household word in India. Dan didn't have the personality to overcome that kind of atmosphere. I tried to help him along. When he came I met him at the airport. At that time, I was serving both the AID Mission and the Embassy. I was acting Labor Attaché at the Embassy. So, I tried to help him along, and went to the airport. We invited him to the house for dinner to get to know each other.

Q: Did he come with his wife?

WALKINSHAW: Yes, and two children, a boy and a girl I can recall. Even at those encounters, he tended to be somewhat aloof or uncaring maybe is a better way to describe it. This thing came to a head. We were both invited to speak to a management group in Calcutta. I called him on the phone to see if we could go down together. He said over the telephone, "I'm the Embassy, and you are the AID Mission, and we have different functions, and this is not going to be a Bob Walkinshaw-Dave Burgess road show from now on in." That relationship then became rather cool. I tended my own responsibilities and didn't get involved with the Embassy. As a matter of fact, I think it more or less broke off. I said to myself, the Foreign Service is not for me.

Q: Were there any policy issues involved in this difference or just personality?

WALKINSHAW: None. Just personality. He never really took on the India assignment as just Horowitz. He never lived down Dave Burgess' role. That just killed him. Now, had he come in there and said to himself, I'm the Labor Attaché, I'm Horowitz; I have a role. He never did that, because people kept talking about Dave Burgess. Everywhere he went he got Dave Burgess' name all the time you see. I unfortunately a couple of times happened to mention Dave, and that didn't go over very well, I understand.

Q: Did Christian help out in all of this? He was such a wonderful guy.

WALKINSHAW: Christian I think was protecting his own skin. I agree with him because he had a relationship; he had to work with Horowitz. I didn't have to work with Horowitz, although I wanted to have a relationship so that we could have a unified American team,

whether it be AID or the Embassy. It didn't matter as far as I was concerned. The important thing was the American policy.

Q: Did Dan try to influence appropriately we should do this in AID or that in AID.

WALKINSHAW: No, I never did discuss any kind of AID policy with Dan at any time.

Q: So the last year of your stay there wasn't very...

WALKINSHAW: It wasn't very healthy. I became disenchanted. So much so that I sent a letter to Walter telling Walter that I was coming back, and that I had my fill. I have a copy of the letter someplace. I had my fill and maybe this last experience had convinced me that the Foreign Service is not for me. Then I got a phone call from Victor after Walter had gotten the letter. He said to me don't act too hastily because nobody wants you to leave. You can write your own ticket. About two weeks later, I get a telegram to be at the airport at such and such a time to pick up George Weaver. I go to the airport and pick up George Weaver and drop him off at his hotel. The next morning he is at my doorstep at the AID mission, and he has a paper with him for me to fill out.

Q: He didn't get in touch with Dan Horowitz?

WALKINSHAW: Dan was at the airport. I got a telegram, and he probably got a telegram also. We were both there, and so was Christian. Carol Rice was also there.

Q: Carol Rice was the Political Counselor, yes.

WALKINSHAW: Anyway, he came to the AID Mission and said what is this I hear about you going back to the automobile workers? I said yes. He said tell me why. So, I told him why. He said I've changed your mind already. You are going to be a Labor Attaché. Then he gave me a paper and said fill it out. I can't remember 457, is that the number?

Q: That's right!

WALKINSHAW: Anyway, I filled it out. I said to myself why am I doing this. I was happy with the automobile workers union. I had no quarrel; I had a good position.

Q: Was your family happy there?

WALKINSHAW: Pauline was teaching school in India. She had a role to play. I won't tell you what they paid her; it was a pittance.

Q: They paid her in rupees. What about the kids?

WALKINSHAW: The kids enjoyed it. She enjoyed it. She didn't like the social life. Sometimes you had to go to four or five cocktail parties a night. In any event, I did

discuss it with my wife before I made the move. I filled out the paper. I don't think that paper was on his desk three minutes when I got a telegram right back that I was leaving India on the 24th day of May, 1962, and to come into Washington for a three-month period of training and I was on my way to Brazil. That's what they told me, Brazil. I come back and go on home leave and go into Washington, and they say, "No. It is not Brazil; it is Sydney, Australia." Then I get the post report for Sydney, Australia. Then I'm in Washington another week and they say, "It is not Sydney, Australia; it is Melbourne, Australia. I get the Melbourne reports and it was right. It was Melbourne, Australia. I can't remember the date I got there, but it was sometime in '62. I was at the Embassy for about a week.

Q: The embassy was in Melbourne then?

WALKINSHAW: No. Canberra. I went to Canberra for a week for orientation. I met the Ambassador and all the Embassy staff people.

Q: Do you remember who the Ambassador was?

WALKINSHAW: Bill Battle. Anyway, they assigned me to Melbourne. They gave me the assignment in Melbourne because the labor movement was concentrated in Melbourne. The Australia Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) with Albert Monk and Harold Suitor as I recall. I got to Melbourne in '62, the middle or latter part of '62, and resided in Melbourne. I had an immediate responsibility to make myself known to the leaders of the movement.

Q: Whom did you succeed? Was there a blank period in between?

WALKINSHAW: Yes. Who was there? Was it Herb Lear?

Q: Maybe.

WALKINSHAW: They didn't have one for about seven or eight months.

Q: That's what I wanted to know; there was a blank period.

WALKINSHAW: I went over to the Australian Council of Trade Unions office and introduced myself. At that time Suitor was there and a couple of other people. We sat around and chatted a little bit. I gave them my background and emphasized the labor movement to get the rapport started. When I mentioned the automobile workers union the lights went up and right away Walter's name came up.

They told me they were working out an arrangement with Reuther, some arrangement to have some of the people come in and testify on their behalf against General Motors, which made the Holden car. I left there and went back to the Consulate. The Consul General, a fellow named Hopkins, gave me a little bit of a party and asked me about various names. I was only there a couple of weeks when he gave me the party and I was

able to establish some rapport with the Victoria Trade Union Council and Mick Jordan, about a 300-pound man. A very jolly fellow, very affable.

We had this party and I got to know a few more people. I always felt that my job was like a public relations man; you sell yourself first then you sell the product. I was more or less taking everything in a personal way to get the personal relationship started. I started moving the labor movement into the universities, and I got to know a lot of the professors. Then, the Embassy asked me to report on the Labor Party, which brought me into the political reporting. That gave me a chance to meet the Labor Party leaders in Victoria.

I had the academics; I had the politicians, and I had the labor movement. Also at this point I had the employers. Now, I made myself a very good friend of the labor minister of the State of Victoria, a man named Walsh. He gave me a party and invited all the employers. They were asking me various questions about the way the American unions negotiated with the employers, what the policies were, what the procedures were. This is what I always believed: when you send a labor attaché out to a country, if he doesn't fully understand the mechanics of the American labor movement, he's lost. I found that my background was invaluable, having all the relationships I had with the arbitration system, negotiating, organizing, and employer relationship response.

Q: Did they ask you anything about our attitude toward the arbitration system?

WALKINSHAW: Oh yes. That came up quite often, not only in the employer category but also in the labor movement. I explained our procedure and the way it worked, which is not compulsory, but which is the way it was in Australia. Some of the employers that I had met told me very candidly that they always felt that these awards were jammed down their throats because they felt that the system was always more pro-labor than pro-management. I think to a degree they were right if you look at things objectively. I did have all these relationships, and I was building upon them.

Q: Among the academics, did you meet---

WALKINSHAW: I spoke at all the major universities in Australia.

Q: So did I. They were so wonderful about it.

WALKINSHAW: In fact, one of the academics wrote a remark about me: the Labor Attaché of all Australia as personified by Bob Walkinshaw. I don't know if I have it now, but the labor attaché at the time sent it to me.

Q: Did you get to meet Joe Isaac?

WALKINSHAW: Oh God yes. I was at his house several times.

Q: I just got a telephone call from him.

WALKINSHAW: Also one who used to visit the United States quite often, he was at the University of Melbourne, very close to Isaac.

Q: Bill Howard?

WALKINSHAW: No, that's not the name. It is a Jewish name actually. I can't remember. He was an academic and served at Harvard for a term. I can't remember, but I got to know him very well.

Q: Bill Isaac was the one who taught me so much about the Australian system. Then he was appointed to the arbitration court. I was appointed to be the visiting professor while they recruited somebody to take his place. You got along very well there, but as distinct from your AID job, you were not projecting programs.

WALKINSHAW: Yes. Policy. The policy of the United States government in that particular country. We knew what it was and had to enhance the image. I spent most of my time trying to do that. I accepted a lot of speaking engagements. I think I spoke as much as anybody in the embassy. I'm not talking about Melbourne; I'm talking about every state in that country.

Q: Did you get out to the west coast? I know whom you were talking about. Was he a west coast academic? Anyhow you taught at Perth.

WALKINSHAW: Perth? Oh yes. I went to Tasmania, Hobart, and Brisbane and, of course, Sidney.

Q: Do you want to comment on the difficulty of working in a consulate as a labor attaché as opposed to the embassy?

WALKINSHAW: I found there was a certain amount of jealousy. You see, I had the diplomatic plates on my car, and the Consul General (CG) had to run around with a different kind of a plate. I always felt he was a little jealous of my role. I had my own office upstairs over the consulate. My office was adjacent to the CIA operation, so I knew generally what was going on. When I would attend, I even told them I'm prepared to attend your staff meetings and contribute what I can. The CG didn't like that. There was a certain amount with the officers always having a little suspicion about this labor attaché; what was his role?

With the CIA, I heard that several times. Be careful of him; he's CIA. This came from some of the country people. I think in general, as a matter of fact, it was this same Frank Hopkins; here's another letter that what's-his-name came out with. He was Assistant Secretary of State under Kennedy, college professor. These names escape me; I apologize for that. In any event, he came out there and this is when I started to cultivate Bob Hawke. This consul general, I didn't know it until I saw my file, put a letter in my file, laudatory. It had to do with the relationship I had culminating with Hawke. When this

assistant secretary went back to Washington, in fact, he was the one who mentioned it. This consul general sent in a letter applauding my plugging in to Hawke. Of all the contacts I had in Australia, the one that I treasured the most was Bob Hawke. We had a relationship not only on a personal basis but family. When we left there, we gave all of the toys our children had there to his children. I worked on Hawke; I played golf with Hawke. The only thing I wouldn't do with Hawke was womanize. He was a great womanizer and drinker. I remember he would be at my house at 2:00, a.m. and he would say one more for the road. I would say you've had it and get him to his car OK.

Q: You know that he vowed not to drink again.

WALKINSHAW: Not since I left there. I've seen him several times since I have left there.

Q: Let's continue now.

WALKINSHAW: One of the things about the Australian trade union movement they had a very strong communist element. You had in the Australian Council of Trade Unions a man named Albert Monk. I think he did more accommodating than would be expected of a man of his stature. I think because in certain respects he was not a strong character. He was in many ways weak.

Q: You would not characterize him as a communist party member.

WALKINSHAW: No. He was far from being a communist party member. I wouldn't even call him a fellow traveler. He was just weak and didn't want anybody to disturb his position, and, if it meant accommodating the communists to succeed, Albert Monk would do it. On the other hand, you had a fellow like Harold Suitor, who was the secretary treasurer. He was a little stronger than Albert Monk although he used to agree, I think, with what Albert Monk was doing because he too didn't want to disturb the *status quo*. That *status quo* meant a paycheck every week. If you talk about brain matter, I think Suitor had more than Monk. In many ways Suitor fashioned himself in the position of Albert Monk and made this comment to me several times in private meetings. Now, I did have to have private meetings with Monk and private meetings with Suitor. You could see the division was there although it was not blatant by either one. They hid it, but it was there. Now, in the background of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), we had to walk this fine line with a very bright young man named Robert J. Hawke whose background was more religious than trade unionist. He was a Rhodes Scholar, had an economic degree, and had a law degree. He was the chief advocate for the ACTU meaning that he made the policy for the arbitration system. He also processed all the arbitration cases for all the trade unions, not only for the ACTU, but also for the Sheet Metal Workers and even the communist unions.

Q: You say he made the policy.

WALKINSHAW: He made the policy! Albert Monk liked to drink. Robert Hawke liked

to drink in those days. You know he is no longer involved with the alcohol. He and Albert used to get together absent Mr. Suitor, out of which would come a policy, which would be announced not by Monk but by Robert Hawke.

Q: It is interesting that later on when Hawke became head of the unions, he kept the advocacy down, which was very interesting.

WALKINSHAW: Because he knew, you see, the power base, because he was dealing with every single trade union leader in the country. If you processed a case before the arbitration tribunal and you succeeded, your name was in the paper and not the trade union name. Robert Hawke knew this; he was very smart. I said to myself, now that's the guy you've got to cultivate because I could see him as the power base. You had to be more or less friendly with Albert Monk and Harold Suitor, and keep a relationship, because you learned what they were doing, and you would be able to report objectively. You had the three people playing roles, one more important than the other and the other more important than that one. I worked on Hawke to the extent that I played golf with him. We socialized together. Let me tell you now, do you have any questions about the embassy's relationship with the labor attaché? Now, there were some people at the Embassy and also at the Consulate General who were a little bit leery about my role with Hawke because they fashioned Hawke as a communist.

Q: The American Labor Movement did at first.

WALKINSHAW: Let me tell you I did not. I viewed Robert Hawke as an opportunist. He would have used his mother to advance the cause. That cause was Robert J. Hawke. I was so friendly with him that I was able to work up a biographical sketch of Robert J Hawke. I forget how many pages it was, but it was comprehensive. In that biographical sketch I wrote, I said that the United States government has to recognize that what we are talking about here is the future Prime Minister of Australia.

Q: Now I want to ask you a question about that assessment of him. At one point the official AFL-CIO position on Hawke was very critical. They didn't want him to come to the United States; they thought he was a communist. How did you deal with that then?

WALKINSHAW: What bothered me is that when Harry Goldberg came to Australia, I got the feeling from Harry Goldberg that they did not cotton to Robert Hawke. They were suspicious. Now Goldberg never came out and told me personally that they thought he was a communist, although I did hear this from other sources. Even some of the embassy people felt that he was a fellow traveler at least. I argued against that, and based on my understanding of him and looking at his history. I delved into it so I could report intelligently. I viewed these things thoroughly from his days in Perth and his relationship with certain people. Plus he was a womanizer and he was a drinker. As a result, he was vulnerable. There is no question about that.

Let me give you an example of Robert Hawke. This is how you can tell a man's background and political leanings. In the Trades Hall Council, there was a fellow called

Mick Jordan; he was the secretary. That was the power structure. Underneath him was an assistant secretary, a very bright young man, very close to Bob Hawke, and he had visions of becoming secretary. Now from my point of view, we were better off with Mick Jordan at that stage. I became friendly with the assistant secretary to the extent that I was inviting him also and having chats with him and putting questions to him and getting answers. There was an election coming up for the secretary of the Trades Hall Council.

I could see that they were building up opposition to Jordan. I felt that opposing Jordan would be a disaster because if Jordan were defeated then the communists would take over that council, a very important Trades Hall Council. Don't forget the state of Victoria is a very large state. I met with this young man, and he told me his background. I said to him, "Do you have good relations with Mick Jordan? You know the communists are trying to take over this Trades Hall Council. It's not my business; I'm not supposed to get involved here. I'm just asking the question. I don't care one way or the other." He said, "Well, you have to care." That left an opening. I said, "Are you supporting Mick Jordan?" He said, "At this stage I might run against Mick Jordan because I'm being pressured by certain elements." He named four elements, three of which were communist unions. Then I went to Bob Hawke and talked to him about, have you heard about what is going on at the Trades Hall Council? He told me what the young man had told him. So, I conceived a plan and got two people to agree to it. One was Mick Jordan; the other was the young man. I said, "Now you are both interested in survival. It's not my business, but you are friends of mine and maybe my background in the labor movement can help you." What I did was I got Mick Jordan to run and this young man to run so the communists thought they had a candidate. Three days before the election; I had the young man resign.

Q: They must have been annoyed at that.

WALKINSHAW: Bob Hawke came to me and said, “You son of a gun. That was a master plan. I wanted to do something, but I couldn't think of what myself.” I said, "I didn't have anything to do with it." Now let me tell you what happened. I told you I was next door to the CIA operation. The station chief asked me to type up this operation because he wanted to send it in to the CIA as a kind of example of how you can manipulate. I wasn't manipulating. I was trying to carry out our policy. We didn't want a communist controlled Victorian Trades Hall Council, and I used my relationships to advance our cause, and it succeeded. Now, the question is what if at the last minute the young man said, “ I'm running.” The commies had no chance to get another candidate up because the time element was gone. Under their rules you had a time element. You had to put your name in writing, When the time element is done, the young man resigns. That man today is secretary of the Victorian Trades Hall Council or he was at least when I left after Mick Jordan died. He became secretary, so he got his way anyhow.

Q: The agency asked that you write that up. Were you fearful that it might leak if you did?

WALKINSHAW: No.

Q: Did you write it up?

WALKINSHAW: Oh sure. I had good relations with the station chief; he was very good to me. I socialized with him. I felt that he was very worthwhile. He was very close to the intelligence director.

Q: Did you write it up for the State Department?

WALKINSHAW: Oh yeah. The State Department got it too. I didn't give it exclusively to the CIA. Let me tell you another story about that. About three months after this happened, I can't remember the man's name, but he was an executive with the CIA. He came out to interview me and wanted to know whether or not I wanted to go to work for the CIA. This is true. They were impressed with the machinations. Anyway that worked out very well.

I spent four years in Australia. Bill Battle left, and they had this fellow, Clark, from Texas come in, a friend of LBJ's. Kennedy was assassinated and Johnson became President. The whole setup changed in the embassy, and this fellow, Clark, came in from Texas. He was former State Treasurer of Texas, a successful businessman, a banker, a lawyer, and a politician. He is the fellow that told *Time Magazine* about Bob Menzies, "We may have said hello; we ain't shook yet." He was a character.

What happened was there was a DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) there. I didn't talk about him yet, a nice man named Jack Leitman. He was DCM under Battle and then under Clark. His big job was to keep Clark from running wild. He left there; he could see the handwriting on the wall. He was a very bright fellow, and he had a very attractive and lovely wife, very intelligent in her own right. He ended up in Indonesia. The next thing I know, I get a telegram that I'm being transferred to Indonesia. This resulted from my relationship with Leitman in Australia. He saw what I had accomplished in Australia. I hope I'm not being overly modest about this thing. He was the kind of a guy that if you were right: stick with it. If you were wrong, he would take you to task. I ended up being transferred. I go down to the embassy and tell the Ambassador Clark that I am being transferred to Indonesia. He said to me, "All you rats are leaving the ship."

Q: You said you went down. Do you mean you went to the capital, Canberra. You were posted in...

WALKINSHAW: Brisbane, but I had to attend all the staff meetings.

Q: I see. So you went frequently. That becomes a problem later with Dave.

WALKINSHAW: The way I used to do it, when I knew a staff meeting was coming up, I would organize a trip to Sidney so I could discuss matters with the Sidney trade union people. I would do it that way so that would save some expense and I would be able to make some work out of it. The ambassador said, “All you rats will leave the ship” and he never spoke to me from that day on. When I got to Indonesia, there was a letter waiting

for me from Ambassador Clark apologizing to me for the remark he made plus he wanted me to know how well he thought of me. Isn't that amazing?

Q: You had a second front.

WALKINSHAW: I've got to tell you about Australia, and then we will go to Indonesia. One of the things about the Hawke election as President of the ACTU with Suitor and Monk. Suitor really wanted the job. Monk has had it. He's ailing; he hadn't stopped drinking; he's in really bad shape.

Q: He was still a delegate?

WALKINSHAW: Oh yes. Hawke was laying the framework, so they had a convention in Sidney. I was invited to the convention. We had it upstairs in this theater. They had this balcony and these little sitting places for my people in each area and all visitors. I was sitting with Joe Isaacs and a couple of other professors from Sidney. In the meantime I'm talking with Hawke because Monk is not getting rid of his position in this convention, but Hawke is laying the groundwork and so is Suitor. Harold Suitor invited me to dinner that night in Sidney. He said, "Bob, you've got some influence with some of the unions here in Sidney; they speak very highly of you. I would appreciate it very much if you would---" I said, "Harold, that is the last thing you can ask me. I will not get involved in trade union politics here, guaranteed not. Not only for you but anybody else." That took care of Suitor. He appreciated that. Then comes Bob Hawke. Hawke said to me that all he wants me to do is talk to a guy named Joe Reardon. Joe Reardon was President of the clerks union. He thinks highly of you. All you have got to do is say support Hawke and he will support Hawke. I said, "Bob, you know better than to ask. Even if I wanted to do it, I wouldn't do it through you. We've been friends a long time now, so don't put me in a spot by asking me that. In your own rights, what you should do is go to Reardon and sit down and talk to Reardon." What I did do was I went to Reardon and told Reardon about my conversation with Hawke. I said he is a little bit leery about approaching you because you might think that he is a radical leftist. Reardon was a member of the right wing of the party.

Q: He was a member of the right wing of the labor party but also a trade union official. In that capacity you spoke.

WALKINSHAW: He was strictly anti-communist, anti-leftist. Anything that had to do with leftist, Joe Reardon wasn't there. He did approach Reardon, and, to my surprise, Reardon gave him a commitment. So you see it all balanced itself out.

Now, I'm up in the balcony. The communist party had the newspaper. I have a copy of it here someplace. They have a newspaper called the Tribune. The week after the convention, Monk was re-elected, Suitor was re-elected, Hawke was re-elected as advocate and so on. The week after the convention up comes this Tribune and on the front-page who is sitting there? Me! I'm on the front page. The caption is, "Who is this man? Is he a banker? Is he a politician? No, he is a labor attaché who is running the

convention."

Q: You should have got a great increase for that.

WALKINSHAW: That made my day at the Embassy. Anybody who worked with me at the embassy from that day on was my great friend. They realized that I had done some work. That is the last story about Australia. There are many others that I could tell you but it would take so much time.

Q: Let's continue on about Indonesia, but have you thought about writing something about that?

WALKINSHAW: Well, yes. There are so many experiences that one has, serving the way I served. I think I told you, my view was not to emphasize labor, but to emphasize that I was an employee of the US government. I think in that respect I got along better than had I carried that labor chip on my shoulder. I think that is a mistake a lot of our colleagues make. They never really convinced themselves that they ought to be an employee of the US government. That was my view.

Now, I get to Indonesia because of this Jack Leiten relationship and Marshall Green is the Ambassador. I couldn't---

Q: This would have been about '66?

WALKINSHAW: '66. As a matter of fact I was only there about a month when they stormed the embassy. You remember they fire bombed the embassy. Here I am; I am coming into a country. Leitman is the DCM and Marshall Green is the Ambassador.

Q: You couldn't have had a better situation.

WALKINSHAW: But I am coming into an embassy and a country that's on fire. The American community is hated; they're spitting at them. As a matter of fact, my wife went to the market and they spat on her. The labor guys were hiding some place, so I said to myself: Eirich. Paul Eirich. He left me a list of people. So I pick out the names and the unions and I get to the embassy and get a car. Let me tell you about my first experience in trying to establish a contact. I get the driver and tell him where I want to go. Immediately he is shuddering. I said, “What's wrong?” “No, nothing.”

Q: Was Sukarno still in power then?

WALKINSHAW: Sukarno and Subrandio were still in power. As a matter of fact Subrandio's office was next to the Embassy. So I go to this place and it is one of the unions that is identified with the right wing Islamic group. I go in there and there are about nine guys sitting around a table having coffee. I did speak a little bit of Bahasha Indonesian, enough to get by. I got better as I survived there. I go in there and tell them who I am and they are all happy to see me. Then I noticed outside, there must have been

about 25 soldiers with rifles. I approached one of the leaders of the movement, a guy named Tjokramonoto. I learned from him they are all under house arrest.

Q: What was their relationship to Sukarno?

WALKINSHAW: They were on his death list. That's why they were under house arrest. You remember the communist uprising. All these guys were on the other side. I left there, and they invited me back. They were pleased to see me, pleased to see anybody I guess.

Q: How did your driver feel?

WALKINSHAW: I had a heck of a time finding him later because when he dropped me off, he left. I had to walk a block and a half because I saw the Embassy car parked and there he was smoking a cigarette. He saw those soldiers too. I didn't know they were under house arrest; I was making a courtesy call. That got me started.

Then I decided I'm going to start down this list and I'm going to go at it. I went over to the Gasbiindo union. The B in all these names meant Boodo, and Boodo means worker. So I go to Gasbiindo and they also have a bad relationship with Sukarno. They too are part of the radical right but not as radical as the other unions. I meet a fellow by the name of Agussudono. He was the president of Gasbiindo. He was bright and spoke fluent English. He and I hit it off. The chemistry was there quickly. We got talking. The staff people, the gals and the men all are working for him.

In Indonesia, when you ask a union how many members do you have, they would give you an inflated number. If you go to another union in the same field and ask how many members do you have?, they would have more than the other. They all count the same people. Nobody pays dues; they are all members. When I was there, this is true, the greatest example was I went on a trip with Sukarno to an American oil rig. I met with Gasbiindo's counterparts. How many members do you have? 14,000. How many do you have? 14,500. How many employees are here? 13,000. They even inflated that. How many pay dues? Ah, that is the question. You never asked them how many paid dues; you would never get an answer. Nobody paid. Well, there were a few. That's why they were all being subsidized. I built up a network just in relationships. Just hello, how are you and so on. I tell them about my background and ask questions about the Indonesian labor movement. I did some studying of the laws there so I could understand what they were doing.

Q: Whom did you succeed there?

WALKINSHAW: Ihrig. Herb Ihrig. I built up enough of a group that I could depend upon if I wanted to do something like socialize. In the meantime they had this uprising. Our embassy was torched and so on. In comes Suharto and Sukarno goes up to the Puntjak outside of Bandung up in the mountains like a summer resort. We had a good relationship with 35 or 40 trade union people in that area in Djakarta and Bandung. Now the embassy is having trouble making contact with anybody. Nobody wants to talk to us.

In the meantime, a labor minister is appointed, a man named Awaluddin. I call on him. Boy! To my surprise and I tell you I was so thankful, he was a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh. Where do you think my wife went to school for her BA and MA? The University of Pittsburgh. I invite him to the house. He comes and Pauline is talking about the University of Pittsburgh. That relationship from then on in was excellent. Then I said to him I would like to do something for you, but I want to get your approval. I would like to invite 10-15-20 of the labor leaders I know to Djakarta, and I want to make you the guest of honor. I wanted his blessing. I sent the invitations out to meet labor minister Awaluddin. Thirty-seven show up. Green was there, all the embassy people. They couldn't believe it. I was the first one in that Embassy to open the door to the Indonesian community.

Let me tell you something. Marshall Green, if you sit down and talk to Marshall Green, he'll tell you the story. I, the United States Labor Attaché, was introducing Indonesian labor leaders to their labor minister. Green wrote that up. After it was all over, he held a meeting at my house after they all left, including Awaluddin and told the staff, if he can do it, you can do it. I actually endeared myself to all of my political section colleagues. I even opened the door. Remember the KBN, the communist union; B meaning Boodo; Boodo meaning worker. I opened up a meeting over there where I debated the Russian Labor Attaché in Indonesia. Unbelievable. I brought with me from the embassy an expert on the KBN. I opened the door for him; he got more information from that relationship, and he reported. That was Indonesia. I stayed there until Marshall Green went back to Washington as Assistant Secretary. I get a telegram: transferred to Washington.

Q: Before we go to Washington, did you have anything to do with the AID program there?

WALKINSHAW: No. Let me tell you why. Because Green made the policy statement that we are not buying our way in. Now, the AID people were pushing him, and he resisted the temptation to bring a massive USAID program as not good enough. When I left there, they had a relatively small membership, just a kind of a holdover.

Q: You mean AID staff, no labor guy? No labor program?

WALKINSHAW: No.

Q: Did you have an assistant attaché?

WALKINSHAW: One, a CIA man.

Q: I see. He was assigned to you, but he didn't work for you.

WALKINSHAW: No. He took my leadership in labor management. Let me give you an example of how a labor type can establish relations with an embassy. Dave Sudono a little while ago became a member of parliament. That meant that he had access to a lot of documentation coming out of Suharto, because he was very close to Suharto. There was a

document that they were going to bring up. I used to meet Sudono at 6:00 A.M. or 4:00 P.M. I used to park my car and walk half a mile or a mile or even two miles to meet him, always privately. Once my phone was not working, so I went to my next-door neighbor who is the embassy doctor to use his phone. I said I'd like to meet you at 4:00 this afternoon at the regular place. He happened to say over the phone, I'll have it with me. So I go to the embassy. The god-darned doctor was a CIA operative. He called the CIA office and told the chief I didn't know that Sudono was on their payroll. They had instructed Sudono not to give me the documents. I went to the labor counselor and I said I don't understand this.

Q: Weren't we working for the same government?

WALKINSHAW: Yeah, that is what I said. Zach Leadman was DCM. He went to Marshall Green. Marshall Green went to the station chief and said let me tell you about the policy. The policy is that you worry about external matters; we worry about internal matters. It is the political section's responsibility. Ed Masters was the political counselor and said that you worry about internal matters and that means that what Bob Walkinshaw is doing is correct. At 4:00 I got the document. Now, if I didn't have a good relationship with the DCM and the ambassador and the political counselor, my head would be hanging high. That was a good example of the kind of relationships one could establish.

Q: You then went to be Marshall Green's labor man for East Asia.

WALKINSHAW: East Asia. There wasn't much there to talk about. Policy wise, the policy was made upstairs. You followed the policy. I would make tours. I went to Thailand, Taiwan, and Malaysia. When I went to Malaysia, who was the Ambassador, Zack Leadman.

Q: He had been promoted, probably at the instigation of...

WALKINSHAW: Who was the DCM in Thailand, Ed Masters.

Q: When did you go back to Washington?

WALKINSHAW: '68. I was in training for about four months at the FSI on Vietnamese matters. I worked as the regional Labor Attaché for fourteen or fifteen months with Green.

Q: Nothing particularly important about that?

WALKINSHAW: No. I think the important part about that is that I was involved in about everything they were doing there. I worked for the regional office, which was a segment of the East Asian Bureau. I got involved in matters other than labor. I got involved in human rights and used to attend meetings on the 7th floor. That took up a lot of my time. The important part about the role we played, I was the point man for the US government with relationship to the offshore labor agreement with the government of the Philippines.

I spent a lot of my time preparing documentation for those negotiations, and I worked very closely with the department of defense. I worked with their appointees, a Navy man and a Navy man and an Air Force man and an Army man who all worked with us on that offshore labor agreement. That took up a lot of my time because I was meeting maybe twice or three times a week.

Q: Who was SIL? (S/IL, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator International Labor Affairs)

WALKINSHAW: Oh, the Irishman. I can't remember, Phil Delaney. He never got involved in that. It was a bureau matter, and I would report to him.

Q: We are going to continue on with your service as the area Labor Advisor before you went to Vietnam. This is a period from about '68 until '70.

WALKINSHAW: Yes. For most of the work there you would take that which had come in from the field, and you would analyze it and draft a synopsis country by country. Then you would send that to the Assistant Secretary, which in this case was Marshall Green. You had to establish relationships with each of the country directors. Each country has a Director and a Deputy Director and a staff. They followed events in each of their respective countries, and anything that involved labor came to my attention. I would take that (we were required to report weekly) and summarize various labor movement events in East Asia. I would extract that which I thought was important enough for the assistant secretary to see and would draft and clear it with the respective country director. Then it would go into a condensed form and would be the paper for that week for the whole East Asia.

Q: To what degree did you have any participation by the Labor Department expert in that field, if any?

WALKINSHAW: I did have a relationship with the Labor Department where we kept in touch all the time about what was going on in various countries, yes. Also with the CIA. The CIA had a person in charge of labor events, a lady. She would call me about some event, for example, that happened in Thailand. Did I have any background or advance information on it and so on. In that respect I was somewhat helpful.

Q: Who was the lady calling from the department? Was it Glenn Halm? It must have been one of his predecessors. He is the guy now.

WALKINSHAW: No. I remember him. The other one was a public type fellow. I contacted him and he would call me. I also had a relationship with Congress on human rights. For example, I established a relationship with the administrative assistant to Congressman Frazier of Minnesota, who at that time was the director of some committee involving human rights matters. I established a relationship with one of his assistants, and we used to have lunch every two or three weeks. We would go over matters. He would tell me what the committee was thinking, and I would return with as much as we knew.

We would get Marshall Green and the Congressman together. We were able to work out a pretty good relationship on that basis.

Q: Did you get back to the AID efforts in your area at all?

WALKINSHAW: Never. I never had involvement with AID from the day I left India. Not because I didn't want to, but I didn't have the occasion to get involved.

Q: What were the circumstances of your going to Vietnam?

WALKINSHAW: They were looking for some people to go into Vietnam.

Q: This was your first non-labor assignment.

WALKINSHAW: Yes, except I did do a lot of non-labor work when I was a labor officer. They were looking for some people to go into Vietnam. They had these jobs they called the Deputy of Records, region by region. At that time one of the fellows close to Green suggested that I might be a good candidate to go into Vietnam and serve in one of those positions because of my background. They asked me. It meant severing some of the relationship with family. After you came home it would be six months and two days. I gave it some thought and talked with Green about it. He thought it would be a good idea because Bunker was there and another friend of his, Bill Colby. So a letter went out to Bill Colby saying that they were thinking about having me go to Vietnam. A letter came back saying, if you think it is all right, it is OK with us. They asked me and I said OK. I talked with Pauline about it and we agreed that I would go to Vietnam. I had to go to training for three months. I got to Vietnam and they assigned me to Charlie Whitehouse. I got to meet Bill Colby. Whitehouse at that time was Deputy of Records for region three. He wanted me to become the senior advisor to a province called Pauoc Tui. That is up close to the R and R center, Vung Tau. I said OK. He took me around to various provinces other than the one I was going to. I met the head of policy. There you had a civilian as the head and the deputy was a military man and vice versa.

So I finally ended up in a place called Pauoc Tui and met the staff there. It was a big operation. A senior advisor had lots of power and lots of money to spend doing things for the Vietnamese. I had a staff of about 40. Then the Australians were in Pauoc Tui province. The Australian military, I had a job to establish rapport with them. I worked there for a while, and finally one of the major problems came up in military group three. The commanding general, a man named Davison, was asked by the ambassador to evaluate the various province senior advisors. Unfortunately I came out on top of this military general, a three star general.

Bunker suggested that I take over this province in Gia Dinh adjacent to Saigon. I was there for some time, and here again, I had to start all over again. Here you had all kinds of operations as province senior advisor, the counterpart to the Vietnamese province chief. Being counterpart to him meant you were involved in every one of his programs including the Phuong Hang program. That's the anti-communist program. The Americans

call it the Phoenix program. There you are organizing to target certain groups and so on. Then you have the development program. You have people there who are experts in agriculture and so on. You watch all of these operations, and you are required to report every month on every element in your province. This is the responsibility of the province senior advisor, so you are writing a lot. You are also extracting from reports you get from other people. Gia Dinh was a different kettle of fish. You were close to Saigon, so everyone is watching you in Gia Dinh. In Pauoc [sp?] Tui you were way the hell up in a different region so you were on your own, but down in Gia Dinh you were almost subservient to everybody who was watching you.

Q: Was that the district that contained Bien Hoa?

WALKINSHAW: Yes, Military District Three contained Bien Hoa. Gia Dinh is part of Military District Three also. So is Paouc [sp?] Tui. There were sixteen provinces in two zones. You had a zone for the navy and a zone for the R&R center: you had all those provinces. I was in Gia Dinh for about six or seven months and Deputy of Records Ambassador Funkhauser was leaving. The Embassy was looking for somebody to replace Funkhauser. I got a call to meet Ambassador Bunker. He told me, "You are going to Bien Hoa to become Deputy of Records." That gave me the responsibility for the sixteen provinces and all the elements on those provinces and all of the expenditures. It was a big operation. I don't know how many people worked for me. I like to say it better: they worked with me. So that was a big responsibility. That was a far cry from buttonholing a labor leader. Talk about politics. So anyway, I was up there for over a year as Deputy Director of Records. I had my own helicopter with two pilots and two door-gunners. I was traveling by helicopter about four or five hours a day to various provinces talking about getting things started here and up there. Then I had to be at the embassy occasionally to have meetings.

Q: Did you get in touch with or have anything to do with the labor attaché at that time?

WALKINSHAW: I knew who he was, but I never had time. I had so damn many responsibilities that I didn't worry about labor attachés. I did see him when I went to the embassy.

Q: Was that Barney Taylor?

WALKINSHAW: No this was---I can't think of his name. I saw him a couple of times at the embassy, but I didn't have anything to do with him. To tie in the experience I have, here I am in Vietnam, right? It was important that we got people to support our policy, right? Who do you think was one of the first ones to support our policy in Australia? Robert J. Hawke!

Q: The AFL was a little suspicious of that?

WALKINSHAW: No. There were two religious organization trade unions in Indonesia, the catholic and the protestant. They were trade unions attached to the orders. Who do

you think came to Vietnam to support our policy? We snuck them out of the country. Four people from those unions in Indonesia! Which shows you that you can have a salutary effect when you are not even there. That is important from the point of view of knowing what you can do and what you can't do. So I'm in there and the American military decides to move. I remember they had a meeting in Paris and they agreed to a ceasefire and we would remove the military and they would go back to the north. It all worked out, which didn't work out. Ambassador Bunker wanted to set up consulates general. He wanted one in Bien Hoa. There were three of them, I think, set up. I got a call from the ambassador to come down to see him. He said, "I have just nominated you for the Consul General for Bien Hoa." He said, "I'll be out to swear you in within 15 days." We had to pick someplace to swear me in. I had it in a garage. There I am. I started out in an AID mission as a labor division chief and ended my career as a consul general in the Foreign Service.

Q: That is a very interesting career. In that responsibility, did you have anything to do with the trade unions?

WALKINSHAW: No. We had some trade unions working to form some trade unions in the military regions of trade. I don't recall having one bad situation that would involve a trade union except that we did catch one of the drivers stealing some of the gasoline. My view is that if you don't get rid of him, it is going to compound itself, and you are going to get more. We had a meeting with the Vietnamese and the board sustained my position. This isn't going to help the trade unions. Otherwise, we had a pretty good relationship.

Let me tell you something, Murray, in addition to being responsible for a lot of Americans, I was responsible for a lot of Vietnamese. Pauline was there for 17 months; what she did, I had tried at two hotels. There were two hotels that...

Q: You went out there without your family. You haven't brought Pauline in.

WALKINSHAW: She came. There were a lot of wives that came. She was there for 17 months. While she was there, she started an English class for the Vietnamese employees. I had two hotels under my jurisdiction where the people lived. We had a banquet room. She got the blackboards; she was a very good teacher. She started an English class for the Vietnamese employees. I can show you that the Vietnamese employees gave her a little plaque in there. It says in Vietnamese, "Van win chou;" they have her name, "wak in cha"(Walkinshaw) in three syllables.

Q: I was asking if you had met or had any meetings with [inaudible]

WALKINSHAW: I had met him, and I did meet other members of the Vietnamese federation on occasions, just to say hello to them. As a matter of fact, the Vietnamese counterpart was a four-star general, Huin van Minh who was in the United States living in New York. He invited me to his house a couple of times. He had a summer house on the river, and who was there but [inaudible] of the Vietnamese trade union federation.

Q: You have no reaction about his qualities or anything like that.

WALKINSHAW: Based on my own knowledge of the Vietnamese labor movement, it was always a weak animal. Actually if you want to call it anything, you have to call it an adjunct of the catholic party. Everybody's very close to the priest.

Q: You stayed there how long?

WALKINSHAW: I was there four years.

Q: You were there through '75.

WALKINSHAW: You've got to remember, I was a Provincial Senior Advisor, a Deputy Director of Records and Consul General. I went there in early '70 and left there in late '74, so it was a little over four years.

Q: So you weren't there in '75.

WALKINSHAW: No. I left just before that. See, Pauline had left. I had only a year and a half to go before retirement. It was a tough time to get an assignment. Nobody wants you when you've only got a year and a half. Green was in Australia. I talked with Marshall; he felt it would be a little bit much to come out there for a year and a half. Otherwise, he'd love to have me, but a year and a half wouldn't make much difference. I went back to Washington and became Phil Habib's Labor Advisor. The concentration then was human rights. We were able to make some headway in human rights in the region.

Q: You talked about some of the people you worked with, Habib---

WALKINSHAW: Habib was great. Here again, you have to look at this thing on the basis of personalities. It depends on how you face that responsibility. I think that the man makes the position. That's true of ambassadors; that's true of consuls; that's true of anybody in the service. I've seen some duds outside of the labor assignment because they didn't look at the picture in totality. They were selfish; I'm in the economic section, that's all. There is much more to the Foreign Service than just one section.

Q: Your final assignment was with Habib?

WALKINSHAW: Yes.

Q: Then you retired when?

WALKINSHAW: January 31, 1976.

Q: I'd like to go over some of those questions just to ask whether you have anything you want to say about them because some of them, as I recall... Oh this isn't a question.

WALKINSHAW: No. You took the questions back.

Q: Before we stop, Bob, I'd like for you to review in total. You made individual comments about the role of the AFL-CIO in foreign labor affairs. Was it positive, negative; how could it be improved or what particular approaches might be taken. Do you have any comments about that?

WALKINSHAW: I don't quarrel with the idea of the AFL-CIO having a role in labor matters internationally. I think that is a proper role for the AFL-CIO. I just have a question about some of the ways in which they handle that role. It seems to me that here again it is a question of personalities. Now, my own experience has been that a couple of the people who have worked in that field who came to countries where I was serving, I would have to categorize as disasters. It didn't help the situation any; as a matter of fact, after they left, we were still trying to repair some of the damage. The point I would make about that is you have to get very trained and qualified people, and they have to understand that when they come to a country, it is not their country. They don't pay taxes to that country and don't own that country. They don't dictate policy to that country, and they more or less have to do a lot of listening instead of a lot of talking. I found that they very seldom listened to other people, and they tended to throw their weight around much more so than that to which they were entitled. So, here again, it is that personality thing.

Q: Do regular Foreign Service types have the same faults or did you never see a case of a regular Foreign Service officer, not one in the labor field, being guilty of the same thing.

WALKINSHAW: We are talking about the AFL-CIO role in the world, and I can relate to that based on my own personal experiences. If you want to talk about Foreign Service, yes, I've seen some Foreign Service people who damaged the position of the embassy by reason of forcing positions where they had no business to force positions.

Q: What you are saying is that the personality and capability of the individual does not depend on whether he is labor or not.

WALKINSHAW: That's it. It could apply to both sides. I can't emphasize enough, whether he comes from the AFL-CIO or the labor field or from the Foreign Service, he has to understand what the role is. The role has to be tied to an objective. If you don't have an objective, you don't have any role. The trouble is a lot of these people had roles, but they don't worry about objectives because they are in and they are out.

Q: I have a question here about the sensitivities dealing with opposition groups and what that refers to is how you deal with opposition groups. Do you approach them? Do you have anything to do with them? Under what circumstances?

WALKINSHAW: It seems to me that one of the mistakes that we make (I'm not talking about communists now), I'm talking about opposition groups in governments. Some of them are not communists. They could just be [inaudible] Now the one example I can cite,

and I can credit Bill Battle for having the foresight as to what to do. He asked me if I would get together in Australia 10 or 15 left-leaning labor leaders or politicians, but he didn't want communists. So, I got together with Mick Jordan and Hawke, and I said now I want some radical, some not too radical, but no communists, and I want you there too, both of you. We ended up getting ten opposition leaders and Hawke and Mick Jordan. It was at my house in Melbourne. I want to tell you Bill Battle performed a service to our government that is not to be believed. Toe to toe; issue to issue. They left there applauding the American ambassador. These were definite opposition. Some of them, for example, were very outspoken about Vietnam. I tell you, he allayed a lot of their fears just by that one session. Now, he had the foresight to ask me to do it, and I had the contacts to do it.

Q: Now, let's talk about the communists. The regular policy of ours is not to have anything to do with them.

WALKINSHAW: I met them. I didn't search them out. I met them at conventions. I had them attack me on the floor when I was speaking at some hall, particularly about Vietnam and the American role in Australia. I took them toe to toe. I didn't back away. I met them at union halls, known communists. I've had them speak to me at meetings, civilly. I never sought them out because I kept them at arms length all the time.

Q: In India also?

WALKINSHAW: In India too, yes. My claim to fame in India was the time that one of the unions in Bombay, I can't recall which, had advertised a meeting as a social gathering. I didn't know because they set the thing up without telling anybody that they had me there as the American representative to balance a Soviet representative. I tell you, I almost clapped when I saw what I was doing, when I debated him toe to toe, and I succeeded.

Q: Did you get any feedback?

WALKINSHAW: No, the political section applauded me.

Q: I'm not talking about the political section; I assume they thought it was great. I mean we don't have anything to do with AFL/CIO policy.

WALKINSHAW: Never!

Q: Let's see. Arab or African nationalism, did you have anything to do with that?

WALKINSHAW: No, no experience.

Q: You spoke a little about Congress and Congressional visits. I don't know if you have anything to add on that.

WALKINSHAW: Human Rights was one of my primary responsibilities when I was dealing with human rights matters. You had to know what they were doing over there and you had to make contact with somebody who had responsibility for it. I don't want to get into the story about Kissinger on this thing, but the human rights thing from my point of view was very important.

Q: The last question I have for you is relating to the role of the AFL-CIO in the selection and assigning of labor officers and how this may have affected your career because you mentioned a number of times that Victor Reuther suggested this or that. What is your reaction to the AFL-CIO or any individual union having that sort of a contact? There are good cases and bad where they recommended good or bad guys, but, in general, a policy should approach whether that sort of thing is appropriate or whether some limitations should be placed on it.

WALKINSHAW: When I mentioned Victor Reuther, I didn't mention Victor Reuther in the sense that he was influencing the selection of labor officers or dictating policy to labor officers. What I was saying was he asked me whether I was interested. When you have to be interviewed by people, the very fact was I was interviewed by Taylor and George Lodge, and they obviously turned me down for labor attaché positions, so the influence wasn't there. I think I sold myself to the AID people on the basis of my own abilities without Victor. I don't think Victor influenced; he was interested in seeing me get into the Foreign Service.

Q: I'm paraphrasing what you had to say because I want to relate it to other answers we get. You think it is appropriate for them to engage themselves actively in getting people nominated for jobs, but the function of approving is an internal government matter.

WALKINSHAW: I don't think the AFL-CIO has any business in deciding who gets what job and where he goes or where she goes. Nor do they have any right to dictate what that labor attaché reports and what he doesn't report. Once he signs his name and takes his oath, he more or less severs the relationship with his former position. He never loses the background, because he can call upon that background at any time, but he has to understand he is now a different animal.

Q: That is certainly a defensible and quite clear demarcation of function and responsibility. Suppose as an area labor advisor, you get a cable that gives you some insight into what is happening. What part of that cable, even if it is classified, is it appropriate to contact the institute or the international affairs department and say gee you ought to know that this is going on.

WALKINSHAW: I never gave any of it. I never once turned over any kind of documentation to any outside sources.

Q: Even if you felt they should know about it. That's interesting.

WALKINSHAW: I have heard that others had done it, but I never turned over a

document or a paraphrase of a document that came in through our system to anybody including the AFL-CIO.

Q: I can't think of anything else I'd like to ask you. It is now 3:20 and you have a 3:30 appointment.

WALKINSHAW: Yeah. He told me if I'm late, he'll show me where to go. Anyway, the point I'm getting at is that the AFL-CIO certainly has a function, but that function does not call for dictating the roles of labor attachés.

Q: Commenting?

WALKINSHAW: You see that is another problem. Let me tell you something else about Harry Goldberg. Harry Goldberg used to say, "I've got a little private book. I write things down about you fellows." He scared some of the young officers, but he didn't scare me.

Q: OK. I took you up to within a couple of minutes of your next appointment. Thanks very much for this fascinating interview. I'm sorry that I took longer than I intended. Anyhow you know about the procedures I'm giving you to sign and comment on this thing whenever we can get the money to transcribe it and send you the document. Thanks very much, Bob.

WALKINSHAW: Well, the only fear at the outset was whether or not I could be helpful, but when you are being interviewed like this, they make you appear as though you are an ego maniac because you keep talking about all these things you have done with your career. The average young man who hears this tape will say, " Who is that character?"

Q: No, that's not what he's going to say. What he's going to say is I can't believe what somebody else said about him. Thank you very much, Bob.

End of interview