United States Mission
To International Organizations in Vienna
(UNVIE)

READER
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DWIGHT J. PORTER
Economic Counselor and Deputy Representative, International Atomic Energy

Agency
Vienna (1959-1963)

Ambassador Dwight Porter, a native of the Midwest, graduated from Grinnell College in 1938. His Foreign Service career included positions in Germany, the United Kingdom (England), Austria, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Lebanon. Ambassador Porter was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1990.

PORTER: When I arrived as economic counselor, I was also the last Marshall Plan chief for Austria. I think by that time all the Marshall Plan offices had closed down in all of Western Europe and only Austria remained because the Russian zone had only recently been evacuated and it was, of course, denuded by the Russians as they pulled out, they took everything with them. So the Plan kept going a little bit longer when I got there, but it was largely a matter of using counter-part funds rather than dollars. I think we ran out of dollars the first year I was there. We did have a continuing relationship with Austria in the economic field. The Austrians, I think, relied on us rather heavily, as you know, although they are a special breed and are a bit arrogant about their own capacities and potential. They chaffed a bit, I think, under the belief that we were still trying to run their economy, although we really weren't. We mainly wanted to make sure that the money was being used effectively and was not being frittered away.

There was another reason, of course, why we still were in business with counter-part funds, there was a very large counter-part package, close to half a billion dollars in schillings. But Doc Matthews, very rightly I think, refused to release the use of counter-part funds without American permission, until the Austrians cleared up certain outstanding issues. Among them was the oil claim, mainly Mobil Oil, that had been nationalized and not reimbursed, at least in most of the oil fields in Austria. The Nazis had taken them away and they had become Austrian government property after the war. Mobil had perfectly legitimate claims which were not being addressed by the Austrian government. Matthews never made it a clear *quid pro quo* so nobody could say he was blackmailing the Austrian government, but the fact was that ultimately it sunk in that until the oil claims, I think they called it the Vienna memorandum business [?], were settled there would be trouble with the counter-part funds. Finally they were settled; there were a few other little odds and ends that were settled in the process.

It is amusing that one of the things that I did at that point was to insist on holding out enough money on counter-part funds to provide a sort of endowment for the Salzburg Seminar, which probably would not have continued its existence if this was not done. Of course it has been held ever since, and the Austrian government, which originally was rather unhappy about our U.S. insistence on this, later on they changed their views completely and came up with quite a bit of money themselves. They made it into a rather fascinating place, mainly for East-West exchange.

As an aside, since I have taught there several times, I got a notice from the Salzburg Seminar that they are terribly worried about their new role in life. For so long they

worked to develop a bridge between East and West and now that the bridge has become superfluous, what are they going to do? There are plenty of things for them to do, but they may have more trouble with financing.

Q: I have been following that for a long time too.

PORTER: The Austrian experience was an extremely interesting one. I will go back a little bit. While I was economic counselor David Waynehouse, who was DCM left and Doc Matthews very kindly promoted me to DCM, so I had about five years in Austria in the two posts of economic counselor and DCM. It was an interesting period, it was shortly after the Berlin wall went up and it was much more difficult to get information about what was happening in Eastern Europe. So of course there was a great expansion of intelligence facilities in Vienna or developed from Vienna, is a better way of phrasing it.

Q: We used to figure that five percent of the national income of Austria came from the intelligence activities that were paid by both sides for the same false information. It kept the coffee houses going very well.

PORTER: There was a lot of the *Third Man* business which has remained to this day.

Q: There were so many people from East Europe there, so many expatriates with connections.

PORTER: Of course it was not only the CIA but also the embassy that was participating in this, it was called a debriefing exercise to find out what was going on in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Every time a senior Austrian would visit the Soviet Union I would be down at his desk the day after he came back to find out where the hell Khrushchev or Brezhnev might be and report that because there was very little contact between the Soviets and our embassy in Moscow in those days.

Doc Matthews, Murphy and Henderson were three of the first four career ambassadors in the career foreign service. I thought I was very lucky to have a substantial amount of experience working for them.

While I was in Vienna Doc Matthews decided to retire, he had reached age 65 and I was chargé for about a year after he left. That was an interesting year, it was about 1963. Then Jimmy Riddleberger came in, he was an old friend from German days, head of the political office of the High Commission and later head of the office of German affairs. I think he was the only person in the State Department who really stood up to McCarthy and McCarthy's henchmen. He showed great courage when courage was not worn on the sleeve. I, of course, always enjoyed working for him, he was delightful.

Q: Was it on your watch that the age-old coalition government disintegrated and you got Socialist government?

PORTER: It happened just after I left, it was still the Proportz. Kreisky was still foreign minister when Riddleberger arrived and I guess that did single the change. He was the first Socialist foreign minister. To show you how close the Austrian-American relationship was at that time Kreisky and I would be on the phone at least twice a week. He would keep trying to select who would be the next ambassador - American ambassador to Austria. I would come up with names and he would raise questions, two or three he accepted, but he really wanted Jimmy Riddleberger. Jimmy was a very good ambassador, he spoke very good German but his accent was really something. We had to write his arrival speech when he first arrived in Austria as ambassador. I could hardly understand him. He had learned all his German in Berlin and that accent is so different than the rather mellifluous Austrian accent.

I stayed another year with Jimmy and then left for my next assignment.

Q: You were in Austria and you mentioned while the tape was off that you some PL 480 [grain] programs and other economic things that were going on.

PORTER: The economy was indeed taking off dramatically during my last couple of years there. Of course you had the Austrian neutrality question which made it quite clear, whether the Austrians wanted to do it or not, and I am not sure they did, that they could not join the Western market, the Russians did not want that. That took a great deal of time; the European Free Trade Association was created and the Austrians needed a lot of hand holding, but it was their first major post-war attempt to come out of the isolation, which was not necessarily their fault. They had to become a part of a large Europe and to take a role in EFTA, which consisted of European neutrals, Scandinavia, etc. which was developed apart from the Common Market. A lot of my friends who were working on Austria, on the administration of the Marshall Plan were the people who continued on as the Austrian EFTA bureaucracy which developed in Geneva. Much as we did in Germany where we trained a lot of German bureaucrats, we also trained a lot of Austrians.

Q: Also I think on the public affairs side with the press and radio and that sort of thing.

PORTER: Yes, very much so. In those days too, you could go out to the ski areas and find Marshall Plan plaques all over on lifts and gondolas and the like. If you go back today you will find all of those have been removed.

Q: They probably have been rebuilt.

PORTER: A lot were taken down when Austria decided that it was going, indeed, to stand on its own two feet. Austria was, of course, an area where the black-market, where the word *schwartz* described all sorts of economic activity where you could trade currencies, engage in illicit trade with the East, there was an awful lot of activity in enforcing U.S. trade restrictions and Pro-Com restrictions and the transfer of goods to the Eastern Bloc. It was quite clear that there were a lot of Austrian fortunes being made in a

way that would not necessarily be approved by the U.S. government. The Austrians are not necessarily Puritan in their life, by and large.

Q: Any more than they were in their political life, as we discovered.

PORTER: Indeed, as we discovered documentarily. I remember uncovering one juicy little scandal in Austria. We kept trade statistics. The U.S. government had, at that point, an interesting program called triangular trade where one sell, say, grain to Austria at perhaps favorable prices. The schillings that would accrue from that sale would go to buy commercial diamonds in South Africa or Turkey or wherever, most of which were used for building up strategic stockpiles in the United States, or sometimes for other purposes. We found that studying the trade statistics, the U.S. was exporting a great deal more grain to Austria than the triangular trade income would indicate. We started to look into it and found that $25 million worth of grain had gone to Austria and had been reexported to Eastern Block countries, largely Hungary, I think. There were the usual payoffs and Austrian bureaucracy had kept this thing from reaching the public eye. It was interesting that by just an analysis of the statistics we found that this thing was going on. The Austrians had actually paid for the grain, but they had got it at concession prices. The real problem was that it was being reexported to countries that were not supposed to be getting it and those countries were not getting preferential price as the Austrians were charging more.

I got a totally new perspective on Austria by pressing that case. We finally got a lot of people put in jail; I am sure they got out rather quickly after we turned the other way. It was a little seamy and one could only conjecture what else was going on. In the early days one of the brightest sources of income of the recovering Austria was subterranean channel to the East. Also during that period the Refugee Program pretty much came to an end and the money we gave to Austria to feed and house and resettle, and a lot of them were resettled in Austria, many of them Hungarians from the 1956 revolution and quite few Czechs, those programs pretty much came to an end. There was one final program, it was probably the last one in Europe, which Doug Dillon was very kind to approve when he came over, and it settled about 12,000 refugees in Austria. That in a sense was the end of the refugee problem in Western Europe, with the U.S. involvement. From that point on the refugee problem began to shift to other points of the world.

RAYMOND C. EWING
Political Officer, International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1962-1964)

Ambassador Raymond C. Ewing was born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1936. He graduated from Occidental College in 1957 with a degree in history. Ambassador Ewing's Foreign Service career included positions in Japan, Pakistan, Italy, Switzerland, Cyprus, Tanzania, and Ghana. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1993.

Q: *So you were in Vienna from 1962 to 1964. How did we regard the operations of the IAEA?*

EWING: The IAEA was still quite a new agency in the United Nations system. It really came out of President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative. It was established in Vienna in the late 1950's and had not been there very long. So part of what we were involved with was essentially helping it through its initial phase, getting it organized and staffed, beginning programs of technical assistance in developing countries and holding international conferences. So a lot of it was fairly routine, administrative work. Part of it, though, was the initial negotiation of steps leading toward a nuclear safeguards system to make sure that the peaceful applications of atomic energy did not lap over into military uses. There were a lot of strong, political overtones to much of what went on in the IAEA, both in terms of the Cold War and relationships with the Soviet Union, but also with the developing countries. They were trying to assert their rights to make sure that they did not lose out in this organization which, in many ways, they saw as dominated by the United States and the Western European countries. There were issues relating to South Africa, which was a very important part of the IAEA Board of Governors in those days.

Q: *What about the Soviet Union? I would have thought that this would be one place where we were very strong allies, or did it work out that way?*

EWING: As to an alliance between us and the Soviet Union, this was probably too strong a word to use for the IAEA in those days. We certainly had some common interests and were able to continue a dialogue on issues within the agency throughout that period. On the other hand, it was also the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which, of course, was followed to some extent by a period of limited detente. We were very much affected by what was happening elsewhere in the world but we did have an ongoing dialogue with the Soviets in Vienna. There was probably as cordial and productive a relationship with them as anywhere else in the world.

Q: *What was your impression of how the Soviets dealt with this organization at this time?*

EWING: I think that they took it seriously. They saw it, certainly, as an opportunity to score political points, but I think also that, as they had their own atomic energy program and wanted to use that in some of the developing countries, they saw opportunities to make some gains, if you will, through the agency. They had Soviet personnel in some key positions in the agency. It also was a time when Vienna was a place for interaction with the West in many respects, not just the IAEA, although the IAEA was of considerable importance for both of our countries. We put a fair amount of money into the IAEA and had some Americans in key positions in the Secretariat of the agency.

Q: *Well, this was also a period which extended for quite some time. Atomic energy for peaceful purposes was considered the wave of the future, wasn't it?*

EWING: We were probably pretty naive in some of the ways we looked at atomic energy, not sufficiently taking into account the health and safety aspects and the potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not enough attention was paid to the possibility of accidents like the Chernobyl affair, nor did we anticipate that at that time. There were some very good people involved in the IAEA. Vyacheslav Molotov [long time Soviet Foreign Minister] was actually the Soviet representative on the Board of Governors at the time I went there, except that he was never in Vienna. He was recalled to Moscow, and there were rumors that he was returning for the next meeting or the next session. He never did come again to Vienna and eventually was replaced by somebody else.

Q: *How about the French? The French have always seemed to be the "odd man out" in our Alliance in various aspects. The French have gone in heavily for atomic energy projects. How did we view the French at this particular time?*

EWING: We had a good, cordial relationship with the French in Vienna. However, EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Commission], of course, was already in existence. However, in many ways, I think that the French played a much more independent role as far as the European partners were concerned -- as much with them as with us. We weren't the only ones for whom the French caused some difficulty. They were very talented, very able, very serious in the IAEA, as I recall.

Q: *Two of the countries which became real problems later on were India and Israel. Did problems with them begin to loom at this particular time or not?*

EWING: I don't remember very much about Israel. India and Pakistan were both extremely active in the IAEA. I don't recall any particular apprehension or fear that India -- or, for that matter, Pakistan -- were going to involve themselves in an atomic bomb program. The head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, always came for the key meetings of the IAEA. There was also a Pakistani, who was also internationally renowned as a theoretical physicist and who was extremely active in the agency. Of the countries that were the most active I remember particularly India and Pakistan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, and the United States -- and that was about it. A number of other countries were members, but they tended to be much more "low key" and didn't take initiatives.

Q: *How did we feel about South Africa at that time?*

EWING: I think that we generally didn't think about apartheid. South Africa was not yet a pariah in the IAEA. They were one of the original members of the Board of Governors, they took things seriously, and they generally played quite a positive role, as far as I can recall.

Q: *So it wasn't a matter of glancing at them and wondering what they might do with this field? Did this come later?*

EWING: I think that that came later. I don't recall any initiatives to expel South Africa. You mentioned Israel before. There were always political issues involving Israel and their status in the agency. I remember those issues more than anything to do with South Africa. But Israel involved political issues, as opposed to atomic energy problems as such.

Q: *What kind of work were you doing?*

EWING: I was called a Political Officer. Probably one-third of my time was really administrative work, both vis-a-vis the IAEA itself but also in terms of the Embassy. We were sort of part of the Embassy [in Vienna] for administrative support but if we needed something done, either for our offices or for our houses, people looked to me to deal with the Embassy General Services Officer or whoever else was involved in the Embassy. I would go to the staff meetings of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Another part of my job was helping the other political officer on political issues. Then part of my work was to function as a conference officer, making arrangements for delegations that came from Washington -- doing reporting on meetings of the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the IAEA. I did a number of different things. I was not expected to assume any initiatives or take on any major responsibilities.

Q: *Who was handling contact with the IAEA, from the American side?*

EWING: Dr. Hugh Smythe was a professor of physics at Princeton University and the author of the UNCLASSIFIED report on the Manhattan Project, the World War II atomic bomb project, which was published shortly after the war. He was the U. S. member of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. He would come to Vienna three or four times a year. He had the rank of Ambassador and represented the United States before the agency.

Then we had in Vienna a resident representative, with the rank of Minister. Most of the time that I was there he was Bill Cargo. Frank Hefner replaced Cargo. So the resident representative was the day to day head of the mission. We also had another political officer, who was more senior than I was, by quite a bit. This was Betty Gould, who had had a lot of experience with the United Nations, going back many years and who knew all the ins and outs of parliamentary procedure in international conferences and so on. We had two other officers who had more of a science background. One of them was on detail from the Atomic Energy Commission and one had the title "Science Advisor." He had experience in the atomic energy field. He went back to private life with the Bechtel Corporation and had been with Stanford Research Institute.

SIDNEY FRIEDLAND
Junior Political Officer, International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1964-1967)

Sidney Friedland was born in 1932 and raised in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1955 with a degree in history. Following graduation, Mr. Friedland entered the U.S. Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in Austria, Canada, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland. Mr. Friedland was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 1, 1993.

FRIEDLAND: Arrived in Vienna in February of 1962.

Q: *What was your job there?*

FRIEDLAND: This was an awful job, I was not at the Embassy, I was with the mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was a five-person post, headed up by a non-resident ambassador who was a world famous Atomic scientist. Henry D. Smythe, who was one of the inventors of the Atomic bomb. We had quarters outside the Embassy near to the secretariat of the IAEA. In those days it was a whole different operation. Back in the early '60s, we, the US of A. were the prime salesmen of Atomic power. Not polluting, cheap, the answer to all your power prayers, and all of you poor countries without coal, oil or whatever, just buy one of these and Westinghouse makes real good ones, and your power problems will come to an end. The only thing is that we want you to sign on to this nice agreement which we are in the process of drafting to show us that you won't try to make bombs out of these things. And that's basically what we did in Vienna for two years. Absolutely fascinating.

Q: *Did you get rid of your accent?*

FRIEDLAND: Two months after my arrival in Vienna, we had Frankfurt send down a language instructor and my accent-free German was not quite accent-free, it had sort of shifted over to a Viennese accent. There are 22 districts in Vienna, each one of which has a recognizable accent, and I was able, by the time I left there two years later, to distinguish them.

Q: *As you worked on this atomic selling business, were there countries that were concerned with, particularly India and Israel. Was this a problem at that time? South Africa? Were any of those on our horizon at the time?*

FRIEDLAND: Yes, India was. Although I may be confusing things a bit, because to leapfrog slightly ahead, after I finished up at the mission in Vienna, in the Spring of 1966, I spent the year in the executive secretariat as a watch officer, and upon completion of that assignment, I was made desk officer in the International Organizations Office, for the IAEA. So I spent also '67-'69, as the desk officer for my old outfit, and I was back and forth between Washington and Vienna which means that I was occupied for two, two year periods given my wobbling memory that I've developed in old age, I may jump from one to the other.

Q: *It's sort of within the time period.*

FRIEDLAND: The main thing was the Soviet Union, there were really three nuclear powers, the US the Soviet Union, and China, and of course we were vigorously excluding China from the IAEA. With Russia we did not have great relations, this was Cold War, although I must say, within the Atomic Energy community, our relations were not bad because we did not China or anyone else to acquire the bomb. Plus it turns out that the Chief of the Soviet delegation, whose name escapes me at this point, was an atomic scientist, as was ours, and both were very internationally well known. There was a shared scientific outlook and that sort of thing.

I remember India being particularly difficult. In fact, it is what lead to the Non-Proliferation treaty. Indians swore up and down that they only wanted to use this for peaceful purposes. Well, that means reactors, and what else can you use these for besides power? We intend to create new harbors and a big area of coastline because we are going to put in a device to create a new port. And where are you going to put these things? Oh, we've got lot's of coastline, don't worry. You're not going to put them in your pockets are you? Oh, no, that would be a bomb!

Q: *What were you doing actually on this?*

FRIEDLAND: Actually, I did almost all of the non-substantive stuff, I was a junior officer in a five-man mission, the resident rep was the chief basically, and he was a State Department bureaucrat, when I arrived there, and this fellow was succeeded by an atomic energy commissioner administrative, there was the chief scientific officer, who was a foreign service scientific type, there were a few of those, then the chief nuclear officer who was an Atomic Energy Commission International person, then there was a political officer, who was an IO type, and then there was me, and I was technically the junior political officer, but I was also the junior officer, so I was the admin officer, I signed the chauffeur's time cards, I got PX permits for people, I paid the rent, from housing for people, I did all sorts of stuff. Picked up the Ambassador when he flew in, made all of his arrangements. I was a gofer basically. I also did political reporting when we had to do various conferences, like most U.N. organizations these things work through conferences. Board of Directors and Governors that met three times a year, then a big general conference of all 150 member states once a year. I was with a real pro, this was one of the few areas of the department where women went anyplace was IO, and my boss, she gave me any political work that I had, whereas the resident rep was a state admin type gave me the most of the rest that I did.

She was my real mentor because up to this point, I had been in the Foreign Service for almost six years, as a political officer, and I never had any political work, really, whatsoever. She was one of the pros and her name was Betty Goff, and she was in San Francisco in 1945, drafted the original U.N. Charter, one of the drafting people. It is not the best way to learn political reporting because basically she knew all the actors, her main activities were to keep China and East Germany out of any U.N. organization and anytime there would be a situation which was meant to lead to that, the admission of China, East Germany, Betty would be sent off, she was damage control or the damage

prevention officer, and it came up in the UNGA, she'd fly off to the UNGA and lead the forces, and draft the speeches.

She was one to close to half a dozen women political officers in IO and that was basically the only place that they were. But these women had come into the department during the early forties, while the men were off fighting. Women were brought in where they hadn't been before, and after the war was over, you don't throw them out, although a number of them were thrown out, but the best ones got to stay. The main place they congregated was in IO.

DWIGHT J. PORTER
Representative, International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1970)

Ambassador Dwight Porter, a native of the Midwest, graduated from Grinnell College in 1938. His Foreign Service career included positions in Germany, the United Kingdom (England), Austria, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Lebanon. Ambassador Porter was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1990.

PORTER: Then the Vienna thing popped up. This was the permanent representative to the International Atomic Agency in Vienna. It was a job that I knew quite well during the beginning of the Agency when I was in the embassy in Vienna. I had gotten to know some of the basic problems of the Agency and some of the principal characters in the States who were responsible for it.

Q: December 3, 1990. We were just getting to Vienna, do you want to pick up there? Did you go directly there from Beirut?

PORTER: Actually yes. We were so pleased at that point - things had heated up so much in Beirut and we had heard a lot of gunfire even then. I was rather anxious to get the kids in a more pacific environment for a while. The time was perfect, schools started in September and that is when we got to Vienna. For Mrs. Porter and myself, this was a very familiar environment and a school we knew very well. As a matter of fact I had raised the money to build the school in Vienna and so it was fun to come back a decade or so later to take advantage of it. Our eldest had been in the first graduating class in Vienna. The school itself had become quite an asset to Vienna as the Austrians tried to move UN agencies to Vienna. You remember, this was Kriesky's great dream to make this the second Geneva or New York. At that point he felt this was a bulwark from expansion from any side against an largely undefended Austria. We flew directly - that was the incident that a battalion of troops had to get us down to the airport.

I got there just in time for the first annual general assembly meeting of the Agency. I had to go back and be vetted by the man who was the ambassador to the IEA but who was resident in the United States but only came over for the big meeting.

Q: Was he primarily a technical man?

PORTER: It was Keith Glennen, he had just been appointed and he did not even know anything about Vienna, and I got his agreement to be in effect his alter ego on the scene in Vienna as he handled it in Washington. Glennen was a fascinating man whom I enjoyed working for. His history goes from everything from being a Hollywood executive to being a college president to having been the first head of NASA, he was the man who started us going to the moon. He was appointed by Eisenhower. He had a variety of experiences and knowing people. He had also been a member of the Atomic Energy Commission - very knowledgeable in this field. He was devoted to the cause of the IEA, the effort to keep nuclear from proliferating. He was imaginative, and innovator. His health was not good. During the five plus years we stayed in this job, he was replaced at the end of the third year by a gentleman named Gerald Tape, who had also been a member of the AEC, a college administrator, a physicist of renown. So I was very fortunate to have these two knowledgeable and interesting colleagues while I was in Vienna.

My job was to learn as much as I could about nuclear power and energy economics. Fortunately I already knew a lot about it. I had been a devotee of nuclear power since the war and had studied a lot about it. As somebody who had started out to be a chemist I found it a little easier to understand the intricacies of nuclear power. I believed then and still believe today that if we are ever to have an energy policy that makes any sense it will be based on nuclear power. We will have to get over a lot of hangups before we can do that.

We settled back into Vienna very easily. The Viennese politicians and leaders whom we had known when they were younger were mostly retired or dead. But Kriesky, at that point, was the really dominating figure. We had all known Kriesky from the beginning. I actually did not have a great deal to do with the Austrian government except as a member of the IAEA, but I continued to have close relations with a lot of Austrians friends while we were there.

The job really involved a lot of diplomacy. The U.S. was the founder and the recognized leader of the International Atomic Agency and we were relied on by the staff of the agency as well as its director general, a very competent Swedish physicist, to really set the tone of the agency and set its agenda. The IAA had all the problems that had occurred in all UN agencies of the period, the feeling that if the U.S. was going to do the leading it ought to do most of the funding, and since we were dealing with the questions of nuclear weaponry the Soviets were very much involved. The Soviets had not for a long time understood the importance to them of non-proliferation of nuclear weaponry. The Chinese for a long period before they saw the light and decided that it might not be a good idea to have a few little bombs scattered about the world. The Soviets were not so

clear either in their own mind. Finally they began to understand just how unsettling and destabilizing nuclear weapons would be, and they suddenly became rather stalwart allies of the U.S. in this endeavor. The non-proliferation treaty was legal instrument which the agency enforced. During a period of very sour U.S. - Soviet relations somehow at the IAEA in Austria we found common ground and a certain amount of camaraderie. We carefully consulted with the Soviets in advance about new policy initiatives. We almost always got their sanction and overt support for initiatives which we were working out. The Soviet Ambassador to the IAEA was one of the old-line Soviets named Markatiev [?] who had a long history of being cantankerous in relationships with the Americans. I found him fascinating, he had grown up in the pre-Revolutionary days in Russia and loved to talk about it. His church had the best wine and sacraments on the Moscow River. He would reminisce about life in pre-revolutionary Russia.

Q: What were the mechanics of running the IAEA, was it something like the Security Council with limited votes, or was it something like the General Assembly?

PORTER: It had a director general who executed the decisions. Theoretically there wasn't a superbody such as the Security Council; the Great Powers did not have certain rights reserved to themselves, but in fact it pretty much worked that way. Six or seven powers, all of the nuclear states except for Canada, nuclear states either in a weapons or reactors, those were the states that really led the way and everybody else was hanging around trying to get something out of it. Which is quite understandable. Large nations like India and Pakistan and some of the threshold nuclear states were very often resistant to attempts to get them to indulge in self-denial in nuclear weaponry. This was particularly in states where they were confronting an enemy in close proximity, for example in the subcontinent, India and Pakistan.

Israel was, of course, the real example. Both Israel and India, particularly Israel have the capacity for utilizing nuclear weapons. One of the fights we had for years in Vienna was to keep Israel as a member of the IAEA and there were constant attacks on Israel. The typical kind of attacks one found in New York at the UN and elsewhere. It was even more difficult there because it was an open secret that Israel had nuclear weaponry and was not allowing the inspection of its facilities, not only by the agency, but by the United States, which was contrary to the original promises which were made. So it was quite a diplomatic job each year to keep Israel in the diplomatic fold. At that point the U.S. Congress not clearly understanding the value of the IAEA, with a few exceptions. It was lashing out to the IAEA for "its unfriendliness to Israel". That has subsided as the role of the IAEA has become more evident to the Hill. But for a long time it was treated as somewhat the step-child by the Congress. There were always members of Congress who understood it, but they were always in what, shall we say, was the small, educated minority.

Q: Did you have to do some of the lobbying of Congress on this, or was this usually handled by Glennon and others?

PORTER: Well, I did a lot. I had to come back each year for the authorization bill and appropriations bill. At that point Congress handled it differently, and it was very helpful in a way. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which was the committee of reference for the IAEA did not have to go to either of the Foreign Affairs committees. When I was confirmed for my job I was confirmed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, not by Foreign Relations. Unfortunately while I was there the Joint Committee was abolished. That was the time the IAEA sort of fell into limbo in Congress. That committee which had the knowledgeable members of Congress on it ..

Q: And the best security of any committee on the Hill.

PORTER: Indeed a good security system. Once that committee was abolished we really lost the thread of communication with Congress for a while.

Q: Who took over when it was abolished?

PORTER: Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs took over. We lost almost all of the expertise on the Hill as regards to atomic energy when that happened. Of course it happened primarily because of the basic attacks on atomic energy by domestic opponents to nuclear power. The result was that the international aspects really didn't work, all the staff, for instance of the Atomic Energy Committee, which had a great staff, was just wiped out overnight. They were never picked up by the Foreign Relations people.

That was an interesting transition we had to go through. I think that we did achieve a great deal despite some of these troubles we had with the Hill. No country has developed weaponry, nuclear weaponry, through the use of peaceful nuclear power. While it is also true that most countries that want to have such weapons do it by secret and dedicate facilities to the purpose, there is a great inhibiting value to the IAEA. We are seeing it right now on Iraq where the IAEA is inspecting at least the peaceful facilities in Iraq. Quite a bit of value comes out of their presence there. It is awfully difficult for the political leader of a country to go ahead and develop a weapons system when enough is known internationally about his peaceful program to make it pretty clear that somehow or other leaks are going to appear about what else is going on. Pakistan today is a case in point. In fact, for years they have been talking about making a bomb and have made some progress towards it. I think that Pakistan would have gone ahead with its bomb and had it ready a long time ago if it had not been for the inhibiting presence of the IAEA and its peaceful nuclear program. It is not easy, in an uncertain world, to say that anything is a final determinant in the outcome of political affairs, but the IAEA has quite clearly paid for itself.

Q: Presumably they have some other more technical aspects? They run the inspection teams. Do they also act as a clearing house for atomic information?

PORTER: Very much so. These are safety matters, to assure safety. Ever since the awful Soviet accident in Chernobyl, the safety rule - this is subsequent to my time - has greatly increased, as it should. The Agency does not itself provide all the technical expertise that

needs to be brought to bear on nuclear problems. When there is a nuclear problem the Agency will establish a team of international experts and get them over there quickly. It has now also developed a role of operating the massive relief efforts in the event of any serious accident. This is something new. Fortunately they have never been needed, but they have developed a mechanism to carry it out.

One of the things that has happened since I left Vienna is that other UN agencies have come in, in fact while I was there UNITO was there, and now the job in Vienna runs the gamut of UN agencies, I had resisted that. I thought my time was needed in the IAEA and the other agencies were so relatively unimportant as regards political objectives that I did not want to get involved. But that has changed now, and the resident ambassador in Vienna is representing the U.S. in several agencies. He has subordinates who specialize in each agency. His own time is probably less involved in atomic energy matters than mine was.

Q: What did you have for staff there? Did you have some real technicians?

PORTER: Yes we did. It was not a large staff. We drew from both the State Department, I had two political officers who worked with me on what I would call diplomatic initiatives, we would have to break them in and teach them about what they were doing in atomic energy matters. They would usually get a month or two briefing in the United States. The bulk of the staff was technical. We had about six or seven technical people, not all engineers or nuclear physicists, but they all came from the Atomic Energy Commission, which became the nucleus of the Department of Energy when it was created. As the AEC died out and the DOE came in the function continued. Their main job was to get help from the technical people in the States and also to recruit Americans for positions in the Agency. It was very important that American citizens have a substantial presence in the Agency. The Soviets at that point were staffing the Agency with KGB types, unfortunately. They were using it almost as much for an intelligence platform as a nuclear platform. It was easy to tell them all apart, the real nuclear types, who wanted to work closely with our people on peaceful nuclear matters, and the KGB types who were out just mouthing their lines on nuclear matters. I had the feeling that that has been gradually changing, particularly since the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviets have decided that that is something important to them and they had better put in real technical people. Obviously whatever has happened in the last year or so with the KGB would be fascinating, but I am not in a position to know.

Q: Do you have anything to say about the relations of this job or this kind of job with the embassy? You obviously did not have the same kinds of problems that they have in Paris in interfering in the economic side and in one thing and another.

PORTER: I had to walk something of a thin line for a while until it became clear to my Austrian friends that I was not going to get involved in anything internal. I got that sorted out very quickly and we had someone very sympathetic and pleasant human being in John Humes, the American ambassador at that point. He and I just hit it off fine. There were probably little, understandable, bits of friction between individual officers down the

line - the perks and prerogatives - who gets the biggest house and so on. But this was almost irrelevant. The admin officer at the embassy had worked for me for years, the general services officer had been with me in Beirut so everything worked out just fine as far as I was concerned. It possibly might have been different if you had not had such a congenial person as John Humes. John was delighted to use me in some things. We needed to get additions on the school and needed to have the Austrian government put in some more money - at that point the school was a great asset to them. They could not put UN agencies in there without providing schools for the kids in English. I went to work with John's blessing to raising more money from the Austrians. I dealt with the Foreign Ministry to build another addition to the school, which was done. No frictions at all, the embassy people were delighted to have me do it, they did not have to do it.

ROGER KIRK
Representative, International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1970's)

Ambassador Roger Kirk grew up in a Navy family, and first became interested in foreign service when his father was sent to London in 1939 as a Naval Attaché. Ambassador Kirk's career in the Foreign Service included positions in Italy, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Somalia, Austria, and an ambassadorship to Romania. Ambassador Kirk was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1991.

KIRK: And Warren Christopher, who was on the telephone, said, "The music is better in Vienna anyway."

So I then went home with the news that we weren't going to Africa, we were going to Austria. This was in the job of what they called resident representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency which was headquartered in Vienna, a UN system organization there.

Q: Yes, well I was somewhat familiar with that job because we used to have meetings in Vienna and we'd always talk with whoever was there in that job.

KIRK: That was an interesting job because...

Q: Who was your principal? The guy who was sort of the official ambassador there? Or by that time were you it?

KIRK: No. The U.S. representative on the Governing Board was Gerry Smith, Gerard Smith, who was based in Washington. There were meetings of the Board four times a year. Gerry came out for most of those. Then he got ill and for about a year he didn't come, so I just stood in for him.

Q: I think it has been that way for a long time but there was a period when you were deputy chief of mission.

KIRK: Well, that's right. It was a little tricky in that sense, except, of course, Gerry Smith was such a gentleman that he ended up having enough confidence in me so that he came just for two or three days at a time. Actually there was a mission to the International Atomic Energy and there was also a U.S. mission to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, another UN organization in Vienna. When the person heading that mission, who was a Counselor of Embassy in the U.S. embassy to Austria, left, I suggested that the two be combined into a single mission to the UN organizations, which was done. I was actually head of two separate missions co-located in the same building for a while, then they combined them into a single mission. This made much more sense because all of our foreign diplomatic colleagues were handling all the UN organizations and you would often trade-off an understanding, shall we say, in one organization on your part for an understanding in another organization on their part. It was very important to be able to do that, to be able to speak for the U.S. Government in all of these organizations. One thing certainly that struck me was that when you have permanent representatives doing a lot of the work, they develop a camaraderie, a mutual respect, and a mutual confidence that facilitate regional agreements. It makes it a lot easier.

Of course, multilateral policy is something entirely different, in my view, than bilateral diplomacy. It's much more like a legislature, at least multilateral diplomacy in the sense of diplomacy in one of these big international organizations. You have resolutions you want to pass, you've got to get the votes for them, you have to trade concessions on something that someone else wants, for something that you want. A lot of it is negotiation, almost all on the spot. The Department simply can do nothing more than give you general guidelines. I'm assuming we're not in a crucial world shattering negotiation in which case it's much slower and every single step must be monitored. But in these kinds of things your real decision, and your real negotiation, is done in the last three or four hours in any conference no matter how long that conference is -- be it one week, two weeks or six weeks. There's no way you can get instructions as that process goes on.

One of the interesting things about Vienna was that in the Atomic Energy Agency, for example, we and the Soviets were usually on the same side of any given question. We both had nuclear weapons, and we did not want other people to have them. We both wanted to keep the budget of the organization down. We both wanted the organization to be what we would call responsible, that is responsive to the things that we thought best. So we consulted regularly and amicably, even during bad periods in American-Soviet relations, and essentially were pushing the same points of view. Their negotiating techniques and ours, of course, were quite different. I would drive my Soviet colleague bananas by trying to find out what the other people wanted, and offering limited concessions fairly early in the process. He said, "You're giving things away too soon." I'd say, "Oleg, in the last two hours you'll give everything away. We don't want to do that. You'll just cave." But between the two of us we managed.

Q: Did you have to use your Russian a good deal at that time too?

KIRK: Yes, a certain amount of the time I would. That kind of conversation I would have privately with him in Russian. Two Soviets were there during the five and a half years that I was there; one interestingly enough had been Molotov's private aide for ten or twelve years while Molotov was Prime Minister. He had seen, I'm sure, a great deal of the inner workings of the Soviet Union under Stalin. I asked him what time they knocked off work, and he said, "About 2:00 in the morning." And I said, "What time did he go back to work?" and he said, "About 10:00." He was followed by another very even more capable Soviet who had been deputy head of their treaty section, and a very skilled negotiator.

What else is there to say about the multilateral business? Certainly the importance of making up the U.S. position very early on so that you can persuade other people, have other people take it into account, or persuade them of it, before they form their own positions, and particularly before they form group positions. Increasingly most of the countries of the world get together in regional, or larger than regional groupings in these UN organizations, and hammer out a common position, which then becomes very difficult to change, because it means going back to five, ten, fifteen or fifty countries and trying to get them to change. For practical reasons alone, it is very important to get in there early to identify the two or three individuals who are key, persuade them of the rightness of your point of view, work out some sort of compromise with them, and then have that become their group's position. You're much more successful that way. It's often, of course, difficult to get Washington to make up its mind in time because they don't understand.

JOHN C. LEARY
Representative, United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Vienna (197?-1980)

John Charles Leary was born in Connecticut in 1924. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from Yale University and served in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1946 as a lieutenant overseas. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his postings abroad have included Cherbourg, Dusseldorf, Istanbul, Tokyo, Ottawa, Vienna, Sao Paulo, and Granada. Mr. Leary was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

LEARY: After Canada I went to Vienna, Austria, where I was the U.S. Representative to UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, which was headquartered in Vienna. This was, at the time, a small independent Mission. I had myself, one other officer, a secretary and a local assistant. We had our office in the embassy to Austria, Boltzmanngasse in Vienna, but we had our separate communications series and so on. And our own communications with IO [Bureau of International Organizations] and principle officers of IO in the Department.

Q: What about the IAEA?

LEARY: The IAEA was a separate Mission which was physically located elsewhere and dealt with the International Atomic Energy Agency. There was a history to this. UNIDO was established by a UN resolution in 1968. It was not a specialized agency of the UN the way the World Health Organization or the World International Organization was, but a unit of the New York Secretariat, physically based in Vienna, but being part of the UN general budget and so on. Its staff were hired by New York and paid by New York and so on. Once the Organization was established, and here again is a case where the United States had opposed establishment of UNIDO for a long, long time, but finally gave into the UN political pressures. We had felt that the industrial area was one where the private sector was much more important than government and we feared that UNIDO would turn into an organization promoting statist solutions to issues, which in fact proved to be correct to some degree. But in any event, the Organization was established and we appointed a representative to UNIDO with a separate small Mission in Vienna.

During my time in Vienna, the Austrian government completed construction of a new complex of office and conference buildings which became known as UN City. These were designed to house the IAEA and UNIDO and had several hundred offices left over and so when the Austrian government completed construction and they delivered the buildings to the UN for a token rent of one Austrian shilling per year, the UN vowed to fill the space with overflow from New York and Geneva. Of course, there was some debate about which particular offices would move. In the end, much of the work of the UN in the areas of social activities, women's issues and children's issues and that sort of thing moved to Vienna. Certain of the functions from Geneva, particularly those relating to drugs and narcotics moved to Vienna. And at the same time UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, which had been headquartered in Beirut was forced to move to a more secure location and they came to Vienna. And my office became responsible for relations with these various units. This did not put a great drain on our resources because they were still in the process of moving in and the issues were not in most cases terribly significant at that stage. But it was then decided that it would make much more sense for us to establish in Vienna the kind of Mission that we had in Geneva which was a Mission to the International Organizations of the various sections that dealt with the individual organizations. After my departure that was accomplished by establishing what was called USUNVIE, which is the U.S. Mission to the UN Agencies in Vienna.

Q: That includes the IAEA.

LEARY: That's right. So now there's one Ambassador to IAEA UNIDO and other UN activities there with people under him who are specialists in various areas. But during the time I was there, as I said, we were independent. It was quite an interesting experience to deal with a UN organization which in many cases was engaged in activities for which we had certain reservations. We involved ourselves in the questions of budget control and efficiency, as well as the substance of some of these issues.

Q: Yea. UNIDO was probably one of our least favorite international organizations.

LEARY: We have since withdrawn, but that occurred some time afterwards.

Q: We weren't very happy that it was established as you said before. So I guess your main task was to try to limit the damage.

LEARY: That's basically it. And to encourage to the extent that we could some positive things. One thing we were encouraging, and I'm not sure in the long run what the effect was, but we were encouraging the organization to deal with the private sector. They established a series of industry sector consultations, for example, in the steel industry. And various countries were invited to invite various representatives of their industries to come to meetings, sometimes in Vienna, sometimes at other locations, and meet with developing country counterparts to discuss the real issues of trade in these products. How markets were developed and what one had to do to develop markets, what was happening in terms of change in technology and so on. I think these had some positive impact. One of the problems was that in many cases the developing countries would send government bureaucrats instead of industry people and the bureaucrats simply insisted on repeating well-worn positions rather than listening to the good information that they were obtaining from the developing country spokesmen. But for the most part it was a matter of, as you said, containing the damage.

There was a great push on to convert UNIDO into a full-fledged specialized agency. The developing countries, I guess, had this at the top of their agenda. They felt that this could give the agency clout. Give them an independent budget, independent board of directors and so on. We engaged in a lengthy negotiation to develop a constitution for such a specialized agency and our objective was to have an agency which could be controlled to a certain degree in terms of budget and activities, but in particular, via budget, we didn't want this thing to get out of control. As it was, UNIDO was part of the general UN budget and was controlled in virtually the same way that the general UN budget was controlled. If there was a 2% budget increase for the year, UNIDO got a share of that, and of course other offices. Whereas with an independent agency, the theory was that they sky would be the limit.

So we spent a lot of time negotiating provisions which provide for budget procedures, which gave an effective veto to enough countries in the developed country area, that if we could reach common ground, among basically the donor countries, we could have some control over the budget. This involved developing procedures and voting procedures and so on. We finally reached a satisfactory understanding on this and before I left Vienna we signed the agreement through UNIDO, which of course was ratified by Congress to become a member. We also wanted to include in that Constitution withdrawal procedures which would enable us to withdraw in the event things did not proceed to our liking. That proved to be the case a few years later and we decided that it was not worth the effort and we withdrew. It must have been sometime in the early '90s, I guess.

Q: I assume a lot of your effort in Vienna was in coordinating and working with the other developed country representatives.

LEARY: As in many of the UN organizations we broke down, and in fact this is in the rules of the organization, into groups. Groups "A" and "C" were the developing countries and they were specified in the law and rules. "A" being basically countries from Asia and Africa and "C" being countries from Latin America, but who joined forces on most issues and became known as the Group of 77. Group "D" were the East Bloc Socialist countries and Group "B" were the Western Industrialized countries, including western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Much of our preparatory work was done in these groups. We had a very active and well functioning Group "B" and our Mission took a very active role in that Group. Many of the countries were represented by people who, unlike the U.S., did not have a special Mission for UNIDO. They were either from a Mission whose principal responsibility was the IAEA or in some cases the bi-lateral embassy had also the responsibilities for the international organizations. I discovered that by taking the initiative to get pieces of paper on the table, we could frequently move the discussion in our direction if there were going to be doubts.

I recall in particular, prior to the third general conference of UNIDO which took place in India in about 1979 or maybe '80, the Secretariat had come out with a number of papers on the individual agenda items, many of which took positions that were not pleasing to us or many of our developed country colleagues. We always had people, members of our Group however, who were prepared to avoid strong stands on these things. In part because their interests were not as directly affected as the interests of the major donor countries, and so on, and in part because of domestic political situations.

In preparation for that meeting our embassy established a small working group, of Group "B," and our embassy undertook to review each of these agenda papers and prepare a commentary, which we did and tried to take into account the views we knew were going to be expressed by some countries, but being sure to include all of our own positions. By the end of the process we gotten considerable agreement on a position, which resulted for the first time, when the conference actually took place, in a solid Group "B" vote against the plan of action which had been presented by the developing countries. At first there were statements to the effect that the conference had been a failure, but we went back to Vienna and all sides began to reassess their positions and were much more amenable to compromise on issues. We passed through a period of exercising what was known as the "Spirit of Vienna", which enabled us to get the organization moving again.

Q: Okay. Were you the Chair of Group "B" towards the end of your time in Vienna?

LEARY: Yes, Chairmanship rotated. During the UNCTAD conference that I mentioned, the Chairman was the Belgian Ambassador who was a woman, Ambassador DeBeir. A very capable lady. After the conference, she had done her time and I was approached about taking over the chairmanship. I think in part because of the work that we had done prior to the conference. In fact, the Group insisted during the conference that I spend a lot of time behind the Belgian table to advise Madam DeBeir when she was speaking on the

Group's behalf. I consulted the Department and was given authority to do this. We generally had shied away from this, but in this case they decided that it was alright. So, for the next six months I had the job of coordinating the Group and it was an interesting experience.

Q: You mentioned the history of why it was a separate Mission and then later all the UN agencies in Vienna were folded together as far as the United States representation was concerned. I suppose there were some real advantages that you could focus entirely on UNIDO and maybe to a lesser extent some of these other agencies coming to Vienna.

LEARY: Yes, that's true.

Q: And you had authority and were seen by others as having expertise.

LEARY: There were a couple other countries who had specialists in UNIDO. One was the West Germans and the Swiss also. They had a Mission which was accredited to both groups, but they had one person on the staff who was principally the UNIDO man. Since our three countries tended to have very similar interests, we worked very closely together.

GALEN L. STONE
Representative, International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1976-1978)

Ambassador Galen L. Stone grew up in Massachusetts. After attending Harvard University and serving in the U.S. Army, he joined the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, France, India, Vietnam, Laos, Austria, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Cyprus. He was interviewed on April 15, 1988 by Malcolm Thompson.

STONE: Ambassador Tape had been the principal U.S. delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency and he had called on me at one point when I was Chargé d'affaires in Paris. He had been given a list of three names to be the resident Chief of the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. I think that my name was the only one which looked familiar to him. The result was that eventually I was assigned to Vienna as the U.S. Resident Representative to the international Atomic Energy with the personal rank of Ambassador.

Q: And how long did that last?

STONE: That lasted just exactly two years, from February of 1976 to February of 1978. It was an interesting assignment and at that point career officers were being encouraged to get involved in multi-lateral diplomacy. I must say that I found multi-lateral diplomacy to be a fairly frustrating experience. This was particularly true in an organization which

had a Board of Governors of some thirty-three countries, the majority of whom were from the Third World. The thing that made that assignment most interesting was that of all the organizations in the world, this was the one where our interests most closely paralleled those of the Soviet Union. Neither the Soviet Union or the Unite States wanted to see other countries get their hands on nuclear weapons. So both the Soviets and ourselves were doing as much as we could to beef-up the inspection side of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which sends inspectors out to visit nuclear plants all over the world. Of course the inspections are subject to the willingness of the particular host country to place their plants under such inspection.

We had a practice of sitting down with the Soviets before each major meeting of the Governing Body and at least not pulling any surprises on each other. The Soviets would at times tell us that they were going to have to say nasty things about us in regard to certain political positions, but by and large our relations were reasonably cooperative and complementary.

DAVID G. BROWN
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna (1978-1981)

David G. Brown was born in Massachusetts in 1940 and graduated from Princeton University in 1964. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1964, his postings abroad have included Taipei, Saigon, Yokohama, Tokyo, Vienna, Beijing, Oslo, and Hong Kong. Mr. Brown was interviewed in 2003 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop, but where did you go in '78?

BROWN: I went to the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. I spent three years there.

Q: All right, we'll pick it up at that point. Great.

BROWN: Okay.

Q: Today is the 4th of March 2003. David, 1978, you're off to Vienna, Vienna with the, what was it called?

BROWN: The U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. At that time it was a separate office in Vienna with six or seven people.

Q: Was this part of the UN?

BROWN: The IAEA is related to the UN, and it is housed in a UN complex, but at that time our office that was representing us to the UN agencies there was separate from the IAEA mission. Subsequently they've been merged together into one office.

Q: What brought about your going there? Did you have, was somebody looking at your background?

BROWN: It wasn't entirely accidental. I was looking for something different to do outside of Asia, possibly at an international organization job. Through my work on the Taiwan desk on the nuclear issue, I had gotten to know quite a few people in the non-proliferation field in the U.S. government and that I think helped my credentials in applying for the IAEA job. Of course when I got to Vienna, the work only occasionally was directly related to non-proliferation. It was normal, rather routine international organization work related to the quarterly board meetings of the IAEA and the budget process within the agency and helping to get American people into the key jobs in the IAEA.

Q: You were doing this from '78 until when?

BROWN: Until '81.

Q: When you went there, this was your first sort of international organization, wasn't it?

BROWN: First and only.

Q: How would you, sort of as the new boy on the block for this sort of thing, how would you describe the atmosphere when you came in both within our delegation and beyond?

BROWN: Well, I came in at about the same time that Roger Kirk, our new ambassador to the IAEA came in. He was a very dynamic and thoughtful ambassador with a very strong background in European, Eastern European and Soviet affairs.

Q: He also had been to Vietnam I think hadn't he?

BROWN: Yes, we had met each other in Vietnam. I think he had been handling external affairs in the embassy when I was there.

Q: Yes, he was there when I was there.

BROWN: The most significant non-proliferation issue that came up during my time at the IAEA was he Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor.

Q: Well, did you find I mean was the organization, was there a lot of as I would think a lot of sort of bureaucratic jockeying, I'm thinking not in our delegation particularly, but in the overall one, I mean more people looking out for titles, jobs, that sort of thing?

BROWN: Oh, within the UN system, there is a great deal of that. Countries naturally look after their nationals in the UN. Countries looking after their particular interests. Our principal interest was to make sure that the safeguards part of the agency's work was as strong as it could possibly be and that we had our people in the key positions to work on safeguards. We also had a strong interest in the IAEA's external affairs and budget offices. We wanted the agency to spend increase funding and resources for safeguards, whereas the LDCs.

Q: Less developed countries?

BROWN: Yes, the LDCs on the board were primarily interested in what the agency could do to help them with development of various kinds of atomic energy programs such as assistance with regulatory matters, medical isotopes, food irradiation, technical assistance and so forth. That's what they wanted the agency to spend its money on. So, there was a constant jockeying between ourselves and those members on how the budget was split up and whether it was going to grow or not grow, and in which areas.

Q: How from our delegation and sort of the point of view in '78, how was nuclear energy viewed at that time?

BROWN: It was very controversial internationally. It just so happened that when I was there, Austria, the host country, was conducting a referendum on nuclear power. They had built a nuclear power station, completed it and then decided to have a referendum on whether or not to operate it. The government was defeated, and they had to mothball the plant without ever having operated it. Sweden was going through the same process. I'm trying to think whether Three Mile Island had happened or not happened at that time.

Q: I think Three Mile Island was around that time. It was of course before Chernobyl, which really put the last nail in the coffin. How did you find, let's say we want to get people into the enforcement side of things. How did you go about doing this and how did we do?

BROWN: I mean there aren't great secrets on this. There is a lot of bargaining that goes on behind the scenes in the agency and a lot depends on making sure that the head of the agency is responsive to American concerns. The U.S. put forward good candidates and talked to director general to get their appointments. The Director General had to take into account the balance of forces within the Board of Governors, to which he was responsible. The Russians had their particular interests, as did the Europeans and others. When we had good candidates for key jobs of interest to us, we were usually successful.

Q: At this particular time the United States and the Soviets in this particular field were pretty much on the same wavelength weren't they?

BROWN: Yes, we were. The real trick was how to coordinate with the developing countries on the board. That meant a lot of consulting, paying attention to what they

wanted, working with them at times to ensure that they in turn did not block our key objectives.

Q: Where did the nuclear powers such as France and Great Britain fall on this thing?

BROWN: They played a major role on the Board of Governors. One key issue during my tenure was pressure from the LDCs for more representation on the Board, which would dilute the strong position which the Western Europe and others group, of which we were a part, had on the Board. We pretty successfully contained that effort. On such issues, the Europeans and ourselves plus the Australians and the Canadians were all pretty much lined up on the same side. It happened that the Secretary to the Board the whole time I was there was a delightful Frenchman with whom I worked very closely. If you wanted things to go smoothly, you had to have his cooperation. He likewise knew that if you wanted things on his board to go smoothly, he didn't want to misjudge where the Americans were coming from.

Q: How was Israel handled at that point?

BROWN: Israel was a constant target of others in the Agency. Their opposition prevented Israel from ever getting on the Board of Governors. So, we ended up speaking for their interests from time to time. That proved to be very awkward, when Israel conducted the preemptive air strike that destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. France had sold the reactor to Iraq. Iraq was a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty and the agency had a safeguards agreement with Iraq that covered the reactor, which at that point was soon to become operational. So you can imagine the outrage over the Israeli attack. There were intense discussions about what position the Board should take concerning the attack. Should the Agency take the lead or was this a matter for the UN Security Council.

Q: Was there the feeling that on the Iraqi side that this reactor and all that was being put up was a legitimate process or was it the feeling that this was going to turn into a weapons producing plant?

BROWN: Well, the reactor was ideally suited for producing weapons grade plutonium and Iraq was seeking to obtain reprocessing equipment from France. That was one perspective. The other was that the reactor was covered by IAEA safeguards, which many saw as making its eventual operation legal. Another question was whether the safeguards were effective. Were the Iraqis declaring the facilities and the material in the facility properly to the agency?

Q: You mentioned in Israel's nuclear program. Could you explain what that was, is and what the agency might be trying to do there?

BROWN: Israel is not a party to the non-proliferation treaty. So the agency didn't have any role there, but that didn't stop countries in the Middle East who were concerned about Israel's nuclear program from asserting that the agency ought to be involved and ought to be going out and trying to clarify what Israel was doing.

Q: How did you find people lined up or countries lined up on this Israel thing? Were we kind of alone?

BROWN: All I remember is that we were successful in preventing the Board from condemning Israel. Just how we got to that outcome I would have to go back and do some checking.

Q: Then did you, how did working in the international organization field, did that interest you or was it an interesting sideline?

BROWN: It was something I was glad that I had done so that I understood the processes and how these organizations functioned and how business got done in them, but it didn't fascinate me enough or entice me to apply for a job at the UN. In fact, quite the opposite. Once was enough.

Q: Well, in a way these things are intensely political. It sounds like working in or being in a legislature of some state or something like that. You're trading, you're working, you're cajoling, the whole thing.

BROWN: Yes.

Q: Well, then you say, '81?

BROWN: '81, yes.

GERALD B. HELMAN
Deputy Head of U.S. Delegation, UN International Conference on Outer Space Vienna (1982)

Gerald B. Helman was born in Michigan in 1932 and received a B.A. and an L.L.B from Michigan University. After entering the Foreign Service in 1956, his postings abroad have included Vienna, Barbados, Brussels, and Geneva. Mr. Helman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

HELMAN: For example I was named deputy head of the U.S. delegation to the second UN world conference on outer-space that took place in Vienna in the summer of ‘82. It was an interesting event that required considerable effort to organize. The U.S. delegation was very large, numbering close to 100 as I recall. There were arms control issues involved, so DOD was represented. So was NASA, of course, and State as well as a variety of agencies with scientific competence. The White House also used the occasion to award politically deserving types, as well as representatives from the private sector. The delegation included Ursula Meese, the wife of Ed Meese, who proved quite helpful. We had a large exhibit in an outer space exposition that accompanied the conference. It

was put together by USIA and attracted participation by Charlie Wick. That was my first exposure to Charlie with whom I worked quite closely later when I got involved with public diplomacy. He carried a certain notoriety, but I liked him.

By the time I returned from Vienna, Larry Eagleburger was Undersecretary for Political Affairs, as I recall, and Larry had his own way of organizing things. I had gotten to know Larry quite well as his deputy when he was political adviser to the U.S. mission to NATO back in the early '70s. Larry had created a couple of positions which he called deputy to the undersecretary of state for political affairs, and I took one of them. So I embarked on a variety of activities that had fairly sizeable scope. I was able to function reasonably well within the Department and national security bureaucracy generally from that position. I remained in that job basically throughout much of the '80s.

Q: So we'll pick this up in late '81 when you came back, and you'd mentioned that you were dealing with outer-space. We might talk about if there are any issues there that were of interest and then we'll talk about when you were working with Larry Eagleburger in political affairs and all of that.

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I'm not sure where we left off so we are going to start with your Washington assignment in '81. How did you leave Geneva in '82?

HELMAN: *(laughs)* I hope not in disgrace. I was assigned to Geneva somewhat short of two years and I was the first non-political appointee to that job as ambassador to the UN there. I did not expect to be retained by the new administration and of course I was not. The first rumored replacement was Senator Javits, who at that time either had retired or was about to retire from the Senate because of illness. He had something similar to Lou Gehrig's Disease that gradually diminished his ability to move - it was a muscular disease. His name was withdrawn and I was not surprised; I had visited him in New York and clearly physically he was incapable of performing. Then they replaced me later that year with Geoff Swaebe - he also was subsequently our ambassador in Belgium.

In any event that was life in the Foreign Service and I came back to Washington sometime in the second half of 1981 with no particular assignment, no specific assignment, and I was lodged rather handsomely on the first floor where the transition team ordinarily is lodged. The first rather interesting job I had was to organize, manage, and participate in the second UN international conference on outer-space. I knew a bit about that from earlier assignments, and I certainly knew how to manage our participation in UN conferences. Reagan's NASA Administrator, Jim Beggs, was the head of delegation. He was a solid fellow, an engineer with a successful career in the private sector. The conference was in Vienna and I knew Vienna and the Austrian conference organizers from an earlier Foreign Service assignment And I knew the issues. It was a conference in which the United States had no particular substantive interest but it was a good way of demonstrating our competence in outer-space. There was the usual

competition with the Russians. So this took a good bit of time over the course of three or four months, beginning in early ’82.

Q: I would think that we were sort of preeminent in space, so that we would have an issue there.

HELMAN: Well, we didn’t have any substantive issues at stake, though we wanted, first, no damaging decision, and, second, some reasonably positive conference statements. There was an outer-space exhibition in connection with the conference. We also had a former astronaut on the delegation, I think it was Chuck Schmidt, who later was a Senator from Arizona or New Mexico. Great guy and a big hit with other delegates. He was very generous with photos and autographs. In those days, it was still a big deal to say you had met with a man who had been on the moon. We had that. There were a number of issues that were on the agenda on the future uses of outer-space, none of them were difficult to manage.

Q: Nobody was challenging putting up satellites and things like that? Because that would’ve cut to the quick.

HELMAN: No, it wasn’t that. The Conference was one in a series of UN activities that promoted the peaceful uses of outer-space. The exploration and use of outer space, almost by the laws of physics, is a global activity, one that inevitably attracts the interest, opposition, help, cupidity and contributions of other countries. The UN served as a forum through which to channel a lot of this and make sure the interests of others were benign or even positive in their expression. If you look back to the record of the UN’s actions on outer-space, they involved the Outer-Space Treaty, that probably remains a keystone of international law to the extent that it governs the uses of outer-space both for military and commercial purposes. So that has been a useful document and still pertains and still sets the standard. There were some follow-on treaties dealing with the safety and rescue of astronauts in distress and responsibility for damage caused by de-orbiting space objects. So the United Nations had a historic role and the United States would certainly not contest that historic role.

Q: Were you picking up any of the contempt for the United Nations that was one of the themes that ran through the early Reagan administration?

HELMAN: To some extent. There was some considerable initial debate in the Administration on whether the US should participate. This was before I got involved, though I speculate that there was concern that the Conference would somehow deprive us of something important. Once we decided to go, there was precious little time to pull together position papers, assemble a delegation and find the money to design and mount an exhibit. I probably was pulled in because they were desperate to find someone who at least pretended to know what he was doing. In the event, the Conference was pretty much a celebration of outer-space and our contributions to its development. There were some military issues, some arms control issues, but those were fairly easily dealt with.

Q: But what you're saying about the delegation, including the wife of the attorney general, it sounds like it was sort of a nice thing to go to. (laughs)

HELMAN: Sure, it was in Vienna. *(laughs)* One of the hottest summers anyone could recall in Vienna. And little air conditioning. But we survived. It was nice. It was nicely done and the delegation seemed reasonably happy with the results. Ours was a huge delegation, close to 100 people.

Q: And something like that, as sort of the top professional person, did you find you're having to ride herd or something like that?

HELMAN: I managed. I had a fair amount of credibility with everybody. I think they understood that I probably knew more than they were ever going to learn. I got a lot of support from our delegation chief, Jim Beggs. All the career people from NASA, from DOD, from State, who were on the delegation were very cooperative. My main management problem was how to have all of the many delegation members feel they were participating but keeping them away from the controversial issues or those that involved sensitive material. Not too many of the delegation members had security clearances, as far as I recall. I organized a technique for keeping everybody informed. Rather than hold delegation meetings where some of the sensitive issues might be raised, and from which I would have to exclude most of the delegation, I simply put together a small team with which I would consult and discuss, off-line, the classified issues that were of concern. But in terms of a formal structure of the delegation, everybody was a part of the team; everybody was welcome. Every morning everybody had a chance to talk. It worked. My recollection is - and it's been a number of years - that people were satisfied; they felt they were participants, they felt they were playing a role. We had the usual receptions and there was our outer space exhibit.

Q: Did you find yourself also acting a certain amount as a teacher or missionary and other to this disparate group, you know, saying international relations matter, the United Nations matter?

HELMAN: Yes, certainly I was doing that but it was not as if I had to take the initiative to overcome a palpable sense of opposition. Most of the people were fine. They were good American citizens; they wanted to do a good job for their country. They recognized that this is what we were involved in and they certainly were going to be on their best behavior with foreign nationals. There was an outer-space exposition associated with it that showed the glory of the U.S. and its achievements in outer-space. There was a competition with the Soviet Union that always excites enthusiasm and cooperation on the part of the Americans. I think they accorded me a fair amount of respect with my background and my knowledge. They were eager to learn whatever I had to say about the UN and the conference. I don't think I had any opposition, any backlash in terms of negotiations, in terms of procedure, organization of the delegation. I tried to make it as inclusive as possible.

Obviously when it got down to the nitty-gritty in some negotiations towards the end, I handled that personally. I didn't take along teams of people with me. I had the information I needed and I usually included one or two others from the delegation. I knew the subject matter fairly well so I was fairly confident. We weren't dealing with the kind of high profile issues where we had to have a decision by the National Security Council.

Q: Did the rivalry with the Soviet Union show up in any of this?

HELMAN: Well, in a couple of substantive issues, but mostly in the exposition; you know, we're better than you are. But they had a very fine display, the Soviets. As did we, as did France, as did some others. It was fine. The Austrians enjoyed putting on these kinds of shows and we participated. I think my only complaint was we got started late on our exhibit because of indecision over whether to participate in the conference so didn't commit quite enough money to put up the kind of exposition that we should have. But we still did a good job.

JOHN A. BUCHE
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
Vienna (1989-1992)

Born and raised in Indiana, Mr. Burch studied at St. Meinrad Seminary, Purdue University and the University of Tubingen, Germany. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service, where he served primarily in African countries, including Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger and Zambia. Other assignments took Mr. Buche to Canada, Germany, Austria and Switzerland as well as to the State Department in Washington. He was an Amharic language specialist.

BUCHE: To 1992 with the Mission. Then I retired.

Q: *What were you doing there?*

BUCHE: I was the DCM at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The agencies for which we were responsible were the Vienna-based UN organizations. These were the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the formal name for the agency responsible for the care and maintenance of the Palestinian refugees who had fled or been expelled from Israel beginning in 1948, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). We also had responsibilities for the UN Women's Commission and the UN Drug Agency. There were some smaller offices, but our main business was with the above-mentioned organizations.

Q: *What was your main job?*

BUCHE: The main job was helping Ambassador Michael Newlin run the Mission. There were a dozen officers and support staff assigned to the Mission. Mike wanted me to handle the administration and personnel issues, and to be the focal point for official visitors and to monitor incoming cables, and to work with the various officers in drafting/editing our reporting cables. Since I had responsibility for all of the Vienna-based agencies when I was in Washington, I knew them quite well. I had more political, financial, and institutional expertise than the staff at the Vienna Mission or my replacement as the IO/T Office Director, Tom Martin. Accordingly, I could work confidently with the officers in Vienna or Washington. Admittedly, I did not have the technical expertise of the nuclear scientists and technicians seconded to the IAEA from the US Department of Energy. They had the technical background, and I provided the political guidance.

Since the Cold War was coming to an end and the Iron Curtain was crumbling, there were large numbers of official visitors coming to Vienna from Washington. I believe many of our visitors had themselves accredited to a UN conference or study group, so they could take the opportunity to visit Prague or Budapest from Vienna. Unless the visitors were Congressmen or Senators, or high-ranking State Department officials, Mike Newlin asked me to take care of them. (Accordingly, I made many trips with the visitors over the weekends to Prague and Budapest.) Some of the most demanding delegations were those for the annual meetings of the UN Women's Commission. The delegations were completely female and were selected by the White House as rewards for political contributions in behalf of President Bush. The visiting women attended all the sessions (from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M), but looked forward to the evening or weekend activities. We were asked to obtain opera tickets, reservations to some of the best restaurants, and to make arrangements for excursions to Budapest and Prague. I was requested to accompany them to Budapest. Fortunately, the State Department sent along a seasoned professional, Sharon Kotok, to help the Mission on the substantive business of the Commission, namely to prepare for the Cairo Conference on Women and Children. Sharon, Greg Sprow, the Mission officer responsible for the Commission, the Ambassador, and I did whatever was required to carry out our policy objectives for Cairo.

Michael Newlin had been the Principal DAS in Consular Affairs before his Vienna assignment. Before that, he was at the United Nations as the DCM to the Ambassador, the Permanent Representative. During most of Newlin's posting to the UN, the Permanent Representative was George Bush. So he was on very good terms with President Bush.

Ambassador Newlin chose me, in part, because we got along together very well on both a personal and professional basis, as he was being briefed by my staff and myself in Washington in preparation for taking charge of the Mission. Once he was installed in Vienna, he appreciated the way I supported the Mission. Also, I had an excellent reputation from my previous experiences as a DCM. So when Mike considered the various candidates proposed to him by the Foreign Service Personnel Office as his DCM, he quickly settled on me. Mike headed a successful, proactive, and dedicated team. It was also a happy and cohesive group of professionals. Vienna, from my first days there, was

my most enjoyable and interesting posting since Addis Ababa. For professional, cultural, and family reasons, it was the zenith of my Foreign Service career.

Q: *You had been involved in budget paring. What was your impression of the UN agencies that your mission was representing? How were they run?*

BUCHE: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was considered one of the best run of all the agencies. It was an independent agency that was an absolute necessity because of the Cold War. Its purpose was twofold: to inspect for violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to provide technical assistance for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was one of the few international agencies where the Soviets, Chinese, Americans, Brits and others would really concentrate on the business at hand. It was to the major powers' interests that the agency be well-run and highly professional. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was temporarily located in Vienna. The UNRWA headquarters was moved to Vienna from Beirut because of the security situation in Lebanon. (In the late 1990s, the headquarters was moved to Amman, Jordan.) I was responsible for UNRWA matters between 1984-87, when I was in RP. I had visited the camps and met on several occasions with the UNRWA leadership. A career Italian diplomat, Giacomelli, was the Director General, and a distinguished Foreign Service Officer and former Ambassador to Syria and Algeria, Bill Eagleton, was his deputy. It was a huge agency with over two million refugees in its care in five different countries. The leadership had to walk a narrow line because of the political sensitivities of the refugees and the host countries. An ongoing problem was the constant need to obtain more funding from the donors to provide the refugees with education and health care, and for some of the particularly vulnerable, food and shelter. We were impressed with the ability of Giacomelli and Eagleton to keep the many disputes, protests, and demonstrations localized and eventually to work out solutions. We did not like UNIDO's performance when I was in Washington, and when I was in Vienna and saw the organization and its newly-elected Director General, Domingo Siazon, up close, my evaluation was confirmed.

Q: *UNIDO being -*

BUCHE: United Nations Industrial Development Organization. The Reagan Administration and Alan Keyes were determined to get rid of the previous head of UNIDO, an Algerian named Abdul Rahman Kahane. He was a strong advocate of socialism as the preferred system for the development of industry in the third-world. Our chosen candidate was the Philippine Ambassador to Vienna, Domingo Siazon. He was an outspoken advocate of capitalism and was favorably disposed toward the United States. Our Embassy in Manila had worked with him and gave him rave reviews. The UNIDO election was hard fought and bitter. The Kahane had strong support from most of the Africans, some Middle Eastern countries, the USSR and Eastern Europe, plus France and a few Scandinavians. We (and the Philippines) lined up the Latins, some of the Middle East and Africa, and all of Asia. For Keyes and the White House, the battle was ideological. Our Mission Vienna had the task of much of the day-to-day campaigning. The Algerian was not a good manager, regardless of his political leanings, so that was an

effective talking point. UNIDO fell into even greater disarray as the campaign progressed. The final tally was close, but Siazon won. There were strong feelings and much bitterness within the organization and in the Vienna embassies and missions over the election. Many of Kahane's supporters were waiting for Siazon to make a serious mistake in order to pounce.

After Siazon won, he replaced many of the top officials in UNIDO. Because of the UN staff regulations, the buy-outs were quite costly. The US decided to give a little extra money to make up for some of the funds lost when the member states supporting the Algerian cut back on their contributions. (Funding for UNIDO was voluntary.) Siazon decided that he had to mend fences with some of the third-world countries which had supported Abdul Rahman Kahane, so he offered jobs to their nationals, although their qualifications were weak. He also gave some study or feasibility contracts to politically important persons. He brought in a dozen Philippine nationals (about half in staff-support jobs). Siazon's wife obtained a job with the IAEA. It was widely assumed in Vienna that he used his influence in her behalf. Despite the poor condition of the organization when Siazon took over, there was the expectation that after a year of transition, he and the new team would put UNIDO on the right track. We expected Siazon's principal deputy (an American, the brother of Senator Warner of Virginia) to play a major role on the administrative side. Unfortunately, there was no quick turn around in UNIDO. (I came into IO/T at this point.)

Our mission was quite aware of what was happening and reported accurately, not only on what was happening in UNIDO, but about the hypercritical attitudes of the diplomats in Vienna. When IO had to make cuts, there was no way we could justify exempting UNIDO from a heavy hit. Siazon was "our man", but he was failing in our eyes to manage the organization the way we expected. That may have been an impossible task for Siazon, given the prior history of the organization, but when forced to choose between such well-run and vital organizations such as the IAEA, ITU, WHO, and a few others and UNIDO, the latter had to be put in the lowest category. Of course, word got out that the USG was cutting back on its usual voluntary contribution to UNIDO. That made Siazon's task even harder. Ambassador Newlin in Vienna and we in Washington spoke with Siazon and with Warner about what we wanted, but only part of our message sank in. The organization was drifting. We wanted greater transparency in the financial aspects of UNIDO. We wanted the operational funds to go for real market feasibility studies, and not for "pay-off" writings that had no value. We proposed that a few additional experienced Americans in key middle-manager jobs would help. We were paying roughly a quarter of the budget and wanted more positions, something between ten and fifteen percent of the professional slots. Congress was quite insistent that American representation in UN bodies be roughly proportionate to our contributions. The rule of thumb was that we should have about ten percent less in jobs than our percentage contribution. Under the Algerian, almost all the Americans had practically been squeezed out of the organization. When Siazon took over, we had around seven percent of the positions. We thought it was catch-up time. Despite offering some well-qualified candidates, we were turned down in most cases. Siazon used the vacated slots to hire his own preferences. As I mentioned above, these persons were only minimally qualified.

Our criticism of Siazon was both very parochial on the jobs issue, as well as broader on the achievement of the goals and objectives of the organization.

When I went to Vienna, I was determined to be objective in reporting on UNIDO. I could see mitigating circumstances for Siazon's actions and appreciated the Mission's nuanced reporting. There were, however, some decisions (and statements) by Siazon that bothered the Ambassador and me. We were finding ourselves in the difficult and uncomfortable position of defending the Siazon and Warner against the criticism of the Europeans, particularly the French, Belgians, and Nordics, when we, too, were critical of what was happening. The longer I stayed, the more critical I became. I learned so much of the inside, day-to-day activities of the organization from our superb Mission UNIDO officer, Greg Sprow. He was observant, had developed valuable contacts, and could communicate so clearly. Mike Newlin was more patient, but he, too, eventually realized that Siazon was falling down in the job and that the USG had made a mistake in pushing his candidacy.

The Europeans were really honing in on UNIDO. They uncovered some uses of small discretionary funds and some procurement policies that were not clearly illegal, but did not pass the "smell" test. Siazon apparently had decided to mend his fences with the African embassies, but not with the Europeans. He was like a ward politician. He calculated who could be bought off and who could be ignored. He put the Europeans in the latter category.

The first major confrontation developed over UNIDO's decision to upgrade the computer capabilities of the organization. They had several systems of computers, and they did not function as a network. Siazon and Warner, along with some in-house advisers decided to purchase a big mainframe computer. To make the US happy, they chose an IBM. There were many computer specialists inside and outside the organization who were saying that a large mainframe was not the way to go. It was not only too expensive, but using PC's was the wave of the future. Siazon was not technically minded, and his insistence on a large mainframe seemed to be rooted in wanting a machine as large as the IAEA's computer. (The IAEA, as an organization dealing with nuclear issues, needed a large mainframe.) There was no need for UNIDO to have a mainframe for 99% of its tasks. If there were a need now and then, UNIDO could make arrangements to lease time on the IAEA machine, since the two organizations were in the same building. UNIDO's plans were attacked by the Europeans as financially and technically unsound. We were caught in a bind. We had to defend Siazon, Warner, and IBM. When Siazon and Warner insisted on moving forward with the IBM purchase despite the European objections, the Europeans were enraged. They threatened to withdraw funding, and eventually forced Siazon to agree to a re-study of the issue. Outside consultants (including some Americans) were brought in, and they recommended going the PC route. UNIDO had no choice but to comply. Warner worked out a deal with IBM that resulted in only a nominal penalty for voiding the contract. The entire affair was embarrassing to us. We had to use so much good will and "political capital" to save Siazon from being publicly censured and forced out of office. Although he survived, his reputation in Vienna was tarnished, and UNIDO as an institution suffered. Canada announced that it was leaving the

organization and gave the necessary one-year's notice. Australia and Belgium threatened to follow.

We were in the awkward position of defending our protégé, Siazon, when we, too, had lost trust in him. He seemed to be oblivious to criticism from the USG or the Europeans. Washington was by now also quite concerned because of the financial condition of UNIDO. Washington was afraid that we would have to contribute more than our customary amount to keep the organization afloat. (UNIDO was supported almost entirely from voluntary contributions, and the Europeans had reduced their funding to show their displeasure at Siazon.) Several officials came from Washington to see at first hand what could be done. I hosted a lunch for the officials and Siazon. Siazon came a few minutes late. He explained that he was on the phone with his personal banker and was delighted to announce that he had just made several thousand dollars profit from a speculation involving a foreign exchange transaction. Although there was nothing illegal about what he had done, it was so incongruous to us that he would boast about a personal speculative gain when his organization was making plans for layoffs because of financial difficulties and he was asking the USG to increase its voluntary funding of UNIDO.

The Europeans did not give up their efforts to force out Siazon. We decided that we were not going to waste any more capital propping up the institution by increasing our funding or defending the indefensible. Siazon saw the handwriting on the wall and resigned to become the Philippine Ambassador to Japan. (He had served there before, had a Japanese wife, and spoke Japanese.) When the Philippine Government changed, he left Japan to become the Foreign Minister. Apparently his mismanagement of UNIDO had no effect on his subsequent career. Mike Newlin and I had to spend so much time on UNIDO that we sometimes delegated responsibilities to other members of our staff for carrying out a few tasks with the IAEA or UNRWA that perhaps should have been handled by us. Of course, that all changed with the Gulf War.

Q: *Aha.*

BUCHE: The Gulf War catapulted the International Atomic Energy Agency into strategic importance. The UN Security Council gave the IAEA the responsibility to conduct the inspection missions in Iraq to determine the status of that country's nuclear program. Our Mission was the focal point for carrying out Washington's instructions for discussions and negotiations with Hans Blix, the Director General, and the other top officials of the IAEA regarding the mandated inspections. Our Mission staff was augmented by two officers from the CIA and several nuclear-detection specialists from the Department of Energy. They provided us with the technical expertise we needed in our discussions with the IAEA on the modalities, interpretation of findings, communications, security, logistics, and other aspects involving the inspections. Our reports of the meetings with the IAEA were read by the top policy makers in Washington and shared with our Coalition Partners. (For the sake of efficiency and clarity of purpose, Washington obtained the concurrence of our major Coalition Partners that the US Mission in Vienna would be the focal point for discussions with the IAEA on the inspections.) The IAEA was sending its own reports to the UN Secretary General of the discussions. To avoid any

confusion or misunderstandings in the reporting by the IAEA or ourselves, we informally compared notes at the conclusion of each of our discussions. The inspections took place, and the results were spectacular. The IAEA team discovered the secret laboratories and the infrastructure used by the Iraqis to construct nuclear weapons. The conclusions of the IAEA were that the Iraqis were about a year away from their first bomb. The IAEA had the mandate from the UN Security Council not only to seek out the clandestine nuclear program and to report on the findings, but also to destroy the Iraqi capabilities to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. The IAEA succeeded brilliantly. The Security Council accepted the report by the IAEA that the Iraqi program had been uncovered and dismantled. The inspections by other organizations for chemical and biological weapons in Iraq were not so successful and thus were not accepted as conclusive by the UNSC. The success of the IAEA resulted from many factors. First of all, the IAEA was a superb organization and organized the inspection teams carefully. The IAEA inspection teams were augmented by some outside specialists and helped by intelligence data from several major powers, including the Soviets, and the USA. Also, the nature of constructing a nuclear weapon required larger facilities and more machinery than would be required for chemical or biological weapons. Thus, the facilities would be harder to hide. Washington was paying close attention to the developments over the six months of the various IAEA inspections. We received daily telephone calls and cables from Washington. I know on three occasions, President Bush himself phoned Ambassador Newlin to discuss the inspections. Our IAEA reporting was commended frequently by Washington.

After the IAEA inspections were completed, Ambassador Newlin decided to retire. He had done a superb job and had also thoroughly enjoyed his tour of duty in Vienna. With his friendship with President Bush and his excellent professional credentials, he could have asked for and received another ambassadorship, but he and his wife, Milena, wanted to enjoy their retirement. They had a daughter in the Washington area, and wanted to see her more often. I was the chargé ad interim for a month, and then the new Ambassador, Jane Becker, arrived. She came from IO, where she was the principal DAS. We got along quite well together. There were no major crises involving our organizations in the time we were together. After the UNIDO debacles and the strategic demands in connection with the Iraqi inspections by the IAEA, I was pleased with this relatively calm period. My successor, Tom Martin from IO/T, arrived at post in August 1992, so I handed over to him my office and my responsibilities. I formally retired from the Department of State on September 30, 1992, after thirty three years in the Foreign Service. My career was exciting, challenging, and successful, but above all, interesting and fulfilling.

After I retired, Anike and I found a small, furnished apartment near St. Stephan's Cathedral. She continued working with the Representative of the Department of Defense to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I went to the University of Vienna as a post-graduate student in a special course on Eastern Europe and the European Union. Given my diplomatic background, I was asked by the Chairman of the International Relations Faculty, Professor Neuhaus, to mentor three students from the Baltics. They were on a scholarship given by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was delighted to help them during the year, and in doing so, we developed friendships. I also had become a member of one of the most prestigious choirs in Vienna, the

Augustinerchor (Choir of St. Augustine). I now had time to take special singing lessons and devote the necessary hours to private practice and group rehearsals. Our son, John, moved to Vienna upon his graduation from Northwestern University, so we were with him again. In July 1993, Anike and I departed Vienna for me to take a position (pro bono) as an Adjunct Professor of History at St. Meinrad College. I returned to the institution, which had meant so much to me in my formative teenage years. I was invited to return by my former classmate, Bob Sweeney, now Archabbot Timothy, O.S.B.

End of reader