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Q: Let’s talk a bit about your experiences during those three years in New York. Was your position an Ambassadorial appointment?

PHILLIPS: No, although it was an Ambassadorial level position which required Senate confirmation, Lodge decided that two Ambassadors, himself and his Deputy, James Wadsworth, were quite enough. In subsequent years, however, the ECOSOC Representative was accorded the rank of Ambassador. My responsibilities as the U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council included supervision of the Mission’s economic and social affairs staff and participation in all meetings of the Council and in some of its subsidiary bodies, such as the four regional economic commissions. Those commissions were established by the ECOSOC to deal with regional economic and social problems in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. The idea was to relieve ECOSOC and the General Assembly of the necessity to deal with matters primarily regional in character. In 1959 I chaired our delegation to a session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East which was held in Broadbeach, Australia, or what is known as the Gold Coast. It was an interesting time to be in Australia. Shortly before the Commission’s meetings began, Australia had severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union over an alleged spying incident involving Soviet agents. As it turned out, the Commission’s meeting provided a good cover for private talks between the Australian Foreign Minister, Lord Casey and the head of the Soviet delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firubin. The talks were apparently successful because a short time thereafter, diplomatic relations were resumed.

I often wondered whether the sandy beaches and the salubrious climate of the Gold Coast may not have contributed to the success. Certainly, the Russians who had come all the way from Moscow’s frigid, February weather, were happy to take full advantage of any out-of-doors recreational opportunities. Occasionally, when I went to the beach for an early swim, I encountered members of their delegation approaching the beach in single file behind their leader. Only when they reached the water’s edge, did the formation break up and the swimming begin.

In those days, the Council was a relatively small body with a total membership of only 18. Its membership today is 54 and, in my opinion, it has become a less effective and more unwieldy organization. The U.S. during those earlier years could count on the support of the three or four Latin Americans as well as most of the Europeans. Our influence, therefore, was considerably greater, and the work of the Council, more efficient and more productive than it is today.
One of the problems which faced, and continues to face ECOSOC, is the role assigned to it by the Charter, to coordinate the activities of the 10 or 12 Specialized Agencies. These include such organizations as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and UNESCO. The trouble is that the Specialized Agencies are relatively autonomous bodies. ECOSOC has no control over their budgets and therefore little leverage in controlling their programs or expenditures. Furthermore, their independent governing bodies tended to reflect the special interests of their national constituencies, which were not necessarily consistent with the policies of member governments concerning the allocation of resources to various UN programs.

The situation was improved somewhat, by the establishment of the UN Development Program in 1966. Funded by voluntary contributions from member governments, it operates on the basis of country priorities and programs established in consultation with recipient countries. When funds for a country program have been approved by the UNDP Governing Council, the program is carried out by those Specialized Agencies which have the appropriate expertise to implement the program. Thus, they became, in a sense, subcontractors for UNDP. This provided some degree of control over the activities of the Specialized Agencies, thus assuring better utilization of their resources and more coordinated programs at the country level.

Q: Cabot Lodge - both of you came out of Massachusetts politics, and you say you knew him quite well. How did he operate at the UN and how effective was he?

PHILLIPS: During Lodge’s tour at the UN we were, of course, still under the influence of McCarthyism, and the United Nations was under attack for being hostile to American interests. Cabot Lodge was very effective in countering those charges. In speaking to audiences around the country, he argued that when U.S. interests are best served by working through the UN, we should do so. On the other hand, there were occasions when our national interests are best served by working outside the UN. In this way Lodge tried to introduce a more balanced approach to the UN and put to rest some of the fears held by those who believed the UN was a threat to our national sovereignty.

As the U.S. Representative to the UN, Lodge had his strengths and weaknesses. His years in the Senate had prepared him well for the job. He was a skillful politician, articulate and effective in gaining support for U.S. positions. This, of course, was somewhat easier in those days when the membership was about half of today’s, and we could usually count on the support of most of the 21 American republics. However, there were those at the UN who were privately critical of what they considered to be Lodge’s arrogance. Within the U.S. Mission some of the staff found him too quick to make judgments, and not always willing to listen to opposing views.

PARKER D. WYMAN
International Economic Officer, Bureau of Economic Affairs
Washington, DC (1958-1962)

Parker D. Wyman was born in Illinois in 1922. He received his AB from Harvard University and served in the U.S Army during World War II. His overseas posts
WYMAN: One of the most interesting experiences I had in that area came when I was sent up to New York to attend a meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Soviet Union had previously circulated for ECOSOC's consideration a draft resolution proposing certain principles to be followed in international economic relations. Of course this resolution was full of everything which would benefit the Soviet Union and very few principles with which we would agree. I was given the Soviet draft to see what I thought we should do about it. I decided that the best thing to do was to come up with a counter-draft of our own instead of seeking to amend their draft. So I did a lot of research and consulted a lot of people in order to come up with a good draft of our own.

I was thinking very much about the need to include in our draft not just principles that we strongly believed in, but also of the need to win support for our draft resolution from the colonial areas which had recently become independent and had joined the United Nations. This was in 1961 and not too many of those countries were already in the UN, but the flood had begun and some of them were represented in ECOSOC. After writing up the principles that would be particularly important from our own standpoint, I had inserted a number of principles that I knew would be very popular with these new countries. This draft resolution was approved on the American side with very little change and I went off to the ECOSOC meeting in New York confident that our counter-draft would appeal more than the Soviet draft to new countries who were members of ECOSOC.

When this issue came up at the ECOSOC meeting, the representatives of a couple of European countries spoke up and said they liked our draft much better than the Soviet draft. Then the representative of one of the new countries spoke up. After praising a couple of paragraphs in the Soviet draft and several in our draft, he went on something like this: “There are, however, a lot of principles we favor which we do not find in either of these drafts.” Then he came up with 20 or 25 principles which would, if actually put into practice, drastically revise current practice so as to benefit the under-developed countries, as they were then called, at the expense of the industrialized countries. I realized then that, while I had taken some account of the under-developed countries in our resolution, I had still made the basic mistake of thinking that the controversy at ECOSOC was going to be essentially between ourselves and the Soviet Union. That clearly would not be the case. Our basic problem would be to cope with the demands of the under-developed countries, who were really starting to throw their weight around in the General Assembly and in ECOSOC. That experience was an eye-opener to me as to the direction in which the United Nations was rapidly moving at that time.

JOHN J. HARter
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Washington, DC (1959-1960)
John J. Harter was born in Texas in 1926. Harter served in the US Air Force during WWII before graduating from the University of Southern California and joining the Foreign Service. Overseas, Harter served in South Africa, Chile, Thailand and Switzerland. He also worked in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, for USIA and after retirement on Oral Histories. Harter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: How did you fit into that?

HARTER: OES, an office that no longer exists [Note: The State Department now has a Bureau of Oceanic, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs known by its acronym, OES.], was responsible for coordinating U.S. interests in the specialized UN agencies concerned with economic and social activities. My responsibilities evolved during the three years I was there. Initially, I backstopped the U.S. Delegation to UNHCR [The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, based in Geneva]. In addition, I assisted Herb Weiner, the Desk Officer for the ILO [The International Labor Organization, which was created after World War I and recognized as a special agency of the UN system after World War II]. I later worked with Kathleen Bell on the IAEA [The International Atomic Energy Agency] and UN technical assistance programs.

Kathleen was outstanding! She was the only child of Dan Bell, Henry Morgenthau's enormously influential deputy at the Treasury Department in the 1930s. When she first came to the State Department toward the end of World War II, Kathleen worked with Leo Pazvolsky, who headed the group that helped Cordell Hull develop plans for the post-war world. She attended the San Francisco Conference. When I was in OES, Kathleen was a special assistant to Walter Kotschnig, the office director and Deputy U.S. Representative to ECOSOC [The UN Economic and Social Council.]. Kathleen coordinated the huge flow of position papers and briefing memoranda related to ECOSOC meetings.

Q: What, exactly, was ECOSOC?

HARTER: The UN Conference in San Francisco expected ECOSOC to parallel the Security Council. It was supposed to ensure that activities of the specialized agencies were coordinated and mutually supportive. However, the outbreak of the Cold War provoked an anti-UN backlash, and that infected an array of special interests that constrained ECOSOC influence.

Q: You arrived in IO toward the end of the Eisenhower Administration. What was your impression as to how the United Nations and its specialized agencies fitted into our foreign policy?

HARTER: The reality I encountered in IO was certainly different from the picture of the United Nations I framed at the University of Southern California. Strengthening the UN was certainly not a priority in the State Department in the late 1950s. Perhaps OES was the only office in the Department that saw the potential of the UN for constructive international economic and social operations. To me, Walter Kotschnig, Kathleen Bell, and Otis Mulliken, the Deputy Director of the Office, represented the idealism that inspired the creation of the UN, and they struggled valiantly to ensure its effectiveness, but that was an uphill battle.
HERMAN KLEINE
U.N. Economic and Social Council – Summer Seminar
New York (1962)

Herman Kleine was born on March 6, 1920 in New York, New York. He attended the State University of New York at Albany and then entered the military. Mr. Kleine began his career in Foreign Service in 1949 when he joined the Marshall Plan Mission to the Netherlands. He also served in Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and Brazil. Mr. Kleine was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1996.

KLEIN: The exposure to the U.N. which started in Geneva was fascinating. It was such a different milieu from bilateral assistance, everything was done by committee. Committees made up of representatives of the nations of the U.N., whereas I was more accustomed to dealing with problems on the technical and substantive levels, everything in the U.N. was politically colored and infested with the East/West tensions and growing signs of North/South conflicts. Each country had its own agenda and point of view and repeated it on every issue, related or not. It gave me a good foundation for the work that I was to do when I got back to New York. It was a six week session, which started in June 1962. Philip Klutznick was the U.S. Ambassador to the ECOSOC. He was a businessman from Cleveland, a very articulate, intelligent man. He was in charge of the work that I was to do at the U.S. Mission. Adlai Stevenson was the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. at that time. As a footnote, I should mention that at the graduation at the National War College, before I took off to go to the U.N. job, an announcement was made of Paula's and my engagement. Dean Rusk, then the Secretary of State, was the speaker at graduation so he saw this little ceremony at which the announcement was made and a class gift was presented to Paula and me. He congratulated us. That was in June. In September each year, at the beginning of the U.N. General Assembly, the Secretary of State goes to New York for consultations with the heads of the major missions and to address the Assembly. In the elevator at the U.S. Mission I bumped into him. He recognized me and asked how I was. I replied, "I'm now married," and he congratulated me and wished me well. The following year at General Assembly time, again I bumped into Dean Rusk and again he asked how I was. My reply then was, "Now I have a son." We both had a good laugh.

Q: Do you remember any of the issues that you they were dealing with at that time? Was it relevant to AID being represented?

KLEINE: Yes. The relevance to AID was in maximizing coordination with U.N. technical assistance activities and with the new U.N. Special Fund. It was my role to be in touch with those who were in charge and to try and find out what was going on, to the extent possible and desirable, and to influence what was going on and being planned. The development activities of the U.N. were split. For a number of years, there was a Technical Assistance Program that was run by the Technical Assistance Committee. It was headed by a Englishman named David Owens. Then we had the Special Fund of which Paul Hoffman was the head. It was recognized early that there was a lot of possibility of overlap between the two. The U.N. Technical
Assistance Program, as well as the Special Fund, relied very heavily on the U.N. Specialized Agencies. Among them were and are the World Health Organization, UNESCO, there was the World Meteorology Organization (WMO), and a whole slew of others. They had their own funding through assessments of member countries. Their resources were supplemented for technical assistance activities by monies obtained through the Technical Assistance Program of the U.N. The U.N. carried out some activities through its own secretariat, primarily in public administration. Likewise, the Special Fund came to rely heavily on the specialized agencies to implement its projects. I forget when the merger of the two programs ultimately occurred, but that was something that we pushed for.

Q: That led to the formation of UNDP.

KLEINE: That's right. The United Nations Development Program.

Q: Paul Hoffman was the first head, I think.

KLEINE: Initially there were co-heads, David Owen and Paul Hoffman. It was recognized that it was an arrangement that would not continue long, but was undertaken because of the reference to the individuals concerned. Soon there was only one head.

My job was principally to relate to the UNDP. This involved lots of committee meetings, including annual meetings and lots of speech making. I was in the middle of all of that, drafting position papers, getting instructions and guidance from two sources, the State Department through its International Organizations Office and AID, where Jack Kaplan headed up a small unit that served as my back-stop office in Washington.

A subject I pursued with the UNDP was evaluation of project results. Most attention by the UNDP was given to finding and approving new projects. Each recipient country was vying for a larger share. There was little concern about the implementation of the projects, and assessing whether or not they were doing what they were supposed to do. To get the attention of these organizations you had to do it constitutionally, which meant the passing of resolutions. To get that done you had to negotiate the texts with the various interests. The USSR was normally an obstruction on issues that the U.S. pursued. You could never tell, however. On some issues they occasionally would be cooperative and work together with us, but so much of their involvement was dialectic preaching and trying to promote disagreement and discord. A Caucus of the 77 of the Undeveloped Countries was formed. It was a forum used by the developing countries to organize as a block to get more power in voting on various resolutions, not only in the political arena, but also in the economic and social arena. The USSR and its Eastern European allies, the so-called Soviet Bloc, as well as the U.S. and its allies, vied to get the support of the Caucus and its related institutions on important issues of trade and development. The Caucus was primarily interested in obtaining larger flows of resources from the developed countries.

Q: The Caucus is also known as the Non-aligned States?

KLEINE: The so-called Non-aligned States. Egypt was a leader, as was Indonesia. Cuba also got very active, as did Brazil. It was quite frustrating to deal with them in the U.N. environment. As
you know, except in the U.N. Security Council, all other U.N. bodies provided each member country with one vote. The U.S. had and has one vote and so does every other country. Each vote has the same weight.

Q: You made this point about evaluation, what was that about?

KLEINE: We got resolutions passed that made it part of the UNDP mandate, that attention should be given to project evaluation. We felt that before approving similar new projects, lessons should be garnered from earlier projects that had been undertaken.

Q: Requesting evaluations of what they were doing.

KLEINE: Evaluations of what they had been doing. Another objective that I pursued was improved coordination between what the U.N. was funding and what other assistance programs were doing, not only those of the U.S., but also those of other countries, such as the U.K., Germany, France and Canada. Speaking of the Germans, I should mention that before the end of ICA, we encouraged the Germans to get into the foreign assistance field by starting their own bilateral program. It was probably in 1960 when we invited key people from the foreign office and the Central Bank for consultations. We briefed them on what we were doing and they invited a group that I headed to Bonn and to Berlin and they briefed us on what they were thinking of. Not long after, they started a program in technical assistance. For awhile they had one type of project that they would offer. That was to set up technical vocational schools. They had in Germany a very advanced program of such training at the secondary level, and they had a lot to offer the developing countries. Wherever they started a program abroad in Africa and elsewhere around the world, the first activity was to set up as a technical vocational school, staffed first with Germans who later were to be replaced by host nationals who would be trained in Germany.

Going back to the U.N., I proposed a pilot project to improve coordination between the U.N. and AID. Sometime in 1963 I went to Africa with Charles Nelson detailed from the African Bureau of AID. We visited Ethiopia, and another country (I forget which) and we talked to the U.N. people and the representatives of the U.N. specialized agencies in country, as well as the AID Mission staff to see what they were doing in terms of coordinating and explore what they might do to improve coordination. Everybody in principle agreed that there was a question of setting up systematic mechanisms. That was my first contact with the AID Bureau on Africa since I had left the African work.

Q: This was to form coordination units in countries?

KLEINE: Not necessarily formal units, but a regular procedure for coordination. Then instructions from AID and the U.N. went out to the U.N. and AID missions in Africa that they should regularly maintain contact concerning on-going and proposed new activities. The principle we were pursuing from the U.S. side was that we should not be the be-all and the end-all of all assistance and that we should encourage others, the U.N. and individual Western donors.
Another memorable experience occurred while I was in New York in November 1963, right around Thanksgiving. I was attending a U.N. meeting, then suddenly there was silence at the head table followed by the shocking announcement that President Kennedy had been shot. It just left a pall over the whole U.N. building as the news went around. There was absolute silence throughout the building. It was a deeply sad time; everybody seems to remember where he or she was at that time. Not long after that I got a query from the AID Africa Bureau, wanting to know if I would be interested in coming to Washington to be Ed Hutchinson's Deputy Assistant Administrator, the position you held years later.

Q: That was in 1976, so it was quite a while later.

JOHN MCDONALD
Bureau of International Affairs
Washington, DC (1967-1974)

John W. McDonald was born in North Dakota in 1929. He graduated from the University of North Dakota in 1953 and served in the U.S. Army from 1951 to 1952. His postings abroad have included Berlin, Bonn, Paris, Ankara and Cairo. Mr. McDonald was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: I guess from ’67 to ’74, you were on the economic side of IO, ECOSOC and all that. Was that it?

MCDONALD: Well, ECOSOC is the body in the UN system, the intergovernmental committee, that works on economic and social affairs. I had about 35 officers working for me. In those days an office director really had a lot of clout and we prepared all U.S. policy issues [toward] all of the agencies of the UN system dealing with economic and social affairs. This means all the specialized agencies, like the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the ILO [International Labor Organization], and within the UN itself, the economic and social aspects.

Even within the IO Bureau, this was the dregs, because anybody who went to IO wanted to be involved in the political side of the UN, which were the Security Council and the sexy stuff. So what I really enjoyed was that I was basically left alone, and I had a great time.

JOHN A. BUSHNELL
Economic Officer
Geneva, Switzerland (1969-1971)

Mr. Bushnell was born in New York State and educated at Yale University and McMurray College. An Economic Specialist, he served primarily in senior level positions at Latin American posts, including Bogota, Santo Domingo, San Jose
and Buenos Aires, dealing primarily with Economic and International Trade issues. An assignment to the Staff of the National Security Council was followed by tours as Deputy Chief of Mission at Buenos Aires, Chargé d’Affaires at Panama City, and subsequently as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Bushnell was the recipient of several awards for outstanding service. Mr. Bushnell was interviewed by John Harter in 1997

Q: They were purely administrative people and both Rimestad and Bassin were uninvolved with substantive issues.

BUSHNELL: I don’t know. They certainly were not involved with the things I was involved in, even in the crises. We had one crisis involving ECOSOC [UN Economic and Social Council]. The head of our delegation to ECOSOC was a political appointee who wanted to have a big impact with a forthcoming policy speech. I don’t think he was going to advocate the 1% of GNP target as a goal for aid to the developing countries. But he was going to commit us to moving up some tenths of a percent per year in our aid and to reducing trade restrictions. These were all things the developing countries wanted to hear. I forget the specifics, but there were two or three things in this proposed speech which were clearly against our established policies. Some of us pointed this out to him. He took the position that he was hired to make policy. [Laughter] Fortunately, there were other career officers, who had come with him from Washington. I was mainly involved in pointing out to them where the problems were. I don’t remember that the front office paid much attention to the situation. I was involved in trying to quiet this head of delegation down. He was finally recalled to Washington and was relieved as head of the US delegation. He gave his speech and then was relieved. This whole performance was disgraceful, but it turned out, as we all knew, that he had not been hired to make policy. I was glad this mess occurred in ECOSOC and not in UNCTAD.

The summer ECOSOC meetings were among the low points of my assignment to Geneva. Normally ECOSOC meets in New York, but New York is pretty hot in August and a month or so in Geneva is pleasant for many delegates. In August UNCTAD has no meetings because the Europeans are on vacation or because ECOSOC takes up the UNCTAD facilities. Since I did not have UNCTAD work, I was assigned to the ECOSOC delegation during both summers I was there. Of course, it was cheaper to place me on the delegation than to send another officer from Washington or New York. Fortunately the pace of work was slow. I handled only a few issues such as economic reports and tourism. I enjoyed developing contacts with the Latin American delegations, and we even developed some drafts in Spanish especially on tourism.

The worst thing about the summer ECOSOC, and the most difficult, was the ECOSOC Council meeting room where the plenary met almost every day for many hours filled with endless, and usually meaningless, speeches by the heads of delegation. The chamber has a balcony above it, which is where the thousands of tourists on tours of the Palais file through and can then sit and watch the proceedings. You go back after a nice, Geneva lunch and a couple of glasses of wine, and you have to sit for three or four hours through boring and tedious speeches. Often I had to take the US place at the table as the senior delegates were busy negotiating. Most speeches were not even worth taking notes. However, woe to you if your head should nod, because some American tourist will be in the balcony and will look down and see that, behind the sign for the
US delegation, the delegate is sleeping. You really have to look as if you are representing US interests or you might be at the end of a Congressional investigation of why the US delegate was sleep in.

WENDELL W. WOODBURY
Bureau of International Organizations

Wendell W. Woodbury was born on April 29, 1920 in Crocker, South Dakota. He received his BA from University of Iowa in 1942 and received his MA from Harvard University in 1949. He served in the U.S. Army in World War II from 1943 to 1946 as a captain. As a member of the Foreign Service, he served in countries including the Dominican Republic, Algeria, Japan, and Denmark. Mr. Woodbury was interviewed by Virginia Crawford on June 4, 1993.

Q: So from Denmark you came back to the United States and were in the Department from 1971 until you retired in 1980, is that correct? First in the East Asian Bureau as an economic advisor and then the Senior Seminar. But most of your time was in the Bureau of International Organizations and I think that was the one you wanted to speak to.

WOODBURY: Yes. This was a new field for me, though I had been involved in a number of multilateral negotiations. I was in charge of the regional economic commissions, ECOSOC. This was just after the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly which was led by the Algerians after the OPEC embargo when the LDC's thought they had the economic and political clout to change the terms of trade and power relations with the developed, industrial countries. The LDC's thought they should have special consideration, specialized trade preferences, debt forgiveness, special access to capital, and what have you. That special session turned out to be a great fiasco for the United States because we were completely opposed to this so-called new international economic order (NIEO), as were the Europeans and Japan. We had an absolutely ambiguous position; we didn't vote for it; we didn't vote against it, we didn't abstain; it supposedly was passed by acclamation but we said no we didn't approve it. That was when I came into IO, which was not a very good time, and was put in charge of preparing for the Seventh Special Session which was to implement the NIEO. I cursed the USDEL at San Francisco for not insisting on a veto for ECOSOC as well as the Security Council.

ELINOR CONSTABLE
Officer of investment Affairs
Washington, DC (1978-1979)
Ambassador Elinor Constable was born in California in 1934. Constable graduated from Wellesley in 1950 and joined the Foreign Service in 1955. Constable met her husband, Peter Constable while in the Foreign Service and resigned to care for her family. During her break from the Foreign Service, Constable traveled overseas to Spain, Honduras, Pakistan and helped organize the domestic Peace Corps. Constable rejoined in 1974 and returned to the Economics Bureau serving as an office director and later a deputy assistant secretary. Constable also served in Pakistan in A.I.D and Kenya as ambassador. Ambassador Constable was interviewed in 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Today is the 14th of November, 1996. Elinor, you heard where we are. We're 1979ish.

CONSTABLE: 1979, and I was an office director in EB having the time of my life, learning how to negotiate, thoroughly enjoying every minute of it. And as I indicated last time, I got a call from a fellow who was working in Personnel, and wanted to know if I'd be interested in being the ambassador to ECOSOC, and I said I wouldn't. Now, normally I think about things for a day or two, but in this case Peter and I had been separated during most of his tour in Pakistan. We'd gotten back together the summer of 1979, this was either toward the end of the year or early 1980. And I didn't want to leave my family again. They wouldn't, I knew, relocate to New York. That was impractical. And beyond that the ECOSOC job for people really interested in economic work wasn't one that we all aspired to.

Q: Tell me what ECOSOC was, is.

CONSTABLE: The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. I take the view that by and large the UN has not been successful in dealing with economic issues that have a broad scope. We never, wisely I think, ask the UN to deal with trade. We have separate trade organizations that have their own rules. The UN, directly or indirectly, has over the years dealt usefully with a number of more specialized economic issues. But where the UN has gotten involved as it did in the '70s, and early '80s, in a much broader economic agenda, I think its been inefficient and inept. UNCTAD was part of that system, UNIDO was part of that system. We can spell out those acronyms.

Q: Let the students find out what they mean.

CONSTABLE: ECOSOC is perhaps a little more benign than UNCTAD or UNIDO in that it is a traditional part of the UN system, and it has responsibilities for some fairly important issues. But we didn't look to ECOSOC to be terribly involved in terms of either making policy, or leading the negotiations. When I went to the UN, for example, to run negotiations that were supposedly under ECOSOC, I had almost nothing to do with our mission. This wasn't deliberate, I wasn't boycotting them, they just weren't engaged. They were trying to make the ECOSOC Ambassadorship a woman's job, and I objected to that. As it turned out the individual who took the job when I turned it down, was Joan Spero, who, of course, is now Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Joan was a superb ambassador to ECOSOC, and Joan made it into a job that is worth having, and I never told her what had happened until years later when we became friends. But in any case I was asked if I wanted the job. I said no.
I then got a call from the same fellow in Personnel, who said, what would you say if the Secretary, then Cy Vance, asked you to take this? Because they really wanted women in these jobs. I said, I'd tell him the same thing I told you. I'd tell him no. And he started putting a little heat on me. Well, you can't say that to the Secretary of State. I said, of course I can. So we hung up, he was not happy with me at all. I then immediately called one of my best friends, a fellow named Arnie Raphel, who was the executive secretary. I said, Arnie, will you make sure that that piece of paper involving me and ECOSOC never gets to the Secretary's desk. And he said, sure. So as far as I know the Secretary of State never knew anything about this.

So I went back to my job happily. And in the middle of all this I went to see Frances Wilson. We've talked about Frances Wilson.

HARRY A. CAHILL
Deputy Representative to ECOSOC

Harry A. Cahill was born in New York, New York and raised in New England. He received a bachelor's degree in English from Manhattan College and served in the U.S. Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, Uruguay, Colombia, and Bombay. Mr. Cahill was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 29, 1993.

Q: You were there till December, 1989. What were you doing?

CAHILL: I was minister-counselor for economic affairs, developmental affairs, human rights, etc. My other title was deputy representative to the Economic and Social Council or "ECOSOC".

Q: ECOSOC?

CAHILL: It was one of the six main bodies of the United Nations. It dealt with international economic issues. This was a Presidential appointment. President Reagan appointed me and thus made me an "Honorable".

EDWARD MARKS
Deputy United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council

Ambassador Edward Marks was born in Chicago in 1934, and received his BA from the University of Michigan. He served in the US Army from 1956 to 1958. Entering the Foreign Service in 1959, his postings included Nairobi, Nuevo
Q: What was your position at the United Nations?

MARKS: I was the Minister-Counselor for Economic and Social Affairs, and also the Deputy United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council - a Presidential appointment. In essence I was the head of the economic and social affairs section of the U.S. Mission to the UN. My direct boss in the Mission was Ambassador Jonathan Moore, who was the Representative to ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] and one of the Mission's five ambassadors. As you know, he official title of the COM at USUN, Thomas Pickering at that time, is the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, while his deputy is the U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, one other ambassador is the representative to ECOSOC, and the other two have non-specific titles. USUN is a very top-heavy diplomatic mission, with five ambassadors, and eight or nine ministers-counselor.

Q: This is the Bush Administration. He had been an ambassador to the United Nations. Could you describe what ECOSOC did at that time and what were our relations with it?

MARKS: The Economic and Social Council is one of the main organs of the United Nations, established by the UN Charter along with the Secretariat, Security Council, General Assembly and International Court of Justice. It was originally intended to be the economic counterpart to the Security Council, but had over the years been expanded in number until it had 55 members and been essentially marginalized. This marginalization reflects the whole history of the UN and the Cold War where the major powers, particularly the United States, was interested in using the Security Council for security reasons in terms of the bipolar confrontation with the Soviets, and not at all interested in having the UN become any sort of global, economic management institution. The organization of the Security Council and the existence of the veto meant that we could also, at a minimum, prohibit adverse action in that body. However, in the General Assembly and the expanded ECOSOC, the majority voting procedure and the existence of a non-West voting majority meant that the West in general and the U.S. in particular were not about to allow economic and trade policy to be determined by votes among the total membership of the UN. This attitude was in place even before the emergence of the Third World voting bloc became anti-American.

By the 1970s time the UN had expanded from its original 50 members to 130 or 140, and the largest single group - a majority in itself - belonged to the Group of 77 or Third World bloc. By the time I got to New York the G-77 had 122 members, all of whom voted as together on almost all economic and social issues from a Third World perspective which was not the same as ours. As a result ECOSOC had become marginalized as the Group of 77 pushed for changes in international rules and agreements which would foster two things. One, an institutionalized process of recompense to the Third World for the harm they had suffered in the colonial period. Recompense would be in terms of trade measures, subsidies, and privileged positions. Second, and closely related, was an attempt to obtain an increased amount of the transfer of technical research from the rich to poor countries on concessional, if not free terms.
That had been the central issue for 30 or 40 years, with the United States and the rest of the West essentially blocking it. We were not about to have a one country, one vote directed international board of economic and social policy. The G-77 or Third World was pushing for it. The Soviet bloc would rather mischievously support the G-77 on these issues, but we never knew what Moscow would do if the G-77 position ever had a chance of being adopted.

That was the situation in ECOSOC and why it had become essentially marginalized over the years. We, the U.S. and the West in general, would go in there with delaying tactics. Nothing could be passed that we would not approve of, even if they had the votes. However, in the late 1980s, as it became clear that they would always be unable to pass these measures, a new voting strategy was adopted by the G-77 - later called consensus minus one. In this approach, the G-77 would modify its proposals so as to attract the support of almost all countries, including many rich countries of the West, leaving only the U.S. and a couple of others to hold firm. Often the U.S. would merely abstain (hence the phrase consensus minus one). It was a means of isolating the U.S. by passing vague and essentially meaningless resolutions which nevertheless the U.S. would not accept (possibly out of concern for domestic reaction or excessive legalism while the Europeans would merely shrug their shoulders and go along). The real sticking point for the U.S. was the inclusion in many of these resolutions of anti-colonial type issues which included the Cuban problem and U.S. policy toward Cuba, as well as the whole question of the Middle East and Israel. So, the U.S. had spent years resisting to a large number of proposals. It was a delaying strategy, a parliamentary guerilla war in what had become a very marginalized part of the UN system. That was the situation up to 1989 when with the end of the Soviet Union all sorts of things changed, including the whole mood, tenure and possibilities available to us in the United Nations.

Q: What was Tom Pickering’s operating style at the UN?

MARKS: I am a firm cardholder in the Pickering admiration camp. The conventional wisdom in New York and almost everywhere is that he was the best representative we ever had at the UN. He is as we all know the quintessential professional and a man of all sorts of qualities and skills. He has an extraordinarily high energy level, who is just running faster than everybody else all day for longer hours. It is not forced. He is just a high energy person. He has an extraordinary memory, never seems to forget anything. He is not a genius, but he is very intelligent and a serious professional. I will give you one incident. I went up to see him with one of my officers to brief him on a quite detailed and technical subject, pelagic deep sea fishing. We were briefing him for a meeting he was about to have. We were in his office no more than 12 minutes. In that time he had heard the briefing, read the three page memo, and played it back once to see if he understood it.

This is a man who would come to huge staff meetings with never a piece of paper, never a note, run through a complicated agenda, ask detailed questions, listen, make decisions, and give instructions. It is true that others in the room were taking notes but you always had the feeling the notes were for others, not for him. He is always in control of details, not visa versa. Therefore if I took a telegram or memorandum to him for review, any change he made was for a substantive reason - he knew something you didn't, or he wanted something different said,
including a judgment call. It was always substantive and you always knew why it was there, although you may not always have agreed with the change.

Q: What was your impression at that time of Pickering's support back in Washington, particularly from the Secretary of State and his immediate circle and maybe the President?

MARKS: Everybody knows that Pickering is an extremely articulate man, and at the UN he was in a very prominent position. USUN is across the street from the United Nations and we would all - Pickering included - cross the street to go to meetings. The press is permanently placed on the way into the Security Council chamber, which was Pickering's basic arena. You cannot go in and out of the Security Council chamber without a media camera, without a gaggle of journalists. So, you have an articulate man in a prominent public position who has to expose himself to the press as much as four or five times a day when the Security Council is in session. He has no choice. All of this in a time of enormous change when the U.S. was particularly prominent. The fall of the Soviet Union, the changes in the UN and a renewed emphasis on the UN, and a whole bunch of front page issues such as the Iraqi war. All this made Pickering front page copy for the media and he received enormous coverage.

This led to the problem with Washington, and specifically with the Secretary of State. Actually we never knew whether the problem was with Secretary Baker himself or with his press spokesperson. She had been with Baker for many years, a long time political colleague, was very close to him on policy matters. She was the keeper of Baker's public persona and clearly unhappy with anyone else in the foreign policy arena who received coverage and prominence. Given the times and the mood, of course, Pickering appeared to be on the front page of the NY Times everyday. She kept clearly putting bounds on Pickering. In fact, word came down once, quite formally I think, that he was not even to give a press interview without clearing it with Washington. This was impossible given the situation I described above. He could, of course, stiff the press as he walked in and out of the Security Council, but this would have been counter to what we were trying to do. We had policy positions and objectives and he could make a good case for them. The alternative was to be ungracious to the press and to the public. So there was a constant tension between Pickering and Baker's office. They tried to muzzle him, which is ironic as Pickering is not at all a seeker after publicity. He is not a prima donna.

Another problem was a sort of running battle with the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs [IO], John Bolton, a very bright but a very conservative man. He knew a lot about international affairs and about the UN, but represented a conservative perspective that essentially is very mistrustful of the UN. Pickering has a much more open, receptive attitude towards international cooperation and organizations so there was inevitably tension between USUN and the IO Bureau reflecting the differing perspectives of their chiefs. Pickering's attitude, I must say, was shared by many of us in the Mission, including my direct boss, Ambassador and U.S. Representative to ECOSOC, Jonathan Moore.

Finally, as a backdrop to all of this was the dramatic change in the world environment with the end of the Cold War. Pickering and most of his staff saw the changed situation as an opportunity, while Bolton and other conservatives were concerned about the dangers. We saw the current situation as a place of opportunity to do all sorts of things in pursuit of American foreign policy.
and interests in the post-Cold War period for lots of reasons. The break up of the USSR and the Soviet bloc, the changed attitude among many of the G-77 or Third World countries, the sudden prominence and dominance of the United States, the rise to importance of new issues to the so-called transnational issues, such as narcotics, deep sea fishing, human rights, population, terrorism, failed states, peacekeeping in a non-confrontational, etc. All sorts of issues were now open and could be dealt with to some degree in the UN which had turned from "a dangerous place" as Daniel Patrick Moynihan once called it to a forum now wide open to American influence and interest.

Pickering was generally considered the single most successful representative to the United Nations, not merely because he was popular and did well generally, but because he was able to accomplish pretty much everything the USG wanted to accomplish during his period at the UN. One example was support for the Gulf war. We were also able to get a change for the better in the treatment of Israel in the UN, a matter of some domestic as well as foreign policy interest. In fact, I carried out the floor campaign which obtained the first pro-Israeli vote in a UN body since possibly the original vote which established Israel. And the following year, after that trial run, we got a new GA [General Assembly] resolution which reversed the old Zionism equals racism resolution. We were able to do those sorts of things in the UN at that time. Pickering led a mission that attempted to accomplish many things because we saw opportunities in what had been a closed arena up until then. It was an exciting time to be at the UN.

Q: You keep mentioning the fall of the Soviet Union. Could you explain the timing of that from your time there and how this impacted, which may be in a sort of series of steps on the UN as you saw it?

MARKS: With the actual collapse of the USSR in 1990, the successor Russian Federation had a loss of confidence and influence. The international political environment changed without a competing superpower to the U.S. The new Russian Federation could no longer seriously promise anything or threaten anyone. The Third World movement was predicated on the fact you had two super-powers between which the countries of the Third World could maneuver. Well, with the collapse of the USSR there was no maneuvering space left. As one of the super-powers disappeared, the other power acquired vastly expanded prestige, and in a sense became the only game in town. The intellectual and ideological alternative to the West in general and the U.S. in particular was gone. As a result, the Soviet Mission to the UN lost almost all prestige and influence in the corridors of the UN. In fact, we found them hanging around us for help and guidance. This was very interesting to watch. As an example of what I mean, let me review the question of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, and how it played out in the UN.

Q: Could you explain what it was?

MARKS: The accident at the nuclear plant at Chernobyl, Belarus, in 1986, was the worst nuclear accident in history. It caused thousands of deaths, and contamination of a large bit of territory both in Belarus and the Ukraine. In 1989-90, the Ukrainians and Belorussians had been coming to the UN to obtain support, money, etc. through the UN processes. Remember that Belarus and the Ukraine had always been full members of the United Nations, even though Soviet satellites. They were part of the Charter compromise of 1945 and maintained diplomatic missions to the
UN in New York. They functioned of course, as sections of the Soviet Mission and were never known to have a word of their own to say, and voted the way they were told. This arrangement essentially gave Moscow three votes in the UN, in addition to the votes of the Warsaw Pact nations.

So from 1989 on we would watch each year, in ECOSOC and in the Second (Economic) Committee of the General Assembly, the missions of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia present resolutions which attempted to obtain foreign sympathy but also calling on governments and the UN system to provide money and technical assistance to help them deal with the horrible aftermath of the accident. As head of the Mission's economic and social section, I was the officer in charge, or at least the floor manager, of our representation in those committees of the UN. Therefore I watched, in the period of 1989-93, the change of the relationship between the Russians, the Belorussians and the Ukrainians.

I was in a particularly good position to do so, as the U.S. ended up the de facto negotiator for the other delegations, as the rest were prepared to go along with anything Washington accepted. (Washington was prepared to give lots of sympathy, a reasonably amount of technical assistance, but not prepared to agree to an open-ended program of financial assistance.) So, I was instructed to make sure that the resolutions contained language no more committal than Washington would go along with.

The negotiating process was quite interesting, and went on over my four years there. The negotiating took place among a very small crowd, myself and occasionally someone else from my section, and representatives from the three interested Missions. We would usually hold our meetings in one of the coffee rooms. In the first year, the Russian did the talking and the other two (or three or four) just sat quietly. By the second year, the Russian diplomat led their side but the others participated. In the third year, the Ukrainians sent their Permanent Representative and he did most of the talking, with an occasional remark from the Byelorussian and not a word from the Russian. By my fourth year, the Byelorussian took the lead, claiming to be the most severely affected, with the Russian (a very able young Russian diplomat and a very good friend of mine) continuing to remain silent - playing the role of observer. We saw this shift as the Ukrainians and Byelorussians asserted their independence. It was fascinating.

Q: What was Pickering's attitude towards ECOSOC?

MARKS: Pickering was interested in everything, and did not limit himself to the sexy political issues and the Security Council. He was interested in ECOSOC (and the Second and Third Committees) because in his view of the contemporary world and the opportunities at the UN, many of the issues were in the economic and social area. He understood that close to 80% of UN funds and UN personnel were engaged in the economic and social areas, even though the political work and the Security Council got most of the headlines. He was especially interested what were called the transnational issues which were rising to the top of the strategic priority list, both for our country and for others. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its influence meant that the UN was now available to deal with these issues to some degree. The UN became a more useful forum in which to deal with these issues. That is the way he saw it and the way USUN
approached the UN. There were now possibilities to do some things in the UN that we couldn't do during the Cold War.

Q: Was it ECOSOC that was the bête noire of many conservatives or was it another one?

MARKS: That would have been UNESCO [United Nations Economic, Science, and Cultural Organization] from which we had withdrawn in the eighties.

Q: So there was no connection with UNESCO?

MARKS: Not really, although as a UN specialized agency UNESCO is supposed to come under the general policy guidance of ECOSOC. This raises the question of the character of the United Nations as an organization which most people are quite ignorant of, including many policy makers and including this administration which is pro-UN but doesn't understand the UN. What is the UN? What is it as a creature? What, for instance, is the difference between intergovernmental and secretariat institutions. These distinctions are not understood and that failure gets us into a lot of trouble. It is a major reason which is why the current administration is making a mess of UN reform and its relationship with the Secretary General. Basically they do not understand the UN.

The UN can be viewed as a set of interlocking circles: the UN Organization, the UN system, and the UN family. The organization is the central administration, if you will. That means the main bodies (Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretary General and the Secretariat). It is very New York centered. The system is the Organization plus the several dozen funds, programs (e.g. UNICEF, UNDP) and specialized agencies (e.g. ILO, WHO, UNESCO). The family is the other two plus the Bretton Woods organizations.

As a specialized agency, UNESCO has its own intergovernmental governing body, its own secretariat or staff. and an appointed and essentially autonomous boss, and most important its own funds provided by member states. Nominally it comes under the policy direction of ECOSOC, but since it has its own intergovernmental governing board the relationship with ECOSOC is limited. USG delegations are represented in both places - the system wide General Assembly and ECOSOC and the agency specific governing bodies. However it is not always the same officials who go to these meetings. While the Economic and Social Section of USUN would go to many of these agency governing boards there would also be other USG officials from Washington and often from other agencies and departments. For instance, UNDP and UNICEF are located in New York so at their annual meetings the USUN delegation would be buttressed by USAID specialists from Washington. UNESCO met in Paris, so people from Washington used to go to the UNESCO governing board meetings. However since the USG withdrew from UNESCO (we were fed up with its policies and the corrupt management), we did little with UNESCO unless it came up in ECOSOC meetings.

Q: Did you feel at odds with the IO Bureau in Washington?

MARKS: Yet we knew there was a generally favorable feeling towards the UN at the White House. A major reason for the tension between us was a significant difference between Bolton's
and Pickering's views of the world. Pickering saw opportunities in a changing world situation. Bolton had a more conservative attitude that the world remained a dangerous place where you have to watch yourself. I think he felt that most of the world was essentially anti-American and could not be trusted. Pickering felt we ought to participate actively and positively and play a constructive leadership role.

There was also the normal difference of perspective and tension between the field and headquarters. This problem was exacerbated due to the fact that the USUN is a very special mission where the USUN representative is of the same rank if not senior to the IO assistant secretary. In fact, prior to Pickering, all PermReps had been members of the Cabinet. He wasn't, nor was his successor Ed Perkins, but Clinton's appointee, Madeleine Albright, was put back in the Cabinet. In addition, part of the problem was that the officers on site in New York were playing more generalist diplomatic game while many of the people back in Washington were specialists who only dealt with a part of it.

So, we had a range of reasons for the tension. The difference of perspective between a global view of opportunities and a global view of dangers. Some personality differences complicated by bureaucratic turf wars. There was the concern in some circles in the Department with Pickering's public prominence. And then, of course, there was the [acerbation of the] normal differences between field and headquarters. All of this, remember in a context where USUN was in the State Department telephone book and we didn't even have to dial long distance. Headquarters was just down the road from us. At times they were just too close.

Q: Let us go to some of the issues, we will go to the Gulf War later.

MARKS: I had very little to do with the Gulf War. It was a political issue handled by the Political Section and in the Security Council. I had very little to do with it until after the war was over when the Sanctions Committee was created, and my deputy became the U.S. Representative in its working meetings.

Q: What were the issues you were particularly concerned with during this period?

MARKS: We had a whole range of issues, of course, but deep sea fishing become a major issue in the later 1980s. This issue involved the spread in use of the huge nets of 70 to 80 kilometers in length which deep sea fishing ships would use to sweep the seas, sweeping up everything in their path. Everybody does this, but the worst practitioners are the Japanese and the Norwegians, among the traditional fishing countries. The issue was raised and pushed by the sustainable development movement, the Green movement in other words. It was one of the few economic issues dealt in the United Nations context. The USG was interested as we have our own fishing industry, although our industry has apparently not gone in or the very big nets; we would limit ourselves to the 20-40 kilometer nets. So, we had our fishing interests to take care of.

UN conferences were held, often in ECOSOC, and a special commission was set up under UN context to deal just with the fishing net problem. Negotiations went on for two years, culminating in an international convention regulating the use of these nets. It was a complicated diplomatic negotiation involving very complex interests. The U.S. like many countries had
mixed interests with the fishing companies on one side and the Green movement on the other. An involved compromise agreement was worked up which created an international regime limiting and controlling the use of these sort of nets. It was a very constructive exercise.

This was a bit of the model that Pickering and many of us were all talking about. It assumed that the UN was an acceptable and useful forum in which you could deal with issues that by definition couldn't be handled by any one country. No country could formulate a policy on the use of fishing nets that would be of any use. It required multinational action. With the end of the Cold War and the end of automatic confrontation on almost any given issue, we now had a place where we could get together and talk about issues, not the international political structure. The fishing net exercise was a good example of what Pickering and others thought were opportunities to use the UN in new and constructive ways.

Q: How did you find the Japanese and Norwegian delegations?

MARKS: On this subject? Difficult. They were very hard nosed, and the Japanese were the worst of all. It finally came down to everybody negotiating with the Japanese, and we had to muscle them very heavily. Generally, however, we got along with both delegations very well; I had very close friends in both.

Q: It is one of these things where it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to understand that if you are destroying huge areas of fishing, you lose your fish. This was already becoming apparent that there were startling deficiencies in the amount of fish.

MARKS: Right. But will you explain to me why people shoot heroin into their veins when they know it is a dangerous activity? People do these things and governments sometimes take very difficult positions, for various reasons. In this case, both these countries have important fishing industries So do others, and it took two years to achieve consensus. The Japanese were the final holdout and the most difficult. They were not against the agreement and regulations in theory, but were very difficult about the specific conditions and terms.

Dealing with problems in the UN and the negotiation of UN resolutions drives some people up the wall, or at least until they get into it. The process is almost a caricature of bureaucratic or diplomatic pettifoggery and of wordsmithing. Resolutions are negotiated and passed which are not law, have no binding authority in international law, but are norm, if not precedent, setting and thereby contribute to customary international law. Countries read every word to make sure they are not in some way prejudicing their view on positions that are important to them. Since countries have different agendas, everybody is looking at it from a different perspective. For example, on issues that have nothing to do with the central issue for India and Pakistan of Kashmir, both will read all sorts of resolutions to make sure there is no language which can in any way be interpreted to throw a bit of a line to the other side on the Kashmir issue. Every country has a concern like that. The PLO, which is not a member of the UN but has a delegation there nevertheless, not only introduces numerous resolutions touching directly on Palestinian questions, but they also watch and try to slip language into unrelated resolutions. In this they are abetted by other Middle East and Third World delegations while the Israelis with our support stand guard against this campaign. We generally lose and the USG “no” votes on this matter
alone constitute a third or more of our negative votes in given GA session. You now have some 180 delegations doing this, in five different official languages no less. You see the complexity.

Multilateral diplomacy in the UN takes place in various fora. There are the formal sessions, when the General Assembly or the Security Council or ECOSOC meet. Then you have the informal meetings where the negotiations takes place, which take place on the record with translators and written records. But there is another category of meetings called informal-informals with interpreters, but no record kept. These plus the "corridor" conversations are where the majority of negotiations on resolutions actually takes place. Corridor negotiations include, of course, lunches, dinners, coffee bars, cocktail parties, and small gatherings in somebodies office. In fact, the intimate nature of the UN - where hundreds of representatives mill around a fairly small area (a very large building with many rooms and the adjacent several city blocks) - resembles a vast marketplace, full of bustling bazaari merchants.

The first time you walk into a UN meeting of delegates, it is difficult to believe what you are hearing, the apparent pettiness of the discussion. The dogged argument over seemingly irrelevant wording. However, after a while you become acclimated to it and realize it is not petty because the discussion is largely about code words. You begin to realize that these delegates watching every comment and every word from different national perspectives. Can a particular phrase in any way be used later in another context on another issue of importance? Can the phrasing of a resolution on Eritrea, for instance, lend itself to be used later in the Kashmir situation, and if so by which side? The involved delegations will hold it up negotiations completely if they think so. Think of the range of the matrix now, of 180 delegations on all these subjects, all watching out for implications. Suddenly you realize the complexity and why this is such a ponderous, slow, pettifogging process. that means the process has lots of limitations. It will never be a race horse. It will never become a national parliament, bit it is not supposed to be. It can do certain things, but can't do others.

Let me comment on the UN culture, particularly in New York. On the East Side of Manhattan there is three or four block area consisting of UN offices and national missions (although some are scattered further afield). It is a pure physical expression of the Corps Diplomatique, but a diplomatic corps without a host government and without a local community. It is free from consular duties, free from worrying about national days for its own community, and free from a host national government. If thought about in that context, professional diplomats at least will understand a lot of what goes on in the United Nations in New York.

Q: What was the attitude towards the UN bureaucracy? This has been a continuing target, particularly of Congress, but also the media.

MARKS: In a broad sense, the UN world is made up of two communities, the delegates and the officials. Again, this is something not understood by many people. People in the national missions are delegates who represent their country at the UN. The majority are there permanently, on regular diplomatic assignment, but there are many who come and go often for the annual GA or other meetings. Delegates go to meetings where they interact with other delegates as their primary responsibility but they also interact with Secretariat officials. This task resembles what diplomats generally do with their host government in national capitals. (The
relationship is complicated in that many Secretariat officials perform staff support functions for delegates' meetings: interpreters, the recorders, etc.) Secretariat officials are recruited in various ways. Some are UN professional staff pursuing a bureaucratic career in the United Nations. Others are political appointees: the retired diplomat from x country, the nephew of a prime minister somewhere, the political exile with friends, etc. There are also people on secondment from their governments, mostly diplomats, who are spending a few years at the UN. But the basic difference at any given moment is between delegate and official, even though some move back and forth over time.

What do we think about them? They are a very mixed bag. There are some very impressive people who work very hard and are first rate by anyone's standard, there are lazy time servers, and there self-serving corrupt officials. The selection process is not at all clean but is full of nepotism, old boy connections, favoritism, and back scratching. Although is supposed to be a bureaucratic merit system, it falls quite short.

Q: Like the congressional staffs.

MARKS: Yes, somewhat.

Q: How does it compare with national bureaucracies?

MARKS: Parts of it are better than many national bureaucracies, parts are better than some national bureaucracies, parts are as the worst. It is a mixed bag which deserves to be condemned but also to be understood. The UN is not a national institution but more like a permanent international conference. It is not a free standing institution with any authority of its own or any autonomy. It has no independent power, authority to raise money, or authority to issue any binding rules or regulations. It is a universal conference, based essentially on consensus. Given that, why would one expect its bureaucracy to be the calibre of a General Motors or of any reasonably competent national government. Every country is a member, has a right to belong, to be represented and expect to get a little something out of it. What is not understood in Washington is that the three or four patronage positions which Kenya, for instance, has gotten at the UN is part of what Kenya gets out of the UN. And if their three or four people are not there by pure merit, well, that may be the price of a universal consensual organization. Everybody has to get something out of it or why should they belong.

So, the UN is a very mixed bag and yes, should be made better, but let us accept the world we are in and the sort of organization this is.

Q: Who was the Secretary General when you were there?

MARKS: Perez de Cuellar, when I arrived and later Boutros Boutros-Ghali from Egypt.

Q: What were you getting from your impressions, from our delegation and maybe from other places about Perez de Cuellar's term of office?

MARKS: Perez de Cuellar is the quintessential Latin diplomat: intelligent, well educated, experienced. He was rather low profile in style but it should be remembered that he did not have
a mandate to be aggressive and a problem solver. Remember, he was a Secretary General selected during the Cold War. Since Dag Hammarskjold, all Cold War Secretary Generals have been compromise choices kept on tight leases by the big powers. The permissible lines of activity in the Cold War were restricted to activities to which none of the major powers objected. Perez de Cuellar was respected, but essentially functioned as a low profile compromiser and mediator, and he was good at that.

However, the United States and some other powers were unhappy with him, claiming they wanted a more aggressive manager, a different kind of Secretary General. They didn’t have anything against him personally. They said they wanted a different Secretary General. They recognized that he was a good back room negotiator, who worked hard bringing people together, and operated quietly in the area that he was authorized. Then the Cold War ended while he was in office and the U.S. and other powers went in search of a more effective political figure and manager - or so they said.

Q: Was Ed Perkins there while you were there?

MARKS: Yes, for about eight or nine months following Pickering's departure in early 1992.

Q: What was your impression of him? He was also a career Foreign Service officer. His main interest as Director General seemed to be in promoting the cause of more diversity.

MARKS: Ed Perkins is a gentleman with a solid professional background. He is serious man, and a nice person. However, he was not at the UN very long, being replaced by the new Clinton Administration with Madeleine Albright after only about eight months. In any case, he didn't have the horse power of Tom Pickering, but then I don't know very many people in the Service who do. Perkins had a tough act to follow, essentially did not have enough to place his own stamp on the mission. I think his basic view of the professional situation was similar to Pickering, but as I said it was a time of transition in Washington he had very little scope.

Q: You mentioned deep sea fishing and then there was another major issue?

MARKS: There were a number of other outstanding major issues in the economic and social area. The deep sea fishing is the neatest one because it came to a resolution, with an international convention. Sustainable development was blowing up tremendously as an issue, and finally ended up with that great big Rio conference in 1992. It was followed the year after by a UN conference on women, and then later UN international conferences on various social and economic issues throughout the decade. It was in the context of the sustainable development issue that an interesting new characteristic of the modern world made itself manifest, that is, the rise of non-governmental organizations or NGOs. NGOs has existed in small numbers for some time, provision for their involvement in international affairs was even included in the UN Charter. However, by the early 1990s, there had been an explosion in their number and influence. At the Rio Development Conference in 1992, 6,000 NGOs registered to participate. A number of them were ad hoc institutions created for the Conference, and somewhat cynically described as three people and a fax machine. Nevertheless they made a significant impression and since then there has been further growth in their numbers and influence.
Q: Could you explain what you are talking about when you talk about non-governmental organizations, the NGOs?

MARKS: NGOs have been around for a long time, of course, and the original Charter of the UN included reference to and a place for non-government organizations in ECOSOC. The Charter has provisions for the registration of NGOs - under certain criteria such as their bona fides, international character, and their connection to items of interest to ECOSOC. Five quite large NGOs - Lions International being one of them - were involved in getting this provision included in the Charter and were the first NGOs registered. The idea was these organizations - respectable and properly vetted - would have a formal observer status at ECOSOC meetings. Although not entitled to vote or to speak except when invited, they did have the right to attended meetings and to submit papers. It was an early attempt to provide access for the private public.

But in the seventies and eighties the number of NGOs began to grow, dramatically. At first the explosion of NGOs was in the human rights area. Now, human rights is a subject which is the responsibility of the Third (Social) Committee of the General Assembly, but also ECOSOC and most especially the Commission on Human Rights. This is a specially established UN intergovernmental body with about 50 some member State delegations which meets every year to discuss just human rights questions. So, particularly in the field of human rights the number of NGOs have grew rapidly, demanding more voice in UN deliberations.

Then, the end of the Cold War unblocked the international situation in a very real way. Private civil movements which had been growing underneath the Cold War structure broke into the open and developed into a very large, worldwide NGO community. The Green or environment movement was a major source of NGOs. They have been very active in lobbying their governments, going to the press and at the UN they are all over the place. They are demanding broader rights of participation, and have become major players at international conferences. And, one of the things the UN is going through is how to deal with this explosion of non-governmental members of the UN community and how to integrate them. In fact, ECOSOC has recently appointed a new committee to look into the rule on NGO participation and the possibility of giving them more rights to participate in UN bodies.

Q: This type of community activism is a natural growth in the United States. Is this true in other places?

MARKS: Increasingly so. Although it is clearly a very American and British phenomenon, it is growing everywhere. Particularly with respect to human rights and sustainable development, we are seeing the growth of truly indigenous NGOs in lots of countries where you would never have seen anything like that. Obviously it is still difficult to do this in some countries, it would be very difficult to create a true NGO in Burma on either of those two subjects. But, even in many African countries you are seeing the growth. They are becoming a major factor in both domestic and international politics.

Q: What do you mean by sustainable development?
MARKS: Sustainable development is a merging of two streams of policy concern that have been around for quite a long time. One is economic development and the other is concern for the environment, the old conservation movement. There is also an overarching element of economic equalitarianism. The merger is designed to define agreement or agreements on policies which will produce economic wealth by methods and procedures not damaging to the future health of the earth and of future generations. For instance, how do you obtain tropical woods for consumption by people without destroying the tropical forests, and thereby depriving future generations? How do you get pursue economic development which benefits the world's poor? Sustainable development advocates argue that most of the current methods of rapid economic development are extremely polluting. However, the countries of the so-called Third World argue that this concern is self-serving, in that the rich became so and now are trying to tell the poor not to do so. The sustainable development advocates respond that it is necessary therefore to figure out methods of economic development that are non-polluting and therefore sustainable over time.

As for the rich countries, the problems is to change their economic processes and procedures so that they stop polluting. Sustainable development is a catch-all topic, involving questions about ozone levels, acid rain, fisheries, loss of arable land, the Sahara desert, and such. Soon it will get into health problems. But, it is basically the merger of various concerns over how you preserve nature and still get development. Sustainable development became and still is very fashionable in, especially in NGO circles. However some governments, for instance the Scandinavians, have picked it up also. The movement resulted in the creation in the UN of the Commission on Sustainable Development, a major new intergovernmental body. Note that this development was very popular in the Clinton Administration, especially with Vice President Gore, although it was received with great skepticism in the Congress.

Q: In your work what was your main concern in this?

MARKS: We had three main concerns. One was that it was not a bad idea, Why not cooperate in this area? Two, our UN delegation viewed its role as that of a leader, which means seeking and/or crafting acceptable deals. And three, there was strong pressure from Washington to make sure we in no way committed ourselves to any increase in resources, i.e. money. Washington was going over every word to insure we in no way implied that the United States would provide additional resources. We had to make sure that all language carefully stated that while we are in favor of sustainable development, all new programs would have to be pursued in terms of currently available resources. And, of course, more of the Green NGOs and lobbying groups were trying to get increased resources for sustainable development programs. So, that was the key negotiating question.

Q: Did you find any of the other affluent Western powers were taking a more relaxed view towards this?

MARKS: Yes, although the Japanese were very much with us. They also did not want to have any additional commitments. The Western Europeans varied, but basically they were a little more relaxed than we were, yes. The whole question of the attitude of the Europeans towards sustainable development at the UN is a very interesting one. They were more relaxed on two grounds. First, they were more sympathetic to the general idea, being pushed by their own Green
movements. Some of them were willing to put more money into it, especially the Nordics and the Dutch. Second, they were a little more cynical. The United States generally takes a much more legalistic position in the UN than most governments. Others are often more willing to go along with fuzzy phrasing, knowing that they will interpret any particular resolution when the time comes. We are much more legalistic, take UN resolutions more seriously, and are much more concerned that we really can live with the phrasing as it exists. Some of the European governments would say, “Oh, what the hell. It's close enough for government work and it doesn't really bind us, so we can live with it. And if we can't, we won't, so what the hell.” In other words, they are much more relaxed and cynical about the binding precedence of UN resolutions. We, on the other hand, keep saying these resolutions do not constitute binding international law but keep dealing with them as if they were.

Q: Did you find at all a dividing line between those countries allowing free enterprise and those putting more restrictions on their economy?

MARKS: From 1990 on almost no one would defend anything remotely socialist, except maybe the Chinese (who, however, supported the USG proposed resolutions on the virtues of entrepreneurship) and the Cubans. Everyone else would get up with a straight face and talk about the glories of free enterprise. It became quite the rage to praise free enterprise. In fact in 1990-91 we drafted a series of resolutions praising the concept of private enterprise and entrepreneurship. Everyone voted in favor, Russians and all.

Q: And that was an anathema to the third world before.

MARKS: Two years before you couldn't get a soul to even consider such resolutions, but there we were pushing them through. And remember the UN is the corps diplomatic in its purist essence, so the degree of tongue-in-cheek hypocrisy is fairly high.

Q: Speaking of small governments, what about the arrival on the scene of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Micronesia, etc.? Did you all find yourselves as mentors?

MARKS: To some degree, but not to all. We got to play a little bit more of a role with some of the former Soviet Union people because the Russians had so badly lost prestige and status, and were themselves floundering. Therefore we were even mentors to the Russians for a while. But that was a brief period. They have now regained their poise and have started to push back and assert themselves, which we should have known would happen. So, yes, small new countries latched onto various people for a time. UN membership jumped to 180 or so. They even had to increase the seating in the General Assembly room, put up a lot more flag poles, etc.

Q: Ed, were their any other major things which you were dealing with that we should talk about, or should we move on?

MARKS: Well, as the UN was my last real assignment, when we finish with the UN we finish. Let me talk about the Israeli issue because I played a role about which I feel very proud. Israel had been in the UN since its establishment, but from the fifties on had become pretty much a pariah with the growth of the Third World movement, and the creation of the huge voting block
in the UN of the G-77. Remember that block works on pure consensus, so that everybody in that block gets the whole group to support their position on a subject of particular interest to them in exchange for the same support to others on their particular issues. This meant that on anything to do with Israel and the Middle East the Arab countries got the whole block to vote their way. Although a Member State, therefore, Israel was consistently the object of critical resolutions, even though many countries had good bilateral good relations with Israel. When it came to voting on Israeli issues, it was the United States and sometimes only some or all of the Europeans, who would support Israel or at least abstain.

Now, every Member State is a member of the General Assembly but almost every other intergovernmental body in the UN is an elected body. For instance even the Security Council includes 10 elected members in addition to the Permanent Five while ECOSOC has a membership of 55 who are elected for three year terms. The U.S. and several other major countries are always elected to ECOSOC - although a defeat for the British a few years ago was a bit of a scandal - while other countries take their turns. But, Israel never gets elected to anything. And in addition every year Israel is the subject of critical resolutions in the General Assembly and other inter-governmental bodies. These resolutions are passed by large majorities (the Group of 77 remember has over 120 members). Only the U.S. can be counted on to ensure that these resolutions are not unanimous.

Well, with the change going on after the end of the Cold War, we saw an opportunity to push a breakdown in the traditional predictable voting patterns in the UN. So we started to talk about the long-standing and invidious General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism, a resolution which embittered Israel. We knew that overruling it would be hard, the Arab bloc would certainly be against it, and would call on the Group of 77 for support. As a tactic, we made a first run in ECOSOC by trying to get Israel elected to one of the ECOSOC subordinate inter-governmental bodies. I can’t even remember which one, to be honest – there are number of these small commission and committees. I was the floor manager for that. We spent about a year lobbying then introduced Israel as a candidate for this particular commission at the summer ECOSOC meeting. It was held in Geneva (ECOSOC alternates between New York and Geneva). I was the head of the ECOSOC delegation and floor managed the campaign. We were successful, Israel was elected providing the first vote in favor of Israel in 40 years or so. It was a tremendous breakthrough, and I was the hero of the Israeli delegation (and I am told spoken of well in the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] in Jerusalem. This became important when I later was somewhat imprudent in a corridor discussion with a PLO representative (a real no-no), and the Israelis were prepared to cover for me. The next year we introduced a successful resolution in the General Assembly withdrawing the Zionism equals Racism resolution which passed years ago. Of course, other developments in the Middle East contributed to our success.

Q: What do you mean you floor managed?

MARKS: First, let me explain the background to voting in ECOSOC (and in the UN) in general. Member delegations organize themselves in so-called regional groups. For instance, the U.S. belongs to the Western European and Other Group (the others being the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). There is an Eastern European group, an African group, a Latin American group and an Asian group. Each has so many seats in any given UN intergovernmental body. In
ECOSOC, for instance, of the 55 voting seats, 6 belong to the Western European group, 8 to the Latin American group, etc., all based on the total number of countries in each particular geographical region. Israel did not belong to any group, which meant it could not fill any groups quota. So, if Israel was interested in obtaining one of the 32 seats on the Committee on Technology, the Israeli delegation would have to find a Regional Group will to give up one of its seats. Only the Western Group would consider doing so but never did because of the impossibility of winning – given that almost all of the members of the African, Middle Eastern, Asian, Latin American, and the Eastern European groups were either members of the Group or 77 or allied with them and would vote against Israel.

With the end of the Cold War, however, and the resultant shifts in attitudes we felt the time might be ripe for a successful election of Israel to some body. We got the European group to support Israel for membership in a minor subsidiary body of ECOSOC and began to solicit core support among sympathetic delegations. Then we started planning for the next meeting of ECOSOC by negotiating with some delegations while bypassing others. At the ECOSOC meeting, we put the nomination in play, and ratcheted up our lobbying. We also solicited support directly with some governments in their capitals through the State Department and our embassies.

Q: What is in it for country B when you come up to them? What kind of argument did you use?

MARKS: It varied enormously, of course. With like-minded governments (the Western Europeans, etc) we argued that the time was ripe to remedy a long-standing injustice in the treatment of Israel in the UN and that doing so would contributed to the Middle East peace process by demonstrating to Israel that it could obtain a normal place in the UN and in the international community. Towards delegations not fundamentally anti-Israel but caught up in Group of 77 obligations, we would argue as follows: “My dear colleague, the world has changed. The Cold War is over and we need to open up the UN. Israel is a member of the UN and we are not going to solve any problems by keeping isolated. The United States is strongly in favor of this. The French are strongly in favor of this. The Dutch are strongly in favor of this. And it is time we all changed our UN attitude towards Israel.”

Some were sympathetic and agreed with us from the beginning. Others really didn’t care and realized that times had indeed changed. In the end we were successful, for various reasons, the traditional G-77 consensus broke on this issue. In their meetings...and there are lots of G-77 meetings all the time...this subject came up and the issue became whether it would be a consensus or non-consensus vote. All the lobbying we and other like-minded delegations, and the Israelis, had done was successful and G-77 decided that issue would not require a group consensus vote. Once that happened, it broke the thing wide open. With that we could really concentrate our lobbying, plan a debate strategy (who would say what) and were able to obtain a heavy vote in favor of Israel’s candidacy.

And then the next year, as I mentioned earlier, we went into the General Assembly and got the Zionism equals racism resolution abrogated.

This was very important to the Israelis who deeply resented the resolution. Our success demonstrated this change in the UN and in our international relationships. During the Cold War delegations voted on many issues as a result of the Soviets had called “the correlation of factors.”
Now that the correlation had changed, delegations voted differently and specifically became much more solicitous of U.S. views.

Q: You mentioned human rights.

MARKS: That was an on-going problem and question, growing in weight as the U.S. has an aggressive policy on human rights. We are not alone in this, the Dutch and the Nordics for instance are often out ahead of us. Deliberations in the Third Committee of the General Assembly and the ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights are often donnybrooks. We usually went to Geneva for the annual Human Rights [HR] Commission meeting and try to condemn the mainland Chinese, and the Chinese go armed for bear to ensure that our resolution is not passed. The Palestinians try to condemn the Israelis and others attempt to condemn some of the Arab countries. This was also the period of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the beginning of that set of problems. In 1992-93 the question of ethnic cleansing arose. So, The Commission on Human Rights is a very contentious place where very touchy and nasty issues are raised and which governments subject to attack energetically resist. We usually have a special representative with the title of Ambassador for the HR Commission from Washington. The first two years I was there it was a refugee Cuban named Valedares, who was replaced by a black American politician. Former VP candidate Geraldine Ferraro held that position for the last couple of years.

The HR Commission is a forum where a specific part of American foreign policy is identified and pursued. So, the human rights NGOs and lobby groups push us to take a very aggressive stance and it is difficult in that body to engage in the usual diplomatic trade offs. But on the other hand, everyone has to to some degree, even the Israelis and the PLO. Nevertheless the rhetoric gets pretty carried away, especially on the Middle East, Chinese, and Cuban questions. The Administration can really get its ears beat back. Interestingly, the Department of State’s annual human rights reports now play a big role in those debates, as it has become the basic document for many if not most debates in the Commission.

Q: It is an interesting thing that these reports which were mandated some years ago by Congress, which everybody screamed about in the State Department, have become part of the international vocabulary.

MARKS: Very much so, and used by everybody, including governments people who were defending themselves against charges of bad behavior. They were always reasonably good, but have gotten better and become almost everyone’s standard.

Q: You mention the Cuban question keeps coming up. In the context, what is the Cuban question?

MARKS: The Cubans have a very large mission at the UN, almost as large as ours. They are smart, aggressive and very skilled. The Cubans spend a lot of time competing with the United States, attacking, trying to get language in resolutions attacking the United States for, among other things, our sanctions policy against Cuba. From time to time, we will attack them, particularly in the human rights area.
So, you often get an exchange of words between the Cubans and the Americans. But they are very good at multinational diplomacy and important at the UN. They were an original member of the Group of 77 within which they play an active and often leadership role. They are very supportive of other countries such as the Arabs, Africans, etc., and can therefore draw on their credit when they need to. They have very effectively used the G-77 consensus voting policy. When that policy broke down some in recent years, some of the more successful Third World governments such as Malaysia and Singapore found they needed a more complicated view of the world, the Cuban found they were having to work harder and were having less success.

Q: Did you ever have any relations with them, ever sit down at the delegates lounge or something?

MARKS: Yes, I have. There was a great deal of collegiality at the UN, professional diplomatic collegiality. The atmosphere is very intimate as we are together hours on end, especially during General Assembly sessions. There are very few delegates that you cannot at least be collegial with, unless there is a personal problem. I even once got into a corridor discussion, with many other delegates standing around, with a PLO delegate which is very dangerous for an American official. However an Israeli colleague said he would get the Israeli Foreign Ministry to cover for me if I ran into trouble over this incident; given my effort on their election to an ECOSOC subordinate body noted earlier, I was in their good books.

Q: What about China?

MARKS: The Chinese are a major, brooding presence in New York. They are usually very restrained in their behavior, do not say much, nor are always present. If they get excited about a subject, they can get very difficult. Yet they can often be quite constructive, working with others to obtain consensus, something they are usually in favor of. I got along well with my counterpart, the Chinese Mission Minister Counselor for ECOSOC matters. He was an older man, with a great deal of experience. He spoke reasonably good English, and we got along very well. He was a reasonable soul and we both tried to stay out of each other’s way on substantive matters, certainly did not look for fights. He was very cooperative, very skilled and we, as I said, got along very well. If we had to disagree, we did so without making it very emotional or personal.

Also as I noted, the Chinese are ever-present in UN activities and meetings, even if often a passive way, observing manner. They generally do not attempt to lead but do lots of backroom and corridor work. This style may be forced by their relative lack of comfort in English and other Western languages, and the rare number of others who speak Chinese.

There is a major difference in UN meetings, particularly in the economic and social areas, between the countries that are represented at every session and meeting, and those with small staffs and more limited interest who drift in and out. This is not always a question of the countries size; comparatively small countries like Holland and Singapore are all over the place.

One interesting development was watching how the Western Europeans operated in the UN. When I arrived in 1989, the Western Europeans had been coalescing as a cohesive group for
years. As members of the European Community now the European Union [EU], they meet for coordination of positions and this coordination has been hardening. The EU diplomats would meet every morning in the EU Mission (they have one) and coordinate their positions. Then one of them would be designated as the EU spokesmen (usually the delegate from the country then serving as EU president) who would speak for them in meetings. He (or she) would always begin any statement with “Speaking on behalf of the 12 associated members of the European Community. He would be surrounded by representatives of the other members of the EC, of course, would often the participate debates on their own.

This posed a new and special problem for us. We have different relationships with different members of the EC and a very special one with the English. We had traditionally depended on them to keep us informed as to what was going on inside the EC group. Over the time I was there, however, 1989-93, we saw a clear, definite intensification of the EC. They early morning meetings increasingly produced a common EC position, one applied equally to us as to other delegations. Increasingly it became difficult for us to get inside the EC group and influence them by bilateral discussions and negotiations. Although many of the Europeans remained friendly and close to us, we found that increasingly we had to negotiate with them as a group, after they had formulated a common position.

Q: I would think there would be an endemic problem to that and that would be once they had reached their consensus they couldn’t very well change it. That was it and in a way it developed a rigidity.

MARKS: Absolutely, that is what I meant. For instance, it had long been a habit for the U.S. delegation to meet with the Europeans to exchange ideas and even to coordinate tactics. Usually this was done bilaterally, depending on a combination of country and personal relations. Increasingly, however, we would now meet more formally, the United States delegation and all the EC delegates together. (This was true on the ECOSOC side, I am not sure how things were managed on the political side.) We were trying to go over issues before the EC group solidified its positions. That became increasingly hard during my tour in New York, even though I got along extremely well with most of my European colleagues (except for the Brit, despite the “Special Relationship” and my long lasting Anglophilia, we did not get along. He had a bad case of arrogance and probably hidden resentment of the U.S.). But that was what was happening and it became difficult to work with the Europeans. This was a comparative judgment; we certainly remained on better terms with them than with most others.

However, one day at a large informal meeting I became increasingly tired of the EC spokesmen (probably my British colleague) who preceded every intervention with the rolling phrase “Speaking on behalf of the 12 associated states of the European Community...” On one of my interventions, I mimicked his tone and began my statement with “Speaking on behalf of the 50 Associated States of the United States and the Associated Commonwealth of Puerto Rico...” This brought the house down, I must say.

This development created numerous incidents. For instance, not only were the European Community delegates increasingly solidifying their positions, the European Commission itself had established a Mission at the UN. While that mission did not have voting status, it could
participate in all meetings. In addition, all the EC delegations would hold their group meetings at
the European Commission. In the fall of 1992 the EC Mission overreached itself and drafted an
ECOSOC resolution, which would have moved them very close to full independent membership.
The resolution was not specifically about the European Commission, but it was a reordering of
the participation requirements for regional organizations like the European Commission giving
them a much more active role in the UN and very close to the rights of Member States.

Actually the United States government was not uninterested in this and not unsupportive in
theory: we always have been a big supporter of the European Community. But, for various,
largely legal reasons, we didn’t want to go down this road at this time. The EC was pushing the
proposal in a way which we thought would create problems with respect to other regional
organizations, creating a precedent for other, less respectable organizations. We also thought this
proposal was somewhat of a back door approach which might create problems in the future.

Nevertheless, the EC Mission had obtained support from the EC Missions (although many
admitted later in private that they were less than enthused with the whole idea) and when it was
introduced at the ECOSOC meeting, we began the negotiations. I had the lead on this, and
essentially proposed a serious redrafting in order to avoid the problems we saw.

The European Commission people were very aggressive, seeking a very clear and very real new
status. Given the USG position, I found myself on the side of many Third World countries who
resented this push by the Europeans. (They are always very sensitive about any challenge to their
sovereign status and any effort by the Europeans or us to change the situation to their
disadvantage. They saw the EC initiative as a way for the rich to obtain even more influence in
the UN).

This EC initiative opened up a whole summer of fun debates for me, where I found myself in
partnership with a very intelligent and aggressive lady delegate from Colombia who was
designated as the G-77 spokesperson on this issue. She was furious with the Europeans who she
felt were trying to put something over on the rest of the UN membership. The Japanese were also
upset, and we formed a triumvirate to oppose the EC Mission. Actually, I put this coalition
together, and in meeting after meeting we just shredded them to pieces. The poor EC delegate
had to take the brunt, as his colleagues from the EC national missions gave him only nominal
support.

Finally, we had been so successful in opposing this initiative, that a high powered delegation
flew in from Brussels, five quite senior Commission officials. The Representative of the
European Commission gave a little stag dinner for me and a couple of my staff, just to start off
the week they planned to be in New York to resolve their problem, i.e. to soften us up.

The discussions went on all week and I had a great time. That week led me to better understood
what the Economist magazine had always noted about the style of senior bureaucrats of the
European Commission which has apparently made them quite disliked all over Europe. They
were extremely arrogant, convinced they are the only people who know what is going on, and if
they want to do something, everyone should just get out of their way. Well, to be blunt, I had
them by their balls all week, they were on our turf playing by our rules. Supported by my
coalition partners we just said no. It was very interesting, their position was, if they wanted it, we had to give way. We kept saying no. We had some very interesting exchanges which tripped them up all over the place, as they were playing by their rules and criteria and we just did not accept them.

However from their perspective their objective was logical and should be achieved. After a week of discussion, we sent them back to Brussels furious and outraged that people would deal with them that way. It was a marvelous week of multilateral negotiation where for once I was on the majority side. It was also fun to watch the other European diplomats maintaining a straight face as we manhandled the Brussels officials. It was clear that many people share the Economist’s view of EC officials.

Q: I hope you weren’t too tough on them because I think these bureaucrats are going to be our salvation. I think they are going to so screw up the European Community as an economic rival, that it is going to make them a patsy for the United States to deal with.

MARKS: We had a whole number of activities of this type. It was a very rich four years.

Q: It sounds like an excellent time.

MARKS: Yes, it was a lot of fun. Relations with Washington were difficult, but relations inside the Mission were superb, although the excitement declined some after Pickering left. But the real excitement was participating in the activities across the street, in the UN itself. I would leave the Mission as soon as I could, and cross the street to disappear into the UN - all day if possible. Meetings and discussion would follow each other, and lunch would be at a restaurant or one of the coffee bars. At the end of the afternoon, we would often go straight to someone’s reception where the same people would continue the same discussions and negotiations. It was all office talk and the wives hated it, and mostly didn’t attend. Afterwards, we would often go straight back to meetings.

Q: I was going to say, what does this do to the family life?

MARKS: It was difficult for some, but my wife was relaxed and said the hell with it, let him enjoy himself. And I did, even if and maybe because the activity was constant and rather exciting it its own way. Meetings and sessions, particularly during the General Assembly in the fall or ECOSOC in the summer, often mean twelve, fourteen, sixteen, eighteen hour days. We had one three week period when the hours got longer and longer until during the last four days I only went home twice, just to change clothes and take a shower. During that session we worked around the clock three nights in a row. As I noted earlier, we worked very long hours at the UN, with lunches and receptions part of the work day in a very real way. You often went from one reception to another, meeting the same people and doing your lobbying and information gathering. And then we would go back to the office to report or back to the negotiations. It was all very intense and of course, if you like that, and I do, it was marvelous fun.

It meant constant professional interaction with a group of three or four hundred people, and it became quite intimate with the core group of maybe a hundred or so. It was almost all shop talk,
and as I keep repeating, I enjoyed it thoroughly. Not everybody did. Some delegates from smaller delegations, with Missions not as close to the UN as we were, would literally go to their office in the morning, check their traffic, review their papers, fill up their briefcase and go to the UN and not go back until late at night to file their reports. These colleagues also had to cover the whole range of activities on their own. Some got good at it, some just coasted.

Q: Well, Ed, then you retired.

MARKS: No, then I returned to Washington, where I was detailed as a Visiting Senior Fellow to the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University [NDO] at Fort McNair. After two years there I retired.

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Q: Today is December 11, 1996. Ed, let’s talk a little bit about the reform of the UN.

MARKS: My arrival at the UN in 1989 coincided with the end of the Cold War, which dramatically changed the whole political environment of the world and of course the environment of the UN. The UN had been, after all, frozen for 30 years or so with the U.S. and its allies on one side, the Soviets and their allies on another, and a large number of people called the Third World between them. The UN had been frozen in such a way that on almost any given issue there was no need to take a vote. You knew how it was going to turn out as the three sides lined up. The end of the Cold War however opened up the UN. All the players looked around to find new ways and maybe new positions and relations in order to play important roles. The options were open, so to speak. The U.S., for instance, started out with President Bush’s “Brave New World” insight, and we suddenly became very involved in multilateral questions, such as how the UN could engage in active peacekeeping and crisis management – subjects which we had carefully avoided until then.

These were of course political subjects but, although my portfolio in the Mission was economic and social affairs, I became involved from the humanitarian assistance side. The end of the Cold War seemed to have open up a Pandora’s Box of local and internal conflicts creating horrendous humanitarian crises. The first reaction of many governments, including the U.S., was to deal with these problems through the UN, through a form of expanded peacekeeping married to humanitarian assistance. This approach produced interest in the idea of multinational humanitarian assistance and initiatives to create a new UN body to deal with implementation of this new concept (Department of Humanitarian Affairs or DHA), and authority in the form of a GA resolution. The discussion and negotiation of these proposals took place in ECOSOC and the GA’s Third (Social) Committee which were my turfs. It was a subject of long-term significance as to turned on interpretation and reinterpretation of the concept of national sovereignty in international law. The repercussions of that negotiation and subsequent action continue to reverberate today. Interestingly, the U.S. and most developed countries, especially Western Europeans, were relatively enthusiastic about the concept of humanitarian intervention while the Third World delegations were very suspicious and skeptical, seeing it as new authority for the former colonial powers to pursue neo-colonial ambitions through the UN. As a result, the final product was carefully circumscribed and DHA was limited to a coordination role between other
UN agencies. Nevertheless these changes allowed, if they did not lead to, later UN activism in places such as the Balkans and have significantly altered international law. The world is no longer a pure Westphalian place – at least with respect to international law. (I have continued work in this area since I left the UN, both at NDU and since retiring.)

Another activity I did get involved in reform of the UN. It went under the mind numbing UN phrase of Revitalization of the Economic and Social Council. UN reform had been a subject of discussion for a long time but had never gotten anywhere. But in the late 1990s, the five Nordic countries released a report they had done on their own proposing on significant revitalization, or reorganization, of ECOSOC. ECOSOC is a main organ of the United Nations, according to the UN Charter, and originally intended to be the economic equivalent of the Security Council. It never worked out that way and ECOSOC became marginalized for all sorts of reasons, one major one being that the United States and its Western European allies did not wish to have the UN become a forum in economic decisions were made. All the deliberative bodies of the UN work on the one country-one vote principal, and we were not about to have economic decisions made that way. We preferred the World Bank group where we have weighted voting.

However, the end of the Cold War created a new situation which seemed ripe for some reorganization in an attempt to revitalize ECOSOC. The objective was not to restore a major role for it in macro-economic decision making, but to revive what its original role as the source of political and policy guidance for the UN’s operational departments, specialized agencies, funds and programs such the World Health Organization, World Food, UNDP, UNICEF, etc. And that is what the argument revolved around.

I spent much of my three and a half years on this subject. As the head of the Economic and Social section of the Mission, I was the floor leader, doing much of the lobbying and the primary drafter of the position papers. This was a major activity for us in 1991, ‘92, and ‘93 in the General Assembly and in ECOSOC. In the end, we passed two ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions; resolutions which to insiders were very close to revolutionary. The final one was not passed until after I left in 1993, but I had completed the negotiations on it prior to leaving.

It was important because it reversed 30 years of UN practice which had consistently broken up, diversified and dispersed authority. More and more committees and subcommittees had been created, and operational authority had been dispersed to the specialized agencies, funds and programs - divorced from any central leadership by the General Assembly or ECOSOC. All this is admittedly very esoteric, deep into questions of UN culture, arising from the fact that the UN is a hybrid institution. In one sense it is nothing more and nothing less then a permanent, ongoing diplomatic conference. That is the political side of the UN. The other side is that it is a set of international bureaucracies, each headed by a mini-general assembly or governing board. There is a real difference in the UN between the UN as an intergovernmental political body representing governments and the UN as a set of international bureaucracies. These bureaucracies, such as UNICEF and UNHCR, were famous or notorious for going their own way, or at least representing viewpoints not acceptable to Washington.

Q: UNICEF is?
MARKS: It is the UN’s Children’s Fund, begun soon after WWII and famous for being represented by people like Danny Kaye and Audrey Hepburn. A very effective but also very successful in creating an image and a reputation. In fact it is a very effective international organization, but somewhat parochial, in that they have marked out their own turf – children’s relief – and resent any attempt to get them involved in working with other organizations.

The UN reform movement I discussed above a whole bunch of delegations, not restricted to North/South or East/West. It included us, the Western Europeans, Canadians but also the Pakistanis and the Russians. The Moroccans were very cooperative as were some of the Latin Americans. It was a very ecumenical group of delegations and, in fact, I sometimes thought participation in reform was more often than not a decision by the resident mission, rather than being a decision taken in capitals.

After months of discussion and negotiation, we finally passed a UNGA resolution, which had a number of points. First, ECOSOC was formally designated as the central policy governing board for the four UN funds and programs: UN Development Program, UNICEF, World Food Program, and the Population Development Program. In pursuant of that decision, the governing boards of these organizations 1) had their authority restricted to questions of a management nature, and 2) specifically made subordinate to ECOSOC for policy guidance.

What we had done in essence was regroup dispersed policy authority and pull it back to a central organ of the UN. This was very difficult to do, as there was a great deal of opposition. The organizations themselves, of course, opposed the shift in authority and lobbied like mad. The UNICEF people in particular ran around and tried organize delegations in opposition. None of these organizations wanted to lose authority to a central political body. But, we got it through. In my case, I spent a great deal of my time negotiating and fighting with Washington. Not everyone in Washington was excited about UN reform, and the Assistant Secretary for IO John Bolton was extremely skeptical. He was not enormously enamored of the UN in any case.

To anyone who knows about the internal workings of the UN, this was a truly important reversal, all developments up until had been in the opposite direction of decentralizing authority and creating new committees and sub-committees. It may, of course, all come to naught because many governments, including Washington, have never quite realized the potential significance of this change. It is potentially significant because it gives - in Archimedean terms - a place from which to move the system. Washington doesn’t see it, however, which is a source of great frustration to many of us. Washington has not really attempted to use this opening in any meaningful way. Meanwhile this Administration talks about reform, better management and prompt response to emergencies, yet here is a tool we have given them but which they are not using. They appear to be more interested in television bites, PR management, and fights with the Secretary General instead of understanding the true character of the UN - good, bad and indifferent - and how to use it for your own purposes.

The major problem I have with the present Administration’s UN policy is that it does not understand the UN, and therefore most of what is said is therefore either irrelevant or perverse and does not accomplish what we want. The Administration has made no attempt to understand the nature of the creature, and what carrots and sticks will actually work.
Meanwhile, our UN reform activity, still an ongoing process up there in New York, was successful to a significant degree and there now on the books a tool for management of the dispersed UN system, a better tool than is appreciated in Washington. But, of course, use of this tool requires 1) greater comprehension of the UN than exists and 2) willingness to engage in multinational bureaucratic trench warfare. It is long term work, not particularly dramatic on any given day, will rarely produce a headline. It is the exercise of day-to-day leadership of a very complex organization.

**Q:** But it was put into shape by the time you left?

**MARKS:** Yes. I was involved in helping to negotiate one of the first reform resolutions passed in 1991, and then I was involved in a major way in the most comprehensive resolution on ECOSOC reform finally passed in 1993 or maybe even in early 1994 just after I left. At the last stage of negotiating this resolution, in the General Assembly in the fall of 1992, the Nordics, particularly the Swedes, got into a snit and said they wouldn’t go along the compromise we had negotiated. I always found the Nordic diplomats to be intelligent and interested, good colleagues, and serious people, but they don’t know how to close a deal. At the end they often have a great deal of difficulty compromising. In this case since they had initiated much of the reform program and the final result jettisoned a lot of their ideas, they became very unhappy and finally wouldn’t sign the final deal. It took another year of massaging them to bring them around. But we had a negotiated text in place when I left and I feel very good about it. It is perhaps a modest legacy that a crowd of delegates left, but it is already apparently making some difference for the good in the UN system. Perhaps not as much as it could, and it should have been followed up by further reforms along those lines. But tightening up authority gets one into areas where it requires governments to make commitments about their own willingness to do this sort of work, and to commit more resources. Although, this Administration (Clinton) seems to believe in the UN it also seems to believe it can lead from behind. Not paying one’s bills while pushing others to do so and to make commitments is an approach I do not quite understand.

To be fair, much of the Administration’s problems in the UN stem from congressional opposition, but the Administration does not appear to be able to handle that opposition.

One final remark while we are talking about the UN. The openings made by the end of the Cold War are still there, and the real debate in foreign policy should include the role of the UN.

In my opinion, this Administration really does not understand the UN even thought it is obviously intellectually oriented towards a multilateral foreign policy, and with the best intention has been perverting its own objectives by its mishandling of the UN in New York and in Washington.

**G. CLAY NETTLES**
Economic Counselor
Geneva, Switzerland (1990-1993)
George Clay Nettles was born in 1932 in Alabama. He attended the University of Alabama for both a bachelors and a law degree after serving in the US Army. Nettles joined the Foreign Service in 1957 and served overseas in Japan, Vietnam, Venezuela, Lebanon, Pakistan, Zaire, Turkey and Saudi Arabia as well as attending the NATO Defense College. Nettles was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1997.

Q: A very low reputation with whom?

NETTLES: With everyone. To give a good example of that, every four years there would be a meeting of UNCTAD almost always outside Geneva where major issues would be discussed. However, it was very difficult to find a developing country who would host such a meeting. It took five years instead of four until Colombia finally agreed to host a meeting.

When I arrived, the ambassador at our mission there, who was very capable, said, “UNCTAD is a very ineffective organization. We have withdrawn from ECOSOC because it was not effective and it was wasteful. Should we do the same for UNCTAD?” I said, “First of all, we can’t withdraw from it completely because it is a body of the UN General Assembly, so we would still have to pay our contribution for it. Secondly, tactics are very important. If UNCTAD collapses, it shouldn’t be seen as the fault of the Americans so since we have this major meeting coming up in a year, we should have a major campaign to persuade not just the developed countries, but the developing countries that if we don’t have fundamental reforms of UNCTAD, then UNCTAD will just be a travesty - a joke.” Washington supported this view. The U.S. government worked very hard and tried to persuade others, especially the developing countries that UNCTAD had to be reformed if it was going to be an effective organization. Our efforts paid off. We met for a month in Cartagena, Colombia and were able to accomplish significant reforms within UNCTAD, much more than I thought would be possible. It was an ideal way to end one’s service, feeling that one had accomplished something.

Q: And, you really had a game plan, a strategy that you had developed at the Mission in Geneva? It probably couldn’t have been developed say in Washington, because there probably wasn’t that much interest in UNCTAD, or nobody really had the time or energy to think it through. You were able to do that because you were on the scene and got the support of the ambassador. Who was the ambassador?

NETTLES: Maurice Abrams was the ambassador. I want to give full credit to IO, the International Organization bureau within the State Department. They took UNCTAD very seriously and they gave full support, particularly Melinda Kimball who was the DAS and who actually headed our delegation in Cartagena. I gave the initial idea, but Washington supported it fully. Much of the work, if you were going to get other countries involved, had to be done outside of Geneva by demarches in foreign capitals and, of course, IO had to be the one to draft those demarches. That went on for a full year.

Q: What was the position of the Secretary General of UNCTAD? Was he resisting changes and reforms to make it a more effective and efficient organization?
NETTLES: Not really, but he was a somewhat of a controversial figure which as you know he was a Ghanian. He was a likeable person, but he had a different constituency. He had the U.S. advocating reforms and many developing countries resisting - very similar to the situation in the UN General Assembly. He was a capable individual, and once he had the developing countries themselves pushing for basic reforms, he could work with the different groups. He was very good in that sense, but he was not a natural leader. He was not an improvisor, but a capable individual and certainly likeable.

Q: When we talk about reform, not just of UNCTAD, but of the United Nations system as a whole, I think one of the proposals that we’ve made or perhaps the Secretary General of the United Nations has made or has been encouraged to make is to consolidate some of the economic functions of the UN system. I think some of those economic functions included UNCTAD - I’m not sure what else, ECOSOC, UNIDO, maybe, and to pull all those functions together. Is there a lot of duplication and overlap, would you say from your experience?

NETTLES: Not a great deal of overlap I don’t think, but, for example, ECOSOC used to meet every year in Geneva and, of course, we would have a great deal of responsibility for that. We changed it to every other year, but there is no reason why we should meet in Geneva or any place outside of New York. There was some duplication, but duplication is not the major problem with the UN in economic functions.

Q: What is the major problem, would you say?

NETTLES: Unrealistic expectations of developing countries. Too often, the developing countries want the UN to do things or draft some resolution which the developed counties, particularly the U.S., are not willing to do.

GERALD MONROE
Office Director, Bureau of International Organizations

Gerald J. Monroe was born on October 13, 1933 in New York State. He attended City College in New York where he received his BA in 1955. Mr. Monroe served in the US Army as a 2nd lieutenant from 1955-1956. His career has included positions in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Germany, China, Switzerland, and Italy. Mr. Monroe was interviewed by Raymond Ewing on March 22, 1999.

Q: To what extent were you involved with IO the International Organization bureau particularly with regard to...

MONROE: Just in this one area, the conflicts between the two, the FAO, the two main food institutions; there are others, but the two main ones, which gave me some grounding in the way the UN operated. It was really necessary because it is not hierarchical as many would think. Of course, there were just numerous programs, research institutes that reported to about six masters.
It was really quite... ECOSOC was not functioning very well. Its charter granted the role to coordinate these activities, so that you would get these horrible debates among the leadership. I think I was appalled at the problem that they called everyone in to meet the principals. I did not meet the director general of the FAO at that time. I did meet him at a ceremonial service. It was the second time I saw the President in this job, celebrating the 25th anniversary of the PL-480. He may have thought I favored the other side in this debate which was not true. Actually my aim quite distinct from IO's aim as it turned out was simply to get the executive secretary of the World Food Programme's attention onto programmatic issues, operational issues, and not on his struggles, his bureaucratic struggles with the fellow who had been his boss.

Q: It had been headed by an American for a long time.

MONROE: It had always been headed by an American from the time it became UNDP. It had been something else. It had gone through about three different titles and structures. It was designed to be a coordinator of all aid activities and the resident representative representing effectively the Secretary general would open an office and would ask that all UN agencies in the country share that office, share the communications. We saw it as a, we saw the resident rep more affectionately called the resrep as the answer to a lot of our problems in dealing with, one the confusion that ensues when you have 20 different agencies in a country and something happens, a civil war, a famine, what have you. And you are running around trying to rescue workers from various parts of the UN system. Two, in terms of delivering appropriate services as efficiently as possible, as cost effectively as possible, the resrep system appeared to us to be the best approach. The Europeans understood the efficiency. They weren't always happy with having an agency run by an American. There were American resreps, but there weren't numerous incidentally. The resident representatives were very powerful. Now an agency like UNICEF and FAO would not, would be very hesitant to cooperate with the resident representative. UNICEF's view was that they were essentially not in the capital. If they were in the capital, they weren't doing their job. They were organized to be around the countryside in various department governments or state governments, call it that if you will, local governments. Whereas, WHO would very definitely be in the capital because they would have physician instructors at local hospitals and whatnot training and so forth. Those people, in our judgment should have reported to the resident representative in country and had their offices and their communications facilities operating out of the resident representative's office. For policy guidance, theoretically, all the agencies reported to ECOSOC. ECOSOC was not a very effective agency. It still may not be, and so that had sort of fallen into disuse I think, before it ever got started really. Those agencies such as UNIFEM, the United Nations program for women reported to the director of UNDP, who incidentally is number three in the UN system.

Q: Number three after the secretary general and who else?

MONROE: The secretary general and, well there is now a deputy secretary general, before there was it was a deputy secretary general for political affairs. It was rather like the State Department thing. But in any case, it was considered a very powerful position. The Scandinavian reform movement which someone said the Scandinavians were the mother-in-laws of the system, because they had reform plan for everything. They said it was because of their deeply religious backgrounds. They wanted to revitalize ECOSOC, and they wanted all the voluntary agencies to
report to ECOSOC. That, we weren't too concerned about UNDP at that point, but we were really concerned about the World Food Programme which is a voluntary agency in this but mostly food. After giving it its own administration and giving the necessarily rapid response time that one needs from an organization like the World Food Programme, putting them into an ECOSOC straitjacket was really not what we thought appropriate. Some agreed with us; some didn't agree with us. But, I think everyone agreed with us, it was simply that the Scandinavians felt it more appropriate. We could sacrifice that rapid response time for the great benefits to be had by UN reform. I don't believe we ever saw it that way. Neither did the Australians or the Canadians. Because we recognized the rapidity with which food emergencies arise, and prepositioning food is always difficult. It is expensive and it is difficult.

Q: And we resisted that.

MONROE: Well policy would then be made by ECOSOC. Well in our judgment, not in our judgment in our money, ECOSOC was not a leading institution for any number of reasons. It was far too politicized. Whereas in general the executive council had worked well, the executive council of the UNDP. From our point of view primarily because it was dominated by the donors.

Q: How was the United States represented on the executive council? Did we have someone in New York who did that?

MONROE: We had someone in New York who was the ECOSOC ambassador who also did this but not very frequently. Basically I was the deputy chief of delegation and I did nine-tenths of the work.

End of reader